

Mobilizing Ignorance?
Comparing Populist Approaches to Trade and Migration in English Speaking States¹

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Abstract: While exclusionary populism is transforming the political spectrum in many states, there are often assumptions of similarities across borders. This research will examine populism in several English-speaking states to assess similarities and differences in emphasis on core issues relating to trade and international migration. While there seems to be similar rhetoric and approaches on some issues notably nativist responses to immigration, there are marked differences on other issues. For instance, Canadian populists remain resolutely pro free trade, with trade deals with Europe and Asia enjoying overall public support; in contrast the US populist movement has more characteristics of protectionism and nationalism which disrupts economic agreements. In the overall project, comparisons will be drawn between populist political positions on trade deals, immigration and refugees in the “five eyes” countries: Canada, New Zealand and Australia the US, UK . Research will explore the extent and sources of variations in approaches by right-wing populist parties. This project will involve mixed-methods, triangulated research drawing upon qualitative and quantitative analyses produced in government, academic, political party, non-governmental and think tank settings. The author will analyze government documents, legislative proceedings, journalistic and NGO publications and political party discourses. This will be supplemented by surveys of public opinion done in the target countries by polling firms, university institutes or government agencies. Economic distress and cultural nationalism and nativism, plus the context of institutions (especially electoral systems) and the use leaders make of nativist rhetoric seem pivotal to the different trajectories of exclusionary populist movements in these case studies. For the CPSA presentation, the focus will be on Australia and New Zealand though the other three cases will be referenced (and further developed over time). Overall the analysis challenges the either/or vision of cultural nativist versus economic sources of right populism, which produces problematic scholarship and political strategy.

Introduction:

Hogan and Haltinner discerned “striking similarities that suggest a cross-fertilization of ideas and rhetoric between right-wing populist groups across the globe, and the emergence of a transnational right-wing populist ‘playbook’ which can be successfully adapted and employed in a variety of national settings.” (2015, 521). This project sets out to compare more systematically the positions of such parties across these five states on two issues: trade and immigration. (The focus will be on minor right populist parties, as well as major parties which have adopted populist rhetoric in response to real or perceived electoral challenges from such parties.

¹ The analysis, conducted with limited resources with a FASS undergraduate research grant from Dalhousie University, is inherently preliminary. Please do not cite without permission. Special thanks to Noel Guscott for his energetic pursuit and provisions of research materials for this analysis.

Table 1: Right Wing Parties included in the Project

Australia	New Zealand	Canada	United Kingdom	United States
Liberal Party	New Zealand First	Conservative	Conservative	Republican
National Party		People’s Party	UKIP	
One Nation			Brexit Party	

In the interest of space, only the cases of New Zealand and Australia will be covered here. This essay will consider the impact of the electoral system in these case studies and how these create different possibilities for exclusionary populist movements and parties with minority support to exercise outsized influence over the political system. It will revisit and update Hogan and Haltinner argue that, while “right-wing populist parties and movements may achieve only limited direct electoral impact, such groups have the potential to significantly reshape national politics by nudging public discourses and public policy to the right.” (2015, 521). Polling data from each state will illustrate that, despite the absence of a majority in public opinion favoring xenophobic or exclusionary policies, there has been an augmentation in exclusionary discourse driven by political leadership more openly expressing such views, with variations across the cases. As the US and UK cases suggest, the FPTP model provides perverse incentives to divisive discourses which also separate people by region, class and education. However, Australia’s STV Senate elections and New Zealand’s MMP system also contributed to the rise of smaller populist parties which may become influential as “queenmakers” in coalition governance.

Table 2: Electoral system by country

Office	New Zealand	Australia	Canada	United Kingdom	United States
Lower Chamber	House of Representatives	House of Representatives	House of Commons	House of Commons	House of Representatives
Electoral System	Mixed: Mixed-member PR system. 2 votes, party vote & electorate vote; 63 single member, 7 Maori, 50 PR list	Majority: Direct preferential majority vote (ranked ballots); 150 single member districts	Majority: plurality system ("first past the post"); 338 single member districts	Majority: plurality system ("first past the post"); 650 single member districts	Majority: plurality system "first past the post" (except Georgia runoff); 435 single member districts
Upper Chamber	None	Senate	Senate	House of Lords	Senate
Electoral System	N/A	Proportional: Single-transferable-vote (party slate and ranked ballot) 76: 12 per state, 2 per territory	Appointed: serve to age 75	Appointed: Life peers and bishops	Majority: plurality "first past the post" (except Georgia runoff); 2 state-wide districts per 50 states
Head of State	Monarch/Governor General	Monarch/Governor General	Monarch/Governor General	Monarch	President
Electoral System	Appointment	Appointment	Appointment	Hereditary	Indirect election in electoral college (plurality doesn't always win)

Source: International Parliamentary Union PARLINE database (plus author’s additions)

Populism Analyzed


This analysis draws on definitions of populism which distinguish exclusionary and inclusionary variants, as deployed elsewhere by the author (Finbow, 2017; 2018). Populism, per Mudde, refers to an “ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2004, 543). As a thin centered ideology based around this simple distinction, populism is subject to potential manipulation and exploitation by leaders who employ this rhetoric differentially, especially by providing inclusive or exclusive variants of the “corrupt elite” versus the “pure people”. (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 151). With McSwiney and Cottle (2017), this author follows Mudde’s depiction of the populist right as demarcated by a synthesis of “nativism, authoritarianism, and populism”; emphasizing the security and order dimensions of the classical state, alongside xenophobic typing of outside threats serves as compensation for the attenuation of taste autonomy in the globalized free market economy, and increasingly protectionist economic approaches join nativism in the policy platforms of some right populist parties (as demonstrated by Trump and Brexit).

Analyses of the rise of right populism on both sides of the Atlantic have sometimes noted the duality of influences, economic insecurity versus cultural resentment. (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). For some researchers, trends of increased political and economic polarization, declining political trust and engagement and rise of populism, nativism, illiberal and authoritarian ideas may be a response to trends the economy and globalization, which leave a substantial portion of the population unsatisfied with political choices and outcomes. European based analyses have shown the willingness of leaders and receptive voters to scapegoat immigrants for unemployment, for instance. (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014). Other analyses question this by noting the appeal of populist and nativist rhetoric across income levels and in varied economic conditions. (Mols and Jetten, 2018). Khosravini notes many right populists make “vociferous claims to being anti-establishment, anti-elitist and anti-globalization” while promising a “a swift and radical shift from a globalization rationale towards a national and nativist politics” and connect “disastrous economic realities with the perceived encouragement of more immigration and diversity” (2017, 53-54). The use of such manipulative messaging has been enabled by the “echo chambers” of social media which “have removed all requirements of democracy and dangerously reduced it to a game of gaining popularity at any cost. In that sense, Social Media politics has created a fertile space of growth of populist politics or haphazard populism in every sense” (Khosravini 2017, 66).

Of particular interest is recent work by Betz (2019) who notes that “Contemporary radical right-wing populism is an ideational compound of anti-elite populism and nativism, the latter encapsulated in the notion that ‘the own people’ should come first.” (Betz, 2019, 111). Drawing on Louks and Emerson’s treatments of the historical phenomenon in the US, Betz notes that “nativism refers to ‘an expressed partiality to the native-born and their culture in preference to the foreign-born’” which can be expressed via “a range of sentiments and ideational constructs, most prominently patriotism, nationalism and even racism” (Betz, 2019, 112). He provides a useful heuristic differentiation of nativist tendencies: “economic nativism, centered on the notion that jobs should be reserved for native citizens; welfare chauvinism, based on the notion that native citizens should be accorded absolute priority when it comes to social benefits; and symbolic nativism, advancing the notion that government should do everything to defend the cultural identity of a given national society.” (Betz, 2019, 111). Betz’s work is important for its exploration of the ways in which right populist movements “mobilize diffuse popular nativist sentiments” with appeals which are socio economic (protecting jobs) and increasingly “identitarian” and xenophobic, focusing on the incompatibility of certain cultures (especially Islam) with Western society. (Betz, 2019, 112). This essay will attempt a preliminary investigation of the relative weight of economic, welfare and

symbolic and identitarian elements of right populism in these case studies, though it is preliminary. Figure 1 provides a proposed heuristic framework of the terrain to be considered throughout the project, which requires substantial in-depth investigation in each case study.

Figure 1: Parameters for Populist Discourse



This comparison will explore these different factors to illuminate similarities and difference in the role of political leaders and parties in generating populist and nativist responses and concerns among the electorate. In the context of the electoral systems in place in these states, there are incentives for leaders to employ this tactic to court a plurality of votes to secure political power even where majorities reject or avoid this rhetoric. In addition, there is both the opportunity to bring together previously closeted bigots and marginal outsiders via “scapegoating” in the context of globalisation and economic insecurity and declining prospects (relative deprivation) (Mols and Jetten, 2018); and at the same time appeal to above average income earners who may share discriminatory views or be willing to tolerate them in the pursuit of goals such as tax cuts, deregulation and privatization. This may explain the seeming confusion as many citizens of lower incomes can be courted by billionaire-funded political movements using populist guises; at the same time, the least well off - often indigenous and immigrants of colour – will avoid those parties and ally with relatively privileged cosmopolitans in inclusionary political movements, compounding the confusion on incomes and populism and requiring nuanced analysis of each case. (Finbow, 2017).

The focus in this preliminary study will be on ways in which populist parties - and mainstream conservative parties influenced by or reacting to the perceived electoral threat – may (to follow Mudde and Kaltwasser) “manipulate” and “exploit” populist messaging to mobilize voters sufficiently in the confines of these countries electoral systems to secure political office. Leadership and agency on the part of politicians makes a difference to the degree of linkage between economic and symbolic nativism. “Far-right anti-immigration political parties, we argue, play a pivotal role in forging the connection between economic misery and anti-immigrant sentiment. Political parties do not ride passively atop a sea of public opinion. Rather, they actively work to shape public

opinion.” (Cochrane and Nevitte, 2014, 2). In this respect, even smaller parties can play a role in reshaping the mix of economic, welfare and symbolic nativism and harnessing these forces to target migrants for political gain. As will be seen, the strategies and impact of this “mobilization of ignorance” varies in part based on electoral rules, and within specific social and cultural contexts.

Latent populist potential

Systematic polling across all the case studies is difficult to find, so some background to the situation will be presented from the World Values survey (WVS), which is infrequent and unfortunately does not include Canada or the UK in its most recent iteration; nor does it provide any information on public opinion towards trade and globalization. WVS polling showed economic and cultural concerns influenced attitudes on immigration across the case study states in the years leading up to the 2008 crisis. Substantial pluralities (and a slight majority in Australia) believed immigration should be linked to available jobs. Sizeable percentages (and close to a majority in the US and New Zealand) believed that immigration should only occur with “strict limits”, an exclusionary position. (Table 3). It was possible to discern some reticence about immigration, especially when economic conditions were less promising, or jobs were unavailable. Sizeable pluralities believed “Employers should give priority to local people rather than immigrants”. (Table 4). This statement was also sensitive to the employment status of the respondent with pluralities or near pluralities pf those unemployed (Table 5) believing jobs should be reserved for local persons (though the small n renders some of this speculative).

Table 3: Attitudes toward Immigration

How should the government regulate people from other countries coming here to work?

RESPONSE	TOTAL	AU	CA	NZ	US
Let anyone come	5.3%	3.2%	7.6%	1.6%	6.6%
If jobs available	46.1%	52.1%	49.6%	43.1%	35.5%
Strict limits	41.9%	39.5%	37.7%	47.7%	47.4%
Prohibit migrants	3.2%	2.2%	1.9%	2.1%	7.4%
(N)	(5,788)	(1,421)	(2,164)	(954)	(1,249)

Source: World Value Survey Wave 5 2005-09 v.124

Table 4: Attitudes toward Migrant Employment

(Employers should give priority to local people rather than immigrants in %)

RESPONSE	TOTAL	AU	CA	NZ	UK	US
Agree	45.7	40.8	40.1	49.0	50.0	55.0
Neither	17.0	21.5	12.8	17.7	10.1	24.4
Disagree	34.5	35.7	45.1	27.6	34.4	19.8
(N)	(6,829)	(1,421)	(2,164)	(954)	(1,041)	(1,249)

Source: World Value Survey Wave 5 2005-09 v. 45 (Excludes “No answer” and “Don’t Know”)

Variations in education levels (Table 6) affect the responses as more educated persons were more open to accepting immigrant workers than those with primary education (though the again small n renders some of this speculative; especially the US numbers).

Table 6: Attitudes toward Migrant Employment (if unemployed)

(Employers should give priority to local people rather than immigrants in %)

RESPONSE	TOTAL	AU	CA	NZ	UK	US
Agree	50.0	51.4	46.7	53.1	57.9	45.4
Neither	12.2	24.4	8.4	9.4	6.0	30.7
Disagree	32.7	24.2	41.9	23.4	27.6	23.8
(N)	410	41	188	64	71	46

Source: World Value Survey Wave 5 2005-09 v. 45 (Excludes “No answer” and “Don’t Know”)

Table 7: Attitudes toward Migrant Employment (primary school only)

(Employers should give priority to local people rather than immigrants in %)

RESPONSE	TOTAL	AU	CA	NZ	UK	US
Agree	48.4%	40.6%	56.1%	58.6%	53.3%	34.9%
Neither	17.3%	18.6%	5.1%	17.2%	15.1%	42.2%
Disagree	30.7%	34.4%	38.7%	17.2%	31.6%	17.0%
(N)	263	68	92	29	29	45

Source: World Value Survey Wave 5 2005-09 v. 45 (Excludes “No answer” and “Don’t Know”)

Table 8: Attitudes toward Migrant Employment (university education)

(Employers should give priority to local people rather than immigrants in %)

RESPONSE	TOTAL	AU	CA	NZ	UK	US
Agree	30.5%	29.8%	27.0%	41.4%	27.0%	36.9%
Neither	15.1%	21.7%	11.7%	16.7%	11.7%	37.0%
Disagree	51.0%	47.6%	59.3%	37.2%	53.0%	26.1%
(N)	1,102	205	464	215	196	22

Source: World Value Survey Wave 5 2005-09 v. 45 (Excludes “No answer” and “Don’t Know”)

Therefore, there is certainly a significant segment of society which remained wary of too much immigration especially in the context of competition for scarce employment, a form of economic nativism in Betz’s terminology. More recent polling results will be provided in the analysis below for the selected cases though at time of writing no study linking all 5 with similar questions was discovered by this author. In the cases of Trump and Brexit, evidence exists that the right populist appeal works best in areas which are negatively affected by globalization, erosion of industry from competition from emerging states like China etc. (Autor et al 2016; Kolko 2016, Hübner, 2016, Dorling et. al. 2016). Evidently a core of exclusionist individuals exists in all these cases. The populist appeal draws upon these persons and extends to those whose primary concerns are perceived or real relative deprivation or economic insecurity. While this project did not have resources to replicate these in-depth empirical analyses, it will look for initial evidence of the connectedness of economic insecurity and receptiveness to populist appeals. And it will emphasize how these factors are shaped by the electoral and party systems of each country; such institutional contexts remain crucial to the nature, success and limits of populist movements.

As possible comparisons with Canada, although New Zealand and Australia are based on the Westminster model they use different electoral systems which affects the calculus of populist politicians seeking to draw on latent insecurity and nativist instincts especially of less secure or educated persons. This influences the prospects for new party right populist formation and the likelihood of electoral success as a route to political influence as opposed to internal processes within an established party. The eventual final product also will include the US

and UK, but for now Trumpism and Brexit will be used as the benchmarks for populist appeals which have yet to play out as dramatically in the included case studies. The UK's first past the post models set the context for the limited electoral success (to date) of parties like UKIP which nonetheless wield outsized influence, notably PM David Cameron's disastrous choice to court their votes with a referendum pledge. The unusual US electoral system - especially the winner take all executive elections, the primaries enabling of rank and file populist activists, coupled with the Electoral College awarding of victory to the popular vote loser - created the unique prospect for the Trump takeover of the Republican Party – with ongoing support from a Senate which over represents less urbanized, cosmopolitan states, a ripe target for exclusionary populism. Populists in the cases covered here do not have the same incentives, obstacles or potentials as in the US case, so their trajectory will be different. This analysis will attempt a preliminary assessment of populist influences and prospects in these cases by examining in turn electoral models and effects on party systems, polling data on immigration and party discourses on trade but especially immigration.

Australia:

Electoral and Party System:

Australia features electoral system elements which distinguish it from the other case studies. In addition to compulsory voting, which has kept turnout rates higher than elsewhere, Australia has two elected chambers with different electoral rules designed to provide proportionality to the seat total for each party. In the Senate, a single transferable vote system sees voters rank candidates on a single ballot, with their first preferences tallied and subsequent preferences redistributed by rank in if no candidate emerges from the initial count with an absolute majority. These candidates face off in multi member constituencies with 6 Senators elected from each. This system has been shown to create more opportunities for third and minor parties to secure representation in parliament. In the House of Representatives an alternate vote model is used, whereby citizens rank candidates in single member constituencies. Historically, compulsory voting may have assisted the Labor party by motivating its lower income supporters to vote at a higher rate than is often the case for that socio-economic status. (Mackerras and McAllister 1999).

The system essentially functions as a two party plus model, with dominant Labor and Liberal parties which often have to rely on coalition partners, such as the frequent Liberal coalition with the National Party – the two parties have now merged at the federal level in Queensland. The current government (rejected in May 2019) can be seen as centre-right with a focus on tax cuts extending to upper income levels, smaller efficient government and limited and targeted program spending; the Labor Party tracks more toward centre-left, but notably shares positions on trade, tax cuts (though focused more on the middle level) and offshore processing for refugees; its rhetoric skews more to inclusionary neo-liberal. The Senate electoral system encourages election of representatives from smaller populist parties, (with reforms undertaken in 2016 to address this) even though major parties retained most of the seats. The complex staggering of terms in the Senate, including 4 territorial senators who's terms corresponds to that of the House, and staggered election of half the Senate every three years (unless a double dissolution requires 100 per cent Senate election) also complicates the calculus of parties, which employ a different strategy for that chamber. With maldistribution based on equal state representation (12 Senators per state) which favours rural less populated areas, this has given a platform for right populist parties to secure a foothold in national parliament. Pauline Hansen's One Nation Party won 4 seats in 2016 with first preference votes few but boosted by preferences transferred from other parties. (Colebatch 2016). Internal fragmentation and defections meant only 2 members remained by 2019. 4 other right populists secured election (McDougall 2016, 568). So personalized factionalism split much of the vote on the anti-immigrant far right, while

left and centre minor parties picked up more seats. As many as 9 parties with Islamophobic views campaigned in the 2019 elections for Senate.

Polling trends:

Concern about the rate of migration into the country has escalated significantly in the Lowry poll rising from 37% to 54% between 2014 and 2018; a slight plurality still agrees that “Australia’s openness to people from all over the world is essential to who we are as a nation”, though 41% now disagree. (Oliver, 2018, 14-15). In a 2018 ANU poll, while majorities understood the need for migration to provide a skilled workforce, and offset the aging population, a plurality of around 58% agreed with the statement that “We have too much cultural diversity already” up from 52% in 2010. Yet that response trailed other concerns respecting overpopulation, housing provision, environmental stress as reasons to reject limiting newcomers (Biddle, 2019, 10) Contrasted with earlier periods, in which racial and ethnic characteristics were explicit among anti-immigrant policymaking, the current era sees the general population as more receptive to newcomers and increased diversity. (Biddle, 2019, 14)

As in Europe, the US and elsewhere, the perception of the issues has been filtered through the narrative of refugee “crisis” Concern has been expressed about irregular arrivals, so-called “boat people; however, polling indicates that it has not been regarded by the majority as a “critical threat” by a majority of respondents, with numbers holding steady around 40% between 2009 and 2018, notwithstanding a significant increase in numbers of such arrivals. (Munro and Oliver, 2019). According to the Scanlon Foundation surveys, when ranked in terms of the most pressing issues facing the country, concern over immigrant numbers was relatively low but rising from 3 to 7% from 2013-18; concern about asylum seekers and “boat people” actually dropped from 10% to 1% in the same period, despite the securitization rhetoric. (Markus, 2018). And the level of public concern trailed other potential destabilizers, including “international terrorism, North Korea’s nuclear program, climate change, cyber-attacks, disruption in energy supply, food shortages and scarcity of water”. (Munro and Oliver, 2019).

Betts documents the substantial variations between persons based on education, with higher degree and professional graduates supporting more immigration and those with less education supporting slight or substantial reductions, with variations by occupation and sector. (2018, 3) She suggests that political leaders suppress the extent of insecurity and concern among lower status social sectors. Notably, there are important demographic variations in public perceptions of the “crisis”; the degree of concern and negativity is related to age with older cohorts more likely to deem irregular arrivals a “critical threat”. Additionally, (60%) of the public seems tolerant of “offshore processing” involving pre-screening of refugees in territories like Nauru and Papua-New Guinea and a full 70% favour turning boats of refugees back to home countries where deemed “safe”. Smaller numbers, though running between 40-48%, believe that “boat people” should never receive permanent settlement in Australia. (Munro and Oliver, 2019). Additionally, the social class and residency of respondents makes a difference; as in Canada and other states, concerns about migrants on grounds of “economic threat of immigrants or refugees competing for jobs, and cultural threat, with anxiety over the implications for national values, identity, and culture” (Gravelle and Wells, 2019) increased for those who felt marginalized or at risk of losing their jobs or identity. Notably those living in more ethnically diverse communities and especially major urban centres were less likely to perceive such threats. (Gravelle and Wells, 2019). Hence, substantial portion of the population - approaching the threshold for majority government under the plurality first past the post system - do express openness to populist tropes and messaging on migration. And affiliations with parties where leaders have employed such tropes is correlated with resistance to newcomers and diversity. (Gravelle and Wells, 2019).

Party Discourses

The current Liberal-National Party coalitions government represents the centre right, establishment typical of two party plus politics; yet populist elements have coloured its rhetoric and action. Populist-exclusionist rhetoric has crept into coalition positions on migration, though not trade. The Liberal Party platform from the early 2000 to present times has stressed international competitiveness and harnessing the benefits of globalization for Australia. (Liberal Party, 2002). The current governing party remains committed to Australia's participation in trade agreements like CPTPP and pursuit of deals with China, Japan, Korea, Peru and other nations. (Liberal Party, 2018). Government members described the a "vigorous free trade agenda" which produced a "dazzling array of game-changing free trade agreements". (Hansard - Federation Chamber 20/02/2019). Similar support for free trade was expressed by the coalition partners, the National Party (which despite its name emphasizes regional and state interests), which joined in boasting about the jobs and growth opportunities created by the open trade policy of the coalition and indicate continued pursuit for such engagements going forward. (National Party, 2019).

But the coalition's rhetoric and performance on international migration at times resembles populists elsewhere, especially in the use of securitization messaging, whereby immigration is discussed using a "rhetoric of existential threat". (Messina, 2014, 531). Concern especially about refugee flows has been stressed, with a security focus on strong borders. "Australia has one of the most generous humanitarian immigration programs in the world, but we can only do it by maintaining strong borders and insisting people come the right way. We have secured our borders, we stopped the boats and the tragic drownings at sea. And we have been supporting children compassionately without putting our strong border security at risk" (Liberal Party 2019). "Stopping the boats" was a frequent mantra, and linked to broader goals of security, social stability, and even fiscal sanity. (Hansard - House of Representatives 4/04/2019). Despite recognition of the necessity for population growth, mainstream Liberal party politicians express concern about the pace of migration, and the need for a slower pace for the country to "breathe" and adjust to immigration. In words reminiscent of Trump's justification for the Muslim ban – to "figure out what's going on" – MP Dean Smith appealed for time to accumulate evidence and "perhaps give ourselves some time to breathe, some time to pause and reflect, to make sure the predictions are the best they can be" and migration levels were beneficial for the country; it was time to initiate a " 'civilised national discussion' about population without stoking xenophobia and without politicians dog-whistling" (Murphy, 2018). Therefore, the coalition parties portrayed themselves as moderates seeking to balance population increases with national security and to prevent terrorist incursion. (National Party, 2019a).

Nonetheless, some of the rhetoric resembles exclusionary, nativist themes. Policy was framed in a sharp partisan fashion, with claims that "the last Labor government dismantled Australia's effective border security policies". (Liberal Party, 2019a). The government pursued a policy of turning back refugee boats and excluding claimants and boasted that this reduced the numbers of children in detention. (Liberal Party, 2019a). In addition, some 18,691 persons were detained for overstays or visa cancellations from 2013 to January 2019, the vast majority from Asian states. (Hansard - House of Representatives 4/04/2019). The Liberal Party Chair of the immigration committee, Jason Wood, emphasized gang violence by African immigrants in parliamentary investigations, with the Sudanese "Apex" gang portrayed much like MS13 in the US as "terrorizing" communities and requiring stricter visa controls (Joint Committee, 2017); but Wood rejected criticisms by opponents that he used the issue to secure race-based votes. (ABC News 2018). Still, the coalition passed the Strengthening the Character Test Bill of 2018, which permitted cancellation of visas for persons convicted of some crimes even with brief sentences. The coalition portrayed this as reasonable extensions of visa exclusions for persons who did not meet 'community expectations' for suitable behaviors. But it was explicitly described by the minister of

immigration, David Coleman, as a signal: “This bill sends a clear and unequivocal message on behalf of the Australian community that entry or stay in Australia is a privilege granted only to those of good character”. (Hansard Oct. 25, 2018).

Critics, such as groups supportive of refugees rights argued that this reform “lowers the bar for visa cancellations” so minor offenses such as shop lifting, or image sharing could lead children locked in indefinite detention. The Council also noted that the bill gave the minister new powers to unilaterally detain claimants without recourse to normal judicial processes. (Refugee Council, 2018). In the 2019 election campaign, both the Coalition and opposition Labor parties promised they would retain the policy of housing refugees on offshore facilities; the coalition also vowed to end a policy whereby medical personally could recommend transfer of refugees to the mainland if necessary, for medical treatment. (Reuters, 2018). It should be noted that despite the portrayal for the approach as “humane”, the policy of offshoring refugee claimants in camps on Nauru and Manus Island (which Labor began and would continue) has been rebuked for its harshness as a “strategy of despair”. Much like the Trump administration’s approach at the Mexican border, the offshore processing emphasized efficiency over welfare and was mainly designed for deterrence: “the harsh conditions of the Nauru centre were a tactic of government to encourage asylum seekers to give up their refugee claims and return to their home country” (Fleay and Hoffman, 2014, 6), which belied alleged humanitarian commitments (Grewcock, 2017). Even Nigel Farage felt this was beyond what the UK public would tolerate. (McDougall 2016, 567).

Between 1990 and 2010, Australia saw the emergence of new conservative social movements, motivated by the issue of Asian immigration and it’s perceived “threat” to white Australian society. As the share of immigration consisting of refugees rose in relation to the admission of skilled refugees, some political leaders reported to “a discourse in which foreigners dilute or undermine the national culture and Australian ‘way of life’” a “‘paranoid nationalism’ in which displaced ‘white worrying’ is projected onto foreigners” mainly by working class, white male Australians “who feel ideologically and economically marginalized by globalization” (Louis et. al. 2010, 655). Betts found that active politicians, responding to public opinion, were more likely to be skeptical of the calls for high levels of immigration, and more likely to think population was being added too quickly. (2018, 5). Additionally, the electoral system allowed the emergence of small exclusionary populist parties with a foothold in the Senate with as many as 8 such senators elected in 2016.

Prominent among these was Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, which was launched with a “broadly populist and protectionist” approach in 1997. Its own historical account online reveals its nativist tendencies; the party emphasized its opposition to “divisive and discriminatory policies ... attached to Aboriginal and multicultural affairs.” Multiculturalism was a “threat to the very basis of the Australian culture, identity and shared values”, which could lead to “the Asianisation of Australia.” (One Nation, 2018). This rhetoric went beyond economic nativist and welfare protectionism to a clear symbolic, identitarian, culturalist nativism. After an initial rise in popularity, the party experienced rapid decline but “its lasting impact has been in nudging the mainstream parties, public discourses, and public policy to the right”. “One Nation helped reframe ethnonationalism as a potentially legitimate way of conceptualising the nation. Amidst contentious debates over the arrival of ‘boat people’ on Australia’s shores, John Howard’s Liberal party warned of the nation being ‘swamped by asylum seekers’” (Hogan and Haltinner, 2015)

After tumultuous intra-party conflict and litigation, Hanson returned to lead the party in 2014. There was some moderation of positions on multiculturalism which was still rejected: “One Nation encourages and recognises that Australia is forged on people from many countries with multi-racial backgrounds, who call themselves Australians. There should only be one culture in this nation and that is Australian.” While the “contribution of

migrants and their families to Australia is undeniable when migrants come to embrace our way of life and not to change it.” (One Nation, 2018). One Nation expresses rhetoric which comes closest to Trump’s portrayal of the “threat” to the nation from foreign competitors and migrants. “Free trade agreements have cost Australian workers jobs in manufacturing and we are forever seeing other industries lost to an influx of foreign workers” (One Nation, 2018). This party pledged to “review and revoke any Free Trade Agreements that are not in Australia’s best interest”, considering withdrawal from the CPTPP; the party also attacked UN policy “dictates” on refugees’ rights and pledged to uphold the national constitution. (One Nation, 2019). Independent populist senators also criticized free trade which lead to “poor trade outcomes for Australia”. (Downer, 2016, 43).

One Nation’s platform suggests that “population needs to be planned ahead so that infrastructure including water, electricity, hospitals, schools, and public transport are available to respond to an increased population” Immigration rates were “too high” causing myriad social problems including unaffordable housing. (One Nation, 2019a). “We believe Australia has the right to choose the number and mix of migrants to ensure immigration is in the national interest of existing citizens because the interests of existing citizens come first.” (One Nation 2018a). The party takes several approaches to justify lowering immigration rates including preventing Islamic radicalism, protecting the environment, and preserving current resource and service distribution. The party supports a “travel ban” on Muslims similar to Trump’s to address the issue of radicalization and violence. (One Nation, 2018a). The party also places emphasis on increasing current population growth rates through births, rather than through migration (One Nation, 2019). While electorally small, the presence of such parties does provide pressure on the two major parties to adopt policies which address, rhetorically if not in reality, the disquiet of many in the Australian electorate.

New Zealand

Electoral and Party System

New Zealand’s single chamber, with its complex mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system, has created a situation in which coalition governance is often required. Prior to 1993, with a first past the post electoral model, single party majorities for either Labour or National party on the left and right of the spectrum, were the norm. Subsequent to then a realignment happened with a Labour government introducing Thatcherite policies of deregulation and limited government in the mid-1980s, and the National party then moving to the right on social and labour policy which drastically altered the political landscape. The political fallout and disillusion with both major parties contributed to a referendum with an anti-establishment result to approve the MMP electoral system. This facilitated the rise of smaller splinter parties on the left and the right and a drop in the vote share for the two major parties. (Duncan, 2017). 5 parties currently hold seats in the house of representatives and coalition governance is necessary.

Polling trends

Polls on the benefits of immigration were more mixed than in the Australian case. Slightly more respondents provided somewhat positive (26%) and totally positive (7%) assessments of immigration (for a positive total of around 34%) as opposed to only 23% negative. However, a full 41 % (or a plurality of respondents) indicated they were “unsure” indicating either a lack of knowledge or unwillingness to commit. (New Zealand Insight, June 2017). A slight pluralist of 40% indicated that immigration made New Zealand “a better place to live” versus 23% who said it made the country worse and 34% who felt it made no difference. There were notable variations in generational responses with majorities of younger New Zealanders expressing the positive view, while older

residents were less positive. Party supporters also differed, from 55% for the Greens versus 41 for Liberal, 43 for National and only 19% for the NZ First expressing positive views. (New Zealand Insight, June 2017).

The poll did indicate that on specific issues concerns were more notable; for instance a majority felt it was hard to discuss immigration without sounding racist; a majority also believed that “Too many people who come to live here from overseas don’t seem to have a good enough grasp of English”. Although a slight majority disagreed, a full 30% said that “To be truly a New Zealander you have to be born in New Zealand”. (New Zealand Insight, June 2017). 66% indicate that “People should have basic English when they arrive” while 56% felt too many arrived without sufficient English language skills. There were notable party variations among these sentiments, which were more likely to gain traction among NZ first voters. These indicate sizeable elements of the population to which a nativist appeal might resonate. 33 recent believed newcomers should have to “abandon traditional cultural practices that many New Zealanders find wrong or offensive” (though 60% disagreed) and 40% agreed that burqas should be banned with higher numbers favoring bans in banks, courts, schools etc. Significant minorities close to 33% agreed with statements that “Current levels of immigration threaten the Kiwi way of life” or “leave me feeling like this isn’t really my country any more “, (New Zealand Insight, June 2017) with concerns about crime and terrorism sprinkled in as well. These findings indicate the potential appeal of calls (as in Canada) to report or ban “barbaric practices”.

Nonetheless the poll also indicated that more citizens had concerns about economic effects and social preparedness. Majorities felt that on matters of health, transport and housing, the country was not prepared for population expansion, (with jobs, environment and school capacity worrisome to a lesser degree. Effects on house prices (increases and wages (decreases) were portrayed as a double squeeze on residents. Current immigration levels were perceived as “unfair” by over a third of residents, while 55% supported a “cap” on immigrant numbers and numbers of foreign students. (New Zealand Insight, June 2017). 60% supported two tier “unfree” immigration with limited rights to social benefits and limited duration of stay, while only 40% favored fewer visas but permanent path to benefits and resident status. Accelerated citizenship for the wealthy was strongly rejected. (New Zealand Insight, June 2017). And polls in the run up to the election showed that economic issues like inequality, housing availability and costs, were uppermost in the minds of voters; only 5.5% cited refugees and migration as a major issue for the country. (Morgan, 2017). There were substantial divisions among party supporters however with 62% of New Zealand First voters putting immigration issues among their top 3 election issues. (Duncan, 2017, 125).

Party discourses

The Labour Party has currently formed government in coalition with the Greens and NZF. The party remained fully supportive of bilateral and multilateral trade and services agreements as a means to export-led growth, though with caveats respecting preservation of regulatory sovereignty; the party promised to revisit agreements like TPP and that with South Korea, whose investment provisions limited the right to control sales of infrastructure, land etc. The manifesto also promised greatest transparency and engagement with civil society on matters like labour and environmental standards. (Labour 2017b) In this, the coalition was building between the coalitions partners, including the Greens, whose trade policy focused on sustainability and rejected concessions to multinational firms in trade agreements; foreign investments should meet sustainability goals, and outside land ownership should not be permitted. (Green Party 2017a).

The Labour party’s positions reflect public opinion on the balancing of immigration’s positives with concern about its costs. “We have always welcomed migrants to our country and will continue to do so. But in recent years our population has been growing rapidly as record numbers of migrants arrive here. This has happened

without the Government planning for the impact immigration is having on our country". (Labour, 2017). The balance of attracting necessary skills was front and centre, but compromised by measures to "strengthen the Labour Market Test for work visas so they are not being used for jobs Kiwis can do", tightening student work visas, "increased monitoring" of refugee and family admissions, and requiring visa holders to work in regions "where there is a genuine skills shortage" (Labour 2017). This suggested attentiveness to economic nationalist conceptions that economic conditions mattered to the choice of policy. But overall this was packaged in a progressive policy focusing on diversity and support for multiculturalism. (Labour 2017a) Again this showed influence from the Green Party who supported a "human" immigration policy with an increase if need be refugee numbers in accordance with UN guidelines. (Green Party 2017).

The challenges for the Prime Minister are complex given that, at present, the coalition includes New Zealand First (NZF), a right populist party which has pushed the boundaries of political norms. Despite winning only 9 seats and 7.2% of the party vote in 2017, this party found itself in the "queenmaker" position in the recent government, collaborating with Labour and the Greens, which hold very different views. Founding leader Winston Peters serves as Deputy prime minister and foreign affairs minister for the government of Jacinda Ardern. The party's 15 "founding principles" make clear its nationalist goals to "Put New Zealand & New Zealanders First". But the principles also indicate its populist messaging arose in response to neo-liberal consensus between the other two parties, with emphasis on education, health and employment policy, and "export lead growth". (NZF, 2016). 2 opposition parties (National and Act) hold conservative limited government values which are elsewhere connected with populist rights approaches; in a first past the post system supporters of such positions might need to cooperate in a single party. But in the MMP system these are NZF's main rivals. On trade there seems a notable consensus among all parties, which all avoid the protectionist elements of Trumpism. While Peters may have originally been an economic nationalist (Duncan 2017, 129), he has conformed to the government line. Now NZF stresses its "free trade message – that New Zealand is open for business and wanting foreign investment in major infrastructure projects". (NZF, 2018).

Many of NZF's policies seem nationalist-centrist, and Peters, who has Maori heritage, insures that the nationalist vision includes the centrality of treaty relations in Aotearoa/New Zealand, though he has condemned using the Treaty of Waitangi to fuel a "grievance industry" (a position he repudiated for the 2017 election). NZF was openly anti-immigration in the past, as Peters employed exclusionary inflammatory rhetoric emphasizing the threat of too much immigration. In a 2002 speech he declared "New Zealand First believes our heritage is worth fighting for. I urge you to join us in the battle". (Cited in Ward and Liu, 2012) The Party's election manifesto in the early 2000s stated "there is the need to keep a tight lid on immigration if we are to avoid New Zealand's identity, values and heritage being swamped". Pressure from this party was said to contribute to a "strict new English-language test for migrants". (Collins, 2002). Placing the concerns in cultural but also economic realms, the latter provided "plausible deniability" that the message was racist in intent. (Liu and Mills, 2006). Yet references to "third world" sources of newcomers indicated the racial concerns. "Kiwi traditional values" and "kiwi nationalism" were justified in populist terms as a counter to the neo-liberal impositions, but suggested appeal to anti-Asian sentiments. (Simon-Kumar 2015, 1179). Peters often employed rhetoric which could be so interpreted: "Many suburbs are now totally unrecognisable from even a decade ago. Someone has to stand up and say it – this obsession – this fetish with diversity is destroying our national identity." (2003). He also used terms to portray immigrants as a security threat, emphasizing "imported criminal activity" which required stronger controls. (Peters, 2005). The party website still touts the 2002 election in which "Peters had mounted a brilliant three-point campaign against uncontrolled immigration, Treaty costs, and crime" which won the party 13 seats. (NZF 2019). And party members use the rhetoric of threats to the border, reminding of the bad old

days under the National party government; “Just about every other month there was some kind of infringement across our border, compromising the very lifeblood of our nation.” (Hansard. Feb 12, 2019).

Such sentiments have taken a back seat in NZF as a member in the coalition; the coalition agreement drew mostly on the Labour party approach. The reference to immigration was brief and included provisions to “Ensure work visas issued reflect genuine skills shortages and cut down on low quality international education courses” used as a back door to permanent status; and “Take serious action on migrant exploitation, particularly of international students” (Coalition Agreement, 2017). The coalition accepted legal advice that the United Nations Migration Compact did not violate New Zealand sovereignty as it was legally non-binding (NZF 2018a). Peters stated that he made the decision as foreign secretary and that the PM did not impose it on a divided cabinet, as the opposition alleged. (Hansard, Feb. 21, 2019). In a reversal of roles Peters rebuffed the National Party for making alarmist statements on the pact, which did not “restrict” or “curtail” established human rights. (Hansard, Dec 19, 2018). Nonetheless, some party adherents remain sympathetic to exclusivist approaches as polling numbers indicate. For instance, 41% of NZF supporters believed that a person had to be locally born to be a “true New Zealander”; 86% felt the country was not prepared to accept newcomers; and 77-80% felt the number of newcomers, temporary or permanent, was “too high”. (New Zealand Insight, June 2017).

A legislator for NZF recently proposed the Respecting New Zealand Values Bill “requiring migrants to respect New Zealand values” and “to live a life that ‘demonstrates that they respect New Zealand values’”. (van Beynen, 2018). The bill suggested that “that New Zealand has some unique value system, outside the law, that migrants must abide by. The idea suggests that apart from being a democratic, secular country that values free speech, open government, independent courts and tolerance of all religions and creeds, we have some unwritten rule system, any breach of which threatens our fragile way of life”. (van Beynen, 2018). As part of the coalition, party leaders distanced themselves from this measure, but did not repudiate its discriminatory discursive intent, which sought to rally the most uninformed supporters around an emotive message implicitly targeted at Muslims and other migrants seen not to fit the existing value system. Hence symbolic or identitarian nativism still seems evident in the ranks of the party, though skillfully managed so far by the Prime Minister.

Comparative Analysis: variants of nativism and leadership discourses

So far, the project has considered polling results from recent years and party rhetoric using both party documents and legislative proceedings in the cases of Australia and New Zealand. Table 9 summarizes some of the findings from polling and party discourses in the two completed case studies. They have been divided by Betz criteria to illustrate the resonance of nativist rhetoric on economic, welfare and symbols or identity grounds. There is some variation in the priorities of the public and the depth of feeling. However, both cases reveal potential for nativist mobilizing, extending to symbolic, identitarian, exclusionary tropes. While the World Values Survey most recent wave does not extend to the full five cases, data for New Zealand and Australia, covered here, is available in more recent years. This data reveals the potential for economic nativism, with concern about migration linked to job competition with majority or near majorities supporting local preferences; this linkage appears consistently high in New Zealand while rising in Australia. (Table 9).

Table 9: Trends in responses to Jobs scarce: Employers should give priority to local people rather than immigrants (Australia vs New Zealand)

Australia	1994-1998	2005-2009	2010-2014
Agree	44%	41%	51%
Disagree	47%	36%	27%
Neither	6%	22%	22%
(N)	2,048	1,421	1,477
New Zealand	1994-1998	2005-2009	2010-2014
Agree	48%	49%	49%
Disagree	27%	28%	28%
Neither	20%	18%	18%
(N)	2,048	1,421	1,477

Source: World Values Survey Wave 4,5, 6: 1994-2014 C002.

Unsurprisingly, direct tests of identitarian or symbolic nativism are hard to come by as polling has been limited and accuracy of responses could be questioned. Comparisons over the last 20-30 years in the two cases show most people unwilling to directly single out immigrants or refugees as undesirable neighbors. Notably a slight uptick in willingness to state this openly in Australia has been evident between 2009 and 2015. If the WVS includes similar question in the current wave it would be interesting to see if this number has grown with the increasingly open resort to racist language and othering by political leaders especially on the populist right.

Table 10: Trends in responses: “Could you please mention any that you would not like to have as neighbors?” Immigrants and refugees (Australia vs New Zealand)

Australia	1981-1984	1994-1998	2005-2009	2010-2014
Not mentioned	94%	95%	94%	89%
Mentioned	6%	5%	6%	11%
(N)	1,228	2,048	1,421	1,477
New Zealand	1994-1998	2005-2009	2010-2014	
Not mentioned	95%	93%	94%	
Mentioned	5%	7%	6%	
(N)	1,201	954	841	

Source: World Values Survey Wave 1, 3, 5, 6: 1994-2014 A124_06.

In the Australian case, Mols and Jetten (2018) suggest that clear links between deprivation and populism are difficult to draw, given the data which shows significant support from well-off segments of the populism for parties such as One Nation. This is unsurprising as racism, xenophobia and islamophobia are evident across class categories. Yet trends seemed also to support a static or increasing sense that immigration and cultural diversity are beneficial and should be supported with government assistance alongside increasing worry about inequality and belief that government support for the poor is inadequate (Markus, 2018, 24, 27). Polling does indicate however that concerns about economic and social impacts of immigrations and refugee flows correlate to a degree with income and education levels and are higher among those who are less likely to interact with persons from different racial or ethnic backgrounds. (Munro and Oliver, 2019; Gravelle and Wells, 2019). Hence as McSwiney and Cottle (2017) argue, the insecurity induced by neo-liberalism and “precarity” in the economy made some portions of the electorate receptive to right populist scapegoating tactics. Australian opinion demonstrates awareness of the need for population growth via immigration countered in some social constituencies by fear of economic competition and cultural and environmental disruption, especially from refugees as demonstrated in recent polls. (Table 11).

Whatever the causes, there can be no underestimating “the effectiveness of Australian social conservatives’ ‘identity politics’, in which political involvement among supporters was clearly motivated by a rhetoric of threat to group identity from feared Others.” (Louis et. al. 2010, 670). A variant of Betz’s symbolic or identitarian nativism seems to be at play. (Table 11). Without the fragmentation induced by infighting and aided by the PR system’s creation of openings for splinter movements to win Senate seats, the movement could perhaps be more unified and influential. But the reforms meant to quell such tendencies, by reducing single ticket voting and requiring more marked party and candidate preferences to avoid minor party elections on small first preferences (McAllister and Muller, 2018) instead empowered radicals. “The new system has put power back in voters’ hands. That has allowed the undercurrent of racism that is one of many minority views here to surface and make itself heard, emphatically.” (Colebatch, 2016). With the demonstration effects of Brexit and Trump and other similar movements, the potential via PR for an increase in exclusionary populist legislators, especially in the Senate, cannot be discounted. Nonetheless, the major parties need little incentive to be exclusionist on the immigration file; the Liberal-National coalition was reelected in 2019 in a come from behind performance featuring strong commitments to reduce refugee numbers and continue offshoring on island camps with limited access to medical care. Doctors without borders was banned from Nauru by the government there for activism on mental health. (Davidson, 2018). PM Scott Morrison used nativist messaging to generate support through an appeal to populism and nativism. This was despite polls showing many voters did not agree that reduced immigration was a good approach. (Hanrahan, 2019).

Table 11: Nativist discourses compared

Country	Australia	New Zealand
Economic Nativism (jobs and income)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> immigrants or refugees compete for jobs unskilled labourers looking for work only admit when unemployment low insecurity and concern among lower status risk of losing jobs increased inequality, precarity, poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> wage decreases mean “double squeeze” Stronger labour market test for work visas so “they are not being used for jobs Kiwis can do” Migrants should fill skills shortages only “desirable immigrants” bring skilled labour and investment
Welfare Nativism (service access)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Slower immigration pace to “breathe” stress on infrastructure/programs/housing People coming here to claim benefits overpopulation and environment conserving services and resources loss of social stability and fiscal sanity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NZ isn’t prepared for population increase Lack of planning for impact of migrants house price increases schools, transport overwhelmed stress on housing availability concerns for wellbeing and social cohesion
Symbolic Nativism (identitarian)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> too much cultural diversity already Asianization and Islamification Security threats: gangs, terror neighbourhood change Strengthening the Character Test for visas ‘community expectations’ for behaviors Multiculturalism is a “threat” to Australian culture, identity, values “swamped by asylum seekers” Risk of losing identity “travel ban” on Muslims “boat people” should not get status Offshoring: “strategy of despair” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> too many people don’t know English well People should have basic English on arrival “True” New Zealanders are born there newcomers should abandon offensive practices many refugees could be terrorists burqas should be banned in schools, offices immigration threatens the Kiwi way of life Immigration makes me feel this isn't my country “Many suburbs are now totally unrecognisable” “our heritage is worth fighting for” NZ’s identity, values being swamped “3rd world” newcomers weaken “Kiwi values” Respecting New Zealand Values Bill

Source: Author’s assessment of polling and party discourses

So far, the New Zealand coalition experience has mitigated the populist elements of the minor coalition partners. Prime Minister Ardern has been forced to defend the coalitions' position and the need to compromise with the NZP has complicated that task, but she denied "taking a break" on immigration or lower targets as sought by NZP. But the government was attentive to concerns respecting the socio-economic impacts; "our immigration policy is a quality education system for international students and proper labour market testing so that we fill genuine gaps in our labour market." (Hansard May 9, 2018). On many issues, the coalition government has moved towards progressive policies, notwithstanding its coalition partner's positions; but also, the move to concerns for wellbeing and social cohesion do in fact address the economic concerns which underpin elements of the economic nativist populism represented by NZF. Overall, New Zealand may have moved towards a vision of the "desirable immigrant" which now stresses economic elements like skilled labour and investment over cultural belonging (Simon-Kumar, 2015).

Yet looking and parliamentary debates indicate the continued concerns about the economic and environmental impacts of high levels of immigration and especially irregular arrivals, given the lack of preparation and infrastructure to cope with such large population flows. But beyond these economic concerns, the presence of traditional treaty-based nationalist, exclusionist elements in public opinion remains important. (Table 11). This seems especially important in a party system where left politics appears confined to minor parties, and variants of neo-liberalism have long dominated the political spectrum. Coalitions with various permutations including the NZF and other minor populist groupings appear possible some time into the future. And as the Christchurch terrorism indicates, individuals who are radicalized to the point of terrorism remain a threat in this society as well. Yet the current government is demonstrating, for the moment, the ability to steer the course away from the neo-liberal directions which accelerated nativism and towards a more progressive policy direction which could assuage some of the economic and welfare concerns and dampen the appeal of exclusionary populism.

In considering the potential for similar trends to emerge, some claim that Canada is a distinct case. There is an all-party consensus supportive of free trade despite social stakeholder skepticism, and no Canadian political leader has made protectionism a part of their platform. Decision makers and public opinion alike illustrate a recognition of the importance of immigrants to the economy, culture and society and general positive perceptions are reported in scholarly research (Reitz, 2012) Messina, for instance, considers Canada an exception to the practice of securitizing migrants, with little evidence of such discourse in politics or the media even immediately after 9/11. (2014, 537, 542, 544). Yet there is considerable evidence of the impact of racism and nativism in Canadian policy historically and newcomers consistently experience difficulty flourishing in the economy. (Choudry and Choudry 2016). Canada's vaunted multicultural policy has been condemned as largely rhetorical and as a "thin" variant which does not enable newcomers to integrate from their own culture but rather as a harmless addition to the existing national culture. (Hanson, 2017).

The presence of nativism, economic and cultural, cannot be denied. And as Cochrane and Nevitte argue, the choice of mainstream parties – to adopt or reject nativist rhetoric – plays a large role. "When mainstream political parties co-opt the antiimmigration positions of far-right parties, for example, it may well reduce, at least for the short term, the share of the electorate available to new far-right parties. Even so, a chorus of co-opting voices may nonetheless magnify the social influence of far-right parties; it may legitimize their arguments even as it undercuts their electoral ambitions." (2014, 24). This has direct implications for Canada. The Conservative government of Stephen Harper worked out a "neo-conservative multicultural politics" balancing outreach to the diverse immigrant communities in suburban Canada with exclusionist conceptions of common values and condemnations of "barbaric cultural practices" (Carlaw, 2017). In opposition, pushed by the formation of a splinter right populist party (People's Party), mainstream conservative political leaders have adopted the same

rhetoric of border “crisis and “threat” and condemnation of UN dictates which has been used elsewhere (Wright, 2018). That is particularly dangerous in the first past the post model, which permits mobilized nativists to dominate legislatures with minority support. Nonetheless, this preliminary survey indicates that replacement of FPTP is not a panacea. Careful consideration would have to be given to the nature of electoral reform, as the Australian and New Zealand models indicate, since right populist parties have secured a foothold under their electoral rules. And the difference between these cases involves leadership choice – embracing anti-immigrant sentiment by PM Morrison, versus rejecting it by PM Ardern, with implications for the centrality of exclusionary populism in political debates going forward.

Conclusion: Mobilizing ignorance?

Political economists should not exclude considerations such as globalization, economic insecurity and relative deprivation as contributors to populism. Nor can analysts resort to deterministic assessments which consider racist, nativist rhetoric to be a mere offshoot of economic disquiet. Studies which take an either/or approach on these issues remain limited. As Betz suggests, the “different facets of nativism cannot be neatly separated” (2019, 113). He may be correct that for some states the rush of developing world migrants has eased so nativism has turned more to cultural variants and xenophobia. Nonetheless, the overall character of globalization and technology generates insecurity which can permit populist leaders to portray immigration and trade as economic “threats”. Analysis requires nuanced investigation of specific national contexts, to determine the contributions of economic disquiet, concerns about infrastructure and social support programs, and open cultural chauvinism and racial animus within specific political contexts and institutions. As Carreras, et. al. (2019) suggest, interplay between economic insecurity and cultural factors seems to be involved in situations like Brexit. With similar pressures facing many states, political and electoral institutions provide parameters for what is possible with the range from the Trump takeover of Republicanism, to the UK electoral panic with the resultant Brexit catastrophe, the regionalized expression of Canadian social conservatism, New Zealand’s coalition politics, and Australia’s electoral uniqueness empowering right legislators yet encouraging their fragmentation.

This remains, however a preliminary take. Future work required includes extending to Canadian conservatism and incorporating the UK’s Brexit and Trumpism; seeking more consistent/recent polling across the cases; finding polling on trade (which is scarce); improved (possibly computer assisted) content analysis; coverage of more minor parties; and linking institutional effects and electoral outcomes more comprehensively. Additional themes of right populist messaging and mobilization, including misogynist, anti-green and anti-LGBT elements should also be added to the mix to provide a more complete depiction of the strategies at work. And those strategies will clearly differ depending on the political, especially electoral, institutions, and the particular leaders and their choices. The motivation to employ an exclusionary populist approach appears to include its marketability to wealthy donors who seek to weaken and rollback the state to promote self-interest. This will eventually be tested by including data on campaign contributions, to reveal why parties adopting populist rhetoric maintain or enhance their fundraising as opposed to parties with more open, inclusionary approaches. Selecting to embrace exclusionary nativism, especially on cultural and racial terms, is an effective route to other ends – social conservatism, limited state, transfers via tax cuts and privatization to the wealthy.

But it is a divisive and dangerous approach, amounting to mobilization of ignorance which plays out damagingly in social and political realms, in exclusionary politics and legitimation of hate, with disastrous effects on social cohesion and stability. The interdependence of economic and political forces needs to be considered in analyses of nativist sentiments and exclusionary populist mobilization. As Cochrane and Nevitte argue, “Citizens do not

automatically blame immigrants for unemployment. And it is not just exposure to far-right rhetoric that drives anti-immigrant sentiment. The minds of citizens are not blank gray screens that can be shaken and erased at the whims of politicians. The missing link... comes from an interaction between economic misery and far-right rhetoric that turns citizens against immigrants” (Cochrane and Nevitte, 2014, 3). Economic insecurity and relative deprivation encourage some voters to accept the negative depiction of immigration by right populists which may be less persuasive in good economic times. The completion of the five cases will explore these connections between economy and rhetoric to challenge the either/or vision of symbolic/identitarian nativist versus economic/welfare nativist sources of right populism, which produces problematic scholarship and political strategy.

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