A Curious Case of “Negative” Policy Diffusion?
The Legacy of Quebec’s ‘$5-a-day’ daycare

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Rahim Mohamed
Dept. of Politics and International Affairs, Wake Forest University
mohamers@wfu.edu

Abstract:

Since its inception in the fall of 1997, Quebec's "$5 per day" daycare program has emerged as Canada's most visible and widely-debated stand-alone provincial social program. However, while commendably stimulating a national conversation about universal child care, the program presents a more problematic legacy for child care advocates in other provinces and at the federal level. Firstly, acknowledged shortcomings of the Quebec model have provided fodder for ideologically-tinged attacks that use the example of Quebec as an indictment of the general concept of universal child care. Secondly, the branding of the program has motivated campaigners to emphasize price targets (e.g. British Columbia's "10-a-day" campaign) over the quality of care. This dynamic was especially prevalent in the coverage of the Baker et al. working paper "Non-Cognitive Deficits and Young Adult Outcomes: The Long-Run Impacts of a Universal Child Care Program" during the 2015 federal election campaign. I argue that the case of Quebec's daycare program challenges extant theoretical perspectives on Canadian federalism and inter-provincial policy transfer by presenting an anomalous example of 'negative diffusion'.

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Introduction

Since its inception in the fall of 1997, Quebec’s "$5 per day" daycare program has emerged as Canada's most visible and widely-discussed stand-alone provincial social program. Given a conspicuous lack of government financial support for subsidized daycare elsewhere in the country (see Arsenault et al. 2018), the Quebec program has emerged as a rallying point for child care activists – commonly presented as a model to be emulated by other provinces and supported by the federal government (see, e.g., Banerjee 2018; Brassard 2019). However, the program, now in its twenty-second year of existence, has also been a frequent target of pro-family and anti-big government interest groups, who have gleefully publicized its shortcomings in a concerted effort to prevent other provinces from setting up their own subsidized daycare programs. Moreover, given the program’s high national profile, it has inevitably shaped child care debates elsewhere in the country – and not necessarily in a way that has been advantageous to the proponents of reform.

In fact, I argue here that the example of Quebec’s provincial daycare program has, on balance, hamstrung reform efforts in other provinces and federally, constituting an anomalous case of ‘negative’ policy diffusion. This has happened for two principal reasons. Firstly, ideological opponents have been successful in highlighting flaws in the program’s administration; presenting the program as a cautionary tale for other provinces and pre-empting a more productive discourse about Canada’s chronic underinvestment in child care. Secondly, the program’s “x dollars-per-day” branding has been emulated by would-be reformers in other provinces, fostering a narrow policy focus on minimizing user fees. I draw from both a close reading of the relevant literature and a series of interviews with provincial child care advocates based in British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, and Prince Edward Island, conducted between 2016 and 2018.¹

The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with a review of the extant literature on interprovincial and bottom-up social policy transfer in Canada and then give a brief run-through of the series of events that led up to the creation of Quebec’s daycare program in 1997. I then address some prominent criticisms of the Quebec model before turning to an exploration of how Quebec’s experience has influenced policy discourses in other provinces; noting that provincial reform efforts have been hobbled by the countervailing efforts of ideological opponents (primarily right-of-center think tanks) to publicize shortcomings of the Quebec program and, more broadly, the advent of a national policy discourse that emphasizes low parental fees over high program quality. I then show that the insular national policy debate over the relative strengths and weaknesses of Quebec’s daycare program crowds-out a more constructive national conversation about addressing Canada’s lagging levels of investment in child care versus other middle and high-income countries.

¹ All interviewees were guaranteed anonymity.
Moving to the federal level, I then address the centrality of Quebec-inspired “$15-per-day” daycare to the federal NDP’s platform going into the 2015 election. Here, I note that the mid-campaign release of an academic working paper that tied the Quebec daycare program to negative long-run developmental outcomes (Baker et al. 2015) received substantial press coverage, hobbling the NDP’s ability to credibly campaign on its child care plan. This marked the second time that a proposed national child care framework, patterned on the Quebec model, headlined a failed federal election campaign, meaning that the window for any meaningful federal involvement in the financing and administration of child care has likely closed. I conclude with a discussion of how the influence of Quebec’s daycare program on both provincial and federal policy discourses challenges established perspectives on Canadian federalism and draw broader implications from my findings.

Canadian Federalism and Social Policy Transfer

The Canadian literature on federalism and social policy transfer is notable for challenging the pervasive view that the administrative decentralization inherent to federal systems necessarily leads to a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ type paring down of social program generosity. Much to the contrary, scholars have observed that, under the right set of circumstances, Canada’s federal institutions can quite effectively facilitate policy transfer – both horizontally (province-to-province) and vertically (from the provincial level to the federal level in areas of shared competence) (see Noël 1999 for a review). This stems largely from the periodic success of experimentative left-of-center parties at the provincial level; as well as the development, over time, of various consultative mechanisms that have enabled the parties to confederation to share ideas and work towards common objectives (Cameron and Simeon 2002). Some scholars have gone so far as to identify policy decentralization as a source of Canada’s periodic deviations from its default liberal-residualist policy orientation (see, e.g., Mahon 2008).

One exemplar in this respect is Antonia Maioni’s classical study of how Canada’s universal health insurance regime came to be. Maioni (1997) finds that Canada’s highly decentralized policy landscape allowed the prairie-based CCF-NDP to establish a foothold at a regional level, notably controlling the provincial government of Saskatchewan for much of the 1940s through 1960s. This beachhead gave subnational policy entrepreneurs an opportunity to experiment with new forms of health care delivery, creating a model for other provinces to learn from and, ultimately, the Liberal federal government to coopt. Maioni demonstrates, through a paired historical analysis of the coeval development of private health insurance in the United States, that such an entry point would not have existed in a more centralized policy ecosystem (p. 424). Another example, provided by Mahon (2008), is the process of policy learning and adaptation that took place among the Atlantic Provinces as they each experimented with various social activation policies in the late 1980s and 1990s (p. 352). Alain Noël (1999) saw this process of decentralized, province-to-province social policy transfer, paradoxically, as a potential path to greater national harmony, writing: “Provincial welfare states emerged that gave a substantive content to social policy and, in the process, created
strong provincial communities, able to emulate each other. If Canadians find their way to a new social contract, this is where they will find it.” (p 217).

Yet this framework fails to account for circumstances where social policy innovation in one province, Quebec here, actively impedes progress elsewhere. As such, I offer an important case of ‘negative’ policy diffusion in this piece, showing that the existence of a stand-alone daycare program in Quebec has consistently been an obstacle for would-be reformers elsewhere in the country and at the federal level. I offer a tangible contribution to the literature on Canadian federalism and social policy transfer by illustrating that the creation of a new social program in one province can actually diminish prospects for reform elsewhere when the program’s opponents are successful in shaping the way it is perceived.

Quebec’s Family Policy Breakthrough

Starting with the release of the landmark Castonguay-Nepveu report on health care and social services in 1967, the province of Quebec has long followed a quasi-autonomous course on health and social welfare policies (Jenson 2013, p. 631). While Quebec’s ‘go-it-alone’ approach has at times been largely symbolic, with provincial social programs bearing a close resemblance to the corresponding federally-administered ones found in the other provinces (McRoberts 1993, p. 141), family policy is one area where differences have generally been meaningful. Such deviations from the national current have alternatively reflected policy logics of pronatalism, feminism, and social solidarity at different points in time. This has resulted in an anomalous long-run policy trajectory that combines elements of the conservative, liberal, and social democratic paradigms (see Jenson 2013).

The most meaningful additions to Quebec’s family policy edifice came in 1997, through a comprehensive package of reforms implemented by the then governing Parti Québécois (PQ). The mid-1990s provided an opening for would-be reformers due to several accommodating factors, paramount among which was a dire need for the PQ to refurbish its political brand. A polarizing fall 1995 referendum on Quebec’s independence saw the proposed motion to secede from Canada fail by a margin of just over one percent. Narrow though it was, the defeat of the sovereignty bid nevertheless triggered the immediate resignation of then Premier Jacques Parizeau, the de facto leader of the pro-secession camp. On his way out, Parizeau notoriously attributed the referendum result to “money and the ethnic vote” (Farnsworth 1995).

Parizeau’s parting shot cemented already stirring perceptions of the PQ as parochial, xenophobic, and downright racist. The persistent characterization of the party as an ethno-nationalist vehicle was especially problematic given the ambiguous international law surrounding secession and the spate of ethnic violence that had accompanied the then ongoing secessionist claims-making in the former Yugoslav states and elsewhere in the world (Hebert 2008, pp. 151-2). In short, any future claim to Quebec’s political autonomy that could cut muster with both domestic and international audiences would need to be built on more than just ascriptive identity (Beland and Lecours 2006, p. 82).
With sovereignty off the table for the time being, the PQ government looked to reembrace its social democratic roots. In an effort to formalize this change in tone and establish the appropriate policy agenda, the party convened a Summit on the Economy and Employment in October of 1996. The Summit marked the first time in the province’s history that the government opened formal ‘quatripartite’ policy consultations with representatives from labor, business, and civil society groups (Levesque and Mendell 1999, p. 17). Despite differing motivations and agendas heading into the summit, the parties ultimately forged a consensus around the new paradigm of Social Economy, which proposed a synergistic relationship between public, voluntary, and for-profit entities acting jointly in pursuit of the collective well-being (see Arsenault 2018). The model specified a critical role for cooperatives, mutual benefit societies, and civic associations (Mendell 2003, p. 4).

One of the key substantive items to come out of the summit was a new blueprint for family policy as feminists, child development experts, and other participants were able to sell the initially hesitant premier, Lucien Bouchard, on the necessity (and potential political upside) of a complete overhaul (Jenson 2013, p. 628). A government white paper released two months after the summit’s conclusion (Les enfants au cœur de nos choix) outlined the core priorities that would shape the government’s new approach to family policy and unveiled a corresponding set of forthcoming reforms. Placing a distinct—and, to this point in the province’s history, unprecedented—emphasis on promoting employment and the equality of opportunity between men and women, the document proposed: a new targeted family allowance (available to all low-income parents with dependents under the age of eighteen), a new paid parental leave scheme (delinked from unemployment insurance), various child-friendly modifications of the provincial tax code, full and half-day kindergarten for five and four year-olds, respectively, and, most prominently, five-dollar-per-day care for children aged four and under (Jenson 2013, p. 646).²

In keeping with the Social Economy concept, and in particular its emphasis on the inclusion of ‘third sector’ civil society actors, the new daycare program would be delivered through a network of non-profit ‘Centres de la Petite Enfance’ (CPEs) and smaller home-based daycares.³ Each CPE was to be governed by a board of directors composed of at least seven persons, with a requirement that at least two-thirds of board members be the parents of program enrollees (Friendly et al. 2007, p. 65). The CPEs were authorized to accommodate between eight and eighty children, subject to provincially established space requirements and staff-to-child ratios (“Types of childcare services” 2018).

While the CPEs managed day-to-day administration, the provincial government’s role would be to provide requisite financing to cover the gap between the mandated five dollar a day user fee and program operating costs, primarily through direct grants to individual centers

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² The program was scheduled to begin, in September 1997, with four-year olds and then incrementally expand to younger ages until all children were eligible by the fall of 2001 (Les enfants au cœur 1997, p. 21). This target was reached in September 2000, one year ahead of schedule (Jenson 2013, p. 652-3).

³ Home-based daycares in Québec may only serve a maximum of six children (Friendly et al 2018, p. 50).
The provincial government, which had placed a moratorium on new licenses for commercial daycare centers in 1995, initially envisioned that the remaining for-profit centers would ultimately be absorbed into the CPE structure. However, facing an unexpected level of organized resistance from commercial operators and a desperate need for the spaces they could contribute to the system, officials begrudgingly made the new subsidies available to select for-profit providers, although at a less generous level than what the non-profits received. The moratorium on new commercial licenses was lifted 2002, leading to a steady increase in the amount of for-profit daycare spaces as a percentage of the total (Jenson 2006, pp. 12, 14).

Even with the continued involvement of the for-profit sector, Quebec’s new daycare program was a complete game-changer for Quebecois parents and toddlers. Starting from a baseline of around 54,000 total spaces in 1997 (Senkiw 2003, p. 16), the program generated an average of 15,000 new subsidized spaces per year over the first eight years of its existence. Although the rate of growth slowed somewhat from there, Quebec accumulated a total stock of over 215,000 subsidized spaces by the early 2010s (Fortin et al. 2012, p. 3)—enough to serve roughly half of all children aged four and under. The number has since surpassed 230,000 (Friendly et al 2016, pp. 44, 51). While parental fees have increased over the years—now starting at a baseline of $8.05 per day and rising incrementally for families with household incomes of $50,000 per year (see “Daily daycare costs” 2018)—Quebec still offers parents, by a wide margin, Canada’s most affordable daycare services. The per space cost of daycare is, in fact, three times higher in Manitoba, the province that comes closest, and over six times higher in neighboring Ontario (see Table #1). The program is also relatively cost-effective with an annual budget of roughly $2.5 billion, approximately 0.7% of provincial GDP (Fortin 2017) and much of this cost recouped in economic gains from increased labor force participation (Fortin et al. 2012). This actually puts Quebec slightly below the average, among OECD members, of 0.9% of GDP spent on early childhood education and care (Arsenault et al. 2018, p. 3).

Table #1 – Annual Cost of Child Care Across Canada

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Median annual parent fee per space, combined infant, toddler, preschooler (2015)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Columbia</td>
<td>$10,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alberta</td>
<td>$10,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saskatchewan</td>
<td>$6,984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manitoba</td>
<td>$5,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontario</td>
<td>$11,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Quebec</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,824</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Brunswick</td>
<td>$8,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nova Scotia</td>
<td>$8,816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince Edward Island</td>
<td>$7,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newfoundland</td>
<td>$9,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>$8,544</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Press and Leung 2015

Just as their architects had hoped, Quebec’s 1997 family policy reforms laid the groundwork for a new claim to cultural distinctiveness based on social solidarity and egalitarianism. The province’s celebrated daycare program in particular has become a lynchpin of this self-styled solidarism (See Beland and Lecours 2010, pp. 83-6). However, it would be a mistake to overstate the magnitude of the changes as Quebec’s family policy regime has retained both neoliberal and familial elements. In addition to the growth of the for-profit child care sector and the shift to income-targeted family benefits discussed above, Quebec has preserved Canada’s only universal tax credit for families with children—in conformity with the long-running familial tradition of direct, flat-rate parental subsidies (Jenson 2013, p. 648). Making note of such aberrations, Jenson (2013) classifies Quebec as a “mixed regime... falling more on the market performance side,” (p. 627).

**Criticisms of the Quebec Model**

Although justifiably lauded both within and outside of the province, Quebec's daycare program has not been immune from criticism — much of it valid. Detractors have been especially critical of the uneven distribution of spaces, leading to excess capacity in some parts of the province and multiyear wait-times in less well-served areas (Campbell 2006, pp. 210-11; Jenson 2013, pp. 655-56). Moreover, serious concerns have been raised with regards to the fairness of the system, as higher-income parents have been shown to receive preferential access to in-demand spaces (“Quebec’s unfair lottery” 2009). Perhaps most troublingly, lingering concerns about the general quality of care provided through the system, and the potential developmental consequences therein, have been validated by recent studies (see Baker et al. 2015; Haeck et al. 2015). These shortcomings are generally acknowledged by proponents and opponents of universal child care alike.

As the program’s earlier cohorts enter adulthood, researchers have uncovered some concerning long-run trends. Most notably, a controversial 2015 working paper, co-authored by economists from the University of British Columbia, University of Toronto, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, linked the introduction of Québec’s subsidized daycare program in the fall of 1997 to a “sizeable negative shock in non-cognitive skills... with little impact on cognitive test scores”, finding that “cohorts with increased child care access subsequently had worse health, lower life satisfaction, and [for boys] higher crime rates later in life,” (Baker et al. 2015, abstract). Although the authors utilized a dubious methodology that grouped program
enrollees and non-enrollees together (See Gordon 2015), the study nevertheless received substantial media attention due to the proximity of its release to Canada’s fall 2015 general election (see below). Another 2015 study, published in the journal Labor Economics, found evidence of a negative effect on school readiness for daycare attendees from low-income households (Haeck et al. 2015). These issues will likely persist (or worsen) over time as commercial daycare centers, which have been shown to provide a consistently inferior quality of care versus CPEs and family daycare (see Japel et al. 2005), have expanded steadily and now account for just over twenty percent of all subsidized spaces (see Figure 3.2).

Figure #1 - Regulated Daycare Spaces (for 0-4 year olds), Quebec

Source: Friendly et al. 2007; 2018

The Quebec Program and Interprovincial Policy Discourses

Opponents of child care, most prominently right-of-center think tanks, have seized on these shortcomings in attempts to dampen appetites for reform in other provinces. For instance, The Canadian Taxpayers Federation and Fraser Institute have both recently published reports condemning Quebec’s daycare program and cautioning other provinces against adopting similar policies (Geloso 2015; Geloso and Eisen 2017). These organizations have also churned out a multitude of unfavorable opinion pieces in various regional outlets, leading with headlines like: “Alberta shouldn’t copy Quebec’s failed government daycare plan” (MacPherson and Vallee 2016) and “Ontario is poised to repeat Quebec’s daycare mistakes” (Mrozek 2018).

While such ideologically-driven opposition is to be expected in the prevailing national political landscape, the centrality of the Quebec program to policy discourses outside the province has hobbled even sympathetic parties. Following the Quebec example, would-be reformers at the provincial levels have often led with price targets for parental user fees. For instance, the Coalition of Child Care Advocates of B.C. launched the website 10aday.ca in the run-up to British Columbia’s 2017 provincial election. Similarly, Alberta’s NDP government unveiled a plan for universal $25-per-day child care going into its unsuccessful spring 2019 re-
election campaign. Such branding betrays an implicit assumption that affordability trumps program quality, a logic that prioritizes keeping parental fees as low as possible over all else. Several of the provincial advocates I interviewed expressed exasperation with the shadow cast by Quebec’s program. One interviewee, a child care activist and former civil servant based in Victoria, characterized the situation as a “race to the bottom” wherein province-level activists have been pressured to embrace aggressive price targets with little consideration of the quality of care that would be provided under such frameworks (personal correspondence, 27 Aug 2017).

The insular discursive focus on Quebec has also obscured just how far Canada lags other jurisdictions in public support for early childhood education and care (ECEC). Canada is, in fact, tied for dead last among Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries in ECEC spending as a percentage of GDP (0.2%) – falling well behind even the United States (0.6%) (see Figure #2). Even the 0.7% of provincial GDP that Quebec devotes to its daycare program falls below the OECD average of 0.9%; a fact that has not stopped critics from decrying the program as unreasonably expensive and financially unsustainable (see, e.g., Geloso 2015; Yabuski 2017). Rather than taking seriously Canada’s chronic underfunding of ECEC and looking to other jurisdictions for inspiration, the principal participants in the policy discourse have unhelpfully concerned themselves with debating the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Quebec model. It stands to reason that the mere existence of Quebec’s provincial daycare program has impeded the development of a more productive national discourse on closing Canada’s ECEC funding gap versus virtually all other advanced economies.

Figure #2: Public Spending on Child Care⁴ - OECD Countries and Quebec (from Arsenault et al. 2018)

[Graph showing spending on child care across OECD countries and Quebec]


⁴The OECD uses total spending on in-kind family benefits as a comparative measure for child care (see: Arsenault, Jacques, and Maioni 2018).
Child Care in the 2015 Federal Election Campaign

Even though the defeat of Paul Martin’s Liberal government in the 2006 federal election – and with it the loss of Martin’s bilateral agreements on child care – seemed to signal the end of a national child care program as a credible political agenda item, the 2015 campaign presented an unexpected opening for further progressive action on child care. The Conservative Government’s final major policy initiative prior to calling the election was to increase the monthly payout of its Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) for children six and under and enable parents to claim a smaller monthly benefit for each child aged seven to seventeen – a gesture the government called “Christmas in July for moms and dads.” (Poilievre 2015). The beefed-up child benefit was so central to the government’s re-election strategy that then prime minister Stephen Harper circulated a letter to members of his caucus urging them to emphasize the benefit in their interactions with their constituents (“Harper tells MPs to tout child care payout” 2015). The UCCB expansion brought total federal spending on children’s benefits to $18-billion per year, comprising approximately 1% of national GDP (Department of Finance Canada 2015, Table 5.2.6).

While the notion of the benefit – a monthly cash allowance that parents could spend on anything the wished – as a child care policy had always strained credibility, ratcheting up payments to such a degree gave the opposition parties a cue to introduce their own big-ticket family policy items. The federal NDP, led by the Outremont-based Thomas Mulcair, used this opportunity to dust off the idea of a Quebec-inspired national daycare program. The multistage plan pledged to incrementally increase federal financial support for child care, culminating in $5-billion of annual spending to fund a million daycare spaces by the end of the NDP’s second term in office (Armstrong 2015) – contingent on $3.3-billion of additional spending from the provinces (Bryden 2015). Following provincial campaigners, Mulcair led with a price figure, $15-per-day, which was prominent in the NDP’s campaign branding.

The plan met immediate skepticism, as its feasibility was called into question by the other parties, members of the press, and provincial officials (Bryden 2015). This lukewarm response gave way to calamity at around the midpoint of the campaign, with the mid-September release of the abovementioned Baker et al. working paper on non-cognitive behavioral deficits linked to Quebec’s daycare program. Despite not having passed the threshold of peer-review, the study was quickly swept up into the campaign narrative, generating headlines like “Study links Quebec’s universal child-care system to crime rates” (Montreal Gazette) and “Study raises questions about NDP’s proposed universal child-care system” (Globe and Mail). While Mulcair’s poorly-received daycare plan was unlikely to be a substantial vote-getter to begin with, the coverage surrounding the Baker et al. study killed whatever momentum it may have given to the NDP campaign. Despite early polling that indicated that Mulcair had a good shot to lead the NDP to it’s first ever federal government, the party lost fifty-one seats en route to a disappointing third place finish.

5 The authors have thus far been unsuccessful in their attempts to publish “Non-cognitive deficits and young adult outcomes” in an academic journal (personal correspondence, 3 January 2018).
Over the years, pollsters have commissioned several polls to gauge the attitudes of Canadians on universal daycare and their findings have varied widely (see, e.g., Vanier Institute 2003; Environics 2006). This stated, data from the Canadian National Election Study (CNES), the country’s most comprehensive and reliable public opinion dataset, indicate that enthusiasm for the idea is on the wane. The most recent edition of the CNES, taken over the course of the 2015 federal election campaign, shows a 10% drop in support for publicly funded daycare versus levels of support recorded over the two previous election cycles – although a majority of respondents (53.4%) still favored the idea (see Table #2).

Table #2: “What Should Government Do?” (Canadian National Election Study)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fund public daycare</td>
<td>63.4%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>53.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Give money directly to parents</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know/no response</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents (#)</td>
<td>2,451</td>
<td>3,362</td>
<td>7,288</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusion

It is an oft quoted parable that “the road to hell is paved with good intentions”. This nevertheless seems to suit the policy legacy of Quebec’s daycare program – both internally and for the rest of the country. Faced with tight budget constraints in the mid-1990s, Quebec’s provincial government succeeded in building a viable daycare program ‘on the cheap’. However, as the program enters its third decade, evidence is beginning to mount that the program’s architects sacrificed too greatly on quality in order to keep daily parental fees in the single-digits and to contain the program’s hit on the provincial budget.

As this paper has shown, the ramifications of these decisions go beyond Quebec. With the shadow of Quebec’s program invariably cast over family policy debates in other provinces, and at the federal level, hostile ideological interest have been successful in amplifying the program’s shortcomings, framing it as a policy failure. Whether fair or not, this strategy appears to be working as, despite a myriad promises of “x-dollar-a-day” daycare, no other province has ultimately been able to follow Quebec’s lead. The lesson here for provincial social policy entrepreneurs is to ensure that their stand-alone programs are of the utmost quality. The continued influence of right-of-center think tanks and their allies in the national policy discourse means that any and all new social programs, both provincially and at the federal level, will inevitably find themselves under a microscope. It is unclear if the process of province-to-province social policy experimentation and emulation described by Noël above can persist in the prevailing political landscape.

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6 The release of the Baker et al. paper itself does not appear to have affected public opinion. CNES respondents polled after the study’s release (September 21st, 2015) were slightly more likely to support publicly funded daycare than those surveyed beforehand.
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