"Where Did 59% of the Federal Liberal Voters Go?

Why Couldn't the Ontario Liberals Win in 1999?"

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Introduction:

This paper is a *first cut* at a study concerned with voting in a federal state, in this instance, Canada, one of the world's oldest continually functioning democracies. Our focus is voting in Ontario, Canada's largest, richest and most industrialized province and *a "puzzle" which has intrigued scholars since at least the end of World War Two. We ponder why the Province's voters, for most of this period voted Conservative in provincial elections and Liberal in federal contests? Our specific focus, however, is the Ontario provincial election of 1999.*

The Canadian national elections of 1993, 1997, and 2000 were significant for a variety of reasons. First, it was argued (Carty, Cross, and Young 2000; Clarke, Kornberg, and Wearing 2000; Stephenson, Scotto, and Kornberg 2004) that they marked the transformation of the federal party system from the "two-party-plus" system that had characterized national electoral politics since 1935 into a genuine multi-party system. Second, it began the latest period of Liberal Party dominance. However, unlike other such periods, it is a dominance that rests largely on the overwhelming support the Liberals received in Ontario. Indeed, *never in the Country's history did Ontario voters make so great a contribution to Liberal victories in federal elections during a particular period (59% of the total seats the Liberals won in the three elections).* The closest they came was in 1874 (with 48% of the total Liberal seats) when MacDonald and the

Conservatives were caught with their fingers in the CPR cookie jar.[1] And not surprisingly, *never in the country's history did the Party do as well in Ontario as it did in the three elections of the last decade when, on average, it won 98% of Ontario's seats.* The only election in which the Party even came within hailing distance of this level of support was 1968--the Trudeaumania election in which the Liberals won 73% of Ontario's seats.[2]

What makes these recent Liberal triumphs in Ontario so notable is that at the provincial level, Ontario voters selected a NDP government in 1990 and Conservative governments in 1995 and 1999. For the student of comparative politics who is not a Canadian politics specialist, these data would pose both an empirical and theoretical puzzle. The theoretical puzzle is what do they say about the character of the Canadian party system? And, more specifically, what do they say about the concept of party identification, which for almost a half-century has informed studies of voting and other forms of political behavior in mature democracies, including Canada (c.f. Campbell et al. 1960; Meisel 1975; Jenson 1975; Elkins 1978; Clarke et al 1979; LeDuc et al. 1984). In two interesting and thoughtful papers, the first two published more than thirty years ago, the third some twenty years ago, the late John Wilson (1983), and his coauthor Richard Hoffman (1970, 1972) offered at least a partial answer to these questions.

Viewing the question of Liberal federal and Conservative provincial dominance as part of a more general question of electoral behavior in federal political systems, Wilson first considered and rejected a number of theories that also have addressed this

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[1] In two elections, the 1882 and 1988 contests, 52% of the Liberal's seats came from the province but they still were decisively defeated by the Conservatives.
[2] In the 1935, 1940, and 1949 elections, the Liberals won an average of 68% of Ontario's seats.

issue.[3] These include what might be turned the "balance" theory of voting in federal systems posited by distinguished scholars such as Lord Bryce (1921) and Frank Underhill (1955). Simply put, this theory holds that voters deliberately elect different governments at different levels of a federal system so that the governments can keep their eye on one another and so that the voters will not be taken for granted by any one party. A second is R.M. Dawson's "cyclical" theory (1954), which holds that as soon as voters put one party in office at both the national and provincial levels, they turn away from it by voting for another party at the provincial level, thus setting off a cycle of "attraction-repulsion." A third is the "protest *cum* alienation" theory proposed by luminaries such as C.B. MacPherson (1953), William Morton (1950), and S.M. Lipset (1968). Given the conjunction of federalism, a British parliamentary system with disciplined parliamentary parties, a state in which two-thirds of the population live in a single region, and a history of deep seated regional cleavages based on economic (the West), and socio-cultural (Quebec) particularisms, provincial voters have looked to their respective provinces and to their provincial governments to best represent their interests vis-à-vis Ottawa. Finally, another explanation, which (in one form or another) has attracted some of Canada's most prominent social scientists, argues that Canada does not really have a national party system. This is because Canada does not have national parties consistently capable of

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[3] In total, the Conservatives won 14 of 17 provincial elections between 1943 and 1999. Although they had the highest number of seats in 1985, the Liberals and NDP formed a coalition government under the Premiership of David Peterson. In 1987, the Liberals won, and as noted above, in 1990, the New Democrats were victorious. The Liberal Party's victory in the 2003 provincial elections marks a deviation from this historical pattern. The three elections lost by the provincial Tories came at a time when they were in control of the federal government (1985, 1987, and 1990). If the Liberals maintain their hold on the federal government in the upcoming elections, it will mark the first time that the same party has controlled both the federal and provincial governments in Ontario since the Great Depression.

generating policies, programs, and images that transcend the aforementioned regional

cleavages (Porter 1965; Mueller 1967; Meisel 1975; Simeon and Elkins 1974, 1980).

Wilson considers and rejects these theories and proposes his own--namely, that

the Tory dominance in Ontario electoral politics is a product largely of abstention among

federal Liberal and New Democratic voters and cross-over voting for Tory candidates

among federal Liberals and New Democrats in provincial elections. In the earlier paper,

he and Hoffman tested their theory regarding the importance of abstention and cross-over

voting by delineating the composition and size of this group, and their places of

residences. Wilson also had something to say about the macro-characteristics of

Canada's party system. Perhaps not surprisingly, given his own political values and

perspectives, he argued that the character of a party system is a function of the level of

economic development and of economic relationships among the several groups of the

society in which the parties are a part. Since the provinces vary markedly in both the

extent to which they are industrialized, the character and value of their economic

resources, and the economic relationships among different social groups, *there is no

national party system*, but rather a number of regional systems in which the provinces are

the major players and in which voting and political behavior in general is grounded in

conditions existing within individual provinces. *In brief, according to Wilson and

Hoffman (1970, 1972) voters do not view themselves as operating at different levels of a

federal system. Rather, most voters believe they are participating in a single system, but

one which has its roots in, and which continues to be grounded in their province.*

In this paper, we will test their empirical argument regarding the explanatory

power of abstention and crossover voting in Ontario provincial elections. Our key

interest is in comparing the characteristics and attitudes of those who, in both federal and provincial elections, report voting Liberal in federal elections but who abstain, or defect to the New Democrats or Progressive Conservatives in provincial elections.

The decision of the federal Liberals to remain loyal or defect from the provincial Liberals is modeled as a function of soci-economic variables, provincial valance issues (provincial partisan identification, and affect for provincial leaders and parties), positional/"ideological" issues (respondents' positions on three ideological factors including many parochial issues) and strategic/"rational actor" assessments toward the Ontario election (their calculations of party chances both provincially and within the ridings). The standard socio-economic variables we include are subjective class placements, union membership, gender, age, first language, religion, employment in the public or private sector, and income level. The data we use derive from the pre and post election samples of the 1999 Ontario provincial election study.[4] In this *first-cut*, we model the choice of the federal Liberals to remain loyal to their party in the province in a series of dichotomous probit models where the dependent variable is coded "1" when the voter remains loyal to the Liberals and coded "0" when: In estimation "A" abstains from voting; in equation "B" defects to the Tories; and in equation "C" votes for the NDP.

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[4] The two stage pre-post election survey was conducted by the York Institute for Social Research under the direction of Michael Ornstein. 1157 telephone surveys of Ontario residents were conducted in the seven days preceding the election (May 27-June 2, 1999), and 896 of these respondents were re-interviewed in the two months following the election (July 22-September 4, 1999). The pre-election component of the study was designed to measure respondents' beliefs about election chances of the three major parties in the province and in respondents' respective ridings. The focus of the post-election questionnaire was on the policy beliefs of the respondents. We thank Professor Ornstein and his co-investigators for use of the data although all interpretations and errors in this paper are ours alone.

Reported Voting in Ontario:

At the beginning of the post-election study, respondents were asked a two part question:

"Did you vote in the recent Ontario provincial election held on June 4th?" (and, if so)

"Which party did you vote for: the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party, the New

Democratic Party, or another party?" Approximately 78% of the 896 post-election

respondents reported voting. 44% reported voting for the Harris-led Tories, 33% selected

the McGuinty-led Liberals, and 15% cast a ballot for the Hampton-led NDP. The

remaining 9% of the respondents either voted for a minor party, did not remember who

they voted for, or refused to answer the question.[5]

The 78% of the respondents who reported turning out is significantly higher than

the 58.3% turnout reported for the election by Elections Ontario. Unfortunately, privacy

laws prevent any form of voter validation (Hurtubise, e-mail communication).[6] The

actual results (45% Tory, Liberals 40%, and the NDP 13%) also show that there is a

tendency to overestimate recalled support for the victorious Tories. Existing theory

suggests that the reported support for the Tories would be higher than their actual level of

support because of: a) a "bandwagon" effect in which people erroneously report

supporting the "winning team" (Converse 1966; Katosh and Traugott 1981); or b) the

demographic characteristics of those who over-report voting are those of higher SES

groups for whom voting is at least putatively more socially desirable (c.f. Silver,

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[5] The latter respondents, along with three voters in the post-election study who did not remember if they voted or refused to answer whether they went to the polls are excluded from our analyses below.
[6] Section 42 (6) of the Election Act states, "No person shall communicate any information obtained at a polling place as to the candidate for whom an elector is about to vote or has voted or whether the elector declined to vote." This 20% difference is greater than the 10-15% of the sample who falsely reported casting a ballot in the 1976 and 1978 American National Election Studies (Katosh and Traugott 1981).

Anderson and Abramson 1986). Note that higher social status is traditionally linked to support for the Tories (c.f. Wilson and Hoffman 1970).

"Ticket Splitting" in Ontario:

Since we wish to test Wilson's theories regarding why federal Liberal voters defected or remained loyal in provincial elections, our principal interest lies in explaining the variation in provincial vote choice among those who reported voting Liberal when asked the question "Did you vote for the Conservatives, the Liberals, the NDP, Reform, or another party?" after responding affirmatively that they had voted Liberal in the 1997 federal election (Slightly more than 50% of the sample reported voting Liberal in the 1997 federal election.). In the analyses that follow, we focus most of our attention on this sub-sample.

Of considerable interest is the varying degree of loyalty supporters of the federal parties showed to their provincial counterparts. Note that 71% of federal NDP supporters remained loyal to their party in the provincial election as did 70% of Tories. In addition, 82% of Reform voters, a party normally viewed as on the "right" of the ideological spectrum, supported the Harris "Common Sense Revolution" provincially. In sharp contrast, only 41% of the federal Liberals supported their party provincially, giving 34% of their votes to the victorious Tories, and another 9% to the NDP. In addition, 16% abstained. Since federal Liberal supporters constituted 51% of the research population, it

appears that the inability of the Liberal Party to maintain voter support in the 1999

provincial election was indeed *a major* factor in the Conservative victory that year.[7]

Explaining the Vote in Ontario:

We now turn to analyzing the bivariate relationship between the vote choices of federal

Liberals and key explanatory variables. These variables will be tested in multivariate

probit models in the next stage of the paper.

Standard Demographic Variables and Switching:

Wilson and Hoffman (1970) identify what they regard as key explanatory variables in

provincial voting among federal Liberal supporters. These are subjective class

orientations, region, and ethnic background.[8] In the later paper, Wilson and Hoffman

(1972) expand the list to include ethnic identification, age, religious affiliation, sex, and

union membership.

Table 1 reports the distribution of the 1999 vote by self-identified upper middle,

middle, and working class Canadians.[9] The Liberals were able to retain the loyalty of

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[7] Nor did the provincial Liberals realize any significant gains from the few who defected from the federal NDP, Tory and Reform parties. Only 38% of the Tory and Reform defectors voted Liberal provincially with the rest choosing to either abstain or make a "great leap" and vote for the provincial NDP. Although the provincial Liberals were favored by 69% of federal NDP voters who defected, this group constituted only 9% of the total sample making these gains numerically insignificant. The provincial Liberals also did not realize any gains among those who reported voting in the 1999 provincial but not in the 1997 federal election. Of this group, the vote was evenly split among Liberals and Tories with 42% each with the remaining 17% voting NDP.

[8] At the time of the writing of this paper, contextual variables for the dataset were still under development. Consequently, we do not compare the vote by region in this version of the paper. Nonetheless, an analysis of voting patterns by area codes follow Wilson and Hoffman's (1970) observation that those in the suburbs of Toronto (905 area code) were the most likely to defect to the Tories and voters in Toronto (both the 905 and 416 area code) were less likely to report abstaining in the provincial election than citizens in the rest of Ontario.

[9] Respondents had the option of placing themselves into five different class categories: upper class, upper middle class, middle class, working class, and lower class. Few respondents in either American or Canadian voting studies identify with either the "upper" or "lower" classes. The 1999 Ontario survey is no exception with fewer than 5% reporting themselves to be in these categories. Hence, we collapsed the

approximately 40% of each category. However, the nature of defections varied by class. Among those who defected, members in the upper middle class were much more likely than their working class counterparts to switch to the Tories, and those in the working class were more likely than both middle and upper middle class voters to stay home.[10] Interestingly, support for the NDP was similar among working and middle class respondents, perhaps indicative of earlier findings that "traditional NDP seats tend to be in working class ridings…but many of the party's activists and candidates are middle-class professionals" (Dyck 1996: 320). Nonetheless, the finding that class differences did exist among 1999 provincial voters who switched to the Tories and those who abstained are consistent with the pattern identified by Wilson and Hoffman a generation earlier.

[Table 1 about Here]

It is commonly assumed that union members are disproportionately supportive of the NDP because of the latter's positions on issues dear to their causes (Caplan 1973; Morley 1984; MacDonald 1988; Dyck 1996). Thus, it is not surprising that 53% of the NDP support in 1999 came from union households whereas less than 30% of Tory support came from such voters. This gap was likely wider than it had been in the past as

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upper class and upper middle class into a single "upper middle class" category and the working class and lower class into a single "working class" category. It should be noted that over 60% of the respondents did not "think of themselves as belonging to a social class", and subjective class status for most of the respondents was obtained only after asking respondents "if [they] had to make a choice" which class they would place themselves. Those who freely placed themselves into a class were approximately 10% more likely to self-report being members of the upper middle or middle class as opposed to the working class when compared to the respondents who needed further prompting.

[10] Note that some of this difference may be due to the result of the over-reporting of turnout among the group that is more likely to vote Tory (see above). This makes Wilson and Hoffman's (1970) assertion that federal Liberals who switch to the provincial Tories are disproportionately upper class in comparison to the working class who are more likely to abstain susceptible to Type 1 Error. Hence, we caution that the findings that class is significant from both the 1967 and 1999 surveys may be erroneous. As we show below, the importance of subjective class disappears when placed in a multivariate model, a finding that reinforces our argument that party identification and rational expectations play a much greater direct role in determining the provincial vote choice of federal Liberals than these demographic variables.

the early and well publicized acts of the Harris Conservatives included the repeal of the

anti-scab and employment equity laws passed by the Rae led NDP government (Tanguay

2002).

In contrast to Wilson and Hoffman's (1972), we found no relationship between

religion and the direction of voting. In the 1960's, Catholics, were an important

component of the Liberal vote whereas in 1999, they were actually more likely to vote

Tory. Note that those who professed no religious affiliation were least likely of the three

groups to abstain (13%) or vote Liberal (35%) and most likely to support the Tories

(39%). However, none of the differences between groups were significant.

With regard other standard demographic variables, men were more likely than

women to support the Tories (37% vs. 30%). The relationship between education and the

vote was non-linear with those with a high school education or less most loyal to the

Liberals (58%), and those with some higher education the least loyal (37%). There is a

progression of defection to the Tories as educational attainment increases: 26% of those

with high school or less, 32% with some post-secondary education, and 39% of those

with a Bachelor's Degree or more voted Conservative in the 1999 Ontario election.

There is also some variation in the direction of voting by income. Voters reporting the

lowest incomes (less than $30,000) were most likely to vote Liberal or Abstain

provincially. The Federal Liberals most likely to abandon the Liberals provincially was

those earning between $30,000 and $49,999 whereas upper income voters split their votes

evenly.[11]

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[11] Note that concerns about multicollinearity prevent us from using both education and income in the
multivariate models that follow. We chose to drop education, although similar findings resulted when
substituting income for education into our multivariate models.

There is a monotonic increase in the loyalty to the provincial Liberal party as the voter ages—only 36% of Federal Liberals aged 18-34 voted Liberal provincially in 1999 but 55% of those 65 and over stuck with the party. Defection to the Conservative party was highest among voters aged 55-64 (44%) but declined sharply among voters 65 years age or older (27%).

Party Affiliation, Loyalty, and the Voting Decision:

The role of partisan affiliation in Canada is notable for the presence of dual identifiers—those who identify with one party at the federal level and another at the provincial level. Uslaner (1990) found that over 20% of Canadians possessed dual partisanship and posited that the presence of dual identification was mainly the product of the cultural and historical trends in the development of party systems in Canada and, to a lesser extent, a function of the weak nature of partisan identity in Canada.[12] Kornberg, Mishler, and Clarke (1982) and Stewart and Clarke (1998) reported similar findings.

The 1999 Ontario election study contained two batteries probing the provincial partisan identities of the respondents. The pre-election survey used an alternative question wording which initially asked respondents whether "in provincial politics" they "usually [thought] of [themselves] as close to any particular party." Only if respondents answered affirmatively were they then asked with which party they identified. Sanders, Burton, and Kneenhaw (2002) note respondents who are given a clear opportunity to register their non-identification with a party and are not immediately prompted with the names of the parties less likely to identify themselves as party partisans. Table 2, maps the migration of identifiers over the course of the campaign, and shows that less than

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[12] On the instability of partisan identity in Canada see, among others, Clarke et al. 1979; Sniderman, Forbes, and Melzer 1974; and LeDuc 1984.

40% identified with one of the three provincial parties in the pre-election survey while in the post-election study--where a more common question wording was utilized--77% identified with a provincial party.[13] This pre-post difference may also be a function of the mobilizing effect of elections identified by Kornberg and Clarke (1992). The latter effect, they demonstrated, extended to feelings of trust, efficacy, and attitudes towards informal and formal governmental institutions. Interestingly, all of these declined in the interim between elections.[14] In the multivariate analyses that follow, we use the more conservative pre-election partisan identification response because we reason that the post-election question is capturing many "fleeting partisans" whose identity is solely a function of the mobilizing effects studied by Kornberg and Clarke.

[Table 2 about Here]

Feeling thermometers:

Research shows attitudes toward federal parties and their leaders, although highly variant over time, can dramatically shift voting intentions. For example, Clarke et al (1996) found that positive attitudes toward a federal party's leader, for example, the Conservatives, increase the probability that Canadians will choose that party *but* positive

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[13] The question was phrased: "Thinking about politics in Ontario, do you usually think of yourself as a Conservative, Liberal, NDP, or something else."

[14] Although the proper role of both the federal and provincial governments is one of continuing debate in Canada, no direct questions on the matter were asked in the study. The Ontario Elections study asked respondents two separate questions as to whether they thought that the federal and provincial governments has either too much, the same, or too little power. Approximately 20% of federal Liberal voters believed that *both* the federal and provincial governments had too much power with another 30% believing that both levels of government had the right amount of power.

Following Wilson and Hoffman (1970), we tested for and found a bivariate relationship between the difference in perceived power of the two governments and the vote. Over 60% of federal Liberals who believed that the provincial government of Ontario has too much power compared to the federal government remained loyal to the provincial Liberals. In contrast, respondents who believed the federal government to be as powerful as or more powerful than the Ontario provincial government gave 7% more of their votes to the Tories. However, when this artificially constructed variable was tested in the multivariate models that follow, they always failed to reach significance. Because the appropriate strength of the two governments' variable is difficult to classify into the socio-demographic, valance, spatial, or rational actor category of independent variables, we dropped the variable from the multivariate models.

attitudes towards the leadership of *competing* parties (i.e., Reform) diminish the probability of a federal Conservative vote. In Table 3, depicting the feelings Ontario federal Liberals had towards each of the three provincial parties and their leaders, we see similar relationships between leaders in affect and vote choice. Taking the average of the thermometer scores the respondent gave the party and the leader and categorizing the rating as negative (less than 50) or neutral or positive (equal or greater than 50), it appears that support for the provincial Conservatives is highly polarized. Those that rated Harris and his party negatively were far less likely to vote Conservative than those who gave either neutral or positive evaluations of them. Supporters of the provincial Liberals and NDP were more divided in their evaluations towards the parties and leaders. The modal NDP and Liberal voter had positive feelings about Hampton and the NDP, suggesting that forces other than affect are the deciding element of the decision to support the NDP over the Liberals.

[Table 3 about Here]

Ideology: Existing research suggests few Canadians employ a left-right paradigm when they think about politics and politicians (i.e. Laponce 1970, 1972; Kay 1977; Gibbins and Nevitte 1985), but we have argued (Scotto, Stephenson, and Kornberg 2004) that issues may cluster to form durable cleavages that are important to voters nationally. Here we consider whether "ideological" variation can affect provincial voting. An exploratory factor analysis on the more than thirty issue questions used in the post-election 1999 Ontario study yielded three factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 (See Appendix A for questions, factor scores, and the dimensions onto which the issue questions load). The first dimension, which we label a "Pro-Anti Interventionist Government" factor, has an

eigenvalue greater than 3.0 and encompasses issues dealing with regulation of the environment, equal opportunity for women, rent control, and government efforts to assist the unemployed and those on welfare. Respondents with factor scores greater than zero tended to have what are usually considered "left" positions in that they support a more interventionist government in the above issue areas. Table 4 shows that the number of respondents with "right" positions (negative factor scores) on these dimensions outnumbered those who favored a more interventionist government and that *more* federal Liberal voters wanted less government intervention. Only a minority of provincial Liberal and Conservative voters desired greater intervention, but, not surprisingly, a majority of NDP voters favored greater intervention (56% to 44%).

[Table 4 about Here]

The second dimension encompassed questions that traditionally make up political efficacy batteries in election studies and is labeled as such. Table 4 indicates that Liberal loyalists felt less efficacious than did Liberal defectors or those who stayed home in the provincial election. Not surprisingly it is those who defected to the Tories, supporters of a party that has been a perennial victor in Ontario provincial elections, who felt the most efficacious.

It is on the third dimension, a factor encompassing voter attitudes toward unions, welfare, and multiculturalism that we see the greatest variation in voter support for the several parties. Liberal loyalists (64% to 36%) and those defecting to the NDP (85% to 15%) favored more government intervention whereas defectors to the Tories favored less (68% to 32%). The differences between loyalists and abstainers were less substantial--56% of abstainers favored less intervention in this area.

Chances of Victory in the Province and in the Riding:

In contrast to prior surveys, the 1999 Ontario election study asked respondents both to rate the chances the candidates had of winning in their riding and of winning the election. Respondent evaluations of each parties' chances of winning provincially and in the respondent's riding were highly correlated (r>0.70). Before conducting our analyses, we assumed that supporters of the two "out parties," the provincial NDP and Liberals would believe that their party would be most likely to win their ridings even if they did not foresee a provincial victory for the two parties. In contrast, Tory supporters would be more likely than either their Liberal or NDP counterparts to predict a victory in both the riding and provincially for the party. Consequently, we began by thinking that the respondent estimates of Liberal and NDP chances in the riding were likely suitable for multivariate analysis and were agnostic as to whether respondents' estimates of provincial or riding chances for the Tories would better predict defection.

To test our original hypotheses, we reason that if voters were making strategic calculations, estimates of party fortunes should be different for those who switch during the election period in comparison to those who remain loyal to the party. We focus on those who switch because pre-committed voters are likely to place emphasis on the independent variables outlined above as opposed to the chances variables. Difference of means tests with corrections for variations in sample size and unpaired observations were conducted. Comparing estimates of provincial chances, we found some evidence to support our claims. Respondents who were supportive of the Tories in the pre-election survey but ended up abstaining were significantly more pessimistic than those who reported voting for the party in the post-election study. On average, voters who remained

loyal to the party estimated that the Tories had a 74% chance of winning while those who abstained put their chances at 58%. However, in a counterintuitive finding, those who moved from supporting the Liberals in the pre-election study to supporting the Tories were 9% more likely (65% vs. 56%) to think that the Liberals would win in the province. We leave the theoretical rationale for this behavior an open question.

Interestingly, it was the differences in the chances of winning provincially that was associated with defection from both the provincial Liberals and Tories whereas the differences in riding chances for both parties among those who defected during the campaign and those who remained loyal to the parties was negligible. The exact opposite was the case for the provincial NDP. NDP voters were *far* more likely to remain loyal to the party if they believed that the party had a chance of winning a seat in the riding. Those who remained loyal to the NDP over the election thought the party had, on average, a 61% chance of winning a seat while those who defected put the NDP's chances of winning in the riding at 33%. Findings for the Liberals and PC at the provincial level and the NDP at the riding level suggest that estimations of party fortunes had some impact on the voting decisions of the respondents, perhaps indicating a degree of strategic voting. Given the high degree of correlation between the provincial and riding chances estimates given by the respondents, and the results of the difference of means tests that we conducted, in the multivariate models that follow below, we include the respondents' estimations of the Tories and Liberals winning a majority and their estimations of the NDP winning in a given riding to gain insight as to whether federal Liberal voters were strategic.

Multivariate Analyses:

Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c show results from probit analyses comparing the decision of federal Liberals to remain loyal to their provincial counterparts or: a) abstain; b) vote Tory; and c) vote NDP. For each dichotomous decision, four separate estimations were performed, the first of which only contained the standard socio-demographic variables, many of which were studied by Wilson and Hoffman (1970, 1972). The second estimation added to the model three dichotomous partisan identification dummy variables derived from respondent's reported partisanship in the pre-election phase of the study and continuous feeling thermometer variables, an average of party and leader thermometers, measured on a 0-1 scale.[15] Note that our labeling of this estimation as a "valance" politics model follows the work of Clarke et al (2004) because we view partisan identification and party and leadership images as cognitive shortcuts in a limited information framework. We then test whether information about specific issue positions ("ideological" model) and the party's chances of winning ("rational actor" model) add to our understanding of the choice of federal Liberals to remain loyal to or defect from the provincial Liberals in Ontario.

[Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c about Here]

A key finding from these analyses is that almost all of the socio-demographic variables fail to explain the provincial voting decisions of federal Liberals when included in a multivariate analysis. Indeed, the only occasion where an SES variable is consistently significant across estimations is the age of the voter. Consistent with

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[15] As noted above, the pre-identification partisan identification question is a highly conservative estimation of partisans as before being prompted to specify the specific party they considered themselves members of, the respondent had to answer that they considered themselves partisans beforehand. It is not surprising that the impact of partisan identification was muted in these estimations vis-à-vis those of other analyses of the Canadian electorate (i.e. Clarke et al 1996; Clarke et al 2000).

findings that age is related to all forms of political engagement in Canada and a concern that the youth are tuning out to politics (i.e.; Young 2002), our preliminary findings show that youth is a predictor of abstention in comparison to voting for the provincial Liberals.

Another notable finding is the consistent importance of the leader and party affect variables across all three comparisons of voter choice. The decision to vote Liberal over Tory (Table 5b) rested almost entirely on one's feelings toward the provincial Liberal and Conservative parties and their leaders. Even with the conservative question wording of the survey's party identification question, the "valance" variables still have the greatest impact on the explained variance of the voter choice of federal Liberals in Ontario. The proportion of explained variance not captured by the party identification variables is likely taken up by the affect variables, suggesting that judgments about parties and their leaders play a crucial role in determining whether federal Liberals defect or remain loyal to the provincial Liberals.

This is not to say that a large sub-sample of the voters does not behave with an eye on the polls or that their positions on important issues do not matter. As would be expected, this is especially true for the comparison between the Liberals and their left of center rivals, the NDP (Table 5c). Concerning voter attitudes towards governmental intervention in the economy, scored in standard deviation units ranging from approximately -3 to 3, we find that a voter wanting much more government attention paid to the issues that load on this dimension is significantly more likely to defect from the Liberals to the NDP even if they have positive feelings toward the provincial Liberal

Party and Dalton McGuinty. Moreover, the voter desiring more intervention is much more likely to defect if they believe the NDP has a good chance to win in the riding.[16]

There are a number of findings that are interesting, but a better specified model is necessary to better understand voter decision-making in these areas. For example, there appears to be a threshold on the Interventionist Dimension that federal Liberals reach whereby they would rather abstain than vote for the provincial Liberal Party (Table 5a). Below we discuss a modeling technique that would consider a voter's positions on this dimension and how it affects whether they would remain loyal to the party, abstain, or vote for the Tories or NDP, a choice that better represents the reality of what the voter is facing. Further the fact that positive assessments the overall provincial chances of *both* the Liberals and Tories demand better model specification.

Conclusion and Suggestions for Further Inquiry:

The ideological outlook of the Conservative Party in Ontario has changed since Wilson and Hoffman (1970, 1972) conducted their studies of the provincial electorate in the late 1960s and early 1970's. To paraphrase Byron Montgomery's (2002) angry prose at the direction of the party, it has gone from being a perennially governing dynasty built on "understanding the need to balance progressive change with solid management and strong, careful leaders" (10) to one with an all out neo-conservative vision of "less government, lower taxes, and individual responsibility" (80). Nonetheless, many of the bi-variate associations of demographic forces and the provincial vote that Wilson and Hoffman found in the 1970's remain. However, with the exception of age, we find that

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[16] The chances in the riding and province variables are all scored on a 0-100 scale.

once these variables are placed in a multivariate model, their direct influence on the decision of federal Liberal voters to defect from their party is negligible. Furthermore, Wilson and Hoffman (1970) did suggest that partisan identification was also part of the puzzle which explained the vote in Ontario--a suggestion we concur with although the manner in which the partisan identification question is worded may relegate the influence partisan identification has on the vote in traditional models to the more fleeting leadership and party evaluation variables. Nonetheless, a key component of voter choice in Ontario appears to lie with these variables.

We believe that a voter's attitude towards interventionist government and their perceptions of the parties' chances--the Tories and the Liberals in the entire province and the NDP in individual ridings--can influence the decision of federal Liberals to remain loyal to their party. However, in order to gain a better understanding for how these variables influence voter choice, we are experimenting with a nested logit model which considers the decision to vote or abstain as the first step in a sequential process and the provincial party the federal Liberal supporter ends up choosing as the second step. The benefit of such a model is that it allows for the decision to abstain to be influenced by the parties in the race as well as other variables that do not necessarily influence the choice between specific parties.[17]

More careful thought must also be given to role respondents' estimation of chances the parties will have in the model. The fact that the *riding* chances for NDP candidates appears to drive defection away from the Liberals towards that party furthers

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[17] In other words, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption does not hold for the choice between abstaining and voting for one of the three parties. However, in a nested logit model, the IIA assumption does hold for choices within a sequence, also an assumption that should be tested (see Amemiya 1985: Chapter 9; Greene 2000).

the case for building contextual variables to look at the competitiveness of the parties within each respondent's riding. Moreover, we must consider whether modeling these variables as straight 0-100 probabilities truly capture the manner in which they influence provincial vote choice given the work that has been done on strategic voting in the United States (Abramson et al. 1992), Canada (Blais et al. 2001); and Israel (Abramson et al. 2004).

These conditions notwithstanding, we believe that Wilson and Hoffman (1970, 1972) were correct in challenging many of the systemic theories that were used to explain the ability of the Liberal Party to win big at the federal level while floundering provincially. Seventy years of political history in Ontario indicate that a party's good fortune in provincial elections neither proceeds nor precedes success at the other level. Nor are we convinced that there is a massive coordination game going on among voters to produce divided government. Most of what produces the election outcomes we see in the Province today and two researchers saw in the 1960's are the individual characteristics and attitudes of the Ontario voter. Regardless of whether the influence of socio-demographic variables on vote choice are direct or indirect, the traditional individual components of voter choice possibly combined with the competitive standing of the three parties are what has time and again produced split party fortunes in the Province. In looking at the individual voter instead of grand systemic causal forces, Wilson and Hoffman provided scholars with a starting point for studying voting behavior in this Province. Improved modeling techniques will allow scholars to better understand the direct and indirect causes of voter choice in Ontario.

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Table 1: Provincial Vote of Federal Liberals by Subjective Class

Status / Vote	Upper Middle Class	Middle Class	Working Class	Total
Abstain	10.2%	11.4%	26.1%	16.0% (59)
Conservative	46.9%	37.3%	23.5%	34.2% (126)
Liberal	40.8%	41.3%	40.3%	40.9% (151)
NDP	2.0%	10.0%	10.1%	8.9% (33)
Total	13.3% (49)	54.5% (201)	32.3% (119)	100% (369)

Table 2: Pre and Post Election Partisan Identification:

Post / Pre	Non-Identification	Conservative	Liberal	NDP	Total
Non-Identification	32.0%	25.1%	35.9%	6.9%	61.3% (231)
Conservative	10.6%	78.7%	10.6%	0%	12.5% (47)
Liberal	5.8%	3.5%	90.7%	0%	22.8% (86)
NDP	7.7%	0%	30.8%	61.2%	3.5% (13)
Total	22.6% (85)	26.0% (98)	45.1% (170)	6.4% (24)	100% (377)

Table 3: Voting Behavior by Affect towards Party Leaders and Parties

Vote

	% Abstaining	%Voting Conservative	%Voting Liberal	%Voting NDP	%of Total Voters
Affect Toward Harris/Tories:					
Negative:	43%	12%	76%	76%	49%
Neutral or Positive :	57%	88%	24%	24%	51%
Affect Toward McGuinty/ Liberal:					
Negative:	21%	56%	17%	35%	32%
Neutral or Positive :	79%	44%	18%	65%	68%
Affect Toward Hampton and NDP					
Negative:	44%	71%	45%	26%	52%
Neutral or Positive :	56%	29%	55%	74%	48%
Column Frequencies:	61	127	157	34	379

Table 4: Voting Behavior by Factor Scores

Vote

	% Abstaining	%Voting Conservative	%Voting Liberal	%Voting NDP	%of Total Voters
Dimension 1: Interventionist Government Positions:					
Favoring:	54%	32%	48%	56%	45%
Opposing:	46%	68%	52%	44%	55%
Dimension 2: Political Efficacy					
Efficacious:	43%	72%	41%	41%	51%
Not Efficacious :	57%	28%	59%	59%	49%
Dimension 3: Social Welfare and Diversity:					
Favoring:	46%	32%	64%	85%	52%
Opposing:	54%	68%	36%	15%	48%
Column Frequencies:	61	127	157	34	379

Table 5a.: Probit Estimation of Loyalty (=1) vs Abstention (=0)

Variable	Socio-Demographic	"Valance"	"Ideological"	"Rational Actor"
Middle Class	0.13	0.32	0.08	0.10
	(0.30)	(0.42)	(0.47)	(0.57)
Upper-Middle Class	0.38	0.49	0.48	0.47
	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.37)
Union Household	0.65***	0.59*	0.63*	0.55
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.38)
Age	0.03***	0.02*	0.02**	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	-0.07	-0.06	-0.04	0.47
	(0.19)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.37)
Income	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Catholic	-0.10	0.13	0.24	0.21
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.39)
Not Protestant/Catholic/Agnostic	-0.14	0.50	0.50	0.34
	(0.36)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.74)
Agnostic	0.36	0.57	0.39	0.58
	(0.31)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.49)
First Language French	0.13	0.82	0.76	0.98
	(0.36)	(0.79)	(0.81)	(1.01)
First Language Not French or English	-0.07	-0.28	-0.26	0.16
	(0.24)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.60)
Employed in the Public Sector	0.12	-0.04	-0.10	0.14
	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.38)
Liberal Identification		0.46	0.65	0.97**
		(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.46)
Tory Identification		0.35	0.68	1.31*
		(0.49)	(0.52)	(0.66)
NDP Identification		-0.88	-0.91	-0.62
		(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.78)
Feelings toward Hampton and NDP		1.87**	1.58*	2.89**
		(0.71)	(0.80)	(1.11)
Feelings toward McGuinty and Liberals		0.30	0.15	-0.88
		(0.67)	(0.71)	(0.99)
Feelings toward Harris and Tories		-1.77***	-2.21***	-3.96***
		(0.53)	(0.65)	(1.04)
Interventionist Government Factor			-0.33*	-0.76***
			(0.17)	(0.23)
Efficacy Factor			0.27	0.36
			(0.21)	(0.26)
Social Welfare and Diversity Factor			-0.35	-0.14
			(0.21)	(0.13)
NDP Riding Chances				0.02
				(0.01)
Tory Provincial Chances				0.01
				(0.01)
Liberal Provincial Chances				0.02
				(0.01)
Constant	-1.34***	-1.62**	-1.52*	-4.72***
	(0.42)	(0.73)	(0.77)	(1.43)
Pseudo-R^2	0.11	0.28	0.33	0.40
N=	234	165	165	141

Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis; * $p<0.5$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.05$

Table 5b.: Probit Estimation of Loyalty (=1) vs Tory Vote (=0)

Variable	Socio-Demographic	"Valance"	"Ideological"	"Rational Actor"
Middle Class	-0.34	0.26	0.26	0.09
	(0.25)	(0.45)	(0.47)	(0.54)
Upper-Middle Class	-0.21	0.04	0.10	-0.12
	(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.34)	(0.41)
Union Household	0.65***	0.36	0.34	0.05
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.33)
Age	0.02***	0.02	0.02	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	-0.25	0.27	0.25	0.53
	(0.16)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.33)
Income	-0.03	-0.05	-0.04	-0.06
	(0.24)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Catholic	0.06	0.13	0.15	0.22
	(0.19)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.40)
Not Protestant/Catholic/Agnostic	-0.32	-0.91	-0.95	-1.24
	(0.30)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.67)
Agnostic	-0.03	0.48	0.34	0.80
	(0.24)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.55)
First Language French	-0.06	-0.68	-0.73	-1.19
	(0.29)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.64)
First Language Not French or English	0.20	-0.50	-0.49	-0.19
	(0.22)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.49)
Employed in the Public Sector	0.26	-0.02	-0.04	-0.09
	(0.17)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.34)
Liberal Identification		0.58	0.64*	0.35
		(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.42)
Tory Identification		-0.38	-0.35	-0.29
		(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.44)
NDP Identification		0.46	0.26	-0.28
		(0.84)	(0.86)	(1.00)
Feelings toward Hampton and NDP		0.92	0.76	1.79
		(0.72)	(0.73)	(0.94)
Feelings toward McGuinty and Liberals		3.04***	2.81***	2.77**
		(0.89)	(0.89)	(1.18)
Feelings toward Harris and Tories		-3.16***	-2.96***	-4.76***
		(0.52)	(0.59)	(0.93)
Interventionist Government Factor			-0.01	-0.27
			(0.16)	(0.20)
Efficacy Factor			0.04	0.00
			(0.18)	(0.21)
Social Welfare and Diversity Factor			-0.32	-0.14
			(0.20)	(0.23)
NDP Riding Chances				-0.00
				(0.01)
Tory Provincial Chances				0.02***
				(0.01)
Liberal Provincial Chances				0.03***
				(0.01)
Constant	-0.52	-1.38*	-1.35	-4.03***
	(0.38)	(0.72)	(0.74)	(1.47)
Pseudo-R^2	0.08	0.59	0.60	0.65
N=	299	242	242	210

Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis; * $p<0.5$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.05$

Table 5c.: Probit Estimation of Loyalty (=1) vs NDP Vote (=0)

Variable	Socio-Demographic	"Valance"	"Ideological"	"Rational Actor"
Middle Class	0.38	0.28	0.25	0.43
	(0.35)	(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.55)
Upper-Middle Class	0.12	0.23	0.23	0.42
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.39)
Union Household	-0.09	-0.24	-0.32	-0.60
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.40)
Age	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	-0.10	-0.04	-0.03	0.25
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.35)
Income	-0.02	0.04	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Catholic	0.18	0.28	0.34	0.44
	(0.25)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.46)
Not Protestant/Catholic/Agnostic	-0.21	-0.39	-0.29	0.60
	(0.40)	(0.58)	(0.61)	(0.86)
Agnostic	0.04	0.10	-0.02	0.18
	(0.32)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.53)
First Language French	-0.37	-0.72	-0.87	-0.53
	(0.37)	(0.55)	(0.56)	(0.70)
First Language Not French or English	-0.19	-0.77	0.84*	-1.19**
	(0.26)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.53)
Employed in the Public Sector	0.19	-0.09	-0.06	-0.27
	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.41)
Liberal Identification		0.64*	0.80**	0.53
		(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.42)
Tory Identification		0.59	0.68	0.95
		(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.76)
NDP Identification		-0.84	-0.62	-1.11
		(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.60)
Feelings toward Hampton and NDP		-1.30	-1.47	-0.63
		(0.72)	(0.82)	(1.05)
Feelings toward McGuinty and Liberals		2.76***	2.82***	2.82**
		(0.82)	(0.83)	(1.13)
Feelings toward Harris and Tories		-1.19**	-1.02	-1.90**
		(0.57)	(0.63)	(0.87)
Interventionist Government Factor			-0.26	-0.65***
			(0.17)	(0.23)
Efficacy Factor			0.06	-0.06
			(0.18)	(0.21)
Social Welfare and Diversity Factor			-0.14	-0.06
			(0.20)	(0.24)
NDP Riding Chances				-0.02**
				(0.01)
Tory Provincial Chances				-0.00
				(0.01)
Liberal Provincial Chances				0.02
				(0.01)
Constant	0.21	-0.45	-0.44	-0.94
	(0.50)	(0.77)	(0.83)	(1.37)
Pseudo-R^2	0.04	0.28	0.30	0.41
N=	207	160	160	139

Notes: Standard Errors in Parenthesis; * $p<0.5$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.05$

Appendix A: Issue Questions Loading on Dimensions

Eigenvalues are given next to description of dimension, and are listed next to issues variable descriptions. Variables with loadings above 0.400 are listed. Full results of the factor analyses are available from the authors upon request.

A. Dimension 1: Pro-Anti Interventionist Government (3.10)
       i. Effort Government Should Put into Helping the Poor (0.63)
      ii. Effort Government Should Put into Eliminating Gender Discrimination (0.60)
      iii. Effort Government Should Put into Protecting the Environment (0.54)
      iv. Effort Government Should Put into Education (0.51)
      v. Effort Government Should Put into Assisting the Unemployed (0.50)
      vi. Effort Government Should Put into Crime Prevention (0.45)

B. Dimension 2: Political Efficacy (2.43)
      i. Government Doesn't Care What People Like Me Think (0.75)
      ii. People like me Don't Have a Say About What Government Does (0.66)
      iii. Doesn't Matter Who Wins Ontario Elections--Parties are the Same (0.49)
      iv. Those Elected to Parliament Soon Lose Touch with the People (0.48)

C. Dimension 3: Social Welfare and Diversity (1.23)
      i. Unemployment High Because It's Easy to Get Welfare (0.63)
      ii. Approve of Workfare Program (0.57)
      iii. Approve of Reduction of Welfare Payments in Ontario (0.56)
      iv. Teachers Should Not Have the Right to Strike (0.48)
      v. Unions Should Not Have More Power (0.42)
      vi. Immigrants Should Try Harder to be More Like Other Canadians (0.42)

Notes: Positive loadings on Dimension 1 indicates that respondent supports more government effort in these areas; positive loadings on Dimension 2 indicates that respondent disagrees with the statements indicating negative political efficacy; and positive loadings on Dimension 3 means that respondent agrees with these socially conservative statements. Due to coding considerations, factor loadings on Dimension 3 are negatively correlated with those in Dimensions 1 and 2. Mean substitution was used for missing data (i.e. instances when the respondent did not know the answer to the question or refused to answer).

Questions failing to load on any of the three dimensions include those questions asking about: governmental efforts to reduce the income gap between the rich and the poor, progressive taxation on the rich, the rights of employers to replace striking workers, gay rights, power of corporations, the tradeoff between more taxes and high spending and its converse, the funding of hospitals, single-payer healthcare, school uniforms, hydroelectric power, citizen trust in ordinary people over the government, and rent control in Ontario.