

Ranking far-right parties in Europe

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Abstract

How far right on the left-right political scale are located European far-right parties? This question is relevant for reasons of expected governmental policy once these parties democratically take control of political power, either alone or in coalition. This paper offers two Guttman-type scales for measuring European far-right parties based on content analysis of their political programs and electoral manifesto, both for European and national elections (including the most recent election for European parliament in May 2019). Guttman scale is a tool designed to empirically test the unidimensionality of a set of items. In this paper, the first of these scales measures the right wing extremism with the concept of national identity that far-right parties use in order to restrict political and social rights and freedoms of people they consider not part of a national community. The second scale measures the extremism with the policies these parties suggest to implement in order to protect national community and to discriminate against the “others”. The results may be used as tools for further analysis and for educational purposes.

Review of the literature

Far-right or extreme right parties in Europe are not a new topic in the literature. Relevant studies looking at these parties, usually in the context of national party systems, have been regularly published since the Second World War (Almond, 1947ⁱ and 1948ⁱⁱ; Daalderⁱⁱⁱ, 1955; Siegfried, 1956^{iv}; LaPalombara, 1958^v), to mention just a few examples. The contemporary literature on this phenomenon is diverse; it includes exploratory, descriptive and explanatory studies covering different political formations in different European countries. On the one hand, we see highly idiographic studies, focusing on a particular national case, making ethnographically rich analyses on the origins, development and current forms of far-right political parties and movements (Fielitz, 2016^{vi}; Kott, 2016^{vii}; Macklin, 2016^{viii}; Silvennoinen, 2016^{ix}). On the other hand, we note studies that look at the political far-right as a group of quantifiable phenomena. They analyze it by measuring parties' electoral performance, party membership, street mobilization potential and actions (Norris, 2005^x) and may go to even count parties' Facebook pages “likes” (Saal, 2016^{xi}). This second approach is a good candidate for comparative analysis, pooling together quantifiable data from different European political

systems or presenting results from European elections (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou, 2014^{xii}). A missing quantifiable element in far-right parties' analysis is the level of extremeness, in other words, how much radical these parties are on the political table and among the other far-right parties. Although none of the authors assumes that these parties are completely identical in terms of ideology and action, this missing element in the analysis points to two possible conclusions: first, that similarities among far-right parties are overwhelming and dissimilarities, if any, are really a matter of secondary importance and do not warrant special attention, or second, that these dissimilarities are important but unfortunately cannot be measured. This study starts with the assumption that the degree of extremeness of far-right parties in Europe can be measured.

Definition of far-right

Defining far-right is intuitively easy but conceptually complicated. Most definitions focus on, but are not limited to authoritarianism, anti-communism and anti-socialism, supremacism and nativism. The difficulty using these definitions is their nominal and not gradual nature; people either sign under one or many of these ideas or not, and these affiliations put them in the category of far-right supporters. This study cannot automatically apply these definitions because of the research objective, which includes constructing a gradual unidimensional scale of far-right extremism. We do not want to have all supremasist parties look equal in their extremism; therefore we have to define the far-right in a way that underlines the differences between these parties. Therefore, I will define far-right parties as legal political organizations calling for identity exclusion of people by enforcing strict borders between normative (what it should be) and descriptive (what it is) national community. This research starts by focusing on legal political organizations because outside legality they do not threaten liberal democratic system; they must play by the democratic rules in order to reach power and apply their program. The national community they want to protect is normative because the people threatening its existence, according to far-right parties, may already be implanted on the soil reserved exclusively for a particular national community. This definition is useful for the purpose of this study because it allows far-right parties to be measured by the number of social groups they want to exclude from normative national community and by the type of policies they plan to implement in order to reach this goal. Thus, the number of explicitly identified threats and the scope of explicitly identified policies will determine the level of far-right extremism. A party that calls for protecting the nation against immigrants, religious and sexual minorities will be considered more extreme than a party that calls for protection against immigrants only. A party that only calls for establishing legal privileges for particular group will be less radical than a party that also calls for physical elimination of specific groups.

Guttman scale

Guttman scale, named after Louis Guttman in the early 1940s, was designed to empirically test the unidimensionality and cumulative effect of a set of items (Frankfort-Nachmias et al., 2015). The cumulative characteristic implies that a researcher can order the items by degree of intensity and that the respondents who reply positively on a more

intense item will intuitively also respond positively to less intense item. Similarly, respondents who disagree with more intense statements will also disagree with milder versions of the same statements. For example, people who express very strong agreement with particular idea will also agree in less stronger words with the same idea. Those who agree to ban all minority groups from political life will also agree to ban some minority groups. The opposite, however, is not necessarily true; people who agree with milder statement on a particular issue will not necessarily agree with more radical rewording of the same statement. Those who agree to ban some minority groups from public life will not necessarily agree to ban all minority groups.

Gorden (1977) lists three conditions that must be met in the process of discovering and selecting items for a Guttman scale. First, an attitude toward particular object must actually exist in the minds of the respondents. Far-right parties share attitude of rejection of what they perceive as “foreign” elements within national social and political community. Second, valid indicators should be constructed in order to elicit these attitudes. These indicators may be statements within questionnaires or, as we have in this presentation, elements of party programs and electoral manifestos. Third, the attitudes toward particular object must represent different degrees along a single dimension. Here, a large set of potential items is compiled before making final selection. Selected items should cover the total continuum from strongest to weakest attitudes. Gorden (1977) also suggests to have between two and seven response categories in the scale.

There may be two alternative types of reasoning in designing and administering Guttman scale for far-right parties: deductive and inductive. Within the frame of deductive reasoning, the categories are already present from most-to-least extreme and the parties are assigned their place according to objective indicators found in their programs and manifestos. Unfortunately, we do not have such ready-to-use scale, although we have a theoretical view on the stages of close phenomenon – the practice of genocide^{xiii}. We do not even have an intuition whether particular category, e.g. banning religious group from political life, is more or less extreme than banning sexual minority group. Therefore, we need to proceed using induction in order to identify, if any, general patterns that exist in the minds of far-right political leaders, those who write party programs and manifestos. After establishing rules that determine the kind of phenomena to be used as indicators, we will proceed with content analysis that, hopefully, will put categories as degrees along a single dimension. From methodological point of view, the first goal of this research is to have a cumulative scale that can account for as many cases as possible, without imposing a strict coefficient for reproducibility, e.g. 90 percent. Later research will try to deal with difficult cases.

Once we have identified the groups to be discriminated against and intensity of attitudes against them, the task will be to conceptualize these findings and present these concepts as logical steps within the scale. We will use as a helping tool only the scale created for measuring genocide. As part of the discussion, away from its Stanton’s teleology¹, we may use some stages of his model to present some levels of far-right extremism.

¹ Stanton (1998) identifies eight stages of genocide: classification, symbolization, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, extermination, and denial. Logically, later stages must be preceded by earlier stages. But all stages continue to operate throughout the process.

Planning

The data collection will begin with far-right parties in Bulgaria, a former communist country and European Union member since January 2007. Bulgaria is a good candidate for starting point because it offers not one but several far-right parties acting alone or in coalition. The stand-alone parties and party coalitions that will be analyzed, in alphabetic order, are Ataka, National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), Patriotic Front, VMRO – Bulgarian National Movement (VMRO-BNM), and United Patriots. The data for each of these parties will be collected from their programs and electoral manifestos. Content analysis will identify those people who should be kept outside Bulgarian nation and the policies aiming this. The number of categories of unwanted people will determine the position of each party of the Guttman scale. Comparative analysis will be provided with other mainstream Bulgarian parties as well as with other European far-right parties. These additional comparisons will allow to confirm the status for above-mentioned Bulgarian parties on the far-right of political spectrum; this will also prove that the new instrument for measuring far-right political extremism can be generalized to other political systems. Preliminary hypotheses here are that on the Guttman scale far-right parties are at significant distance from mainstream parties within particular party system but quite similar in terms of extremism across different national cases.

What follows is a brief description of Bulgarian far-right parties:

Ataka is a party established in 2005 by Volen Siderov who has been its leader ever since. Profiting from proportional representation electoral system, Ataka managed alone to enter Bulgarian parliament in 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2014. The peak of its popularity for Bulgarian parliamentary election was reached in 2009 when it received more than 9 percent of the popular vote. In 2017 Ataka entered the parliament as part of United Patriots multi-party coalition. In election for European parliament Ataka won seats from Bulgarian quota in 2007 and 2009. Siderov run for Bulgarian president in 2006 and in 2011. In 2006 he reached the second round. As part of coalition United Patriots, Ataka is part of Bulgarian governmental coalition since 2017.

National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB) was created in 2011 by Valery Simeonov who had left Ataka few years earlier. NFSB did not manage to enter Bulgarian parliament in 2013 but succeeded as part of coalition Patriotic Front in 2014. The party did not succeed to win seats in European election in 2014.

Patriotic Front is a coalition between NFSB and VMRO-BNM, co-chaired by the leaders of both parties. It was created in 2014 to run a common list for parliamentary election. The coalition won over 7 percent of voters and managed to enter the parliament.

VMRO-BNM was established immediately after the end of communism in 1989 as symbolic continuation of the organization under the same name that existed in Bulgaria between World War One and World War Two. In the 1990s and 2000s it frequently changed partners in mostly unsuccessful electoral coalitions, although in 1997 and in 2005 it succeeded to win seats in parliamentary election as part of anti-communist United Democratic Forces and conservative Bulgarian National Union. In 2014 and 2017 VMRO-BNM is part of Patriotic Union and United Patriots.

Finally, United Patriots is a multi-party coalition between Ataka, NFSB and VMRO-BNM, created in 2016 and co-chaired by the leaders of these three parties. Since

2017 it is part of Bulgarian governmental coalition after winning 9 percent of the popular vote in the parliamentary election in the same year.

Findings

For party Ataka we have the following material: Principles and Program scheme from 2005, the year Ataka was created. The Principles define Bulgaria as one-nation state that cannot be divided along religious, ethnic or cultural lines. National identity stands above ethnic or religious differences. Putting these differences above national belonging makes people not belonging to Bulgarian nation and they lose all claims toward Bulgaria. Ethnic parties and separatist organizations should be banned. Foreign business persons, investors and producers should be negatively discriminated; foreigners should not be allowed to buy agricultural land. Bulgarians accused of treason toward the nation should be prosecuted; sanctions should be issued toward those who blaspheme with Bulgarian sanctuaries and who defame Bulgaria. The Program scheme adds the need to make files on all illegal drug users, to limit and liquidate gypsy criminality, and to legally enshrine the Eastern orthodox Christianity as official religion.

For the party NFSB we have the following material: Party targets and Electoral program for parliamentary election in 2013. The Targets call for support and upgrading of Eastern Orthodox Christianity as traditional religion of Bulgarian people; for banning political parties based on ethnic or religious principles; and for allowing only people with good mastering of Bulgarian language to vote. The Electoral program of 2013 more specifically calls for assimilation of non-Bulgarian ethnic groups through language education beginning in the preschool daycare; for banning Islamic education in schools; for bringing law and order in Gypsies' ghettos; for banning dual citizenship; for integration of Turkish-speaking regions; for fighting Gypsies' criminality; for destroying illegal buildings in Gypsies' ghettos; for transforming Gypsies' ghettos into tourist attractions; for banning religious excision; for banning religious groups that defend political causes; for not allowing the building of mosques; for banning Islamic veils in public; against public pornography and against Bulgarian-Gypsy and others folklore's cultural mix (chalgalizatsia).

For the party VMRO-BNM we have the following material: Party program and Electoral platform for parliamentary election in 2013. The Program takes ethnic approach in defining Bulgarian nation; only ethnic Bulgarians are part of the nation. Bulgarians are threatened by the Gypsies to become extinguished minority in their own homeland. To face this threat the party calls for immigration of ethnic Bulgarians living in other countries. VMRO-BNM rejects the existence of party representing ethnic Turks and Muslims. The party claims ethnic Bulgarians in neighboring Macedonia and expects that this republic joins Bulgaria. Eastern Orthodox Christianity should become official religion. Bulgarian enterprises should be under special protection by the state. The electoral Platform builds on Program's foundation. It calls for limiting Gypsies' birth rates. Citizens with double citizenship to be allowed to vote only if the second citizenship is from EU country. Only people with elementary education and paid taxes to be able to vote. Special commission to decide whether candidates for parliament and government are loyal to the national idea. To face the "Gypsies' question" the party calls for introducing forced labor under specific conditions. It also calls for establishing

paramilitary groups for protecting the population. The party drops the call for annexation of Macedonia; instead, it calls for supporting Bulgarian-ness in all neighboring countries: Macedonia, Serbia, Greece and Romania.

For the coalition Patriotic Front (NFSB and VMRO-BNM) we have the following material: Political program for parliamentary election in 2014. The Program calls for immigration of ethnic Bulgarians in order to populate regions with demographic problems. It also calls for banning Islamic education in schools. The coalition stands against cultural mixing (chalgalizatija) and public pornography. Bulgarian citizenship and the right to vote should be conditional upon passing Bulgarian language test; this measure is explicitly targeting Turks with Bulgarian citizenship living in Turkey. Ethnic minorities cannot establish separate regulations for in-group use, including within families. National integration is one-way road, in which minorities adopt majority's standards. The state should act to break the encapsulation of Gypsies' ghettos and Turkish regions and deal with Gypsies' criminality. Ethnic ghettos can be transformed into tourist attractions. The state should promote Eastern Orthodox Christianity and to support citizens against constructions of mosques. All religious services should be done in Bulgarian language. Religious groups cannot adopt dress code that hides the women's heads. In foreign relations, Bulgaria should stand against enlargement of EU to Turkey. The coalition calls for special policy toward Bulgarians living abroad.

For the coalition United Patriots (Ataka, NFSB and VMRO-BNM) we have the following material: Electoral platform for parliamentary election in 2017. The platform identifies uncontrolled immigration as main threat for Bulgaria; it calls for banning permanent settlement of foreign refugees in the country. It also calls for immigration of ethnic Bulgarians living abroad; only ethnic Bulgarians can claim Bulgarian citizenship. Turks claiming Bulgarian citizenship because their ancestors lived in Bulgaria should be denied this possibility. The coalition promises to fight against ghettoisation and "Gypsization" of the country. It calls for state support for the Eastern Orthodox religion and for the Bulgarian entrepreneurs. Finally, it makes claims over Bulgarians living in other countries ("Bulgaria is everywhere where there is even one single Bulgarian").

Discussion

Before discussing the facts let me make a brief summary of the findings. Ataka explicitly calls for discrimination between Bulgarian nationals and foreigners as far as economic rights are concerned. It also calls for discrimination between Eastern orthodox Christians and all other religions. There is also clear segregation along ethnic lines between ethnic Bulgarians and other Bulgarian nationals; Gypsies are mentioned in the context of criminality and Turks are mentioned in the context of banning ethnic parties and organizations. Finally, two other problematic groups are identified within the core ethnic Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Christians – drug users and national traitors. The state should make files on the first group and actively prosecute the second group.

NFSB looks very much like Ataka on many topics; similarities are rule and dissimilarities are rather exceptional. NFSB does not explicitly discriminate foreigners but the emphasis on the protection of the rights of Bulgarians makes this segregation possible. The segregation along ethnic and religious lines makes Ataka and NFSB identical twins. Within the Bulgarian ethnic core problematic groups are those who do

not shy away from public display of pornography (Gay Pride) and those who culturally mix Bulgarian and Gypsies' folklore elements ("chalgalizacia"). Unlike Ataka, however, NFSB does not call for hunt against unspecified national traitors.

VMRO-BNM does not stand far away from the other nationalistic parties. There are, however, some important differences. One of them is that there is no threat for Bulgarian nation coming from within Bulgarian ethnic core. Another one is that there is much more emphasis on protecting ethnic Bulgarians living abroad, especially in the neighboring countries. In this respect, irredentist claims toward (Northern) Macedonia are part of the party program. On all other issues: ethnic and religious discrimination between Eastern Orthodox ethnic Bulgarians, on the one hand, and ethnic and religious minorities, mainly Gypsies and Turks, on the other hand, VMRO-BNM's position is identical to that of Ataka and NFSB.

As far as the coalition Patriotic front (NFSB - VMRO-BNM) is concerned, its political program generally follows that of NFSB. All elements but one already described within NFSB program are still holding in 2014 as part of coalition; the only exception is the banning of dual citizenship. Much more omissions are made within the coalition program compared to older VMRO-BNM documents. In addition to milder version of banning dual citizenship as precondition for voting, the coalition also omitted the call for special commission that will evaluate national loyalty of parliament and government candidates; there is no call for creating paramilitary groups for protecting Bulgarian citizens against Gypsy's criminality; and there is no mention of forced labor under specific conditions for Gypsies. The irredentism toward (Northern) Macedonia has also been eliminated from the coalition program. The net influence of VMRO-BNM toward the Patriotic front program is the call for immigration of ethnic Bulgarians living abroad and the call to limit the Gypsies' birth rates.

Finally, United Patriots (Ataka, NFSB, VMRO-BNM) present a platform in 2017 that is substantially based on Patriotic Front main elements and on common points between party platforms, a document that eliminates some radical elements of previous Ataka and Patriotic Front programs, and elements that take account of new political developments. The common elements that remain in the new platform are fighting Gypsy's criminality and establishment of Eastern Orthodox Church as official religion. Other elements from Patriotic Front that are included are immigration of ethnic Bulgarians and reserving Bulgarian citizenship to only ethnic Bulgarians. Radical elements that are dropped from the common platform are banning Islamic veils, Islamic school education, construction of new mosques and control over Gypsies' birth rates (Patriotic Front) and the call to prosecute national traitors and those who lie against Bulgaria as well as creating files on drug users (Ataka). Surprisingly, both organizations drop their previous demands for banning ethnic parties. The new development is identifying immigration to Bulgaria as a threat. The answer to this threat is the call not to allow permanent settlement of refugees in the country.

All these program elements can be conceptualized in two major categories: identity definition and problem-solving policies. The elements within the concept of identity establish criteria of who is inside and who should be considered outside Bulgarian nation; the concept of problem-solving policies recommends how to deal with threats coming either from outsiders or from rogue Bulgarians. These two concepts may

logically correlate with one another; intuitively, *ceteris paribus*, more exclusive national identity should correspond to more radical policies against perceived threats. This conceptual intermingling, however, may lower the Guttman scale coefficient for reproducibility; parties with similar concept of national identity may pursue quite different problem-solving policies. It would be more appropriate at this time, therefore, to construct two Guttman scales instead of one. The first scale will measure the level of far-right extremeness with the elements included in the concept of identity and the second will use the concept of problem-solving.

As far as the concept of national identity is concerned, the findings suggest the following answers. Bulgarians are people living in Bulgaria, belonging to Bulgarian ethnic group (Bulgarian as a mother tongue) and to Eastern Orthodox Christianity background. Bulgarians may exclude national traitors and some social marginals (drug users). Intuitively, the picture of Bulgarian national identity represents system of internal circles. At the center are unquestionable Bulgarians (both by ethnicity, religion and social behavior); the next circle adds national traitors and social marginals; the third adds ethnic and religious minorities; and the fourth adds non-Bulgarians living abroad that may eventually decide to settle in Bulgaria (as immigrants). The Guttman scale for far-right extremism based on the concept of identity, therefore, may look as the following (0 level is introduced as reference for parties that lack far-right extremism; see Table 1):

0 - all citizens (regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, mother tongue) are equally considered as part of national community. Naturalization of immigrants (regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, mother tongue) is also considered as possibility. This level erases the sharp frontier between national community and foreigners.

1 - all citizens (regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, mother tongue) are equally considered as part of national community. Naturalization of immigrants is either completely excluded as an option or is considered as a possibility but only if they correspond to specific categories (based on race, ethnicity, religion, language, etc.). This level imposes strict separation between national community and foreigners with some well-defined exceptions.

2 - not all citizens are equally considered as part of national community (which is narrowly based on racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic and other criteria). This level constructs internal barriers based on “objective” criteria.

3 - not all citizens, part of narrow definition of national identity, are equal because of their social behavior. This level constructs barriers based on arbitrary criteria.

As far as the concept of problem-solving policies is concerned, the findings suggest the following answers. Bulgarian national identity should be protected by establishing official markers (Eastern Orthodox Church as official religion); ethnic and religious groups may be identified as threats to national identity; ethnic and religious parties (others than based on Bulgarian ethnicity and Eastern Orthodox religion) should be banned; well-identified groups may be targeted with exceptional political measures, measures that will change these groups’ way of life. The Guttman scale for far-right extremism based on the concept of problem-solving policies, therefore, may look as the following (0 level, again, is introduced as reference for parties that lack far-right extremism; see Table 2):

0 - all citizens (regardless of race, ethnicity, religion, mother tongue) are equally treated under the law; exceptions may include affirmative action policies to fix existing cases of past injustice.

1 - establishing legal preferences for specific groups (e.g. by calling for special status of particular religion, language).

2 – restrictions regarding rights and freedoms of specific groups (banning parties, organizations, traditional dresses).

3 – imposing exceptional measures against specific groups (forced labor for minorities; special laws against “Gypsy’s criminality”).

Application

What is the rating on these two Guttman style scales of Bulgarian parties and coalitions? Party Ataka receives grade 3 on the scale of identity and 3 on the scale of problem-solving policies (Table 1 and 2). The reason for this top rating on far-right extremism is the fact that the party establishes barriers within the ethnic core according to social behavior and also calls for exceptional measures against these outcast groups. Party NFSB can receive 2/3 on both scales; the only difference between this party and Ataka is that NFSB does not create internal barriers within Bulgarian ethnic core. VMRO-BNM shares the same position on both scales as NFSB. When these parties become part of nationalistic coalitions the ratings on both scales undergo the following transformations. The coalition Patriotic Front (NFSB and VMRO-BNM) basically repeats the results of the two parties as separate actors: 2/3. The three-party coalition United Patriots (Ataka, NFSB, VMRO-BNM) makes one small step away from extreme values by skipping the calls for measures against specific ethnic and religious minorities; it receives on both scales 2/2. Given that the findings for Ataka apply for the period of the establishment of the party in 2005 and the two- and three-party nationalistic coalitions are recent phenomena in Bulgaria, there is clear trend for reducing extremism in Bulgarian far-right political actors.

Next step is to compare Bulgarian far-right parties and coalitions with Bulgarian mainstream parties in order to confirm validity of Guttman-type scales. Expectations are that Bulgarian mainstream parties will be positioned closer to zero-point on each scale. For the purpose of this comparison I choose the two main parties in the country according to their electoral performance and parliament representation: right-wing GERB (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) and left-wing BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party). GERB is represented by its electoral program of 2017. The program defines the party mainly in opposition to left- and right-populist organizations. Words “Roma”, “Gypsies” and “Turks” are missing from the text. The general impression of the text is that the party does not divide the population along ethnic and religious lines. Only the short section “Politics for Bulgarians abroad” reveals the ethnic concept of Bulgarianness. Therefore, on the scale of identity GERB corresponds to level 1 because of the residues of ethnicity that makes difference regarding the treatment of foreign citizens; on the scale of problem-solving politics GERB is clearly not a far-right organization because it does not identify specific ethnic or religious groups as problematic and therefore does not identify specific policies to deal with these issues. BSP is represented by its Political report to its Congress

in 2016. The report defines the party mainly in opposition to neo-liberalism and its political advocates. Again, like with GERB, words “Roma”, “Gypsies” and “Turks” are missing from the text. Again, the general impression of the text is that the party does not divide the population along ethnic and religious lines. However, like GERB, BSP is not ethnically neutral. Among the problems the nation faces, the party identifies the “changing ethnic composition” and warns against “ethnic confrontation”. Therefore, on the scale of identity BSP corresponds to level 2 because of the residues of ethnicity that makes difference among citizens; on the scale of problem-solving politics BSP is clearly not a far-right organization because it does not identify specific ethnic or religious groups as problematic and does not conceive specific policies against these groups. To sum-up, both GERB and BSP are less extreme than Bulgarian far-right parties and coalitions analyzed at the beginning. However, residue ethnic concepts of nationhood still are part of official party documents. None of these parties proposes policies against minority groups and on this point there is clear line that separates mainstream and far-right parties in Bulgaria. Among the two instruments for measuring the level of far-right extremism, the scale of problem-solving policies is clearly better off in measuring far-right political actors.

Next step is to validate application of these two scales on other European cases. To show that it can work not only on political parties, but also on stand-alone politicians, I will use the case of French presidential election of 2017. Among the two top runners, Marine Le Pen, leader of National Front, is considered to represent French far-right. I will use two Guttman type scales to measure her political views expressed in her platform of 144 electoral promises. In these promises Le Pen calls for defining French citizenship in terms of bloodline. She clearly establishes Islam as source of threats for the French state, society and way of life and calls for criminal and administrative measures for stopping propagation of this threat. It goes without saying that Le Pen establishes clear symbolic border between French nation and foreigners and calls for assimilation of minorities. In general, on the scale of identity Le Pen corresponds to level 3 because she opens the door for denying citizenship; on the scale of problem-solving politics Le Pen’s campaign can also be given 3 because of her assimilatory projects. The winner of French presidential election, Emmanuel Macron, has quite different views regarding French identity and policies needed to make France prosper. For him, French nation is based on values rather than bloodline and everybody can be part of these values. Only once in his entire program Macron apparently stands off this inclusive ideology, it is when he promises to dismantle organizations which under cover of religious cults, preach terrorism. In this case, however, the focus is on fighting criminal activities rather than taking measures against particular religion. Therefore, on both scales, Macron’s campaign views in 2017 can be evaluated as 0 on the scale of far-right extremism.

Newly constructed Guttman-type scales for measuring far-right parties can also be used with regard to historic political actors, some of which are conventionally associated with far-right political spectrum. The Nazi party in Germany can thus be evaluated on the group of its 25-point program. As far as the Nazi views on national identity are concerned, it is identified on ethnic grounds, which automatically excludes Jews from being part of nation. Immigrants are not welcome and they cannot become Germans. Germans whose activity harms general interest should also be excluded from the nation. As far as problem-solving policies are concerned, Jews should be kept apart from the

nation. Immigrants who entered Germany since 1914 had to be forced to leave. Those whose activity harmed general interest (“usurers, profiteers and so forth”) should be punished by death. Easy enough, on each Guttman type scales the German Nazi party scores 3. To evaluate this party within the historic context of Weimar period, in terms of comparison, I can use the program of the Social Democratic party of Germany of 1925 (“Heidelberg program”). Social democrats call for fighting privileges under any form, including those based on race, and for equal political rights regardless of origin. Within the last section of the program dedicated to international politics, the party erases the sharp border between Germans and foreigners by calling for creation of United States of Europe. Without much surprise, the German social democrats score 0 on both scales of far-right extremism.

Both scales may suggest identical scores for parties and politicians from different European countries living in different times. Is this sufficient to conclude that expected political outcomes for having these parties and politicians in power will be the same? Do we have to expect acts of genocide if Marine le Pen becomes French president? The answer is negative. These Guttman type scales are not intended to be sufficient predictors of political behavior, which has additional drivers. The task is to measure the level of extremism based on publicly available official discourses. Intuitively, discourses and behavior may be statistically correlated, correlated in a sense of predicting more extremist policies from parties and politicians with more extremist discourses. Nevertheless, this statistical correlation is not so precise as to predict exact type of behavior, which may be subject to other drivers.

The example of Ataka with and without coalition partners illustrates well that far-right parties and politicians can change discursivity, becoming more or less extremist when this is required by political circumstances. Here again, this change should not be understood as a sign of profound political change. Far-right politicians working within realities of democratic political system have to adapt their discourse when this is required by electoral process.

Despite their limitations, the Guttman scales are appropriate for use in comparing European far-right parties. Even if these parties and politicians may be far away from Hitler’s genocidal policies, the simple fact of questioning people’s political rights and ultimate elimination of entire groups from political process should be conceptually indistinguishable from more radical means of taking people’s rights away. Having different outcomes measured by morality standards does not necessarily makes them different in terms of science concepts.

More application (Election for European parliament (May 2019))

Finally, a look at the most recent European electoral cycle, the election for European parliament in 2019. I choose two countries with significant right-wing parties, France and Germany. Some illustrations from electoral manifestos of these parties are presented in the Annex. For France I am first focusing on Rassemblement National (RN), former Front national. On the first Guttman scale for far-right extremism based on the concept of identity, this party’s score is 2, citizens are not equal and religion is key criterion for determining rights and freedoms. On the second Guttman scale based on the concept of problem-solving policies the score is 3, some people may be expelled based

on their religious beliefs. Is this vision unique to RN or is it part of larger French political consensus. To answer this question I take a key center-right party, Les Républicains (LR), which in the previous election for European parliament in 2014 went under its former name of L'Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP). Apart the call for expulsion of people based on their religion, its electoral manifesto is for most part a copy of that of RN, and the scores on both scales are 2. Both French parties are fighting over monopoly of extremist messages. The RN is barely moving toward the mainstream political spectrum. The big transformation is that of LR. The proof is the comparison between the platforms for elections for European parliament of UMP in 2014 and of LR in 2019. UMP explicitly presented itself in 2014 as an anti-populist party and the only point in its program to be concerned with was the reluctance to allow Turkey to become an EU member. This point could not affect significantly its scores on both scales, which would have remained between 0 and 1. It is LR that made the most significant move toward far-right extremism between 2014 and 2019, and according to both Guttman type scales, France has now not just one but two significant far-right parties. In fact, for the first time since late 1950s France has lost its moderate center-right party.

Is this situation in France unique or we can observe similar trend toward right-wing extremism and implosion of main moderate-right formations in other European countries? First step toward answering this question will be by presenting the picture in the largest European Union member, Germany, where far-right party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), is already presented in Bundestag, provincial parliaments, as well as in European parliament. Compared to French RN, the German AfD is even more radical on the scale of far-right extremism based on the concept of identity, where the score reaches the maximum of 3. Foreigners and Germans are clearly discriminated. Within Germany, religion is considered key marker for belonging to the national community. In addition to the French far-right, the AfD also makes problematic gender people and opens the issue of abortion for discussion. The score of AfD on the second scale is 2. Active political measures should preserve Europe for people belonging to Judeo-Christian cultural tradition. Muslim minorities should be denied freedom to practice religion and to dress according to their religious beliefs. If the German far-right is located very near the French far-right on both scales, where the traditionally moderate German right is located compared to both German far-right and to now radicalized traditional French right? The German moderate right, Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich-Soziale Union (CDU/CSU), is ideologically immune to radical ideas. There is no mention of discrimination of any kind based on ethnic, religious, and social criteria. German nation is not separated from the rest of humanity, and no special measures are suggested to protect it against the others or to penalize the others. Therefore, the CDU/CSU scores 0 on both scales. It is still away from any trend toward radicalization similar to that of LR in France.

Conclusion

Constructing Guttman type scales for European far-right parties and stand-alone politicians is just a first step on a longer research program. The following steps may include, but are not limited to, application of these scales in other national contexts,

measuring parties that exist today or that have existed in the past. Another avenue for further research will track and analyze the changes in scores, changes like those described with Bulgarian party Ataka that turned down the volume of its discourse extremism. Additional research may lead toward reevaluation of content validity of the scales as measuring instruments. The findings produced by content analysis of political and electoral programs of some European far-right parties led us to construct and apply two Guttman type scales. Accumulation of new findings, however, may suggest that these scales are not sufficient to represent all domains that englobe the concept of political far-right. Finally, a discussion may be necessary to elaborate on merging these two Guttman scales into one.

Table 1. Guttman type scale on far-right national identity exclusion

Parties (politicians)	Items in the scale			Total score
	National identity denied because of social behavior	National identity denied because of background (ethnicity, religion, etc.)	National identity reserved only to citizens + foreigners with specific background	
Ataka; Marine Le Pen; Nazi party	+	+	+	3
NFSB; VMRO-BNM; Patriotic Front (NFSB and VMRO-BNM); United Patriots (Ataka, NFSB, VMRO-BNM) ; BSP	-	+	+	2
GERB	-	-	+	1

Table 2. Guttman type scale on far-right problem-solving policies

Parties (politicians)	Items in the scale			Total score
	Imposing exceptional measures for specific groups	Restricting rights and freedoms for specific groups	Establishing preferences for specific groups	
Ataka; NFSB; VMRO-BNM; Patriotic Front (NFSB and VMRO-BNM); Marine Le Pen; Nazi party	+	+	+	3
United Patriots (Ataka, NFSB, VMRO-BNM)	-	+	+	2
No cases	-	-	+	1

Annex

Political programs in elections for European parliament in 2014 and 2019

L'Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP) – 2014

“Pour la France, agir en Europe” (“For France, to act in Europe”)

(<https://www.youscribe.com/BookReader/Index/2437089/?documentId=2414185>)

P.3 - “Everywhere in European Union, populist movements, nationalists, separatists, use economic situation for playing with fears of the Europeans. Their solutions, consisting in building new frontiers and customs barriers around each country, leaving Euro, and finally, making Europe explode, are obviously not credible”

P.5 - “Europe needs borders and Turkey has no calling to become European Union member”

Les Républicains (LR) – 2019

“Pour la France, transformer l’Europe” (“For France, to transform Europe”)

(<https://www.republicains.fr/sites/default/files/2019-03/2019-03-26-LR-elections-europeennes-projet.pdf>)

P.13 - “Proposition 1. Establishing double protection of our borders: European protection and French protection in order to stop mass immigration”

P.19 - “Proposition 12. Adopting European shield against islamism:… immediate closure of islamist religious sites (lieu de culte) … refusing to allow djihadists on European soil”

P.23 - “Proposition 16. Refusing any new enlargement of European Union”

P.23 - “Proposition 17: Definitive stop of the process of integration of Turkey to European Union”

P.25 - “Proposition 19. Writing down judeo-christian sources of Europe, as well as greco-roman heritage and that of Enlightenment, in European treaties and in new European Charter of values and obligations”

P.25 - “Proposition 20: Conditioning of granting or renewing right of residence to adherence to the European Charter of values and obligations”

Rassemblement national (RN) – 2019

“Pour une Europe des nations et des peuples” (“For Europe of nations and peoples”)

(<https://rn-europeennes.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/europeennes-projet.pdf>)

P.9 - “European nations have in common values of civilization, common sources and history going deep into ancient Greece and Rome, then Christianity and humanism of Renaissance”

P.9 - “No to Turkey in EU (European Union)”

P.10 - “Re-establishing control over national borders... Having firm migration policy: remaking the asylum system, stopping legal immigration, expulsion of clandestine (people)”

P.11 - “To wage and win the war against islamism... to expel foreign islamists, to close radical mosques”

P.12 - “Putting an end to the dogma of free competition and (giving) priority to French enterprises in public offers”

Christlich Demokratische Union / Christlich-Soziale Union (CDU/CSU) - 2019

“Unser Europa macht stark. Für Sicherheit, Frieden und Wohlstand” (“Our Europe is strong. For security, peace, and prosperity”)

(https://www.cdu.de/system/tdf/media/dokumente/europawahlprogramm.pdf?file=1&type=field_collection_item&id=18290)

P.14 - “Asylum: Our Europe brings order and humanity together with uniform standards. Our Europe is committed to its legal and humanitarian obligations. At the same time, we want the number of refugees who come to us to remain permanently low.”

P.15 - “Migration: Our Europe is fighting illegal migration. ... migrants must be registered in European transit centers and their identity established. No one is allowed to enter without authorization and under no circumstances without papers or clear identification.”

P.21 - “Based on our experience with past accession processes, we do not consider it possible to include more countries (in EU) in the next five years.”

Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – 2019

“EUROPAWAHLPROGRAMM”

(https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2019/03/AfD_Europawahlprogramm_A5-hoch_web_150319.pdf)

P.37 - “...aggressively advancing Islam risks to destabilize our liberal democracies...Any immigration to Europe must be so limited and controlled, so that identity of European cultural nations in all circumstances be maintained.”

P.51 - "Islam - Danger for Europe. Europe is essentially shaped by Greco-Roman antiquity, the Jews and Christianity, the Enlightenment and human rights. In the spirit of freedom, the rule of law and democracy, we want permanently this Europe for us and our progeny. We will defend Europe against Islam, based on the Koran, because its claim to power is incompatible with the European basic principles of law, freedom and democracy."

P.52 - "We will fight with determination the terrorist threat as well as any radicalization of Muslims. Mosques may not be financed from Islamic countries. Minarets and muezzin calls should be prohibited because they are considered Islamic symbols ... Public Friday prayers should not be allowed because they are religious demonstrations of power... Burka and niqab are barrier to social communication according to a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The headscarf should not be worn as a religious-political sign in the public service."

P.68 - "Abortion is not a human right like the right to life and the right to physical integrity! The AfD therefore rejects any EU funding of organizations or measures which, often in developing countries, promote abortions."

P.74 - "The state funding of the so-called gender science has to be stopped. Occupation of posts must be based solely on the professional qualifications of the candidate. We reject the unnatural transformation of the German language as a means of enforcing gender ideology. In a free Europe there should be no state compulsion to use a politically correct language."

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