

Canada Compared: Voting Behaviour

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Abstract

National electorates are expected to differ slightly (or even greatly) in their vote motivations, but it is also believed that there is a common structure to voting behaviour in most democracies. Given this twofold assumption of common structure and cross-country variation in voting behaviour, we might ask: how does Canada compare to other electoral democracies? The use of the comparative approach is essential for answering that question. In this chapter, we offer two illustrations of the extent to which a comparative approach is helpful for understanding Canadian voting behaviour. Adopting first a macro-level perspective, we show how using comparative theories can push the community of Canadian scholars to go beyond national data to reveal some interesting intricacies of electoral system effects. We provide empirical evidence of the applicability of Duverger's Law in Canada by using aggregate-level electoral data that cover 80 years of provincial politics. Second, adopting a micro-level perspective, we consider the two major "comparative" models of voting behaviour and evaluate their utility in Canada, relying on recent individual-level survey data to verify the degree to which existing accounts of their applicability for Canadian voting behaviour are still accurate. We conclude that applying comparative theories to the Canadian case is beneficial in two ways – it tests the generalizability of theories, and it pushes scholars to better understand the reasons that the theories do or do not apply in Canada.

As is the case with most human behaviour, the act of voting does not happen in a vacuum.¹ Voting behaviour is thought to be motivated by a number of factors, and as political scientists we wish to make some sense of these motivations. National electorates are expected to differ slightly (or even greatly) in their vote motivations, but it is also believed that there is a common structure to voting behaviour that can be brought to light in most democracies with the use of relevant empirical data.

Given this twofold assumption of common structure and cross-country variation in voting behaviour, we might ask: how does Canada compare to other electoral democracies? The use of the comparative approach is essential for answering that question. It is very likely that differences across (or within) countries in terms of voting behaviour are related to the adoption of different electoral institutions; that they are explainable in terms of each nation's (or subnation's) particular social or political cleavage structure; and that vote choice is affected by the context of specific election campaigns. A number of theories have been developed over time to account for such structure and variation in voter behaviour. Using these comparative theoretical models as a foil can help to push our understanding of Canadian voters – whether they are the same, whether they are different, and why.

In this chapter, we offer two illustrations of the extent to which a comparative approach is helpful for understanding Canadian voting behaviour. Adopting first a macro-level perspective, we focus on the multiparty system found in Canada. Testing Duverger's Law in the Canadian case has illuminated the effects of our electoral system on our party system, and has reinforced the importance of regional cleavages for our understanding of Canadian politics in a national sense (see, for example, the discussion in Cox 1997). Yet, a look at third party support in provincial elections (thus, moving the focus to the subnational level) shows that Duverger's hypotheses are still valid in cases where some provinces experimented (briefly) with electoral systems other than the single member plurality one in use at the federal level. Thus, using comparative theories can push the community of Canadian scholars to go beyond national data to reveal some interesting intricacies of electoral system effects. We provide empirical evidence of this by using aggregate-level electoral data that cover 80 years of provincial politics in Canada.

Second, adopting a micro-level perspective, we focus next on the two major "comparative" models of voting behaviour tested in Canada: the Columbia model (group identification/class voting) and the Michigan model (partisanship/issues/leaders). Previous studies have shown class voting to be largely irrelevant in Canada, and the nature of partisanship in Canada has been argued to be different than the Michigan formulation. Both of these findings present challenges to the generalizability of the American-made models, and have helped to expand our understanding of the Canadian case specifically. In this chapter, we revisit these conclusions, relying on recent individual-level survey data to verify the degree to which this account of Canadian voting behaviour is still an accurate one.

A Macro-Level Example: Electoral System and Third-Party Vote Share

Electoral system rules have often been said to affect the shape of party systems in democratic societies. In fact, the electoral system is one of the oldest institutional variables studied by party scholars who are interested in understanding the macro-level variation found

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among modern party systems. The ground-breaking work in this research area is Duverger (1951). According to what is now referred to as “Duverger’s Law,” the single member plurality (or SMP, “first-past-the-post”) electoral system is conducive to a two-party system (Duverger 1951: 247). This is partly due to the psychological effect of this system: as only one candidate can win the district seat with a simple plurality of the votes, a third party vote is essentially wasted in terms of affecting the outcome. In other words, SMP leads to strategic voting behavior which systematically penalizes less competitive, smaller parties (Blais and Nadeau 1996; Cox 1997: 98). While some non-mainstream parties can still attract a sizable portion of the vote under SMP when their supporters hold very strong preferences for their preferred party or when voters incorrectly estimate their preferred party’s chances of winning (Blais 2002), the general expectation is that third parties overall are disadvantaged by strategic voting under the SMP system.

Canada is typically considered a challenge to Duverger’s Law because its SMP electoral system has been able to sustain a national (federal-level) party system with more than two parties for most of its existence (see, e.g., Gaines 1999).² Small federal parties have managed to make real contributions to the Canadian political scene, and today the New Democratic Party and Bloc Québécois are stable entities in federal politics, enjoying significant support among the electorate. Rae (1971: 94) held that “[i]t must be conceded that the Canadian exception is a valid and important one, which necessitates modification of the proposition that plurality formulae cause two-party competition.” This challenge has been handled by electoral system scholars in the most basic of ways – by establishing caveats that Duverger’s Law holds *except* in certain situations.³

Yet, whereas SMP has been the only electoral system in use at the federal level in Canada, an interesting feature of Canadian provincial politics is the historical variation found in electoral systems throughout the 20th century. This peculiarity, long forgotten by Canadian political scientists, has just recently been rediscovered (see Jansen 2004; Pilon 2006). Can the variety in electoral systems possibly explain patterns of third party support in the Canadian provinces over the past century or so? What can such an analysis contribute to our understanding of whether Duverger’s Law does or does not hold in Canada? These questions are examined in this section, through a comparison of provincial party systems over time.

Provincial governments in Canada have experimented with three electoral systems other than the traditional SMP (for a more complete review, see Pilon 2006). Three Western provinces have experimented with the alternative vote (AV). This single member majority system was used in the two British Columbia elections of 1952 and 1953, before quickly being repealed. AV was also adopted in rural areas in both Alberta and Manitoba from 1924 until 1955-56. During that same period, urban areas in these two provinces (mostly Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Calgary districts) operated under a proportional representation system using the single transferable vote (STV). The dual STV-AV (urban-rural) system was used for seven elections in Manitoba and eight in Alberta.

² Cairns (1968) argues that the electoral system in Canada has had a serious impact on the development of the federal party system. He implicates some of the same factors that Duverger highlighted, such as the over-rewarding of winning parties, as contributions to the regionalized focus of federal-level political parties. In turn, he argues that this created a situation where federal parties focused only on areas in which they are likely to win, thus reducing the nationalizing effect of elections and parties.

³ Canada is not the only country that does not follow Duverger’s Law. India is another notable, oft-cited example (Riker 1982). Rae (1971) highlights Austria as another exception.

The four Atlantic provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island (PEI), and Newfoundland and Labrador have also deviated from SMP. These provinces utilized a multimember plurality system from the 19th century until at least the 1970s (the 1990s in the case of PEI). Multimember districts were used in these provinces as a way to balance the representation of different religious and linguistic groups, with the allocation of between two and five seats depending on the district. For example, in Nova Scotia, political parties would each nominate a Catholic and a Protestant candidate in districts with a relatively equal balance between the two groups. In some very heterogeneous districts in New Brunswick, parties would even go as far as nominating a combination of French Catholic, English Protestant, and English Catholic candidates. In PEI, all districts had two seats to be filled and citizens had to vote separately for each seat, contrary to the other three Atlantic provinces where a single ballot was used in all districts.⁴

Taking into account such variation in provincial electoral systems, testing the relationship between the electoral system and third parties' electoral fortunes can shed light on the political consequences of electoral system change, which remains largely understudied in the Canadian provinces. It also allows us to examine the extent to which Canada constitutes an exception to Duvergerian expectations from a different perspective than the federal level one usually adopted in the literature. Our empirical analysis covers 80 years of provincial party politics, a time period that encompasses the various electoral systems that have been experimented with in some of the Canadian provinces during that period.

As previously discussed, Duverger's work suggests that we can expect voter support for third parties to be generally low under the SMP system. Duverger also looked at the other end of the electoral system spectrum, so to speak, and proposed the hypothesis that proportional representation (PR) systems favor multipartyism (Duverger 1951: 269). Recent tests of this hypothesis have provided evidence of such a tendency toward multipartyism in PR systems, showing that strategic voting decreases as district magnitude increases (Cox 1997: 100; Willey 1998). The single transferable vote (STV), used in Alberta and Manitoba, is a variant of PR (also referred to as the Hare system). Under STV, voters are asked to rank the candidates that appear on the ballot, in order of preference, and the multiple seats in the district are then distributed proportionally according to these aggregate preferences. The more seats there are to fill in a district, the more smaller parties have an opportunity to win a seat - this is the main reason why Duverger's psychological effect is not expected to operate in PR systems as much as in single member plurality ones. Our theoretical expectation, then, is that third party support is higher under STV (*positive* impact) as compared to SMP.

Just like SMP, and contrary to STV, the alternative vote (AV) is used in single member districts. The difference is that the single seat is won not with a simple plurality of the votes, but with a majority. This majority of support is calculated on the basis of the ordered preferences expressed by voters on a single ballot. In his examination of strategic voting under AV, Cox (1997: 95) concludes that "AV does not exert as strong a reductive influence on the party system as does simple plurality." As Jansen (2004: 652) puts it: "Voters [under AV] can vote for a smaller party without fear of wasting their vote because of the opportunity to have their ballot transferred at a later stage of the counting process." The alternative vote is very similar to STV in that both are preferential voting systems; thus, even though AV is used in single member districts and STV operates in multimember districts, we do not expect these

⁴ The province of Ontario used the limited vote (LV) between 1885 and 1893, but as that period stands outside the historical period under study in this chapter it is not included in the analysis.

two electoral systems to have very different impacts on third party support (see also Cox 1997: 144 for a similar assessment). As a consequence, our theoretical expectation in the case of AV, much like for STV, is that third party voting is higher under that system (*positive* impact) as compared to SMP.

An additional reason for why we do not expect our results to indicate that AV and STV differ much in their effect is that, unlike in British Columbia where AV was the only system that was experimented with, in Alberta and Manitoba AV and STV were used simultaneously across the province.⁵ Since our measure of electoral system type is aggregated at the provincial level only, for empirical reasons we cannot really disentangle the separate effects of the two systems in these provinces. Yet, as was highlighted above, the two systems operate under the same logic of preferential voting, so that expectations of their effect are practically similar. A final note of caution comes from Jansen (2004: 654) who finds that the number of parties in Alberta and Manitoba did increase under AV, but states that this positive impact may be as much attributable to an altered socio-economic context as to electoral system change per se. Thus, our analyses should be interpreted with this in mind.

The last electoral system type that is examined in this section is the multimember plurality one that was used for several decades in the four Atlantic provinces. Usually, multimember districts tend to be associated with a fractionalization of the party system (e.g., Willey 1998). But if we consider the specific case of multimember districts under plurality rule, we can think of several reasons why the general rule may not necessarily apply. According to Martin (2006: 53), the already large disproportion of votes to seats obtained under SMP can actually be even larger under multimember plurality rule. This is due to the fact that in multimember plurality districts, each political party tries to present as many candidates as there are seats to be filled. This system thus actually reinforces the tendency towards a two-party system found under SMP, as the two systems operate similarly: the voter has only one ballot and one (non-transferable) vote. In addition, small parties often do not have the resources (financial and otherwise) needed to present more than one candidate in multimember districts, so their disadvantage over mainstream parties is actually greater than under SMP rule. This is exactly what occurred in the Atlantic provinces: in multimember districts, the mainstream Liberals and Conservatives typically presented more than one candidate, whereas third parties often presented only one. Multimember plurality was adopted in these provinces as a way to improve the representation of specific social groups in the legislature, not necessarily as a way to balance party representation. Hence, our theoretical expectation is that third party voting is lower under multimember plurality rule (*negative* impact) as compared to SMP. At a minimum, we expect to find no significant difference in third party support between SMP and multimember plurality.

In order to fully investigate the impact of different electoral system types on third party voting, we need to analyze it over a long period of time. Hence, our analysis is based on pooled cross-sectional time-series data that measure trends in third party support in the Canadian provinces over a period of 80 consecutive years (1926-2006). Our examination thus starts in the mid-1920s, just around the time that some provinces began to adopt an electoral system different from SMP. The analysis is performed on a dataset that includes the results of all 205 provincial elections held in Canada between 1926 and 2006. Provincial election

⁵ Jansen (2004: 650) estimates that in both provinces, at the time that these systems were in use, approximately 80% of MLAs were elected under AV, with the remaining 20% elected under STV.

outcome data were compiled from Feigert (1989), the Canadian Parliamentary Guide, and the Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer from each province.

The dependent variable is the total (aggregate) percentage of the vote received by third parties in each provincial election. This operationalization of the dependent variable is similar to that adopted by Rosenstone et al. (1996) in their longitudinal study of third party support in the US. It is preferred to an alternative that would use the percentage of support for each third party individually in each election (e.g., Harmel and Robertson 1985; Willey 1998), because we are mainly interested in the *global* impact of electoral systems on third party voting *in general*. Political parties were classified as “mainstream” or “third” according to whether they had been in power before or not.⁶ According to the literature, third parties (or non-mainstream parties) are those not considered by the public to be a natural (or traditional) governing alternative because they are either new or they have been unable yet to form a government, thus remaining an “untried alternative” (see Pinard 1973; Perrella 2005; Bélanger 2007).

The independent variables are aggregate measures of electoral system type. Two different indicators are used: the district magnitude measured as the average number of Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) per electoral district in each election; and a series of dummy variables identifying provincial elections held under different electoral system types (AV, STV-AV, and multimember plurality).

Table 1 presents an early peek at the effect of electoral system type on third party voting in the Canadian provinces since 1926. In the table, the mean vote share received by third parties in each province is computed for elections held under SMP and for those held under a different electoral system. Looking first at Western provinces, we can see that the mean percentage of votes received by non-mainstream parties is systematically higher when SMP is *not* in use, and that the differences in means are all statistically significant according to standard t-tests. Turning to the Atlantic provinces, we observe that the average third party support was lower when multimember plurality was in use. The differences in means are also statistically significant, with the exception of Newfoundland and Labrador (a difference of 4 percentage points only, the smallest gap in the whole table). All in all, these results provide some preliminary evidence confirming our hypotheses about electoral rules affecting (positively or negatively) support for third parties: AV and STV appear more conducive to third party electoral success as compared to SMP, and multimember plurality rule appears less conducive to third party support than SMP.

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

As outlined above, the effect of electoral systems on party systems is sometimes conceptualized in terms of the impact of district magnitude. We thus calculated a measure of district magnitude being the average number of MLAs (or seats) per district for each election, in each province. For the single member systems, the district magnitude is equal to 1 by definition, as there is always only one seat to be filled per district. For multimember systems (STV or plurality), the district magnitude is greater than 1. Using this indicator allows us to

⁶ The complete list of third parties is too long to be reported here, as it includes all parties that were not “mainstream.” Mainstream parties include the Liberal Party and the Progressive Conservative Party in all ten provinces (but in the latter case, only since 1975 in Alberta and since 1986 in Saskatchewan). Also considered as mainstream were the CCF-NDP in Ontario (1995 on), Manitoba (1973 on), Saskatchewan (1948 on), and BC (1975 on); Social Credit in Alberta (1940 on) and BC (1953 on); United Farmers in Ontario (1923 on), Manitoba (1927 on), and Alberta (1926 on); the Parti Québécois (1981 on) and Union Nationale in Quebec; and the Progressive Party in Manitoba (1932 on).

develop a summary measure that compares SMP (value of 1) to alternative electoral systems (value greater than 1) over time in each province – although it remains necessary to distinguish in our analyses between STV and multimember plurality since we have different expectations regarding their respective impact on third party voting (positive for STV and negative for plurality). A final caveat is that district magnitude cannot be used as an indicator for AV in British Columbia, since its magnitude is the same as for SMP; we therefore rely on a dummy variable for BC-AV in order to compare its effect to that of SMP in that same province.

Table 2 briefly provides summary statistics per province for our indicator of district magnitude. In Alberta and Manitoba, the measure ranges from 1.16 to 1.26. These values would necessarily have been greater were it not for the impossibility of disentangling AV (rural) districts from STV (urban) districts at the aggregate provincial level; yet the resulting values still constitute a meaningful measure of the difference between these systems and the traditional SMP system. In the four Atlantic provinces, the district magnitude ranges from 1.02 to 3.06, depending on the province.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

Does district magnitude affect third party support? The results from multiple regressions⁷ that test for this effect appear in Table 3. Looking at the whole 80 year period, the average number of MLAs per district is significantly associated with third party vote share; the relationship is positive for the Western provinces (excluding BC, but including Saskatchewan where SMP was in effect), and negative for the Atlantic provinces. In the West, an increase of 0.10 in district magnitude, the actual maximum range of the variable in these provinces, yields an increase of 9.2 percentage points in third party support. In the Atlantic region, a similar increase of 0.10 in average district magnitude results in a decrease of a little over half a point (-0.6) for third parties (statistically significant at $p < .01$). As further illustration, an increase of 1.22 in district magnitude, the maximum range of the variable in Nova Scotia, actually generates a decrease of 7.5 percentage points in third party vote share. Thus, these results broadly confirm the impact of STV-AV and multimember plurality on third party support.

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

As for the alternative vote in British Columbia, the resulting impact is also statistically significant (see results in column 3). For the two BC elections that used AV, the third party vote share increased by about 25 points compared to elections held under SMP before and after. This is partly due to the rise of the Social Credit Party in that province, which came into power for the first time following the outcome of the 1952 election. At the time, AV was adopted as a way to stop the rise of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) party; the electoral system change was not only unable to stem the CCF's rise, it also allowed another third party (Social Credit) to defeat the governing Liberal-Conservative coalition and form the new government.

⁷ Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates, with panel-corrected standard errors used due to the TSCS design. Similar results were obtained when a lag of the dependent variable was included on the right-hand side of the equations; since our substantive results were mostly unaffected, we excluded the lagged dependent variable from the models presented herein. Only the AV effect in British Columbia ceases to be statistically significant at the standard 0.05 level with the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable, but this is most likely due to the small number of observations involved in this specific case (only 2 elections).

The impact of all three electoral systems can be jointly tested in a single regression model by employing dummy variables instead of the district magnitude measure and by including all 205 provincial elections held in Canada between 1926 and 2006 (see Table 4). As can be seen in the table, the effect of each system is confirmed in the regression. Compared to the reference category of elections held under single member plurality, STV-AV systems in Manitoba and Alberta increase the vote share of third parties by 21 points, the alternative vote in British Columbia increases support for third parties by 28 points, and multimember plurality decreases third party voting in the Atlantic provinces by 15 points. The model's R-squared is 0.35, indicating that more than a third of the variation in third party support across Canadian provinces over that 80 year period is accounted for by electoral system types.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

To summarize, in this section we have provided evidence that suggests that Duverger's hypotheses about the electoral impact of electoral systems do seem to hold in Canada once we explore the variance in electoral systems across the provinces and over time. In provincial elections, third party support was shown to be higher or lower depending on the electoral system in use. The logic of the psychological effect of electoral systems and wasted votes holds in the Canadian case. Canada's "exceptionalism," so clear when the focus is on the country's federal party system, is much less so once the question is examined via a comparison of the various provincial electoral and party systems. Our findings suggest that there is nothing inherently different about Canada that detracts from Duverger's theories; instead, it may be worthwhile to consider more in depth the specific reasons why third parties persist at the national level. The psychological effect does seem to have an effect on Canadians, just not at the federal level.

A Micro-Level Example: Determinants of Individual Vote Choice

Having established that a macro-level examination of Canadian voters has interesting implications for comparative research, we now turn to a micro-level examination of those same voters. How do voters determine who they will vote for? Studies conducted primarily in the US have developed a number of theories over the years. The two main theories are named after the universities at which they were developed – Columbia and Michigan. The Columbia model focuses on the affiliation of various social groups with particular political parties (Lazarsfeld et al. 1948; Berelson et al. 1954), and suggests that there is a natural way for a person to vote based on social group membership. If someone belongs to a particular social group or has a certain class status, then his/her vote choice is clear.

In Canada, this model is sometimes overlooked because of early research that found that the model, especially its focus on class, did not fit well with the Canadian reality. Alford (1964), for example, noted an absence of collective group experiences in Canada that precluded the model from having any real predictive power. Regenstreif (1965: 98) echoed this finding, noting that "[a]ll the evidence points to the fact that, for Canada as a whole, there is little in the way of long-term status-party linkage." Furthermore, Clarke et al. (1996: 94) explain: "Although social class divisions constitute one of the major fault lines in party systems in many Western countries, Canada is an exception. Surveys conducted since the mid-1960s show that relationships typically are quite weak between indicators of social class such as education, income, and occupations, on the one hand, and voting behaviour, on the other." This strand of early research argued that some group affiliations, specifically ethnoreligious and regional, can be significant vote predictors in Canada, but socio-economic

status and class (two characteristics which should be significant, according to the model) really do not apply consistently to the Canadian voter (Meisel 1973).

This discrepancy between the Canadian case and the Columbia model sparked closer examination of the dynamics of the Canadian political system. One of the most prominent explanations offered focuses on the role of political parties in mobilizing class cleavages. Alford (1964: 251) argued that “[c]lass voting is low in Canada because the political parties are identified as representatives of regional, religious, and ethnic groupings rather than as representatives of national class interests”. Meisel (1973) and Schwartz (1975) suggest that only some small parties, such as the NDP, are able to boast any type of consistent class appeal. The major parties, the Liberals and Progressive Conservatives, do/did not provide distinct alternatives for voters and therefore cannot count on attracting specific groups of support. This can be related to the brokerage nature of the two parties; taking strong stances risks alienation, and so attempting to be “all things to all voters” is a wise strategy.

Another explanation for the lack of class voting in Canada is that Canadians do not think in terms of left-right ideologies. Clarke et al. (2005), for example, note that only 31% of respondents to their Political Support in Canada project said they use “left” and “right” labels when thinking about politics. Trying to use a vote model that relies on class consciousness, then, is destined to have little predictive power in Canada. This suggests an important contextual constraint on the Columbia model – only in a certain type of society can a group-based model of voting be appropriate. Only when voters are not only aware of their group affiliations but also able to see a link between those affiliations and the political party choices being offered can the Columbia model be applied successfully. In the case of Canada, this prerequisite framework has been argued to be non-existent due to the natures of the major political parties, which are themselves influenced by the regional nature of the electorate.

The other major voting model is the Michigan model. Most famously laid out in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) by scholars at the University of Michigan, it is widely used to explain American voting behaviour. Campbell and his colleagues prioritized three factors for vote choice – party identification, issue positions, and evaluations of political candidates – after noting that social group characteristics alone cannot explain short-run turnover in government. In this model, “[t]he role of party identification seems primarily to be that of an antecedent factor that colors (sic) these attitudes as they are formed”(Campbell et al. 1960: 137). Party identification essentially operates as a summary measure of all of the sociological factors considered in the Columbia model, and is conceptualized as a long-standing, psychological attachment to a political party that influences how a person’s vote is cast. The Michigan model is a realistic improvement in that it allows shorter term influences (issues and candidates) to play a role in vote decisions, but party identification is the most important component, operating directly and indirectly on vote behaviour.

Soon after its development, the Michigan model (and the idea of party identification) was applied to the Canadian case. While the model itself remains widely used, many researchers (early and more recent) have found that the important concept of party identification operates somewhat differently in Canada. It has been found that Canadian partisans are neither as numerous nor as committed as American partisans (Regenstreif 1965; Meisel 1973) and that Canadian partisans are more volatile (Clarke et al. 1979; Stephenson, Scotto and Kornberg 2004). However, the view that party identification is not the same in Canada and the US has been challenged. Sniderman et al. (1974), using the same data as Meisel, argue many Canadian partisans maintain stable party loyalties comparable to those of Americans (see Jenson 1975, 1978 for a rebuttal). More recently, Gidengil et al. (2006b)

revisited the controversy, finding that Canadian party identification is fairly stable, even when the party system itself is in flux.

In light of the challenge of integrating a different kind of partisanship into vote models, Clarke et al. (1979, 1996) developed a way of taking the uniqueness of Canadian partisanship into account when applying a basic Michigan model of voting behaviour. They suggested that a number of Canadian partisans were “flexible” (as opposed to being “durable” in the Michigan sense) and that for this reason, we should expect that partisanship in Canada does not exert as strong an influence on vote choice. As a result, issues and candidates should have a more prominent role in the vote calculation. Archer (1987) supports the importance of short-term considerations to Canadian voters. In a two-stage model of Canadian vote choice that considers the three Michigan factors (partisan identification, issues, and candidates) to be endogenously created, he finds that attitudes are more important vote determinants than sociodemographic factors, and that “short-term attitudinal variables, such as issue positions and leader evaluations, affect voter behaviour directly, and also indirectly through their effect on party identification” (Archer 1987: 571).

However, a challenge to a Michigan-inspired model of Canadian voting behaviour remains, one that questions whether the Columbia model is really inappropriate for studying Canadian elections – the importance of religion and ethnicity. Recently, Blais (2005) reminded scholars of the importance of group-based voting in Canada through an analysis of data from 1965-2004, in which he pointed out how important religion (Catholicism) and ethnicity (non-European) have been for the fortunes of the Liberal Party. In his conclusion, he argues for revisiting the importance of sociological factors, like those in the Columbia model, to understand Canadian politics: “My point is rather that we miss something important if we do not examine the group bases of party support.” (Blais 2005:834) Even if class politics is weak in Canada, there may be other group identities that are influential for voting. Indeed, for several years the Canadian Election Study team has employed the block recursive model of voting behaviour developed by Miller and Shanks (1996) when analyzing the overall election (Nevitte et al. 2000; Blais et al. 2002; Gidengil et al. 2006a). This model includes all of the factors expected to influence vote behaviour, including those sociological factors that the Michigan model assumes are accounted for by party identification, as well as factors immediately proximate to the vote. In those analyses, elements from both vote choice models (Columbia and Michigan) were found to be significant predictors of vote choice. Perhaps, then, the Columbia model is still relevant for Canadian politics after all.

From the perspective of comparative voting behaviour studies, the important question to answer is: how relevant? Is the Michigan model insufficient to explain voting in Canada, because of the importance of social groups to voting patterns? It may be the case that the differences in Canadian partisanship mean that the measure does not adequately absorb the sociological factors expected to be captured by party identification, and so accounting for group bases of support is necessary to fully understand electoral outcomes. This line of research represents an important piece of information for comparative scholars as it relates to the generalizability of the Michigan model, as well as for scholars interested in the nuances of the Canadian case in particular.

In the remainder of this chapter, we consider the relative utility of the Michigan and Columbia models for studying recent Canadian elections outside Quebec.⁸ We use survey

⁸ Studying Canadian vote behaviour outside of Quebec is a common practice given the differences in issues and party systems. Further research into the applicability of these models for vote behaviour in Quebec is warranted.

data from the 2008 and 2004 Canadian Election Studies to investigate the relative explanatory value of multinomial logit regressions of vote choice that address each model. If the Columbia model remains relevant for Canadian voting, we should see significant coefficients for the variables that tap into sociological identities and a considerable portion of the vote being explained by the model. If the Michigan model is more applicable, however, we should see that party identification, issue stances and leader evaluations do more to explain vote decisions. Finally, as a way of providing a direct comparison, we combine the variables from both models into a single regression to get an accurate indication of the relative strength of each set of variables. A substantial improvement in explanatory power from combining the two models would indicate that a hybrid of the two models is best to explain recent Canadian voting behaviour.

The results for the 2008 elections are presented in Table 5. The first set of columns present the results for a Columbia model; the second for a Michigan model; and the final for a combined regression that includes all of the variables from the two models. The Columbia model includes a collection of sociodemographic variables, some capturing class distinctions (education, income, renting a home), some capturing location (Atlantic and West dummy variables, a rural dummy variable), most importantly those that capture group identity (immigrant status, being a visible minority, Catholicism, household union membership, being a public sector worker, and language). The Michigan model includes party identification with any of the parties, issue stances for 4 prominent issues in the campaign, and feeling thermometer ratings for each of the party leaders. The Liberal party is used as the baseline category for the multinomial regressions. Thus, the results for the Conservative coefficients indicate the effect of the variable on deciding between voting for the Conservatives and the Liberals, and similarly for the NDP and Green coefficients.

Consider first the results for the Columbia model. Education, region, being a visible minority and being francophone are significant predictors of voting Conservative instead of Liberal; age, gender, education, region, income and union membership matter for choosing the NDP over the Liberals; and age, region, living in a rural area, being a visible minority, being Catholic and living in a union household matter for choosing the Green Party. Several of the variables identified by the Columbia model matter for vote choice; however, the explanatory power of the model is quite low (pseudo $R^2=0.08$). It is interesting to observe that of the two group memberships that are expected to matter the most for supporting the Liberal party (being Catholic and a visible minority), being Catholic only factors into the Green-Liberal choice and being a visible minority only matters for Conservative and Green decisions.

Turning to the Michigan model, for each of the vote choice pairs some combination of party identification (both for the party in question and against the baseline Liberals), issue positions and leader evaluations are significant. In this case, the explanatory power of the model is significantly higher, accounting for almost half of the variance in the vote decision (pseudo- $R^2=0.47$); this suggests that the utility of the Michigan model for explaining Canadian voting patterns is much greater than the Columbia model.

In the combined regression, however, we see an interesting twist on this interpretation of the findings. The choice between the Liberal and Conservatives is not influenced by Columbia-type considerations but the NDP-Liberal and Green-Liberal choices are. Age, education, income and speaking French all pull voters away from the NDP and toward the Liberals, net of party identification, issue stances and leader evaluations, while only being from the West pushes in favour of the NDP. For the Green-Liberal choice, Westerners favour the Greens while Catholics favour the Liberals. Interestingly, in the combined regression

model one's economic evaluation is no longer significant, nor is Green party identification, but leader evaluations and the other party identification variables remain strong and significant. It is these variables that provide the most explanatory power, as is evident in the small increase in the pseudo- R^2 value (from 0.47 to 0.52). Thus, although Blais (2005) argued for the continuing importance of group identities in voting behaviour, our analyses here suggest that the additional benefit of including such variables in a model of Canadian vote choice in 2008 is only marginal explanatory improvement over a standard Michigan-type model, and even then such variables do not seem to be important for a choice between the two largest Canadian parties, the Conservatives and Liberals.

We recognize, of course, that the election of 2008 may be anomalous. Many of the most persistent group-based findings in Canadian voting behaviour are best understood only over time. To see whether this is the case, we recreated our 2008 analysis for 2004, an election with a different incumbent party (the Liberals) and a different political climate. In that year, the Conservatives were a newly-merged party, the Sponsorship Scandal had recently been exposed, and the economy was doing well. The results, reported in Table 6, largely mirror those from 2008.

In the Columbia model, several variables are significant predictors of vote choice. Region, rural residence, being a visible minority and being Catholic all matter for choosing the Conservatives over the Liberals. For choosing the NDP, age, education, region, income and union household membership are significant; for a Green vote age, region, rural residence, being a visible minority and being Catholic are all significant. As expected, both of the Liberals' core groups (Catholic and visible minorities) support them against each of the other parties, and union households support the NDP over the Liberals, but once again the explanatory power of the model is very low (pseudo- $R^2=0.07$). The Michigan model once again behaves as expected – partisanship, some issues and leader evaluations are significant vote predictors⁹ - and accounts for more than half of the variance in vote choice (pseudo- $R^2=0.58$). Curiously, Conservative party identification is not quite significant for choosing the Conservative party (just outside standard significance levels, $p=0.118$).

Finally, turning to the combined regression model, once again we see only marginal improvement in explanatory power when we add the Columbia variables to the Michigan model. For voting Green, only speaking French influences voters toward the Liberals. For an NDP choice, only being from the West is significant. The other variables remain the same for those two choices. Choosing between the Liberals and Conservatives, however, is influenced to a greater degree. Not only are some Columbia-type variables significant (education, Western residence, visible minority) but some of the Michigan variables change values (Conservative PID and attitudes about Iraq become significant).

Taking the results from these two elections together, and considering across the different models, it is clear that the Michigan model is very useful for understanding voting behaviour in Canada. Although variables in each of the models contribute to an understanding of vote choice, those in the Michigan model contribute much more in terms of explanatory power. Furthermore, the same pattern appears in 2004 and 2008, when about half of the variation in voting behaviour can be explained by considering party identification, issue stances and feeling thermometers. We should note, however, that the issue stances considered were inconsistently influential across parties and elections. The majority of explanatory power seems to be coming from partisanship (despite arguments that it is a different or

⁹ Green party identification and feelings toward the Green party leader are not available for 2004.

perhaps inapplicable concept in Canada) and leader evaluations. It is also important to note that we see significant variability in the influence of the various Columbia-type variables - region and being a visible minority seem to matter the most, not unexpectedly, but Catholicism matters in 2004 but not 2008, and living in a union household matters in 2008 but not 2004. This variability suggests that the value of using a model based on group identities, or even including such variables in a general explanation of modern Canadian voting, is limited. Although group membership has long been an important factor in Canadian elections, the current applicability of that conclusion needs to be updated in light of recent evidence. Thus, despite some unique features of Canadian voting behaviour, it appears that the Michigan model that is widely used in other contexts is appropriate for studying current voting patterns in Canada as well.

Conclusion

Is Canadian voting behaviour influenced by broader structural trends common to most electoral democracies, or is it unique in some ways? In this chapter we have attempted to answer these questions by using existing comparative theoretical models as a baseline for comparison, and by studying Canadian voting behaviour both in its aggregate- and individual-level dimensions.

When discussing the political consequences of electoral systems in Canada, authors usually only look at the effects of the single member plurality system on party competition in federal elections (e.g., Cairns 1968; Gaines 1999). Their usual conclusion is to say that Canada sustains a multi-party system that stands in opposition to Duvergerian expectations. Yet, political scientists often forget that several Canadian provinces have not always used SMP, and have experimented with other types of electoral systems. This provides us with the variation needed to compare the potential impact of different electoral system types on provincial party systems, and on provincial third party support more specifically.

Using macro-level data covering a period of 80 years (1926-2006), we have shown that electoral systems did shape provincial party systems during that period, at least insofar as third parties are concerned. In provincial elections that used some form of preferential voting system (either the alternative vote or the single transferable vote), third party support has been significantly higher than in elections that used SMP. Inversely, in those elections where the multimember plurality system was used, third party voting has been significantly lower than under SMP rule. Put differently, the electoral system experimentations made in the Western provinces during the 20th century proved more conducive to third party voting, whereas the experimentations made in the Atlantic provinces proved less conducive to electoral success for non-mainstream parties. This pattern of results may partially account for the different fates of provincial third parties in these two regions of Canada, given that third parties have historically been found to be much more successful in the West than in the Atlantic provinces.

Of course, additional variables ought to be included in the analysis, provided that the relevant aggregate-level data are available across time and provinces. For instance, Jansen (2004) argues that the partisan and socio-economic contexts found in the Canadian provinces at the time of their experimentations with various electoral systems ought to be considered, as they too can help explain the cooperating behaviour (or lack thereof) observed among parties under different electoral systems. Thus, the comparative approach helps to show if and how electoral rules matter to electoral success, but some idiosyncrasies are necessarily accounted for better through case studies.

At the micro-level, our investigation into the applicability of comparative voting models for understanding Canadian vote choice reveals a similar conclusion. The Canadian case does not deviate strongly from the comparative literature, but there are some unique aspects of the case that deserve careful attention. We find that a great deal of the variance in how Canadians voted in 2004 and 2008 can be explained by the Michigan model of voting behaviour, which acknowledges the importance of party identification, issue stances and leader evaluations. There is some evidence that the Columbia model is still relevant for the study of Canadian voting but its overall value is weak. However, we should clarify that this result does not lead us to conclude that the study of Columbia-type variables is not interesting, or that it cannot add to our understanding of political dynamics in Canada. Even though the explanatory value added is not high, recognizing that there are some groups that still express partisan leanings that are not explained by party identification or the Michigan model is important. In this respect, although Canada is not a unique case, only by going beyond the Michigan model can some of the more interesting (and unique) aspects of Canadian voting behaviour be understood.

In conclusion, this chapter suggests that there is much to learn about Canadian voting behaviour from theories in the comparative literature. Canada is not immune from the dynamics that have been modeled in other countries. At the same time, it is important to recognize the features that make Canada unique, which is best revealed through a careful application of comparative theories. It is a win-win situation – the generalizability of comparative theories can be tested and potentially supported, while the specific features of the Canadian system can be made more readily apparent.

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Table 1: Electoral System Type and Mean Third Party Vote Share in Selected Provinces, 1926-2006

Electoral System		Mean Third Party Vote Share (%)	Number of Elections
<i>Western Provinces</i>			
Manitoba	STV in Winnipeg and alternative vote in certain rural districts (1927-1953)	42.33	7
	SMP (1958-2003)	10.99	14
Alberta	STV in Edmonton and Calgary* and alternative vote in rural districts (1926-1955)	38.85	8
	SMP (1959-2004)	26.33	13
British Columbia	Alternative Vote (1952-1953)	47.50	2
	SMP (1928-1949)	31.88	5
	SMP (1956-2005)	18.22	14
<i>Atlantic Provinces</i>			
New Brunswick	Plurality-at-large in certain districts (1930-1970)	2.75	11
	SMP (1974-2006)	12.73	9
Nova Scotia	Plurality-at-large in certain districts (1928-1978)	7.06	14
	SMP (1981-2006)	26.11	8
Prince Edward Island	Plurality-at-large in all districts (1927-1993)	1.79	19
	SMP (1996-2003)	6.57	3
Newfoundland and Labrador	Plurality-at-large in certain districts (1949-1972)	5.34	7
	SMP (1975-2003)	9.34	9

Note: The data exclude the 1933 British Columbia and 1949 Newfoundland General Elections due to the lack of an incumbent government. All mean differences are statistically significant at $p < 0.05$ or better, except for the case of Newfoundland and Labrador.

* STV was also used in the district of Medicine Hat in 1926.

Table 2: Average Number of Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) per Electoral District in Selected Provinces

Province	Electoral System	Average Number of MLAs per District	
		Min	Max
British Columbia (1952-1953)	Alternative vote	1	1
Alberta (1926-1955)	STV in Edmonton and Calgary and alternative vote in all other districts	1.16	1.22
Manitoba (1927-1953)	STV in Winnipeg and alternative vote in certain rural districts	1.16	1.26
New Brunswick (1930-1970)	Plurality-at-large in certain districts only	2.53	3.06
Nova Scotia (1928-1978)	Plurality-at-large in certain districts only	1.04	2.26
Prince Edward Island (1927-1993)	Plurality-at-large in all districts	2	2
Newfoundland (1949-1972)	Plurality-at-large in certain districts only	1.02	1.12

Table 3: Effect of Average Number of Members of Legislative Assembly per Electoral District on Provincial Third Party Vote Share

Independent Variables	Western Provinces excluding British Columbia (1926-2004)	Atlantic Provinces (1927-2006)	British Columbia (1928-2005)
MLA Average	92.51** (25.43)	-6.13** (1.16)	
Alternative Vote Dummy			25.68* (11.61)
Constant	-69.72** (27.04)	17.25** (2.16)	21.82** (3.58)
R-squared	0.15	0.24	0.19
N	61	80	21

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: Effect of Electoral System Type on Provincial Third Party Vote Share (1926-2006)

Independent Variables	
STV-AV Dummy	21.27** (3.96)
BC Alternative Vote Dummy	28.3* (11.25)
Atlantic Plurality Dummy	-15.27** (1.60)
Constant	19.20** (1.25)
R-squared	0.35
N	205

Note: Entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients with panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. The reference electoral system type category is SMP.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: 2008 Vote Choice Results, Comparing Models

	Columbia			Michigan			Combined		
	Coeff.	Robust SE	Min/Ma x	Coeff.	Robust SE	Min/Ma x	Coeff.	Robust SE	Min/Ma x
Conservative vs. Liberal									
Age	-0.94	-0.59	0.09				0.82	-1.26	0.19
Female	0.01	-0.18	-0.04				0.03	-0.33	-0.02
Education	-2.20***	-0.54	-0.34				-1.26	-0.98	-0.06
Atlantic	-0.48*	-0.25	-0.1				0.2	-0.48	0.02
West	0.92***	-0.2	0.07				0.58	-0.38	0.02
Rural	0.33	-0.21	0.03				0.55	-0.41	0.07
Income	-0.03	-0.03	0.13				0.04	-0.07	0.13
Renter	-0.2	-0.28	-0.08				0.5	-0.46	0.06
Visible	-0.60*	-0.34	-0.09				-0.67	-0.61	-0.05
Immigrant	-0.16	-0.27	-0.02				-0.03	-0.56	-0.03
Catholic	-0.14	-0.21	0				-0.25	-0.38	-0.03
Public Sector	-0.22	-0.26	-0.02				0.18	-0.49	0.02
Union Household	0.2	-0.25	-0.09				-0.15	-0.44	-0.06
Francophone	-1.18***	-0.43	-0.22				-0.91	-0.77	-0.05
Allophone	-0.45	-0.31	-0.1				-0.84	-0.67	-0.06
Liberal PID				-1.93***	-0.4	-0.13	-1.80***	-0.42	-0.12
Conservative PID				1.99***	-0.47	0.27	1.89***	-0.52	0.26
NDP PID				0.33	-0.56	-0.05	0.02	-0.72	-0.07
Green PID				-38.99***	-0.61	-0.35	-37.35***	-0.76	-0.39
Environmental spending				-0.68***	-0.25	-0.18	-0.79***	-0.29	-0.26
Health care spending				0.28	-0.32	0.04	0.11	-0.32	0.04
Support for Private Hospitals				0.04	-0.15	0	0.11	-0.17	0.02
Retrospective Economic Evaluation				0.49*	-0.29	0.07	0.57	-0.35	0.14
Afghanistan				0.22	-0.19	0.07	0.21	-0.21	0.07
Harper Feeling Thermometer				6.91***	-0.78	0.83	7.49***	-0.87	0.88
Dion Feeling Thermometer				-4.69***	-0.9	-0.27	-5.76***	-0.9	-0.33
Layton Feeling Thermometer				-3.07***	-0.96	-0.48	-2.14**	-0.9	-0.37
May Feeling Thermometer				0.11	-0.86	-0.12	0.32	-0.99	-0.13
Constant	2.66***	-0.56		0.51	-0.51		0.58	-1.33	

NDP vs. Liberal

Age	-2.78***	-0.7	-0.23				-2.58**	-1.05	-0.37
Female	0.36*	-0.2	0.05				0.29	-0.29	0.05
Education	-1.64***	-0.63	-0.04				-1.63*	-0.91	-0.23
Atlantic	-0.17	-0.29	0.02				-0.24	-0.45	-0.08
West	1.13***	-0.23	0.08				0.83**	-0.34	0.11

Rural	0.03	-0.26	-0.04				-0.26	-0.36	-0.12
Income	-0.17***	-0.04	-0.28				-0.10*	-0.06	-0.28
Renter	0.15	-0.29	0.04				0.26	-0.39	0.02
Visible	-0.27	-0.36	0.02				-0.47	-0.54	-0.04
Immigrant	-0.04	-0.35	0.02				0.56	-0.57	0.13
Catholic	0	-0.23	0.03				0.25	-0.34	0.11
Public Sector Worker	-0.31	-0.28	-0.03				0	-0.42	-0.02
Union Household	1.09***	-0.26	0.17				0.61	-0.39	0.12
Francophone	-0.68	-0.43	-0.02				-1.59**	-0.69	-0.21
Allophone	-0.2	-0.4	0				-0.88	-0.66	-0.14
Liberal PID				-1.42***	-0.32	-0.17	-1.58***	-0.36	-0.19
Conservative PID				0.57	-0.5	-0.01	0.63	-0.57	0
NDP PID				1.57***	-0.41	0.37	1.47***	-0.48	0.39
Green PID				-0.02	-0.74	0.02	-0.33	-0.73	0.02
Environmental spending				-0.28	-0.26	-0.04	-0.06	-0.3	0.09
Health care spending				0.54*	-0.32	0.2	0.15	-0.33	0.1
Support for Private Hospitals				0.05	-0.14	0.01	0.1	-0.17	0.03
Retrospective Economic Evaluation				0.32	-0.28	0.03	-0.13	-0.34	-0.17
Afghanistan				-0.16	-0.17	-0.09	-0.14	-0.2	-0.08
Harper Feeling Thermometer				-0.13	-0.55	-0.33	-0.08	-0.63	-0.34
Dion Feeling Thermometer				-3.55***	-0.8	-0.27	-3.96***	-0.89	-0.2
Layton Feeling Thermometer				2.69***	-0.76	0.63	2.80***	-0.85	0.62
May Feeling Thermometer				0.81	-0.73	-0.09	0.64	-0.87	-0.17
Constant	2.54***	-0.64		-0.59	-0.51		2.23**	-1.07	

Green vs. Liberal

Age	-2.78***	-0.93	-0.09				-0.9	-1.39	-0.01
Female	0.26	-0.27	0.01				0.29	-0.37	0.02
Education	0.54	-0.86	0.12				-0.13	-1.15	0.07
Atlantic	0.03	-0.38	0.02				0.54	-0.54	0.08
West	1.03***	-0.31	0.02				0.73*	-0.38	0.04
Rural	0.96***	-0.32	0.07				0.71	-0.45	0.1
Income	-0.07	-0.05	-0.01				0	-0.07	0.05
Renter	0.33	-0.36	0.03				0.11	-0.51	-0.01
Visible	-1.05*	-0.61	-0.04				-0.83	-0.78	-0.06
Immigrant	-0.46	-0.65	-0.02				-0.08	-0.69	-0.04
Catholic	-0.97**	-0.39	-0.06				-1.08**	-0.46	-0.12
Public Sector Worker	-0.09	-0.35	0.01				0.18	-0.45	0.02
Union Household	0.56*	-0.34	0.01				0.47	-0.42	0.03
Francophone	0.15	-0.56	0.08				-0.66	-1.06	-0.01
Allophone	0.15	-0.72	0.03				-0.04	-0.82	0.05
Liberal PID				-1.44***	-0.41	-0.07	-1.42***	-0.45	-0.07

Conservative PID			0.21	-0.69	-0.05	0.21	-0.76	-0.06
NDP PID			-0.6	-0.84	-0.11	-1.18	-0.96	-0.15
Green PID			1.37**	-0.65	0.31	0.75	-0.7	0.23
Environmental spending			0.04	-0.44	0.06	-0.16	-0.45	0.02
Health care spending			-0.33	-0.38	-0.16	-0.46	-0.36	-0.17
Support for Private Hospitals			0.09	-0.18	0.01	0.08	-0.19	0.01
Retrospective Economic Evaluation			0.67*	-0.36	0.11	0.6	-0.41	0.14
Afghanistan			0.06	-0.19	0.02	0.01	-0.21	0
Harper Feeling Thermometer			0.07	-0.62	-0.11	0.07	-0.71	-0.15
Dion Feeling Thermometer			-4.45***	-0.83	-0.2	-5.54***	-0.96	-0.27
Layton Feeling Thermometer			-1.35	-0.85	-0.13	-1.22	-0.84	-0.18
May Feeling Thermometer			4.67***	-0.9	0.58	5.15***	-1.04	0.68
Constant	-0.24	-0.86	0.1	-0.62		0.85	-1.18	
Pseudo-R2	0.08		0.47			0.52		
N	1154		968			827		

Table 6: 2004 Vote Choice Results, Comparing Models

	Columbia			Michigan			Combined		
	Coeff.	Robust SE	Min/Max x	Coeff.	Robust SE	Min/Max	Coeff.	Robust SE	Min/Max x
Conservative vs. Liberal									
Age	-0.41	-0.5	0.1				-1.65	-1.57	-0.15
Female	-0.04	-0.14	-0.02				0.23	-0.42	0.06
Education	0.02	-0.38	-0.02				-2.31**	-1.14	-0.35
Atlantic	-0.49**	-0.24	-0.1				-0.18	-0.68	-0.03
West	0.86***	-0.15	0.14				0.85**	-0.42	0.09
Rural	0.45**	-0.18	0.13				-0.02	-0.48	-0.01
Income	-0.14	-0.26	0.05				1	-0.72	0.21
Renter	0.11	-0.2	-0.01				-0.28	-0.6	-0.03
Visible minority	-1.71***	-0.33	-0.27				-2.00**	-0.78	-0.21
Immigrant	0.07	-0.23	-0.02				0.75	-0.66	0.09
Catholic	-0.49***	-0.17	-0.07				0.07	-0.52	-0.03
Public Sector	-0.07	-0.2	-0.03				0.32	-0.53	0.03
Union Household	-0.25	-0.22	-0.08				-0.37	-0.57	-0.04
Francophone	-0.36	-0.35	-0.02				0.3	-0.87	0.09
Allophone	0.07	-0.24	0.05				-0.2	-0.66	-0.05
Liberal PID				-3.09***	-0.62	-0.41	-3.28***	-0.67	-0.36
Conservative PID				0.78	-0.5	0.24	0.94*	-0.57	0.24
NDP PID				-0.15	-0.62	-0.15	-0.03	-0.76	-0.11
Iraq				0.37	-0.23	0.19	0.63**	-0.27	0.26
Support for Private Hospitals				0.1	-0.18	0.05	-0.05	-0.23	0
Same-sex Marriage				-0.14	-0.21	-0.11	0.01	-0.28	-0.07
Sponsorship Scandal				0.56**	-0.25	0.19	0.65**	-0.32	0.17
Retrospective Economic Evaluation				-0.44	-0.35	-0.14	-0.72	-0.44	-0.21
Harper Feeling Thermometer				11.50***	-1.33	0.99	13.87***	-1.91	1
Martin Feeling Thermometer				-10.15***	-1.19	-0.81	-11.21***	-1.44	-0.84
Layton Feeling Thermometer				-3.02***	-1.1	-0.71	-3.42**	-1.51	-0.69
Constant	0.23	-0.4		1.45**	-0.61		2.31*	-1.4	
NDP vs. Liberal									
Age	-2.54***	-0.58	-0.25				-1.45	-1.32	-0.12
Female	0.12	-0.18	0.03				-0.28	-0.4	-0.06
Education	0.07	-0.5	0				-1.26	-0.97	-0.07
Atlantic	0.06	-0.27	0.06				-0.06	-0.58	0
West	0.65***	-0.18	0.03				1.12***	-0.37	0.15
Rural	-0.11	-0.23	-0.05				0.09	-0.44	0.02
Income	-0.91***	-0.31	-0.13				-0.57	-0.58	-0.15
Renter	0.36	-0.22	0.05				-0.37	-0.45	-0.05

Visible minority	-0.69**	-0.35	-0.01			-0.74	-0.54	-0.06	
Immigrant	0.42	-0.29	0.07			0.78	-0.6	0.1	
Catholic	-0.37*	-0.2	-0.02			0.73*	-0.39	0.13	
Public Sector	0.26	-0.23	0.06			0.48	-0.49	0.07	
Union Household	0.24	-0.24	0.06			-0.66	-0.53	-0.09	
Francophone	-1.01**	-0.47	-0.11			-0.78	-0.79	-0.12	
Allophone	-0.36	-0.34	-0.06			0.4	-0.56	0.09	
Liberal PID				-1.16***	-0.37	-0.05	-1.25***	-0.44	-0.08
Conservative PID				-0.79	-0.6	-0.13	-0.9	-0.82	-0.17
NDP PID				1.60***	-0.45	0.35	1.66***	-0.51	0.37
Iraq				-0.21	-0.27	-0.11	0.04	-0.31	-0.07
Support for Private Hospitals				-0.09	-0.18	-0.04	-0.18	-0.2	-0.06
Same-sex Marriage				0.39**	-0.2	0.15	0.71***	-0.25	0.25
Sponsorship Scandal				0.05	-0.2	-0.04	0.1	-0.23	-0.02
Retrospective Economic Evaluation				-0.34	-0.3	-0.06	-0.44	-0.39	-0.07
Harper Feeling Thermometer				1.1	-0.73	-0.2	0.44	-0.83	-0.25
Martin Feeling Thermometer				-8.09***	-1.02	-0.17	-8.16***	-1.16	-0.14
Layton Feeling Thermometer				5.20***	-0.89	0.83	5.91***	-1.16	0.87
Constant	0.74	-0.47		0.64	-0.61		1.96*	-1.15	

Green vs. Liberal

Age	-2.97***	-0.86	-0.05			-1.81	-1.62	0	
Female	-0.17	-0.28	-0.01			-0.43	-0.54	0	
Education	1.70**	-0.74	0.05			2.15	-1.34	0	
Atlantic	-1.49***	-0.54	-0.03			-0.73	-0.96	0	
West	0.46	-0.3	0			0.79	-0.55	0	
Rural	-0.73	-0.48	-0.02			0.03	-0.69	0	
Income	-0.82*	-0.49	-0.02			-1.15	-0.95	0	
Renter	0.16	-0.35	0			0.36	-0.65	0	
Visible minority	-1.18*	-0.65	-0.01			-2.1	-1.82	0	
Immigrant	-0.03	-0.59	-0.01			0.97	-1.13	0	
Catholic	-1.10***	-0.43	-0.02			-0.36	-0.77	0	
Public Sector	-0.66	-0.42	-0.02			-0.61	-0.66	0	
Union Household	0.25	-0.44	0.01			-0.59	-0.72	0	
Francophone	-0.34	-0.82	0			-33.51***	-0.83	0	
Allophone	-0.43	-0.69	-0.01			-0.03	-1.17	0	
Liberal PID				-1.58***	-0.59	0	-1.49**	-0.64	0
Conservative PID				-34.85***	-0.54	-0.09	-34.17***	-0.9	-0.02
NDP PID				-0.65	-0.81	0	-0.51	-0.88	0
Iraq				-0.88*	-0.51	0	-1.75**	-0.87	0
Support for Private Hospitals				0.22	-0.26	0	0.15	-0.3	0
Same-sex Marriage				0.47	-0.38	0	0.47	-0.37	0

Sponsorship Scandal			-0.26	-0.3	0	0.01	-0.43	0
Retrospective Economic Evaluation			-0.23	-0.4	0	-0.34	-0.5	0
Harper Feeling Thermometer			3.10***	-1.19	0	3.00*	-1.7	0
Martin Feeling Thermometer			-7.74***	-1.34	0	-7.68***	-1.7	0
Layton Feeling Thermometer			0.75	-1.41	0	0.26	-1.93	0
Constant	-0.79	-0.74	0.89	-0.87		0.62	-1.76	
Pseudo-R2	0.07		0.58			0.62		
N	1472		825			668		