Like Ants Attracted to Sugar: Candidate Recruitment and Entry in Indonesia
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A rich literature exists linking ethnic diversity to party system size (Ordershook & Shvetsova 1994; Amorim Neto & Cox 1997; Mozaffar, Scarritt & Galaich 2003; Clark & Golder 2006; Stoll 2008). Higher levels of ethnic diversity are strongly correlated with higher numbers of electoral parties. The relationship is partially conditioned by the institutional environment; ethnic diversity tends to have a greater effect in countries with high district magnitudes. The underlying theory is simple: ethnic diversity produces more latent demands for representation, resulting in more parties. More recent research on party system nationalization suggests the relationship between diversity and party system fragmentation may be driven by the high costs parties face in coordinating their activities across ethnic lines (Chibber & Kollman 2004; Hicken 2009). Thus diversity has no district level effect, but does prevent parties from stretching across the entire nation. Party balkanization, then, generates the effect we see.

Both stories are compelling; however, exploration of the subject has been hampered by two problems. First, existing work tests arguments using *ex post* electoral results. The statistical relationship between the important ethnic diversity and party system size may be robust, but this tells us nothing about the mechanisms of *how* the theory works. Are there more parties competing? Are there distinct ethnic options? Theorizing thus far only hints at guiding assumptions and does not investigate them empirically. Second, theorizing for both stories takes place at the district-level yet tests arguments at the national-level. Even the literature on nationalization, which is sensitive to district-level dynamics, has relied on national-level ethnic diversity scores when arguments are tested. There is too often a miss-match of theory and empirics.

In this paper I conduct an in-depth investigation of candidate entry in Indonesia to examine the possible mechanisms producing the relationship between diversity and party system fragmentation. The paper asks: why do candidate entry rates vary across electoral districts? More specifically, the paper asks: why is there a higher rate of candidate entry in ethnically diverse districts? Candidate entry rates provide an opening through which the diversity-party system correlation can be studied. More candidates means more options, which could conceivably be a factor splitting the electoral vote. Studying pre-electoral phenomenon like entry rates provides us with a clearer understanding of post-election phenomenon like party system size.

Indonesia is a particularly suitable case in which to explore these mechanisms. First, there no better place to study the phenomena of candidate entry than the county with the highest number of national legislative candidates in the world. Second, Indonesia is a diverse country with high variance in ethnic diversity across electoral districts. Ethnic categorization is not forced by the census form, thereby providing some confidence that identities are not meaningless constructions of sitting authorities. Third, party system size in Indonesia does tend to follow ethnic diversity, as present theory predicts. There are mechanisms at work producing this correlation, and these are plausibly linked to candidate entry rates.

But perhaps the most compelling reason to study entry rates in Indonesia is the way the country's electoral laws confound pre-existing theories. Party system

nationalization is imposed by law; in order to attain access to the ballot all parties must maintain a presence across the country. There are no explicitly regional or ethnic parties. The `nationalization` approach tells us little: all parties must organize across ethnic lines and thus we cannot account for district-level variation in party òutcomes through reference to the costs of inter-ethnic cooperation. Additionally, the work emphasizing the interaction of diversity and institutions tends to simply assume the existence of ethnic parties, but in Indonesia these do not exist. Yet we still find a correlation between diversity and candidate entry.

In this paper I develop an alternative causal mechanism that underlines the importance of both influence building and rent-seeking behaviour. Political candidates benefit from (potentially) gaining office *and* gaining influence within a party. Ethnic diversity produces rent-seeking opportunities, which increases the benefit from holding sub-national seats (more jobs, corruption, etc). For national candidates, local rents also increase the benefit from building influence: where local rent-seeking opportunities are high, it is important to have influence with a locally powerful network. Thus ethnic diversity produces rents, which draws in candidates.

This paper contributes to the party systems literature by developing an alternative mechanism connecting ethnic diversity and party system outcomes. We care about party system features like fragmentation and nationalization because we think they affect public policy outcomes and the stability of democracy. Countries like Indonesia go to great lengths in designing institutions that are meant to produce a small number of nationally-oriented parties. But in order to design institutions that allow us to achieve certain outcomes we need to know the mechanics of how party systems work. And we also need to be sensitive to the possibility that the endogeneity in our arguments about cause and effect.

The paper proceeds as follow. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature on candidate entry. Section 3 outlines my rents-driven theory of candidate entry, highlighting the differences between my theory and two alternative mechanisms that predict a correlation between candidate entry and ethnic diversity. Section 4 provides the necessary background on the Indonesian case. In Section 5 I empirically test the Rent Opportunities theory and explain why this approach is more persuasive that the potential alternatives. Section 6 concludes with a summation of the findings.

Why Entry?

The comparative literature offers three broad approaches to candidate entry. The first is the strategic candidates approach (Besley & Coates 1997; Morelli 2004; Feddersen et al 1990; Osborne & Slivinski 1996). This approach focuses on the decision-making of individual actors. Aspiring politicians are more likely to become candidates when they think they can win office. Running for office is costly. Individuals are less willing to pay these costs if they do not think they have any chance of winning. These simple assumptions, pioneered by Duverger, motivate much of the literature on strategic entry, especially as it applies to entry and electoral institutions.

A second way to conceptualize candidate entry is to use the strategic parties approach. Electoral competition in modern democratic countries is structured by political parties. Parties have an interest in winning seats and achieving policy goals. In order to

maximize the number of seats and maintain internal discipline, parties tightly regulate access to the ballot for those wishing to use the party's banner. Parties set candidate numbers to avoid coordination failures. Coordination issues are of greatest concern to parties in plurality systems, where the costs of failure are higher (Cox & Rosenbluth 1994). Still, even parties operating in proportional systems must balance the different demands of activists and voters. These centralized decision-making processes affect the number of candidates that are allowed to enter the political sphere.

Third, the sociological approach emphasizes the issue of candidate supply (Norris 1997). A citizen's decision to become an aspiring politician is structured by the social environment in which she lives. Factors in the broader social environment can make entry more or less likely. In this way variations in social structure can thus explain variations in aggregate entry decisions. For instance, a Farmer's Party should have trouble finding candidates in a city where we expect the supply of farmers is low. Thus sociological variables should interact with party-level variables to impact the composition and size of candidate lists.

Ethnicity and Entry

A new wave of comparative political research has found a robust correlation between ethnic diversity and the effective number of competitors in a political system, be they executive candidates or political parties.[1] While these results have focused on *ex post* electoral results, the same intuition applies to *ex ante* measures of candidates. Examining aggregate candidate numbers, we do observe a correlation between ethnic diversity and candidate entry in Indonesia's 2004 and 2009 elections. As I will demonstrate in a later section, this is not simply an artefact of the institutions, urbanization, poverty, or other such omitted variables. We thus have a stylized fact that requires explanation.

 [INSERT FIGURES 1-3]

Previous work can be leveraged in different ways to explain this correlation. First, sociological factors can be blended with the assumptions from the strategic candidates approach. This synthesis – which I will call the Communal Voting approach – suggests the number of candidates will tend to follow ethnic diversity. Take, for instance, a hypothetical society equally divided by an ethnic cleavage and a cross-cutting secular-clerical religious cleavage. If both candidates lined up along the religious cleavage are from Ethnic Group A, an aspiring politician from Ethnic Group B may see a chance to exploit the ethnic cleavage. This entry is likely to spur an additional candidate from Group B who can exploit the religious cleavage within that ethnic community. The overall result from these strategic decisions is a greater number of candidates. The Communal Voting model, then, presents a simple causal story:

$$\text{Ethnic diversity} \quad \rightarrow \quad \uparrow \text{ \# of candidates}$$

Aspiring politicians are likely to enter in diverse societies because there are more electoral niches that can be filled. As long as ethnic diversity exists, more candidates should exist.

In a second causal story, strategic parties have incentives to recruit more candidates in diverse areas. Multiple cleavages can force broadly aggregative parties to contain the multiplicity of social divisions within their candidate lists. Facing a diverse

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[1] This finding is conditional on electoral institutions. The relationship between ethnicity and outcomes is greatest in 'permissive' systems using PR and having high istrict magnitudes.

electorate, the party may earn an electoral boost from its ability to construct a diverse electoral slate of candidates. Extra candidates allow parties to increase the ethnic representativeness of their party lists and connect with distinct communities.

A similar argument has been made in the Indonesian case. Herbert Feith (1957) described the logic of long candidate lists in his classic study of the 1955 elections:

> [I]n particular areas of an electoral district, and among different social, ethnic, and clan groups in it, the parties campaigned in terms of the attributes of the individual representatives of those whom they had included in their lists, usually in lower positions. The relatively easy procedure of nomination and the great length which lists were permitted to have encouraged the candidature of many persons who could not possibly be elected but whose name could be useful to the parties in their campaigning among particular groups of voters. (17-8)

In the past, Indonesian parties recruited large numbers of candidates when there were electoral payoffs, and these payoffs tended to be greater in diverse electoral districts. Presenting voters with a 'rainbow' list of legislative candidates allows the party to appeal to voters across the spectrum:

Ethnic diversity   →   'Rainbow' Lists   →   ↑ # of candidates

In this Strategic Parties model it is deliberate partisan electoral strategy that leads to more candidates entering the race in diverse areas.

Rent seeking approach

The above answers are plausible; though I suggest one additional mechanism I call the Rent Opportunities model. The basic, somewhat jaded, intuition is that Indonesian politicians are motivated by the possibility of accessing rents, and they are more likely to enter in areas where rents are high, which tend to be – but are not necessarily - ethnically diverse regions.

First, what do I mean by rents and rent-seeking? I interpret the latter term broadly to mean the use of state power to accrue benefits for a particular person or group at the expense of the broader society. Under the umbrella of rent-seeking behaviour I include political patronage (the retail exchange of state resources for political support), personal corruption (the abuse of public office for individual gain), political corruption (the abuse of public office for political gain), and the various forms of influence peddling that typically result in state intrusions into the economic sphere. I use the term *rent opportunities* to refer to a politician's opportunity to engage in rent-seeking behaviour. The opportunities to engage in this behaviour are determined by two factors: 1) the social/legal norms of a political system; 2) the extent of state involvement in the economy. Lax law enforcement and permissive norms encourage rent-seeking behaviour. As well, legacies of significant state involvement in the market increase opportunities for abuse of state resources. Thus 'high rent opportunity' political systems have lax norms and high state intervention, 'low rent opportunity' systems have strict norms and minimal state intervention.[2]

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[2] This conceptualization and operationalization of rent opportunities is deliberately similar to Chandra's (2004) idea of a 'patronage-democracy' and Shefter`s (1997) `supply of patronage.` I use 'rents' in place of 'patronage' to avoid conflation with traditional, non-state forms of 'patronage' and to emphasize that the relevant abuse of state resources is done for both political and personal gain.

It is important to underline that it is not the mere presence of patronage relationships that is of interest but the relative opportunity to finance these exchanges with state resources. From a candidate's viewpoint, high rent opportunities allow winners to payoff supporters and earn a handsome personal profit through illicit activities. From a voter's viewpoint, rent opportunities increase the chance that winning candidates will reward supporters with particularistic benefits after the election. Rent opportunities increase the winners' payoffs for holding office and increase the credibility of patronage-based appeals to the voting public.

Second, I argue that rent opportunities tend to follow patterns of ethnic diversity. There is a long literature linking low public goods provision and high particularistic goods provision to a political systems level of ethnic diversity (Easterly & Levine 1997; Alesina et al. 1999; Collier 2000; Miguel & Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Kwaja 2007). Originally the answer for this finding focused on divergences in group preferences: groups either wanted different public goods or opposed public good provision when they believed they were not benefitting relative to a competitor group. More recent work has emphasized not diverging preferences but a breakdown of social norms that either enables or encourages patterns of anti-social (such as free-riding, corruption, etc). In other words, the cause of the high-rent, high diversity linkage may be divorced form political preferences altogether. I will not attempt to resolve this argument. My working assumption is that there is such a correlation at the sub-national level in Indonesia, and this relationship existed *before* the democratic era.[3]

Third, I want to suggest that aspiring politicians are more likely to become candidates in areas with high rent opportunities. This should be intuitive: politics in high-rent areas is a lucrative business. Political campaigns in Indonesia are inordinately expensive. Where looting is rampant and bureaucracies are bloated there is a strong incentive to pay these campaign costs as investment may be recouped through future abuse of state offices.

The twist is this: variations in rent opportunities should affect the political calculus of aspiring politicians at the sub-national level, but I am interested in national-level phenomena. To get around this I suggest that many Indonesian candidates have multiple goals. First, they want to win office. Second, they want to build and maintain valuable network connections. In other words, they want to build influence. And it is this second motivation that explains the correlation between entry rates and ethnic diversity. These network connections can come in many forms: occupational, kinship, partisan, etc. The key point is that it pays to have connections with a locally powerful network in high-rent areas. Running under a party label as part of a broader local team allows ambitious rent-seekers to solidify their network connections.

For the rent-seeking model, office benefits drive entry decisions. The presence of rent opportunities is the necessary link in the chain leading from ethnic diversity to increased number of candidates:

Ethnic diversity → Rent Opportunities → ↑ # of candidates

The model can account for link between ethnic diversity in a situation like Indonesia where parties have a restricted ability to cater to ethnic demands. I have thus returned to

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[3] This working assumption is consistent with Van Klinken (2007) finding of a rough correlation between provincial civil service size (as a % of the modern economic sector) and social diversity in the Suharto era. He asserts the relationship is responsible for the communal violence of the 1990s.

the prominent piece of folk wisdom *ada gula, ada semut*[4]*:* like ants, Indonesian candidates tend to congregate in areas where there is a sweet payoff for their efforts.

As I will also show, this model also produces novel predications that bear out in the Indonesian context, such as a correlation between high-entry rates and poor governance even in the absence of ethnic diversity. Theory testing must carefully disentangle the causal processes to establish the plausibility of each answer. Before moving on to theory testing, however, I provide a brief overview of candidate selection and entry in the Indonesian case.

Selecting Candidates in Indonesia: Background

Institutional Context

Indonesia uses a proportional representation system. Since 1999 the country has had moderately sized districts; 2004 had 69 national districts varied in size between 3 and 12 seats while 2009 had 77 national districts with between 3 and 10 seats.[5] Since 2004 voters have been given the choice of marking a preference for a specific candidate on their district list.[6] In order to 'disturb' the order of the list, however, lower ranking candidates had to gather enough preference votes to reach quota within the district, quota being total number of votes divided by total number of seats. This was a very severe requirement which, in 2004, ensured that seats were distributed to parties and then filled by candidates depending on their list order. A December 2008 decision by the Constitutional Court found this system contrary to democratic norms and ruled that seats should be awarded by parties according to preference votes. This shift to an open-list system, however, occurred after the final candidate lists were created for the 2009 election and thus the electoral system was relatively stable during the candidate selection processes for the 2004 and 2009 elections.

National and sub-national elections legislative occur simultaneously. Voters face a slate of candidates in three levels of governance: national, provincial, and regency. Since 2004, voters have the opportunity to mark four ballots: three lower-house legislatures at each level of governance known as the People's Representative Council [*Dewan Perwakilian Rakyak*, DPR] and one national-level upper-house known as the Regional Representative Council [*Dewan Perwakilian Daerah*, DPD]. As a consequence, there is a considerable amount of over-lap in the campaigns for the national and sub-national levels.

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[4] Roughly translated: where there is sugar, there are ants.

[5] Laws to regulate the size of electoral districts came in after 1999. In the country's inaugural election district magnitude ranged between 4 and 82 seats.

[6] The system in 1999 was also proportional but used an unusual method of seat allocation. Candidates on the district party lists were assigned to specific regencies. Seats were allocated to parties by district based on proportion of votes. Parties were then supposed to allocate seats to candidates depending on regency-level electoral performance, such that the regencies where the party was strong should return their assigned candidate.

Partisan Context

All legislative candidates in Indonesia must be nominated by a political party.[7] There were 48 national parties in 1999, 24 in 2004, and 38 in 2009. Party registration rules in Indonesia are onerous. For the 2009 election, in order to gain access to the ballot, parties were required to prove an ability to organize branches in 2/3 of all regencies in 2/3 of all provinces. Only parties that could pass this organizational requirement nationally are allowed to field candidates at lower levels of governance.[8] The stringent organizational requirements effectively eliminate both regional and ethnic parties from competing, as regionally concentrated movements face difficulties organizing outside their bases.

Across all parties the process of selecting candidates tends to be centralized (Syamsuddin 2005). National offices collect and submit candidate lists and thus always get the final say on list composition. There are no residency requirements on national candidates, so parties are free to place any candidate they like in a given district.[9] Most parties, however, have mechanisms to solicit suggestions and feedback from sub-national branches, which include formal quotas for sub-national favourites, informal mechanisms of consultation, and membership surveys.

Candidate selection timelines vary across parties but typically start one year before the election.[10] For the aspiring politician candidature is prompted by a combination of self-selection and network pressures for involvement.[11] Aspiring national candidates can apply directly to the national office or lobby their local branches for a recommendation. Lobbying processes involve both over-the-table gift-giving and large under-the-table donations. Costs associated with attaining a spot on a party list tend to vary by party size and list position: a prominent position will cost more than a position low on the party list, and a position with a large party will cost more than a similar position with a minor party.

The General Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilu Umum*, KPU) requires a Temporary Candidates List of all national candidates approximately eight months before the election. Most parties pass their lists in with very little time to spare before the deadline. The KPU then examines the list to ensure that candidates meet regulation. The reviewing process lasts approximately six weeks and provides candidates with a last chance to weigh their political fortunes. Some political attrition occurs. At the end of the review process the parties submit their Fixed Candidates List. This list stays largely stable between its public release and the printing of ballots.

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[7] The one exception is for the DPD, which will be taken up in more detail below.

[8] The one exception is Aceh, where provincial parties are able to form. This electoral concession was part of broader peace deal between the central government and Acehnese separatists and only affected the latest 2009 round of legislative elections.

[9] Legislative candidates at the provincial and regency level are formally required to reside in the province or regency.

[10] The description of the process refers to both the 2004 and 2009 elections. The 1999 elections involved a comparatively more chaotic process. The 1999 election was brought on by the unexpected fall of Suharto. There were approximately 6 months between the election call and the election itself. Candidate lists were made publically available approximately 3 weeks before the election itself.

[11] The process of putting oneself forward can sometimes be more 'network pressure' than 'self-selection.' Top party officials are expected to run. Parties will sometimes court star candidates. While systematic data on gender and recruitment is lacking, field interviews suggest women candidates are also more likely to be actively recruited.

Theory Testing

The task of testing the Rent Opportunity model is broken into three major sections. First, I demonstrate the validity of the argument by establishing the crucial correlation between candidate entry and ethnic diversity. To establish the plausibility of the rents-based mechanism, I link entry rates to rent opportunities in the absence of ethnic diversity. The second sub-section explores further observable implications of the Rent Opportunity model vis-à-vis other alternative explanations for candidate entry; notably, a Communal voting model and a Strategic Parties model. In the third sub-section I provide a range of robustness checks.

Rent Opportunities model

Ethnic Diversity and Entry at the National Level

The first step in the empirical analysis is to rigorously establish the relationship between number of candidates within a district and ethnic diversity. The key dependent variable is the number of candidates run by each party in each electoral district. Comparing the raw number of candidates is appropriate when district magnitude is uniform; however, there is the potential that district magnitude could overwhelm all other variables when it varies. Instead of raw aggregates I construct a simple dependent variable termed *candidates-per-seat* by simple dividing the number of candidates by the district magnitude.

The key independent variable is the ethnic fractionalization of electoral districts.[12] I used data from the 2000 electoral census to construct fractionalization measures. The 2000 census asked respondents to self-identify their '*suku bangsa*,' which roughly translates as ethnicity. Census forms did not provide any *a priori* categorization, so ethnic identities were freely chosen by the respondent. Ethnic categories are reported by regency and I used these regency totals to construct 0 to 1 measures for all electoral districts.

Other factors affect entry rates. First, district magnitude impacts candidate decision making. Magnitude most directly affects a candidate's perceived probability of attaining a seat. As district magnitude increases the perceived possibility of achieving a long-shot victory diminish as more co-partisans are added. In concrete terms, it should be more desirable for a candidate to take a list position of slot 3 in a district with a magnitude of 3 than a list position of slot 10 in a district magnitude of 10. Thus aspiring candidates should be less likely to take poor list positions in high rather than low magnitude districts.

Second, urbanization may be important for two reasons. First, educated urban residents are likely more politically involved, partially because they have more time and partially because cities tend to attract the politically ambitious. Beyond the sociological reasons, urbanization may also reduce the costs associated with candidate campaigns. In interviews, candidates reported that candidate spending tends to be higher in rural areas. Rural voters are more likely to ask for gifts whereas urban voters are more likely to be both swayed by non-patronage based appeals. Again, the prediction is that lower campaign costs should increase the probability of entry. To measure urbanization rates I

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[12] The standard mathematical expression for the level of ethnic fragmentation is:
$$\text{Ethnic Fragmentation} = 1 - \sum (s_i)^2$$
where *si* is the proportion of the population in ethnic group *i*..

rely on BPS statistics from the 2000 census as made available by Ananta, Arifin, and Suryadinata's (2004) *Indonesian Electoral Behaviour*.

Third, economic factors could influence entry decisions. The direction of the relationship is difficult to predict. On the one hand, wealthier districts could have more citizens able to cover campaigning costs. On the other hand, campaigning costs may be lower in poor districts as voters are satisfied with cheaper gifts. In other words, poverty could reduce the pool of aspiring candidates while decreasing potential campaign costs. I use official poverty rates to measure economic conditions. In some instances poverty rates and per capita income levels can diverge substantially, especially in areas with high natural resource wealth, thus average income does not reflect actual conditions. For the 1999 and 2004 elections I rely on data from Ananta et al. (2004); for the 2009 election I used data from *Data Dan Informasi Kemiskanan Tahun 2007* (BPS).

Two additional variables take into consideration a district's religious context. Both secular vs. religious conflicts and traditionalist vs. modernist divides continue to animate political competition. Religious parties face distinct candidate supply issue. Whereas Indonesia is largely Muslim, some of the outlying districts have Christian or Hindu majorities. To take this issue into account I add a district-level variable that captures the percentage of Muslims in the district. Data for this variable was drawn from the 2000 census.

Since this supply issue should affect Muslim parties, I add a party-level dummy that captures whether or nor the party can be categorized as 'Muslim.' I use two criteria for categorization: 1) official pronouncements denoting 'Islam' as the basis of the party; 2) partisan origins traceable to pre-existing religious organizations. The first criteria captures explicitly 'Muslim' parties, the second includes ostensibly secular parties which have origins in the Muslim social organizations. In denoting parties 'Muslim' I erred on the side of inclusion. Appendix A contains a full list of off 'Muslim' parties for all three elections. In addition to this dummy, a variable capturing the interaction between the percentage of Muslims and Muslim Party is included.

The last set of party-level variables captures partisan strength. The logic is two-fold. First, the Rent Opportunities model holds that participating in electoral efforts allows candidates to build influence within a party, and the payoff for building influence is more valuable when the party is either nationally or regionally strong. Thus candidates should be more likely to join parties that are strong either nationally and/or locally. Candidates, however, may also want to join locally strong parties for purely electoral reasons. By joining a party with a strong history of local electoral performance, a candidate may increase his/her perceived probability of winning a seat. Likewise, a list position with strong national parties may be perceived as more valuable as candidates could take advantage of a nationally recognized partisan brand. Thus a variable capturing perceived local and national strength of a party should capture some entry dynamics.

To measure perceived strength I utilize past strength from the previous electoral contest. Measuring past electoral strength is complicated slightly by party registration rules and changes to electoral districts. Appendix B provides further detail on process of matching electoral strength across elections. When constructing the variable I used results reported at the regency level. For 2004 I relied on previous national-level voting results aggregated at the regency-level. For 2009 I relied on previous regency-level results. Using results from two different levels of governance is not ideal and reflects present data

limitations. However, regency and national voting patterns are close to identical and the use of the regency-level data should not significantly bias the measure.[13]

Results

Models are run using ordinary least squares regression, clustered by party. Results appear in Table 1. For reasons of space I present only results from 2009.[14] The relationship between ethnic fractionalization and number of candidates is positive and strongly significant. District magnitude has a significant negative relationship with candidate numbers, while urbanization induced higher entry. Party level variables are signed in the predicted direction and statistically significant. The supply of Muslims increases the number of candidates that run for a Muslim party. Meanwhile, national and local electoral strength both correlate with higher levels of candidate entry.

[INSERT TABLE 1]

To demonstrate the magnitude of the effect I ran simple simulations using *Clarify*. With all variables set to the mean, a party runs 0.535 candidates per seat. I then increase the ethnic fractionalization measure by one standard deviation, from 0.47 to 0.80. This is like moving from the district of East Java IV, a district with a majority (63%) of Javanese and a minority (36%) of Madurese, to more diverse Riau I, a district with a plurality of Melayu Riau (31%) and sizable minorities of Javanese (26%), Minangkabau (12%), Batak (7%) and other smaller ethnic groups. A one standard deviation increase in ethnic fractionalization results in a 0.037 increase in the predicted candidates-per-seat, bringing the value up to 0.573. While this is a difficult statistic to interpret, the size of this effect is roughly comparable to other important district level variables. For example, increasing district magnitude by one standard deviation (7.2 to 9.4) decreases the predicted candidates per seat value by 0.048.

To further facilitate interpretation I ran a simple model using aggregate number of candidates within the electoral district.[15] Increasing ethnic fractionalization by one standard deviation produced a 1.43 increase in the predicted candidates-per-seat. For an average electoral district containing 7 legislative seats, this would mean approximately 10 additional candidates.

The relationship between ethnic fractionalization and candidate numbers is also consistent across levels of governance. I tested the relationship used provincial aggregates from 2004 and 2009.[16] Ethnic fractionalization is always positively signed and statistically significant at the $P<.05$ level, even with the omission of the control variables.

In sum: ethnically diverse electoral districts attract more national-level candidates. Likewise, diverse provinces attract more provincial candidate. The substantive impact of variations in ethnic fractionalization is comparable to other important district-level factors.

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[13] The *Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta* (Special Capital Region of Jakarta) does not contain any regencies, thus I lack electoral history for the three electoral districts that fall in this region for 2009.

[14] For 1999 and 2004 see Appendix C.

[15] Dependent variable: candidates-per-seat. Independent variable: ethnic fractionalization. Control variables: district magnitude, urbanization, poverty, % Muslim, Jakarta dummy.

[16] See Appendix D

Rent Opportunities and Entry

To test the correlation between rent opportunities and candidate entry I next construct a measure of rents. I start with the common assumption that rent opportunities and public goods provision are inversely related. Thus the presence of rent-seeking behaviour can be revealed by examining past public policy outcomes. One public policy outcome of relevance is the provision of infrastructure services. Local governments in which tender processes are corrupted and state funds are directed toward more particularistic forms of spending tend to do a poor job of paving roads, keeping street lights on, and providing a consistent supply of electricity. According to my simple assumption poor infrastructure quality should indicate the prevalence of rents.

For a measure of infrastructure quality I rely on data generated by Regional Autonomy Watch (*Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonmi Daerah* , KPPOD). KPPOD uses mass surveys of business leaders to measure infrastructure quality by regency. Recent KPPOD reports sample all regencies within a selection of provinces (15 in 2007). Using these data and regency-level population statistics I construct KPPOD infrastructure scores for national electoral districts in 2009.[17] Though the KPPOD data does not cover all regencies, I am able to construct scores for 51 of 77 electoral districts. The initial scores range from 44.8 to 81.1, with infrastructure quality increasing as the score increases. As an interpretive convenience, I subtracted 100 by these values so that the high infrastructure scores reflect poor governance and I use this as a rough measure of rent opportunities.

Scores for the rent opportunities measure correlates closely with ethnic fractionalization. Figure 4 plots this relationship. As ethnic fractionalization increases, the rent scores increase. Ethnic fractionalization alone can explain just over half of the variation in the rent opportunities measure. The clear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the rents measure add confidence in the validity of this rough operationalization of local rent opportunities.[18]

 [INSERT FIGURE 4]

Model 2 in Table 1 adds the rents measure. The size and significance of the control variables are similar across Models 1 and 2. This suggests that, despite losing approximately 1/3 of the sample size, the basic relationships hold steady across both the full and slightly truncated samples.[19]

Turning to the key independent variables, the rents measure is positively signed and strongly significant. Regions with legacies of poor governance are attracting more candidates. Increasing the rent opportunities variable one standard deviation from the mean (32 to 41) produces a 0.028 increase the number of candidates-per-seat. As a comparison, a similar change in the district magnitude variable produces a decrease of 0.032 candidates-per-seat. In contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the ethnic

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[17] Earlier KPPOD datasets cover a smaller number of regencies in a larger number of provinces, thus presenting serious challenges in the construction of a rents variable for elections before 2009.

[18] This is consistent with past analysis of KPPOD datasets. In previous work I have found a robust relationship between low infrastructure quality and ethnic diversity that is not simply a product of income, population size, or population density. The relationship can be found in the earliest KPPOD samples, strongly suggesting that diverse communities have legacies of poor governance that pre-exist the democratic era.

[19] Additional tests were run on the truncated dataset using only the baseline model. Standard errors and correlation coefficients in all models closely mirrored those found in Model 1, Table 1.

fractionalization measure now produces an increase of only 0.015 candidates-per-seat. These results suggest it is not ethnic diversity itself that is producing more candidates but rather the intervening rents variable.

The close relationship between the rent opportunities proxy and ethnic fractionalization make it is a given that the rent opportunities score will correlate with a higher number of candidates. Strong evidence in favour of the Rent Opportunities model would be if the rents variable can explain variation in candidate numbers within relatively *homogenous* electoral districts. To test this I limit the sample to ethnically homogenous electoral districts. Homogeneity is a relative measure. Within the 2009 dataset, mean ethnic fractionalization is 0.47 with a standard deviation of 0.34. I defined homogenous districts as those with an ethnic fractionalization score of 0.13 or less. This is a very homogenous sample of districts. In concrete terms, the largest ethnic group consists of, on average, 97.6% of the entire district population. There is no theoretical reason why minuscule variations ethnic diversity across these homogenous districts should produce any change in the number of candidates.

Model 3 runs the model again on the homogenous sample. Given that the truncated sample is both ethnically homogenous and overwhelmingly Muslim, I drop the ethnic and religious variables. The rent opportunities variable is positive and strongly significant. A move of one standard deviation in the rents variable produces 0.02 more candidates on a party's list, an impact similar in size to changing district magnitude by one unit (-0.024). This effect is substantial, especially when considered in aggregate. Figure 5 presents a simple plot of the aggregative relationship between rents and candidates-per-district. The trend is clear: number of candidates-per-district increases as the rents variable increases.
[INSERT FIGURE 5]

In sum: candidate entry rates tend to correlate with ethnic diversity, but the relationship appears to be driven by the intervening effect of rent opportunities. When a rents variable is added to the model there is a considerable decline in the effect of ethnic fractionalization on candidate entry rates. Even in the absence of ethnic diversity, a legacy of poor local governance attracts higher numbers of aspiring politicians.

Alternative Theories

Communal Voting

In the Communal Voting model, ethnic diversity produces higher rates of candidate entry because aspiring politicians can strategically exploit societal divisions. In the Rent Opportunities model, diversity produces higher rates of candidate entry because competing in a party connects the national candidate to co-partisans at lower-levels of government. One implication of the Rent Opportunities model, then, is that ethnic diversity should not produce higher levels of candidate entry in the absence of partisan competition.

Indonesia offers an opportunity to test the arguments empirically at a similar level of governance by toggling institutional rules while holding the social environment constant. Indonesia's upper-house, the DPD, bars parties from competition. Parties are not allowed to forward candidates and candidates are not allowed to exploit party symbols during campaigns. DPD campaigns remain largely detached from the partisan

competition for the DPR. Electoral districts for the DPD follow provincial lines. The overlap in social context between DPR and DPD electoral districts is *exact* in over 50% of cases.

For the Rent Opportunities story, no partisan ties mean no potential access to local rents. Thus ethnic diversity should not correlate with entry rates. For the Communal Voting model, diversity naturally produces electoral opportunities that can be exploited. Thus ethnic diversity should still correlate with entry rates.

Elections for the DPD took place in both 2004 and 2009. There were 937 candidates in 2004 and 1102 in 2009. For each year I counted the number of candidates competing in each district. Each electoral district is allocated 4 seats. Since the district magnitude does not vary, the raw number is used as the dependent variable. The central independent variable measures ethnic fractionalization within the electoral district; in this case, the measure is ethnic fractionalization by province.

There is no positive correlation between ethnic fractionalization and DPD entry rates.[20] In 2004, the key variable driving the number of DPD candidates was provincial population size. In 2009, the key factor was the strategic electoral context. Provinces that had a concentrated electoral vote in 2004 attracted fewer candidates in 2009, likely because aspiring politicians saw little hope in achieving a seat. Ethnic fractionalization, however, never reaches standard levels of statistical significance in any direction. Figures 6-7 demonstrate the lack of a relationship using district aggregates.

[INSERT FIGURES 6-7]

The finding is consistent with the Rent Opportunities story. There is no social dynamic inherent in ethnic diversity that produces higher numbers of candidates. And in the absence of partisan ties there is no extra incentive to enter the political competition in diverse areas.

Strategic Parties

For the Strategic Parties approach, the mechanism between ethnic diversity and more candidates relies on well-informed, deliberate elites in the national office. National elites can recognize the competing demands of ethnic groups across the country and, in diverse districts, respond to these demands through careful recruitment of candidates. Candidate list sizes expand as parties bring in additional candidates that can appeal to the multitude of communal interests.

The Strategies Parties model offers several distinct observable implications. Parties need to be both aware of and responsive to district-level communal demands for representation. This strongly suggests the relationship between diversity and list size is driven by the strategic calculations of the larger parties. Large parties tend to have the most active local branches, the longest institutional memory, and the financial resources to poll across the country. It is the large parties, then, that are most likely to have the capacity to respond to district-level communal demands.

The Rent Opportunities model does not rely on well-informed large parties. In this case, networks of aspiring politicians use party-labels opportunistically. Given that it requires less money and effort for a network of locally-oriented rent seekers to take-over a minor party, these strategic candidates are relatively more willing to avoid the larger

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[20] Model specifications and results can be found in Appendix E.

parties. Networks can take over minor parties, placing supporters on candidate lists at the national and sub-national levels. As compared to the major-party orientation of the Strategic Parties model, the Rent Opportunities model suggests the relationship between ethnic diversity and candidate entry may be driven by dynamics within the minor parties.

Logic of argument

Weighing the validity of each model requires an examination of the logic and observable implications of each approach. The first challenge to the Strategic Parties model comes in the form of institutional constraints. In order to expand their list size to meet local demands in diverse areas, major parties require the legal ability to offer long candidate lists. This may have been true in 1955, when Feith first posited the relationship. During that election district magnitudes tended to be very large and electoral rules on candidate list size were either vague or left unenforced. This could have provided the major parties licence to expand their lists with the names of ethnic notables. In the last two elections, however, district magnitudes have been moderate and rules on list sizes have been rigorously enforced. This institutional context provides the major parties with little leeway to cater to local demands. Further complicating the story, major parties tend to attract a high number of candidates regardless of local conditions. Given that major parties attract a large number of candidates are legally prohibited in the number of candidates they can run in a district, it is unlikely that the relationship between ethnic diversity and candidate entry is being driven by strategic parties.

Party Strategies

Large parties are constrained in the number of candidates they can forward. Despite these constraints they could still be driving the observed relationship between diversity and entry. One observable implication that can be empirically investigated is the presence or absence of ethnic balancing. If major parties are adding candidates to respond to local demands, they should also be self-consciously selecting candidates to respond to distinct ethnic groups. This type of balancing behaviour should be evident in the process and outcome.

One method of testing this hypothesis, then, is simply to ask national elites with knowledge of selection processes if they are engaged in ethnic balancing. Interviews with elites from the large parties were solicited between May and June 2009. The 'Big-7' parties from the 2004 election – those with over 5% of the electoral vote – were pursued. I was able to attain interviews with elites from six parties.[21] Questions regarding ethnicity can be sensitive in Indonesia. When raising the issue of ethnic balancing, initial questions were deliberately posed to illicit discussion of concrete examples under the assumption that official policy and unofficial practice may diverge and the latter may be more amendable to open discussion.[22]

In no case did respondents ever report balancing as a motivation for selecting candidates. Respondents were typically prompted on the issue more than once but no evidence of balancing was found. There is a possibility that respondents were being careful with the information they revealed. Ethnic jostling can be a sensitive subject in

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[21] I was unable to attain an interview with PKB. At the time PKB was involved in a pitched internal battles caused by the withdrawal of Abdurrahman Wahid, its well-known founder and spiritual leader.

[22] For example: "I have spent time in North Sumatra recently. There are many different social groups there (Karo, Tapanuli, Jawa, etc). When selecting candidates for a diverse region like North Sumatra, is it important in your party to provide a balanced number of candidates from different groups…"

multi-ethnic Indonesia and discussions with a non-Indonesian academic may be more likely to only receive stated policy. Respondents, however, did talk openly about a range of sensitive issue, including nepotism, the perceived failure of internal selection strategies, and internal factional struggles. In light of respondent openness on other sensitive issues, the non-acknowledgment of ethnic balancing is telling. Given that elites in the major parties did not report ethnic balancing it is unlikely that the relationship between ethnic diversity and higher candidate numbers is being driven by strategic parties.

Candidate Entry and Party Size

Two additional observable implications can be tested through an examination of candidate entry rates. First, if the Strategic Parties story is correct, the relationship between ethnic diversity and candidate entry should be strongest among major rather than minor parties. Second, if the Rent Opportunities model is right candidates should exhibit strong signs of 'pack' behaviour. A candidate should not join a small national party label if there are no co-partisans running at lower levels.

To investigate the first I re-ran the national-level party size tests, disaggregating the sample by small and large parties. Again, I defined small parties as those with less than 5% of the national vote. The relationship between ethnic diversity and candidate entry is strong and statistically significant in the minor party samples.[23] A similar result is apparent when rents measure is added; toggling party size reveals that rent opportunities only has a significant affect on minor parties. Some caution is required, however. The truncated size of major party samples impacts estimates. Still, findings do suggest that local networks are taking over minor parties in high-diversity/high-rents regions.

In diverse districts candidates are joining minor parties in large numbers, but are they working in packs? This is an important observable implication of the rents-based theory; aspiring politicians should have motivation to become national level candidates when part of a broader team that reaches down to sub-national levels. To explore this question I compared party entry rates at the national and provincial level. Candidate entry decisions at the national level should be closely connected with those at the sub-national level. I added to the baseline model a variable capturing a party's total number of provincial candidates / total number of provincial seats. This provincial total is used for all national electoral districts within a given province.

As expected, provincial-level list sizes are strongly correlated with national-level candidates-per-seat.[24] The effect was mediated by party size however. In the larger parties, the provincial variable was insignificant, indicating candidate entry dynamics are distinct between the two levels of governance. In minor parties the dynamics across levels are tightly coupled; candidate entry at the national level tends to follow dynamics at the provincial level. Outside of the major parties, candidates travel in packs.

This sub-section finds little evidence to support a Strategic Parties story. The large parties with the capacity to self-consciously respond to local demands for representation do not report any signs of ethnic balancing. Institutional constraints prevent significant expansion of party lists even if they wanted to respond to such demands. It is the minor parties that receive an influx of candidates in ethnically diverse – and high rents – electoral districts. There is strong evidence that these candidates work in

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[23] Results are contained in Appendix F.
[24] See Appendix G

packs, infiltrating minor parties at multiple levels of governance. In sum: an investigation of the Strategic Parties model provides further support for the Rents Opportunities model.

Robustness Checks

To check the stability of the findings I conducted a number of robustness checks. First, I altered with the construction of the key independent variable. Results could be a product of how I measured ethnic diversity. I re-ran all models using two alternative measures of ethnic diversity: 1) effective number of ethnic groups and; 2) size of the largest ethnic group. Replacing the ethnic fractionalization index with these alternative measures did not substantially change the performance of any model.

Second, I investigated whether results were driven by the construction of the dependent variable. In most models I used a candidates-per-seat measure. I re-ran all models using simply the raw number of candidates. This does affect the simple bivariate relationships between ethnic fractionalization and number of candidates for the party-level models. The total number of candidates is determined largely by the district magnitude, and ethnically diverse electoral districts tend to have a lower magnitude. Once district magnitude is added to the model, however, the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and the number of candidates is strong and significant.

Third, I checked to ensure the results were not being driven by religious diversity. This is tricky: there are no ethnically homogenous, religiously diverse electoral districts. Religious divisions almost always follow ethnic lines. To deal with this issue I limited the test to only overwhelmingly Muslim electoral districts. I defined this threshold as only districts with 95% Muslim voters. This sample includes a mix of both ethnically diverse and homogenous districts and going higher would limit the sample to largely homogenous Javanese districts. Models were re-run. For the aggregate sub-national models all variables lost significance. This was likely due to the small sample size (N=14). In the party-level data, there was a qualitative change in the size of the correlation coefficient, though the relationship remained strongly significant. In all, these results indicate that the relationship between ethnicity and candidate entry exists independent of religious diversity.

Fourth, I investigated the possibility that results are driven by the classic geographic divide between Java and the Outer Islands. The geographic split is one of the perennial cleavages taken into account when studying Indonesia and has been important when analyzing political dynamics at the centre of national power. I added a dichotomous Outer Islands variable to all tests. The addition of the variable did not substantially disturb results.

The erratic 1999 results raise the issue of why the models do not perform well in that particular election year. Whereas the relationship between ethnic fractionalization and candidates-per-seat is strong in 2004 and 2009, it appears weak and unstable in 1999. Within the boundaries of the rents-based approach there are several ways to account for this finding. First, the 1999 election took place before substantial decentralizing reforms that accompanied the democratization process. It is possible that the perceived size of the local prize was not large enough to prompt rent-seeking politicians to enter the electoral arena. Second, inaugural elections may be atypical. Periods before the fall of authoritarian regimes are typified by intense political polarization. This polarization could focus attention away from local concerns to national-level struggles over the shape

of the emerging regime. Third, the 1999 elections took place in the wake of thirty years of domination by a hegemonic party, *Partai Golkar*. Up until 1999, participation in Golkar was a primary means through which an up-start politician could access local rents. This expectation that the 'road to patronage runs through Golkar' could have continued into period of party organization preceding the 1999 elections, thus dissuading local networks from trying their luck within minor parties. Fourth, the shortened period of preparation before the 1999 election may have prevented the take-over of minor parties by local networks. While positive results for the 1999 tests would have bolstered support for the rents-based approach there are numerous plausible explanations for why Indonesia's first election should be considered anomalous.

Conclusion

My theoretical focus on office benefits and partisan ties helps explain an important factor driving cross-district and cross-party entry variation in the Indonesian case. In particular, I offer a novel explanation for why ethnically diverse electoral districts in Indonesia attract more candidates. Exploration of the data across *Reformasi* era elections reveal several distinct dynamics that support a rents centered causal story. First, even in the absence of ethnic diversity candidate entry levels are high in electoral districts with high rent opportunities. Second, the relationship between ethnic diversity and candidate entry does not exist in the absence of partisan ties that can connect national candidates to sub-national governance. Third, the large parties with the capacity to respond to local dynamics do not report taking a candidate's ethnic background into account when constructing lists for ethnically diverse electoral districts. Fourth, results suggest the relationship between ethnically fractionalization and candidate entry is driven by groups of locally oriented elites taking over minor parties at both the national and sub-national levels. Taken in combination, the results indicate that aspiring politicians are more likely to become candidates when they expect a higher material payoff for their political activity.

What, if anything, can we learn from the Indonesian case then? I suggest that Indonesia underlines the potential for governance outcomes (state size/corruption level) to shape party system size. Indonesian political careers are motivated by the relative opportunities to access state resources, and these rent-seeking motivations have an impact on party system outcomes. This reverses our typical understanding that pitches party system size as an independent variable affecting governance outcomes. The Indonesian case suggests a more complex, self-reinforcing relationship in which rent-opportunities generate a fragmented party system size and fragmented party system contributes in turn to the protection and expansion of rent opportunities. It may be possible that this cycle can is not easily disturbed through the use of institutional mechanisms designed to reduce party system size. Further research is required to understand how party systems and rent-opportunities evolve over time.

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Figure 1

Candidates-per-Seat by Ethnic Fractionalization - 1999

Figure 2

Candidates-per-Seat by Ethnic Fractionalization - 2004

Figure 3

Candidates-per-Seat by Ethnic Fractionalization - 2009

Figure 4

Rent Opportunities by Ethnic Fractionalization - 2009

*Note: Original Infrastructure scores have been subtracted from 100. Thus rent opportunities *increases* with an *increase* in the modified "Infrastructure Quality" scores in Figures 6 and 7.

Figure 5

Candidates by Rents in Homogenous Districts - 2009

Figure 6

DPD Candidates by Ethnic Fractionalization - 2004

Figure 7

DPD Candidates by Ethnic Fractionalization - 2009

Table 1

Determinants of Candidate List Size – National Legislature (OLS Regression, Clustered by Party)			
Dependent Variable: Party-level Candidates-per-Seat by Electoral District			
	Model 1 – Baseline 2009	**Model 2 – Baseline Model + Patronage**	**Model 3 – Homogenous Districts**
Variable	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)
Rent Opportunities		.003*** (.0009)	.004*** (.001)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.111*** (.020)	.046** (.021)	
District Magnitude	-.024*** (.003)	-.019*** (.003)	-.021*** (.005)
Urbanization	.122*** (.022)	.160*** (.031)	.055 (.051)
Poverty	.049 (.063)	.056 (.109)	-.221 (.160)
Muslim Party	-.252*** (.084)	-.288*** (.082)	
% Muslim	-.167*** (.034)	-.176*** (.034)	
Muslim Party X % Muslim	.426*** (.098)	.462*** (.097)	
National Strength	3.34*** (.773)	3.384*** (.826)	3.833*** (1.119)
Local Strength	.699* (.404)	.698* (.384)	.707 (.509)
Const	.616*** (.066)	.576*** (.070)	.491*** (.074)
Obs	2812	1938	722
R2	0.3685	0.3816	0.3842

*p < .10. **p < .05. *** p <.01.

Appendix A

<u>Muslim Parties</u>

<u>For 1999:</u>
1) Partai Kebangkitan Umat; 2) Partai Nahdlatul Ummat; 3) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; 4) Partai Solidaritas Uni Nasional Indonesia; 5) Partai Indonesia Baru; 6) Partai Amanat Nasional; 7) Partai Islam Demokrat; 8) Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia; 9) Partai Ummat Islam; 10) Partai Masyumi Baru; 11) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; 12) Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia; 13) Partai Abul Yatama; 14) Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia 1905; 15) Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi; 16) Partai Bulan Bintang; 17) Partai Keadilan; 18) Partai Persatuan; 19) Partai Daulat Rakyat; 20) Partai Cinta Damai; 21) Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia.

<u>For 2004:</u>
1) Partai Bulan Bintang; 2) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; 3) Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia; 4) Partai Amanat Nasional; 5) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; 6) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; 7) Partai Bintang Reformasi.

<u>For 2009:</u>
1) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; 2) Partai Amanat Nasional; 3) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; 4) Partai Matahari Bangsa; 5) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; 6) Partai Bulan Bintang; 7) Partai Bintang Reformasi; 8) Partai Kebangkitan Nasional Ulama; 9) Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia.

Appendix B

In Indonesia, parties that fail to meet a threshold of either aggregate national or sub-national strength can not automatically re-offer the following election. If a party fails to meet the threshold it must either present itself under a new name and complete the full registration process again, or amalgamate with other parties so that they can meet the threshold, thereby avoiding the more extensive registration process. Each post-1999 election, then, produces four possible categories of parties: 1) carry-overs from the previous election; 2) re-named parties from the previous election; 3) an amalgamation of parties from the previous election; 4) a completely new party. For the construction of the electoral strength variables, both re-named and amalgamated parties were assigned the electoral vote of their previous incarnation(s). Listed below is a full accounting of all parties that ran in two consecutive elections.

Party History

2004:

Carry-Overs:
1) Partai Bulan BintangPartai Persatuan Pembangunan; 2) Partai Amanat Nasional; 3) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; 4) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan; 5) Partai Golongan Karya (Golkar).

Name Changes:
1) Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme (formerly Partai Nasional Indonesia); 2) Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat (formerly Partai Buruh Nasional); 3) Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia (formerly Partai Keadilan Dan Persatuan);4) Partai Penegak Demokrasi Indonesia (formely Partai Demokrasi Indonesia); 5) Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (formely Partai Nahdlatul Ummat); 6) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (formerly Partai Keadilan).

Amalgamations:
1) Partai Bintang Reformasi (Partai Indonesia Baru + Partai Ummat Muslimin Indonesia + Partai Kebangkitan Muslim Indonesia + Partai Republik);
2) Partai Sarikat Indonesia (Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia + Partai Daulat Rakyat + Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masyumi).

2009:

Carry-Overs:
1) Partai Karya Peduli Bangsa; 2) Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan Indonesia; 3) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera; 4) Partai Amanat Nasional; 5) Partai Persatuan Daerah; 6) Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa; 7) Partai Nasional Indonesia Marhaenisme; 8) Partai Penegak

Demokrasi Indonesia; 9) Partai Pelopor; 10) Partai Golongan Karya; 11) Partai Persatuan Pembangunan; 12) Partai Damai Sejahtera; 13) Partai Bulan Bintang; 14) Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan; 15) Partai Bintang Reformasi; 16) Partai Demokrat; 17) Partai Merdeka; 18) Partai Sarikat Indonesia;

Name Changes:
1) Partai Perjuangan Indonesia Baru (formerly Partai Perhimpunan Indonesia Baru); 2) Partai Demokrasi Kebangsaan (formerly Partai Persatuan Demokrasi Kebangsaan); 3) Partai Nasional Benteng Kerakyatan Indonesia (formerly Partai Nasional Benteng Kemerdekaan); 4) Partai Patriot (formerly Partai Patriot Pancasila); 5) Partai Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia (formerly Partai Persatuan Nahdlatul Ummah Indonesia); 6) Partai Buruh (formerly Partai Buruh Sosial Demokrat

Appendix C

Determinants of Candidate List Size – National Legislature (OLS Regression, Clustered by Party)
Dependent Variable: Party-level Candidates-per-Seat by Electoral District

Variable	Model 1 – 1999	Model 2 - 2004	Model 3 – 2009	Model 4 - 2004
	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.087 (.069)	.112*** (.024)	.111*** (.021)	.113*** (.024)
District Magnitude	-.003*** (.0009)	-.036*** (.003)	-.024*** (.003)	.036*** (.003)
Jakarta	.206* (.114)	.145*** (.034)	.126*** (.020)	.144*** (.034)
Urbanization	.070 (.189)	.126*** (.031)	.122*** (.022)	.125*** (.031)
Poverty	-.035 (.233)	-.133** (.060)	.0484 (.068)	-.133** (.058)
Muslim Party	-.197*** (.060)	-.193 (.126)	-.200* (.099)	-.196* (.105)
% Muslim	.122 (.074)	-.089** (.037)	-.175*** (.034))	-.080** (.036)
% Muslim X Muslim Party	.304*** (.068)	.434*** (.072)	.463*** (.091)	.401*** (.078)
National Strength				1.771*** (.554)
Local Strength				.441*** (.149)
const	.553*** (.121)	.848*** (.070)	.711*** (.066)	.762*** (.055)

Obs	1248	1656	2926	1656
R2	0.0326	0.1775	0.1149	0.4814

*p < .10. **p < .05. *** p <.01.

Appendix D

Determinants of Candidate Numbers – Provincial Legislature (OLS Regression)

Dependent Variable: Candidates-per-Seat (Total Candidates / Total Seats)

Variable	**Model 1 – 2004**	**Model 2 - 2009**	**Model 3 - 2004**	**Model 4 - 2009**
	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)
Ethnic Fractionalization	3.843** (1.526)	6.742*** (1.863)	4.108*** (1.369)	6.385*** (1.828)
DPRD Seats			.022 (.020)	.035 (.027)
Jakarta			8.873*** (2.690)	10.580*** (3.667)
Urbanization			-4.236 (3.157)	-6.336 (4.130)
Poverty			-5.809* (3.270)	3.094 (6.121)
Aceh				-2.170 (2.737)
Const	10.197*** (1.106)	11.896*** (1.358)	11.498*** (2.329)	11.546*** (3.141)
Obs	32	33	32	33
R2	0.1745	0.2971	0.5384	0.5260

*p < .10. **p < .05. *** p <.01.

Appendix E

Determinants of Candidate Numbers – National Upper House (OLS Regression)

Dependent Variable: Number of Candidates

Variable	Model 1-2004 Estimate (std. err)	Model 2 – 2009 Estimate (std. err)	Model 3 – 2004 Estimate (std. err)	Model 4 – 2009 Estimate (std. err)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-17.143** (6.902)	5.278 (8.457)	-3.413 (4.738)	8.274 (7.943)
Population (logged)			8.123*** (1.266)	-.736 (3.152)
Urbanization			-2.280 (8.514)	-13.452 (14.290)
Poverty			-19.553* (11.456)	-43.901 (27.202)
Electoral Fragmentation, 2004				1.337** (.565)
const	40.762*** (5.001)	29.830*** (6.164)	-85.368*** (21.071)	30.846 (43.573)
N	32	33	32	32
R2	0.1706	0.0124	0.7086	0.4152

*p < .10. **p < .05. *** p <.01.

Appendix F

Determinants of Candidate List Size – National Legislature (OLS Regression, Clustered by Party)

Dependent Variable: Party-level Candidates-per-Seat by Electoral District

Variable	Model 1 – Minor Parties 2004	Model 2– Minor Parties 2009	Model 3 – Major Parties 2004	Model 4 – Major Parties 2009	Model 5– Homogenous Districts, Minor Parties	Model 6 – Homogenous Districts, Major Parties
Variable	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)
Rent Opportunities					.005** (.002)	.003 (.003)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.122*** (.028)	.091*** (.022)	.044 (.053)	.106 (.055)		
District Magnitude	-.038*** (.003)	-.025*** (.003)	-.029** (.008)	-.018** (.006)	-.025*** (.005)	-.002 (.013)
Jakarta	.151*** (.041)		.123 (.060)			
Urbanization	.159*** (.032)	.145*** (.025)	.026 (.070)	.075* (.034)	.043 (.060)	.096 (.103)
Poverty	-.075 (.063)	.016 (.071)	-.287* (.132)	.186 (.131)	-.300 (.177)	.126 (.422)
Muslim Party	-.332** (.123)	-.180 (.152)	-.560*** (.084)	-.524*** (.059)		
% Muslim	-.081* (.040)	-.178*** (.034)	.0002 (.080)	.090 (.049)		
Muslim Party X % Muslim	.474*** (.094)	.348** (.139)	.148 (.109)	.222 (.128)		
National Strength	.869 (5.39)	-8.6457* (4.566)	-1.677*** (.219)	-2.12** (.851)	-4.874 (4.950)	.467 (.503)

Local Strength	3.63***	3.698***	.341	.923**	-1.427	.341
	(1.21)	(.819)	(.175)	(.274)	(2.131)	(.328)
	.737***	.672***	1.762***	1.299***		
	(.060)	(.072)	(.137)	(.091)		
Const					.499***	.789**
					(.068)	(.219)
Obs	1311	2294	345	518	589	133
R2	0.2453	0.1236	0.3942	0.4127	0.0532	0.0559

*p < .10. **p < .05. *** p <.01.

Appendix G

Determinants of Candidate List Size – National Legislature (OLS Regression, Clustered by Party)

Dependent Variable: Party-level Candidates-per-Seat by Electoral District

Variable	**Model 1 – Full Sample**	**Model 2 – Minor Parties**	**Model 3 – Major Parties**
	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)	Estimate (std. err)
DPRD Candidates-per-seat	.514***	.538***	.056
	(.079)	(.083)	(.076)
Ethnic Fractionalization	.057**	.060**	.041
	(.020)	(.025)	(.049)
District Magnitude	-.040***	-.043***	-.029***
	(.003)	(.003)	(.008)
Jakarta	-.015	-.026	.109
	(.046)	(.050)	(.071)
Urbanization	.150***	.174***	.031
	(.026)	(.029)	(.067)

Poverty	-.100*	-.061	-.278*
	(.055)	(.060)	(.130)
% Muslim	-.028	-.017	-.005
	(.035)	(.037)	(.079)
Muslim Party	-.087	-.197*	-.537***
	(.088)	(.092)	(.078)
% MuslimXMuslim Party	.184**	.224*	.139
	(.071)	(.097)	(.103)
National Strength	.975**	1.059	-1.640***
	(.374)	(3.362)	(.259)
Local Strength	.096	1.828	.307
	(.146)	(1.280)	(.173)
Const	.556***	.536***	1.704***
	(.064)	(.061)	(.207)
Obs	1656	1311	345
R2	0.5816	0.4093	0.3959

*p < .10. **p < .05. *** p <.01.