

THREATENED MAJORITIES: THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND COUNTERVIOLENCE

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ABSTRACT

When the marginalized groups organize protests and violent activities against majorities, the behavioral pattern of the majorities is affected as well, and it is essential to analyze the conflict through the lens of the majorities for a balanced argument. The reason for the majorities' apprehension can be due to various reasons. First, an unbalanced change of demographics against the current majority population, i.e., the greater population growth of the minority groups. Second, presence of minority nationalist parties makes the majority community apprehensive of their security. And third, growing local mobilizations against the majorities. This paper analyzes the security dilemma of the dominant ethnic groups, who feel threatened about their socio-economic control and the dominant status because of the above-mentioned factors and thereby engage in violence or elect right-wing candidates, both indicating ultranationalism. The number of politically relevant groups that can be responsible for any ethnic-communal violence in a country is more than the ones studied in the MAR project, which does a risk analysis of minority ethnic groups. To bridge this gap of the research, the paper focuses on threatened majorities and ensures concept-measure consistency by identifying the attributes of threat across province-year units of analysis. The spatial-temporal domain is India, and the paper uses process-tracing analysis from 2010 to 2019 on the Hindus of India to analyze a causality between the perceived threat to the majorities and the events of violence against the minorities.

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Introduction

The world has recently seen a surge of majoritarian nationalist electoral victories. From Australia to Germany; and United States to India, the majoritarian right has taken over the governance in these democracies with sweeping victories. Naturally, a query rises about the reasons behind such results. For instance, the centrist Congress party of India has traditionally been triumphant in elections since independence (with brief periods of exceptions). Similarly, the conservatives of Germany retained power defeating the socialists, and the Trump administration continues to draw mass support despite criticisms from elites and media houses. Identity politics literature and studies on democracy and electoral politics explores these matters through a scale of ideology and coalition analysis. This paper, instead, explores the reasons behind the growth of ultranationalism. The spatial temporal domain is the provinces of India from 2010-2019. The paper has come up with three probable causes that increases the ultranationalist spirits in public. And thereby, the ultranationalism either unfolds as communal violence or as electoral victory of rightist political candidates, or both. Drawing from Kopstein et. al. (2018), and Blalock (1967), I name the reasons for ultranationalism as endangered majority stimulus.

Not much scholarly literature is available on endangered majorities, although being a widely politicized issue in the current world. The focus, while analyzing ethnic conflicts is usually on minorities, but I seek to examine the issue from the majorities point of view. Power threat theory of Blalock (1967) theorized that proximity of different ethnic groups always do not lead to peaceful coexistence. Infact, the close proximity of the ethnic groups often increases the probability of interethnic violence. An endangered majority becomes a facilitating condition when it originates from an identity crisis. It is common to assume that identity crisis is more acute for the minority communities in a multinational state, which also has a significant dominant community. Nevertheless, only limited scholarly literature cover the sense of mistrust and angst that the majority community often harbors against the migrating aliens, the existing clustered minority, and the disadvantaged ethnic and religious groups. The reason for the apprehension or mistrust can be the greater population growth of the minority groups, the populist favoritism of some political parties towards minorities for their electoral benefits, increasing competition over limited natural resources, or rising economic and employment-related rivalries. Thus, I argue that this inherent mistrust and anger spurs because of several factors, which in turn stimulates a dominant majority community to mobilize against the other ethno-religious groups. This research aims to analyze the stimulating factors that threaten the majority community through process tracing and thereby draws the causal map of the endangered majority stimulus leading to ethnic and civil violence.

Any conflict requires at least two perpetrator groups and until the focus of study for ethnic conflicts has been usually the minorities. However, understanding the majorities' perspective is also necessary to understand the holistic causal procedure of an ethnic conflict, which involves a disadvantaged community and a plural dominant group. This research aims to bridge the gap. Thereby, it elucidates the endangered majority as a facilitating condition and includes the comprehensive research design and findings of the endangered majority stimulus. Through process tracing, it studies the causal effects of the attributes of endangered majority stimulus that involves the following –

- Increasing relative growth of the minorities
- Presence of minority nationalist parties
- Growing local mobilization against majorities

Theoretical Substructure: Endangered Majority Stimuli

Harff and Gurr (2004) framed a model for understating the facilitating conditions of ethnic conflict. The model explains the causality of conflict with a focus on contexts of conflict that involves societal norms of the disadvantaged groups, regime type, government response, external support and the like. Similar to Harff and Gurr, most scholarly literature focuses on resource and support for the disadvantaged minorities, their group cohesion, the group factions, and their ideologies and grievances. Thereby these literatures explain how the above-mentioned factors facilitate conflict and determine the behavioral patterns of disadvantaged communities. In contrast, this research aims to analyze the causality of conflict from the majority's point of view. In my argument, there exists a missing link between conflict behavioral patterns of disadvantaged communities and civil unrest, and that is 'Endangered majority stimuli'.

When the marginalized groups organize the protests and violent activities against majorities, however, it affects the behavioral pattern of the majorities and majority run government as well, and it is essential to analyze the conflict through the lens of the majorities as well for a balanced argument. Not many researchers have done that before, and I am trying to fill this gap by analyzing the fear, mistrust, and clash of identities.

An endangered majority becomes a facilitating condition originating from an identity crisis. It is common to assume that identity crisis is more acute for the minority communities in a multinational state, which also has a significant dominant community. Nevertheless, only limited scholarly literature covers the sense of mistrust and angst that the majority community often harbors against the migrating aliens, the existing clustered minority, and the disadvantaged ethnic and religious groups. The reason for the apprehension or mistrust can be due to various reasons. First, an unbalanced change of demographics against the current majority population, i.e., the greater population growth of the minority groups is a cause of alarm for the majorities as they fear of being outnumbered in future.

A second reason is the populist favoritism of some political parties towards an ethnic community for their electoral benefits. The populist favoritism is more observable in multi-ethnic democracies where elections are held regularly, and political parties have targeted ethnic group vote banks for support. The populist favoritism can be confirmed by a pro-minority tilt of the particular political party while recruiting state officials. Additionally, on issues of riots, the state administration might choose to be soft towards instances of organized criminality by minority communities, and they tacitly encourage the inflammatory comments of right-wing minority leaders. Thus, the above-mentioned biases often become a reason for apprehension and mistrust among the majorities.

Thirdly, increasing competition over limited natural resources or rising economic and employment-related rivalries also increase apprehension amongst communities. With minority population growing at a higher rate and existence of political biases towards the minorities by one or more political parties, the dominant communities develop a concern about maintaining economic status-quo and balance of power within the country.

Thus, I argue that this inherent mistrust and anger spurs because of several factors, which in turn stimulates a dominant majority community to mobilize against the other ethno-religious groups.

Identity: Perceptions and Differences

Regarding national identity and security, Kowert (2007) observes that “when national identity breaks down, this too has implications for international relations: civil wars, spin-off crises, the dissolution of existing states, and the constitution of new ones.”¹ This raises the question of whether national security depends on national identity, and if it does, then how would a plural or multinational state be built upon identity. More importantly, what impact would this established supranational homogenous identity have on the diverse population and groups? The latter question is relevant and significant to this research.

Multiculturalism maintains that building a single homogenous national identity in a plural multi-ethnic, multi-religious state is inappropriate as this might undermine and engulf the plural ethnonational identities. For Hegelian statist and traditional conservatives believing in a singular homogenous identity of a state, the same task is a positive one. These two mutually exclusive camps differ from each other in defining a state and a nation. The multiculturalists and pluralists maintain a distinction between a state and a nation regarding their constituent elements. They argue that state is a ‘political organization’ whereas a ‘nation is a social, cultural, psychological, emotional and political unity,’ and it might not even possess a ‘sovereign’ territory. Pluralism also argues that these different identities amalgamate to construct a heterogeneous identity that binds the people together and establishes a unique supranational identity. This ideological preference is mostly seen among the average members of the non-dominant communities who aims to retain their distinct character in an otherwise plural state and among liberals as well.

In contrast, the conservatives who base their support on a particular race or ethnoreligious group of significant majorities aim to develop a homogenous identity for the state. They believe that instead of a multinational state with multiple identities, it is more straightforward and better to homogenize the entire nation through a single identity that overlaps among the communities. It has a benefit – homogenization unifies the people subduing their innate differences. For instance, if a state has communities that cut across the lines of economic conditions, language and race, it is bound to develop many exclusive national identities. An example of such state is India, which has 22 different languages, various races, and cultures giving birth to a multinational state. If these otherwise mutually exclusive groups share a common religion, however, they end up sharing a collective identity too. In such scenario, a conservative majoritarian party that has representation from one or few of these groups would aim to

¹ Kowert, P. A. (1998). National identity: inside and out. *Security Studies*, 8(2-3), 1-34.

politically emphasize and expedite the cleavage of religion to homogenize the identity of the people (members of all the groups) and thereby come to power. This party and their core supporting ethnic groups will also argue that the national security and the overall unified development of the country depend on this 'homogenous national identity,' and alternatively, the diverse and multidimensional character of the state weakens the national unity slowly leading to its disintegration. Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) often associated with *Sinhala Maha Sabha* and other Sinhala nationalist parties is a major political party of Sri Lanka that advocates a homogenous Sinhala Sri Lankan national identity. Under SLFP's leadership, Sinhala became the official language of the island state in 1956 undermining the demands of the Tamil minorities.

The majoritarian conservatives also do not trust the mutually exclusive groups and feel that without reiterating the shared identity, the state will fall apart and be in shambles. The majoritarian conservative government or its prominent leaders, having support from a significant section of the population thereby tries to build up a homogenous unity amongst diversity. Often it leads to constructive nation-building – as done by Mahathir Mohammad in Malaysia, Nehru and Indira Gandhi in India, or initiated by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, but sometimes also lead to agony and harsh repression as done by Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, or Gaddafi in Libya. It is not surprising that these majoritarian state patriots consider submission to a common identity and symbol is necessary for the citizens, and regionalism or existence of diverse national identities and multiethnic mobilizations to be antithetical to the interests of the state, and its unity. Thereby any social movement by the minorities, and campaigns by non-majority ethnic groups or political parties make the majorities suspicious at the non-majority communities. The suspicion grows because the majoritarian leaders and their supporting groups consider increasing heterogenous diversity to be the source of an un-unified state that lacks a common nation-state ideology and ethos. The majority group also believes that an un-unified state without a common identity and ideology would be a weak state prone to secession. Finally, the majorities also fear that in such an un-unified weak state with diverse identities, the currently dominant group(s) will lose the power status-quo making them 'endangered.'

The feeling of being threatened and the fear of a weakened state often makes the dominant section suspicious about the non-dominant groups, who the dominant group(s) mistrust and blames for any sociopolitical tensions. This leads to a theoretical argument that the *Threatened feeling and fear of losing dominance (of majorities) raises suspicion about the non-dominant groups*. This argument is tested through various hypotheses stated later in the chapter.

Ultra-Nationalism: From Endangered to Counter-Mobilization and Nationalist Elections

Just as grievances lead to mobilization for marginalized groups, the feeling of being endangered on their own soil makes dominant ethnic groups counterattack against the marginal groups/forces. Earlier chapters on necessary conditions theorize the probability that marginalized groups may mobilize against the dominant groups; for example, the *Bambaras* of Mali has sporadically mobilized against the dominant *Tameshaq*, or the Bengalis of East Pakistan

seceded West Pakistan through a civil war in 1971. Similarly, members of the threatened national plural group(s) counter mobilize against the nationally non-dominant group(s) at a city/village/district where the non-dominant group is a numerical minority.

In a federal country, the province administrations enjoy the significant power and in a multi-ethnic state, the province population often comprise of the majority of one or another ethnic group. These ethnic groups might not be a plural dominant group at the country level but often maintain dominance in the particular province. For instance, the Kashmiri Muslims are non-dominant in India but are a significant majority in the state of Jammu & Kashmir. In such a scenario, a local populist party that rules over such a province might retain power by appealing to a particular ethnic community who are the local majority, making the other non-plural groups regionally marginalized. For instance, the Kashmiri Hindu Pandits (an ethnic group of India) witnessed marginalization and violence by Muslims in the late 1980s and 1990s that forced them to migrate out of the valley and resettle in other parts of the country. This incident did not go unnoticed by the Hindus in India, and the demolition of *Babri* Mosque by a right-wing Hindu organization in 1992 followed by the Bombay riots can be indicated as instances of counter mobilization by Hindus due to the fear of becoming endangered. Similarly, *Bamars* (a dominant plural group in Myanmar)² although being the dominant ethnic group in the country, face social marginalization in Kachin province, which is the native state of Kachin and six other ethnic groups including the *Shans*. The inter-ethnic feuds in Myanmar have led to ongoing Kachin conflict since 2012 that involves the pro-Christian Kachin Independence Army and the Government of Myanmar which has a dominance of *Bamar* people.

Cederman (2011) argued that grievance against majority groups leads to mobilization by marginalized communities. The same logic is applicable in a sub-national provincial level, where the demographics are probably reversed turning the plural dominant group(s) of the country into a regional minority. Similarly, it can be thus argued that when the local minority group; despite being the national majority, is attacked by the local dominant communities, the local minority develops grievance against the local majority and thereafter countermobilizes. This is an example of a security dilemma within state boundaries and among ethnic groups, and I have explained the reason below.

The realist concept of 'the security dilemma' here explains the fear of the groups when they suddenly find themselves newly responsible for their security (Posen, 1993).³ Realism argues that the anarchical nature of the international system makes security the primary concern of the states. Just like in the international system, within a multi-ethnic heterogenous state, groups of people are divided along ethnic/religious/cultural lines. The absence of a strong state creates an anarchy within the country and makes each group worry about its own survival. In such a scenario, among those groups begins a competition for security. This competition continues to a point at which some of the competing groups gets more power than needed for security, and the situation poses a threat to other groups and they respond in turn. If the relative power of the non-plural groups tends to rise over a period, it seems offensive to the majority group(s) who

² Ethnic Power Relations dataset codes them as dominant (numerical strength 6, at a range of 0-6).

³ Posen, B. R. (1993). The security dilemma and ethnic conflict. *Survival*, 35(1), 27-47.

fear of losing the status quo and the current balance of power within the country. Finally, because the plural dominant group(s) wish to remain secure and maintain power, they react by trying to strengthen their own positions and in order counter mobilizes against the minorities.

This research analyzes the security dilemma of dominant ethnic groups who feel threatened about their socio-economic control and their dominant status because of the population growth of minorities, continued immigration, and local small-scale mobilizations against them by the marginalized group(s) (who might be the local majority). These localized mobilizations against the national majority groups make a more profound impact on the psyche of the majoritarian group(s) as the majorities do not expect such mobilizations to occur. If these attacks keep on happening in parts of the country in the form of protests, riots, or guerrilla attacks or minor vandalism, in retaliation a significant counter-mobilization by the majoritarian group is likely to happen.

However, majorities always do not mobilize against minorities. The effect of rising suspicion and tension within the majority community also results in right lenient polling. Established democracies like the US and Canada have institutional checks and balances to prevent riots. Even quasi-federal countries like India has a long tradition of electoral politics. This nature of political culture among the masses often lead to sweeping victories of right wing political parties, which also can be referred as an indicator of ultra-nationalism.

H1: Growing local mobilization against Majorities surges ultranationalism

Change of Demographics

Demographic shifts are an additional facilitating condition for civil conflict. Growth rates of the population can vary across ethnic communities, and it raises a feeling of insecurity among the members of the dominant group(s) if the growth rate of the dominant community is lower than that of the marginalized community. They fear that in the near future (10, 20, or 50 years depending on the growth rate differential) the composition of the state population will change, making today's marginalized community tomorrow's majority. This means that the privileges that the dominant community enjoys today will become severely hampered in the future. For instance, a democracy will have a shift in power if the minorities of today turn out to be tomorrow's majority by the simple logic of numbers of votes earned. This feeling of insecurity by the dominant group(s) develops against the minorities because of the inherent security dilemma and the prior existing mistrust due to the various cleavages of differences that exist between them. As Posen argues, the groups are often incapable of assessing the offensive action potential of each other, and their lack of information coupled with cohesion provides the emotional power stimulating the groups to take aggressive actions against each other.⁴ In the given scenario mentioned above, as an offensive action, the government run by the dominant group(s) might invoke laws that are not ethno-diverse or even use severe punitive actions against militants and extremists representing such communities. In the societal life, hate speeches, communal attacks (both verbal and physical), and racism might increase substantially indicating that the majority are feeling endangered.

⁴ Ibid.

H2: *Increasing relative growth of the minorities surges ultranationalism*

Increasing Support for marginalized communities by Minority Nationalist Parties

Revolutionary mobilization and radical hate speeches are perceived as inciting factors for terrorism by any state. Additionally, repeated guerrilla attacks and extremist militancy by rebel groups because of increasing revolutionary motivation are antithetical to a country's political and economic stability. In a multi-ethnic country, when the minority groups receive nationalist support from a political party or a non-government entity, it increases tension among the majority dominant group(s), also raises nationalist appeals. The majorities are frightened of the militancy, the terror attacks, and consider these fringe elements as the destroyers of a collective national ethos. The Red Mosque of Pakistan used to spread radical messages of jihad against non-Muslims for years and was viewed with suspicion by the majority Hindus in India. Moreover, there is a current growth of '*Hindutva*' in Hindi speaking heartland of India, and their political campaigns are often anti-Pakistan and critical towards Islam. The increasing radical support within and across the border has sown the seeds of mistrust among the communities which in turn has made the majority feel endangered. The speeches of the propagators of counter violence against the minority groups across the world also reiterate these feelings of insecurity, thereby, validating the argument that I have tried to consolidate.

H3: *Presence of minority nationalist parties surges ultranationalism*

Research Design

The spatial temporal domain is the states/provinces of India over the period of 2010-2019.

Causal Variables

Indexing Growth Rate of the Minorities

Indian Census's digital library⁵ was used to gather data on population of religious groups of India. Periodical census is not very common in the global south; however, India is an exception. Saying that, one must remember that the census procedures have gotten better over time in this country. The granularity is decadal, and state level data on religious population hasn't been collected till the beginning of the new millennium. 2001 and 2011 census accumulated state wise data on urban, rural, as well as total population of every religious groups. I have collected and indexed that data – which will help me in analyzing population growth of minorities (Muslims) across states. Additionally, the country level population of majority Hindus and minority Muslims (1951-2011) have been gathered from the national statistics⁶ to assess the growth trend of the religious groups.

Population Trend of Religious Groups –

⁵ <http://www.censusindia.gov.in/DigitalLibrary/Tables.aspx>

⁶ Orgi. (n.d.). Census of India Website: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India. Retrieved November 25, 2018, from <http://censusindia.gov.in/>

Religious Groups	Population	Population	Population	Population	Population	Population	Population	Population
	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011	Population Growth Rate
Hinduism	84.10%	83.45%	82.73%	82.30%	81.53%	80.46%	79.80%	-5.11%
Islam	9.80%	10.69%	11.21%	11.75%	12.61%	13.43%	14.23%	45.20%
Christianity	2.30%	2.44%	2.60%	2.44%	2.32%	2.34%	2.30%	0.00%
Sikhism	1.79%	1.79%	1.89%	1.92%	1.94%	1.87%	1.72%	-3.91%
Buddhism	0.74%	0.74%	0.70%	0.70%	0.77%	0.77%	0.70%	-5.41%
Jainism	0.46%	0.46%	0.48%	0.47%	0.40%	0.41%	0.37%	-19.57%
Zoroastrianism	0.13%	0.09%	0.09%	0.09%	0.08%	0.06%	not counted	-53.85%
Others/Religion not specified	0.43%	0.43%	0.41%	0.42%	0.44%	0.72%	0.90%	109.30%

Table 1: Population Percentage of Religious Groups of India⁷

Table 1 systematically indexes the country level population percentage of majority Hindus, significant minority Muslims, and other non-significant minority religions over a period of 60 years in India. The population growth rate column indicates the growth or reduction of population of the religious groups. And a close observation makes it clear that the population percentage of the majority Hindus have decreased by 5.11% over 60 years, while the minority Islam has grown by 45%. This country level statistics portrays the general overview of the scenario that the growth rate of the minorities is higher than that of the majorities.

2001 and 2011 Census and Statistics –

2001 and 2011 census⁸ recorded state level population of each religious groups. I collected the population data from the government source and tabulated for an in-depth study about regional and state level statistics. Table 1 presents the metadata of all religious groups, and table 2 presents the population growth index of majority Hindus and minority Muslims across states.

[Table 2]

As seen in table 1, the significant minority in India are the Muslims. Thus, in table 2 I index the growth rate of majority Hindus and minority Muslims, and thereby create a binary ‘growth of minority population index’. In the binary index 0 is coded when majority growth rate > minority growth rate, and 1 is coded when minority growth rate > majority growth rate.

The growth rate of majority and minority in each state is calculated by the following method:

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Orgi. (n.d.). Census of India Website: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India. Retrieved November 25, 2018, from http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/Religion_PCA.html

$$PR = \frac{(V_{Present} - V_{Past})}{V_{Past}} \times 100 \quad \text{Where:}$$

PR = Percent Rate
 $V_{Present}$ = Present or Future Value
 V_{Past} = Past or Present Value

Table 2 not only provides us the binary comparative index of the majority and minority, but also shows the growth rate of the groups in each state within the country. Thus, despite doing a process tracing in the context of one country, the state level statistics helps us to dig deeper and compare within states and regions. For instance, now we can look for the causal effect of the minority's population growth on majorities' attacks on minorities across the states. Additionally, we would expect that the attacks on minority groups will be more likely in states where the growth rate of minorities is significantly higher than majorities and the other causal variables are also present.

Next, I reorganized the state level statistics and indexes into various regions within the country. It is not unknown that India as a country is divisible into various fronts such as North, South, East, and West. I added Union Territories (UT), North-East, and Central India to the pool and created 6 different indexes for the study about growth rates. The results in the form of a pivot chart is given below




Figure 1

Indexing Presence of Minority Nationalist Parties

India has a multi-party system with recognition accorded to national, state, and district level parties. The Election Commission of India reviews the status periodically. Other political parties

that wish to contest local, state or national elections are required to be registered by the Election Commission of India (ECI)⁹. Registered parties are upgraded as recognized national or state level parties based upon objective criteria. Additionally, the Ministry of Home Affairs of India has banned a number of organizations that have been proscribed as terrorist organizations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.¹⁰ I have used both the resources to create a list of organizations across India as given below.

States/UTs	RELIGIOUS MINORITY PERCENTAGE	GROWTH INDEX (0/1)	Minority Nationalist Parties	Names	Banned Organizations
JAMMU & KASHMIR	71.36857082	1	2	PDP, PPU	13
HIMACHAL PRADESH	4.677357842	1	0		0
PUNJAB	60.99377804	1	1	Akali Dal	3
CHANDIGARH	18.91667061	1	0		0
UTTARANCHAL	16.81363181	1	0		0
HARYANA	12.1608805	1	0		0
DELHI	17.23741464	1	1	Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI)	0
RAJASTHAN	10.49903151	1	2	Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), WPI	0
UTTAR PRADESH	19.86373805	1	4	Peace Party of India, Social Democratic Party of India, Rashtriya Ulama Council, Indian Secular Party,	
BIHAR	17.03783032	1	1	Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI)	0
SIKKIM	39.22076986	1	2	SDF, SKM	2
ARUNACHAL PRADESH	44.21963292	1	1	National People's Party (NPP)	0
NAGALAND	90.8395847	1	3	Naga People's Front, NPP, Nationalist Democratic Progressive Party (NDPP)	1
MANIPUR	49.98574827	1	3	SDPI, NPP, NPF	5
MIZORAM	97.05196654	1	3	Mizo National Front, Mizoram People's Conference, Zoram Nationalist Party	0
TRIPURA	16.39609714	1	1	Indegenous People's Front of Tripura,	1

⁹https://web.archive.org/web/20150522211954/http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ElectoralLaws/OrdersNotifications/year2014/EnglishNotification_12032014.pdf

¹⁰ Banned Organizations of India.

<https://mha.gov.in/Division%20of%20MHA/Counter%20Terrorism%20and%20Counter%20Radicalization%20Division/Banned%20Organizations>. Retrieved on 4/22/2019

MEGHALAYA	79.42107035	1	2	NPF, Hill State People's Democratic Party	0
ASSAM	38.20111188	1	3	All India United Democratic Front, Bodoland People's Front, SDPI,	4
WEST BENGAL	28.11235338	1	4	SDPI, Gorkha National Liberation Front, Gorkha Janamukti Morcha, Welfare Party of India (WPI)	1
JHARKHAND	19.07649581	1	1	SDPI	0
ORISSA	5.025039418	1	0		0
CHHATTISGARH	4.486334379	1	0		0
MADHYA PRADESH	7.37391753	1	1	SDPI	0
GUJARAT	10.34364636	1	2	SDPI, Muslim Coordination Committee (MCC)	1
DAMAN & DIU	9.244101674	1	0		0
DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI	5.494764466	1	0		0
MAHARASHTRA	18.51461223	1	3	Bharatiya Minorities Suraksha Mahasangh (BMSM), SDPI, WPI	0
ANDHRA PRADESH	10.98255695	1	2	AIMIM, SDPI	1
KARNATAKA	14.99328991	1	2	SDPI, WPI	1
GOA	33.61308701	1	1	SDPI	0
LAKSHADWEEP	97.09956106	1	0		0
KERALA	44.97180018	1	4	SDPI, WPI, Indian National League (INL), Indian Union Muslim League	2
TAMIL NADU	12.02211234	1	2	SDPI, WPI	0
PONDICHERRY	12.40864039	0	0		0
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS	30.22247564	1	0		0

Indexing Mobilization against Majorities

Events of major incidents engineered by militants across the provinces of India are used as measures for mobilizations against state and the majority.¹¹

¹¹ Datasheet - ISLAMIST/OTHER CONFLICTS. (2019, April 19). Retrieved April 22, 2019, from <https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/incidents-data/india-islamistotherconflicts>

Outcome Variable

The research is still under process and I have successfully tabulated one of the two indicators of ultra-nationalism – incidents of communal violence.¹² The yearly statement given by Ministry of Home Affairs to the Indian Parliament about communal violence across India (state wise) is used for this purpose.

Observation and Conclusion

The research observes that as the mobilization against majorities increases, the growth rate of minorities become higher than majorities, and the majority nationalist parties operate in the provinces, the trend of the incidents of communal violence in respective provinces becomes positive.

This observation is backed by descriptive statistics and figures to be presented at the conference. Additionally, my future research will assess this finding through a statistical model backed by two case studies.

Appendix

Table 2

State	Year	Total	NATIONAL MAJORITY Hindus	NATIONAL MINORITIES Muslims	GROWTH OF MAJORITY	GROWTH OF MINORITY	GROWTH RATE OF MAJORITY (%)	GROWTH RATE OF SIGNIFICANT MINORITY (%)	GROWTH OF MINORITY POPULATION INDEX (0/1)
INDIA	2001	1028610328	827578868	138188240					
INDIA	2011	1210854977	966257353	172245158	138678485	34056918	16.7571322	24.64530846	1
JAMMU & KASHMIR	2001	10143700	3005349	6793240					
JAMMU & KASHMIR	2011	12541302	3566674	8567485	561325	1774245	18.6775313	26.1178024	1
HIMACHAL PRADESH	2001	6077900	5800222	119512					
HIMACHAL PRADESH	2011	6864602	6532765	149881	732543	30369	12.62956832	25.41083741	1
PUNJAB	2001	24358999	8997942	382045					
PUNJAB	2011	27743338	10678138	535489	1680196	153444	18.67311436	40.16385504	1
CHANDIGARH	2001	900635	707978	35548					
CHANDIGARH	2011	1055450	852574	51447	144596	15899	20.42379848	44.72544166	1
UTTARANCHAL	2001	8489349	7212260	1012141					
UTTARANCHAL	2011	10086292	8368636	1406825	1156376	394684	16.03347633	38.99496216	1
HARYANA	2001	21144564	18655925	1222916					
HARYANA	2011	25351462	22171128	1781342	3515203	558426	18.84228737	45.66347975	1
DELHI	2001	13850507	11358049	1623520					
DELHI	2011	16787941	13712100	2158684	2354051	535164	20.72583945	32.96319109	1
RAJASTHAN	2001	56507188	50151452	4788227					
RAJASTHAN	2011	68548437	60657103	6215377	10505651	1427150	20.94785012	29.80539561	1
UTTAR PRADESH	2001	166197921	133979263	30740158					

¹² <https://mha.gov.in/MHA1/Par2017/pdfs/par2013-pdfs/ls-070513/6502.pdf>

UTTAR PRADESH	2011	199812341	159312654	38483967	25333391	7743809	18.90844182	25.19118152	1
BIHAR	2001	82998509	69076919	13722048					
BIHAR	2011	104099452	86078686	17557809	17001767	3835761	24.61280446	27.95326907	1
SIKKIM	2001	540851	329548	7693					
SIKKIM	2011	610577	352662	9867	23114	2174	7.013849272	28.25945665	1
ARUNACHAL PRADESH	2001	1097968	379935	20675					
ARUNACHAL PRADESH	2011	1383727	401876	27045	21941	6370	5.774935186	30.81015719	1
NAGALAND	2001	1990036	153162	35005					
NAGALAND	2011	1978502	173054	48963	19892	13958	12.98755566	39.87430367	1
MANIPUR	2001	2166788	996894	190939					
MANIPUR	2011	2855794	1181876	239836	184982	48897	18.55583442	25.60870226	1
MIZORAM	2001	888573	31562	10099					
MIZORAM	2011	1097206	30136	14832	-1426	4733	-4.518091376	46.86602634	1
TRIPURA	2001	3199203	2739310	254442					
TRIPURA	2011	3673917	3063903	316042	324593	61600	11.84944384	24.20983957	1
MEGHALAYA	2001	2318822	307822	99169					
MEGHALAYA	2011	2966889	342078	130399	34256	31230	11.12850933	31.49169599	1
ASSAM	2001	2665528	17296455	8240611					
ASSAM	2011	31205576	19180759	10679345	1884304	2438734	10.89416299	29.59409199	1
WEST BENGAL	2001	80176197	58104835	20240543					
WEST BENGAL	2011	91276115	64385546	24654825	6280711	4414282	10.80927431	21.80910858	1
JHARKHAND	2001	26945829	18475681	3731308					
JHARKHAND	2011	32988134	22376051	4793994	3900370	1062686	21.11083213	28.48025411	1
ORISSA	2001	36804660	34726129	761985					
ORISSA	2011	41974218	39300341	911670	4574212	149685	13.17224848	19.64408748	1
CHHATTISGARH	2001	20833803	19729670	409615					
CHHATTISGARH	2011	25545198	23819789	514998	4090119	105383	20.7308029	25.72732932	1
MADHYA PRADESH	2001	60348023	55004675	3841449					
MADHYA PRADESH	2011	72626809	66007121	4774695	11002446	933246	20.00274704	24.29411402	1
GUJARAT	2001	50671017	45143074	4592854					
GUJARAT	2011	60439692	53533988	5846761	8390914	1253907	18.58737843	27.30125974	1
DAMAN & DIU	2001	158204	141901	12281					
DAMAN & DIU	2011	243247	220150	19277	78249	6996	55.14337461	56.96604511	1
DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI	2001	220490	206203	6524					
DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI	2011	343709	322857	12922	116654	6398	56.5724068	98.06866953	1
MAHARASHTRA	2001	96878627	77859385	10270485					
MAHARASHTRA	2011	112374333	89703057	12971152	11843672	2700667	15.21161771	26.29541838	1
ANDHRA PRADESH	2001	76210007	67836651	6986856					
ANDHRA PRADESH	2011	84580777	74824149	8082412	6987498	1095556	10.30047607	15.68024302	1
KARNATAKA	2001	52850562	44321279	6463127					
KARNATAKA	2011	61095297	51317472	7893065	6996193	1429938	15.78517849	22.12455364	1
GOA	2001	1347668	886551	92210					
GOA	2011	1458545	963877	121564	77326	29354	8.722115253	31.8338575	1
LAKSHADWEEP	2001	60650	2221	57903					
LAKSHADWEEP	2011	64473	1788	62268	-433	4365	-19.49572265	7.538469509	1
KERALA	2001	31841374	17883449	7863842					
KERALA	2011	33406061	18282492	8873472	399043	1009630	2.231353695	12.83888969	1
TAMIL NADU	2001	62405679	54985079	3470647					
TAMIL NADU	2011	72147030	63188168	4229479	8203089	758832	14.9187546	21.86428064	1
PONDICHERRY	2001	974345	845449	59358					
PONDICHERRY	2011	1247953	1089409	75556	243960	16198	28.85567314	27.28865528	0
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS	2001	356152	246589	29265					
ANDAMAN & NICOBAR ISLANDS	2011	380581	264296	32413	17707	3148	7.180774487	10.75687682	1