Gendering the Hyphen: Gender Scripts & Women's Agency in the Making & Re-making of Nation-States[1]

by
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The focus of this paper is the gender dimension of *nation*-states. Western feminists are often anti-state in orientation, investing considerable effort explaining how states sustain patriarchy, while nations are virtually invisible. National*ism* nation is widely demonized as "bad for women". McClintock's thesis that "[a]ll nations are gendered, all are invented and all are dangerous… in the sense of representing relations to political power and to the technologies of violence"[2] (1994:61) is widely held. My interest came from an exception: the belief of many franco-Quebec women that feminism and nationalism are mutually supportive; and that women's citizenship ethically implicates them in projects "their" nation undertakes. The conflation of nations into states hides their nature and obscures the diversity of women's relationships with this core political artifact of modernity.

Feminist critiques of states which exclude nation also ignore the existence of *a feminisms* affiliated with national projects. *Autonomous feminism* is detached from national projects and constructed as a universal ideology and trans-national movement. Within its influence, "[w]omen have often appeared to be more local, more global and less national in their political agendas than men".[3] *Affiliated feminism* involves women in relationships with national projects, from co-optation to co-operation. Both feminist and national projects have provided opportunities for women's emancipation. Feminist nationalists in Quebec see their struggle for an independent Quebec within this framework: hence their desire to participate in shaping a women-friendly "distinct society". *Autonomous feminism* is mainly advanced by women of the hegemonic cultures in the core Euro-American, nation-states; resulting in a paradox that the women most alienated from nationalism benefit most from the stability early *nationhood* produced in their nation-states, which dominated the world in colonial relationships.

It is tempting to theorize that autonomous feminism which rejects national phenomena is associated with "the west"; while affiliation with nations and nationalism characterizes "the rest". Kaplan asserts that: "[f]eminism and nationalism are almost always incompatible ideological positions within the European context".[4] Jacoby also argues that '[t]he merging of feminism and nationalism is a precise starting point for distinguishing non-Western feminists from their Western counterparts" because of "[a] long-standing tendency of Western feminism… to reject nationalism as an emancipatory framework".[5] I resist this dichotomy because feminism has affiliated with national projects in some western countries; and because the relationship between feminism and national projects changes over time. I focus on the meaning of the *hyphen* which symbolizes the joining of *nation* to *state*; and on what it means for women's citizenship and emancipation. By focusing on when feminists affiliate with national projects, I explore conditions for women's agency in nation-state-making and re-making. A key question is: what permits women to open up space for their activism in some *national* projects but not in others. A second key question is: what circumstances allow women's involvement in national

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[1] This paper draws on a 30 country study, focused in each on 3 "snapshorts" of gender/nation relationships. I wish to acknowledge the financial support of SSHRC; the research assistance of Judit Fabian; and the advice of Professor Micheline de Sève and Professor L. Pauline Rankin. For case references, see the project website: www.carleton/genderandnation .

[2] Anne McClintock, "Family Feuds: Gender, Nationalism and the Family", *Feminist Review* 44, Summer (1993), 61.

[3] Sylvia Walby, Gender Transformations, (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 19.

[4] Gisella Kaplan, "Feminism and Nationalism: The European Case" in Lois West (ed.), Feminist Nationalism (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 3.

[5] Tami Amandai Jacoby, "Feminism, Nationalism and Difference: Reflections on the Palestinian Woman's Movement", *Women's Studies International Forum* 22, no.5 (1999), 513.

projects to result in "women friendly" *nation*-states. Are franco-Quebec feminists right that "their" "distinct society" would be more woman-friendly with more autonomy or independence?

In this paper, I explore some relationships embodied in the hyphen which joins *nation* with the state. Rather than starting with *nationalism* as that which signifies the joining, however, I explore other national phenomena. I understand *nations* to involve both cultural and political dimensions, but my focus is that of feminist political science: I compare women with women, and conceptualize what is political to include both public and domestic spheres. I also follow the premise of "the personal is political" that citizenship involves more than voting and running for office. Consequently, my analysis is two-directional in that I seek to explain both how *sex/gender* regimes impact on *nation*-making, and re-making; and how *sex/gender* regimes are impacted by national phenomena. To "gender the hyphen", I explore how *sex/gender* regimes, and gender scripts, shape *nation*-states and the *nation*-state system. But "gendering the hyphen" also involves exploring how they shaped and constrained feminism as the distinctive emancipatory project of western modernity. Although most Euro-American feminists reject nationalism for its propensity for violence and exclusion, elsewhere national projects "empowered millions of women".[6] Why in these powerful states is feminism alienated from both nationalism and from states, focusing on local and global politics; while in less powerful *nation*-states and colonies, feminism and nationalism emerged together. The hostility western feminists have for nationalism, especially in so-called civic nations, also must be explored.

Tohidi believes western feminism is unique because it was formed by industrial capitalism and representative democracy; both inventions of the west, she believes, and necessary for a feminist consciousness to emerge. She believes also that a sustained capacity to organize autonomously over time emerged from feminism's "fierce struggle… to… extend… democratic and civil rights to the female part of the population".[7] It is unclear whether it was a "fierce struggle", or the long delay between *nation*-state founding and women's enfranchisement which produced autonomous feminism. Alternately, it may be the result of participation in the stable democracies and affluent economies which resulted. Citizenship in the public realm was first achieved in marginal Nordic states where women were allies in struggles for national independence; and in British settler states. Many "Third World" feminists reject the thesis that feminism was western women's invention, pointing to indigenous origins; many women in Asia, for example, became citizens before most women achieved the franchise in Europe.

In core western countries, *nation*-state making followed a somewhat different path, partly because of their formative role in inventing the *nation*-state form and international system. The first wave of *nation*-state formation began several centuries before the emergence of national*ism*, therefore, I focus initially on sex/gender regimes in place when nations and nationhood emerged. These core modern polities built on old, continuing nations and the stable nationhood which made them into successful colonial powers.[8] I speculate that the sex/gender regime, and gender scripts, which facilitated this success, formed part of the model of a successful, modern *nation*-state, which polities elsewhere tried, or were encouraged, to imitate. This involved how "we" organize sex/gender. Euro-American women mediated between tradition and faith at home, and modern, rational secularism in the public sphere in a public/private split which became the model of gendered modernity.[9] Although it constrained Euro-American women's choices and agency, it was promoted as how "modern" women should live and behave. The concept of development, which played such a central role in the cold-war

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[6] J.M. Bystydzienski (ed.) *Women Transforming Politics: Worldwide Strategies for Empowerment* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 20.

[7] Nayrereh Tohidi, "Modernity, Islamization and Women in Iran" in Valentine Moghadam (ed.), *Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Societies* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books and Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993), 110.

[8] Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham and Northhampton: Edward Elgar, 1996).

[9] Jill Vickers, "In Search of the Citizen-Mother", CPSA, Halifax, June 2003.

conflict between the democratic west and communist states, contained this model. 'Third world' women have often been divided about this model sex/gender regime, with some emulating it, while others insisted on indigenous models. But it was western feminists in the core, colonial Euro-American countries who reacted most strongly against the sex/gender model associated with the modern *nation*-state, while still sharing the conviction that they are the most "modern" and advanced as women.

Why Bother With Nations?

Why explore feminism's relationships with national projects when many theorists of globalization claim *nation*-states are being "hollowed out" and a thing of the past? *Nation* served as the intermediate form between individual and universal during the centuries when feminism emerged. Women of hegemonic cultures may see *nation*-states as irrelevant as they work through global networks and institutions. But most women still struggle to have "their" *nation*-state defend their rights. Indeed, their
activism in the international arena is usually to encourage "their" *nation*-state to comply with its commitments concerning women's rights. Historically, women achieved citizenship and human rights as members of *nation*-states, often as allies in achieving freedom from foreign domination; or in *nation*-building. Women who see themselves as universal citizens may see "their" *nation*-state as less important, where welfare-state provisions have been eroded. Ironically, however, western women enjoy more security from their *nation*-state than women elsewhere.

Diversity of women's experiences with *nation*-states is part of the "fundamental challenge for global feminism" which is "that the conceptions, objectives and strategy… in different nations and regions have become intertwined with very different economic, socio-cultural and political conditions".[10] These diverse relationships offer an important opportunity for theorizing the potential for women's agency in the making and re-making of modern *nation*-states. Equally important is taking up Smith's challenge that: "gender-nation theories have considerable work to do… to provide a more comprehensive causal analysis of [how] the complex interrelations of gender and nation contribute to the formation of nations and the spread and intensity of nationalism".[11] Theorizing how "the complex interrelations between gender and nation" contribute to the formation and restructuring of nation-states, I hope to insert gender into mainstream theories of nations and nationalism, while asserting the importance of national projects for understanding sex/gender regimes.

The paper which follows has three parts. First, I sketch feminist and mainstream theories of nation and nationalism, arguing that an undue focus on national*ism* obscures the importance of other national phenomena for understanding the role of gender. Second, I explore the basic concepts of nation, nationhood and nation-making and introduce key hypotheses concerning gender/nation relationships. I begin by examining women's roles in nations without states, relating the importance of the domestic sphere in re/producing nationhood. I introduce the concepts of *inclusive* and *defensive nationalism*. I theorize[12] that nation mediates between

[10] Tohidi, "Modernity, Islamization and Women in Iran", 110.
[11] Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 210.
[12] Ithe theoretical work on which I build includes: Erica Benner, "Is There a Core National Doctrine?" *Nations and Nationalism* 7/2 (2001); Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*; Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (London: Zed Books, 1986) and "Colonialism, Nationalism and the Colonized Woman", *American Ethnologist* 16 (1989); Sara Evans, *Born for Liberty: A History of Women in America* (New York: Free Press, 1999); Franz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (New York: Grove Press, 1963) and *Black Skins, White Masks* (New York: Grove Press, 1967 [1952]); Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Women and Social Injustice* (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing, 1942); Montserrat Guibernau, *Nations Without States* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999); Tami Amandai Jacoby, "Feminism, Nationalism and Difference"; Kumari Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World* (London: Zed Books, 1986); Gisella Kaplan, "Feminism and Nationalism"; Ann McClintock, "Family Feuds"; Valentine M. Moghadam (ed.) *Gender and National Identity: Women and Politics in Muslim Socieities* (London & New Jersey: Zed Books, 1994); V. Spike Peterson "Setting Political Identities:

modern and traditional, secular and spiritual; and that women perform the work of mediation. Consequently, different sex/gender regimes reflect women's roles in nation and making nationhood. In particular, I stress the duality between women as citizens and their roles as structured legally by marriage. In the core nation-states, between the 16th and 19th centuries, women were privatized as citizen-mothers, but nationhood was restructured eventually to incorporate legal citizenship. Benner's thesis that the national doctrine is constitutive of the modern international system, however, explains the need for those sex/gender regimes to preserve stability in the first model of nation-state making and why they persist as nation-states are restructured.

In the paper, I explore women's roles in specific "moments" of making and re-making *nation*-states. By "gendering the hyphen", we see how both Euro-American *nation*-state making, and anti-colonial, modernizing nation-making in the 'third world' involved parallel processes. Women were assigned to similar family roles, but in anticolonial cases were also expected to symbolize modernity in the public sphere. In making post-colonial, nation-states, women continued to mediate[13] between traditional and secular, unless traditional, religious values became embedded in state institutions. The Euro-American model of modernity incorporated sex/gender regimes the state secular and rational and assigning to women responsibility for sympathy and Christian virtue, in the family - "a haven in a heartless world". Women were responsible for the emotion and charity now absent from the efficient, rational and impersonal public sphere. The cases chosen illustrate how sex/gender regimes factor into nation-making; and how women form the hyphen which joins nation to state. Finally, I assess when women can make space for feminist agency within the making and re-making of *nation*-states.

Nations & Nationalism: Mainstream Accounts/Women's Experiences

I begin by exploring the troubled relationship between western feminism and nationalism. Analyzing the mainstream Euro-American literature on nations and nationalism, Smith asserts that the dominant paradigm of explanation is *modernist*; and that: "[m]odernists… derive both nations and nationalism from the novel processes of modernisation, …[and] show how states, nations and nationalism, and notably their elites,… mobilized and united populations in novel ways to cope with modern conditions".[14] The "modern" conditions identified are usually those thought needed by industrial societies, especially a homogeneous culture. The paradigm is *functionalist* because it assumes the characteristics of "modernity" exist because industrial society cannot function without them. Different approaches theorized focus on the functional needs associated with print capital; the need for communications, rituals and symbols in forging national communities; and the formative role of a centralized state, war and bureaucracy. Modernists understand nations as created by - not pre-existing-nationalism; and as "imagined" by elites to create societies which fit with modern needs. *Nationalism* is theorized as an ideology which replaces religion; as the political principle "which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent",[15] the legitimizer of political regimes; used to justify creation by the state of an homogenous culture; and to legitimize actions which make territorial and cultural boundaries coincide. Although in sociological accounts of industrial society theorists

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Nationalism as Heterosexism", *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 1:1 (1999); L. Pauline Rankin "Sexualities and National Identities: Re-imaging Over Nationalism" *Journal of Canadian Studies* 35/2 (2000); Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*; Walby, *Gender Transformations*; and "Gender, Nations and States in a Global Era", *Nations and Nationalisms* 6/4 (2002); Lois West (ed.) *Feminist Nationalism* (New York and London: Routledge, 1997).

[13] Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*.

[14] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 224.

[15] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 1.

specify specific sex/gender arrangements,[16] no mainstream, modernist theories include gender as a category of analysis theorize the role sex/gender regimes play in creating and sustaining either modern societies or modern *nation*-states.

Within the modernist paradigm, four types of explanation are offered for the rise of modern nation-states and nationalisms: 1) *socio-cultural* versions in which a functional need generates a common culture for modern, industrial societies; 2) *socio-economic* versions which derive nationalism (and predict its decline) from the operations of the world economy; 3) *political* versions which relate nations and nationalisms to the modern state form, war and elite dominance; and 4) *ideological* versions which see nationalism primarily as a belief system substituting for religion and reflecting ideational changes, especially the end of theological justification for political rule. There is no version which derives nations or nationalism from changes in the sex/gender system; nor which explains changes in sex/gender as caused by any modernist explanation. Feminist scholars of nations and nationalism draw on the modernist paradigm, especially Anderson's idea of nation as "an imagined community".[17] Few engage the paradigms' assumptions, however, beyond "borrowings", except in one way: they critique the absence of gender as a category of analysis and explanation, insisting that *nations and nationalism are always gendered.* They assume that through association with states, nations and nationalisms because of their propensity for violence and exclusion, form part of *patriarchy*, understood as an institutionalized system of male dominance which works through the four dimensions.

Feminist scholars offer little more guidance concerning roles *sex/gender regimes* play in modern *nation*-state formation and restructuring; focusing on nationalist ideology, especially how nationalists try to naturalize nations by reference to families and male dominance within them. But there has been no systematic analysis even of the discursive variability within the gender scripts of nationalisms; such as why *nation*-states are the "mother country" in some places, but the "fatherland" in others. Often it isn't even clear if women are excluded from, or included in, "the nation". Anthias' and Yuval-Davis' works offer a functionalist schema for locating women's roles in reproducing ethnic and national projects: as biological reproducers; as reproducers of boundaries between ethnic/national groups; as ideological reproducers and transmitters of their culture; as signifiers of ethnic/national differences; and as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles.[18] They also focus mainly on ideological phenomena, however, with little emphasis on political and economic dimensions.

Other explanatory paradigms of nations and nationalisms include: *primordialists* who derive nations from the 'primordial' attributes of basic social and cultural phenomena, including kinship, religion, language and ethnicity; *perennialists* who see national phenomena as long-term elements of historical development, derived from ethnic ties, myths of origin and familial metaphors; and *postmodernists* who focus on the current fragmentation of national identities, eschew the possibility of a general theory and employ deconstruction as their basic method.[19] A fifth paradigm - *ethno-symbolism* - focuses not on the *why* of national phenomena, but on *how* to uncover "the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations", and how nationalism involves the reinterpreting of symbols, myths, memories and values to create new symbolic

[16] Parson's functionalism was built into the theory of the "civic" or "political culture" used for decades to "explain" male dominance in western democracies. Carole Pateman's tracking of how it embodied myths underlying contract theory is in "The Civic Culture: A Philosophic Critique" in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba (eds.) *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1980).

[17] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed., (London: Verso, 1991 [1983]).

[18] Flora Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis (eds.) *Woman-Nation-State* (London: MacMillan, 1989), 87.

[19] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 223-5.

scripts for modern use, usually building on ideas of ethnic election ("we are the chosen people"), sacred territory, collective density and golden age.[20] Although feminist scholars have not participated in debates in mainstream studies of nationalism, the field's conflicts are still reflected in feminist work, through borrowings. Their work *is* also affected by the field's: "failure to reach consensus on [its] delimitation…"; its' "terminological difficulties"; the "deep divisions between basic paradigms and methodological approaches"; the lack of "agreement about… fundamental objectives [or] … substantive elements, of explanations"; and the impact of "quite opposed ideological positions *vis a vis* ethnic and national phenomena". [21] Smith locates feminist scholarship within the postmodern paradigm and, borrowing from Walby, identifies four research strands within it: empirical research, virtually all about "Third World" cases; work on the ideological uses of women in nationalist discourses; the "nations are gendered" literature which identifies nations and nationalisms as masculine projects; and "normative… analysis" in which feminism and nationalism are deployed as opponents in identity politics, with nationalism as the moral pariah.[22] Smith believes feminists' adoption deconstructionist methodology resulted in a shift away from causal explanation.[23]

The postmodern approach has produced useful work deconstructing national discourse, especially by Yuval-Davis. She theorizes that gender scripts are related to nationalism, understood as a theory of political legitimacy, with three dimensions: the genealogical constructed around a people, or their race (*Volknation*); the cultural dimension in which the essence of the nation is in its symbolic heritage (*Kulturnation*); and the civic dimension of nationalist projects which focus on citizenship (*Staatnation*).[24] Yuval-Davis argues further that, not only are all nations gendered, but also that all manifestations of gender are "nationed", hence challenging the idea of a universal feminist discourse. She provides abstract, examples of how these dimensions relate to actual, sex/gender regimes but provides no clues why each context structures gender in particular ways. The impression is that if the civic dimension predominates women's opportunities for agency are greatest; but this is neither developed, nor supported by empirical evidence. Moreover the core Euro-American *nation*-states, which are the main civic nations, excluded women from public citizenship often for centuries. Like Fanon and Moghadam, she distinguishes between modernist and anti-modern national projects, suggesting the former are more supportive of women's emancipation. Again, this is not developed; moreover while modernist national projects usually emancipated 'Third world women, the successful, modern Euro-American nations excluded them Yuval-Davis does provide a key insight arguing that in civic *nation*-states the citizenship given to women "is usually of a dual nature: on the one hand they are included in the general body of citizens, on the other… there are always rules and regulations and policies which are specific to them".[25] That is, while women became legal equals in the public sphere, laws regulating marriage and sex/gender relations still construct them as inferior to, dependent on, and subject to, men within the private sphere. Like women in India (see below) they are modern in the public realm, while remaining traditional at home. It has been these gender-specific rules, regulations and policies feminists have struggled against in recent decades, yet even "liberated" western women if married still become less equal at home. Moreover, this affects their public sector status as well.

Kaplan's asserts that European feminists were never comfortable in relation to

[20] Ibid., 224.
[21] Ibid., 221/2.
[22] Walby rejects the view widely held by feminist scholars that nations and nationalisms are allmasculine projects. She does argue that men and women often relate to different national projects, and or relate differently.
[23] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 205-10.
[24] Nira Yuval-Davis, *Gender and Nation* (London, Thouasand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage).
[25] Ibid., 21.

nation-states they see as masculine, coercively pro-natal and constitutive of patriarchy. Yet, national projects elsewhere can mobilize millions of women - some of whom consider themselves feminists. This raises the questions of why women in different contexts have such varied perceptions of, and experiences with, national projects. Morevoer, is the Euro-American model of autonomous feminism alienated from national projects the norm from which women elsewhere diverge? Or is the Euro-American case the exception, perhaps because the *nation*-states involved were first formed as dominant colonial powers. For example, Finland which developed a woman-friendly nation-state, was marginal in its geo-political location and much less powerful. How do power differences affect how feminists construct their relationships with "their" *nation*-state? Pettman conceptualizes dominant nationalism as "state nationalism, or empire nationalism… [which] functions to make the state its own, to conquer and rule 'others'".[26] She believes only women hegemonic cultures in these core *nation*-states benefit from nationalisms. While women in some oppositional national projects and modernizing, anti-colonial nationalisms benefit also, nonetheless, women in these dominant *nation*-states were simultaneously: i) excluded from citizenship; ii) alienated from national projects; but iii) gained materially (with expanded life expectancy, higher levels of nutrition, literacy, education, opportunities for professional, reproductive choice and physical security) from the successes of "their" *nation*-state. Was women's privatization in the founding sex/gender regime part of that success? If women's exclusion was accidental (few men had the right to vote either), the work women performed in the domestic sphere, nonetheless, contributed to the *nation*-state's success and was entrenched in the model of modernity.

Challenges to the Anti-National Position

Because nationalism *is* often complicit in violent conflict and oppression, the idea that women may affiliate with national projects has met with resistance. The belief that nationalism is "bad for women", moreover, was reinforced recently when states like Yugoslavia failed with nationalism blamed for rape camps and ethnic cleansing. Challenges to the anti-national position, however, came first from non-Western feminists led by Jayawardena who argued that many Asian and Middle Eastern women achieved legal rights, citizenship and education by participating in anti-colonial, national struggles. This provoked a debate around two issues: whether the results were "really feminist"; and if they lasted past independence. While western feminists now "recognize difference", what is considered "feminist" still reflects a, modernist ideal[27] including: individualism, anti-natalism, universalism, secularism, pacifism and the valorizing of public over domestic roles and spheres, especially as a site for politics. Women affiliated with their communities are still seen as less feminist - even "unfeminist". "Real" feminists, like Virginia Woolf, neither have nor need a country. Algeria was much scrutinized because women's participation was believed not to have produced lasting advances for women after independence, feeding the view that women who affiliate with national projects are manipulated, even "dupes".

A second body of literature about national liberation struggles also challenged anti-nationalist views. Fanon theorized relationships between women and anti-colonial nation-making would go through three stages as Algerians dealt with their reactions to French-imposed modernity. Chatterjee believed women in anti-colonial struggles mediated between India's claims to being a modern state and nationalists' justification for independence because India was superior to the West in its spiritual civilization. Educated and employed "new women" in public, Hindu women were to guard traditions embodying India's spiritual superiority at home. Feminist scholars developed these themes. Sabbah believed all anti-colonial nationalisms

[26] Ibid., 24.
[27] See Vanaja Druhvarajan and Jill Vickers, *Gender, Race and Nation: A Global Approach* (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 2002).

combine modernity and anti-modernity, analyzing Palestinian women's relationships with different elements of the national movement.[28] Moghadam believed changes in both nationalism and feminism from first-wave to second-wave reduced productive engagement. Changes in western feminism from maternalist, reform-focused, to anti-natal movements focused on sexual liberation she claimed weakened projects for affiliation and made claims feminism is indigenous more difficult to argue. *Autonomous* and *affiliated feminisms* differ over: 1) gender conflict as the primary motor of women's politics; 2) the family as a site of politics; 3) women's maternal/nurturing roles as the basis for politics; 4) the completeness of feminism as a politics, and as an emancipatory framework; 5) the possibility of women's agency in mixed-sex or male-led movements; 6) whether male dominance and female power are a zero-sum game or co-exist.

A third body of literature which challenges the idea that feminism and nationalism are incompatible includes single country studies exploring the complex relationships between women and national projects. It demonstrates the *variability* of women's relationships with national projects including: disengagement; mobilization *of* women *by* nationalists; women's active involvement; and affiliation. The results of these relationships also vary: women may benefit from a national project, even if they reject engagement; gains made by feminists may or may not survive the re/institutionalization of changes. This literature also reveals situations when feminist projects emerge with national projects. But no systematic comparison has been undertaken.

Theorizing Variability: "Contexts" & Transitions

Literature which demonstrates there is not one essential relationship between "gender" and "nations", or between "women" and "nationalism", provides the opportunity to explore how political, economic and ideational processes shape women's gender consciousness and their relationships with national processes. Are similar processes at work? Or is there a separate dynamic of changes in reproductive consciousness and technologies, as Mary O'Brien theorized.[29] Each may also be triggered by *transitions* including: democratization, industrialization and market liberalization; *nation*-state formation, partition, expansion and failure; neo/colonialism and imperialism; militarization and war. While theorizing the effects of all of these transitions is beyond the scope of this paper, my cases illustrate several to show different transitions affect gender/nation relationships.

To theorize why gender/nation relationships vary in different contexts, I draw on Walby's framework which links changes in ("gender transformations") to "rounds of restructuring" *nation*-states and nationalisms undergo in relations to transitions. This produces two axes for comparing variability: first, women's relationships with national projects may vary in a country over time; second, they vary because of a country's (geo-political) location in the international political economy and colonial/neo-colonial power structures. Developing a framework for plotting relationships between sex/gender regimes and national projects in different contexts has only become possible with the increased availability of feminist scholarship from outside the West allowing us to explore the significance given to national projects by non-western feminists. McClintock theorizes "woman's political relation to the nation was submerged as a social relation to a man through marriage… so [her] citizenship… was mediated by the marriage relationship within the family".[30] This parallels Yuval-Davies' observation that women were citizens in the public sphere, but their citizenship was mediated through laws governing their marriage to a male citizen. In some cases, women's citizenship was only expressed within the domestic sphere; while in others women must mediate between being legally equal in one

[28] Suha Sabbah, Palestinian Women of Gaza and the West Bank (1998).
[29] Mary O'Brien, *The Politics of Reproduction* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981).
[30] McClintock, "Family Feuds", 65.

relationship while legally subordinate, dependent, and even inferior to men in marriage. Our cases show women being "Soviet" in public, "Azeri at home"; modern Indian "new women" in public, defenders of Hindu tradition and spiritual superiority as dutiful wives and daughters-in-law at home. This bifurcation between women's public and domestic roles characterizes the making and re-making of *nation*-states. I theorize that how effectively women mediate between modern and traditional - political and familial - may be key to the stability of nationhood and it is this mediation which sex/gender regimes address.

Was this *dualism* in women's citizenship unique to the Euro-American model - and perhaps key to its success? Or is this model a *common element* in the midst of much variability. This is not explored in western feminist discussions of gender and nation.[31] While on one level, western feminists now reject the "sisterhood is global" idea and believe "women" are not homogenous; on another level, they share a universalist conception of feminist values reflecting their location: western (colonizer, not colonized), modern (secular, not faith defined), individualist (not communal), and anti-natal (not maternalist) values are the norm. Ironically, this model of feminism embodies a reaction against the sex/gender regime assigned women in early nation-state founding. Hegemonic, western feminists' alienation from nations and nationalisms also reflects resistance to: being "confined" in the family by a state-sustained public/private "split"; being required to bear and rear more children than they wish (and a belief that the *essential* pro-natalism of *nation*-states produces this demand); and a belief that *nation*-states are dangerous because they command coercive technologies used to maintain male dominance, war and colonial domination. Feminists who are universalist and pacifist do not wish to be implicated in such projects. Euro-American feminists' beliefs reflect on women's experiences with nations and nationalisms in the dominant western *nation*-states. But do they characterize women's relationships with national projects elsewhere? Where women were not privatized but expected to participate and mediate between modern/secular roles and traditional/spiritual ones in their persons, somewhat different views resul? Variation in gender/nation relationships is also linked to value differences within feminism, especially concerning maternal roles and values.

Choosing Cases - A Tentative Typology

Although for this text, I include only a few cases to illustrate theoretical issues, the typology the project includes the following: i) modern *nation*-states; ii) modernizing, anti-colonial national projects; iii) anti-modern, anti-colonial national projects; iv) settler society nation-building; v) nations without states. Within each, however, I also distinguish between hegemonic and minority national projects. For example, in Canada pre-colonial, "First nations", pan-Indian nationalism, diaspora nationalisms and an anti-colonial, minority European national project in Quebec all compete with a pan-Canadian nation-building project. Within category i), moreover, there are three subcategories:

a) Core Euro-American *nation*-states - This is the original model. Its characteristics include: early, stable nationhood; successful capitalist development; foreign markets achieved through colonialism and imperialism; successful political development with representative institutions, and later democratization; a sex/gender regime with upper and middle-class women privatized as "citizen mothers" - e.g., Britain, France, Holland and the United States.
b) Late, failed or incomplete *nation* or state formation - Cases of failed nationhood or nation-state formation, prevented or delayed economic and/or political development, resulting in: violent nationalist movements, e.g. Germany, Italy; encapsulated nations-without-states, e.g. Poland; and states which created empires based on religious-authoritarian and militarist rule, with limited nationhood, political development, e.g. Spain, Portugal, Russia.

[31] See Karen Beckwith, "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective", *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (2000) for discussions about problems identifying what is "feminist" cross-culturally.

c) Marginal western *nation*-states - In the late 19th/early 20th centuries formed successful, women-friendly *nation*-states, with little militarization; and women's full and public participation as citizens from founding, e.g. Finland, Norway.

In addition, reunifications (Germany) and the breakdown of communist empires and states (Russia and Yugoslavia) produced additional contexts and types. See Figure 1 for an outline of 9 contexts and their associated sex/gender regimes.

Gendering Nations & Nationhood

If we begin to "gender the hyphen", not with national*isms*, but with nations and nationhood, we encounter the conflicts among paradigms Smith notes. Between primordialists and perennialists, and modernists there is disagreement about whether nations are "real" entities which pre-existed modern nation-states. Modernists see nations as "invented" or "imagined communities" only created by nationalists and nation-making elites, who are overwhelmingly male. Although primordialists and perennialists theorize nations as from older forms including kinship, neither theorizes roles for women. In the modernist paradigm, the hyphen involves manufacturing nationhood, so the male monopoly on state power would make all gender regimes patriarchal. If nationhood pre-exists pre-existing modern *nation*-states, however, the hyphen may signify incorporation of sex/gender elements.

I incorporate elements of Smith's ethno-symbolic paradigm "to uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular nations, and to show how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories as they face the problems of modernity".[32] But I do not theorize a single path to modern nation-statehood, always involving a symbolic legacy from the past. Settler states project new "nations" into the future, for example, as much as they draw on the past. Moreover, while the modern *nation*-state *system* originated in Europe, *nations* and *nationhood* have more varied origins. Anti-colonial theorists like Fanon and Chatterjee, do identify the role sex/gender systems play in Third-World cases, also showing how imperialists targeted colonized women, as reproducers of faith and nationhood, in their efforts to consolidate colonial power. Fanon asserts: " … to destroy the structure of Algerian society, its capacity for resistance", the colonizers recognized they "must first of all conquer the women".[33] Where foreign powers dominate a nation, however, most men of the dominated polity are displaced from the public sphere by men of the dominant power. Hence domination was different for men and women; and, although resistance was shared, resisting women played more complex roles.

Creating successful, modern nation-states, and successful colonization both required control over women because of their roles in reproducing collective identities. So control of women was key to the disruption or preservation of national identities and to modernization and colonialism. In making *nation*-states, women privatized in the home embodied values lost in the public sphere through modernization. In colonial societies, women were targeted for "liberation" from the oppression attributed to their culture, to justify foreign rule, disrupt resistance and prevent reproduction of pre-colonial identities. In Algeria, Fanon observed, the French "rescued" women from "backward customs" by assimilating them into the modern, European sector. This pattern was repeated under Soviet rule and in settler states. But colonial rule also involved sexual domination of colonized women, so removal of dominated men from the public sphere,

[32] Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism*, 224.

[33] Franz Fanon, “Algeria Unveiled” cited Anne McClintock, “No Longer in a Future Heaven”: Nationalism , Gender and Race” in Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny (eds.), *Becoming National* (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 268.

paralleled sexual domination of "their" women. In resisting moreover, anti-colonial nationalists expected "their" women to mediate between anti-colonial, state-seeking nationalism and the traditional nationhood independence was to restore.

What is embodied in the hyphen between nation and state, and what gendering the hyphen entails, are not always the same; each case must be unpacked to find patterns. Where *nationhood* pre-existed the making of a modern *nation*-state by military and bureaucratic means, however, state elites could appropriate collective identities and the loyalties they embodied. Where nationhood did not already exist, hegemonic control by state elites meant eliminating competing loyalties and creating commonalties, shared myths, beliefs and experiences, even if invented, because domination in the absence of common feelings, beliefs or allegiances requires considerable coercion.[34] To create stable *nation*-states, or impose colonial rule, involve similar processes. In settler states, both processes were combined. Prior to European incursion, North America was organized largely into nations and confederacies in an inter-national system of self-governing nations. When that system was superceded by the modern *nation*-state system, surviving "First Nations" were encapsulated by settler states. To eliminate Aboriginal nations, traditional political structures were outlawed and traditional sex/gender systems disrupted by forced removal of children to residential schools, outlawing languages, and enforcing patrilineal and patriarchal family law. Like the Jewish nation which existed for two millennia in diaspora without a state, however, some First Nations survived. Like the Jewish "nation", they were held together by religious and familial practices, and a sense of nationhood. Although Aboriginal nations have no written texts to transmit their ideas, they used oral history, spiritual and familial practices to reproduce the sense of we'ness.[35] Inclusive and defensive nationalisms which worked through combined spiritual and familial processes are outlined in my discussion of the Blackfoot Confederacy, Poland and Azerbaijan below.

Insisting on the European and modern origins of nationalism, mainstream theorists would not apply the concept to Iran/Persia with its rich internal national dialectic between Islamic and pre-Islamic cultures any more than Aboriginal nations. Kedourie argues that nationalism could not exist in Persia, for example, because for most people the language or culture of the rulers didn't matter.[36] For modernists, Persia was a timeless, agricultural, "traditional" society in which nationalism could emerge only in reaction to, and imitation of, the European original. By examining nation and nationhood, however, we can avoid ethno-centric assumptions which deny nationhood (hence an independent polity) to anyone other than Euro-Americans. By exploring how nations without states develop nationhood, we can better understand both why nationalism is so potent, and takes forms different from those in Europe. We also can better understand why globalism loosens the ties of *nation*-states, without eliminating nationalisms. Some nations without states, which existed prior to modern *nations*-states, are re/emerging as global, political actors with varying degrees of autonomy; moreover, some *nation*-states are morphing into multi-national states. These cases also show women play important roles in nations without states, and in sustaining nationhood in face of foreign domination. To gender the hyphen, however, we first must understand *nation* and *nationhood*, in relation to sex/gender regimes.

Nations Without States: Inclusive and Defensive Nationalisms

Several types of nations without states are important for our analysis: first are

[34] Fiona Wilson and Bodil Folke Frederickson (eds.) *Ethnicity, Gender and the Subversion of Nationalism* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 1-6.
[35] Gerald R. Alfred, *Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965).
[36] Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London, Hutchinson, 1960).

nations within a system of state-less nations, as in North America prior to European incursion. Without state power, political systems worked on consent, although war could occur between nations. An *inclusive* form of *nationalism* was associated with this form. The other form involves minority nations within nation-states in the modern international system, some with some autonomy; others subordinated to foreign powers. A *defensive* kind of *nationalism* based in the family characterized this form. Most recently, globalization and transnational structures have loosened nation-state ties, so nations-without-states have emerged as political actors[37] often with positive results for women through a conversion from defensive to more inclusive national projects.

Ladner describes the *Silksikaawa* (Blackfoot) nation and confederacy before colonial incursion, including its non-patriarchal sex/gender regime and inclusive form of nationalism.[38] Based on oral evidence from Elders (a form of evidence withstanding in Canadian courts), she describes *Siiksikaawa* nationalism as embodying a nationalism "unto itself": unlike European nationalism, it was inclusive and not based on coercive/state rule.[39] Moreover, she concludes, gender "didn't matter" in terms of citizenship. Not bound together solely by kinship or blood ties as primordialists theorize,
it "had a very open conceptualization of community membership, and an individual was welcome to join or be adopted into the community".[40] Nationhood involved sharing "a cultural, spiritual and political identity and a relationship with the spiritual and living world based on a shared sense of community or commitment or nationhood".[41] A confederacy of three nations, subdivided from the *Siiksika* or Blackfoot proper, it defined itself in relation to, and defended, territory including much of what now is Alberta, Montana and southern Saskatchewan. In the inter-*nation*al system "[e]ach nation had its own language, history, tradition, territory and structures of governance, and… an inherent right to self-determination"[42] recognized by other units, with diplomacy and war as dispute resolution mechanisms. Other confederacies like the *Haudenosaunee* (Iroquois) included separate nations joining together under a constitution. Although some social scientists reserve the term "nation" only for "civilized" peoples, Ladner shows the *Siiksikaawa* and *Haudenasuanee* meet all of the qualifications of nationhood set out in the Euro-American literature.[43]

Ladner theorizes that a strong nationhood (sense of "we-ness") was essential for Aboriginal nations because they were based on consensual political rule with leadership based on the confidence of the nation. In Aboriginal culture "individuals were perceived as being autonomous and were… bearers of all rights, freedoms and responsibilities".[44] Regardless of gender, all could do anything they wished "as long as their actions respected their place in the circle of life and their responsibilities within their families and the broader web of human and

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[37] Guibernau, *Nations Without States*.
[38] Keira L. Ladner "Women and Blackfoot Nationalism" in Jill Vickers and Micheline de Sève (eds.) *Nations and Nationalisms/Les femmes et les nationalismes: Canadian Experiencés/les èxperiences canadiennes, Journal of Canadian Studies* 35/2 (2000).
[39] None of the North American nations were state-seeking, although proto-state forms were developed in what is now Mexico.
[40] Ladner, "Women and Blackfoot nationalism", 38.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid., 39.
[43] Some Canadian scholars who reject the idea that Aboriginal peoples had "nations" employ the idea that only "civilized" (literate) peoples could qualify. See Thomas Flanagan, "The Sovereignty and Nationhood of Canadian Indians: A Comment on Boldt and Long", *Canadian Journal of Political Science* xviii (June 1985). A frequent distinction is between politics organized around blood ties versus territorially. But many "First Nations" are territorially organized. Size is also problematic since some Aboriginal Nations have a larger population than some European nations. The absence of written language is the only difference which stands up to close scrutiny. Modernists would reject the inclusion because of the absence of a state.
[44] Ladner, "Women and Blackfoot Nationalism", 45.

non-human interaction". [45] This meant citizenship in the nation was inclusive with leadership based on consent and ability. *Siiksikaawa* national*ism* was genderless. Although a division of labour assigned men and women to different, although complementary tasks, women were full and integral members of the nation, played spiritual and political roles, and owned most of the property. "[A]ll secular activities normally pursued by men were also open to women, should they wish to join". Women who pursued more masculine roles, alone or combined with feminine ones, were *ninawaki* or *sakwo'maoi akikwan* ("manly-hearted women").[46]

Siiksikaawa nationhood, therefore, contained an inclusive understanding of how "we" organize sex/gender. Although the sex/gender systems in pre-colonial "First Nations" varied, the basic elements were similar. In the Iroquois Confederacy, women were "mothers of the nation" with political powers of advice, veto and appointment of chiefs. These "nations" existed prior to modernity and apart from modern *nation*-states. The inclusiveness of the nationalism, however, was largely destroyed by colonialism.

Defensive Nationalism and the Polish Nation

Polish national identity, forged through centuries of partition, war and foreign domination resulted in a defensive form of nationalism which used familial and religious sites because it rarely had state institutions to reproduce identity. The *Matka Polka* (Polish mother), and the *Matka Bohhaterska* (mother hero), has perpetuated Poland's language and culture since the 1772 partition. Rousseau's advice to the Polish nobles who sought his advice about how to protect Poland was to "forge a body of citizens… so deeply imbued with a sense of unique Polish identity that no invader could destroy it". The family became locus of the Polish nation and Catholicism became its national faith

when foreign rule displaced Polish men from state power. Women created the Polish nation as "chaplains of the national fire",[47] "guided by traditional religious convictions, by the self-evident use of the mother tongue, and… traditional patterns of daily life".[48] The nationalism developed was defensive.

Nations without states generally make family the main site of national politics[49] with any autonomous faith-based institutions. Often "battles of the cradle" result in which those dominated seek to reclaim power by out-reproducing their rulers, resulting in coercive pro-natalism which restricts women's lives. Women transmit identity across generations, often as passive conduits; but women also may dissent about what should be reproduced. If foreign domination ends and elites transfer national-making to public institutions like schools, there are several possible results for women. Much depends on whether liberation valorizes military power, reinforcing male authority, as militarism usually excludes women from decision-making, even if women fight in liberation movements. Walby questions if this reflects a greater tendency to non-violence by women, perhaps because they consider war for nationalist reasons less likely to benefit them.[50] Or they are "seriously internationalist in outlook".[51] Gandhi also associated women with non-violence and admired its use by British activists.[52] Women's responsibility for

[45] Ibid.
[46] Alice B. Kehoe, “Blackfoot Persons” cited Ladner, “Women and Blackfoot Nationalism”, 53.
[47] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Government of Poland [1772] cited Erica Benner, “Is there a core national doctrine?”, 167.
[48] Rudolf Jaworski and Bianka Pictrow-Ennuker (eds.) *Women in Polish Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 56.
[49] See Jill Vickers, “Sex/gender and the construction of national identities”, *Canadian Issues/Themes Canadiens* 3 (Fall, 1982); “At His Mother’s Knee” in G.H. Nemiroff (ed.) *Women and Men* (Montreal: Fitzhenry and Whiteside, 1987); “Notes Toward a Political Theory of Sex and Power” in H.L. Radtke and S. Henderikus Stan *Gender/Power*, (London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage, 1994).
[50] Walby, *Gender Transformations*, 191.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Gandhi, *Women and Social Injustice*.

Christian values in the gendered division of labour on which nationhood was built in Europe may also explain their lesser militarism.

Often transition to an autonomous nation-state drew women into the public sphere, where they sometimes affiliated with nation-building projects. The first, brief experience with a Polish *nation*-state conferred citizenship on women, but established no pattern of female authority in public politics. Nor did women's heroic roles in the resistance movement in the second war change this. Under Soviet rule, they were expected to contribute as workers but were addressed mostly as mothers. Poland's liberation from communism, its transition to democracy and market liberalization resulted in many women being returned to the family, with less access to paid work or political power. Only a weak feminist movement advocates for women locally. Polish women were involved early in the largely non-violent, Solidarity-led struggle for democracy. But by the late 1980s, they were excluded from power by Solidarity and Polish Catholic leaders.[53] Women were expected to return to the *Matka Polka* role and since the new, fragile market economy would more easily be stabilized if it didn't have to provide work, or gender-specific benefits to bridge work and family roles, privatizing women was attractive.

While many feminist analyses assume women are always eager to participate in the public sphere, Poles were suspicious it after their experiences under communism. Whereas the family represented freedom under communism, and security over the long period foreign domination and unstable states. Polish women did not look on "their" state as a potential ally, or for security. So few Polish women demanded space in the new democracy, making their political marginalization easier.[54] Men excluded under communism from public politics expressed a long-pent up desire to claim the *nation*-state. The negative impact of "free" market policies on women's lives, their loss of welfare and social services, and of gender-specific rights (especially reproductive choice), however, may stimulate them to become more active. Feminism was implicated in discredited community ideology and Western ideas. Views of family as oppressive for women, for example, conflict with the high value placed on women's roles, including in nation-making, in the domestic sphere. Polish women, therefore, diagnose the causes of gender discrimination differently than in Euro-American nation-states.[55]

Features of Poland's history which *repressed* the emergence of women is participation in state-based national projects were:

- A long period of foreign domination when the sex/gender regime placed women in the domestic sphere with a valued role in national reproduction;
- The influence of religious authorities;
- Suspicion of the public realm, and of civil society, combined with a sense of safety, freedom and authority for women in the domestic realm;
- An economic transition facilitated by women's re-privatization and a reduction in, or elimination of, gender-specific and welfare services.

Ostrowska theorizes that the "religio-political image system was adapted to the demands of the new Communist ideology" because it was a symbol of civic faith designed to function independently of state or church institutions.[56] The new deployment defined women as both workers and mothers contributing to the new Poland's prosperity through their paid and unpaid work. Women's engagement with nationalism gave Polish women a special role in national life, but also "strengthened traditional patriarchal structures" so "men who feel deprived of the institutions of power for nearly two centuries will not easily surrender their new positions of

[53] Anna Reading, *Polish Women, Solidarity and Feminism* (London: MacMillan, 1992).
[54] Barbara Einhorn and Charlotte Sever, "Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe", *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5 (2003).
[55] Ibid., 173.
[56] Elizbieta Ostrowska "Filmic Representations of the 'Polish Mother' in Post-Second World War Polish Cinema", *The European Journal of Women's Studies* 5 (1998), 426.

dominance in the public political sphere" or share them.[57] Following Fanon's insight that foreign dominance works on men by displacing them from the public realm and leaving them only the domestic sphere in which to express their displaced authority, we can see that women may well have welcomed the freedom of the domestic realm, especially since Catholic gender scripts reinforced male authority. The basic structure of defensive nationalism, however, does not invariably lead to women's re/privatization when nation is finally joined to state.

Defensive Nationhood and Domesticated Religion – Azerbaijan

Under communist rule, Azeri women were also the prime repositories of tradition and national identity, but with somewhat different results, in part because Soviet secularism removed public religious institutions and authorities in a way not paralleled for Poland.[58] Tohidi's title "Soviet in Public, Azeri in Private" reveals the mediation Azeri women played under Soviet rule. But their role in preserving Azeri nationhood was complex. Azerbaijan is geopolitically located between East and West; and the

Bolshevik Russian takeover from Iran in 1920 occurred after that country's "Constitutional Revolution" had produced reformist and modernist Azeri organizations. As in Iran, they included feminist aspirations for and among elite women. Many Azeri's organized in a nationalist, social democratic movement in the late 19th and early 20th century[59] and Azeri women formed organizations and were active within the newly-formed political parties. The earliest women's groups, like the Muslim Women's Committee (founded 1906) engaged mostly in welfare work among women and children. But gender-specific demands - including for maternity leave - were expressed by reformist parties and the Muslim Social Democratic Group representing oil workers as early as 1904-5.[60]

Unlike Polish women, Azeri women experienced communist rule from within a recent past including feminist claims. For Azeri women mediation was not simply between Western, communist modernity and Eastern, Muslim tradition. "Azeri women pioneers… mobilized tens of thousands of women, contributing to… modernization and nation-building of Soviet Azerbaijan".[61] Women's emancipation in the public realm was remarkable: universal education resulted and the quota system resulted in 39% women in the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan in 1985, with 48% at the local level. As elsewhere in the Soviet system, real decision-making power stayed in male hands, but compared to other Muslim-majority and communist states, Azeri women had more public authority.

Reproducing Azeri identity in the domestic sphere constrained Azeri women's agency since vigorous secularization under Soviet rule made the home the only site of defensive nationalism. The "cultural characteristic[s] of… ideal Azeri women [were] at times as rigidly stressed as in the Islamic-theoretic Iranian part of Azerbaijan". These included: "honour…, feminine shame…, chastity and modesty…, virginity before marriage; beauty and tact; high education", self-sacrificing motherhood; docility and subservience towards her husband; home-making skills; ethnic loyalty; and endogamy".[62] To be Soviet in public and Azeri in private involved major contradictions but Azeri women were not passive transmitters of cultural identity; active creators of Azeri national projects. Nonetheless, they did not experience the domestic sphere as a realm of freedom, although were also both citizens in public and governed at home by strict Muslim norms.

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[57] Ibid., 443.
[58] Nayereh Tohidi, "Soviet in Public, Azeri in Private: Gender, Islam and Nationality in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan", *Women's Studies International Forum*, 19, 1 / 2 (1996).
[59] Ibid., 112.
[60] Audrey Alstrad, *The Azerbaijan Turks* cited Tohidi "Soviet in Public, Azeri in Private", 113.
[61] Ibid., 113. The result in the public realm included: 99.9% female literacy (1994) compared to 70% in Turkey and 42% in Iran.
[62] Ibid., 114.

Soviet Azerbaijan involved the domestication of religion, since only the family could inculcate Muslim identity establishing an interplay between religion and nationality for women to mediate. The male biased *shari'a* was replaced by a civil family code, so Muslim practices and Islamic values became part of Azeri nationality. Extended family and powerful sense of obligation to kin, "slowed down" women's integration into the Soviet polity because Soviet secularism made belief in Islam private and dependent on familial ritual, religion was both privatized and domesticated. [63] Anti-religious campaigns bonded the "*experiential*, *consequential* and *ritualistic* dimensions of Islam, understood… as a Muslim way of life" to Azeri nationhood in a powerful way. Unlike in the Middle East and Iran, where nationalists resist "westernization" by giving Islam a larger political role, Azeri's privatized their faith and "[c]overt ritualistic Islam" became "a barrier against total Russification".[64] Azeri women, were the primary tenders of this barrier and see themselves as agents in Azeri national survival. Leading activists in Omid Ancila Jamiyati (Mother's Association of Hope) stressed women's greater authenticity because, by "never marrying out", they demonstrated that "a nation is kept alive only through its mothers".[65] One concluded "had we been ruled over by Muslim Arabs, or Muslim Persians, we would have been assimilated long time ago" but "we can revive the Azeri nation as long as… daughters and mothers retain their Azeri identity".[66]

After the Soviet period, Azerbaijan's geopolitical location, war with Armenia, many war widows and a million refugees, combined with a deep sense of "militarized national humiliation". Nonetheless, Azeri women reject both the western, feminist model of womanhood and veiled model from Iran. Proud of their role in national survival, they seek to enhance their agency by overcoming authoritarian conformism"[67] in the public realm. But they also believe that male dominance of public power is a reaction to Azeri's "militarized national humiliation".[68] With a long activist tradition and high levels of education, literacy and paid work, Azeri women are organizing to defend women's rights within a nationhood in which they still accept strict constrains on their behaviour for the collective good.[69]

Nationhood

Margaret Canovan observes that, while national*ism* is common in the Euro-American world, and was exported around the globe, *nationhood* was quite rare.
Western political theorists ignored nations, and nationalism, because they lived where stable *nation-hood* was achieved *prior* to the formation of modern *nation*-states. So nationalist struggles were not needed. Canovan believes that countries which engaged in *nationalism* movements in the 19th or 20th centuries, were "unlucky" because they had not developed nationhood prior to the emergence of the international system based on *nation*-states. Those with a headstart already had a stable identity. This supports my strategy of focusing on how *nations* and *nationhood*, *nationality* and *national consciousness* were incorporated into nation-states and not just on nationalism. Then by "gendering the hyphen" and identifying the distinctive sex/gender system associated with nation-states, we can distinguish why in the "lucky" Euro-American *nation*-states were so successful.

Canovan's thesis is that *nationhood* mediates between individual and universal; familial and political. Similarly, Nairn sees the nation as "the modern Janus", with one face looking back to timeless tradition, while the other looks to a limitless future.[70] Nairn seeks to explain the

[63] Ibid., 116.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid., interview with Mahabbat.
[67] Ibid.
[68] Ibid., 120.
[69] Ibid., 120.
[70] Tom Nairn, *The Breakup of Britain* (London: New Left Books, 1977), 101.

worldwide appeal and spread of nationalism. He focuses on national*ism* as an ideological movement. But the Janus image also captures the role of women. Kandiyoti believes national*ism* presents itself as a modern project which can dissolve traditional identities and loyalties, while constructing new ones out of the symbols of a supposedly shared communal past.[71] National*isms* draw on both traditional and modern aspects; women are represented as traditional, embodying the conservative principle of continuity with the past, in their bodies, lives and values; while men represent what is modern. This associates women with timeless, ahistorical nature, while men represent progress and change.[72] But imperialist discourse and European thought represent *all* those colonized as embodying timeless tradition. To contest this, anti-colonial nationalists represented "their" women as modern, in contrast to western women who were guardians of tradition at home, while being represented as emancipated abroad. In the national movement in India women were simultaneously represented as modern in public, but traditional at home.

Canovan theorizes that, far from being common and easy to produce, nationhood and nationality, are uncommon and hard to produce. If nations embody authority and consent, while states are about power and coercion, joining nation to state can divorce political authority from the need for religious sanction, diminishing the coercion required by appropriating authority as though "the people" had consented to it. But how did this joining - this hyphen - occur in the original nation-states, and what sex/gender regimes did it require? Moreover, since legitimacy is at risk each time change forced nation-state restructuring, how could stability be maintained? Canovan argues that *nationhood* performs acts of mediation in the lucky countries which pioneered secular modernity. Debates about nations involve apparent dichotomies: *Is the nation a political entity, a state? Or a community held together by language and culture? Is it constituted by birth? Or by choice? Or is it a politicized version of ethnicity? Is it a matter of individual or collective identity? Are nations natural or artificial? Are they immemorial or recent products of modernization?* To Canovan nationhood mediates, links, contains within itself, and holds together these alternatives. "Thus, a nation is a polity that feels like a community".[73] It is "a contingent historic product that feels like part of the order of nature". [74] It links individual and community, past and present", and "turns political institutions into a kind of extended family".[75] The nation is modern, but also somehow immemorial; it makes "[a] polity… seem like the family inheritance of an entire population".[76]

Canovan takes us close to a gender analysis, but passes by. She theorizes that secure nationhood is based on a "central mediation between state and community".[77] She makes no distinction between women and men as members of the nation, but I theorize that the mediation the nation performs depends significantly on women. In anti-colonial contexts, women link modern and traditional in their persons and behaviour. But nationhood distinguishes successful modern polities from those which struggled long, and often violently, to impose nationhood in a territory. To mediate between modern and traditional values and loyalties, therefore, required stable nationhood, which in the original Euro-American model was performed by "citizen-mothers" in the domestic sphere. Women created the "fusion between the familial and the political"; this is the work of mediation which "gendering the hyphen" involved. Moreover, although nation-states now have been restructured to include women as citizens, they still relate to the state through a duality. As citizens, they are equal; but marriage laws make them

[71] Deniz Kandiyoti "Identity and Its Discontents: Women and the Nation", *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* 20/3 (1991), 431.
[72] Ann McClintock, "No Longer in a Future Heaven", 263.
[73] Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 69.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid., 71.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid., 74.

responsible for perpetrating traditional values. Wives and mothers are to provide care without reservation, to love without limit, to make homes, festival and identities without pay.

A nation mediates among the diverse people who belong to it, but how does it link them together? And what do women do to achieve this mediation? Why did they become allies and agents in some nation-states while in others they were merely conduits for transmitting male authority. Here gender scripts which capture symbolically the permissible relationships between women and authority come into play. Gender scripts within nationhood in the west almost always used the trope of the patriarchal family. Fanon theorized gender was a formative dimension of national*ism.* While rejecting the idea that "the" European family is natural or normative, he also rejected any logical isomorphism between family and nation. Canovan believes "part of the magic wrought by nationhood is to make the 'we' … it constitutes seem as natural as a family group". Women make nations seem natural by creating common identity at home, teaching children their native tongue and the customs and rituals which make them feel related to people they have never met. While male theorists are dismissive of "dine and dance" parts of identity in the making of everyday life and of making festivals and holidays, this is how women create the magic of mediation. But, women's mediation is rarely seen as creative activity it is; not is any agency attributed to it. Yet nationhood is created in the household of first basic identity is formed by the smells, tastes, heroes, stories, songs and sounds of childhood which represent who we are and where we were raised.

Fanon links military violence, central state authority and gender power asserting that: "[m]ilitarization and the centralization of authority in a country automatically entail a resurgence of the authority of the father".[78] Canovan's nationhood may have been achieved without militarization, but it or reinforced patriarchal authority. Circumstances within which nationhood was created or imposed may signal differences in the associated sex/gender regime.

Smith asserts "if any political phenomenon are truly global, then it must be the nation and nationalism".[79] How do we square this with Canovan's thesis about the rarity of nationhood? Her image of nationhood is of a *battery* "which can store power for future use without needing to be active all the time".[80] Nationhood mediates between the familial and the political, but the power structures in the two not are the same; public democracy coexists with authoritarianism in the family. Neither families nor nations are natural, but we experience a sense of inevitability about both. The battery of nationhood stores the legitimizing power to weather crises of transition and challenges to legitimacy. While legitimization can also be achieved through religion or political ideology, nationhood works best because it "can attract so much support with so little by way or organization, doctrine and continuous mobilization".[81]

Nationalist movements struggle to imitate "the magic wrought by nationhood… to make the 'we' that it constitutes… natural".[82] But "[t]he most stable of modern states, those in which internal peace seems most assured, are precisely those that do belong to a people".[83] In the "lucky" countries, nationhood evolved over centuries is reproduced by women in childhood. Machiavelli and Rousseau both theorized the division of labour between women and men they believed best produced stable nationhood. While nationhood may be a "sticky cobweb of myths and mediations", it does provide those lucky enough to have it, a precious gift of internal stability - at women's expense. Greenfeld also believes that nationhood ("national sentiment") most characterizes the "old, continuous nations"; the English, French, Dutch, Danes and Swedes.[84] She also believes we can only properly speak of nationalism when significant portions of the

[78] Fanon cited McClintock "No Longer in a Future Heaven", 265.
[79] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1991 (132).
[80] Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, 3.
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid., 74.
[83] Ibid., 138.
[84] Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).

population identify a "nation" with "the people"; that is, the "we'ness" has depth so the population, not just the rulers and nobles, are seen as the nation. She does not ask if "the people" included women, although the "citizen-mother" role developed by Locke suggests they could have been.[85]

Historians of British identities before nationalism, see it as a nation centuries earlier but a centralized, bureaucratic state created by absolute monarchies was necessary for nationhood to be joined with a modern state. Seton-Watson[86] and Tilly[87] also distinguish between the old, continuous nations which existed before nationalism and the nations-by-design which are nationalism's product. Some of the "old, continuous nations" became encapsulated within other nation-states (the Scots, Basques and Poles) surviving as distinct entities. Other built empires (Portugal, Spain and Russia) but failed to develop economically or politically of home. The secret of stable nationhood appears to be its weaving together over a long period of selected symbols, myths, heroes and values drawn from diverse (not homogenous) ethnic and religious traditions, and institutions, creating a collective identity to legitimize institutions despite rapid change. In none of the successful, core Euro-American, colonial states were women allies partners in *nation*-state making, as they were in settler states and anti-colonial movements.

The Nation-State System & the National Doctrine

Benner extends Canovan's analysis by explaining the significance of stability provided by nationhood in the modern, international system. She theorizes that the national doctrine "has deep roots in the security concerns specific to the modern, pluralistic system of sovereign states and prescribes in general terms the *form* that any community should take in order to survive or distinguish itself in that system".[88] Benner explains the persistence of the national doctrine in the nature of the international system, rejecting the thesis that modernity or "democracy needs nationality",[89] noting that national*ism* hangs out as often with anti-democratic, as with democratic partners. Because of the association of nationalism with military struggle, however, we can distinguish between early-formed and later-formed nation-states; both depended often on absolutist monarchies to create modern centralized states and the early-formed nation-states were colonial powers engaged in foreign domination. She concludes "the national doctrine is constitutive and geopolitical", [90] not constitutional or cultural. The cohesion and stability nationhood provides is essential if polities are to resist external threats, defend "the people" and the "national interest"; and dominate others with minimum risk to stability at home. The requirements of the international system emphasize military power and bureaucracy, both of which enforce masculine authority.

The international system in which the national doctrine developed was: 1) modern in that states claimed sovereignty; 2) pluralist with multiple sovereign states each of which could remain autonomous; 3) based on self-help with each unit responsible for its own self-interest; 4) sovereign, in that no intervention was tolerated within each state's territory; 5) there was no arbiter; 6) no single power could dominate all of the others. The core states with stable nationhood were mostly formed before this system emerged; certainly before it was expanded globally. In the new system, conflicting internal loyalties were a serious disadvantage, so initially subjects had to profess the same faith as the ruler. Nationhood, or a deeper collective identity and loyalty to state institutions, improved the polity's survival and success.

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[85] Vickers, “In Search of the Citizen-Mother”.
[86] Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nationalism, Old and New* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1960).
[87] Charles Tilly, *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975).
[88] Benner, “Is there a core national doctrine?”, 155.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid., 171-2.

Canovan echoes Machiavelli's idea of nationality as "making provision in quiet times" by building on existing affinities in the polity including shared language, customs, historical memories, religion and territory or boundaries. To Benner the national doctrine at its core is about "how to constitute a viable political community in a specific kind of international system". Both Machiavelli and Rousseau both wrote about creating new cultural bonds to foster patriotic virtue in "the whole people", not just those who rule or fight. But were women included in "the people"? How do they help constitute viable political community in a highly unstable, competitive international system. As early *nation*-states emerged, the household still "was widely regarded as part of the public realm"; and women were seen as having public duties "even if they were not oath-swearing citizens". By the 19th century, however, the household was seen as part of the private realm, through the privatization of the family, and the removal of many economic activities from the family to the market.[91] In the new, specialized political structures, women increasingly were excluded because of their sex, as in elections when introduced.

Militarization and bureaucratization in *nation*-state formation also worked against women gaining authority as "[r]ulers intent on increasing and centralizing their own authority supported legal and institutional changes that enhanced the power of men over the women and children in their own families".[92] In Catholic Europe, where religious ideology supported male dominance, state control over marriage enforced increasing constraints on women's autonomy. Weiser notes: "[t]he power of husbands over wives was rarely disputed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries [in Europe], which was why women were not included in discussions of political rights".[93] But women petitioned parliament for both general and gender-specific goals. Although sent home on grounds that as dependents their husbands represented their interest, in the 1649 Petition, they argued "we are not all wives" when claiming political rights for women. "[H]ave we not an equal interest with the men of this Nation in those liberties and securities contained in the Petition of Rights and the other good Laws of this Land. Are any of our lives, limbs, liberties or goods to be taken from us more than for men, but by due process of Law?"[94] Petitions received a favourable hearing when they asserted women's economic interests or ways of facilitating women's domestic responsibilities, petitioning, bringing cases to court and to city council meetings declined. While some women had some political power, the new nation-state authorities were not about to grant them political rights. In Protestant countries, there was less against women's authority or against their ability to consent as part of "the people". But men were the dominant sex in both domestic and public authority in both contexts.

The sex/gender system in successful nation-states involved women mediating through nationhood between modern and Christian values. By the 18th century, "Christian virtues were privatized and feminized, no longer viewed as important in the public actions of rulers or political leaders, although their private lives were still to give evidence of religious convictions". [95] The proper values for the public realm were rationality, efficiency, good judgement and comradeship: men were modern but even the most rational Enlightenment thinkers like Voltaire wanted their wives, children and servants to display proper Christian virtues. As economic changes elevated ownership, efficiency, secularism and "realism" in power politics, Christian virtue, compassion and charity became the responsibility of religious orders and of women in the family and

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[91] Merry E. Wiesner, *Women and Gender in Early Modern Europe*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 295.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid., 296.
[94] Ibid., 298. Petitioning also occurred in the British settler colonies and was one political activity in the public sphere open to women, demonstrating that “citizen-mothers” were part of “the people”, even if men monopolized public power. Moreover, although marriage laws established male dominance in the family, marriage contracts could modify their effect.
[95] Ibid., 302.

community. Secularization in the public realm was balanced by a sex/gender regime which assigned the values removed from the modern public sphere to women. Nationhood mediated between the two. In Protestant countries women expanded their activities as citizen-mothers, and as good Christians, out from the domestic sphere into charitable organizations, settlement organizations, anti-slavery groups, etc. to ameliorate the horrible costs paid by slaves, the landless, homeless, jobless and hopeless because of the capitalism and colonialism. "Our way" - the sense of nationhood which mediated between traditions of reciprocal rights and duties and Christian obligations to others; and a society organized around efficiency, power and greed - assigned women roles as tenders of the sick, the poor and dispossessed; as well as reproducers of national identity in each generation and eventually also in work in nursing, teaching and the missions.

Women-Friendly Nation-States and Nationalisms

In this section, I introduce cases from the late 19th, early 20th century which involved women-friendly national projects. Walby rejects the idea of a single, formative period of *nation*-state formation in her work on the restructuring of European nation-states and their "gender transformations".[96] So while British and French nationhood originally excluded women from public citizenship, it was changed and women now are citizens; there are even discussions in France about women's right to parity, or equal representation in public life. Walby theorizes that national projects undergo "rounds of restructuring" when nationhood is reworked and new "systems of gender relations" are written into national scripts. This may result from women's agency; or "systems of gender relations" may be re-written to facilitate changes in how nationhood mediates between familial and political; tradition and modernity. In some cases, however, circumstances make national projects women-friendly.

I sketch several cases which involve different relationships between gender and nation, to explore different aspects of the theoretical literature focusing on the hyphen between *nation* and state. The analysis reveals different aspects of "gendering the hyphen" including:

i) the role(s) women play(ed) in creating and reproducing nationhood;
ii) the locus of nation-making, especially the role of the family;
iii) women's role(s) in nation-state formation and/or restructuring, including identifying transitions which precipitate formation/restructuring;
iv) the circumstances which facilitated/repressed women's agency in national projects;
v) circumstances which facilitate/repress affiliation between feminists and national projects;
vi) How specific sex/gender regimes mediate between tradition and modernity.

The cases are represented in Figures 2 & 3.

Finland - A Women-Friendly Nation State

The Finnish Case involves first a project to create a nation-state independent of Sweden and Russia. To apply Walby's framework, two subsequent restructurings which also involved feminist affiliation with nationalism. All adults became citizens simultaneously in a new independent nation-state "coeval with goals of achieving prosperity and social progress". [97] The "Let Us Be Finns" nation-making movement created "an environment predisposed to promoting feminist goals. Finnish women were first in Europe to gain the right to vote (1906) and displayed a high level of political participation from the beginning with 39% women legislations in 1996.[98]

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[96] Walby, *Gender Transformations*, 189.
[97] Kaplan, "Feminism and Nationalism", 28.
[98] Ellen Marakowitz, "Gender and National Identity in Finland", *Women's Studies International Forum* (19, 1 / 2, 1996.

How can we test the nature of women's political agency in Finland? If we applied only the modernist Euro-American model of feminism (see Figure 2), as Kaplan does, we'd find that Finnish "feminism" still fits, because it is associated with left, progressive arguments for women's' autonomy as individuals and encourages their participation in public politics. But the national narrative Finns created was "gender interdependent"[99] and the national project made nurturance something to be shared by the whole society, not for women alone in the family. The Finnish "design for the nation" included "the domestication of the state" in a welfare-state ideology "rooted in a belief inequity and the absence of difference of worth (value), either gender- or class-based".[100] Finnish women inserted mothering into the national script, making nurturing a shared, public responsibility. The resulting nation-state was "women friendly", and the national narrative portrayed strong, competent women as makers of the nation-state and responsible for its actions through their citizenship. This afforded women considerable agency with a strong "fit" between feminism and nationalism.

Beckwith's thesis that "[f]eminist movements… are distinguished [from women's movements] by their challenge of patriarchy"[101] proposes that "feminism" is marked by a *gendered* analysis of the power structures of women's subordination and a determination to contest them. Both are present in the Finnish cases. But does this also mean gender conflict is the only dynamic of gender relations? Basu complains that this conception "assumes a sameness in the forms of women's oppression and… movements cross-nationally".[102] The Finnish nation-state is based on a form of equality in which both men and women share responsibility for both private and public nurturing; and welfare state policies so both sexes can undertake responsibilities are part of a strategy to overcome the negative effects of patriarchy on *both sexes*. So the Finnish nation-state project involves both inter-dependence and gender conflict, with both sexes responsible for mediating their effects.

Modern, Anti-Colonial National Projects – Asia

In modernizing, anti-colonial projects in Asia, women's roles in the family often conflicted with those assigned women in the public realm. But in many countries, feminist movements developed within nation-building projects, and women achieved citizenship while mediating between private and public roles. India and the Philippines are two cases. In each, the national project changed over time and my analysis examines women's roles in three or more phrases: modernizing, anti-colonial nationalism (late 19th century to Independence); modernizing, post-colonial nation-building; and recent cultural, anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist nationalism. Both countries are functioning democracies, each with many languages, cultures and religions so the national project is the main unifying force. In both women express indigenous forms of feminism, somewhat different from the dominant Euro-American form. Feminism is largely a project of better-off, better educated, urban women; but in both countries women are more visible in politics than in Western Europe or the U.S.

In India, women engage with nationalism in three phases: anti-colonial, modernizing nationalism (1880-1947); Congress-led, independence nation-building (to 1991); and the recent period dominated by right-wing Hindu nationalism under the BJP. (See Figure 3). In each, Indian women were expected to be modern in terms of work, education and citizenship in the public sphere. But at home, they were to embody spirituality which Indian nationalists believe demonstrates India's superiority to the West. Some Indian feminists argue it was the need to mediate this contradiction which produced Indian feminism. But more recently

[99] Ibid., 56.
[100] Ibid.
[101] Karen Beckwith, "Beyond Compare? Women's Movements in Comparative Perspective", *European Journal of Political Research* (37,2000) 437.
[102] A. Basu, "Introduction" in A. Basu, *The Challenge of Local Feminisms* (Boulder: Westview), 1.

it is evident in right-wing, anti-feminist nationalists active in the *Hinduvta* movement. Hindu nationalists have not developed an anti-western form of political Hinduism, rather it developed in reaction to, and to contest, political Islam. "The Saffron Wave" has recruited millions of women to that cause in a form of controlled emancipation.[103]

Prior to Independence, feminism emerged mainly within male-led anticolonial movements. The national movement had several strands: the Congress-led project for a United India; and Hindu- and Muslim-exclusive strands. The Congress movement project focused on a secular state under Nehru; and an anti-modern project associated with Gandhi. Both included women, although in different roles. Chatterjee argues that Indian nationalism established a new form of patriarchy in which "female emancipation" was associated with the historical goal of sovereign nationhood. Although Congress sought to modernize women's lives, and granted them rights", Chatterjee argues the result was a new sex/gender regime in which men still dominated women. Some Indian feminists agree. Others reject it as an oversimplification, point to Gandhi's "feminizing" of nationalism which valued women's gender-specific attributes and traditional values.

The literature on Gandhian nationalism and the women's movement has two views. First was that Gandhi used the movement, but also promoted its emergence as a strong, feminist project allied with, but also critical of, the Congress-led project of nation-building. The post-colonial feminist movement was women-led and participated in building a secular state. They also promoted feminist co-operation across communal lines. The second view was that Gandhi co-opted the movement and prevented its development as an autonomous project. Forbes concluded that India demonstrates "feminism and nationalism are compatible", but that a Western-style "sex war" based on gender conflict could not emerge because the basic contradiction between private, traditional values and public and public modern ones persisted.[104]

Gandhi's "feminized nationalism" was based on a new, but still essentialized, plan for women's lives. He believed men and women were essentially different, but valued their roles as equal which led him to incorporate women into the non-violence campaign. He knew men had power over women; urging college women as early as 1927 not to marry and subject themselves to husbands but to devote themselves to national service. His goal was justice for both sexes as he tried to feminize men, by encouraging them to be more like women, from learning to spin cloth to bearing suffering. To those who reject any kind of essentialism, Gandhi's plan to eliminate the contradictions western civilization and modernity produce for both women and men is unacceptable. Feminism is now generally seen in terms of sameness between the sexes and equated with sexual autonomy for women, a result Gandhi feared. He supported a difference-based feminism rejecting the modernist model. But this did not mean ignoring gender conflict. Gandhi's theme that "women alone can emancipate themselves" suggests compatibility between feminism as an emancipatory project and his antiwestern nationalism, although it was Nehru's plan for Indian modernity which feminists promoted in the post-Independence period. Women did benefit from Congress-led nation-building, but urban, educated women benefited most and women are still inferior to men in most contexts, especially in the family. Nonetheless, women's authority is evident in all versions of the national project, even in the recent right wing Hindu version. Feminists work against gendered harms like dowry deaths, and for benefits of sex equality and citizenship. When Congress governments targeted "excessive reproduction" as a hinderance to development, and imposed coercive contraception

[103] Thomas Blom Hansen, \"Controlled Emancipation: Women and Hindu Nationalism" in Fiona Wilson and Bodil Folice Frederickson, (eds.) *Ethnicity, Gender and The Subversion of Nationalism* (London and Portland: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1999) 82-94.

[104] Geraldine Forbes, "The Indian Women's Movement: A Struggle for Women's Rights or National Liberation?" in Gail Minault (ed.) *The Extended Family* (Delhi: Chanakya, 1981) 49-82.

and sterilization, however, feminists mobilized and receonceptialized the issues in terms of "reproductive choice and health", rather than adopting an anti-natal model.[105]

The third stage beganwith the election of the Baharitya Janata Party (BJP) in 1991. Frustrated by their displacement in politics, education and good jobs because of the "modernizing" state's equity policies, higher caste men - and women - support the BJP and more militant right-wing Hindu nationalist groups. They want a "normal" nation-state in which the dominant culture's values (Hinduism) are inserted in state laws and institutions, as Christian values are in most supposedly secular nation-states in the West. A clear distinction emerges here between the "controlled emancipation" of Right Wing Hindu women working with the RSS (Rashtriya Sevika Samiti) or the Women's Wing of the Nationalist Volunteers and feminists organized in trans-communal groups. Right Wing nationalist or Hinduvta ideology is attractive to some upper caste, educated Hindu women and some play activist and leadership roles in organizations rejecting a secular state. As Juergensmeyer[106] argues, religious nationalists understand and construct the world through "cultural" essentials of faith, food, marriage, the body and death, so a "secular" state not imbued with these "cultural essentials" is unthinkable. While Hindu nationalism is not an antiwestern religious "fundamentalism" and does not reject modern technology or western consumerism, it does see the family as a barrier against modernity.[107] Patriotic motherhood, the extended family and opposition to equality-promoting measures set Hindu women nationalists against Indian feminists.

When identity transmission no longer revolves mainly around women in the home women must contest public power if they are to ensure restructured nationalism does not equate male dominance to social order. When defensive nationalism ends, distinctions between private and public spheres are introduced and cultural reproduction may be transferred to the public sphere, and the family subordinated to the state. If this coincides with secularization (chosen rather than forced), women may be able to insert equality as a national value. But since women rarely have the same education or access to resources that men do, if "equality" is interpreted as same-as-men women likely will loose out. When the national script values nurturing as a public sector role, by contrast, women may experience less contradiction between the family and public sector roles. Whether anti-colonial or not, nation-making involves both modernizing and anti-modern, tradition-preserving tendencies, which must be mediated.

In the Phillippines, women encountered complex demands partly because two colonizers were involved, the Spanish and then the United States. Women calling themselves *feministas* joined the national liberation struggle against Spain from the 1880s, although women had participated in uprisings in previous centuries. The colonial powers ruled indirectly through indigenous elites. Catholicism had important, if contradictory results for women, since it provided European values and education and important roles outside of marriage. *Feministas* campaigned against colonial rule, for political rights for women and to remove limitations resulting from the Spanish Civil Code which had undergone no modernization. They were the first women in Asia to win the vote following a lengthy campaign in which they mobilized over half a million women for a plebiscite. This first wave of feminist nationalism emphasized: a national identity shared by both men and women, focused on the common good rather than individualism; women's involvement in progressive religious movements which affected both feminist theory-building and practice; and the family and kinship relations and roles.

Feministas also affiliated with national projects: against Japanese occupation; in the struggle (1970-86) against the US-supported Marcos dictatorship; and in the (peaceful)

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[105] Navsharan Singh, “Of Victim Women and Surplus Peoples: Reproductive Technology and Third World Women”, Ph.D. Thesis (Political Science, Carleton University, 1998).
[106] Lynn M. Kwiatkowski and Lois West, “Phillipines: Feminist Struggles for Feminist Nationalism” in Lois West, (ed.) *Feminist Nationalism* (New York & London: Routledge, 1997), 148.
[107] Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, 57.

transition to democracy. From 1970s organizations like MAKIBAKA (Free Movement of New Women) initiated a vigorous debate on "the woman question" within the National Democratic Movement, struggling to insert women's concerns while resisting co-optation. "Since 1960s, feminists have appropriated nationalist themes to argue that true liberation includes gender, race and class, as well as nations, to create a truly democractic national culture".[108] Women organized as feminists in both left movements and autonomous, feminist movements. The umbrella organization GABRIELA, founded in 1984 as a general assembly, aimed to keep feminist issues alive within the National Liberation Movement. Women workers movements are now especially active.

The third phase of affiliation related to the anti-imperialist nationalist movement against the negative impact of modernization and US domination. GABRIELA's commissions on Women's Health, on Violence Against Women and on Reproductive Rights fed into government activity, defining women's issues as national issues. Jayawardena describes the feminism of the first phase as "motherist" and focused on rights. But with each phase feminism deepened and mobilized more segments of society, without losing this core. Drawing on pre-colonial, spiritual imagery, *feministas* resisted the left nationalist myth that "feminism" was western and middle-class, successfully insisting on its indigenous roots. Recently GABRIELA supported sexual orientation rights within a difference-based feminism.

Nationhood Without Women? Iran

It is important to include in our discussion at least one case with little possibility for women's agency within the national project. The Iranian case displays periods of women's participation around their emancipation and state action to "modernize" their lives. Iran, however, involved a form of coerced secularization, and a backlash against it, which made women's dress and behaviour a battleground on which conflict between western nationalism and anti-western Islamism has been played out. There are three periods of interest: the popular uprising around the Constitutional Revolution (1905-11); the Nationalist Movement (1951-53) and the Islamic Restoration of 1979-81. Although women played active roles in each, "[w]omen's participation in political struggles and the question of their emancipation first arise in Iran in response to foreign domination and as part of the nationalist reaction both to the foreign powers and to the ruling dynasty".[109] Although small groups of educated women, mainly in Tehran, pursued women's rights linked to the struggle for a western-style nation, the emancipation of women was largely imposed from above by the Shah as part of his program of authoritarian "modernization". Forced unveiling, for example, symbolized the autocratic leader's battle with the Shia clerics in which secularism symbolized his efforts to replace Islam with a Persian-inspired national project.[110] In the first period, western-inspired male reformers favoured women's education, political rights and opposed polygamy, but assumed male dominance would persist in both the family and the state. Although women addressed some nationalist demonstrations against Russian, British and, later, US incursions, they were mobilized by male elites as powerful symbols, not agents.

Women's behaviour and dress was a battleground between secularists, including the Shah, and Shia clerics. Laws supposedly "emancipating" women, such as the outlawing of chador, which was brutally enforced until 1941, were not struggles *by* women, but about who would control them and what model of society they would symbolize. While the Shah "gave" women the right to vote (1963) and enacted a *Family Protection Law* (1967) to limit polygamy and give women more opportunity to initiate divorce; the vote involved little real power under the

[108] Sandra Mackey, *The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation* (New York: Plume Books, 1996).
[109] Jayawardena, *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*, 70.
[110] Haiden Moghissi, *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis* (London & New York: Zed Books, 1999) 134.

monarchy, and not much more under the Islamic Republic, which rolled back the Shah's reforms.

Moghissi, a refugee Iranian feminist, argues strenuously against post-modern tolerance of the Islamic Republic believing: "hostility toward feminisms and feminist demands inherent in divine laws and women's liberation in Islamic societies must therefore start with de-Islamization of every aspect of life. Hence, feminism and Islam cannot be reconciled".[111] Although Islamists' manipulative use of gender issues has confused many secular scholars, she concludes that "Islamic feminism" is not possible within the framework of the Islamic Republic which rejects the links between national and women's emancipation as "western" secularism. Iranian feminists promote women's rights in the family, education and the workplace, but the Republic is a theocracy governed by Shia doctrine and Islamic law. The Majis (legislature) acts as an institution of representation to which women may be elected (although they cannot be elected as President), but the all-male Council of Guardians controls who may contest elections, and veto any legislation as "unIslamic". The ancient and modern scripts of the Iranian nation contain no female images. Indeed, Mackey believes its political culture depends on (male) charismatic leadership, not democracy or the power of the people which could include women. Despite its name, the Republic is based on the sovereignty of God and clerics who interpret the Koran, not on popular sovereignty - with or without women. Female political authority isn't conceivable against the backdrop of a millenia-old national consciousness of "the Iranian way".[112]

Moghissi argues that, whether individualist or communal, whether independent or interdependent, "feminism" includes refusing to subordinate one's life to male-centred dictates - whether secular or religious.[113] Women who are attempting to ground women's advancement within an Islamic framework grapple with the question of whether Islam "as a personal faith" or "a cultural identity" or "a response to spiritual need" is compatible with any conception of feminism. Moghissi concludes that "[t]he *Shari'a* unappologically discriminates against women and religious minorities" and so "is not compatible with the principles of equality of human beings". This is evident, she argues, in the behaviour of the Islamic Republic because theocratic rule is authoritarian rule. In fact, women have been able to combine national projects and feminism best in democratic regimes, although ironically it has more often been feminists who were the unwilling partners.

Conclusion: Women's Agency and the Hyphen

Contexts when women can insert gender equality into national scripts and develop autonomous feminist movements provide the best opportunities for women's agency in bringing nation and states together. Finland, India and the Phillippines each provided opportunity for some agency at the time of nation-state founding or restructuring. The common factor is likely the non-violent nature of the struggles against foreign domination in each case, which made it possible for women to be seen as allies and co-founders of nation-states. A second factor is that in all three cases, feminist movements affiliated with national projects were difference-based and
supported a public role for women whether of their own making or not, consistent with their familial and communal roles. The discursive power Finnish women were able to mobilize let them shape the nation-state by valorizing nurturing as a public-sector task. But the meaning of the Finnish case is disputed. Kaplan argues that Finland is merely "an outpost of Europe", "marginal to European and world events". Others argue that Finnish women's political prominance resulted because new political structures were not a bastion of entrenched male power when women became citizens. Nonetheless, Finnish women gained political power

[111] Mackey, *The Iranians*.
[112] Moghissi, *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism*, 140.
[113] Ibid., 141.

primarily because of their affiliation between feminism and nationalism and the absence of militarism or authoritarian rule. Marakovitz and Kaplan also question if Finnish feminism is "really feminist" because: it is maternalist, rejects gender conflict, stresses interdependence between men and women, and inserted maternal values into the public sphere by legitimizing in the national narrative the idea that the nation-state should nurture the society. Since the most successful affiliations between nationalism and feminism also involve difference-based feminisms, it is worth exploring this further.

Defining feminism across time and space is a major problem for feminist political research; and the dominance of Euro-American feminism, with its model of feminism makes it especially difficult. Although Finnish feminism is atypical in Europe, this does not disqualify it as feminist, especially when women name themselves and their organizations as feminist. Moreover, there are elements in Finnish feminism we find replicated in other Nordic countries. Maternal feminism was the common form when Finland was founded and also shaped British "social feminism" and feminism allied with nation-building in New Zealand and English Canada. Whether women who call themselves feminist, but display divergent values are "really feminist" is especially complicated regarding the "Third World". Nonetheless, values of Indian feminists are closer to those of mainstream Euro-Americans than to Finnish feminists; *feministas* in the Phillippines display an ideology like Finnish, and some settler states.

Exploring nations without states, I showed that in both defensive and inclusive nationalisms, women can be deeply engaged with re/creating nationhood without agency; or with agency. Defensive nationalism, however, rarely sponsored feminist allies. While Blackfoot nationhood did provide space for women's agency, the values are not appropriately described as "feminist, since that ideology is associated with modernism. Moreover, the Polish, Azeri and Iranian cases indicate that women may be deployed symbolically and represent the nation in their person, behaviour and maternal duties, without emancipation in women's lives resulting. Nonetheless symbolic inclusion may well result in public citizenship subsequently, even if the values women embody in the nation put significant constraints on their behaviour and opportunities. Azeri women, for example, enforced Azeri values at home themselves as a barrier against Russification and assimilation. Like Polish women they have a sense of agency from joining nation to state, although from our perspective "emancipation" may not result.

Figure 1: Contexts and Sex/Gender Regimes: Women's Orientations to National Projects

Location	Contexts	Sex/Gender Regimes	Women's Orientations to National Projects
"The West" (i - v)	i) Core modern* Euro-American nation-states ("state/empire nationalism)	i) • Privatized "Citizen-Mothers" • Dual relationship to state continues after restructuring citizenship	i) • Reject nationalism • Feminism is unaffiliated • Welfare state dilutes opposition
	ii) Marginal, western nation states**	ii) • Women citizens & applies from founding • State responsible for nurturing	ii) • Feminists involve in projects • Inscribe feminist values in national scripts
	iii) Failed, late or incomplete nation or state formation***	iii) • Variable but women's roles in family important • Pro-natalism (coercive) & militarism shapes results	iii) • Coercive pronatalism, authoritarian familialism will alienate women • Resist authoritarian & militaristic projects
	iv) Settler-state**** nation building	iv) • White women become allies in nation-building in pioneer era • Nation-states may reprivatize	iv) • Women of dominant cultures benefit from alliance • Citizenship denied to subject/minority groups
	v) Nations without states ("defensive or inclusive nationalism)[a]	v) • Women's roles in reproducing the nation crucial to its survival • Women may be conduits or agents	v) • Women symbolize nation but not able to convert this to public citizenship when state is won
"The Rest" (v - ix)	vi) Modernizing,[aa] anti-colonial national projects	vi) • Women are symbols of modernity in public sphere/defenders of tradition at home	vi) • Contradiction may result in feminist alliance with national projects
	vii) Anti-modern,[aaa] anti-colonial national projects	vii) • Women's behaviour, dress, especially in public sphere must symbolize rejection of modernity/west	vii) • Women may create space for gender projects but not for feminism
	viii) Post-colonial[b] nation-states	viii) • Variable - usually women become citizens when men do • But marriage rules regulate behaviour and roles	viii) • Citizenship may be disrupted by military authoritarian regimes • Weak states cannot protect or deliver
	ix) Post-communist[bb] nation-states or national projects	ix) • Women usually reject feminism & may return home to zone of freedom • Men reclaim public roles	ix) • Support nationalism

Legend: Cases Discussed in This Paper

* Britain, France, Holland, US
** Finland, Norway
*** Germany, Italy
**** Canada

a Blackfoot Confederacy, Poland
aa India
aaa Iran
b Phillippines, India
bb Azerbaijan

Figure 2: "Gendering the Hyphen" - Case Studies

Variable Case	Role of Women in Nation-Making/ Restructuring	Site of Nation-Making	Role of Women in Nation-State Making (The Hyphen)	What Facilitated or Repressed Women's Agency in National Projects	What Facilitated or Repressed Affiliation Between Feminists & National Projects	How Did Sex/Gender Regime Mediate?
Poland Dominant Pattern • Dominated & Encapsulated National w/o State • Defensive Nationalism	*Matka Polka** Reproduced language and culture Women are part of "the nation"	Family main site during long periods of foreign domination	• "Hero mothers" play role in extremis (WW2 Resistance, early solidarity movement) • No pattern for women leaders	• Agency in family; militarism & foreign domination repressed • Nurturing not part of public sphere	Circa WWI affiliations limited. • Solidarity-era-church inference, rejection against communism	Women mediated in their lives, modern workers in public, preserve Poland at home
Finland Created in resistance to foreign domination; men and women created new nation-state together	• Limited military so women were allies in nation-state making & nation-building • Women are part of "the nation"	• Both sexes participated in nation making in public realm • Women played important role in creating national scripts including nurturance	• Active as citizens • Present as political decision-makers from founding • Present in crises and restructuring • Pattern for women's authority exists	• Limited military on founding • Women active in work and politics during founding • Importance of nurturing as a public role	• Timing of nation-state founding • Feminist organizing was simultaneous • Difference-based feminism "fit" with national script	• Women drew familial and nurturing values into public sphere • Supported male responsibilities in private sphere
Azerbaijan Defensive nation-making at home	• Main agents within a framework of domesticated religion and defensive nationalism • Post communist restructuring complicated by war and increasing authoritarianism	• Family is site of both nation-making and reproduction of faith	• Early pre Soviet tradition of citizenship • Token roles (quota) in Soviet Azerbaijan • Role reduced by military conflict and authoritarianism in post-Soviet period	• Early tradition of women's organization •Need for women to "keep the faith" and reproduce Azeri identity in their activities	• Early pattern of maternal feminism • Experience of paid work and organizing • High levels of education & literacy • National religious ideology represses feminism	• "Soviet in public" Azeri at home • Between East & West • Secular in public & Muslim at home
Iran	• Symbolic inclusion	• State clergy monopolized • Shah in early periods • Imams in republic	• Symbolic	• Low levels literacy & education • Seclusion • Ideological assignment of authority to men	• Anti-Shah nationalists used women's emancipation as a symbol	• Symbolized modernity or Islam • Struggle over women • No mediation
Phillippines	• Active at every stage • Initially upper/educated classes • Peasants & working classes also mobilized	• Public sphere primary site • Women's roles in family and faith also important	• Active in anti-colonial struggles • Mobilized mass of women to gain citizenship and vote • In people power transitions • Two women presidents	• Alliance with national movements • High levels education	• Difference-based feminism • Nationalism's need for allies	• Women balanced domestic, communal & public roles

Notes: * Polish Mother

Figure 3: Three Phases of Gender/Nation Relations: India

Context	Period	Women's Role/Location	Women's Relationship	Feminist Relationship	Results
1. Anti-colonial modernizing National Movement	1880 to Independence (1947)	• Symbols of India's spiritual superiority • Gandhi "feminized nationalism"	• Women active but controlled • But Gandhi based women's new roles of an essential identity	• Controversial if any autonomy possible • Feminist agitation emerged	• Women seen as allies • Congress adopts sex equality & women's suffrage (1928)
2. Post-colonial, modernizing Nation-building Project (secular)	Congress Governments (to 1991)	Women's roles divided • "New women" in education; work and politics • Defenders of spirituality & communal tradition at home	• Women benefit from Congress nation building (rights, education, work) • But targets for "excessive reproduction"	• Autonomous women's movement in civil society • Participation in National Project created a tradition female participation in politics	• Men & women citizens at same time • Men proud of modernity of the nation • Women's rights programs
3. Right-wing Hindu nationalism (anti-secular)	Ideology BJP** governments (to present) Hindutva	• Feminists • Opposition to Hindutva nationalism • Educated Hindu • Women's groups aligned with Hindutva nationalism	Many women (especially higher castes) active inside Hindutva groups • Some in leadership roles • Reject secular state • Oppose trans-communalism	• Oppose Hindutva project • Continue trans-communal organizing • Support secularism • Remobilized against BJP	• The "Hindu Bomb" • Extensive mobilization of women within women-led organizations within Hindu nationalism (RSS***)

** BJP - Bharatiya Janata Party
*** RSS - Rashtriya Sevika Samiti - Women's Wing of Nationalist Volunteers