

Constructing Victims: Reconceptualizing Identity and the Genocidal Process

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1. Introduction

The fundamental question at the heart of genocide studies is simply why does something so appalling as genocide happen? To answer this larger question we need to ask and answer three subsidiary questions: 1) where does the idea to commit genocide come from?; 2) why does genocide happen when it happens?; and most importantly for this paper, 3) why do political elites choose to exterminate whole groups of people simply because of who they are? Taken together the answer to these three questions constitute a unified constructivist (and comparative) theory of genocide. This paper will outline the entire theory, but will concentrate on the answer to the final question of why and how elites choose the “policy option” of planning and executing the annihilation of a specific segment of society, usually in response to a series of destabilizing changes and crises.

The theory of genocide suggested here is that genocide, as opposed to other forms of political violence, conflict, mass death or gross human rights violations, is the result of a specific “permissive” political culture (the source of the idea to commit genocide; the answer to question one) and a set of long-term destabilizing changes and short-term crises (the trigger for genocide; the answer to question two), all of which set the stage for the reconceptualization, first by radical political elites and then the majority society, of the identity, interests and perceived future actions of the victim group (the process by which genocide becomes the “policy option” of elite political actors; the answer to question three). Using elements of constructivist social theory and political psychology it will be argued that in a reconceptualization process that is unique to genocide, the victim group comes to be seen as a dangerous “enemy within” whose mere physical existence is believed to pose a mortal threat to the continued survival of the dominant community. With the victim group so conceived, the only perceived recourse left for political elites is the physical liquidation of the group.

The following essay will begin with a brief discussion of how genocide will be defined in this study. The first three variables of the theory (political culture, structural changes and crises)

will briefly outlined, followed by a longer discussion of how these background variables set the stage for the reconceptualization of the victim group. The paper will conclude with an analysis of the nature of the reconceptualization process.

2. Defining genocide

Although genocide scholars and legal experts have expended much time and energy trying to define genocide, there is still much debate over what constitutes genocide and which instances of gross human rights abuses should be classified as such. Beginning with the coining of the term “genocide” by the legal scholar Raphael Lemkin in 1944¹, to the promulgation of the UN Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in 1948 through to today, legal and academic scholars have failed to reach a consensus as to what exactly genocide is both conceptually and practically. For the sake of brevity this lengthy admittedly important debates will not be reviewed here. However, it must be acknowledged that the gravity of labelling certain acts of mass killing and cruelty as genocide has imbued the term with enormous normative weight. As such, debates over the use and abuse of the label are often emotionally charged. In the very legitimate quest to validate their own suffering and to draw public attention to it, victims of gross human rights abuses and other wrongs have increasingly labelled their own experience as genocide even though what has happened to them often seriously stretches legal or scholarly definitions of genocide. On the other side, victims of unequivocal genocides, specifically the Holocaust, argue that any dilution of the definition of genocide is an insult to the unique suffering of survivors and the memory of those who died. Some Holocaust survivors and scholars go further and argue that the destruction of European Jewry by Nazi Germany is a

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Lemkin coined the term genocide in his 1944 study *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (New York: H.Fertig, 1973 [c.1944]) and based the term on the ancient Greek *genos* meaning “race” or “tribe”, and the Latin *cide* or “killing”.

catastrophe without equal and is not comparable to any other instances of state-sponsored mass murder, and therefore is not covered by the collective term genocide².

For the present study a relatively narrow definition of genocide will be employed that is based on the Un Convention definition³ but is expanded to allow for a wider range of victim groups. It also conceptualizes genocide as qualitatively different from all other forms of state-sponsored violence. Genocide is here defined as *the actual or attempted intentional, systematic physical or biological destruction of the members of a group as defined by the perpetrator authorized and/or directed by a state or comparable authority*.

Intentionality is emphasized because genocide is not simply killing as a means of repressing a group of people or killing of an adversary in a conflict in which both sides possess some form of offensive and defensive capabilities. Nor is genocide a means to a political or military end or a method of collective punishment for real illegal acts (although allegations of such crimes are often made by the perpetrators). As well, modern twentieth century genocides typically transcended conflicts over “real” things such as territorial, political or economic control, although pre-genocide tensions and conflicts have often involved real and perceived struggles over resources. Finally, genocide is not an accidental or unintended consequence of some other kind of military action or political policy. Rather the killing is an end in itself. It is an attempt to physically eliminate an innocent, defenceless group of people who are targeted for who they are and not because of the power they really possess or what they have done⁴.

² See, for example, Yehuda Bauer’s recent work “Rethinking the Holocaust”(Yale University Press, 2001),1-67. The Hebrew word for the destruction of European Jewry, *shoah*, literally means “the catastrophe”.

³ Article II of the Convention states that genocide “means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups as such [through]: a) killing members of the group; b)causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; c)deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; e)forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. United Nation Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, United Nations, 9, December 1948, UN International Law Commission Report, Chapter II, Article 19.

⁴ There is, of course, a huge debate among genocide scholars about whether intention should be included in a definition of genocide or whether genocide should be defined only according to outcomes; i.e. the mass death of large numbers of often innocent defenseless people. For the former view see, for example, Chalk and Jonassohn who use the phrase “intent to destroy”(The History and Sociology of Genocide, New Haven, Yale

Emphasis is also placed on the systematic nature of genocide, again because the killing is intentional, but also because it is organized. We must be clear that genocide is not a spontaneous act of irrational mob or “tribal” violence. It is not a random event that is committed without reason, direction or a clear objective.

Genocide is also defined here as consisting of only physical and biological destruction of the victim group. In his critique of the idea of cultural genocide, Irving Horowitz rightly points out that what he calls “symbolic” genocides are, at least in principle, reversible, while “actual” genocides, which involve real deaths, are not since the killing is the “final event”. Horowitz aptly suggests that the study of genocide “show what separates death, the ultimate punishment allowing no rectification or correction, from all other forms of victimization, where, in theory at least, recovery if not redemption is possible”⁵.

Following the definition offered by Chalk and Jonassohn⁶ the identity of the victim group has been left to the perpetrators since in reality it is they who choose their victims, define their alleged characteristics and draw the boundary between the victim group and the rest of society. By not limiting the identity of the victim group we can acknowledge the victimization of

University Press, 1990, 23) in their definition of genocide. Helen Fein strongly endorses a key role for intent and refers to the “purposeful action by a perpetrator to physically destroy a collectivity” discerned through a pattern of purposeful action (*Genocide: A Sociological Perspective*, London: Sage, 1993), while Steven Katz suggests that genocides occurs only when there is an “actualized intent” to physically destroy an entire group (*The Holocaust in Historical Perspective*, New York: Oxford University Press). For the latter view see Israel Charny who stresses in his definition of genocide the causing of death to defenseless people. He deliberately leaves out the issue of intent not only for methodological reasons but also because he believes that to argue that the causing of mass death to innocents is not genocide is morally inappropriate. Charny thus defines genocide “in the generic sense” as the “mass killing of substantial numbers of human beings, when not in the course of military forces of an avowed enemy, under conditions of the essential defenselessness and helplessness of the victims” See Israel Charny’s “Toward a Generic Definition of Genocide” in George Andreopoulos and Lorn Shirinian (eds), *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).

⁵ See Horowitz, *Taking Lives: Genocide and State Power*, Fourth Edition, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997), 41.

⁶ Chalk and Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, 23.

political groups and whole socio-economic classes in the past as well as the targeting of other groups who may become victims of genocide in the future⁷.

A relatively narrow definition of genocide is preferable for the purpose of constructing a comparative analysis because it avoids two key problems cited by political scientist Giovanni Sartori that inhibit effective case selection and comparison. The first problem associated with open-ended definitions of concepts is that of “degreeism”. Sartori identifies degreeism as the “abuse (uncritical use) of the maxim that differences in kind are best conceived as differences of degree”⁸. For Sartori the result of degreeism is either the inclusion of what are fundamentally different kinds of cases under one definition, or the exclusion of an equally large and differentiated number of cases along a continuum “whose cut off points are stipulated arbitrarily and can, therefore, be moved around at whim”⁹.

The second problem is what Sartori refers to as “concept stretching” in which definitions are so loosely defined as to apply to an unwieldy variety of quite dissimilar cases”¹⁰. Both of these problems are present in several definitions of genocide, particularly those that seek to expand the definition to draw attention to other instances of gross human rights abuses. While perhaps understandable from a normative point of view, expanding the definition of genocide to such a degree robs the concept of any real meaning. As Helen Fein has warned, when genocide is used to decry such diverse phenomena as abortion, bisexuality, suburbanisation, and dieting as well as

⁷ The Convention definition has been criticized, correctly, for restricting the recognized victims of genocide to racial, national, ethnical, and religious groups. However in the April 2004 conviction and sentencing of General Radislav Krstic for “aiding and abetting genocide” in the slaughter of approximately 7000 Muslim men and teenaged boys in Srebrenica in July 1995, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ruled that the crime of genocide can be applied to cover, in this case, men only, rather than all ages and both sexes within a victim group. The court rejected Krstic’s appeal that the numbers killed at Srebrenica were “too insignificant” to be genocide. “War Crimes Case Widens ‘Genocide’”, BBC News On-line, <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk>, downloaded 5/8/2004 12:38.

⁸ Giovanni Sartori, “Comparing and Miscomparing”, *Journal of Theoretical Research*, Vol.3, No.3, 1991, 248.

⁹ Ibid., 249.

¹⁰ Ibid., 249.

massacres and pogroms we “work and act in a public arena in which the term ‘genocide’ [is] so debased by semantic stretch that it stirs suspicion. Virtually everything but genocide...is called genocide!”¹¹ Although a limited definition will by necessity leave out several cases of state-sponsored mass killing, death and other atrocities, it will help ensure that what we compare are instances of exactly the same phenomenon. The subsequent comparisons we make will be valid and can reasonably be generalized to other instances of genocide.

3. Political culture, structural change, crisis and the construction of victims

To date, most of the genocide literature has been written by historians or specialists of specific genocides who have focussed quite ably in many cases on the analysis of individual cases of genocide¹². While vital, such studies do not, however, *explain why*, in general, genocide occurs and, more importantly, how such atrocities can be prevented in the future. The more comparative works of social scientists but also some historians have linked genocide variously to the advent of modernity¹³, radical, revolutionary and/or racist political ideologies¹⁴,

¹¹ Helen Fein, “Genocide, Terror, Life Integrity, and War Crimes: The Case for Discrimination” in George Andreopoulos(ed), *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*, (University of Pennsylvania Press), 96.

¹² On the Holocaust a very few examples include Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust*, (F. Watts,1982); Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945*, (Bantam Books,1975); Raul Hilberg, *The Destruction of the European Jews*, Third Edition, (Yale University Press, 2003); Christopher R. Browning, *The Path to Genocide: Essays on the Launching of the Final Solution*, (Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the Armenian genocide see Vahakn Dadrian’s *The History of the Armenian Genocide: Ethnic Conflict from the Balkans to Anatolia to the Caucasus*, (Berghahn Books, 1995); Richard G. Hovannisian, *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, and Ethics*, (Macmillan, 1992); and Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris*, (HarperCollins, 2003). For Cambodia see David Chandler, *Pol Pot Plans the Future*, (Yale University Press, Southeast Asian Studies, 1988); Ben Kiernan, *The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia*, (Yale University Press, 1996); Michael Vickery, *Cambodia 1975-1982*, (Silkworm Books, 1999). On the 1994 genocide in Rwanda see Alison Des Forges, *Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide in Rwanda*, (Human Rights Watch, 1999); Philip Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families*, (Picador USA,1999); Gerard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of Genocide*, (Hurst, 1997); Romeo A. Dallaire, *Shake Hands With The Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, (Random House Canada, 2003).

¹³ Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

¹⁴ Robert Melson, *Revolution and Genocide: On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the Holocaust* (University of Chicago Press, 1992); Eric D. Weitz, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*, (Princeton University Press, 2003).

totalitarianism¹⁵ or the absence of liberal democracy¹⁶, the role of and interaction between social groups (both victims and perpetrators) in the genocidal process¹⁷, or the psychology or social-psychology of individual actors and society¹⁸. While many of these theories cover several important preconditions for genocide - political culture, a history of inter-group tension and conflict, political, economic, or military upheavals, radical, racist, and/or utopian ideologically driven revolutions that call for the creation of “new” and “pure” societies through the destruction of suspect or superfluous groups - the precise manner in which preconditions influence elite decision-making and the exact process by which the decision to commit genocide is made remains under-theorized albeit not completely unexplored. It is these lacunae that this paper is meant to address.

To construct a truly comparative and comprehensive theory of genocide we need to more clearly define the variables at play and set out the relationship between these variables. Variables should be general, rather than based on specific cases, without being so general as to bear no resemblance to any one individual case. As suggested earlier, each variable must also address certain key questions, namely; where does the idea to commit genocide come from?; why does genocide happen when it happens?; and why is genocide, as opposed to some other form of violence or oppression, the policy option of elites. A comprehensive theory of genocide also requires that we problematize the relationship between collective actors; that is, perpetrators (i.e. the state), bystanders (the dominant society), and the victim group, rather than concentrate

¹⁵ Irving Horowitz, *Taking Lives*, 1997.

¹⁶ R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government*, (Transaction Publishers, 1994).

¹⁷ Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust*, (Free Press, 1979); Also see Fein's *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London: Sage, 1993).

¹⁸ Wilhelmus Petrus du Preez, *Genocide: The Psychology of Mass Murder*, (Boyers/Bowerdan, 1994); Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Psychological and Cultural Origins of Genocide and Other Forms of Group Violence*, (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

simply on the actions of one or more of these groups exclusively. Finally, we must problematise the connection between structure (material and ideational) and agency.

It is argued here that the key variables that lead to genocide are: a) a specific “permissive” political culture; b) long-term destabilizing structural changes; c) short-term crises; and d) the reconceptualization of the identity of the victim group by political elites and receptive majority society.

The first two variables, the permissive political culture and long-term destabilizing changes, constitute the background to genocide. The permissive political culture provides the conceptual underpinning for genocide and is thus the source for the idea to commit genocide. The prior existence of the permissive political culture creates the potential for genocide because it socializes elite and societal actors into a particular set of exclusionary beliefs and non-democratic practices. The idea to perpetrate genocide comes to elite political actors out of these prevailing anti-group and authoritarian political cultural attitudes and practices. In turn, genocide is acceptable and comprehensible to non-victims in society because they too are socialized into the same political culture. Long-term structural changes such as economic, political, social, or geopolitical transformations meanwhile destabilize the relationship between groups in society. Next, short-term crises serve as the catalyst for the destruction of the victim group and thus accounts for the timing of genocide. Crises are interpreted by radical elites and the majority society through the lens of the permissive political culture and long-term destabilizing structural changes with the inter-group tensions they create. The interpretation of crises culminates in the identification of a specific target group or groups with these crises. Blame, but more importantly, future threats to the entire political community, are assigned to this group.

It must be noted, however, that each of these variables is not specific only to genocide and can be found in many historical times and places as precursors to other forms of non-genocidal

conflicts and upheavals. It is the confluence of them in one time and one place that makes them the necessary but not sufficient preconditions for genocide.

The final variable, and the one that will be examined in most detail in this paper, is the reconceptualization of the target groups' identity, interests, and presumed future actions. This process grows directly out of elite and societal constructions of the meaning of crisis. A unique three-step reconceptualization process, it is the variable that distinguishes genocide from all other forms of political violence and oppression. The victim group comes to be identified as an overwhelming threat to the future survival of the political community, a supremely powerful force whose power rests not in the possession of objective power capabilities, but in their mere physical existence. The only policy option believed available to neutralize the threat posed by the target group is to strip members of the group of what is believed to be the ultimate source of the group's power; their lives. But while the reconceptualization variable is what ultimately "makes" genocide, the process is not possible without the prior existence of the permissive political culture, long-term destabilizing changes and the inter-group conflicts they create, couple with short-term crises that inflame a volatile but not yet dangerous situation.

In this theory the relationship between the state and society is not a one-way street in either direction but rather a mutually determining and reinforcing relationship. Although political elites take the lead in initiating and perpetrating genocide, genocide only becomes possible in the presence of a receptive public. Political elites are aware of the convergence of views concerning the victim group between themselves and the broader public. To be sure, the anti-group sentiments of radical political elites are in many instances more extreme than most ordinary people, but the underlying beliefs and practices are the same. Political elites, therefore, calculate that genocide will not be actively opposed by most members of the dominant society.

Similarly neither structure nor agency is take to be ontologically prior in this theory. Instead they are treated as mutually constitutive such that structure both influences actors' understanding of the world and how they subsequently act in it, and is itself transformed by the beliefs and actions of actors. As we shall see below, political culture is conceived of as an ideational

structure that both influences action and is itself reshaped by action, while changes in material structures such as economic, political, and social systems shape the relationship between groups in society and are themselves altered by the resulting inter-group tensions and conflicts.

Each of the variables outlined above will be fleshed out below, briefly in the case of the first three and in more detail with respect to the constructivist reconceptualization of the victim group and how this leads political elites to “choose” genocide as a policy option; an option that is usually accepted by most non-victims in society.

The “Permissive” Political Culture

For political scientists, the concept political culture has been both frequently used and hotly contested. Although it continues to be employed in comparative political inquiry, political culture admittedly remains difficult to define and operationalize. As Dogan and Pelassy note, “political culture has proved at the same time imprecise and advantageous, risky and useful, full of pitfalls but deserving of more attention than disregard”¹⁹. Despite the conceptual and methodological challenges, political culture is a useful concept for explaining genocide because it can provide some insight into the origin for the idea to conceive of and perpetrate something so extreme and seemingly irrational.

Recently Pierce et al. have problematized the content of political culture, subdividing it into three layers: core political culture, traditional political culture, and “new” politics political culture. Particularly relevant for the present study is their definition of core political culture which they argue refers to “distinctive patterns of those fundamental individual orientations to the social and political world out of which grow characteristic and central political structures and processes, and which define *the core relationships of a society’s components (individuals,*

¹⁹ Dogan and Pelassy, *How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics* (Second Edition), (Chatham N.J.: Chatham House, 1990), 69.

groups, institutions) to each other” [italic added]²⁰. The core level involves such fundamental concerns as the relative role of the individual and the community in defining norms of behaviour, the relative rights and positions of different groups in society, and the criteria by which privileges and deference are allocated within society²¹. Political culture thus accounts for the beliefs, values, and attitudes members of a society hold regarding their own and others’ place in society.

As suggested earlier, political culture is conceptualized here as an ideational structure. This conceptualization is drawn from international relations theorist Alexander Wendt’s understanding of structure which, he argues, can be both material and ideational in nature. Ideational structures provide the basis for inter-group knowledge and practice which in turn shape inter-subjective understandings of collective identities, interests, and actions²². The relationship between political culture as an ideational structure and actions is, meanwhile, mutually constitutive and reinforcing. In his theory of “structuration” Anthony Giddens suggests that the duality of structure implies that the “constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organize...Structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always both constraining and enabling”²³. Giddens adds that “the moment of the production of action is also one of reproduction in the contexts of the day-to-day enactment of

²⁰ John C. Pierce, Nicholar P. Lovrich Jr., Brent S. Steel, Mary Ann E. Steger, and John R. Tennert, *Political Culture and Public Policy in Canada and the United States: Only a Border Apart?*, (Edwin Mellen Press, 2000)40-41.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 41.

²² Wendt’s theory of collective identity construction was originally formulated to explain the conflictual and cooperative behaviour of states in an anarchical international system. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics”, *International Organization*, 26, 2, Spring 1992, 391-425

²³ Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 25.

social life. This is so even during the most violent upheavals or most radical forms of social change”²⁴.

Political culture, as a relatively enduring set of attitudes, values, and beliefs can therefore be understood as an ideational structure that is not solely the product of socialization but also of action. It is a continuously evolving structure that both informs action and is modified by action. The ideas embedded within a given political culture are changeable, or they may be relatively consistent, with some beliefs, values, and attitudes lying dormant until they come to the fore under particular conditions including elites responses to destabilizing changes and crises²⁵. The permissive political culture is thus marked by a latent/manifest quality in which the more sinister political cultural beliefs and practices concerning often marginalized groups in society are drawn on and come to the surface during upheavals and crises, turning what had previously been relatively benign attitudes and practices into a violent attack on a specific segment of society. The pre-genocide permissive political culture has three dimensions: exclusionary and unequal patterns of group interaction; Exclusionary and unequal conceptions of the community; and authoritarian methods of conflict management.

i) Exclusionary and unequal patterns of group interaction

The three dimensions that constitute the permissive political culture of genocide are in many ways the antithesis of Robert Putnam’s ideal of civic engagement²⁶. The first dimension of the

²⁴ Ibid. 26.

²⁵ For a similar argument concerning the connection between culture and experience, see Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky’s *Culture Theory* (1990).

²⁶ For Putnam, civic engagement is characterized, first, by political equality, both formal and informal, such that the political community is bound by “horizontal relationships of reciprocity and cooperation” and mutual obligations while political leaders see themselves as responsible for all citizens and do not aspire to exercise absolute power. Second, civic engagement includes feelings and actions of solidarity, trust, and tolerance, and third, social structures of cooperation in which the norms and values of the political community are embodied and reinforced. Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, (Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press, 1993), 88.

permissive political culture is manifested in legal and other formalized divisions within the political community that simultaneously reflect and reinforce societal fragmentation and inequality. Legally based divisions variously include the limited extension of citizenship rights and obligations, both in terms of who is granted citizenship as well as the content of the rights and obligations extended to particular groups in society; segregationist marriage laws and education systems; residency restrictions; rules of land tenure and other exclusionary regulations governing participation in the economy. Similarly the associational life characteristic of a permissive political culture is built around distinct divisions in society rather than cross-cutting cleavages. The social structures of every day life tend to promote particularistic goals while their membership is composed of individuals from specific rather than diverse groups. Rather than “bowling alone” as Robert Putnam fears, members of these societies will only “bowl with their own kind”.

What is important here is not just the existence of non-integrative formal structures and institutions but rather their effect on the perception of elites and society. Elites and the majority population see the political community as one that either ought to be, or should remain, exclusive and/or unequal, rather than pluralistic, integrated and egalitarian. Formal segregationist practices serve to divide society along relatively rigid boundaries and prevent the interaction and potential integration of the community as a whole.

It is important to note that the exact formal divisions present prior to the genocide are not necessarily the ones which form the boundaries for the identification of the victim-group during the genocide itself, although this happens in most cases. Rapid, revolutionary change in which the entire foundation of the political community is restructured can create new, ultimately deadly divisions as was the case in the Khmer Rouge’s Democratic Kampuchea. However, even in this case the legacy of prior divisions and inequalities strongly influenced the willingness of the new elites and society to target a specific group. In sum, the identification and persecution of a victim group becomes possible and intelligible when the political community historically lacks a

strong “civic”, legal and associational foundation that links all members of a community together.

ii) Exclusionary conceptions of the community

While the first dimension concerns the importance of how society is formally divided, the way in which groups do or do not interact with each other, and the impact this has on the intersubjective perceptions of elites and societal groups, the second dimension taps more directly the content of these perceptions. The permissive political culture exhibits a lack of solidarity, trust, and tolerance vis-a-vis members of other groups. This is a result not only of the structural fragmentation of society but also deeply held cultural beliefs, values, and practices. Anti-group attitudes serve to reinforce formal divisions within society and to hinder the development of a more inclusive integrative understanding of how the political community is or ought to be.

At a more general level, the attitudinal dimension also focuses on conceptions of membership in the political community. This involves understandings of authenticity, namely, who constitutes real or genuine members of the community. Such notions are particularly important in situations where formal political rights, such as citizenship, are extended to most or all groups within society but where the majority population feels this to be illegitimate.

The attitudinal elements of the permissive political culture are not, however, always at the forefront of political cultural beliefs. Rather, anti-group feelings either regarding membership or the exhibition of intolerance and a lack of trust and solidarity may vacillate between being latent and actively manifest in everyday life. In the latent phase such attitudes, while still present, do not directly or actively influence day-to-day life in blatantly malevolent ways. Instead they remain just below the surface waiting to be activated by catalytic events and the response to these events by political elites.

iii) Authoritarian Modes of Conflict Management

The permissive political culture is, finally, characterized by a propensity by elites to adopt authoritarian political practices and of members of the majority society to accept such policies as normal and even desirable. The important element here is not the mere fact that the state that goes on to perpetrate genocide is authoritarian, although historically, most genocides have been committed by non-democratic regimes. Rather it is the manner in which real and perceived inter-group conflicts are dealt with by political elites, including intra-elite conflicts, and how societal actors view this kind of policy approach that is most significant. Inter-group tensions and conflicts tend to be framed by top decision-makers as zero-sum struggles²⁷ in which the political community at large, and possibly the leading position of the state and the leadership of specific elites, are seen to be in peril. The subsequent response is therefore a strong one, with the state playing an active and direct role in suppressing real and perceived challenges through a number of non-democratic policy interventions. Examples may range from the revocation of rights and privileges of the target group, to placing restrictions on economic activity and movement within the state, to the use of physical repression. There is little if any effort to engage in dialogue or mediation with the group in question with the aim of reaching an acceptable consensus on how the conflict should be resolved. As such, there is rarely an attempt made to end conflicts through mutually satisfying, inclusive, and democratic means. Compromise with opponents is seen as dangerous because it risks betrayal of one's own side. Partisan hostility, therefore, often "smothers cooperative efforts²⁸".

The role of elites in this process, it must be stressed, is not only that of policy action but of orientation. While elite actors formulate and implement authoritarian policies to combat group

²⁷ In an earlier work Putnam refers to these kinds of elites as "conflict-oriented politicians" for whom conflict is highly salient. They are likely to be "fragmented and paralyzed, for their cognitive lenses magnify conflicting interests and minimize mutual interest". The interpersonal orientation of these elites is given by "personal and partisan antagonism" a "culture of conspiracy, mutual suspicion and cynicism..." Robert Putnam, *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976),86.

²⁸ Ibid.,86.

tensions and conflicts, they also believe that such an approach is entirely appropriate and is one of the principle activities of the state.

Similarly, most members of society²⁹ accept the state's authoritarian methods as justified and believe that it ought to play this kind of role in managing group conflicts. With the exception of zealots and vigilantes, the majority of the population believes it is the responsibility of the state as the protector of the political community to resolve group conflicts swiftly and with force if necessary. Again the tendency is to eschew inter-group dialogue or consensus building at the societal level. This not only grows out of the preference for, and deference to, an activist at times repressive state, but also exclusionary practices and beliefs.

The result is for most members of society who are not targeted to accept the state's reconceptualization of a group or groups in the community as an immanent overwhelming threat when the call for genocide comes. This is so because political elites and members of the majority society are socialized into the same political culture from exclusionary patterns of group interaction, to common myths and stereotypes about particular groups, to a history of group antipathy and distrust, to conceptions of who constitutes authentic members of the community as well as acceptance of an authoritarian approach to dealing with societal conflicts. Political elites interpret and explain long-term destabilizing changes and short-term crises based on these mutually shared practices and beliefs. Because these practices and beliefs are held in common by political elites and most members of society the call by elites to commit genocide against a particular group at a specific time is comprehensible to societal actors. The suggestion is not that members of a society in which genocide takes place relish the killing to an extreme degree because they are "natural born killers", only that the call to genocide makes sense to a population shaped by this particular understanding of the relationship between groups in society and the role and policy practices of the state. The non-victims in society are thus primed to

²⁹ To be sure, there are some members of society who reject such undemocratic practices and who oppose the repression of the target group. These individuals are, however, in the minority. They are also likely to be the same group of people who later go on to oppose the genocide and may become active in resistance to it even if they are not themselves members of the victim group.

become a facilitating bystander population which allows elites and the state apparatus to perpetrate genocide in the absence of widespread and active societal resistance.

Change and Crisis: The Catalyst for Killing

To understand why genocide happens when it does, and how the permissive political culture can turn genocidal, we now turn to the second and third variables; destabilizing structural changes and short-term crises. In societies where genocide has been perpetrated, a pre-genocide history of long-term structural economic, social or political changes destabilizes the relationship between groups in society, leaving society fragmented and in flux. This in turn produces inter-group tensions and conflicts in an environment marked by the exclusionary practices and beliefs noted above. Short-term economic, political or military/security crises highlight and exacerbate these trends, leading political elites to formulate policies to try to deal with crises and protect the existing regime.

Long-term structural economic, social and political transformations unravel the traditional relationship between groups in society. New tensions arise between groups that historically had maintained unequal and exclusionary relationships with each other. Processes of change include new economic practices in both the rural and urban sectors of the economy, capitalization and marketization, industrialization and urbanization. In the developing world such changes include the effects of colonial exploitation of the local economy, the exercise of foreign political control, the struggle for independence and the quest for development and modernization through educational and other reforms. Far reaching structural changes subsequently create winners and losers, both real and perceived, among groups in society. This dynamic is particularly toxic when the real or perceived winners in sustained periods of upheaval are marginalized groups who are already distrusted and disliked by the majority society. At the same time, these processes undermined traditional social norms and practices, including the way in which individuals and groups in society interact with each other. The cumulative effect is the fragmentation of society

characterized by the pitting of groups against each other in real and perceived competitions as masses and elites alike struggled to cope with their changing circumstances³⁰. Significantly, rising competition and conflict between groups often occur during and immediately after struggles for national unification or independence. The quest for unity in the face of societal fragmentation complicates the process of nation-building especially for political elites who wished to promote homogeneity and unity of national purpose³¹.

Against this backdrop, short-term internal and external crises compound the situation and served as the trigger for genocide. But why is something so extreme as the planned extermination of a whole group of people the response to a crisis preceded by long term destabilizing changes? Any number of societies endure such experiences and the inter-group tensions and even violent conflicts that go with them without going genocidal. The answer lies not in the nature of the crisis (or crises) itself but how elites and the non-victim groups in society perceive a crisis; why it happened, who is to blame and most importantly, how to protect the current regime and the dominant society from similar events in the future. To borrow Alexander Wendt's phrase about anarchy in the international system, "crisis", in this instance, is what elites "make of it".

In genocidal situations, crises are interpreted, and frequently articulated in the form of a radical ultimately genocidal ideology, to be illustrative of an ongoing struggle between the political community on the one hand, and a specific group on the other. This group is seen to be responsible for the current situation and to benefit from it. More importantly, however, the target group's alleged success at the expense of all others is believed to pose a serious threat to the political community. The perception of threat to the future is magnified in situations in which

³⁰ For a similar argument see Erwin Staub's *The Roots of Evil: The Psychological and Cultural Origins of Genocide and Other Forms of Group Violence*, (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 13-34.

³¹ In a recent book Heather Rae explores the connection between nation-building and atrocities such as genocide. Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenization of Peoples*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

elite ideologies involve plans to construct a new “pure” exclusionary utopia³²; a homogenized Turkish or Hutu nation-state, a pure “Aryan” race, or a “clean” and “total” communist revolution for example. Not only the community itself, but a future world order is threatened by the victim group. The perception of the target group as not just to blame for a crisis but as a serious threat to the future survival of the political community is rooted in the dominant political culture shared by the majority society and its political elite. The prevailing permissive political culture provides the conceptual underpinning through which elites and society come to interpret the meaning of crises in such a way as to identify a particular group as an overwhelming threat to the future of the dominant society. The occurrence of destabilizing structural changes and crises as seen through the lens of the existing permissive political culture sets the stage for the reconceptualization of the victim group to be discussed below.

Crises also provide the environment in which radical political elites come to power, often through revolutionary struggles or other forms of political violence³³. Whether these elites have a preexisting plan in mind to liquidate a particular group or whether they decide to commit genocide only after coming to power is a matter of empirical investigation. The historical record is not clear in this regard as the long standing debate between intentionalist and functionalist Holocaust historians clearly indicates³⁴. Crises, therefore, are not necessarily a Tarrowian “political opportunity structure”³⁵

³² For an extended discussion of the importance of modernist radical ideologies in twentieth century genocides see Eric D. Weitz’s recent book, *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*, (Princeton University Press, 2003).

³³ The Nazis are, of course, a notable exception, although they did secure their election victory of 1932 in no small part because of Hitler’s successful exploitation of public anxiety over serious political upheavals and economic crises gripping Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

³⁴ The “intentionalists” argue that we should take the Nazi leadership’s threats against the Jews prior to gaining power at face value; i.e. that Hitler’s early diatribes against the Jews in *Mein Kampf* and in other written and public statements is proof of a pre-existing plan to exterminate European Jewry that was then implemented once the Nazis came to power and began to wage war in Eastern Europe (e.g. Dawidowicz, 1975; Fleming, 1984). The “functionalists” (e.g. Schleunes, 1970; Mommsen, 1979; Browning, 1985 and 1992) on the other hand, contend that although the Nazis came to power with the intention of persecuting the Jews and of making the Third Reich *Judenrein*, the physical liquidation of the Jews was only considered as a possibility, and then put into practice, when it became clear that, due to a number of circumstances, deportation alone was not a viable “final solution” to the “Jewish Question”.

³⁵ Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics* (First edition; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

The Reconceptualization of the Victim Group

While the permissive political culture and destabilizing changes and crises are necessary but not sufficient conditions to explain genocide, it is the reconceptualization of the victim group's identity, interests, and potential actions that ultimately leads to genocide. Without this specific reconceptualization process the response to change and crisis would be other less catastrophic forms of state violence, repression or conflict. But to understand how political elites arrive at this specific reconceptualization of the victim group, we must unpack the mutually reinforcing and constitutive relationship between structures and elite agency and how this relationship influences the process by which elite political actors choose to initiate and execute genocide.

Sociologist and genocide scholar Helen Fein has appropriately suggested that genocide is an apparent “rational choice” and is, from the perspective of the perpetrators a “goal-oriented act [that] is rationally instrumental to their ends”³⁶. To uncover the process by which political elites make this rational but horrible and morally repugnant choice we might reasonably turn to rational choice theory. As an exclusively agency-oriented explanation of political behaviour, rational choice theory argues that: actors choose between sets of goals ; goals are ordered by purposive actors; the possible choices that actors' might make are only those choices known to the chooser; actors try to choose the best means to their ends; means themselves are chosen through a process of calculating subjective expected utility; and intentions can be inferred from behaviour³⁷. Significantly for this paper, rational choice theory does not inquire into how actors arrive at their intentions or goals. The late William H. Riker argued that linking intentions to prevailing social norms or structures is an “unnecessary convolution that complicates but does not eliminate the rational choice model” because social norms “are themselves creations of

³⁶ Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide: National Responses and Jewish Victimization During the Holocaust*, (New York: The Free Press, 1979), 7-8.

³⁷ William Hegel. Riker, “The Political Psychology of Rational Choice Theory”, *Political Psychology*, 16,1, (1995), 24-26.

actors for some purpose”, elements of which actors’ choose from to frame their intentions and make their choices.

Using a rational choice approach in conjunction with the explanation of genocide outlined in the present argument, we might argue that genocide, the observed behaviour of a regime, is simply based on the intention to respond to a crisis or set of crises and to meet a threat posed to the political community and/or newly created revolutionary order. But without examining how genocidal elites arrive at this intention, and what precisely underpins this intention, we have no concrete way of knowing why genocide is the response to crisis and not some other less horrific and irrevocable form of repression such as forcible reeducation or expulsion. All that rational choice theory can tell us is that intentions are connected to goals and that purposive actors act to achieve their goals based on a set of expected utility calculations that genocidal elites may follow³⁸ to make the choice to commit genocide. Riker’s understanding of social norms or structures as simply the outcome of previous choices by actors misses the very likely possibility that agents’ actions only consciously shape social norms and structures part of the time, that actors do not stand apart from ideational or material structures and simply pick and choose which elements of structure such as norms, beliefs, and practices, will influence their intentions and goals. Missing in the rational choice explanations is the mutually constitutive nature of structure and agency, and therefore the crucial ideational content that informs a choice to commit genocide as opposed to some other act.

The missing content can be filled by examining the interrelationship between structure and agency, and specifically how the mutually constitutive relationship between structure and agency

³⁸ “May” is the operative word here. Several studies laboratory studies performed on test subjects as well as analyses of real-world political and other actors have demonstrated that actors are frequently incapable of effectively ordering their preferences or of calculating subject expected utility particularly in crisis situations. See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions”, *Journal of Business*, 59, 4, (1986), S251-S277; Michael Nicholson, *Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

affect how genocidal elites come to reconstruct the interests, identity, and future actions of the victim group.

Drawing on constructivist social theory, international relations theorist Alexander Wendt argues in his self-described meta-theory of collective identity construction³⁹, that the subjective understanding of a group's identity is influenced not only by formal political and economic organizational arrangements and the material distribution of power capabilities between collective actors, but also knowledge and practices. Wendt suggests that material and ideational structures shape identities and interests as well as behaviour not only among one's own group but with respect to others. Collective identities are thus constructed and reconstructed according to collective understandings of the "self" and "other". Meanwhile conceptions of the "reality" of inter-group relations are also socially constructed such that new sets of mutual understandings, expectations, knowledge and perceived interests⁴⁰ regarding different groups can either change or solidify over time, and thus in turn change or solidify certain inter-group relationships and actions.

For Wendt, the nature and structure of social consciousness, what he terms the "distribution of ideas or knowledge", are shared among actors in the form of norms, rules, or institutions. Social and ideational structures constitute identities and interests, helping actors to find common solutions to problems, defining expectations of behaviour or what constitutes threats for example⁴¹. In genocide, the permissive political culture is the "distribution of ideas" comprised of formalized rules and practices of exclusionary and unequal group interaction, exclusionary norms concerning conceptions of the community and authoritarian methods of conflict management which, in response to long-term destabilizing changes and short-term crises, define

³⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, 26, 2, Spring 1992, 391-425

⁴⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics", *International Security*, 20, 1, Summer 1995, 73-75.

⁴¹ Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, *Cambridge Studies in International Relations*: 67, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 24.

and redefine the interests, identities, and expectations of behaviour of the victim group and thus who and what constitutes a serious threat to the political community.

As for how the “rational choice” to commit genocide is made, Wendt correctly argues that we must inquire into how preferences are constituted because “we want what we want because of how we think about it”⁴². Motivations, desires, or interests should be seen as “schemas”, “scripts”, “frames” or “representations” which are knowledge structures that make possible the identification of objects and events”⁴³. How elites think about a crisis and specific groups in society and how they come to reframe the identity, interests, and future actions of the victim group is part of a pattern of symbolic interaction in which collective actor acts toward each other on the basis of the meaning those actors have for other actors and specific acts. These meanings stem from how the situation is understood which itself is embedded in culture⁴⁴. Actors revise their definitions of the situation as they learn more about each other through continued social interaction. In situations in which power capabilities are uneven, as is clearly the case in genocide between the perpetrator state and defenceless victims, “social acts will tend to evolve in the direction favoured by the more powerful”⁴⁵.

At the same time, collective actors engage in “perspective taking” (i.e. cognitively standing in the others’ shoes) to further define each other’s identity and interests. In genocide, genocidal elites take the perspective of a target group who elites believe see in the state and dominant society a community that they wish to or already covertly control, and/or a vulnerable society that can be exploited and ruined to their own advantage. This “perspective” is not, of course, the

⁴² Ibid., 119.

⁴³ Roy D’Andrade, “Schemas and Motivation” in Roy D’Andrade and C. Strauss (eds), *Human Motives and Cultural Models*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992),28; quoted in Wendt, (1999),122.

⁴⁴ Wendt, *Social Theory of International Relations*, 330.

⁴⁵ Ibid., 330-331.

real perspective of the victim group, but a socially constructed one based on the permissive political culture and the legacy of long-term destabilizing changes and short-term crises.

The response to crises in non-genocidal situations either does not include a reconceptualization of the identity and future behaviour of groups in society or the reconceptualization process does not involve the imputing of an overwhelming threat posed by the continued physical presence of a specific group. In the former instance crises are accompanied by a conceptualization process in which different groups within the political community continue to be seen as full members of that community with commonly held rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other and the state, coupled with shared goals for the future. Cooperation, or at least accommodation, in the face of internal or external crises, be they economic, political, or military/security is the result. The political community, while in some instances still heterogeneous, is nonetheless conceived of by elites and members of society as a whole as one political community to which all members of society still belong. Here the collective “self” is conceptualized as completely inclusive such that there is no “other”. A collective self thus confronts crisis as a unified whole. Unlike genocidal situations, intersubjective understandings of society are based on an existing political culture of tolerance and inclusiveness.

In instances where non-genocidal state violence or inter-group conflict is the result of crises, membership in the political community may become contested at the same time that there is an absence of common goals within the larger political community. The involved groups, be they ethnically, religiously, linguistically, economically, or politically based, see each other as competitors for economic, political, military/security, territorial or social goods in the present and possibly even as threats to group gains in the future. While the important element of threat and fear for the future also occurs in genocide, non-genocidal conflict situations produce inter-group conflict because the threat posed by competing groups is perceived to be mutual and is derived from actually existing power capabilities, not the mere fact of a group’s physical existence. Conflict between groups or state-sponsored repression is pursued in order to weaken

a competitor, to acquire their capabilities, to subordinate or even repress members of the group so that one's own group or the state may reap the benefits of having acquired the adversary's power capabilities (eg. territory, economic and political power) for present and future gain and protection.

As in genocide, mutual conflict situations are marked by a conceptualization of the collective "self" and "other" in which a relatively strict boundary is drawn between the competing groups. Inter-group conflict is also frequently underpinned by a permissive political culture. But unlike genocide each group does objectively maintain some kind of real power capability and the contest itself is, for the most part, over "real" things; that is, the contest is not purely constructed.

Three "Switches"

The reconceptualization process that leads to genocide involves three discernible yet often overlapping "switches" which must be "turned on" for genocide to occur. What sets this process apart from mutual conflict situations or the exercise of non-genocidal state violence is the conceptualization of the victim group as a powerful and dangerous enemy "within" whose overwhelming power is believed to be derived from their physical existence.

The first step in the process is the definition of who lies within and outside the political community ⁴⁶. The function of this conceptualization is to clearly delineate to whom political, economic, and social rights and obligations are owed including citizenship, constitutionally recognized political rights, socio-economic support, participation in the economy and the like.

⁴⁶ Helen Fein argues that a necessary precondition of genocide is the conceptualization of the victim group as existing outside the community. She argues, with reference to the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, that both groups were decreed historically by the dominant group to be "outside the sanctified universe of obligation — that circle of people with reciprocal obligations to protect each other whose bonds arose from their relation to a deity or sacred source of authority (p.4). In the modern secular era, this traditional history of exclusion from the religious and social order allows for the modern definition of these same groups as strangers by virtue of the fact that the dominant group was already alienated from the victim group by traditional antipathies. Helen Fein, *Accounting for Genocide*, 4-5. In the theory presented here, the excluding of the victim is only the first phase of the genocidal process because Fein's approach on its own cannot account for why extermination is the option over other policies such as expulsion, forced assimilation, reeducation, or the use of violence that stops short of genocide.

Those who are conceptualized to lie outside the political community are deemed not to be entitled to such obligations and are thus reconceptualized from being marginalized insiders to non-members or “foreigners”. A strict boundary is thus drawn between “us” and “them” or the collective “self” and the alien “other”. This is similar to the boundary drawn between competitor groups in situations of inter-group conflict but goes much further in that membership in the political community is no longer contested by competing groups, as in the case of a civil war. Rather, the victim group is unilaterally stripped of membership, first conceptually and then practically, by the state and the dominant society. No longer members of the community, the victim group is effectively removed from society with its members now labelled as unworthy of protection by their fellow citizens against a hostile state.

The second switch in the genocidal conceptual process is the one that is entirely unique to genocide. The now foreign victim group is further reconceptualized as a powerful enemy bent on the destruction of the dominant group. Crucially, the source of this power and threat is believed to ultimately reside with the physical presence of the victim group. The continued existence of the victim group portends great danger for the very survival of the wider community. The history and future of the political community is reconstructed as an epic battle between a virtuous “us” and an alien, subversive, inherently pernicious and threatening “them”. Claims regarding the supposed economic, political or other manifestations of the victim group’s power are regularly asserted but the actual resources or power capabilities possessed by the victim group are usually dwarfed by those held by the state and the dominant society. Objectively the victim group does not pose a credible threat to the dominant society. Because it is believed that the victim group derives its overwhelming power from their mere physical existence and not substantial power capabilities, conflict or repression, in which real power capabilities could potentially be removed from a threatening group, is not enough. To neutralize the perceived threat posed by the victim group its members must be physically eliminated in order to rid the group of its true source of power. Without linking the threat of the victim group to its continued physical presence, and thus investing the victim group with almost superhuman

powers derived only from their existence, the call for genocide would not be made. Were the victim group to be conceptualized differently, they might be stripped of what ever “real” power or resources they might have (e.g. territory, economic, or political power) while still leaving the group physically intact.

The dehumanization of the foreigner-cum-dangerous enemy within is the final stage of the genocidal reconceptualization process. This conceptualization of the victim group is not the rationale for genocide, as much of the existing genocide literature suggests, but instead provides a necessary understanding of the victim group in order for the actual extermination to take place. The dehumanization of the victim group is not enough to lead to genocide because to see members of a particular group as subhuman does not impute to them the capacity or power to constitute an overwhelming threat. The Nazis, for example, regarded Poles and other Slavs as *Untermenschen*, as less-than human beings to be repressed and transformed into slave labourers for the Third Reich. Jews, on the other hand, were regarded as pernicious threatening enemies who, because of this very “fact”, had to be exterminated. Victims of genocide are, nonetheless, dehumanized by equating them with “vermin”, “pests” or “bacteria” so that the actual act of exterminating whole groups of people becomes intellectually comprehensible and psychologically tolerable for perpetrators and bystanders alike. Whereas the dangerous threat conceptualization makes the *idea* of genocide credible, dehumanizing the victim-groups makes the *actual* genocide understandable and, therefore, its perpetration possible⁴⁷.

⁴⁷ Herbert Kelman argues that dehumanization in a genocidal context is one of the processes by which the “usual moral inhibitions against violence become weakened”. Such an understanding of the target group creates a situation in which moral principles no longer apply to the victim, thus facilitating smooth and efficient killing as moral restrictions are more easily overcome. Herbert C. Kelman, “Violence Without Moral Restraint: Reflection on the Dehumanization of Victims by Victimizers”, *Journal of Social Issues*, 29, 4, 1973, 48-9.