

A Social Constructivist Analysis of Canadian Gun Control Policy, 1989-2012

B. Timothy Heinmiller

Department of Political Science

Brock University

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Introduction

Rhetoric and pandering are ubiquitous in politics, yet most mainstream theories of the policy process overlook them completely. They are either dismissed as empty political theatre or they are derided as the distasteful underbelly of politics, as politicians play to the electorate's most base instincts. But, what if rhetoric and pandering are, in actuality, an important substance of policy-making, the means through which policy elites construct social realities? What if the social groups affected by policies are not objectively or inherently 'good' or 'bad' and these labels are social constructions perpetuated by policy elites to secure political advantage? This is the perspective of the Social Construction Framework (SCF), an approach that lifts the veil on political communication and explores how policy elites' constructions of social groups shape the policies affecting these groups. The SCF not only claims that social constructions are relevant in policy-making, but that there is a systematic linkage between different social constructions and various types of policy outcomes. This chapter examines Canadian gun control policy from the SCF perspective, investigating how well the SCF fares in explaining Bill C-17, the *Firearms Act*, and the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*.

Social Construction Framework

The SCF is based on the fundamental insight that "...much of the political world is socially constructed, drawing on emotional and value-laden images and symbols rather than objective representations of 'reality'" (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 106). The social construction of the political world includes policy processes, and policy outcomes are substantially shaped by the social constructions used by policy elites in these processes. In fact, the social constructions used by policy elites are crucial because different constructions lead politicians toward different policy designs. Therefore, policy outcomes can be explained, at least in part, by the prevalent social constructions in a policy process, and one can fully understand one without reference to the other.

The SCF's emphasis on the social construction of reality has its roots in critical scholarship, but the SCF itself has a largely positivist orientation. The SCF was developed by two American political scientists, Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram, whose seminal text, *Policy Design for Democracy*, was published in 1997. Schneider and Ingram drew from earlier scholarship in critical sociology, such as frame analysis

and metaphorical framing, which stressed the social and linguistic construction of what we perceive as “reality” (Goffman 1974) (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) (Kuypers 2009). The most ardent social constructionists argue that just about everything is socially constructed and that there is no objective or material reality, just individuals’ unique and shared experiences of it. However, Schneider and Ingram did not go that far. In their words: “[t]he theory of social constructions that we embrace... is not one of strict constructionism in which there are no underlying material conditions; but is more of a contextual constructionism that recognizes that there are constraints and limits on the social constructions” (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 107). Schneider and Ingram further argued that there are patterns and regularities in policy elites’ use of social constructions and that different social constructions lead to different policy designs. Over time, SCF scholars developed a number of empirically testable hypotheses to explain various aspects of the policy process, including policy change, and it is this emphasis on empirical hypothesis testing that makes the SCF predominantly positivist, despite the critical origins of some of its assumptions (Pierce, Siddiki, et al. 2014, 1-2).

The SCF holds that social constructions are especially important in “degenerative” policy-making systems “...in which the social constructions of issues and target populations are strategically manipulated for political gain” (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 6). Not all policy-making contexts are degenerative, but many are, particularly in the US where Schneider and Ingram developed their theory. In degenerative contexts, there is little genuine effort to address social ills through public policy, and policies may actually exacerbate the problems they are ostensibly meant to solve (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 121-24). This happens because policy elites exploit policy debates for their own political gain, focusing on scoring political points rather than engaging in genuine attempts at policy analysis or policy learning. Policy elites score political points by playing into popular stereotypes and being seen providing assistance to good, deserving people, while getting tough on bad, undeserving people (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 116). In this way, in degenerative contexts, policy elites manipulate and perpetuate prevalent social constructions in an effort to secure votes or other forms of political support, often at the expense of good public policy.¹

Degenerative policy-making systems, as opposed to non-degenerative systems, have a number of characteristics, most of which are found in Canadian gun control policy. As Schneider and Ingram describe:

...degenerative policy-making systems are characterized by an unequal distribution of political power, social constructions that separate the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving,’ and an institutional culture that legitimizes strategic, manipulative, and deceptive patterns of communication and uses of political power (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 102).

They also suggest that intense political or partisan competition in an issue area is also an important feature of degenerative policy-making, a finding that has been supported in Canadian studies of

¹ It should be noted that there is a normative element to the SCF given that degenerative politics is generally regarded pejoratively as inhibiting the development of ‘good’ public policy that enhances equality, social justice, and full citizenship. SCF scholars acknowledge this normative element – often proudly – and it does not undermine the positivist aspects of the framework.

degenerative politics, as well (Mondou and Montpetit 2010) (Heinmiller, Hennigar and Kopec, Degenerative Politics and Youth Criminal Justice Policy in Canada 2017). Canadian gun control policy, with its heated rhetoric, emotive appeals, and intense partisanship, seems a prime candidate for degenerative politics, meaning that the SCF and its hypotheses about policy-making in degenerative contexts should have application in this policy area.


In the SCF, the social groups affected by a policy are known as target groups (or target populations). There are various aspects of policy design that can affect target groups, and these are generally conceptualized as policy benefits and policy burdens. Policy benefits include such things as subsidies, tax breaks, or permissive regulations, while policy burdens refer to things like taxes, strict regulations, incarceration, and even state-sponsored execution (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 107). The mix of benefits and burdens in a policy design is typically treated as the dependent variable in SCF analyses of policy-making, so that the dependent variable is not just policy change, but policy design.

To explain policy designs, the SCF focuses on two independent variables: 1) the political power of the target group(s) affected by a policy; and, 2) the social construction of the target group(s) affected by a policy (Pierce, Siddiki, et al. 2014, 5). The political power of target groups is understood mostly as the “first face” of political power, the capacity to influence policy-makers. In more concrete terms, this can be understood as the size of a target group, its financial resources, its organization, its electoral influence, and its connectedness with policy elites (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 108). While power is a key variable in SCF explanations of policy-making, in practice, its operationalization and measurement is often neglected in SCF applications. The second independent variable is the social construction of target groups, the popular images or stereotypes of groups as deserving or undeserving of state assistance. Deserving groups are regarded positively as having ‘earned’ the assignment of policy benefits and the avoidance of policy burdens, while undeserving groups are regarded negatively as having ‘earned’ the assignment of policy burdens and the denial of policy benefits (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 106-07). As alluded to above, social constructions are found in the realm of political rhetoric, and SCF scholars often go to great lengths to operationalize and measure these constructions.

The intersection of political power and social construction creates a two-dimensional space in which four distinct types of target groups can be identified, as shown in Figure 1, with different mixes of policy benefits and burdens associated with each group. Advantaged groups are those with a high level of political power and a positive social construction, so they typically receive plenty of policy benefits and few policy burdens. Contenders are groups with lots of political power but a negative social construction. They also receive more policy benefits than burdens, but the benefits are often hidden from public view, so as not to inflame public opposition, and the burdens are usually more superficial than real, so as not to trigger backlash from these powerful groups. Dependents are those with little political power but a positive social construction, and these groups often receive benefits that are “...heavy on rhetoric and low on funding” since policy-makers want to be seen helping them, but the groups lack political power to force policy-makers to follow through on their commitments. The final group, with low political power and a negative social construction, are the deviants, who are typically inflicted with all manner of policy burdens. Punishing deviants is an easy political score for politicians

who can take advantage of negative public stereotypes against groups who lack the political power to fight back effectively (Schneider, Ingram, & DeLeon, 2014, pp. 110-113).

Figure 1 – Typology of Target Groups



Thus, in the SCF, different types of target groups are associated with different policy designs, and this provides the basis for the SCF policy change hypothesis: **“types and patterns of policy change vary depending on the social construction and power of target groups”** (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 12, emphasis added). The SCF makes further claims about patterns of policy change over time, particularly with respect to policy designs affecting advantaged and deviant target groups. It posits that policies have “feed forward effects” that can politically empower or disempower the target groups they effect (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 116-17). For advantaged groups, who receive many policy benefits and few burdens, policies tend to empower them so that they can effectively defend their policy benefits, and perhaps secure even more benefits, over time. Conversely, deviant groups receive so many burdens and so few benefits that they are disempowered in the policy process, making it likely that they will continue receiving burdens, over time. In short, policies affecting advantaged and deviant groups tend to be self-reinforcing and path dependent so that advantaged groups tend to stay advantaged and deviant groups tend to stay deviant (Schneider, Ingram and DeLeon 2014, 129-30). Because the mixes of policy benefits and burdens assigned to contender and dependent groups are more varied, this sort of path dependency is not prevalent in policies affecting these target groups.

Only five applications of the SCF are found in the Canadian public policy literature, with the studies yielding mixed results on the framework's capacity to explain Canadian policy-making. All of the applications are in the general realm of social policy, including: assisted reproduction policy (Montpetit, Rothmayr and Varone, *Institutional Vulnerability to Social Constructions: Federalism, Target Populations, and Policy Designs for Assisted Reproductive Technology in Six Democracies* 2005), poverty policy (Mondou and Montpetit 2010), midwifery policy (Marier, Paterson and Angus 2014), immigration policy (Garon 2015), and youth criminal justice policy (Heinmiller, Hennigar and Kopec, *Degenerative Politics and Youth Criminal Justice Policy in Canada* 2017). In this body of literature, two studies found the SCF adept at explaining Canadian policy-making (Montpetit, Rothmayr and Varone, *Institutional Vulnerability to Social Constructions: Federalism, Target Populations, and Policy Designs for Assisted Reproductive Technology in Six Democracies* 2005) (Marier, Paterson and Angus 2014), two studies found the framework adept in some cases but not others (Mondou and Montpetit 2010) (Heinmiller, Hennigar and Kopec, *Degenerative Politics and Youth Criminal Justice Policy in Canada* 2017), and one study found the framework unable to explain policy-making (Garon 2015), though the latter study may be subject to a contrary interpretation.² Overall, the jury is still out on the utility of the SCF in explaining Canadian policy-making, particularly on the question of the prevalence of degenerative politics in Canada, which is crucial to the SCF's applicability.

There is a considerable degree of methodological diversity in the Canadian SCF literature, especially given its relatively small size. Most of this diversity is in the operationalization of social constructions. Some studies take an illustrative, anecdotal approach (Marier, Paterson and Angus 2014) (Garon 2015) while others are more systematic, relying on public opinion data (Montpetit, Rothmayr and Varone, *Institutional Vulnerability to Social Constructions: Federalism, Target Populations, and Policy Designs for Assisted Reproductive Technology in Six Democracies* 2005) or content analyses of primary sources (Mondou and Montpetit 2010) (Heinmiller, Hennigar and Kopec, *Degenerative Politics and Youth Criminal Justice Policy in Canada* 2017). To obtain valid and reliable data on social constructions, the systematic approaches are preferable and this chapter takes such an approach through a qualitative content analysis of Hansard debates about gun control legislation.

In brief, the content analysis identified MPs' assertions about various target groups (i.e., their target group assertions) and coded these assertions to determine to what extent each group was constructed as deserving or undeserving. The raw results of the content analysis are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6 in the Appendix. From this raw data, two sets of findings are important in this chapter. First, the most prevalent target groups in each policy episode are identified. These are the target groups that MPs most often made reference to in the House debates, and were most relevant in gun control policy design. The

² In his study of Quebec immigration policy, Garon argues that immigrants are constructed as a deviant target group, but are subjected to only superficial policy burdens, which is inconsistent with SCF expectations. However, Heinmiller believes that Garon underestimates the political power of immigrants. Given that immigrants constitute about 10 percent of the Quebec population, are concentrated in ridings in the Montreal area, and have close ties to the Quebec Liberal party, they have substantial political power and, therefore, should be categorized as contenders rather deviants. The superficial policy burdens assigned to immigrants, as contenders, are entirely consistent with SCF expectations. Therefore, in this interpretation, Garon's study supports SCF as useful in explaining Canadian policy-making.

most prevalent groups are identified in Table 1, as measured by the number of assertions made about each group, as a percentage of total assertions, in each policy episode. The second set of findings pertains to the social construction of the most prevalent target groups in each policy episode and is summarized in Table 2. This table contains the proportion of assertions about each group constructing them as deserving (and undeserving). If the assertions about a target group are 80 to 100 percent consistent, (i.e., 80 percent or more of the assertions constructed a group as deserving or undeserving), then a generally accepted social construction is said to exist. If, however, the assertions are less than 80 percent consistent, then the construction of that group is taken as contested, and there is no clear social construction. This high threshold is used in order to provide a clear and rigorous standard for identifying general accepted social constructions. More detail on the content analysis research design is provided in the methodological appendix to this chapter.

The second SCF independent variable – power – is operationalized using five standard measures of the ‘first face’ of political power: target group size, wealth, organization, electoral influence, and connectedness with policy-makers (Schneider and Ingram 1997, 108). Table 3 provides summaries of these measures for the most prevalent target groups, with checkmarks (✓) indicating a high level of power and crosses (✗) indicating a low level of power on each measure. Target groups that score high on all measures are taken as powerful, while target groups that score high on one (or none) of the measures are considered as lacking power, with moderate levels of power between these two extremes. Measures were taken and tables were constructed for each policy episode, but the results did not vary across episodes, so the results in Table 3 summarize the results for all three policy episodes.

The dependent variable, policy design, is operationalized through analyses of policy documents to determine how burdensome/beneficial each policy was to the most prevalent target groups. Specifically, the analysis relied on the legislative summaries, produced by analysts in the Parliamentary Information and Research Service of the Library of Parliament, which translate hundreds of pages of arcane legislation into succinct descriptions of policy design. These policy designs were then compared against a standard of ‘burdensomeness’ to determine how burdensome they were to target groups. The standard used was the extent to which policy designs inhibited the private ownership and use of firearms, a reasonable standard when evaluating gun control policies. The most burdensome policy possible would ban private gun ownership and confiscate all private weapons, while the least burdensome policy possible would have no regulatory controls at all on private ownership and use of weapons. Actual policy designs were placed on this ideal typical spectrum to determine their substantive burdensomeness.

The rest of this chapter investigates the SCF policy change hypothesis with respect to Canadian gun control policy. It does so in three sections, starting with Bill C-17, then the *Firearms Act*, and, finally, the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*. Each section contains an analysis of the prevalent social constructions in the policy debates, the political power of the relevant target groups, and the policy designs actually produced. Ultimately, the expectations of the SCF hypothesis are tested against the empirical findings, allowing us to draw some conclusions about the SCF’s capacity to explain Canadian gun control policy.

Bill C-17

Bill C-17 was passed by Parliament in December 1991, after the failure of Bill C-80 the previous year. Both bills were responses by the Mulroney government to the Montreal Massacre in December 1989 and the ensuing public outcry for more gun control. This section examines the development of Bill C-17 through an SCF lens, identifying the most prevalent target groups in the C-17 House debates, categorizing these target groups using the SCF typology, and investigating whether the policy designs predicted by the SCF actually came about.

As shown in Table 1, two target groups dominated the House debates on Bill C-17: safe firearms users and unsafe firearms users. Safe firearms users were the most prevalent target group, accounting for 60 percent of target group assertions in the C-17 House debates. This target group includes those who typically rely on long guns and who use them for socially approved activities such as farming, hunting, collecting, or sport shooting. Unsafe firearms users were the second most prevalent group, being the subject of 31 percent of target group assertions. This group includes violent criminals, gun smugglers, the mentally deranged, and others, and is often associated with hand guns, sawed-off shotguns, or military style assault weapons rather than long guns. This parsing of firearms users into safe and unsafe target groups was prevalent in all of the gun control policy episodes analyzed in this study, and is a social construction that safe firearms users themselves labour to perpetuate. The Canadian Firearms Association, for example, emphasizes in its mission statement that it “exists to promote, support and protect all safe firearms activities...” (Canadian Firearms Association 2017, 2, emphasis added). Victims of firearms violence, including those vulnerable to victimization, were evident in the Bill C-17 debates, but ranked far behind the safe and unsafe firearms users in overall prevalence, constituting only 5 percent of target group assertions. This finding is somewhat surprising given that the Bill C-17 process, and the Bill C-80 process before it, was initiated by a public outcry over the victims of the Montreal Massacre, but it is a consistent finding across all policy episodes: victims are a mentioned target group, but they are a far less prevalent subject in policy debates than are firearms users.

Table 1 – Prevalence of Target Groups in House Debates on Gun Control (percentage of total target group assertions)

House Debates	Safe Firearms Users	Unsafe Firearms Users	Victims	First Nations	Law Enforcement	Taxpayers	Business	Provinces
Bill C-17 (1992)	60%	31%	5%	-	3%	1%	-	-
Firearms Act (1995)	49%	33%	6%	5%	4%	1%	1%	-
Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act (2011)	45%	16%	12%	-	14%	-	-	8%

Table 2 shows that safe firearms users were constructed as undeserving in 80 percent of MPs’ assertions about them. While the construction was not unanimous, and there was some variance amongst the political parties in their social constructions, the overall tendency to construct safe firearms users in negative terms is clear. In terms of political power, Table 3 shows that safe firearms users had all of the characteristics of a politically powerful target group. In 1992, it was estimated that about 26 percent of Canadian households had at least one firearm, making safe firearms users a very large social group (van Dijk, van Kesteren and Smit 2007, 279). This group was well-organized politically, through the National Firearms Association, which was well-resourced for political action from members’ dues and donations. Moreover, safe firearms users were concentrated in rural, northern, and western ridings, giving them electoral influence which they could (threaten to) use to unseat candidates supporting gun control. Safe firearms users also had strong connections with the governing PC party, so much so that they had succeeded in splitting the PC caucus on Bill C-68 the year before. Given this high level of political power, and their prevailing social construction as an undeserving group, safe firearms users fit the mould of a contender target group.

In contrast, unsafe firearms users can be categorized as deviants with an undeserving social construction and a low level of political power. As shown in Table 2, the undeserving social construction of unsafe firearms users was nearly unanimous: 97 percent of the assertions made by MPs about unsafe firearms users characterized them as undeserving, a result that is consistent across party lines. With respect to political power, unsafe firearms users have almost none of the attributes of a powerful group. If you could count all firearms-related criminals in Canada – both in and out of prison – they would constitute a sizeable group. However, they have limited wealth, they have little collective identity, and they have no

political organization, apart from some prisoners’ rights groups which were not involved in the gun control debates. Unsafe firearms users are also spread out across the country, so they have little electoral influence in any individual ridings, and they have no close connections to elites in any political party. In sum, unsafe firearms users have very little political power which, in combination with their undeserving social construction, makes them a deviant target group, in SCF terms.

Table 2 – Social Construction of Prevalent Target Groups in House Debates on Gun Control (percentage of deserving assertions without brackets; undeserving assertions within brackets)

House Debates	Safe Firearms Users	Unsafe Firearms Users
Bill C-17 (1992)	20% (80%) = Undeserving Construction	3% (97%) =Undeserving Construction
Firearms Act (1995)	58% (32%) =Contested Construction	9% (91%) =Undeserving Construction
Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act (2011)	55% (35%) =Contested Construction	Not a prevalent target group

Table 3 – Political Power of Prevalent Target Groups in Gun Control

Prevalent Target Groups	Size	Wealth	Organization	Electoral Influence	Connectedness with Policy-Makers	Overall Power
Safe Firearms Users	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	High
Unsafe Firearms Users	✓	✗	✗	✗	✗	Low

Given the categorization of safe firearms users as contenders and unsafe firearms users as deviants, some policy design predictions can be made about Bill C-17 based on the SCF hypothesis. As contenders, the hypothesis predicts that safe firearms users should receive policy burdens that are visible but largely superficial, and/or they should receive policy benefits that are substantial but hidden from public view. For unsafe firearms users, who are deviants, the SCF hypothesis predicts that they should be targeted with visible, substantial policy burdens and should receive no policy benefits. So, how well does the SCF hypothesis predict the design of Bill C-17?

For safe firearms users, the design of Bill C-17 was consistent with the SCF hypothesis. Bill C-17 added a number of new regulatory controls on gun ownership, but none of these controls fundamentally challenged private gun ownership for safe users. Most of the new regulatory controls related to the acquisition and storage of firearms. The FAC process was strengthened by adding a mandatory training course, a detailed questionnaire, a reference check, and a 28-day waiting period for the issuance of gun permits. Gun owners were also required to store firearms and ammunition separately, to store firearms in an inoperable condition, and to hide and lock guns during transport (Dupuis, Kirkby and MacKay 2011, 1). All of these regulatory controls are visible policy burdens that are inconvenient for safe firearms users, but do not challenge private gun ownership, which is consistent with safe firearms users' status as contenders. Moreover, safe firearms users received a substantive but largely invisible policy benefit in Bill C-17. The legislation contained a provision requiring that any future regulations banning some classes of weapons or ammunition could be blocked by 20 MPs or 15 senators, forcing a parliamentary vote on the regulations (Brown 2012, 211). Given the safe firearms users' considerable political power, this constituted a substantive procedural benefit for them, but a deferred benefit, obscured from public view. This too is consistent with safe firearms users' status as contenders, supporting the SCF hypothesis.

Unsafe firearms users, as deviants, are targeted with policy burdens in Bill C-17, and their ownership of firearms is fundamentally challenged. Unsafe users are closely associated with such weapons as handguns, sawed-off shot guns, and military style assault weapons. Bill C-17 added about 200 models of such weaponry to the prohibited and restricted weapons lists, banning or controlling their ownership. Furthermore, all of the regulatory controls on the acquisition of firearms created by the legislation were designed to 'weed out' unsafe firearms users and prevent them from obtaining guns, so these controls were intended to be more burdensome on unsafe users than safe users. All of this is consistent with the SCF hypothesis which predicts that deviants will be targeted with substantive policy burdens, in this case, the denial of firearms ownership.

Overall, the SCF policy change hypothesis is strongly supported in the case of Bill C-17. Safe firearms users (as contenders) and unsafe firearms users (as deviants) received the types of policy benefits/burdens predicted by the SCF hypothesis. We now turn our attention to the development of the *Firearms Act* to determine whether the SCF successfully explains this case, as well.

[The Firearms Act](#)

The *Firearms Act* was passed by Parliament in December, 1995, on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the Montreal Massacre. It introduced the (in)famous universal gun registry to Canada and was the Chretien government's signature achievement in gun control. This section examines the development of the *Firearms Act* from an SCF perspective, identifying the most prevalent target groups, their respective social constructions, and their political power. These groups are then matched with the policy benefits/burdens they received in the new legislation to determine whether the policy outcomes are consistent with the SCF hypothesis.

The two most prevalent target groups in the *Firearms Act* House debates were safe and unsafe firearms users. As shown in Table 1, safe firearms users were the subject of 49 percent of target group assertions made by MPs in the debates, while unsafe firearms users were the subject of 33 percent of target group assertions. Five other target groups were also mentioned in the debates – victims (6 percent of assertions), First Nations (5 percent), law enforcement (4 percent), businesses (1 percent), and taxpayers (1 percent) – but none of them were nearly as prevalent as safe and unsafe firearms users. So, apart from the greater diversity of target groups mentioned in the debates, the results are similar to those found in the Bill C-17 debates, in which safe and unsafe firearms users were the overwhelming focus of discussion.

However, the social construction of the most prevalent target group, safe firearms users, was significantly different in the *Firearms Act* debates compared to the Bill C-17 debates. Whereas safe firearms users were constructed as undeserving in 80 percent of assertions in the Bill C-17 debates, this number dropped to only 32 percent in the *Firearms Act* debates. This indicates a remarkable improvement in safe firearms users' social construction from Bill C-17 to the *Firearms Act*, a period of barely three years. They went from having an undeserving social construction in 1992 to a contested social construction, leaning towards deserving, in 1995. This rapid shift in social construction is somewhat problematic for the SCF which assumes that most social constructions are relatively durable and change rather slowly.

Safe firearms users remained a powerful group during the development of the *Firearms Act*, as the factors underpinning their political power changed in only one substantial way. They continued to be a large, well-organized, well-financed, and electorally influential group. Yet, the political party with which they were traditionally allied, the PCs, was decimated in the 1993 election and lost government to the Liberals. Nevertheless, they still maintained some connectedness to policy-makers as some rural, northern, and western Liberal MPs had close connections to gun advocacy groups and staunchly opposed further gun control in the Liberal caucus. Thus, safe firearms users retained some influence over policy decision-makers, though not as much as they had during the previous PC government.

With a contested social construction and a high level of political power, safe firearms users can be categorized as somewhere between an advantaged and a contender group in the development of the *Firearms Act*. This ambiguity is unfortunate but, without a generally-accepted social construction, it is impossible to choose between the advantaged and contender categories. The best that can be done is to examine the design of the *Firearms Act* to determine whether its mix of benefits and burdens matches the expectations of either of these target group types, which we will do shortly.

Unsafe firearms users were the other prevalent target group in the development of the *Firearms Act* and all evidence indicates that they remained a deviant group. Over 90 percent of assertions about unsafe firearms users constructed them as undeserving, which is a generally-accepted, negative social construction. Compared to the Bill C-17 debates, the construction of unsafe firearms users improved slightly, and was most notable among BQ MPs who emphasized the need to rehabilitate rather than punish violent criminals. Also notable was the position of Reform MPs in these debates: the Reform Party, despite being the third party in the House, made more assertions about unsafe users than any

other party, and 100 percent of these assertions were negative. Thus, there was some polarization between the opposition parties, both of them relatively new to Parliament, when it came to unsafe firearms users, but, the overall construction of unsafe users was still resoundingly negative. In terms of political power, the position of unsafe firearms users did not change from 1992 to 1995, so they remained a politically powerless group. The combination of an undeserving social construction and almost no political power made unsafe firearms users a deviant target group in 1995, just as they had been in 1992.

The categorization of safe firearms users as either advantaged or dependent, and unsafe firearms users as deviant, leads to a number of policy design predictions based on the SCF hypothesis. First, we would expect the *Firearms Act* to assign safe firearms users either: substantial and visible policy benefits (if they are advantaged); or, insubstantial and visible policy burdens (if they are contenders). Second, we would expect that unsafe firearms users, as deviants, would be targeted with substantial and visible policy burdens.

Analysis of the design of the *Firearms Act* reveals that the SCF hypothesis is not supported with respect to safe firearms users. The *Firearms Act* heaped a number of visible and substantial policy burdens on safe firearms users that were not in keeping with their status as either an advantaged or a contender target group. New licensing systems were introduced for the acquisition and possession of all guns and ammunition, and all licences had to be renewed every five years. This replaced the less demanding FAC system which was a one-time permit pertaining only to firearms acquisition. Universal firearms registration was also introduced and a national firearms registry was created to allow authorities to track all firearms in Canada. Possession of an unregistered gun was made a criminal offence and police were given increased powers to enter and search premises that had ten or more registered guns (Bartlett 1995). Altogether, the *Firearms Act* significantly increased regulatory controls on private gun ownership, made no efforts to disguise these controls, and applied these controls to all firearms users, safe and unsafe alike. These types of policy burdens are not predicted for advantaged or contender groups in the SCF hypothesis, so the hypothesis can not explain the treatment of safe firearms users in the *Firearms Act*.

However, the SCF hypothesis is supported with respect to unsafe firearms users. The *Firearms Act* prohibited additional classes of weapons that are typically associated with criminal activity, such as assault weapons with barrels 105 mm or less in length and .25 and .31 calibre handguns. Importantly, the new legislation also amended Part III of the Criminal Code to introduce stiffer penalties for those convicted of serious gun crimes (Bartlett 1995). These measures were designed to inhibit and disincentivize gun ownership and use by unsafe firearms users, and constitute visible and substantial policy burdens for this target group. Since this is the sort of treatment expected for deviant groups in the SCF hypothesis, the hypothesis is supported, in this instance.

It is also interesting that, during the development of the *Firearms Act*, the Reform Party made a motion to split the bill into two parts, one part dealing with tougher sentences for gun crimes, which Reform would support, and one part dealing with the universal gun registry, which Reform would oppose (Parliament of Canada 1995, 10363). This was a clear effort by Reform to use the legislative process to

subdivide between safe and unsafe firearms users, so that it could prevent the assignment of policy burdens to the former and heap further policy burdens on the latter. Take, for example, the comments of Reform MP John Duncan who spoke in support of the motion to split Bill C-68:

Anyone can see that splitting the bill will focus the wrath where it should be, at those individuals who use firearms in the commission of crimes and who continue to make our streets unsafe for law-abiding citizens (Parliament of Canada 1995, 11156).

Even though the effort to split the bill failed, this attempt to isolate a deviant target group and subject it to additional policy burdens is consistent with SCF expectations of policy-making in degenerative contexts.

In sum, the SCF hypothesis is only partially successful in explaining the design of the *Firearms Act*: it explains the policy burdens received by unsafe firearms users but does not explain the policy burdens received by safe firearms users. The hypothesis' failure with respect to safe firearms users is troubling for the SCF in a number of ways. Safe firearms users were the most prevalent target group in the *Firearms Act* debates, and the bulk of the provisions in the legislation pertain to them, so the inability to explain these aspects of the policy is a significant explanatory shortcoming. Moreover, since we were unable to categorize safe firearms users in the SCF typology with much specificity (i.e., they could have been advantaged or contenders), policy design outcomes associated with either of these target group types would have offered some support to the SCF hypothesis. In other words, the SCF hypothesis with respect to safe firearms users lacked specificity, so a greater number of policy design outcomes would have satisfied it, making it a relatively weak and easily supported hypothesis. Yet, the hypothesis was still unsupported and did not make it over this relatively low bar, putting the SCF hypothesis in considerable doubt.

[The Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act](#)

The *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* was introduced in Parliament on October 25, 2011, just a few months after the Conservative Party won its first majority government. The Act fulfilled one of the Conservatives' longstanding policy promises, to end the registration requirement for all non-restricted firearms in Canada. In this way, it was a direct repudiation of the 1995 *Firearms Act* and brought the experiment with universal firearms registration to an inglorious end. This section examines the development of the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* and investigates whether its design matches the predictions of the SCF hypothesis.

Like the House debates in the previous two policy episodes, the most prevalent target group in the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* debates was safe firearms users. Table 1 shows that this group was the subject of 45 percent of the target group assertions made during the House debates. The remaining target group assertions were spread out amongst four other groups, including: unsafe firearms users (16 percent), law enforcement (14 percent), victims (12 percent), and the provinces (8 percent). Unlike the Bill C-17 and *Firearms Act* debates, unsafe firearms users did not feature prominently in the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* debates. Given the Conservatives' 'tough on crime' agenda, this result is

somewhat surprising. However, it is likely explained by the fact that the Conservatives dealt with unsafe firearms users in other legislation, such as the *Safe Streets and Communities Act* which introduced mandatory minimum sentences for many gun crimes (Barnett, et al. 2011). Our analysis here is limited to the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*, which had only one prevalent target group – safe firearms users – in its development, so the SCF hypothesis will be tested according to the policy outcomes for this singular target group.

The content analysis results in Table 2 show that the social construction of safe firearms users in 2011 changed little from their social construction in 1995. In the 2011 debates, 35 percent of the assertions about safe firearms users constructed them as undeserving, compared to 32 percent in the 1995 *Firearms Act* debates. Thus, the construction of safe users was only marginally more negative in 2011 than 1995, and there was no significant shift in their construction. Nor was there a unanimous or generally accepted social construction of safe firearms users. Their construction was contested but leaning towards deserving, just as it had been in 1995.

Safe firearms users also continued to be a very powerful target group, even more powerful than they had been in the previous two policy episodes. In 2011, safe firearms users were still a large, well-organized, well-resourced, and electorally influential group, as they had been in the past. Plus, they enjoyed the advantage of being closely connected with policy elites inside the governing Conservative Party and, unlike in the 1992 and 1995 policy episodes, the governing party caucus was unified in its opposition to stringent gun control. This meant that safe firearms users had access to policy elites and that most of these policy elites shared their views, with very little internal opposition, giving safe users more influence on gun control policy than they had enjoyed in decades.

With their considerable power and contested social construction, safe firearms users can be categorized as somewhere between advantaged and contenders, in SCF terms. Since their construction is contested, it is impossible to categorize them conclusively in either one of these groups, so we must consider the policy designs associated with both of these groups. If they are advantaged, the SCF hypothesis predicts that safe firearms users should receive substantial policy benefits. If they are contenders, the SCF hypothesis predicts that they should be assigned with substantial, concealed policy benefits and/or insubstantial, unconcealed policy burdens.

Not surprisingly, the design of the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* reduced the policy burdens assigned to safe firearms users, generally in keeping with their advantaged/contender status. The Act did away with the requirement to register non-restricted firearms, while maintaining the registration requirement for weapons in the restricted and prohibited classes (Dupuis, Kirkby and MacKay 2011, 10). This was clearly an attempt to reduce burdens on safe firearms users, who are associated with long guns in the non-restricted class, while maintaining burdens on unsafe firearms users, who are associated with handguns and military-style assault weapons in the restricted and prohibited classes. It is important to note, however, that the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* maintained some of the regulatory burdens on safe firearms users introduced in the *Firearms Act*. Instead of returning to the pre-*Firearms Act* situation in which only firearms acquisition was licenced, the new legislation continued the *Firearms Act* requirement that all firearms possession, including non-restricted firearms possession, be licenced

(Dupuis, Kirkby and MacKay 2011, 10-11). Thus, safe firearms users had their policy burdens reduced in the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*, but the private ownership of firearms was still regulated, and they were not relieved of policy burdens entirely. This sort of policy design is inconsistent with that expected of an advantaged group, but it is somewhat consistent with that expected of a contender group: that is, safe firearms users are burdened but not over-burdened by the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*.

In the case of the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*, there is some evidence in support of the SCF hypothesis, but the hypothesis itself is not particularly strong. The first difficulty was in trying to categorize the singular prevalent target group in this policy episode – safe firearms users – for which there was no generally accepted social construction. Using the SCF hypothesis, this resulted in a broad policy design prediction incorporating two target group types rather than a precise prediction based on one target group type. Nevertheless, the design of the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* is in accordance with what would be expected of a contender group, which was one of the target group types identified in the hypothesis, so there is some evidence in support of it. This provides some confidence in the SCF hypothesis, but a confidence qualified by the vagary of the hypothesis itself.

Discussion

Given all of the above findings, we can now draw some conclusions about how well the SCF does in explaining the development of Canadian gun control policy. The findings, it seems, are mixed. The SCF hypothesis does well in explaining some parts of gun control policy but does poorly in explaining other parts. Let's start with the apparent strengths of the SCF.

The SCF does a very good job of explaining the policy outcomes for unsafe firearms users. The evidence unequivocally showed that unsafe firearms users were a deviant target group in 1992 and 1995. Limited evidence suggests that they were also a deviant group in 2011, but they were not a prevalent target group in that policy episode. The policy design outcomes for unsafe firearms users in 1992 and 1995 were consistent with those predicted by the SCF hypothesis: in both instances, they received visible and substantial policy burdens, as expected for a deviant group. The SCF also predicts that, over time, deviant groups become locked in a self-reinforcing (or path dependent) process in which they receive increasing policy burdens as they become increasingly alienated and disempowered in political processes. There is some evidence to support this contention with respect to unsafe firearms users in Canada. From Bill C-17, to the *Firearms Act*, to the *Safe Streets and Communities Act*, the penalties for criminal firearms offences became increasingly severe, and the target group affected by these increasingly harsh penalties – unsafe firearms users – was powerless to stop it. Overall, just about all of the policy outcomes predicted for a deviant target group were evident for unsafe firearms users, so the SCF did very well in explaining this aspect of Canadian gun control policy.

The SCF also did well in explaining the policy outcomes for safe firearms users in Bill C-17. In this policy episode, safe firearms users could be clearly categorized as a contender target group. Moreover, the policy outcomes assigned to this contender group matched the expectations of the SCF: they received insubstantial and visible policy burdens, as well as substantial but obscure policy benefits. Given that the

SCF hypothesis was able to explain the policy outcomes for the only two prevalent target groups in the Bill C-17 policy debates – safe and unsafe firearms users – it provides a parsimonious explanation for the design of this particular gun control policy.

Unfortunately, the SCF did not fare nearly as well in explaining policy design outcomes for safe firearms users in the *Firearms Act* or the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act*. These shortcomings are significant because safe firearms users were the most prevalent target group in the debates on both of these policies, and regulatory measures affecting safe firearms users constituted the bulk of both policies. If, in two of the three policy episodes analyzed, the SCF hypothesis can not adequately explain the policy outcomes for the most prevalent target group, then the utility of the theory must be put in question. Three explanatory weaknesses of the SCF, in particular, are worth highlighting: the difficulty in categorizing safe firearms users as a target group; the inability to account for a large part of the *Firearms Act*; and, the omission of gun control advocates from the analysis.

The SCF hypothesis worked best when the prevalent target groups could be clearly categorized in the SCF target group typology, but this was not always possible. In 1995 and 2011, safe firearms users had a contested social construction, leaving them somewhere between the contender and advantaged categories. When a target group's categorization is unclear, multiple policy design outcomes may be associated with them, and the specificity of the theory's policy predictions declines. Consequently, the SCF does not have great predictive or explanatory power for target groups that can not be clearly categorized, limiting its potential as a widely applicable theory.

Probably the most glaring weakness of the SCF in explaining Canadian gun control policy is its inability to account for the policy outcomes assigned to safe firearms users in *Firearms Act*. This weakness is notwithstanding the question of whether safe firearms users are better categorized as contenders or advantaged, because the policy outcomes assigned to safe firearms users by the *Firearms Act* are inconsistent with the SCF expectations for both of these target groups. In short, the SCF simply can not account for why safe firearms users, who had a relatively positive social construction in the legislative debates, were assigned substantial policy burdens by the legislation. Furthermore, explaining this anomaly casts doubt on the basic causal chain put forward by the SCF. Based on the empirical evidence, it is conceivable that policy elites, particularly the Liberal government, constructed safe firearms users in a relatively positive light because they were trying to 'soften the blow' of the policy burdens being imposed on them. This would have been a deliberate political strategy to mollify safe firearms users who were a very powerful group with electoral sway over a number of important ridings. In this interpretation of the evidence, neither political power nor social construction operate as independent variables in explaining policy outcomes, and social construction is, to some extent, dependent on a group's political power. If there is any credence to this interpretation of the evidence, it casts the SCF causal chain, and the hypothesis based on it, in considerable doubt.

The SCF explanations of Canadian gun control policy also entirely omit a group that is known to have played an important role in these policy processes: gun control advocates. The SCF has an inherent tendency to concentrate on target groups which receive tangible policy benefits/burdens from a particular policy. This was evident in this chapter, as the analysis focused on safe and unsafe firearms

users and the benefits and burdens assigned to them. Given this focus, the SCF tends to overlook the ‘public good’ aspects of policies – that is, the impacts that policies have on all citizens, not just specific social groups – and the actors who advocate for these public goods. For example, the Canadian Coalition for Gun Control was a tireless advocate for firearms-related public safety, an important public good, in all of the policy episodes analyzed. However, their presence does not register in the SCF analysis because they were not a target group: they received no tangible benefits or burdens from gun control policy, other than the public good of ‘public safety’ which everyone enjoys. Empirically, any explanation of Canadian gun control policy that omits the role of gun control advocates is incomplete, and this exposes a weakness of the SCF. It is telling, for instance, that the SCF had the least success in explaining the *Firearms Act*, precisely the policy episode when gun control advocates were most active and most successful in shaping policy.

Ultimately, the findings in this chapter are similar to the findings of Mondou and Montpetit (2010) and Heinmiller, Hennigar and Kopec (2017), in their applications of the SCF to Canadian policy-making: it seems to explain policy outcomes well in some cases but not in others. With this accumulated evidence, the SCF is probably not a strong contender to be a general theory of Canadian policy-making. However, its explanatory strengths and successes should not be discounted, it continues to occupy an important niche in policy studies, and further advancements in the theory may eventually broaden its appeal and applicability.

[Appendix: Using Qualitative Content Analysis to Measure Social Constructions](#)

Social constructions, one of two independent variables in the SCF, are best measured by analyzing primary source materials that capture citizens’ or policy elites’ perceptions and descriptions of target groups. For example, Montpetit, Rothmayr and Varone (2005) captured citizen’s perceptions through surveys, Montpetit and Mondou (2010) examined policy elites’ perceptions through an analysis of policy action plans, and Heinmiller, Hennigar and Kopec (2017) captured policy elites’ perceptions through an analysis of Hansard transcripts. The main reason for relying on primary sources is to measure social constructions of target groups as directly as possible. In this chapter, Hansard transcripts were used as the data source for policy elites’ social constructions. These transcripts were a good source because they captured – verbatim – the justifications that policy elites (i.e., MPs) used in support of various gun control measures, including justifications based on how policy elites believed that various target groups should or should not be treated by government. Moreover, these justifications were explicit and public, capturing how policy elites may have exploited social constructions for their own political gain, as envisioned by the SCF. For our purposes, the English language Hansard was used, which contained translations of other languages spoken in the debates, including French and Inuktitut.

In order to analyze the social constructions contained in the Hansard transcripts, a manageable sample of this material was needed. A sample was constructed using relevance sampling; that is, material was selected based on its relevance to the variable being measured (Krippendorf 2013, 120-21). Three

parameters were used to determine relevance. First, it was essential to include material from each of the three time periods included in this study so that measures of the prevalent social constructions in each time period could be taken. Second, only debates on gun control bills that had first, second, and third readings in Parliament were included in the sample, since these bills provided ample opportunity to measure social constructions, whereas other bills did not. Third, the sample was limited to House debates, excluding Senate debates, since, in Canadian government, elected MPs better fit the definition of policy elites than do unelected senators. Based on these parameters, the sample of Hansard material included the House debates following all readings of bills C-17 (1992), C-68 (1995), and C-19 (2011).

To analyze the sample systematically, a qualitative content analysis was undertaken using 'target group assertions' as the coding unit. A 'target group assertion' is an argument made by a policy elite about how a particular target group should (or should not) be treated by government. Each 'target group assertion' has three elements: 1) an identifiable target group; 2) a proposed policy benefit or burden for that group; and, 3) an expression of support or opposition for the target group-benefit/burden pairing. In this way, 'target group assertions' are an operationalization of social constructions. Textually, 'target group assertions' may be as short as a phrase or as long as several paragraphs, making it a thematic coding unit rather than a mechanical coding unit (Schreier 2012).

The general design of the qualitative content analysis was to identify a large, representative sample of 'target group assertions' within the Hansard transcripts, and then systematically code these assertions to reveal the prevalent social constructions.

'Target group assertions' were identified in the Hansard transcripts through keyword searches. The debate transcripts from all three bills were converted to Microsoft Word files, and Word's 'Find' function was used to search for five keywords that indicated an assertion (of some sort) in the text: "should," "ought," "must," "need," and "ensure." These searches yielded over 2,000 hits, and each hit was reviewed to determine whether it met the three criteria of a 'target group assertion.' If it met the criteria, it was highlighted, given a unique identifier, and included in the sample; if it did not meet the criteria, it was ignored and excluded. This procedure was undertaken by one coder, and verified by a second coder, ultimately identifying 844 potential 'target group assertions' in the debates. The procedure did not identify all 'target group assertions' in the transcripts, but it identified a large proportion of them. A control test was undertaken in which the first 50 pages of the 2011 transcripts were closely read and all possible 'target group assertions' were identified. The test revealed that our procedure captured 57% of all 'target group assertions' and showed no systematic sampling biases based on political party, gender, or language originally spoken. Therefore, we concluded that our procedure captured a very large sample of 'target group assertions' and was identifying them as if random, even though our procedure was not genuinely random. This gave us considerable confidence that the sample of 'target group assertions' we identified was representative of all 'target group assertions' in the Hansard debates.

To code the identified 'target group assertions,' a three-level coding frame was developed, each level corresponding to one of the defining elements of 'target group assertions'. The first level coded for types of target groups and had ten categories: safe firearms users, unsafe firearms users, victimized and

vulnerable people, law enforcement, first nations, provinces, businesses, taxpayers, other, and unclear. These categories were inductively developed through a close reading of the data and a process of subsumption (Schreier 2012). The second level of the coding frame coded for policy benefits/burdens and had only four categories: policy benefit, policy burden, other, and unclear. These categories were deductively derived from SCF theory, but were inductively fleshed out as lists of example benefits and burdens were developed through a close reading of the data. Finally, the third level coded for support/opposition for a target group-benefit/burden pairing. This level was deductively derived and included four categories: support, oppose, neutral and unclear. The entire coding frame was subjected to a round of practice coding, which involved coding the first 40 'target group assertions' from each of the three debates, and was revised and improved based on these results.

The coding procedure itself involved two coders working independently but using the same coding guide. The coders reviewed the highlighted and numbered 'target group assertions' in the Word files, and recorded their coding decisions in an Excel spreadsheet. The coders' results were then compared to identify coding discrepancies and to measure inter-coder reliability. The coefficient of agreement between the two coders was 81 percent, indicating a high level of inter-coder reliability. The coders then reviewed and discussed each coding discrepancy in an effort to determine the correct coding decision, based on the coding guide. Whenever agreement could not be reached, the disputed coding decision was coded as unclear. This process ultimately produced a single dataset of coding decisions based on the agreement of two trained coders.

The dataset was then analyzed in three steps to determine the prevalent social constructions in each debate.

First, the dataset was "cleaned" to remove any coding units that were coded as 'other' or 'unclear,' since these coding units contained no useful information for our analysis. After the cleaning, 658 coding units remained in the dataset.

Second, the various combinations of benefits/burdens and support/opposition were dichotomized as either deserving or undeserving social constructions, in the following manners:

- benefits + support = deserving
- burdens + opposition = deserving
- benefits + opposition = undeserving
- burdens + support = undeserving

Third, using the newly created social constructions data, frequency tables were created for each debate. These tables, shown tables 4, 5, and 6 below, tabulated the most frequently mentioned target groups as well as the proportions of assertions constructing each group as deserving or undeserving. Deserving constructions are shown without brackets, while undeserving constructions are shown within brackets. These frequency tables provided the data for tables 1 and 2, which appear in the chapter.

Table 4 – Social Constructions in the Bill C-17 House Debates

Target Groups	PCs	Liberals	NDP	BQ	Reform	Totals
Safe Firearms Users	40% (60%) n=20	12% (88%) n=26	27% (73%) n=11	0% (100%) n=7	0% (100%) n=5	20% (80%) n=69
Unsafe Firearms Users	0% (100%) n=17	8% (92%) n=12	0% (100%) n=6	0% (100%) n=1		3% (97%) n=36
Victims	100% (0%) n=2	100% (0%) n=3	100% (0%) n=1			100% (0%) n=6
Law Enforcement	100% (0%) n=2	100% (0%) n=1				100% (0%) n=3
Taxpayers				100% (0%) n=1		100% (0%) n=1

Table 5 – Social Constructions in the *Firearms Act* House Debates

Target Groups	Liberals	BQ	Reform	NDP	PCs	Totals
Safe Firearms Users	63% (27%) n=59	21% (79%) n=24	100% (0%) n=44	100% (0%) n=1	100% (0%) n=2	68% (32%) n=130
Unsafe Firearms Users	4% (96%) n=28	54% (46%) n=13	0% (100%) n=45	0% (100%) n=3		9% (91%) n=89
Victims	92% (18%) n=13	100% (0%) n=2	100% (0%) n=1	100% (0%) n=1		94% (6%) n=17
First Nations	100% (0%) n=9	0% (100%) n=1	0% (100%) n=3		100% (0%) n=1	71% (29%) n=14
Law Enforcement	100% (0%) n=2		89% (11%) n=9	100% (0%) n=1		92% (8%) n=12
Business	0% (100%)	0% (100%)				0% (100%)

	n=1	n=3				n=4
Taxpayers	0% (100%) n=1	100% (0%) n=1				50% (50%) n=2

Table 6 – Social Constructions in the *Ending the Long-Gun Registry Act* House Debates

Target Groups	Conservatives	NDP	Liberals	BQ	Green	Totals
Safe Firearms Users	73% (27%) n=96	38% (62%) n=24	0% (100%) n=3		100% (0%) n=1	65% (35%) n=124
Unsafe Firearms Users	0% (100%) n=38	25% (75%) n=4	0% (100%) n=1	0% (100%) n=1		2% (98%) n=44
Law Enforcement	100% (0%) n=10	100% (0%) n=23	100% (0%) n=5			100% (0%) n=38
Victims	100% (0%) n=7	100% (0%) n=18	100% (0%) n=6		100% (0%) n=1	100% (0%) n=32
Provinces	0% (100%) n=6	100% (0%) n=12	100% (0%) n=3		100% (0%) n=1	73% (27%) n=22
First Nations	100% (0%) n=1	100% (0%) n=4				100% (0%) n=5
Taxpayers	100% (0%) n=3		100% (0%) n=2			100% (0%) n=5
Business		0% (100%) n=3				0% (100%) n=3