

“Measuring the Assurances of Female Political Leaders:
Hillary Clinton on the Campaign Trail”

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Abstract: A well-established maxim within the political leadership literature holds that most leaders, most of the time, seek to assure citizens in their public communications. The provision of such certainty is thought to be integral to the exercise of leadership: uncertain citizens seek advice and reassurance, and so they turn to political leaders who can provide such goods (Downs, 1957). This understanding has been studied empirically mainly with respect to male leaders (de Clercy, 2005). This study asks: do female political leader also communicate certainty and uncertainty to citizens and, if so, how may such messages compare with those of male leaders? The study focuses on Hillary Clinton, the first woman to campaign for the American presidency. Leader communications are evaluated by analysing the content of Clinton’s three televised 2016 presidential debate performances using Atlas.ti, a qualitative content analysis program. These findings are compared with the same speech sets for her opponent, Donald Trump. Then, these values are compared with similar data for a sample of two other male presidential candidates. The study finds Clinton fits the role of a classic transactional leader and given the small number of cases under study here, there seems to be no systematic difference in how she communicated assurances to citizens based on her gender.

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A well-established maxim within the political leadership literature holds that most leaders, most of the time, seek to assure citizens in their public communications.¹ The provision of such certainty is thought to be integral to the exercise of leadership: uncertain citizens seek advice and reassurance, and so they turn to political leaders who can provide such goods. Interestingly, although the relationship between leadership and certainty is often and widely reiterated, rarely has it been tested empirically. In earlier work I modelled how transactional and innovative leaders may strategically address citizens' uncertainty with a view to capturing their support. These studies focused only on male political leaders in industrialized states.²

However, the ongoing feminization of the political sphere provides a growing number of cases of women in leadership roles. In the classic analyses of leadership, authors such as Anthony Downs or R. Macgregor Burns do not mention gender as a key variable in leader communication. More recent studies report gender does structure leadership communications.³ So, this study has two goals. First, it builds on extant work to examine whether as a transactional leader, Hillary Clinton communicated more certainty, and less uncertainty, to citizens than her innovative Republican counterpart in the 2016 American presidential election. Second, because this election marked the first time a woman contested the US presidency, the analysis probes whether gender made any discernible difference in the leaders' public communications along the certainty/uncertainty axis. As discussed in more detail below, three hypotheses are articulated to guide the analysis. They are tested by analysing the content of three televised 2016 presidential debate performances using Atlas.ti, a qualitative content analysis program based on grounded theory. Then, these values are compared with similar data collected at a different time but concerning comparable male leaders during the 1976 presidential election.

The study finds Clinton, as a transactional leader, communicated more certainty, and less uncertainty, than her innovative competitor during the 2016 campaign. As well, and although there are few cases under study here, there seems to be little evidence that her gender influenced how she

communicated assurances to citizens in comparison with her colleagues. The next section reviews some key literature and briefly summarizes the theoretical assumptions supporting the hypotheses.

Leadership, Certainty and Uncertainty

In most definitions, the exercise of leadership is a product of the relationship between leaders and followers and in modern mass democracies this relationship is established mainly through communication.⁴ While not constitutionally bound to communicate with citizens directly, the accretion of customary practices (such as press conferences and personally presented legislative programmes) is as binding on leaders as enshrined provisions: citizens expect leaders to address them, and leaders spend much time and effort speaking to their publics.⁵ These communications perform several basic functions within the political process. First, they link government and public. A central means to this end is the mass media, for coverage of a major address may draw the attention of millions of voters to a leader's message.⁶ Second, language can be symbolic action, and politicians must communicate because they need to appear active.⁷ Third, leaders are a significant source of public information, for a leader's address or mediated coverage of the event can contribute to public knowledge about a current issue or policy proposal.

Finally, and importantly, leaders' statements are a "largely irreplaceable means of defining situations, exigencies, and the way the world is."⁸ Through informing citizens about an issue or policy proposal, leaders discover the opportunity to shape public perception of political reality and many scholars consider this the core social function of leadership. James MacGregor Burns suggests that leaders, like teachers, use information to shape followers' perception of reality. In modern contexts, this capacity to define reality is particularly important, for uncommunicative leaders effectively relinquish control over the construction of public perception to the media.

Because they inform citizens, leaders are considered sources of knowledge, or certainty. And because there are strong incentives to address their publics, it is commonly assumed that political leaders are necessarily sources of certainty. This widely held assumption permeates the study of leadership. Tucker, for example, views leaders' certainty as an antidote to citizens' uncertainty: "a leader is one who gives direction to a collective's activities . . . [and] if political and other groups are in need of direction, this must be because of uncertainty about what courses of collective action are desirable."⁹ As well, most students of policy innovation assume that innovative leaders must reduce uncertainty to capture support: Bryson and Crosby note that "big win" policy changes require leaders to educate groups to overcome potential resistance stemming from a lack of knowledge about the new policies.¹⁰

So, most studies assume that leaders are always sources of certainty for uncertain citizens. However, some empirical evidence challenges this myopic perspective. One excellent example concerns former Quebec premier Lucien Bouchard's actions during a Parti Québécois [PQ] convention in November of 1996. Some radical separatist members openly challenged the premier's moderate approach to French language policy, and this dissatisfaction was reflected in a party confidence vote which revealed that only 76.7% of the delegates had confidence in their leader.¹¹ When pressed for his response, Bouchard ambiguously suggested that he would have to reflect upon the result and then dramatically retreated from the convention floor.

Delegates' uncertainty about Bouchard's reaction to the vote and the meaning of his sudden departure fostered apprehension about the possibility of his resignation. Rumours that he had resigned spread throughout the convention, and media speculation about the negative effects of his resignation heightened party members' anxiety. A day later, expressions of relief and loyalty marked the premier's return to the assembly, and some observers suggest that this tactic helped him to overcome opposition

and win support for his controversial language policy position. As leaders may not always decrease their followers' uncertainty, one may ask why leaders might benefit from generating uncertainty.

Theorizing Leadership and Uncertainty

In this view leaders are considered to possess agency in politics. In modern mass democracies, political leadership is often effected through persuasive communications, and how politicians communicate is essential to their success as leaders. Because it is critical to the leadership act, the nature of leaders' communications is considered to be intentional, rather than accidental, and leaders can try to generate support from groups of potential followers through communicating specific information in a particular manner. Citizens are considered to be rational actors who make decisions to pursue their goals, and these decisions are based on probabilistic calculations about future outcomes. Because uncertainty, or any lack of sure knowledge, is ubiquitous in politics, and because citizens are "rationally ignorant," citizens usually make decisions with less than full certainty concerning outcomes. Leaders possess (or are thought to possess) more information about the state of the polity, and so leaders are an important source of knowledge for uncertain citizens. Citizens value leaders' knowledge, for it may help them to make more informed choices and may increase the validity of their probabilistic calculations.

Through communicating certainty or uncertainty to citizens, leaders may affect citizens' probabilistic calculations about future outcomes, and hence their decisions. So, citizens' uncertainty may increased or decreased, but its manipulation is contingent on two factors: leaders' orientation to risk (acceptant or averse); and the nature of leaders' policy objectives (innovative or status quo). Two core hypotheses emerge from these assumptions: risk-acceptant innovative leaders who seek to achieve new policies may increase uncertainty to mobilize support for change, and risk-averse transactional leaders who advocate traditional, status quo policies try to alleviate uncertainty. The next section draws

from the work of several noted analysts to present the core behavioural characteristics of each leadership type and summarizes the assumptions supporting the hypotheses.

Transactional Leaders

The first category is "transactional" leadership and it is considered common or ordinary.¹² The conduct of this type of leader is characterized as a pragmatic, brokerage approach to politics, for these leaders "approach followers with an eye to exchanging one thing for another," such as jobs for campaign contributions or reciprocal "logroll" legislative vote agreements.¹³ The commodities exchanged may be political, economic or psychological in nature, and the participants' individual wants and goals create the necessary market conditions.¹⁴ Where followers' interests conflict or diverge, transactional leaders broker among factions in search of a consensus position supported by most of the participants. These leaders are rewarded for their efforts with goods such as money, status and ego-satisfaction, but their main objective is securing or maintaining the occupation of political office.¹⁵ Because these leaders highly value office, they avoid taking risks that may undermine this objective.

These leaders are commonly (and disparagingly) considered mere managers of the political process, for their aversion to risk is reflected in their moderate policy objectives: they prefer known, *status quo* approaches to innovative ones.¹⁶ So, these leaders serve to reify and perpetuate the existing political order through managing short-term, incrementalist change. The result of such management is the "adjustment of the equilibrium of a social structure," or systemic maintenance.¹⁷ They may supervise more significant change, but the impetus to such restructuring originates in the exogenous social, political or economic environment.¹⁸ While many analysts value transactional leaders for this *status quo* pragmatism, others describe them with distaste for they "truckle to the most powerful interests within the electorate" to realize their main objective: continuing in office.¹⁹

To summarize, these leaders effect leadership by brokering between factions and trading political commodities. They act within known, usual policy boundaries, and manage (rather than initiate)

change. Transactional leaders are risk-averse, for they value office above all other political objectives. The rational model of leadership that supports this study suggests that citizens lack certainty to a greater or lesser extent. In normal political circumstances, transactional leaders will communicate certainty, for certainty is what uncertain citizens seek. In return, transactional leaders expect citizens to support them. So, transactional leaders may try to exercise leadership by alleviating uncertainty in return for support. This is expressed as: Hypothesis I - If a leader is risk averse and advocates status quo policies, then s/he communicates much more certainty, and less uncertainty, to followers.

Innovative Leadership

The second category is "innovative" or "transformational" leadership and it is characterized as a creative, dynamic exercise of power that is uncommon, even rare.²⁰ Innovative leaders value holding political office for its resources, such as access to a large bureaucracy. Unlike transactional leaders, the goals of innovators lie beyond mere office-holding. Also termed "reform-mongers" or "conviction politicians," their unusual perseverance in pursuit of particular policy goals marks the behaviour of innovators.²¹ They are commonly described as those who take advantage of open "windows of opportunity," or stimulate new preferences, to pursue policies beyond *status quo* boundaries.²² Innovators want to lead followers to support new or uncommon policies, and in most views this is achieved through influencing public perception about the benefits of change. Some scholars suggest that innovators change constituents' perceptions of public policy, and its effect, through employing a range of strategies to create and communicate new meanings.²³ Others find that they motivate followers through successfully articulating, crystallizing and legitimating a vision of citizens' longer range interests.²⁴

Because most of their followers do not hold their desired policy objectives, and as the maintenance of public office is not their sole goal, innovators take risks more readily than transactional

leaders.²⁵ Innovative leaders are sources of substantial political change, and these politicians are considered “real” leaders whose direction provides “collectively purposeful causation.”²⁶ Once they mobilize support for objectives beyond the existing order, innovators serve to break the “drag chains” of tradition.²⁷ Similar to economic entrepreneurs, political innovators are a creative, dynamic element within the political system who disrupt its static equilibrium and produce systemic change and development.²⁸ They “move mountains” and influence many independent actors to restructure the political landscape.²⁹

To summarize, innovators maximize the attainment of new policy objectives, and they are sources of political change, for they pursue policies beyond the *status quo*. Innovators are much more risk acceptant than transactional leaders, and they are willing to risk their office to achieve their goals. Unlike transactional leaders, they may communicate uncertainty to uncertain citizens to increase public uncertainty. Innovators may strategically increase citizens’ uncertainty to secure support for their policy goals, for this may influence public perceptions about the need for new policies. They may lead citizens to support new policies if innovators can decrease citizens’ certainty about existing policies and anticipated policy outcomes. Once citizens are much less certain about the true “state of the world,” innovators can introduce their preferred policy option as one that will resolve citizens’ uncertainty. Highly uncertain citizens may then support the new option to resolve their uncertainty. So, where innovators seek to achieve new policies, they may exploit uncertainty to create the conditions for policy change, for they possess more incentive (and less aversion) to such strategic manipulation than office-maximizing leaders. So, Hypothesis II- If a leader is risk acceptant and pursues new or unanticipated policy objectives, then s/he communicates less certainty, and more uncertainty, than transactional leaders.

In this view, how leaders choose to address followers’ uncertainty hinges largely on each leader’s orientation to policy change. In this view the gender of the leader is immaterial to whether and

how they communicate certainty, or uncertainty to citizens. Some analysts, however, report gender does in fact influence leaders' political communications. To test whether the gender of the leader makes a difference, we propose here it does not. So, Hypothesis III articulates the null hypothesis: there is no relationship between gender and the communication of certainty or uncertainty. In the next section the main case at hand is introduced, and then the empirical results are presented and explored.

The 2016 Presidential Election

The main case under study here concerns the 2016 American presidential contest between Democratic party nominee Hillary Clinton and the Republican candidate, Donald J. Trump. This contest was unique in several respects. Importantly, it marked the first time a woman contested the American presidency. As discussed in more detail below, Hillary Rodham Clinton has meticulously pursued the opportunity to run for president for many years, and her mission to "shatter the glass ceiling" that effectively bars women from attaining the highest executive office in the USA was an historic campaign. So, this first case of a female presidential candidate allows us to examine presidential leadership communications across genders in a widely-followed race where each side's communications were central to mobilizing their supporters and influencing the narrow margin of victory. Now we turn to consider the career and leadership characteristics of one of the most influential politicians of her time, to help establish her as a transactional leader.

Hillary Rodham Clinton

An unavoidable challenge in writing about Hillary Rodham Clinton is the superabundance of sources. The object of much analytic and academic attention, she has been subject to "saturation coverage" by the media for more than two decades.³⁰ As well, she has contributed a substantial number of works in the form of several lengthy books about her years in politics. To present a brief depiction of her life, Hillary Diane Rodham was born on October 26, 1947 in Chicago. She grew up in Parkridge, a

pleasant family suburb, and had two younger brothers. Her mother, Dorothy Rodham, was a homemaker and her father, Hugh, was a self-employed small businessman who manufactured draperies for hotels and office building.³¹

Hillary demonstrated precocious political interest and as a young girl adopted her father's subscription to the Republican party. For example, when she was in the eighth grade the 1960 presidential campaign took place that fall. As a "spirited and deeply conservative Republican" she rooted sincerely for Richard M. Nixon, the Republican candidate.³² After displaying interest in student leadership during high school, she was encouraged to apply for entrance to a women's liberal arts college, and attended Wellesley College from 1965 to 1969.

Hillary's mother nurtured and carefully focused her daughter's aptitudes and ambitions. Carl Bernstein suggests "Hillary's mother taught her, above all else, she could do anything, aspire to anything, that there was no reason for a daughter to aim for less than her brothers."³³ Hillary took this lesson to heart, writing to NASA when she was fourteen to volunteer as an astronaut. At the same time, her mother wanted her to be able to maintain her equilibrium in chaotic circumstances. To demonstrate this point, she showed Hillary how the bubbles in a carpenter's level move to the center. "Imagine having this carpenter's level inside you", she said. "You try to keep that bubble in the center. Sometimes it will go way up there" – she tipped the level so the bubble drifted – "and then you have to bring it back." She straightened the level.³⁴ The pattern of Hillary's university activities reveals these early lessons. On the one hand, the psychic space of the all-women's campus liberated her ambition and encouraged personal growth.³⁵ She contested and won the presidency of the student government, and then spent nine weeks in Washington, DC in the Wellesley Internship Program learning how government works and making key connections with political insiders.

On the other hand, in a place and time where the second wave of the women's movement was breaking new ground and finding new champions, Hillary Rodham was not known as a radical activist.

Although her midwestern ideals, political ideology and insulated upbringing changed significantly during her time at Wellesley she always followed a sensible course, argues Carl Bernstein.³⁶

An excellent example of her dislike of extremism is reflected in her first formal experience with the Democratic party. Disappointed with the Republican party's nomination of Richard Nixon, Hillary and a friend attended the 1968 National Democratic Convention in Chicago. One reporter, remembering the event years later, wrote: "The 1968 Chicago convention became a lacerating event, a distillation of a year of heartbreak, assassinations, riots and a breakdown in law and order that made it seem as if the country were coming apart. In its psychic impact, and its long-term political consequences, it eclipsed any other such convention in American history, destroying faith in politicians, in the political system, in the country and in its institutions."³⁷

But Hillary, equally repelled by the arbitrary use of police authority and the violence masquerading as civil disobedience, concluded politics was the only route in a democracy for peaceful and lasting change.³⁸ As a campus leader in the era of civil rights protests and anti-Vietnam demonstrations, while many of her contemporaries at other colleges were directly challenging the authority of college administrators and of government structures, Hillary worked carefully within the system to steer her colleagues away from ugly confrontations with authority.³⁹ Her preference for mediating between opposing parties and for using existing democratic institutions to secure incremental change was clear by the time she graduated.

Hillary Rodham enrolled at Yale Law School in the fall of 1970 and began specializing in law relating to children and minors. Here she met her husband and future political partner, Bill Clinton. Although they worked together on Democratic political campaigns, after graduation Bill returned to Arkansas to prepare to contest a congressional seat while Hillary worked on a congressional judiciary committee preparing charges of impeachment against President Nixon, her former hero. They married in 1975.⁴⁰ Appointed by President Jimmy Carter to the board of the Legal Services Corporation, which

funded legal access for poor people across the U.S., she soon became its chair.⁴¹ In 1978 Bill won the Arkansas gubernatorial race, and in 1980 their daughter was born.

Bill was re-elected in 1982, and soon asked the legislature to let Hillary head an effort to improve the quality of the state education system. Arkansas was at or near the bottom of almost every socio-economic indicator, but she threw herself into this daunting task with energy and her usual diligence. She wrought changes where possible while carefully avoiding making provocative commitments in controversial areas like teacher testing. Her solid work on educational improvement won her the admiration of some of her most vocal critics. One critic, Dick Morris, commented that on this issue she was “never finer” and praised her pragmatic approach.⁴²

In three subsequent elections Bill Clinton retained the governor’s office. By the late 1980s he was preparing for a presidential bid; he secured the Democratic party’s presidential nomination in 1992. The incumbent president, George H. Bush, lost the general election, and the Clintons’ arrival in the White House marked the first time since the Carter era that the Democrats controlled both the executive and legislative branches of government. Bill Clinton was re-elected in the 1996 election, and so Hillary spent eight years as First Lady.

While her political role with respect to her husband remained much as it was in the early years of their marriage, the scale of the projects she pursued was much greater, as was the magnitude of the opposition she faced. In the case of health care reform, the Clintons greatly underestimated the amount of time it would take, and the amount of political capital they required, to secure reform. Unpopular with Republican and many Democrats, the difficult reform plan ultimately was abandoned in the summer of 1994.⁴³ Widely criticized for this failure, she altered her approach to governing by reducing her expectations about the magnitude of policy change she could achieve. Admitting subscription to incrementalism, she described her approach this way: “I now come from the school of small steps.”⁴⁴

Bill Clinton was easily returned to office in 1996, but then his popularity began to slide as the Senate's Special Committee to investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters forced key members of the administration to testify, including Hillary.⁴⁵ As Arkansas governor and as president, Bill was rumoured to have been involved in several affairs with other women. The ongoing political problem concerning his infidelity became a maelstrom when it was revealed he had lied about his sexual relationship with a 21-year-old intern, Monica Lewinsky.⁴⁶ As his Senate trial of her husband was proceeding, Hillary was exploring running for a Senate seat in her own right. Public opinion polls consistently suggested she was widely admired for her conduct during the scandal.⁴⁷

On July 7th, 1999 Hillary Rodham Clinton announced her senatorial candidacy to represent New York. She won the seat by a comfortable margin in the 2000 election which elevated George W. Bush to the presidency. In January of 2007, after she was re-elected to the Senate, she announced her presidential candidacy on a website, saying she wanted to start a conversation with America.⁴⁸ While several candidates had begun campaigning for the Democratic party's presidential nomination by that point, the most serious challenger was a young Illinois senator, Barack Obama. He went on to win nomination race. And in 2008, Barack Obama and his vice-presidential running mate, Joe Biden, won the general election. Asked to serve as Secretary of State, she decided to accept the position on grounds that the President had asked her to serve. As well, Clinton later aligned herself with Obama's approach, stating both saw themselves as "pragmatic progressives" trying to move the country forward in the face a new, extreme brand of radical conservatism. On April 12, 2015, she officially announced her candidacy for the Democratic nomination.⁴⁹ After a close race against Vermont senator Bernie Sanders, Hillary Clinton clinched the nomination in June of 2016, becoming the first woman in the country's 240-year history to lead the presidential ticket of a major political party.⁵⁰

Donald J. Trump

As noted above in the introduction, there is a superabundance of information about Clinton's political career. In the case of Donald J. Trump, however, the opposite is the case. Although he had a longstanding interest in politics, the body of work about him largely comprises books he wrote about how to succeed in business, and accounts of his career and business practices authored by investigative journalists, lawyers and former associates. Indeed, Trump is unique. It is rare indeed that someone (let alone a septuagenarian) is able to win the most senior public office (let alone the American presidency) in an industrialized democracy without any prior political experience at all. He is a true outsider.

Donald Trump was born on June 14, 1946 in Queens, New York City, and was the fourth of five children. Like Hillary Clinton, he was raised in a traditional family context that revolved around a driven and domineering father.⁵¹ He was born into the fourth generation of a line of businessmen who consistently grew the family's wealth in the United States. In many accounts, including his own, Trump was a "very assertive, aggressive" child who liked to stir things up and test people.⁵² To help direct his aggression and teach the benefits of discipline, at thirteen years old he was sent to a military academy in upstate New York, where he completed high school. Trump turned eighteen in 1964, when the death toll in Vietnam was quickly rising. He secured four student deferments and one medical deferment from military service. Initially he enrolled at Fordham College, a Jesuit institution in New York City. However, after two years he transferred to an Ivy League school: the University of Pennsylvania. Although Trump often suggested he graduated from Penn's famous Wharton graduate business school, in fact he was enrolled as an undergraduate and received a Bachelor of Science in economics.⁵³

His father's main business was low and middle income real estate development, and while he was in college Donald began partnering with his father on several real estate deals. He also learned how to manage large, lower-income apartment complexes by collecting rents and minimizing repair and maintenance costs. He soon realized he did not want to continue the partnership, although he remained interested in real estate development as a career. He wrote: "The real reason I wanted out of my

father's business - more important than the fact that it was physically rough and financially tough – was that I had loftier dreams and visions. And there was no way to implement them building housing in the outer boroughs.”⁵⁴

Donald moved to Manhattan shortly before it entered a period of steep decline. In 1973 New York City began suffering a “crisis of confidence” as rising debt levels and stagnant investment took hold.⁵⁵ Real estate development slowed dramatically, and several parts of the city became especially decrepit. He was interested in a huge, abandoned rail yard property along the Hudson river, known as the Sixtieth Street yards. At twenty-seven years old, with no independent track record of established projects that were his own, Donald began an intricate effort to buy the yards and develop them. On July 29, 1974, he announced the Trump organization had secured options to purchase two waterfront sites, known as the West 34th street and 60th street sites, with no money down to build middle-income housing. Victor Palmieri, who negotiated the sale of the railway lands, was asked why he chose Trump over other bidders. He replied: “Those properties were nothing but a black hole of undefinable risk. We interviewed all kinds of people who were interested in them, none of whom had what seemed to be the kind of drive, backing and imagination that would be necessary. Until this young guy Trump came along. He’s almost a throwback to the nineteenth century as a promoter. He’s larger than life.”⁵⁶

When Trump’s Commodore/Hyatt project broke ground in the summer of 1978, it was the largest development project in the city. In the same period, he began negotiating for the land and rights that would provide the opportunity to begin construction on his signature edifice, Trump Tower.⁵⁷ And in 1977, he quietly married Ivana Zelníčková. Shortly after meeting her, with typical hyperbole Donald boasted to his friends that she had been on the 1972 Czech Olympic ski team and was a top Canadian fashion model. A Czech national, in fact, she did not compete in any Olympic games though she was a fine skier. Similarly, while she did model for several prominent Montreal department stores, she was certainly not a leading model.⁵⁸ Shortly after marrying, the couple celebrated the birth of their first son,

Donald Jr., then daughter Ivana Marie (1981) and Eric Frederick (1984). Ivana quickly became a business partner and went on to head the management of the Trump Castle Hotel and Casino among other projects. However, after Ivana encountered Donald's mistress, Marla Maples, at a ski resort in 1990, they divorced the following year.⁵⁹

Beginning in the mid-1980s and continuing for several decades, he made cameo appearances on television shows and in movies, such as *The Jeffersons* and *Home Alone 2*.⁶⁰ By far the most well-known project was *The Apprentice*, a reality television game show developed by Mark Burnett. Trump was an executive producer and the game show's host. Trump recalled: "all my advisors thought it was a risk, that it would bomb... that I was making a huge and very costly mistake."⁶¹

As a consequence of his diligent pursuit of publicity and the creation of the Trump brand, Donald became personally popular and widely admired. He seemed to possess a canny sense of how to hold public attention. As one biography notes, "He was, almost from the start, his own brand.... He knew how to be famous, he knew how to win numbers, get ratings, make people take notice. More than three decades before he decided he wanted to be president, he showed up on Gallup's list of the ten men Americans admire the most...."⁶² His business interests grew and multiplied, and his net worth increased: making the *Forbes'* World Billionaires list for the first time in 1989, by 2010 the same publication estimated his net worth had increased to \$2.4 billion.⁶³

He had mused about campaigning for high public office, such as the governor of New York or the presidency, on several occasions, and had published several large newspaper ads on particular political issues that attracted attention.⁶⁴ However, in 2015 he became serious. Announcing his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination on June 16th, he began speaking at rallies across the country in an extremely unusual way. Dismissing prepared texts and tightly orchestrated appearances, he gave long, rambling, vulgar and politically incorrect extemporaneous speeches that underscored the fact that "Trump would not and could not be handled. He *intended* to be unpredictable."⁶⁵ The Republican field of

seventeen nominees included several well known, deeply experienced politicians like Jeb Bush, Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and John Kasich.⁶⁶

Initially the party establishment ignored Trump's inflammatory campaign rhetoric. However, after doing well in several southern primaries and carrying South Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Tennessee and Virginia, the GOP establishment attacked the unconventional front runner. The party's previous nominee, Mitt Romney, called Trump a phony and a fraud who knew little about the world, and who was temperamentally unfit for the presidency. On March 15th, Trump won the Florida primary with 46 percent of the vote.⁶⁷ Once it became clear that he would be the Republican presidential nominee, the party elite divided, with some supporting him and others declaring he was not a Republican, and they would rather vote for Hillary Clinton.⁶⁸ Against great odds the bombastic 70-year-old career businessman and reality TV star without any prior political experience had improbably outplayed sixteen Republican politicians to secure the presidential nomination. He began to prepare for the general election.

The 2016 Presidential Campaign

The 2016 presidential campaign was unique in several respects. At the time of writing some initial treatments have been published, with more work certainly on the way to press. While there are many different possible perspectives on the contest, such as a battle for social media dominance or an artefact of cultural alienation among worker class voters, for our purposes in the analysis below the formal campaign is understood as a contest between a transactional and a transformational leader to win support from uncertain citizens. Clinton's campaign motto was "I'm with Her," which underscored the historic possibility that she would become the first female president in the USA. At the same time, in this contest Hillary Clinton clearly represented the status quo. Her impressive political resumé reflected decades of political activity. She had served in Barak Obama's administration, and in many ways was viewed as a continuation of his approach. As Michael Ashcroft observed, "Hillary Clinton

represented business as usual: the insider's insider, the embodiment of the American political establishment."⁶⁹ Her long apprenticeship in the real world of politics had sharpened her appreciation of incrementalism and the necessity of compromise. Moreover, a key aspect of her candidacy was the sense that she was running for the presidency because it was the next logical career step, rather than because she wanted to use the office to achieve a specific goal or set of goals. As a transactional leader, her proclivity naturally was to broker among factions and "straddle many lines" rather than cling to any one particular path or approach.

Donald Trump is understood here as an excellent example of a transformational leader. He promised deep change to the status quo in American politics. Although his ideology was flexible enough to reflect Republican tenets, he was not a conservative ideologue. He was so far outside the party establishment that his nomination represented the grassroots in rebellion against the party's elite. And in his 70 years he had not held any political office before winning the presidential nomination. Certainly, as he consistently insisted, he was not a politician in any usual sense of the term. His motivation for running seems mixed. Given his long hunt for, and valuation of, celebrity, surely we can't ignore the fact that winning the presidency would bring him a singular sort of celebrity. At the same time, he perennially articulated a core message that was captured in his campaign theme, "Make America Great Again." For many years he believed that American political and business leaders were failing to nurture the country's interests domestically and internationally. He promised dramatic change in America's foreign relations, trade deals, energy and health policy, and immigration reform. As well, as suggested in the summary of his career, Trump has a strong capacity to focus intently and single-mindedly on securing specific goal in spite of much difficulty and challenge. As he wrote in *The Art of the Deal*, "I tend not to give up on something I've started."⁷⁰ We can understand this tenacity as a sort of leadership behaviour common among innovative or transformational leaders: when Trump creates a vision or an objective, he often then pursues it relentlessly, and with little desire to compromise on his original plan.

We now turn to summarize the 2016 race before analyzing each leader's approach to citizen's certainty, and uncertainty.

The 2016 Presidential Campaign

American presidential campaigns traditionally kick off formally on the Labour Day weekend. The 2016 campaign began on September 5th for Clinton with two addresses. That day she spoke in Cleveland, Ohio and Hampton, Illinois.⁷¹ Similarly, the Trump campaign also focused on Ohio. At the start of the campaign, there was much focus on whether the candidates would debate each other. In fact, there were three 90-minute presidential debates, organized by the bipartisan Commission on Presidential Debates. The first took place on September 26, 2016 at Hofstra University in New York state. It was watched by an estimated 84 million viewers, a new record. In early September Clinton was leading in the opinion polls. However, by the time of the first debate, several national polls suggested Trump was cutting into her lead, and that his supporters were more enthusiastic than hers.⁷² The second debate took place on October 9th at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. Ten days later the final debate occurred, on October 19th at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Credible polling analysis suggested Clinton was considered decisively to have won all three debates.

Moreover, by the time of the final debate, Clinton had moved ahead of Trump in the national polls and had a lead in nearly every swing state as well. Trump's lead had shrunk, and he seemed to be encountering difficulty even in states like Georgia, Arizona and Utah that were won by the GOP nominee, Mitt Romney, in 2012.⁷³ Both candidate faced much criticism over particular issues. Clinton, for example, was perennially on the defensive concerning her handling of emails on a private server when she was serving as the Secretary of State. On several occasions Trump had to defend his extreme or offensive comments, particularly concerning women and minorities.

On voting day, November 8th, 2016, it was revealed national opinion polls tended to reflect the election's actual outcome fairly well. Most opinion polls showed Clinton leading by one to five points in

the last week, and in fact she won the popular vote by slightly more than two percentage points. However, at the state level some of the polls did not estimate the actual results correctly in key states, and some undecided voters at the last minute swung heavily to Trump. Therefore, although most people expected Clinton to be victorious, in fact Trump won the Electoral College contest, and so became the forty-fifth President of the United States.⁷⁴

This was not predicted by many analysts, so the result was considered the biggest electoral upset since President Harry S. Truman's election in 1948. Moreover, the election was decided by 77,744 votes out of a total of 136 million cast.⁷⁵ Reviewing the campaign, Larry J. Sabato writes Trump's contrast with Clinton was stark: "He attracted millions of followers so devoted that they were unmoved by many unsavory revelations about their nominee.... They loved Trump's rejection by the Republican governing class, which certified this billionaire as an outsider populist."⁷⁶ He notes Clinton's campaign team mistakenly took Democratic base states for granted. Moreover, while Trump charged the economy was in terrible shape, she seemed hesitant to tout an economy that by many measures had improved significantly under the Democrats.

After the election, Clinton released a book whose title, "What Happened" reflected upon the key question about the election. Considering her strategy and choices, she recorded that she knew despite being the first woman to have a serious chance at the White House, I was unlikely to be seen as a revolutionary, transformational figure. I had been on the national stage too long for that, and my temperament was too even-keeled. Instead I hope that my candidacy-and if things worked out, my presidency- would be viewed as the next chapter in the long progressive struggle to make the country fairer, freer and stronger....This framing took me directly into the politically dangerous territory of seeking a so-called third term after Obama and being seen as the candidate of continuity instead of change, but it was honest.⁷⁷

Prepared for a standard presidential campaign similar to the ones she had watched her Democratic predecessors execute, Clinton instead found herself engaged in a political contest operating well beyond the normal rules of political conduct.

Method

Fortunately, rather than sorting out exactly what happened in the 2016 campaign, our task is limited to evaluating how each type of leader addressed public uncertainty toward mobilizing support for their candidacy, along with examining any apparent gender effects. To test Hypotheses I and II concerning how transactional and innovative leaders communicate certainty and uncertainty, the three debate texts were scrutinized. There are several clear benefits found in analyzing such public debate events. Owing to the nature of the remarks, we can be sure that each politician is the actual author of their messages. Some mediums of campaign communications, such newspaper op-ed pieces, stump speeches, or Twitter casts may have been prepared mainly by campaign staff. In these cases there is concern that the medium obscures authorship of the message. However, in the case of televised debate comments, we know fully that these candidates authored the message.

As well, in view of their extempore quality, another virtue of these sorts of communications is that they allow us some insight into each politician's natural speaking style and word deployment. This is very helpful as we are trying to ascertain whether and how each candidate addressed public uncertainty as a leadership strategy. Normally, the speaking time is divided fairly evenly, so we can easily compare their performance.⁷⁸ Finally, because such events often draw large audiences, and the 2016 set in fact broke existing viewership records, by analyzing their content we can understand the sorts of messages that millions of voters accessed directly during each broadcast or later on as the events were mentioned in the news media and rebroadcast in multiple media channels.

So, transcripts of the three presidential debates were accessed from The American Presidency Project archive at the University of California-Santa Barbara's website⁷⁹, loaded into the Atlas.ti text interpretation program, and then coded using a set of synonyms for the core concepts of certainty and uncertainty, drawn from two standard American thesauri. The results appear below in table 1, and support the predictions contained in Hypothesis 1 and 2. As a transactional leader, Hillary Clinton

communicated much more certainty than Donald Trump, her transformational counterpart. Moreover, in his debate remarks Trump communicated more uncertainty than Clinton did (although it is worth noting the Uncertainty scores are lower than for Certainty across both cases). To compare the distribution of the cumulated scores, a Chi Square test for independence was performed. It reports that the distribution is significantly different, and this difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Table 1. Coding Counts for the Three 2016 Presidential Debates

	Debate number	Certainty	Uncertainty
Clinton	Debate 1	63	5
	Debate 2	49	12
	Debate 3	60	4
		= 172	= 23
Trump	Debate 1	58	14
	Debate 2	47	10
	Debate 3	37	13
		= 142	= 37

*p<.05

$X^2 = 5.45^*$

Owing to the nature of empirical analysis undertaken here, which basically counts the occurrences of specific words or phrases, the numerical values do indicate in a broad sense the content of the leader’s messaging. However, when the text is examined in context, the difference between these two types of leaders is amplified and much clearer. For example, when reading all three debate transcripts one has the sense that Clinton was clearly positioning herself as a reassuring, capable leader who could be trusted to be the president. In the first debate, on September 28th, there was a segment of the discussion that concerned American foreign policy. Clinton stated:

Let me start by saying, words matter. Words matter when you run for president, and they really matter when you are president. And I want to reassure our allies in Japan and South Korea and elsewhere that we have mutual defense treaties and we will honor them. It is essential that America's word be good.

In this passage Clinton clearly sought to reassure citizens and allies that if she were elected she would continue the longstanding practice of engaging in, and being bound by, existing mutual defense treaties. So, while the coding of it picked up only one word, “reassure,” the entire phrase is an amplification of this concept. As well, its concluding sentence—“[i]t is essential that America’s word be good”- reinforces her commitment that as president she would continue to uphold America’s traditional role in world affairs as a dependable, trustworthy partner. Therefore, she is communicating much assurance to domestic (and foreign) audiences in this entire passage, even though only a single word, “reassure,” is picked up in the textual analysis.

Another example of how the word count underestimates comment salience because it is not designed to capture contextual nuance is found in the controversy that arose over respecting the election results. During the campaign, Trump charged that there were election improprieties. At the end of her comments during the first debate, Clinton remarked:

Well, I support our democracy. And sometimes you win, sometimes you lose. But I certainly will support the outcome of this election.

And I know Donald's trying very hard to plant doubts about it, but I hope the people out there understand, this election's really up to you...

In this statement she unequivocally asserted her commitment to respecting the results of the vote, win or lose. Trump, however, played coy on the issue. In the same debate, he suggested if his opponent won, he would support her. However, in the third and final debate, the moderator directly asked Trump to address the issue:

Wallace: Mr Trump, I wanna ask you about one last question in this topic. You have been warning at rallies recently that this election is rigged and that Hillary Clinton is in the process of trying to steal it from you. Your running mate, Governor Pence, pledged on Sunday that he and you, his words, "Will absolutely accept the result of this election." Today, your daughter, Ivanka, said the same thing. I wanna ask you here on this stage tonight, do you make the same commitment that you will absolutely... Sir, that you will absolutely accept the result of this election?

Trump: I will look at it at the time. I'm not looking at anything now. I'll look at it at the time.

After some discussion, the moderator again tried to lead Trump to make a commitment to respect the outcome of the election. Once again, Trump deliberately would not answer, stating he was keeping the moderator, and through the moderator the voters, "in suspense." Clinton reacted by promptly branding Trump's position as "horrifying:"

Moderator Chris Wallace: But Sir, there is a tradition in this country... In fact, one of the prides of this country is the peaceful transition of power, and that no matter how hard fought a campaign is, that at the end of the campaign, that the loser concedes to the winner, not saying that you're necessarily going to be the loser or the winner, but that the loser concedes to the winner and that the country comes together, in part for the good of the country. Are you saying you're not prepared now to commit to that principle?

Trump: What I'm saying is that I will tell you at the time. I'll keep you in suspense, okay?

Clinton: Well, Chris, let me respond to that, because that's horrifying...

Although this issue had been circulating in the news since the first debate, in view of these unprecedented comments on the part of an American presidential candidate a new wave of controversy ignited the next day. Describing the exchange between the candidates, *The Washington Post* reported that "A defiant Trump used the high-profile setting of the final presidential debate. . .to amplify one of the most explosive charges of his candidacy: that if he loses the election, he might consider the results illegitimate because the process is rigged."⁸⁰ The *New York Times* relayed Trump's comments, noting that every losing presidential candidate in modern times has accepted the will of the voters. The *Times*

concluded Trump continued to make such supported accusations about vote tampering because he was under enormous pressure to “recover from a politically damaging three weeks” on the campaign trail.⁸¹

For her part Clinton, who repeatedly accused her opponent of fear mongering, extensively used her Twitter social media account to focus on this controversy. For example, on October 20th she tweeted “When you try to sow the seeds of doubt in people’s minds about the legitimacy of elections- then that undermines our democracy.”⁸² Later that day she and Trump appeared at the Al Smith Dinner, where she gave this riposte and then disseminated it via Twitter: “it’s amazing that I’m up here [on the stage] after Donald. I didn’t think he’d be OK with a peaceful transition of power.”⁸³ So, while the analysis coded a single word, “suspense,” as evidence of Trump communicating uncertainty to voters, this episode exemplifies the great degree of uncertainty Trump deliberately cultivated when he refused to agree to respect the election’s outcome. Therefore, while it is a useful, reliable, replicable method of testing our key leadership propositions, it is worth noting that the method of coding analysis presented above significantly underestimates the contextual communication of certainty or uncertainty by the politicians under study here.

Therefore, analysing the content of the debate speeches suggests as a transactional leader, Hillary Clinton communicated much certainty, and much less uncertainty. This is predicted in the general leadership model supporting this study. The final challenge is to isolate whether her gender influenced her communications. Are her communications different than her male peers? Or are they the same? In answering this question it’s important to ensure we are comparing “apples to apples.” Another case exists which is comparable to the 2016 election: the 1976 presidential context between Democratic candidate Jimmy Carter and Gerald Ford, the Republican nominee. As recounted in more detail in my forthcoming book, Carter is an excellent example of an innovative leader while Ford nicely represents the transactional archetype.

The 1976 Campaign and the Debates

For the first six weeks of the 1976 presidential campaign, the Republican incumbent, Gerald Ford, followed a frontrunner's "Rose Garden" strategy. His first appearance outside Washington was on September 15th, when he gave an address at the University of Michigan. One week later, he spoke in Philadelphia and then undertook a brief tour in the South. Despite its tactical merits, the Rose Garden strategy did not help to inform citizens and many voters remained unaware of Ford's legislative record and policy proposals. As one editorialist observed, the "major party candidates this year are an unelected incumbent President about whom voters know little and a former Georgia Governor about whom they know even less."

In this light, the 1976 presidential debates were particularly important for several reasons. First, they afforded each nominee the opportunity to communicate his position and appeal to voters, many of whom remained largely uninformed about the candidates. As well, much public attention focused on the debates for they were not yet an institutionalized feature of presidential campaigns. Finally, the candidates anticipated using these forums to bolster their respective campaign strategies. As in the 2016 election, in 1976 there were three 90-minute debates. They occurred in Philadelphia on September 23, in San Francisco on October 6, and in Williamsburg, Virginia on October 22. Carter went on to capture the presidency. His margin of victory was relatively narrow: he received 50.1 percent of all votes cast and Ford received 48 percent. However, the winning campaign exceeded its target of 270 electoral college votes by 27 votes.

Carter's victory is intriguing for several reasons. First, he demonstrated that a relatively unknown former governor from the South could defeat an experienced presidential incumbent. Second, his policy themes did not reflect those traditionally advocated by previous Democratic presidential nominees. Finally, he called for significant policy change and Carter was able to overcome what Ford's strategists termed the "fear of the unknown": citizens' aversion to voting for an unknown and unusual

politician. Analysis of the three debates is summarized below in Table 2. Following our method of classification, Gerald Ford is held up as a transactional leader, and Jimmy Carter is an example of an innovative leader.

Table 2
Chi-square Independence Test of 1976 Presidential Debate Speech Values

	Carter	Ford
Certainty: hits	112	99
Uncertainty: hits	45	10

***p<.001

$\chi^2 = 14.9^{***}$

To help inform our examination of whether gender is relevant or irrelevant to the strategic content of leader communications, we can compare the cumulative scores in tables 1 and 2 among these four leaders. In terms of their “Certainty” scores, the values range: 99 (Ford), 112 (Carter), 142 (Trump) and 172 (Clinton). In terms of “Uncertainty,” the values range 10 (Ford), 23 (Clinton); 37 (Trump) and 45 (Carter). Comparing Clinton’s scores against the others, on the one hand her Certainty score is larger than the others. On the other hand, her Uncertainty score is comparable to her peers. Within this small set of highly similar leader communications, then, we have some insight into how female presidential candidates communicate along the certainty/uncertainty dimension, and how they compare with their male peers. It is worth reiterating that until the data were generated and analysed, it was not known if she would fit the pattern of a transactional leader as predicted, or if the content of her communications would be similar to, or very different from, her male comparators. Although the number of cases is extremely small, and more research certainly is merited, at this point there is reason to accept the null hypothesis expressed in Hypothesis 3: gender does not seem to matter significantly when leaders address public uncertainty.

Conclusion

This analysis set out to test two basic hypotheses about transactional and innovative leadership in the context of the 2016 US presidential campaign. Owing to the fact that this contest featured the first female candidate to run for this office, we also probed whether gender seems to have any obvious effect on how female political leaders communicate to their publics. The results of a content analysis of three presidential debates yielded support for the first two hypothesized relationships: as a transactional leader, Clinton communicated more certainty and less uncertainty than her innovative competitor. In the case of Trump, as an innovative politician he communicated less certainty, and more uncertainty, than his rival to try to win support. The third hypothesis simply proposed there is no relationship between the gender of the candidates and their communications along the certainty/uncertainty dimension. Given the limited number of cases here, and in comparison with two additional instances of leader communications in the 1976 election, the findings do not suggest any reason to overturn the null hypothesis.

Certainly, many more cases should be collected and analysed with a view to examining whether gender matters to this sort of strategic communication. As well, there are many different kinds of political communications that may be examined, and different ways to calculate the volume and frequency of leader communications. At the same time, this study concludes the paper's overarching rational model holds up rather well and may help to provide insight into why and how different sorts of leaders engage public uncertainty.

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- ⁵³ David Cay Johnston, *The Making of Donald Trump*, (Brooklyn, NY: Melville House, 2016), 17.
- ⁵⁴ Trump, 54.
- ⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 69.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 73.
- ⁵⁷ Trump, *The Art of the Deal*, 100-114.
- ⁵⁸ Barrett, 134-135.
- ⁵⁹ Marla Maples and Donald began seeing each other steadily, and she became pregnant. They married shortly after she gave birth to Tiffany Trump in 1993. The marriage lasted six years. In 2005 he married again, to a Slovenian model named Melania Knauss. The following year she became a U.S. citizen and gave birth to their only son, Barron.
- ⁶⁰ Adrienne Lafrance, "Three decades of Donald Trump film and TV cameos," *The Atlantic*, December 21, 2015, accessed July 16 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2015/12/three-decades-of-donald-trump-film-and-tv-cameos/421257/>
- ⁶¹ Trump, *Never Give Up*, 9.
- ⁶² Michael Kranish and Marc Fisher, *Trump Revealed: The Definitive Biography of the 45th President* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster), 2016.
- ⁶³ Elspeth Reeve, "A history of Donald Trump's net worth publicity," *The Atlantic*, April 21, 2011, accessed July 17, 2017 at <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/04/weve-been-trying-figure-out-how-much-trump-worth-20-years/349875/> .
- ⁶⁴ Kranish and Fisher, 258.
- ⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, emphasis in the original.

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- ⁶⁶ Carl Bialik, "How the Republican field dwindled from 17 to Donald Trump," *FivethirtyEight*, May 5, 2016, accessed July 25, 2017 at <https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-the-republican-field-dwindled-from-17-to-donald-trump/> .
- ⁶⁷ Kranish and Fisher, 308.
- ⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 313.
- ⁶⁹ Ashcroft, 16.
- ⁷⁰ Trump, *The Art of the Deal*, 131.
- ⁷¹ Speech Archive, *Hillary Clinton Speeches*, accessed July 5, 2017 at <https://hillaryspeeches.com/speech-archive/2016-2/september-2016/> .
- ⁷² Karen Tumulty and Philip Rucker, "At third debate, trump won't commit to accepting election results if he loses," *The Washington Post*, October 19, 2016, accessed July 3, 2017 at https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-wont-commit-to-accepting-election-results-if-he-loses/2016/10/19/9c9672e6-9609-11e6-bc79-af1cd3d2984b_story.html?utm_term=.4280044ea71f .
- ⁷³ Tumulty and Rucker.
- ⁷⁴ Ariel Edwards-Levy, Natalie Jackson and Janie Velencia, "Polling in the 2016 Election," in Larry J. Sabato, Larry J., Kyle Kondik and Geoffrey Skelley (eds.) *Trumped: the 2016 Election that Broke all the Rules*, 1552-161, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017).
- ⁷⁵ Clinton, 394.
- ⁷⁶ Larry J. Sabato, "The 2016 Election that Broke All the Rules," in Larry J. Sabato, Larry J., Kyle Kondik and Geoffrey Skelley (eds.) *Trumped: the 2016 Election that Broke all the Rules*, 1-13, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017).
- ⁷⁷ Clinton, *What Happened*, 77.
- ⁷⁸ At the first presidential debate, on September 26, 2016 at Hofstra University, Trump spoke for 45 minutes and 3 seconds; Clinton spoke for 41 minutes and 50 seconds. The second took place on October 9th at Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri. At the second presidential debate, Trump spoke for 40 minutes and 10 seconds; Clinton spoke for 39 minutes and 5 seconds. Ten days later the final debate occurred, on October 19th at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. At the third presidential debate, Clinton spoke for 41 minutes and 46 seconds; Trump spoke for 35 minutes and 41 seconds.
- ⁷⁹ At <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/debates.php>.
- ⁸⁰ Tumulty and Rucker. <https://www.cnn.com/2017/07/27/hillary-clinton-calling-new-book-what-happened-promises-to-let-her-guard-down.html> .
- ⁸¹ Patrick Healy and Jonathan Martin, "Donald Trump won't say if he'll accept result of election," *The New York Times*, October 19, 2016, accessed July 3, 2017 at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/us/politics/presidential-debate.html> .
- ⁸² Hillary Clinton, Twitter Post, October 20, 2016, 1:43 pm, <https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/789205356945760256>.
- ⁸³ Hillary Clinton, Twitter Post, October 20, 2016, 6:26 pm, <https://twitter.com/HillaryClinton/status/789276725171593216> .