Côte d'Ivoire Local Opinion Survey – Supplementary Analyses

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1 Executive Summary

This paper reports supplementary analyses of survey findings from a citizen-perceptions survey conducted in conflict-affected areas of Côte d'Ivoire in August-September 2018. The survey was designed and implemented in partnership with the Centre de Recherche et de Formation sur le Dveloppement Intgr (CREFDI) and USAID Côte d'Ivoire in the context of the Political Transition and Inclusion (PTI) initiative. Full details on the survey design and implementation can be found in the CREFDI report: *Enqute quantitative par sondage visant a informer le project Transition Politique et Inclusion (TPI)*, Rapport d'Etude, November 2018.

The analysis in this document is organized into five thematic sections. The first section examines perceptions of security conditions, attitudes towards police, and perceived risks of recruitment of youth and ex-combatants in Côte d'Ivoire. The second section examines citizen perceptions of local economic improvement since 2011. The third section examines citizen trust in government institutions and public authorities, while the fourth section examines civic engagement and local collective action.

The main findings of these analysis are as follows:

- Residents living in western areas of Côte d'Ivoire feel less secure relative to other areas of the country, and are more likely to perceive risks of youth recruitment into armed groups.

- Residents who belong to northern ethnic groups feel more secure than members of other groups, but have more negative feelings towards the police and gendarmerie.

- Victims of violence are less likely to feel personally secure, and have less favorable views of security provides like the police.

- main findings from other sections...

The final section examines citizen attitudes towards governance institutions and civic engagement, focusing on comparisons between the rebel-held zones in western Côte d'Ivoire and government-held zones. The main findings of this analsysis are as follows:

- Respondents living on the former rebel (FN) side of the ceasefire boundary are more likely to express mistrust of governance institutions, and are less likely to support actions and obligations tying citizens to the state, such as voting and paying taxes. However, these respondents are somewhat more likely to engage in civic action at the local level.

- Education, poverty, gender, and ethnicity are also important determinants of residents' views towards state institutions and civic obligations.

Overall, these preliminary findings suggest that interventions to improve citizen confidence in state institutions are needed most in former rebel-held territories, among victims of violence, and among less educated and impoverished residents.

Implications for 2020 and main challenges

2 Explanatory Variables

To examine the importance of different geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic factors in our analyses, we construct the following variables:

- Zone ex CNO (2): Categorical variable indicating if the respondent was in Zone ex CNO (2) (i.e. the western rebel-controlled zone).

- Zone gouvernementale: Categorical variable indicating if the respondent was in the government-controlled zone.

- Rebel Zone: a binary variable coded as a 1 if the respondent was a resident of the ex-CNO zone during the conflict and a 0 if the respondent resided in the government-controlled zone

- Nordiste: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent identified themselves as belonging to the North Mand or Gur ethnic groups.

- Victim: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent reported they were the victim of physical violence during the crisis.

- Age: The age of the respondent.

- Female: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent identified themselves as female.

- Education: An ordinal variable indicating the level of education of the respondent (0 = No formal education, 1 = Primary education, 2 = Secondary education, 3 = Post-secondary education)

- Poverty: An ordinal variable indicating the level of poverty reported by the respondent (0 = No lived poverty, 1 = Moderate lived poverty, 2 = High lived poverty. The definition of lived poverty is based on the Afrobarometer Lived Poverty Index (LPI).)

3 Security Conditions

This section is based on the full sample 1 of survey respondents (n=1200). It considers perceptions of personal and community security (including risks of violent remobilization), and at whether citizens feel that the state security forces are able to address their security concerns. The section is based on Q6, Q7, Q8, Q9 and Q24 of the survey. Responses to these questions allow us to understand whether respondents feel secure, but also to assess their perceptions of the official security forces and of non-official security providers.

Through the analysis of the sample we want to understand whether the experience of rebel governance affect perceptions of safety and trust in the security forces. We also want to assess whether there is still a difference between the Western areas of the country, which witnessed some of most gruesome episodes of violence during the crisis, and the rest of the sample with respect to perceptions of safety and security risks. The influence of other factors, such as ethnicity and having been a victim of armed violence, is also considered.

3.1 Variables

The following variables code survey responses to questions related to security issues.

- Feel Safe: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that their locality is safe enough to walk alone at night without fear (Q6).

- Go to Police: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent would go to the formal authorities if they were the victim of a crime (Q7A).

- Police Powerful: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that the police and gendarmerie have a lot of influence in their locality (Q8G).

- Armed Groups Powerful: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that former armed groups have a lot of influence in their locality (Q8I).

- Approve Police: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that the "Police et gendarmerie" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9G)

- Youth at Risk: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that youth in Cte d'Ivoire are at risk of being recruited by groups using violence (Q24A)

- Ex-combatants at Risk: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that ex-combatants in Cte d'Ivoire are at risk of being recruited by groups using violence (Q24B)

- Security Index: Summary index of perceived security conditions. Includes Feel Safe, Armed Groups Powerful, Youth at Risk, and Ex-Combatants at Risk. Ranges from 0 (least secure) to 1 (most secure)

- Police Index: Summary index of citizen ratings of police. Includes Go to Police, Approve Police, and Police Powerful. Ranges from 0 (least confidence in police) to 1 (most confidence in police).

3.2 Perceptions of Security and Policing by Region

Figure 1 shows the distribution of the Security Index variable across regions included in the survey sample. The regions are listed in descending order; i.e. regions at the top are rated most secure, and regions at the bottom are rated less secure.

Figure 2 shows the distribution of the Police Index variable across regions. The regions are again listed in descending order; i.e. regions at the top have the highest ratings of police, while regions at the bottom have the lowest citizen ratings of police.

Notably, there appears to be an inverse association between regions that score high on Security Index and those that score well on the Police Index. In other words, areas where citizens report feeling relatively secure and perceived risks of remobilization are low, there are also lower citizen ratings of the police. By contrast, in areas where perceived security conditions are worse, the police appear to have a relatively better image.

3.3 Correlates of Perceived Security and Police Ratings

The results of the linear regression analyses (ordinary least squares) are reported in Table 1. The correlates of each outcome variable appear in a separate column. With respect to the territorial dimension of security, we found several statistically significant correlations.

Being a resident of the Western part of the former CNO area (Zone ex CNO (2)) appears correlated with negative perceptions of security. Residents in this zone were significantly less likely to report feeling personally safe (Feel Safe). A similar association is also found between perceptions of security and being a resident of the Western government-controlled area (Zone gouvernementale), although this is not statistically significant. Being a resident of the Western government-controlled area is also positively associated with perception that the security forces are a powerful actor (Police powerful) and play a positive role (Approve police) All these correlations are statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level.

There is a robust positive association between being a member of a Nordiste ethnic group (associated with support to the RDR party and with president Alassane Ouattara) and

Figure 1: Boxplot of Security Index. Red points indicate mean; white dashes indicate median. Colored boxes indicate upper and lower quartiles.

Figure 2: Boxplot of Police Index. Red points indicate mean; white dashes indicate median. Colored boxes indicate upper and lower quartiles.

feeling safe (Feel safe). No similar clear pattern emerges, however, with regards to ethnicity and indicators of trust in the security forces.

Former victims of armed violence (Victim) are more likely to feel personally insecure, less likely to agree that the police and gendarmerie are powerful, and tend to have a less positive opinion about the security forces than the rest of the population. They are also more likely to state that vulnerable youth and former combatants could be recruited by groups employing violence (Youth at Risk and Ex-comb at risk). These relationships are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

The level of education seems also to have an impact on security perceptions. Educated citizens feel less safe and are more worried about a violent mobilization of youth and former combatants: the indicators Feel safe, Youth at Risk and Ex-comb at risk are all negatively correlated with the level of education. But educated citizens are also more likely to go to the state security forces in case of being victim of a crime. Poverty seems to have the opposite effect, with poor citizens being less likely to go to the police and less worried about (re) mobilization for armed violence with respect to the average population.

Interestingly, practically none of our explanatory variables is statistically significantly correlated with the perception of influence of former armed groups (AGs powerful). The only exception is the variable Age, which is negatively correlated and statistically significantly at the $p < 0.01$ level (older respondents tended to see armed groups as less influential) but the effect is very small.

Table 2 examines the summary index measures of security and police ratings. Residents in the Zone ex CNO (2) rate their security conditions somewhat less favorably than those in Zone ex CNO(1) and government-controlled areas, while respondents in government-controlled areas appear to rate police more favorably. Victims of past violence reported both more negative ratings of security, and less favorable ratings of the police. Older respondents were more likely to report favorable views of the police, while women had less favorable ratings of police. More educated respondents reported worse security ratings, but had more favorable views of the police. Poorer respondents, by contrast, rated their security conditions more favorably but had more negative views of the police.

Table 1: Security Conditions (linear regression)

	Dependent variable:						
	Feel safe	Go to police	Police powerful	AGs powerful	Approve police	Youth at risk	Ex-comb at risk
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Zone ex CNO (2)	−0.102**	−0.016	−0.014	−0.004	0.027	0.091**	−0.017
	(0.041)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Zone gouvernementale	−0.038	−0.101***	0.061*	−0.061**	0.218***	0.054	0.057
	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Nordiste	0.061*	0.040	0.015	−0.026	0.010	0.071**	−0.014
	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)
Victim	−0.054*	0.032	−0.111***	0.023	−0.129***	0.080***	0.065**
	(0.031)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.031)
Age	0.001	0.0004	0.003***	−0.003***	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.050*	−0.044	−0.030	−0.044*	−0.031	−0.003	0.005
	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.023)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Education	−0.041***	0.128***	0.035**	−0.011	0.018	0.078***	0.092***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Poverty	−0.022	−0.096***	−0.013	−0.022	−0.036	−0.055**	−0.061**
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Constant	0.555***	0.428***	0.607***	0.368***	0.540***	0.232***	0.370***
	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.056)	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.069)
Observations	1,181	1,181	1,181	1,181	1,181	1,181	1,181
R²	0.035	0.104	0.032	0.014	0.056	0.044	0.051
Adjusted R²	0.029	0.098	0.025	0.008	0.049	0.038	0.044

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Reference category is Zone ex CNO (1)

Table 2: Security and Police Ratings (linear regression)

	Dependent variable:	
	Security Index	Police Index
	(1)	(2)
Zone ex CNO (2)	−0.173*	−0.003
	(0.093)	(0.078)
Zone gouvernementale	−0.087	0.178**
	(0.088)	(0.074)
Nordiste	0.031	0.064
	(0.079)	(0.067)
Victim	−0.222***	−0.208***
	(0.070)	(0.059)
Age	0.0002	0.006**
	(0.003)	(0.002)
Female	−0.009	−0.105*
	(0.066)	(0.055)
Education	−0.200***	0.180***
	(0.035)	(0.029)
Poverty	0.115**	−0.146***
	(0.054)	(0.045)
Constant	−1.415***	1.575***
	(0.159)	(0.133)
Observations	1,181	1,181
R^2	0.057	0.071
Adjusted R^2	0.051	0.065

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Reference category is Zone ex CNO (1)

3.4 Discussion

The results of our analysis confirm that citizens living in the Western areas of Cote d'Ivoire close to the former ceasefire line continue to feel less secure with respect to other areas of the country even six years after the end of the conflict. However, when it comes to trust in the state security forces, the impact of rebel occupation plays a stronger role, with residents in the Western government controlled areas reporting more positive views of the police and gendarmerie with respect not only to areas of the former CNO zone located close to the ceasefire line (Zone ex CNO (2)) but also to other areas of the former CNO zone that did not experience armed violence at a level comparable to the West of the country. This finding confirms the findings of section 1 with respect to the effect of rebel governance on trust in state institutions.

Ethnicity seems to have an important effect on feelings of security. On average, citizens that belong to ethnic groups associated to the former rebellion and the president's party feel safer than other Ivorians. Several causal pattern can explain this association. First, for residents in the former CNO zone, this pattern might be a legacy of the period of rebel occupation, when Ivorians of Northern ethnicity were feeling less likely to be victimized by the Forces Nouvelles than Ivorians belonging to other ethnic groups living in the CNO area that were not equally represented within the ranks of the rebellion, such as the yacouba and baoul. The association between Northern ethnicity and feelings of security could also reflect the ethnicization of post conflict Ivorian politics. The RHDP government has been accused multiple times of appointing 'Nordistes' to high ranking positions in the security sectors and in other government institutions. However, interestingly, Northern ethnicity appears to be correlated with negative opinion about the police and gendarmerie, although the association is not statistically significant. This correlation might be due to the reputation of these specific security forces, which under the presidency of Laurent Gbagbo were known to be close to the presidential camp and to frequently harass the Nordistes, while the army on its overall tend to be perceived as closer to the Ouattara government.

The results also suggest that citizens that are relatively more educated are more likely to engage with security and police forces compared to the general population. They tend to be more perceptive of security risks, but they are also more likely to expect the state to intervene in order to solve their security problems. For poorest citizens, opposite dynamics seem at play: they feel less secure on a personal level, but are less likely to worry about the re-emergence of armed actors and to rely on the security forces for their safety.

The inverse association between security ratings and police ratings across regions suggests that the policy problems of insecurity and citizen confidence in police forces may be driven by different dynamics. Residents in regions with low levels of confidence in the state security forces may nevertheless feel relatively secure, perhaps due to the role of non-state security providers. Moreover, even high levels of citizen confidence in state police forces may not reduce other forms of perceived insecurity, including perceived risks of violent remobilization.

4 Economic Conditions

This section examines perceptions of local economic improvement since the end of the Ivorian civil war in 2011.

4.1 Variables

- Economy Improved: A binary variable that indicates whether the respondent agrees that the economic situation in their community improved since 2011 (Q10A).

- Rehabilitation. A binary variable that indicates whether the respondent agrees that their community has benefited from rehabilitation projects financed by the government.

- Economic Improvement Rating is a combined measure of Economy Improved and Rehabilitation. It ranges from 0 (lowest rating) to 2 (highest rating)

4.2 Perceptions of Economic Improvement by Region

Figure 3 shows the distribution of economic improvement ratings across regions in the survey sample.

4.3 Correlates of Perceived Economic Improvement

Table 3 shows the correlates of respondents' perceptions of local economic improvement. Compared to respondents in Zone ex CNO (1) and the government zone, residents in Zone ex CNO (2) were less likely to have positive views of local economic recovery. Respondents from nordiste ethnic groups were significant more likely to have favorable views of local economic recovery, while victims of violence were significantly less likely. Women also had less favorable views of local economic improvement. Educated respondents gave more favorable economic ratings, while, not surprisingly, impoverished respondents gave more negative ratings of local economic conditions.

Figure 3: Boxplot of Economic Improvement Rating. Red points indicate means; white dashes indicate median. Colored boxes indicate quartiles.

Table 3: Correlates of Economic Improvement Index (linear regression)

	Dependent variable:
	Economic Improvement Index
Zone ex CNO (2)	−0.279***
	(0.060)
Zone gouvernementale	−0.035
	(0.057)
Nordiste	0.135***
	(0.052)
Victim	−0.221***
	(0.045)
Age	0.001
	(0.002)
Female	−0.116***
	(0.043)
Education	0.074***
	(0.023)
Poverty	−0.092***
	(0.035)
Constant	0.852***
	(0.103)
Observations	1,181
R^2	0.099
Adjusted R^2	0.093

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Reference category is Zone ex CNO (1)

4.4   Discussion

Overall, perceptions of local economic improvement in conflict-affected areas vary widely. Regions in the north, and particularly those that are dominated by nordiste ethnic groups, appear to have more favorable views of economic recovery. This is likely partially explained by the political popularity of the Ouattara government in these regions. Selective distribution of economic patronage and rehabilitation projects by the government to northern stronghold areas may also account for this variation. Meanwhile, women, victims of violence, and impoverished respondents are all less likely to feel that they have benefited from national economic growth since 2011, and that government rehabilitation projects have benefited them.

5 Confidence in Government Institutions

This section examines respondent views about government institutions and confidence in public administration.

5.1 Variables

- Turn to Gov (crime): Binary variable indicating whether the respondent would turn to public authorities to seek redress in the event of a crime (Q7A)

- Turn to Gov (land): Binary variable indicating whether the respondent would turn to public authorities to seek redress in the event of a dispute over land or property (Q7B)

- Turn to Gov (loan): Binary variable indicating whether the respondent would turn to public authorities to seek economic assistance (Q7D)

- Confidence in Public Administration index: summary index comprised of Turn to Gov (crime), Turn to Gov (land), and Turn to Gov (loan). Ranges from 0 (least confidence in public administration) to 1 (most confidence).

- Approve Prefect: Binary variable, if respondent agrees that Prefectoral corps plays a positive role in their community (Q9F)

- Approve Maire: Binary viarable, if respondent agrees that Maire and regional councillors play a positive role in their community (Q9H)

- Listen to Me: Binary variable indicating whether respondent agrees that "Politicians listen to people like me" (Q10C)

- Trust in Public Authorities: Summary index of citizen trust in public authorities that includes Approve Prefect, Approve Maire, Approve Police, and Listen to Me. Ranges from 0 (least trust) to 1 (most trust).

5.2 Confidence in Government Institutions by Region

Figure 4 displays the distribution of the Trust in Public Authorities index variable across regions in the survey sample. Bagoue, Cavally, and Kabadougou score highest on the index, while Bere, Worodougou, and Gbeke score lowest.

Figure 4: Boxplot of Trust in Public Authorities. Red points indicate means; white dashes indicate median. Colored boxes indicate quartiles.

5.3 Correlates of Confidence in Government Institutions

Table 4 shows the correlates of the Trust in Public Authorities index from a multi-variate regression model. Respondents living in former government zones are significantly more likely to express trust in local government authorities like the prefectoral corps, the police, and the municipal government, compared to those from former rebel ruled areas. Nordiste respondents are also somewhat more likely to view these authorities as playing a positive role, while victims of violence are less trusting of public authorities. Older respondents are more confident in public authorities, while impoverished respondents are somewhat less so.

Table 4: Correlates of Trust in Government Institutions (linear regression)

	Dependent variable:
	Trust in Public Authorities
Zone ex CNO (2)	−0.055
	(0.096)
Zone gouvernementale	0.388***
	(0.091)
Nordiste	0.153*
	(0.082)
Victim	−0.306***
	(0.073)
Age	0.006**
	(0.003)
Female	−0.106
	(0.069)
Education	0.059
	(0.036)
Poverty	−0.096*
	(0.056)
Constant	1.359***
	(0.165)
Observations	1,181
R^2	0.054
Adjusted R^2	0.047

Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
	Reference category is Zone ex CNO (1)

5.4 Discussion

The analyses above suggest that the legacies of the civil war had lasting negative consequences for citizen trust in public authorities: respondents in former rebel-occupied areas are less likely to approve of the role of important state authorities in their communities today. Victims of violence during the crisis period are also less trusting of local government institutions, as are youth and impoverished residents. This suggests that policy programs aimed at boosting citizen trust in public administration and engagement with local government need to be attuned to the legacies of the Ivorian conflict as a driver of citizen distrust. On the positive side, women do not appear to be less trusting of public authorities compared to men, holding other factors constant.

6 Civic Attitudes and Local Collective Action

This section analyses respondents' expressed participation in local and national political life, as well as engagement in local collective action and civic activities.

6.1 Variables

- Should Pay Taxes: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that paying taxes is something that a good citizen should ALWAYS do (Q11A)

- Should Vote: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that voting in elections is something that a good citizen should ALWAYS do (Q11B).

- Civic Activism Index: An ordinary variable of the number of activities that the respondent agrees are an acceptable way for a citizen to respond to frustration with the government (Q12):

  - Organize with others in community to demand government intervention
  - Contact the media
  - Refuse to pay taxes
  - Participate in a protest
  - Construct a street barrage
  - Occupy a public building

- Collective Action Index: An ordinal variable that counts the number of activities the respondent has done in the last six months (Q14), including:

  - Join a civil society organization (non-political)
  - Serve your community as a chief, notable, or representative of youth or women
  - Volunteer in a project to help your community
  - Participate in a public meeting or demonstration organized by an independent organization.
  - Participate in a meeting to discuess problems in your community

- Intend to Vote 2020: Binary variable indicating whether respondent intends to vote in 2020 elections.

6.2 Civic Engagement by Region

Figures 5-7 display the distribution of Civic Activism Index, Collective Action Index, and Intend to Vote 2020 across regions in the survey sample.

6.3 Correlates of Civic Engagement

Table 5 shows results from linear regression models of five civic engagement outcomes: Should Vote, Should Pay Taxes, Civic Activism, and Collective Action, and Intend to Vote 2020. The model in the fifth column includes only respondents who are eligible to vote.

Compared to former rebel-controlled areas, respondents living in government-controlled zones were less likely to agree that citizens should always vote in elections, but were more likely to agree that citizens should pay taxes. Those in government-controlled areas were also more likely to support civic activism, but were less likely to participate in local collective action.

Ethnicity does not appear to have a strong impact on civic engagement; although ethnic northerners were somewhat more likely to agree that citizens should pay taxes. However, victims of violence were significantly less likely to agree that citizens ought to pay taxes, and were more likely to support civic activism and to participate in local collective action.

Older respondents were more likely to agree that citizens should pay taxes compared to younger respondents, but were less likely to support civic activist behavior. Younger respondents appear less likely to engage in local collective action, and are less likely to vote in 2020. Female respondents were less likely to support civic activism, and were less likely to participate in local collective action. Females also indicated they were somewhat less likely to vote in the 2020 elections. More educated respondents generally held more pro-social and civic attitudes. However, more educated respondents are *less* likely to report intending to vote in 2020.

Finally, impoverished respondents were less likely to agree that citizens ought to vote or pay taxes. However, poorer respondents were more likely to engage in local forms of collective action and volunteerism.

6.4 Discussion

The results reported above suggest that the drivers of civic engagement in war-affected areas of the country are complex. Support for civic and political activism that involve speaking out against public authorities and mobilizing with other citizens to demand improved governance

Figure 5: Boxplot of Civic Activism Index (standardized to range from 0 to 1). Red points indicate means; white dashes indicate median. Colored boxes indicate quartiles.

Local Collective Action by Region

Figure 6: Boxplot of Collective Action Index (standardized to range from 0 to 1). Red points indicate means; white dashes indicate median. Colored boxes indicate quartiles.

Figure 7: Boxplot of Intend to Vote 2020. Red points indicate means. Only includes eligible voters (n=1081).

appears to be distinct from engagement in local forms of collective action and volunteerism.

The findings concerning victims of violence suggest that Ivorians who experienced violent trauma or abuse during the country's political crisis may have channeled such experiences into increased political activism in the post-war period. This would be consistent with other findings in the literature on the potential pro-social effects of wartime violence. However, it should be remembered that victims of violence were less likely to trust public authorities and government institutions.

Concerning voter participation in the 2020 elections, it appears that citizens in several northern regions (e.g. Folon, Poro), as well as women, younger voters, and more educated citizens are the most likely to abstain from electoral participation.

Table 5: Correlates of Civic Engagement (linear regression)

	Should Vote	Should Pay Taxes	Civic Activism	Collective Action	Intend to Vote 2020
	Dependent variable:				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Zone ex CNO (2)	−0.024	−0.055	0.049	−0.010	0.025
	(0.072)	(0.096)	(0.107)	(0.108)	(0.028)
Zone gouvernementale	−0.175**	0.388***	0.531***	−0.244**	0.011
	(0.068)	(0.091)	(0.101)	(0.102)	(0.027)
Nordiste	0.062	0.153*	0.012	0.001	0.023
	(0.062)	(0.082)	(0.091)	(0.092)	(0.024)
Victim	−0.001	−0.306***	0.282***	0.144*	−0.004
	(0.054)	(0.073)	(0.080)	(0.081)	(0.021)
Age	0.001	0.006**	−0.010***	0.011***	0.002**
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)
Female	−0.079	−0.106	−0.149**	−0.248***	−0.037*
	(0.051)	(0.069)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.020)
Education	0.285***	0.059	0.215***	0.076*	−0.040***
	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.010)
Poverty	−0.237***	−0.096*	−0.089	0.220***	0.015
	(0.042)	(0.056)	(0.062)	(0.063)	(0.016)
Constant	0.857***	1.359***	1.913***	0.786***	0.840***
	(0.124)	(0.165)	(0.183)	(0.185)	(0.049)
Observations	1,181	1,181	1,181	1,181	1,066
R^2	0.142	0.054	0.090	0.052	0.033
Adjusted R^2	0.136	0.047	0.084	0.046	0.026

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Reference category is Zone ex CNO (1)

7 Impact of Rebel/Government zone on citizen attitudes towards institutions and civic engagement

7.1 Introduction

The analysis conducted in this section is based on sample 2 of the population-based survey respondents from the areas located on the opposite sides of the former confidence zone, divided between 300 residents of the former governmental zone and 300 residents of the former CNO zone. The Zone ex-CNO (2) and the Zone gouvernementale covers the Regions of Blier, Cavally, Gbeke, Gumon, Haut-Sassandra, Marahou, and Tonkpi (see Figure 2 in Appendix for a geographical visualization of the sampling strategy). Survey respondents who reported that they had not lived in the locality for at least eight years were removed from the analysis, leaving a total of 524 respondents.

The aim of the analysis of sample 2 is to compare attitudes towards civic engagement and different post-conflict political actors/institutions of the residents in former CNO areas with those in the government-controlled territory. By comparing individuals living in geographic proximity of each other, but on either side of the ceasefire line established during conflict, this research design approximates a natural experiment. It aims to hold constant other potential variables influencing citizen engagement such as ethnicity, levels of economic development and education. Since the location of the ceasefire line dividing these localities is essentially arbitrary, it is possible to use the sample in order to understand the long-term impacts of the FN occupation for citizen-state relations in Cte dIvoire today.

Table 6 is based on the responses to Question 9 (Q9) of the survey. It examines attitudes towards different political actors and institutions. Residents were asked whether they view a set of actors as playing a positive or negative role in their communities. We aimed in particular to understand whether the experience of rebel occupation has eroded trust in the state and whether this erosion of trust has been compensated by an increase in trust in non-state institutions. We also aimed to understand whether former rebel actors are seen as playing a positive or negative role in the community after the end of the crisis.

Table 7 is based on Questions 11 (Q11) and 14 (Q14) of the survey. It compares views on civic responsibility and engagement. Residents were asked questions about their own participation in public life and their feelings on whether citizens should engage with the state and the community in a variety of ways, including paying taxes, voting, volunteering, joining civil society organizations, etc. Here we wanted to understand if citizens who have lived for a prolonged period under rebel occupation are less likely to feel that they have certain duties versus the state. We also wanted to understand whether the fact that during the period of division of the country the population had to compensate for the absence of public service through various community initiatives has left a positive legacy when it comes to participation and public engagement.

7.2 Variables

Explanatory Variables

In order to highlight any potential effects of rebel governance on institutional trust and post-conflict citizen-state engagement, we created the variable Rebel Zone, which signals whether the respondent resided in the CNO or government-controlled zone. We also created the variable Nordiste, which indicates whether the respondent identified themselves as belonging to the North Mande or Gur ethno-linguistic groups. We considered that, although ethnicity is an important factor in the Ivorian conflict, not all ethnic distinctions are politically salient. Citizens belonging to the North Mand speaking groups, such as the Malink, or Gur speaking groups, such as the Senoufo, were well represented within the Forces Nouvelles rebellion and are associated with president Alassane Ouattara's Rassemblement Des Rpublicains (RDR) party. We also analyzed other variables that might influence perspectives regarding civic attitudes and trust.

Outcome Variables (Attitudes Towards Institutions)

- Chieftancy: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that the "Chefferie traditionnelle" plays a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9A)

- Religious heads: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that "Chefs religieux" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9B)

- Politicians (gov.): A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that "Hommes politiques de la coalition au pouvoir" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9C)

- Politicians (opp.): A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that "Hommes politiques de lopposition" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9D)

- NGOs: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that "ONGs / socit civile Ivoirienne" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9E)

- Prefect: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that the "Prfet ou sous-prfet" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9F)

- Police: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that the "Police et gendarmerie" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9G)

- Municipal gov.: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that the "Maire et conseillers municipaux" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9H)

- Ex-armed groups: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that "Anciens groupes arms" play a POSITIVE role in their community. (Q9I)

Outcome Variables (Civic attitudes and behaviors)

- Taxes: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that paying taxes is something that a good citizen should ALWAYS do (Q11A)

- Voting: A binary variable (1/0) indicating whether the respondent agrees that voting in elections is something that a good citizen should ALWAYS do (Q11B).

- Civic Engagement: An ordinal variable (0-5) that counts the number of activities the respondent has done in the last six months (Q14), including:

  - Rejoindre une organisation de la socit civile neutre (indpendante)
  - Servir votre village ou quartier dans une des fonctions suivantes: chef, notable, reprsentant des jeunes ou reprsentant des femmes
  - Effectuer un travail bnvole pour aider votre communaut
  - Participer un meeting public ou une dmonstration organise par une association indpendante
  - Participer une runion de village ou quartier pour discuter des problmes de la communaut

7.3   Results from Regression Analysis

Table 6 reports the results of linear regression analyses (ordinary least squares), examining Attitudes Towards Institutions. The correlates of each outcome variable appearing in a separate column. Looking at the first row in the table, we see that the variable Rebel Zone has negatively-signed regression coefficients in seven out of nine models. These negative coefficients are statistically significant at the $p < 0.1$ level for Chieftancy, Religious Heads, Prefect, Police, and Municipal gov. In other words, Ivorians living in areas that were controlled by the Forces nouvelles rebel group appear to be significantly less likely have favorable views of these governance institutions, compared to respondents in otherwise similar communities in Cte d'Ivoire that happened to be on the government-controlled side of the ceasefire line. By contrast, respondents on the rebel-controlled side of the boundary were slightly more approving of Politicians (opp.) and NGOs compared to respondents in the government-controlled zone, but the differences are not statistically significant.

One puzzling feature of these findings presented in Table 6 is the differences in the perspectives expressed by the respondents regarding similar types of actors. Table 6 illustrates negative views regarding actors tied to the state, such as the police or municipal government, while government and opposition politicians do not appear to be similarly negatively viewed.

In terms of other explanatory variables, Table 1 suggests that Nordiste residents are less likely to approve of Chiefs and Religious Heads. Victims of violence, meanwhile, are significantly less likely to approve of the Police.

Table 7 reports the results of linear regression analyses examining Civic Attitudes and Behaviors. It appears that respondents in rebel-controlled areas are *less* likely to agree that citizens should always pay taxes, and are also *less* likely to agree that citizens should always vote. These differences are statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Interestingly, however, respondents in the rebel-controlled zone are more likely to report engaging in local pro-social and collective action behaviors, such as such as joining a civil society organization, serving their community in a leadership position or participating in a protest, than their counterparts in the government-controlled zone. These differences are statistically significant at the $p < 0.10$ level.

In terms of other variables, Table 7 suggests that better educated respondents are more likely to agree with the need to pay taxes, while more impoverished respondents are less likely to agree. Nordiste respondents appear less likely to be engaged in civic activities, as to female respondents. More educated respondents, meanwhile, are more likely to engage in civic action.

Table 6: Attitudes towards governance actors in the community (linear regression)

	Chieftancy	Religious heads	Politicians (gov.)	Politicians (opp.)	NGOs	Prefect	Police	Municipal gov.	Ex-armed groups
				Outcome: Thinks actor/institution plays positive role in community					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Rebel Zone	−0.072**	−0.112***	−0.041	0.032	0.034	−0.118***	−0.212***	−0.192***	−0.019
	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.025)
Nordiste	−0.258***	−0.082*	0.061	0.011	0.020	−0.078	−0.044	0.014	0.050
	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.033)
Victim	0.033	0.030	−0.060	0.011	0.052	−0.071	−0.109**	0.006	0.002
	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.042)	(0.026)
Age	0.001	0.001	0.0002	0.00005	0.005***	0.003**	0.002	0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	−0.034	−0.005	−0.052	−0.023	0.060	−0.084*	−0.056	−0.038	−0.018
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.024)
Education	−0.054***	0.009	0.004	0.001	0.026	−0.014	0.005	0.029	−0.012
	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.014)
Poverty	−0.004	0.010	−0.023	−0.049*	−0.006	−0.016	−0.038	−0.108***	−0.038*
	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.022)
Constant	0.885***	0.819***	0.317***	0.201***	0.136	0.643***	0.788***	0.512***	0.194***
	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.085)	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.100)	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.055)
Observations	511	511	511	511	511	511	511	511	511
R^2	0.076	0.025	0.020	0.010	0.029	0.039	0.079	0.073	0.019
Adjusted R^2	0.063	0.011	0.007	−0.004	0.015	0.025	0.066	0.060	0.005

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Table 7: Civic attitudes and behaviors (linear regression)

	Taxes	Voting	Civic Engagement
	Dependent variable:		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rebel Zone	−0.175***	−0.071**	0.221*
	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.121)
Nordiste	−0.024	−0.054	−0.371**
	(0.048)	(0.041)	(0.159)
Victim	0.025	0.006	0.142
	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.124)
Age	0.001	0.0004	0.011**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Female	0.014	0.005	−0.289**
	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.117)
Education	0.076***	0.013	0.265***
	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.066)
Poverty	−0.104***	0.021	0.101
	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.106)
Constant	0.898***	0.846***	0.665**
	(0.081)	(0.068)	(0.264)
Observations	511	511	511
R^2	0.094	0.015	0.092
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.002	0.080

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

7.4 Discussion

On the overall, Tables 6 and 7 suggest that individuals on the former rebel side of the ceasefire side are more likely to express a mistrust of state institutions and less likely to support actions and obligations tying citizens to the state. There are at least a couple of ways of interpreting these findings. First, perhaps it is not surprising that those on rebel side of the ceasefire line have these attitudes after being governed by forces seeking to dislodge the sitting government for almost ten-years. This might reflect deep-rooted belief in the cause of the FN or a response to rebel mobilization and legitimization efforts. This might also explain why respondents in the former rebel-controlled zone expressed less support for paying taxes and voting, actions that can be viewed as cementing and legitimizing the authority of the state.

The second interesting finding from this analysis is that while respondents in the sample from the former rebel-controlled zone expressed less support for voting and paying taxes, Rebel Zone was positively correlated acts of civic engagement at the local community level. Again, given that these respondents lived through years of rebel governance, this again may not be surprising. This could be read as a residual effect of a decade-long collective effort to compensate for the absence of the states provision of collective goods such as education, health care and sanitation. Another possible explanation might revolve around the inability of the state, in a context of no war, no peace to coercively limit popular civic action, and in particular popular social/protest movements.

Another interesting aspect of these findings is that these views were expressed despite the fact the conclusion of the conflict resulted in a reversal of the government in power and the empowerment of the political forces of those aligned with the rebels at the time. Thus, these differences might reflect something deeper than partisanship, but a more profound mistrust of state institutions resulting from wartime governance and mobilization that goes beyond who is in charge of the government at the present moment.

Perhaps less surprisingly, the analysis suggest that more educated citizens are better conscious about their duty to pay taxes and more engaged in politics and in community life. Our figures also suggest that women are excluded by some forms of political and civic participation.

This analysis could support divergent policy responses. One view might be to support networks of civic engagement and local sources of solidarity that exist beyond and in opposition to state institutions in former rebel-held territories. Another response might be that these are areas where the reinforcement of state-society relationships are required, and thus resources and political support should be focused on advocacy efforts being directed at communities in former rebel-held zones. However, efforts to work through local traditional authorities (chiefs) may be especially challenging in rebel-held zones, where citizens appear to have less favorable views of these traditional governance actors.

8   Conclusion and Looking Forward to 2020

The analyses of this report suggest that Côte d'Ivoire faces a number of key challenges heading into the national election cycle in 2020. These include...

In terms of concrete policy considerations, our findings suggest the following takeaways...

9   Appendix

Effect of Rebel Zone on Citizen Approval of Governance Actors


Figure 8: Ordinary least squares regression coefficients for the variable Rebel Zone (Table 6). Lines show 95% confidence intervals. Confidence intervals that cross the dotted horizontal line are not statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.

Figure 9: Map of surveyed localities