

TOWARDS A RECONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Paper to be presented at the Annual Conference of the
Canadian Political Science Association,
London, Ontario, June 3, 2005.

This paper examines the role of the welfare state in shaping social capital. The dominant approach to social capital largely disregards the welfare state's impact on associational life, and focuses on the practical implications of citizenship that place value on formal and informal networks. In so doing, it fails to account for the welfare state's influence over citizenship status through the rights and entitlements that derive from its social policies, and overlooks difference in the civil society (gender, race, class). Therefore, this paper contends that social capital theory must be reconceived to account for the role of the welfare state and inequality in the civil society, particularly in light of the private and collective benefits that can result from civic engagement. Drawing on Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology, three different welfare regime-types are selected for a preliminary social capital analysis using the 1999-2000 World Value Survey. While the findings suggest that variation between welfare regime-types exist, they fall short of providing clarity with respect to whether welfare states 'crowd-out' the associative sector, or foster social capital 'from above.' The questions raised by the preliminary analysis are used to outline some methodological considerations for future study.

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of the welfare state in shaping social capital.¹ Social capital theory posits that norms of reciprocity harnessed from social relations can enhance democracy by facilitating collective action. Social capital is a useful concept because it suggests that social networks are vital to democratic governance at a time when scholars are pointing to a decline of deference to, and a rampant disdain for, formal political institutions and politicians. Associational life can promote social innovation, provide goods and services, and offer a voice for the excluded.

The dominant approach to social capital, however, privileges the citizen over the state, and presumes a homogenous civil society, where citizens stand on equal ground. In its preoccupation with the practical implications of citizenship that place value on civic engagement, social capital theory fails to consider how welfare states can shape citizenship status through rights and entitlements that derive from its policies. It is important to examine the effect of constraints on citizenship, such as mandating recipients to work for benefits without providing childcare, as this is likely to affect their social capital. Consequently, this paper will argue that social capital theory must be reformulated to consider the welfare state and inequality, particularly in light of the private and collective benefits that can result from civic engagement. By focusing this analysis on women, this paper will propel issues of inequality to the forefront of what has otherwise been a largely exclusionary social capital debate, absent considerations of gender, race and class.

The first section will provide an overview of the prevailing social capital theory, highlighting its failure to account for the welfare state, and the debate surrounding how the degree of state intervention (universal versus means-tested welfare state) influences the associative sector.² The subsequent section will call for a reconceptualization of social capital theory by introducing considerations of the welfare state and its role in shaping citizenship. Informed by the literature on gender and the welfare state, this section will stress the need to address inequality in the civil society which may have consequences for participating in, or gaining from, social capital. Drawing from the 1999-2000 wave of the World Value Survey, a preliminary social capital analysis will reveal that there is a variation between welfare regime-types.³ However, the findings will also stress the need for greater research to determine the exact nature of the link between the welfare state and social capital. Finally, the last section will reflect on the questions raised by the preliminary analysis, and outline some methodological considerations for future study.

¹ Gordon contends that, in addition to the sum of social services and income support programs designed for those in need, the term 'welfare state' encompasses "those policies, programs and legislation that [redistribute] status, rights and life opportunities." For the purposes of this paper, I will adopt Gordon's broad definition of welfare state. Patricia Evans, Gerda Wekerle, "The Shifting Terrain of Women's Welfare: Theory, Discourse, and Activism," in *Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change*, Evans and Wekerle eds., University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1997, p.3-4.

² For the purposes of this paper, I draw on Putnam's conception of social capital. Robert D. Putnam, "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital," in *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.6, No.1, 1995.


³ World Value Survey 1999-2000.

SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY AND THE WELFARE STATE QUESTION

Scholars have long studied the civil society to determine how the quality of public life and the performance of institutions are influenced by norms and networks of civic engagement. According to social capital theory, networks of association⁴ are imperative because they foster trust and reciprocity which can generate both individual and collective returns (see diagram A).

DIAGRAM A

PUTNAM'S CONCEPTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL



As such, civic engagement is deemed a prerequisite for effective democracy and economic development. Rothstein argues that low levels of social capital can result in a ‘social trap,’ where rational choice theory is ineffective.⁵ While rational choice holds that agents act or make judgments after having ordered their preferences to maximize utility, in a social dilemma, an agent’s preferences become moot, and expectations of how others will act dictates whether or not one should chose to cooperate.⁶ The decisive variable for avoiding a social trap is thus the level of trust fostered in a society that, according to social capital theory, depends on the nature and level of social networking.⁷

⁴ Social capital theory accounts for both formal and informal networks. Formal networks are generally understood as an established association or group, with some form of governing or organizational structure, such as joining a political party. Informal networks are generally understood as social interactions that we engage in but that do not take place within the confines of a structured organization, such as going to a pub. See Robert D. Putnam, *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, Putnam ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p.10

⁵ Bo Rothstein, “Sweden: Social Capital in the Social Democratic State,” in *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, Putnam ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p.290.

⁶ Ibid. For instance, if one is convinced that others will overlook a moratorium on fishing and continue to cast their nets at sea, it makes little sense for one to abide by the moratorium since the good that was supposed to be produced from the moratorium will not materialize.

⁷ Ibid, p.289-90. This paper does not delve into the hypothesized relationship between civic engagement and levels of trust. However, it is important to note that scholars, such as Hall, have found stable or rising levels of social capital, despite simultaneous declining levels of trust, which contradicts social capital theory. Peter Hall, “The Role of Government and the Distribution of Social Capital,” in *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, Putnam ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002. Moreover, Coleman suggests that while levels of trust operate effectively within groups, this may not necessarily translate into generalized, social trust. James S. Coleman, “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” in *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.94, Issue Supplement: Organizations and Institutions, 1988, p.S98-99. In addition, Newton asserts, “survey research shows no more than a weak and intermittent association between membership of voluntary associations and a willingness to express

Putnam, whose method of analysis lies at the heart of the most recent social capital literature, has renewed interest in this approach.⁸ In attempting to uncover the basic requirements for effective democracy, he invoked social capital to explain the divergence between northern and southern Italian institutional performance,⁹ and subsequently studied levels of association in the U.S., concluding that social capital was in decline.¹⁰ Putnam contends, “*all educational (and hence social) levels in American society, and counting all sorts of group memberships, the average number of associational memberships has fallen by about a fourth over the last quarter-century.*”¹¹ According to social capital theory, what is at stake as a result of America’s ‘decapitalization’ is the ensuing deterioration of the quality of civic life and of institutional performance that are the lynchpins of a vibrant and effective democracy.

While Putnam’s analysis largely overlooks the role of the state in shaping social capital, other scholars have engaged in a debate about how the degree of state intervention (universal versus residual welfare states) might affect levels of civic engagement.¹² On the one hand, some researchers insist that the welfare state has the potential to depreciate social capital by duplicating the services offered by private provisions of welfare, and thus ‘crowding-out’ the work of voluntary associations.¹³ Subscribing to this approach, Norton contends, “as government has stepped in to provide welfare benefits, there has been that much less need for private provision of welfare, whether this be through the family, networks of friends, or formally organized charitable bodies. The incentive to invest in these social relationships declines, and so social capital

trust . . . Membership of voluntary associations sometimes does a little for social trust, but usually does nothing for it.” Kenneth Newton, “Trust, Social Capital, Civil Society and Democracy,” in *International Political Science Review*, Vol.22, No.2, 2001, p.204. It is also unclear whether those who are predisposed to trusting tend to be civically engaged, or whether being civically engaged necessarily fosters trust. Countless other scholars have highlighted the need to clarify the role of trust in social capital. See, for instance, Marc Hooghe, Dietlind Stolle, *Generating Social Capital: Civil Society and Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, Palgrave MacMillan, New York, 2003. Such inconsistencies are troubling in light of the significance assigned to trust in the social capital equation.

⁸ While I focus on Putnam’s approach here, scholars who have appealed to social capital in conducting research include: Canadian sociologist John Seeley in the 1950s to describe the rise in memberships in suburban associations; Urbanist Jane Jacobs in the 1960s in relation to neighbourhood ties in the modern metropolis; Economist Glenn Loury in the 1970s regarding neighbourhood segregation and the legacies of slavery; French theorist Pierre Bourdieu, German economist Ekehart Schliecht and sociologist James Coleman all turned to social capital in the 1980s in studying networks of association. See Putnam, *Democracies in Flux*, 2002, Op.cit, p.5

⁹ Robert D. Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993.

¹⁰ Putnam Robert D., 1995, Op.cit; Robert D. Putnam, “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America,” in *The American Prospect*, Vol.7, Issue 24. December 1, 1996; Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 2000.

¹¹ Ibid, 1995, p.72.

¹² For instance, see Staffan Kumlin and Bo Rothstein, “Making and Breaking Social Capital: The Impact of Welfare State Institutions,” in *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.38, No.4, May 2005, p.340.

¹³ Andrew Norton, “The Welfare State: Depreciating Australia’s Social Capital,” in *Policy: A Review of Public Policy and Ideas*, March-April, 1998, visit www.cis.org.au/Policy/autumn98/aut9807.htm; Skocpol refers to this perspective as the ‘Tocqueville problem’ since, in *Democracy in America*, Tocqueville depicted America’s vibrant civil society of the 1830s as a safeguard against a strong, centralized state - like the one in his native France. Theda Skocpol, “The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American Democracy,” in *Social Science History*, Vol.21, No.4, Winter 1997, p.457.

is lost.”¹⁴ While research on the crowding-out hypothesis has been inconclusive, it is nevertheless supported by those espousing communitarian or ‘third way’ views of the welfare state.¹⁵ Accordingly, Skocpol maintains that Republicans have borrowed the concept of social capital to justify their calls for “. . . market incentives and volunteerism and spiritual renewal . . .” to replace the welfare state.¹⁶

On the other hand, there are scholars who postulate a positive relationship between the welfare state and social capital, insisting that associational life has evolved alongside the welfare state, or that the welfare state can foster social capital. While Putnam envisions the causal link as stemming from the citizen to the state, Skocpol proposes we consider social capital ‘from the top down.’¹⁷ She insists that civic engagement in America has always functioned alongside an active government and democratic political system and that, as such, rekindling voluntary associations alone is insufficient to revitalize democracy.¹⁸ Tracing the evolution of voluntary associations alongside the growth of the bureaucratic and welfare state, Skocpol contends:

Twentieth-century voluntary federations were often built from the top down, deliberately structured to imitate and influence the three tiers of U.S. government, and encouraged by parts of the federal government itself . . . the PTA itself, now romanticized as a purely local voluntary group, did not originally bubble up from below. It was founded in 1897 as the National Congress of Mothers (renamed the PTA in 1924) . . . From its inception, the Congress of Mothers/PTA was actively involved in public policymaking and the construction of a distinctively American version of the welfare state.¹⁹

Similarly, Worms examines the co-development of both the French welfare state and voluntary sector, and asserts: “[i]n my view, the growth of the welfare state stands out as the single most obvious explanation of the exceptional growth of the associative sector since 1960.”²⁰ Echoing Worms, Hall points to the ever-blurring line between the public service and associations with the rise of quasi-non-governmental organizations, and to the

¹⁴ Andrew Norton, Op.cit, p.1.

¹⁵ Wim van Oorschot, Wils Arts, “The Social Capital of European Welfare States: The Crowding-Out Hypothesis Revisited,” in *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol.15, No.1, 2005, p.6. The ‘Third Way,’ sometimes referred to as ‘post-conservative,’ generally refers to politics that favour decentralization, deregulation, and stress government fiscal responsibility, and individual self-sufficiency. For an analysis on the effects of both conservative and third way/post-conservative politics on the welfare states of Canada, Britain and the U.S., see Sylvia Bashevkin, *Welfare Hot Buttons: Women, Work and Social Policy Reform*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2002.

¹⁶ Skocpol, quoting Newt Gingrich. Skocpol states: “[o]f course Putnam does not share Gingrich’s hostility to the welfare state. Yet he often speaks of social capital as something that arises or declines in a realm apart from politics and government.” Theda Skocpol, *Unsolved Mysteries: The Tocqueville Files: Unravelling From Above*” in *The American Prospect*, Vol.7, Issue 25, March-April, 1996, p.1-3, visit www.prospect.org.

¹⁷ Other scholars have also proposed we consider social capital from the top down, for instance, see: Rothstein, Op.cit., 2002.

¹⁸ Skocpol, 1996, Op.cit, p.3.

¹⁹ Ibid, p.4.

²⁰ Jean-Pierre Worms, “Old and New Civic and Social Ties in France,” in *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, Putnam ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, p.144.

great impact that public policy has had on the associational life.²¹ He contends, “[f]rom their inception, many of the social programs of the British government have been designed to preserve a substantial role for voluntary endeavour. To an extraordinary extent, these programs have used local volunteers, working in tandem with professionals, to deliver social services.”²²

Rothstein not only finds high levels of social capital in Sweden, but suggests that welfare institutions have the capacity to foster trust, and may therefore be able to generate social capital.²³ Kumlin and Rothstein test this hypothesis by studying two forms of institutional design in Sweden: those that are selective in nature, and those that are universal.²⁴ They find that citizens who had contact with selective institutions were more likely to be distrustful, while those in contact with universal institutions had a tendency to be trusting.²⁵ Accordingly, Kumlin and Rothstein conclude that institutional design is a tool that the state can use to foster trust and, presumably, social capital.

Thus, this ‘welfare state question’ brings to light a weakness in conventional social capital theory: the citizen is privileged while the state is strangely absent. While scholars have argued that the welfare state has an impact on social capital, the exact nature of that relationship has yet to be determined. However, to take the welfare state into account in a social capital analysis would require a reconceptualization of conventional social capital theory. What warrants such a shift? Why is it crucial to examine the impact of the welfare state on social capital?

RECONCEIVING SOCIAL CAPITAL THEORY

Social capital theory must be reformulated to account for the power of the state in shaping citizenship, and to consider issues of inequality and social justice. Conventional notions of citizenship establish a system of inclusion and exclusion. Those who are ‘included’ as citizens are granted rights and entitlements; those who are ‘excluded’ have only a limited citizenship with partial or limited rights and entitlements. Lister suggests that there are two historical traditions of citizenship: that of liberalism, which conceptualizes citizenship as status, emphasizing rights and the individual; and that of civic republicanism, which conceptualizes citizenship as practice, focusing on obligations and the interest of the wider community.²⁶ Social capital theory is grounded in the “citizenship as practice” tradition, where civic virtue is equated with participation - via social networks. However, the demanding nature of this approach to citizenship is problematic since it does not consider differences amongst those within the community, including those stemming from gender, race and class. Consequently, conventional social capital analyses tend to overlook the position of those who may be at a disadvantage, such as women who may be restricted by the gendered division of time and the public-

²¹ Peter Hall, *Op.cit*, p.40-50. Jean-Pierre Worms, *Ibid*, p.144-5.

²² Peter Hall, *Ibid*, p.40-1.

²³ Bo Rothstein, *Op.cit*, p.322.

²⁴ Staffan Kumlin and Bo Rothstein, *Op.cit*, p.350-55.

²⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶ Ruth Lister, “Dialectics of Citizenship,” in *Hypatia*, Vol.12, No.4, Fall, 1997, p.7. Others have referred to this as “active” versus “entitled” citizenship. See Alan Kidd, “Civil Society or the State: Recent Approaches to the History of Voluntary Welfare,” in *Journal of Historical Sociology*, Vol.15, No.3, September 2002, p.329.

private separation of spheres.²⁷ Thus, the prevailing approach to social capital falsely presumes a homogenous civil society. In failing to account for inequality, it assumes that all members of the public stand on equal ground. Those who happen to “capitalize” on networks in a social capital scenario can solve the problems that face their collective, possibly pursuing self-interested ends that would perpetuate existing inequality. Yet, if social capital is indifferent to the norms of social justice or inequality, what vision of democracy is it promoting?

The literature on gender and the welfare state can inform social capital theory on the need for a more comprehensive approach to citizenship.²⁸ Its focus on low-income women who are reliant on the state for support is compelling not only because, as a disadvantaged group, their patterns of civic engagement have largely been neglected in the social capital literature, but also because such an analysis necessarily draws attention to the relationship between the welfare state and citizenship. For instance, scholars who study gender and the welfare state assert that, in the case of liberal welfare regimes such as Canada and the US, workfare programs shifted single mother’s dependency from the state to the family by promoting the traditional “bread-winner/dependent” family model.²⁹ Such restructuring, they insist, simultaneously redefined the relationship between citizens and the state by reinforcing state control over social reproduction and the gender division of labour, forcing single mothers to make the ‘impossible choice’ between becoming dependent on a man rather than the state, or joining the bottom of the labour force.³⁰ Consequently, the citizenship of certain single mothers reliant on workfare schemes is said to be diminished since the state expects welfare recipients to engage in work for benefits without offering childcare; it makes no distinction between mothers with young children, and other workfare recipients.³¹ Scholars have also pointed to how

²⁷ Ruth Lister, *Op.cit.*, p.7-8. See, for instance, Sylvia Bashevkin, *Women’s Work is Never Done: Comparative Studies in Caregiving, Employment, and Social Policy Reform*, S.Bashevkin ed., Routledge, New York, 2002.

²⁸ For instance, Sylvia Bashevkin, *Ibid*; Janine Brodie, *Politics on the Margins*, Fernwood Publishing, Halifax, 1995; Patricia Evans, Gerda Wekerle, *Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change*, Evans and Wekerle eds., University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1997; Jane Jenson and Susan Phillips, “Regime Shift: New Citizenship Practices in Canada,” in *International Journal of Canadian Studies*, Vol.14, Fall, 1996; Margaret Little, “The Struggle Over the Meaning of Deserving, 1965-1995,” in *No Car, No Radio, No Liquor Permit: Moral Regulation of Single Mothers in Ontario, 1920-1997*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1998; Julia O’Connor, “Gender, Class and Citizenship in a Comparative Analysis of Welfare State Regimes: Theoretical and Methodological Issues,” in *Power Resource Theory and the Welfare State: A Critical Approach*, Julia O’Connor, Gregg Olsen eds., University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1998; Sylvie Morel, *The Insertion Model or the Workfare Model? Transformations of Social Assistance within Quebec and Canada*, Status of Women Canada, Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data, September 2002, p.7-14, visit: http://www.swc-cfc.gc.ca/pubs/0662323467/200209_0662323467_e.pdf

²⁹ Leah Vosko, “Mandatory ‘Marriage’ or Obligatory Waged Work: Social Assistance and Single Mothers in Wisconsin and Ontario,” in *Women’s Work is Never Done*, Sylvia Bashevkin ed., Routledge, New York, 2002; Gwendolyn Mink, “Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the American Welfare Police State,” in *Women’s Work is Never Done: Comparative Studies in Care-Giving Employment, and Social Policy Reform*, Sylvia Bashevkin ed., Routledge, New York, 2002.

³⁰ Leah Vosko, *Ibid*, p.183.

³¹ Depending on the scheme, certain Canadian provinces require single mothers with children over the age of 2-3 years old to engage in work for benefits – despite the fact that there is no public childcare program. That women are at a particular disadvantage is illustrated in an Ontario Court of Appeal’s ruling against the reintroduction of the ‘man-in-the-house’ rule which denied assistance to recipients who were deemed to be

workfare policies have put the lives of women in grave danger by rendering “women economically dependent upon men, creating a situation that abusive men will exploit.”³²

In addition to having a direct impact on citizenship via policy (for instance through stricter eligibility criteria for benefits), welfare states are also intricately linked to ‘citizenship regimes,’ consisting of customs that shapes social policy and welfare state discourse, and establish the context within which rights and entitlements operate.³³ For instance, in comparing the discourse surrounding Canadian and French social assistance policies, Morel contends that the French insertion model is influenced by a custom of solidarity where it is the duty of the collective to re-insert the “excluded citizen” back into the collectivity.³⁴ This is in sharp contrast to Canada’s workfare model where the “dependent citizen” is viewed as having failed in their individual duty to sustain themselves through paid work.³⁵ Contrary to the French solidarity custom, Canada’s social assistance model is influenced by British Poor Laws and the custom of deservingness, suggesting some citizens are more entitled to assistance than others. Thus, in the workfare model, the goal is not to include or insert the “recipient-citizen” back into the collectivity, but to promote self-sufficiency (towards the ideal: the “worker-citizen”).³⁶

Therefore, as the gender and welfare state literature underscores, welfare states have an impact on the citizenship status of vulnerable groups. This perspective must be incorporated into a social capital analysis since, in order to gain a greater understanding of patterns of civic engagement, we must establish whether citizens have the resources to participate (see diagram B). These resources, among which Marshall has argued are the rights and entitlements provided by welfare states, form an integral part of citizenship.³⁷

in a ‘cohabitation’ situation. The Court asserted: “[i]n my view, the statistics unequivocally demonstrate that both women and single mothers are disproportionately adversely affect by the definition of spouse . . . although women accounted for only 54% of those receiving assistance and only 60% of single persons receiving benefits, they accounted for nearly 90% of those whose benefits were terminated by the definition of spouse.” For details on the “man-in-the-house” rule and the case, see *Falkiner v. Ontario*, [2002] O.J. No.1771 (C.A.).

³² Janet Mosher, “Managing the Disentitlement of Women: Glorified Markets, the Idealized Family and the Undeserving Others,” in *Restructuring Caring Labour: Discourse, State Practice and Everyday Life*,” Neysmith ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, p.41. For more on the relationship between domestic violence and workfare, see also Ian Morrison, “Ontario Works: A Preliminary Assessment,” in *Journal of Law and Social Policy*, Vol. 2., 1998, p.25. For alarming statistics on domestic violence as a barrier to self-sufficiency for female welfare recipients, see Jody Raphael, “Domestic Violence and Welfare Receipt: Toward a New Feminist Theory on Welfare Dependency,” in *Harvard Women’s Law Journal*, Vol.19, 1996.

³³ Jane Jenson, “Paying for Care: Gendering Consequences of European Care Allowances for the Frail Elderly,” in *Women’s Work is Never Done: Comparative Studies in Caregiving, Employment, and Social Policy Reform*, S.Bashevkin ed., Routledge, New York, 2002, p.71.

³⁴ For more on the differences between the French insertion model and the Canadian workfare model, see, Sylvie Morel, Op.cit, p.7-14.

³⁵ According to Morel, it also implies laziness or passivity leading to the threat of perpetual dependence upon government assistance. Ibid.


³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Marshall postulated that the welfare state could provide the rights and entitlements necessary to provide a comprehensive form of citizenship. He argued that the implementation of eighteenth century civil rights (property, personal liberty and due process) required the extension of political rights (voting and right to hold office) in the nineteenth century, followed by social rights in the twentieth century. Marshall contended that the welfare state could provide the rights and entitlements necessary to produce a

For instance, requiring single mothers to engage in the paid labour market to receive benefits, without providing childcare, may prove to severely limit their ability to partake in social networks.

DIAGRAM B

A REFORMULATION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL



Accordingly, social capital theory must incorporate issues of citizenship status (rights and entitlements) into its analysis in order to gain a better understanding of citizenship as practice (networking). This is particularly important when considering marginalized groups since some may be at a disadvantage, limited in their capacity to contribute to or benefit from social capital. Putnam recently acknowledged this, arguing:

Networks and norms might, for example, benefit those who belong – to the detriment of those who do not. Social capital might be most prevalent among groups of people who are already advantaged, thereby widening political and economic inequalities between those groups and others who are poor in social capital . . . What kind of society is this form of social capital encouraging?³⁸

In light of this, Putnam studied the link between women's status and social capital in American states, finding that women fared better in states with high levels of social

comprehensive form of citizenship. T.H. Marshall, "Citizenship and Social Class," from the Marshall Lectures, 1950, in *Citizenship and Social Class*, Tom Bottomore ed., Pluto Press, London, 1992, p.6. Social rights, Marshall asserted, "range from the right to economic welfare and security to the right to share in the full social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in society." Evans quoting Marshall from his *Class, Citizenship and Social Development* (1964). Patricia M. Evans, "Divided Citizenship? Gender, Income Security, and the Welfare State," in *Women and the Canadian Welfare State: Challenges and Change*, Evans and Wekerle eds., University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1997, p.93.

³⁸ Putnam, *Democracies in Flux*, 2002, Op.cit, p.9.

capital.³⁹ Yet, in compiling his women's status indices, his analysis failed to consider important variables which would have better captured women's experiences, and explained their patterns of civic engagement, such as: the availability of accessible, affordable child care; the number of women and single mothers collecting social assistance; or the number of women engaged in seasonal/part-time work. Absent these considerations, such an analysis only provides a partial understanding of women's experiences.

Gidengil, Goodyear-Grant, Nevitte, Blais and Nadeau (hereinafter *Gidengil et al.*) not only found evidence of gender-segregated networking, but also concluded that men, who dominate more heterogenous, instrumental associations (job-related), tend to discuss and know more about politics than women, who frequent more homogenous, expressive, community-oriented associations.⁴⁰ Alternatively, some scholars have studied networking from a structural approach which suggests that opportunities and constraints, including differing positions in the work force, marital roles, and parenthood, are the principle cause of gender differences in networks between men and women.⁴¹ Moore, for instance, found that the gender differences in networks could only be attributed to opportunities and constraints stemming from women and men's differing locations in the social structure.⁴² Similarly, Munch, McPherson and Smith-Lovin (hereinafter *Munch et al.*) found that childrearing places men and women in different social structural positions, which in turn affects their associational lives.⁴³ Their study confirmed that childrearing, particularly with preschool-aged children, constrained women's ability to develop social ties by decreasing the amount of time spent on networking and diminishing the number of people with whom they interact.

These studies greatly contribute to existing social capital literature by furthering our understanding of various networking patterns, drawing attention to the heterogeneity of the civil society, and examining how such differences might affect social capital. However, they fail to challenge social capital theory's assumption that the causal arrow flows from the citizen to the state, or explore the effects of social policies on citizenship. It is necessary to consider the possibility that state policies, such as social assistance, have consequences for civic engagement because they affect the citizenship status of those reliant on social programs. Therefore, before one can discuss the quality of participation of the civil society, we must shift the current emphasis from citizen participation to focus on what resources are necessary to participate, and whether members of society have access to these resources in the first place.

³⁹ Robert D. Putnam, "Women's Status and Social Capital Across the States," in *Institute for Women's Policy Research*, Briefing Paper #1911, July 2002, p.3. See www.iwpr.org/pdf/i911.PDF.

⁴⁰ Elizabeth Gidengil, Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, Nevitte Neil, André Blais, Richard Nadeau, *Gender, Knowledge and Social Capital*, Paper for the Conference on Gender and Social capital, St. John's College, University of Manitoba, May 2-3, 2003, visit www.fas.umontreal.ca/POL/Ces-ec/documents%5CGender%20Knowledge%20and%20Social%20Capital.pdf.

⁴¹ Gwen Moore, "Structural Determinants of Men and Women's Personal Networks," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol.55, No.5, October 1990, p.727.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ Allison Munch, J. Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, "Gender, Children and Social Contact: The Effects of Childrearing for Men and Women," in *American Sociologist Review*, Vol.62, No.4, August 1997, p.509.

Having outlined social capital's theoretical underpinnings, examined the literature and proposed a reformulation of social capital theory, the following section will reveal the results of a preliminary social capital analysis to determine whether there exists variation between different types of welfare states. While scholars have proposed that welfare states may have an impact on networks of association, studies have largely focused on single country cases. Yet, when weighed against one another, differences in the quality of social capital *between* states emerge which suggests this hypothesis is plausible.⁴⁴

PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS

A) DATA AND METHODS

Drawing on the 1999-2000 World Value Survey, a preliminary social capital analysis was conducted to determine whether variation in social capital between welfare regime-types exists, and test the validity of the 'crowding-out' hypothesis.⁴⁵ The World Value Survey facilitates cross-national comparisons since it is conducted in over 50 states, and questionnaires are coordinated in an endeavour to attain equivalent questions across cultures and languages.

Unlike sources such as the Comparative Welfare State dataset, which includes indicators such as 'unemployment insurance family replacement rates' or 'unemployment benefit waiting period,' the World Value Survey does not contain indicators designed to measure 'welfare states.'⁴⁶ Instead, Esping-Andersen's threefold typology of 'welfare worlds' was used to select three nations from the World Value Survey for analysis, which represent divergent welfare state-types: Canada, France and Sweden. Esping-Andersen's approach dominates comparative welfare state analysis, and is a significant advancement over the earlier leader-laggard model.⁴⁷ His typology ranks welfare states as 'social democratic,' 'corporate-conservative,' or 'liberal' based on the general nature of their income security and employment policies. Social democratic welfare regimes, according to Esping-Andersen, are characterized by social programs provided mainly through the public sector on a universal basis, and tend to stress prevention rather than simply responding to need.⁴⁸ Sweden is identified by Esping-Andersen as a social democratic welfare regime. The welfare-worlds typology suggests that, in the conservative-corporatist welfare regime, welfare provision occurs largely through the state. However, benefits are provided in a manner that serves to maintain status differences within the population, rather than to redistribute wealth. Esping-Andersen includes France as a

⁴⁴ For instance, comparing different cases within the following: Putnam, *Democracies in Flux*, 2002, Op.cit.

⁴⁵ While a more comprehensive analysis would study levels of social capital over both space and time, this analysis is restricted to a comparison of levels of social capital between welfare regime-types.

⁴⁶ Lyle Scruggs, *Welfare State Entitlement Dataset: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Eighteen Welfare States*, Version 1.0, 2004. Of course, this dataset does not contain social capital indicators.

⁴⁷ This leader-laggard model typically ranked welfare states along a continuum based largely upon the proportion of GDP spent on welfare programs. It was a misleading system because it failed to account for the policy instruments and their impact. See Gregg Olsen, "Locating the Canadian Welfare State: Family Policy and Health Care in Canada, Sweden and the United States," in *Power Resource Theory and the Welfare State: A Critical Approach*, Julia O'Connor, Gregg Olsen eds., University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1998, p.184-85.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p.185.

corporatist-conservative welfare regime-type.⁴⁹ Lastly, he holds that, while both the social-democratic and corporate-conservative regimes are market-usurping, the liberal welfare regime is market-supporting. Here, coverage is not universally provided but, rather, is highly dependent upon place of employment, ability to purchase, or in the case of public provision, need, and thus subject to means- or needs-testing. Esping-Andersen qualifies Canada as a liberal welfare regime-type.⁵⁰

A survey of the literature shows that scholars largely replicate Putnam's approach to quantifying social capital.⁵¹ Social capital typically includes measures of social trust, and operationalizes civic engagement as membership and/or the degree of activity in voluntary organizations, and measures for informal networks. In the 2000 wave of the World Value Survey, respondents were asked to identify which of 15 organizations they belonged to, and specify whether they were active or inactive participants.⁵² A 'voluntary membership' and a 'voluntary activity' index was built by recoding the values (member = 1/not member = 0; active = 1/inactive=0), and combining all associational categories.⁵³ Respondents were also probed about their level of trust (trusted = 1; careful = 0). Moreover, an 'informal networks index' was created by combining 4 variables into 1, and recoding the values (frequent = 1; infrequent/never = 0).⁵⁴ Finally, dummy variables for 3 welfare regime-types were built from the "nations" variable in order to conduct an OLS regression.⁵⁵

B) ANALYSIS

In light of Esping-Andersen's welfare state typology, it follows that, if the analysis were to find evidence in support of the 'crowding-out' thesis, it should report weak levels of social capital in Sweden's social democratic model, and France's corporate-conservative regime, but should find higher levels of social capital in a liberal welfare regime such as Canada's. However, the preliminary analysis found Sweden

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ See, for instance, Robert D. Putnam, *Democracies in Flux*, Op.cit, 2002. Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, *Gendering Social Capital: Bowling in Women's Leagues?*, Paper for the Conference on Gender and Social Capital, St. John's College, University of Manitoba, May 2-3, 2003, visit ksghome.harvard.edu/~pnorris.shorenstein.ksg/ACROBAT/Gendering%20social%20capital.pdf. Milner Henry, Svante Ersson, *Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Institutional Performance in Sweden: An Analysis of the Swedish Regions*, Paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, University of Copenhagen, April 14-19, 2000, visit:

http://www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/copenhagen/ws13/milner_ersson.PDF.

⁵² The list of 15 organizations includes: social welfare service for the elderly, church groups, sports and recreation organizations, cultural activities, labour unions, political parties, local political, human rights organization, environment or conservation organization, professional groups, youth work, women's group, peace movement, groups concerned with health, and an all-encompassing category, "other" – and the category "none" – which was not included here as it was not included in the Canadian survey. The two values respondents could choose from included: belong, not mention.

⁵³ Reliability tests were run for each index: Volmem - $\alpha = .65$; Volact - $\alpha = .63$.

⁵⁴ A reliability test was run for the informal networks index: $\alpha = .62$. The 2000 wave of the World Value Survey includes 5 types of "informal networks:" spending time with friends; spending time with work colleagues; spending time with people from your church; spending time with people from sports or cultural groups; and spending time with parents. This last category was not included here because it was absent from the surveys in both France and Sweden. Values included: weekly; once or twice a month; a few times a year; not at all.

⁵⁵ The reference category for this analysis is "corporate-conservative."

leading in membership and trust levels, followed by Canada, while France lagged behind (see Appendix, Tables 1-3). When considering activity in voluntary organizations (see Appendix, Table 3), variation between welfare state-types diminished, particularly between Sweden and Canada. Moreover, the divergence between welfare states vanished altogether when considering informal networks (see Appendix, Table 4), overshadowed by the substantial amount of respondents who reported being “frequently” involved in informal networks.

Thus far, the analysis suggests that there does exist variation in levels of membership and trust between divergent welfare regime-types, particularly when looking at membership and trust levels. However, this relationship can be further examined, by controlling for structural factors. As outlined in the literature review above, some scholars have suggested that structural factors affect the ability of women to participate in social capital, and may therefore help explain variation in gendered-patterns of association. Drawing from the work of Popielarz and Moore, the additional independent variables selected for all waves of the World Values Survey include: marital status, age categories, employment status, number of children, income, gender and education.⁵⁶

An OLS regression was conducted including the welfare state dummy variables and all structural variables on the voluntary membership indices. Moreover, a logistic regression was undertaken for trust with welfare regimes and structural variables as predictors. The results of these analyses (see Appendix, Tables 5-6) indicate that, even controlling for structural variables, welfare regime-types have a significant impact on the social capital indicators, with Sweden consistently displaying the highest impact of variance on the dependent variables, followed by Canada and France.⁵⁷ Furthermore, gender had no impact on membership or trust.⁵⁸

Since Sweden is known for its high levels of labour union memberships, the voluntary membership indices were rebuilt to exclude the category “unions,” to examine whether Sweden’s impact on the membership index would hold. The regression on the ‘new’ voluntary membership index revealed that, even when “unions” was excluded, Sweden continued to explain the most variance in memberships.⁵⁹

DISCUSSION

The results of the preliminary analysis confirm that there does exist variation in levels of social capital between welfare regime-types. However, the pattern that emerges

⁵⁶ For these regressions, Income and Age were recoded on 3-point scales (from -1, 1, 2). Employment status, Gender, Marital Status, Children, and Religiosity were dichotomized. While the World Value Survey did probe respondents about ‘TV watching,’ which Putnam has found is highly correlated to levels of civic engagement, unfortunately, this question was not included the questionnaires for Canada, France and Sweden. Robert D. Putnam, 1996, Op.cit.

⁵⁷ An OLS regression was also conducted for the informal networks and activity indices. In both of these analyses, welfare regimes continued to have a strong impact on the social capital indicators. However, the models were quite weak: for the OLS regression on the activity index, $\text{adjR}^2 = .08$; for the informal networks index, $\text{adjR}^2 = .05$.

⁵⁸ Education had an impact on the social capital indicators which might support Putnam’s findings of a strong correlation between education and social capital. See Robert D. Putnam, 1996, Op.cit.

⁵⁹ The adjusted R^2 went from explaining 30% when “unions” was included, to 23% excluding the category (a difference of 7%). Nevertheless, the ‘social democratic’ predictor continued to have the highest standardized coefficient: .451, followed by the ‘liberal’ regime, with a standardized coefficient of: .263. In each case, $p < .01$.

from the analysis only adds to the already ambiguous relationship between the welfare state and social capital. The findings fail to clarify the impact of the degree of state intervention (welfare state regime-types) on civic engagement. On the one hand, that the ambitious social democratic welfare regime of Sweden demonstrates high levels of social capital casts doubt on the crowding-out thesis that suggests that the stronger the welfare state, the weaker the level of social capital. On the other hand, that Canada's means-tested liberal welfare regime displays moderate levels of social capital appears to vindicate the crowding-out hypothesis, as does France's corporate-conservative welfare regime, lagging in levels of social capital.

Yet, whether one subscribes to the crowding-out hypothesis or the notion that the state can generate social capital, both approaches posit that the welfare state plays a pivotal role in shaping social capital. In this sense, both methods suggest that social capital can be determined 'from above' - whether this involves state mandated means-testing or the implementation of universal policies; means-tested social provisions presumably force citizens to network to meet their needs, while universal social provisions might foster trust, or the state may heavily subsidize the associative sector. In the above preliminary analysis, welfare regime-types at opposite ends of Esping-Andersen's welfare typology (Sweden's social democratic regime, and Canada's liberal regime) displayed high levels of social capital. Thus, perhaps Sweden experienced high levels of social capital encouraged by a generous, social democratic welfare regime, while Canada demonstrated relatively strong levels of social capital because elements of its welfare state are means-tested, forcing citizens to fend for themselves.

However, we have yet to effectively define what qualifies as social capital "from above." The literature does not clearly identify what it is, and the term is used to describe a variety of state-social capital relations. Does it encompass any form of civic engagement that is generated as a result of state policies (which may therefore also include means-tested policies), or does it strictly refer to institutions designed to foster trust, as Kumlin and Rothstein suggest?⁶⁰ Is it the subsidization of voluntary organizations by the state, or the morphing of the state and the voluntary sector, as Hall and Worms highlight?⁶¹ Ultimately, further research is required to uncover how welfare states can encourage civic engagement, and whether all forms of social capital fostered 'from above' provide the same returns. Does social capital fostered from above in a means-tested welfare regime lead to the same benefits as that in a universal welfare regime, particularly when considering vulnerable groups?

The need to better define what constitutes social capital 'from above,' and examine its implications, is underscored by the experiences recounted by a Canadian single mother of two young children in the midst of this author's fieldwork.⁶² The interview revolved around the respondents' associational life as well as her experiences on social assistance in Ontario. The respondent explained that the social assistance system made recipients eligible for a supplement to top-up their regular welfare cheque (about \$100 more/month) provided that recipients would engage in volunteer work. As

⁶⁰ Kumlin and Rothstein, Op.cit.

⁶¹ Hall, Op.cit. Worms, Op.cit.

⁶² This interview took place in Toronto in December, 2004. As part of my field work for my dissertation research, I am interviewing single mothers in Canada, France and Sweden on their formal and informal networks, their levels of trust, as well as the impact of care work on their associational lives.

no childcare was provided to facilitate this volunteering, the respondent established an arrangement with a friend who also happened to be a single mother on social assistance, alternating to allow one of them to volunteer while the other provided childcare.⁶³

In this example, networking was encouraged by the state through its social assistance policy, and could thus be characterized as social capital ‘from above.’ In a survey, this respondents’ volunteering would register as formal or informal networking.⁶⁴ Yet, is this the brand of social capital that we have in mind when referring to social capital ‘from above?’ How do we account for social capital that is produced by a state policy which targets low/no-income individuals and makes the prospect of gaining or losing \$100 a month the prime motivator of volunteering, or triggers informal networking by failing to provide childcare? Moreover, while the case of the single mother on social assistance aptly illustrates how welfare policies affect the citizenship of women, it also serves to show that any explanation of social capital ‘from above’ must clarify how a ‘top-down’ approach would fit in social capital theory, and what implications this has for citizenship as status and practice.

Moreover, this analysis underlines the need to complement a quantitative social capital analysis with a qualitative examination of the welfare regimes and citizenship cultures in order to understand the true nature of the link between the welfare state and social capital. Evaluating the effect of social policy and discourse on citizenship can shed light on how welfare regimes might impede or encourage civic engagement. Lowndes contends that uncovering both the levels and nature of social capital is necessary if some may be limited in their ability to engage. She asserts, “it seems that women may be investing their social capital in ‘getting by’ rather than ‘getting on’ . . . as women draw on their hard-earned social capital as a resource in the day-to-day management of their own and their family’s lives, there may be little left to spend on politics . . .”⁶⁵ In light of this, merely tabulating membership and activity levels from a narrow list of voluntary organization gives us little in terms of the respondent’s motivations for joining, why she got involved in the first place, and the benefits she gains from participating; aspects of social capital that seem significant in light of the potential returns that the theory proposes.⁶⁶

⁶³ Ironically, the volunteering they engaged in was childcare at a day care centre.

⁶⁴ If the respondent’s work at the day care centre does not qualify as ‘volunteering,’ as it was indirectly subsidized by the state, the routine of alternating with her friend for childcare certainly qualifies as informal networking. It is important to note, however, that the World Value Survey does not have a category for care-related networking in its ‘voluntary memberships’ categories, or in its informal networking questions. Thus, this respondent’s activity would have either fallen under the all-encompassing “other” category in formal networking, or been overlooked entirely since there is no generic “other” category for informal networking. For a discussion on the difficulties in determining what qualifies as voluntary or charitable endeavours, see Alan Kidd, *Op.cit*, p.335-36.

⁶⁵ Vivien Lowndes, *Getting On or Getting By? Women, Social Capital and Political Participation*, Paper for the Conference on Gender and Social capital, St. John’s College, University of Manitoba, May, p.17, 2003, visit www.umanitoba.ca/outreach/conferences/gender_socialcapital/Lowndespaper.pdf

⁶⁶ Further research should also make use of survey data that does provide answers to such questions. For instance, in Canada, the National Survey of Giving and Volunteering asks respondents about their motivations for joining and how many hours they spend volunteering. National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating, 1997, 2000.

The finding that gender had no impact on membership levels supports the findings of Moore, Norris and Inglehart as well as Lowndes.⁶⁷ These scholars suggest that there may not be great gender differences in terms of the amount of networking that men and women are involved in, but they diverge when considering the types of groups they join. However, perhaps gender is found to have no effect on social capital indicators because the spheres within which women network is excluded from survey data. In order to better capture women's experiences in a social capital analysis, surveys need to probe further with regards to informal networks. Measures of informal sociability are particularly important to examine when considering gender differences because, as scholars like Gidengil et al., Norris and Inglehart, as well as Munch et al. have highlighted, while men are inclined to join professional or instrumental groups, women tend to frequent informal networks.⁶⁸ It is therefore important to capture informal associations in a social capital analysis not only to better account for divergent networking patterns, but also to understand their implications. Yet, the measures for informal networks included in the 1999-2000 World Value Survey are lacking; two of the four categories largely parallel the measures for formal networking (the list of membership in voluntary organizations), suggesting that more categories are required to measure informal networks.⁶⁹ In addition, the question 'do you spend time with your friends' is too broad to provide much information about who these friends are (friends from school, neighbours, strong or weak ties), what activities the respondent engages in with friends, and inevitably elicits a positive response (*frequently* spends time with friends).⁷⁰ Furthermore, it does not probe into kin-relationships that researchers have concluded are highly frequented by women.⁷¹

If the forms of networks that women are most heavily involved in are not included in social capital theory or do not appear in survey data, women who are active in their communities may fail to register their networking; they may subsume their civic engagement under their domestic role, assuming something relating to care work, for instance, does not qualify as networking.⁷² Accordingly, a more comprehensive approach to social capital requires a broadened understanding of what constitutes 'civic activity,' for instance by considering the impact of unpaid care work and the family on civic engagement.⁷³ Scholars have asserted that dominant social capital approaches have been preoccupied with male-dominated activities, to the neglect of other spheres of activity

⁶⁷ Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, Op.cit, p.14. Gwen Moore, Op.cit, p.733. Lowndes, Op.cit, p.8.

⁶⁸ Elizabeth Gidengil, et.al, Op.cit. Pippa Norris, Ronald Inglehart, Op.cit. Allison Munch, et.al, Op.cit.

⁶⁹ For instance, 'do you spend time with people from your church/people from sports or cultural group' parallels the voluntary organization categories of church, sports, and cultural activity.

⁷⁰ Perhaps asking more details about the friends, such as 'who would you discuss important matters with' could separate strong ties from weak ones; or breaking down 'spending time with friends' into different activities would provide greater information.

⁷¹ For instance, surveys should include more categories about kin-relationships, including those with siblings, children, and other family members. As stated in infra note #54, the question 'do you spend time with your parents' was the only kin-related informal networks category in the 2000 World Value Survey. It could not be included in this analysis because it was not included in the French or Swedish questionnaires.

⁷² Vivien Lowndes, Op.cit, p.13.

⁷³ 'Care work,' according to Herd and Meyer, fits Putnam's criteria for civic engagement, which include civic activity of a voluntary, unpaid, altruistic, nature, unattached to state functions, which breeds trust, reciprocity and social ties. For more on including care work as a form of civic activity, see Pamela Herd, Madonna Harrington Meyer, "Care Work: Invisible Civic Engagement," in *Gender and Society*, Vol.16, No.5, October 2002, p.668-74.

where women's networking often takes place, such as those associated with childcare.⁷⁴ Moreover, Lowndes contends,

...we know that school-runs, childcare swaps and babysitting circles all involve relationships of reciprocity and mutuality. Childcare networks clearly fit with common definitions of social-capital forming activities: 'regular contact with others beyond the sphere of the family or the market... the kind of face-to-face relations of relative equality associated with participation in common endeavours.' (Hall 1999, p.418) And yet, because they involve children and relationships of care, such networks are presumed to be within the sphere of the family – as belonging to the domestic arena rather than the wider civil society.⁷⁵

Furthermore, Moore, as well as Munch et. al, have shown that some networking patterns are not just attributable to gender alone, but become apparent when additional structural considerations are accounted for – the impact of having children, for instance.⁷⁶ In finding that childrearing affected men and women's associational lives differently, Munch et. al argue, "[i]ntensive childrearing during the preschool years restricts women's social worlds by reducing both the number of people with whom women interact and the time women spend interacting with those people. If gender differences in structural location in fact accumulate over the life course, childrearing appears to be a time of escalated accumulation – a time that is critical to our understanding of this process."⁷⁷ Therefore, in order to accurately capture women's experiences, variables such as those intended to measure the impact of 'children' should not only merely include the number of children per household (as did the World Value Survey), but more importantly included the age of children.

Social capital must be reconceived to account for the welfare state and the heterogeneity of the civil society. If social capital is indifferent to inequality, it holds a meagre vision of democracy. The results of the preliminary analysis signal the need for greater research to determine the exact nature of the link between the welfare state, and citizenship as status and practice. Moreover, it also illustrates the need for a broadened understanding of 'civic activity' to better capture women's experiences, calls for refinement of survey questions to measure women's networking more effectively, and would benefit from qualitative research methods not only to uncover the how welfare states shape citizenship regimes, but also to gain some insight into their impact on social capital.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Gwen Moore, Op.cit. Allison Munch, et.al, Op.cit.

⁷⁷ Allison Munch, Ibid, p.518.

APPENDIX⁷⁸

TABLE 1

% Membership in Voluntary Organizations for Canada, France and Sweden (2000)			
	Canada	France	Sweden
Member	74	39	96
Not Member	26	61	4

Source: World Value Survey 1981, 1990, 1995, World Value Survey 1999-2000
 Note: all entries are significant at $p < .001$.⁷⁹ N = 4561

TABLE 2

% Levels of Trust for Canada, France and Sweden (2000)			
	Canada	France	Sweden
Trust	37	21	66
Careful	63	79	34

Source: World Value Survey 1981, 1990, 1995, World Value Survey 1999-2000
 Note: all entries are significant at $p < .001$.⁸⁰ N = 4444

TABLE 3

% Activity in Voluntary Organizations for Canada, France and Sweden (2000)			
	Canada	France	Sweden
Active	49	27	56
Inactive	51	73	44

Source: World Value Survey 1981, 1990, 1995, World Value Survey 1999-2000
 Note: all entries are significant at $p < .001$.⁸¹ N = 4561

TABLE 4

% Informal Networks for Canada, France and Sweden (2000)			
	Canada	France	Sweden
Frequent	75	65	77
Infrequent/Never	25	35	23

Source: World Value Survey 1999-2000
 Note: all entries are significant at $p < .001$. N = 3497

⁷⁸ For Canada, N = 1931; For France, N = 1615; For Sweden, N = 1015.

⁷⁹ Measures of association (Cramer's V) for Table 1 = .460.

⁸⁰ Measures of association (Cramer's V) for Table 2 = .341.

⁸¹ Measures of association (Cramer's V) for Table 3 = .242.

TABLE 5
WELFARE REGIMES AND MEMBERSHIP:
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (2000)

	MEMBERSHIP 2000	
	B (SE B)	β
Liberal	1.00(.06)***	.26
Social Democratic	2.400(.06)***	.53
Employment	-.19(.05)**	-.04
Income	.11(.02)***	.07
Gender	n.s.	
Marital	n.s.	
Children	n.s.	
Age	.18(.03)***	.08
Education	.35(.02)***	.18
AdjR ²	.300	

Note: OLS regression; entries are unstandardized coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and standardized coefficients. * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. N= 3900

TABLE 6
WELFARE REGIMES AND TRUST:
A MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (2000)

	TRUST 2000 exp.(β)
Liberal	1.71***
Social Democratic	6.65***
Employment	.85*
Income	1.17***
Gender	n.s.
Marital	n.s.
Children	n.s.
Age	n.s.
Education	1.66***
Nagelkerke R ²	.221

Note: Entries are logistic regression coefficients exp.(β). * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.
N= 3805.

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