Skills for whom? Access to Retraining for Unemployed Canadians

Working draft - please do not cite.

Alix Jansen, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 100 St George St, Toronto ON M5S 3G3 alix.jansen@mail.utoronto.ca

Key words: Active Labour Market Policy, equality, Canada, skills, welfare state

Abstract

In this paper, I assess the degree to which Canada's training programs for people who are unemployed are offered equitably to different groups who tend to be marginalized from the workforce. What explains which people have access to skills and training assistance *while* receiving state income support? To answer this question, this paper undertakes two levels of analysis. First, I compare access to active labour market policies for groups marginalized from the labour market across liberal welfare states, showing that Canada is relatively more inclusive compared to its peers, especially with respect to its extension of training support to migrants. Second, I analyse Canada's complex of training programs, showing that the quality and diversity of training programs available is much greater for those eligible for Employment Insurance, taking Ontario as a case study. In doing so, I provide an assessment of one aspect of inclusivity in Canada's response to labour market disruption.

Introduction

The combination of globalization and technological change have reorganized demand for skills in the labour market considerably. Continued technological and market shifts highlight the need for interventions that can retrain people who find themselves without in-demand skills. Active labour market policies offer a potential way for governments to support workers whose skillsets become obsolete as a result of technological disruption (Lundvall & Lorenz, 2012, p. 241). However, whether these existing policy tools are able to respond to changing demand for skills for all people equally is unclear – especially in countries where access to retraining is tied to eligibility criteria for different forms of income support while unemployed like Canada and the US. Despite inequalities of access to income support and a shrinking population of people eligible for Employment Insurance, data from the OECD's (2019e) Survey of Adult Skills indicates that Canada provides greater access to training to groups usually marginalized from the labour market than other liberal welfare states. This paper analyses the state of access to retraining for unemployed people in Canada, focusing on Ontario as a case study to help to show how Canada's complex arrangements of federal and provincial training supports create a particular set of barriers and pathways to equal access to retraining.

In this paper, I first outline the importance of considering access to training in the face of technological disruption to work and occupations. I then compare Canada's ALMP accessibility to other OECD and liberal welfare states to show that Canada has relatively inclusive rates of access to retraining for people experiencing unemployment. Finally, I investigate the differences in access and outcomes across retraining offered to people on Employment Insurance compared to provincial Social Assistance, taking Ontario as a case study. The results of this analysis are mixed: while unemployed people in Canada can generally access retraining, the quality can differ significantly – creating a secondary layer of inequality within Canada's training system.

Access to Retraining in the Context of Technological Disruption

Active labour market policies (ALMPs) provide funding for programs that help unemployed people acquire new skills, gain employment experience, or improve their job searching techniques. Popularized as part of the "Social Investment approach to welfare, they aim to foster inclusive economic growth (Esping-Andersen, Gallie, Hemerijck, & Myles, 2002; Gingrich & Ansell, 2015; Hemerijck, 2015) by adjusting the skills and characteristics of people who are struggling in the labour markets. Active labour market programs can be grouped into three main forms:

1. Skills development: training courses, classroom based or otherwise, that support the development of vocational or academic skills, including apprenticeships
2. Employment assistance: training programs that assist with the development of general skills that help people gain employment, e.g. CV workshops, job-search assistance, and coaching for job interviews.
3. Employer partnerships and subsidies: subsidies for public or private employers to facilitate unemployed people. Employers may or may not be responsible for providing on-the-job training

By altering the characteristics of people looking for work, ALMPs provide a way for governments to match labour market supply with demand through improving the skills of the country's workforce, while also offering a way to minimize the costs of providing income support. ALMPs therefore act as a window into a given government's economic and social priorities: they indicate which industries governments aim to supply with workers and which social groups are prioritized in poverty reduction efforts.

Understanding who accesses what kind of active labour market policy is particularly pertinent in a time where labour markets are being reshaped by technological change, exposing new groups of workers to unemployment and underemployment. Activation policies may allow governments to retrain workers displaced by technological advancements that reduce demand for their skills (Lundvall & Lorenz, 2012, p. 241). Workers and welfare states are currently facing increased concerns about the impacts of machine learning, mobile robotics, and more advanced automation on work (Aronowitz & DiFazio, 2010; Autor, 2015; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Goos, Manning, & Salomons, 2009). A plethora of reports now suggest that between 5% and 50% of a given country's workforce could see their jobs replaced or significantly reorganized (Arntz, Gregory, & Zierahn, 2016; Frey & Osborne, 2013; Manyika et

al., 2017).[1] Changing demand for skills as a result of information and communication technology advancements has already hollowed out the supply of middle-income jobs, deepening income inequality (Autor, 2015). Digitalization has changed the mix of skills in-demand for growing occupations like application development and ICT operation (OECD, 2019d). This trend applies, of course, to Canada: technical services employment has been accelerating and grew by 4.5% between 2017 and 2018 – the fastest growth rate of the industrial sectors (Patterson, Hazel, & Saunders, 2019, p. 19).

Active labour market policies are tasked with trying to adjust labour market supply to match these changes in demand. Governments offering support to access skills training should be motivated to ensure they are training people in ways that mitigate, not exacerbate, problems of skill mismatch (Berger, 2013). Government agility in organizing the provision of training matters a great deal – especially when the characteristics of workers needing retraining is also changing – as does the ability of traditionally marginalized groups to access this retraining.

ALMPs, and the Social Investment Approach more generally, have been accused of exhibiting Matthew Effects, which see benefits accrue to the already-advantaged (Bonoli & Liechti, 2018; van Berkel, 2010). Unequal access occurs when some social group is better able to use a given social policy tool. It can manifest both positively and negatively: positive access bias occurs when a usually marginalized social group is better able to access a given service (for example, because policies are targeted at these groups), while negative access bias occurs when this group faces barriers to inclusion.[2] Inequalities of access may occur in both who is selected to participate in activation programs and in who receives what form of support – and is therefore more likely to benefit from activation support.

Scholars studying training for both employed and unemployed people alike have found differences at the welfare state regime-level[3] with respect to who is able to access training. Häusermann and Schwander (2012b) found, for example, that insiders are more likely to access training in liberal and continental welfare states than outsiders, suggesting inequalities in access. An OECD study (OECD, 2019b) on vocational training, which analyzed differential access to training based on migrant status, years of education, gender, and wages, indicates that welfare state regime-type does not perfectly indicate whether access to training is reasonably inclusive or

[1] For example, the accessibility of cloud computing and development of algorithmic matching tools has facilitated the rise of the gig economy – which has created new forms of work while disrupting traditional service industries production (Zysman & Kenney, 2017, p. 2).[1] These new forms of work often come with limited access to social security benefits and high income volatility and insecurity, in part because relationships between workers and customers are organized by algorithms owned by companies that deny an employment-relation to gig workers (Kenney & Zysman, 2018; Wood, Graham, Lehdonvirta, & Hjorth, 2018).

[2] This is explained further in the section of this proposal that outlines the dependent variable.

[3] Much of the literature draws on Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of welfare state regimes. Esping-Andersen finds three main welfare state regimes: liberal welfare regimes, characterized by low decommodification and high social stratification in the anglo-speaking advanced industrial countries including Canada, the US, and the UK; corporatist regimes, which preserve status inequalities and so decommodify some more than others, seen in Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and other continental European countries; and social-democratic regimes which are the most universal and the most decommodifying – mainly in the Nordic countries.

not. The figure below from this report shows that liberal welfare states range from being the most inclusive (New Zealand) to much further down the spectrum (Canada). Otherwise, Nordic countries tend to be more inclusive, while Continental countries are less inclusive.



Figure 1 Results of the OECD's (2019b, p. 36) analysis of adult education inclusiveness for disadvantaged groups.

Evidence from a study of active labour market policies specifically confirms that this trend exists in policies targeting unemployed people: Bonoli and Liechti's (2018) work on Matthew effects and active labour market policies indicates that continental welfare states again are the least inclusive for migrants and the long-term unemployed, while Nordic welfare states are the most inclusive. They also find differences in accessibility for different groups across program types: wage subsidies tend to have the most access bias, which may be because they are designed for people closest to the labour market (Bonoli & Liechti, 2018, p. 905).

The Case of Canada

Canada in Comparative Perspective: Equality of Access to Training and Education

In comparison to the set of liberal welfare states to which it belongs (Esping-Andersen, 1990; O'Connor, Orloff, & Shaver, 1999), Canada does well when it comes to overall educational attainment. Canada has the highest percentage of tertiary-educated adults (56.71%) of the liberal welfare states, along with the lowest percentage of people who have below a secondary school level of education, at 8.87% in 2017 (OECD, 2019a).



Figure 2 Adult education level - Below upper secondary (●) / Tertiary (◊) / Upper secondary (x), % of 25-64 year-olds, 2017 (OECD, 2019a).

When it comes to the inclusivity of education, though, OECD data paints a less flattering picture. The 2019 analysis of inclusiveness of training referenced in the previous section uses the Survey of Adult Skills dataset to show that while Canada ranks highly in terms of coverage of adult training, it does less well at including marginalized groups.[4] Compared to all other OECD countries included in the study, Canada ranks 18th out of 29 countries in terms of inclusivity, just behind the UK and the United States – making it the lowest-ranked liberal welfare state (OECD, 2019b, p. 36). Canada has significant gaps in training between high and low skilled and high and low-paid jobs, as well as between the employed and the long-term unemployed (OECD, 2019b, pp. 38–39).

Focusing on just access to training for those who are currently unemployed paints a slightly different picture. Using the same Survey of Adult Skills dataset (OECD, 2019e), but delimiting the dataset to just those who are currently unemployed, I analyzed access to both

[4] The long-term unemployed, those with low formal education, and those at high risk of losing work to automation (OECD, 2019b, p. 30). Risk of automation is taken from Nedelkoska and Quintini's (2018, p. 49) analysis, which indicates that low-skilled, low-paid jobs are highly at risk of automation: 'The occupational groups that have the highest probability of becoming automated typically do not require specific skills or training: food preparation assistants, assemblers, labourers, refuse workers, cleaners and helpers. The next category are however workers with at least some training, and what they have in common is that large part of their job content is interacting with machines, mainly in the manufacturing sector: machine operators, drivers and mobile plant operators, workers in the processing industry, skilled agricultural workers, metal and machine workers etc.' The report also considers gaps in access to training in relation to employment status, gender, age, skill, wages, and size of enterprise.

formal and informal training as a proxy for ALMP participation.[5] I analysed four dimensions of possible unequal access that reflect labour market inequalities more broadly:

- Education level: those with more education may be more likely to be granted training while unemployed. Education level is considered a source of marginalization in access to government sources and to secure, well-remunerated employment (Corak, 2013; OECD, 2019b; Silva, 2013). I used the variable B_Q01a_T, which combines self-reported levels of education into three categories (less than high school, high school, more than high school). This combined measure allows for effective comparison between countries.
- Migrant status: migrants, especially recent migrants, have been highlighted in the literature as a group who may be marginalized from social services generally and from ALMPs specifically (Bonoli & Liechti, 2018), including as a result of language barriers (Heckman & Smith, 2004). Some of this marginalization may come from eligibility rules, of course, but many migrants are also entitled to services. As a proxy for migration status, I use a binary variable J_Q04a of whether or not a given person was born in the country being analyzed.
- Length of unemployment spell: those who have been unemployed for more than a year are often considered more marginalized from the workforce than those with shorter spells of unemployment (Bonoli & Liechti, 2018; OECD, 2019b).[6] I use binary variable (C_Q08_b), which asks survey respondents whether they have been employed in the last year, allowing me to differentiate between the long- and short-term unemployed in the sample.
- Gender: Literature on continental employment and welfare highlighted the need to consider access differences by gender and that women are more likely to marginalized within the labour force (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Häusermann & Schwander, 2012a; Thelen, 2014) and so more likely to need retraining in order to try to access secure employment. I use binary[7] variable GENDER_R to analyse self-reported gender.

For each measure, I compared the proportion of all who had the marginalized characteristic who got training to the proportion of all who didn't who got training. I refer to the percentage of those with each characteristic as the training "rate" to simplify this discussion.

When these scores are averaged across the four categories, Canada has the lowest rate of differential access across the liberal welfare states. This indicates that while access to training in Canada is generally unequal, it is much more equitably provided across different groups experiencing unemployment. The diagram below shows the degree of bias towards favoured

[5] This proxy measure of ALMP participation is imperfect and may overstate ALMP participation, as it may capture training that people participated in before becoming unemployed.
[6] Note: I could rerun the analysis to include those who are not in the labour force, but this group may not be accessing state income support and may be voluntarily not in the labour force and so would not be the appropriate recipients or targets of ALMPs.
[7] Survey data should include non-binary options in collecting gender data both because people ought to be recognised by social institutions and researchers the way they wish to be identified and because there is evidence those who do not identify with a simple gender binary may be even more likely to face problems accessing social services in countries included in this sample such as Norway (Monro & Van Der Ros, 2018) and Canada (Scheim, Zong, Giblon, & Bauer, 2017) and face issues of inequality within the workplace (Badgett, Lau, Sears, & Ho, 2007; Schilt, 2010). Unfortunately, PIAAC data includes only "male", "female" and "not stated" – the last of which is an entirely unhelpful category for inferring gender identity and so has been excluded from this analysis.

groups in four liberal welfare states: Canada, New Zealand, the UK, and the US.[8] Canada actually favours migrants and women over native-born and men, though it exhibits significant biases in favour of those with more than a high school education. That is, Canada has positive access bias for migrants and women, though significant negative bias for those with less formal education and who has been unemployed for more than a year.



Figure 3 Access bias in liberal welfare states. Author's own calculations, using PIAAC data (OECD, 2019e)

Canada's result is somewhat surprising especially when it is compared to the US. Both countries are federal welfare states with similar active labour market policies: both assign significant portions of delivery responsibility to state or provincial governments and rely heavily on contracted service provision. Compared to other liberal welfare states, both the US and Canada spend relatively low percentages of their respective GDPs on active labour market programs and their administration, illustrated in figure four.

[8] Australia was excluded from this study because Australia's PIAAC data is not publicly available and The Australian Bureau of Statistics charges $AU1,850 to access the data.



Figure 4: Spending on active labour market programs in liberal welfare states as a percentage of GDP, including spending on placement and administration (OECD, 2019c).

This result is somewhat surprising given that Canada has a multiple-tiered system of providing active labour market policies. People who are eligible for Employment Insurance receive different training to those who are only eligible for social assistance when unemployed. Federal programs differ again in their eligibility criteria and tend to target groups with poor labour market outcomes. Some efforts have been made to unite the administration of ALMPs for those on Employment Insurance and social assistance payments – particularly in Ontario – but this process of merging is incomplete (Bramwell, 2012). The US has a similarly bifurcated system of income support, but ties access to training to other payments like SNAP. In Canada, provinces are responsible for contracting some ALMP providers, but they do so by following federal rules about the types of training being provided and regarding which groups are prioritised. The US also has a federal model of devolved responsibility and states must also follow some policy rules set out by at the Federal level, while states retain delivery responsibility for active labour market programming

The main policy difference between the two countries is that Canada has a complex, extensive collection of federal and provincial targeted ALMPs with designated funding and administration. While many countries including the US have youth-oriented targeting strategies, Canada also targets new migrants, indigenous peoples, women, and the long-term unemployed. This may explain why Canada has much less access bias compared to the other countries. In

order to assess this hypothesis, the next section analyses the forms of training available to these different groups.

Canada's Active Labour Market Policy Framework

Canada's unique policy framework is the product of a series of compromises regarding the extent to which authority for ALMPs should be devolved to the provinces. The 1996 changes to welfare through the Employment Insurance Act saw responsibility for training devolved unevenly to the provinces: some took on full responsibility for ALMPs while others co-managed with the federal government (Bramwell, 2012). These arrangements were set out in Labour Market Development Agreements (LMDAs), which outline the conditions for funds transfers of EI Part II benefits (Morden, 2016). These funds continue to cover the main forms of ALMP (skills development, employment assistance, and employer partnerships and subsidies), though 51% of funding goes to skills development programs (Employment and Social Development Canada Strategic and Service Policy Branch, 2017). However, to be eligible for these programs, people must be eligible for Employment Insurance – which is true for only roughly 50% of Canada's population (Banting, 2012).[9]

Those not eligible for training and support under the LMDAs can access training tied to provincial social assistance programs. The governing arrangements for these ALMPs have been subject to considerable rearrangement in the 21st century. Provinces received federal transfers between 2007 and 2014 for these programs and then from 2014, these were largely replaced by the Canada Job Fund Agreements (Morden, 2016), which focused on provincially-specific, employer-provided training. In 2017, the Trudeau Government introduced the Workforce Development Agreements, which consolidated the Canada Job Fund with the Targeted Initiative for Older Workers and the Labour Market Agreements for Persons with Disabilities. These are complemented with a series of federally-funded, targeted policy initiatives including the Youth Employment Strategy, Indigenous Skills and Employment Training, and the creation of the Future Skills Centre – all of which received additional funding in the 2018 and 2019 federal budgets (Morneau, 2018, 2019). Canada has also extended access to tertiary training for people receiving Employment Insurance and the Trudeau Government announced a new Canada Training Credit in 2019, which provides indirect support for individuals spending money on their own training both in and out of work (Morneau, 2019). This elaborate array of programming makes it somewhat difficult to assess whether programs are responding to changing labour market needs (Jansen, White, Dhuey, Foster, & Perlman, 2019) but may just be the cause of Canada's relatively inclusive training support for people experiencing unemployment.

[9] During the Great Recession, just under half of Canada's unemployed people received Employment Insurance benefits, with some variation across the provinces (Grundy & Rudman, 2018, p. 817)

Ontario: A Case Study in Unequal Access in a Changing Labour Market

Ontario is Canada's most populated province with a large, varied, and changing labour market. The province is has a very high expected growth rate: the population is expected to grow by 30.2% between 2017 and 2041, mainly as a result of net migration (Ministry of Finance, 2018, p. 7). It has a strong labour market, with the highest gains in employment alongside Quebec and British Columbia – despite a persistent unemployment rate of 6% (Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities, 2019; Patterson et al., 2019, p. 4). Recent employment growth bucks the long-term trend towards services across advanced industrial democracies: in Ontario, general-skill, low-wage job growth in food services, retail has been slowing down (Patterson et al., 2019, p. 16), which could indicate that those without high levels of training are likely to struggle in the labour market and will be the last to benefit from employment growth – contributing to the persistent 6% unemployment rate. Statistics on the current population of unemployed people support this: employment decreases between March 2018 and 2019 were the greatest for those with incomplete post-secondary training or less than high-school (Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities, 2019). Growth has instead come from goods-producing sectors across Canada, and healthcare and social assistance in Ontario in particular (Patterson et al., 2019, p. 18). That said, the fastest growing employment segment in Canada is in professional, scientific, and technical services – with growth heavily concentrated in Ontario, where over half of the total growth has occurred (Patterson et al., 2019, p. 19). Those with diplomas, certificates, or university degrees have experienced the greatest growth in employment (Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities, 2019) – and these two trends are likely related.

The combination of growth in a highly-skilled sector and reduced availability of general-skill, low-wage employment suggests Ontario is going through a period of skill-biased technological change. Under skill-biased technological change, technology substitutes for low-skilled human labour, which drives down wages for these skills At the same time, technology is understood to increase demand for high-skilled workers because it creates demand for 'more abstract and data-driven reasoning' (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). Problems then occur when the workforce is not able to adjust to changing demand for skills, which can be caused by a lack of investment in skills, rigidities in education systems, and a variety of other institutional and human causes (Piketty, 2014, p. 386). There is some evidence that Ontario has been experiencing these growing pains. The Changing Workplaces Review (Mitchell & Murray, 2017) of Ontario's employment trends and legislation shows that technological change has also contributed to the growth in non-standard employment because technology facilitates offshoring and the reorganization of work in space. For example, the share of workers involved in the gig economy is growing: within the GTA alone, 9% of residents have worked on labour platforms such as Uber and mechanical Turk (Bajwa, Knorr, Di Ruggiero, Gastaldo, & Zendel, 2018; Block & Hennessy, 2017). Remote work and platform work in particular are routinely classified as contract work rather than employment, and so the majority of those who participate will not be eligible for Employment Insurance or covered by a number of labour regulations (Mitchell & Murray, 2017).

As a result, Ontario represents a test case of whether Canada's ALMP structure can provide both equality of access and relevant retraining to those experiencing frictions in the labour market – including to those not eligible for Employment Insurance and therefore the forms of training provided through the province's Labour Market Development Agreement. Given that those with low formal education are struggling with employment and general-skill work is growing more slowly than highly-skilled specific work, is Ontario equipped to retrain displaced workers and move them into better paid work? The next section of the paper addresses this question by assessing the barriers and opportunities for access to retraining in Ontario's active labour market policy system.

Differential Eligibility for Training and Support with Securing Employment

In order to access support for retraining while unemployed, people must first meet various eligibility criteria for assistance. Eligibility criteria are set by legislators and then applied by street-level bureaucrats, who judge applications for support against operational policy rules and standards (Heckman & Smith, 2004, p. 250). Canada's complex range of avenues towards accessing ALMPs suggests that there are likely to be disparities in access to retraining while unemployed.

There are three paths to accessing retraining while unemployed in Ontario, as in all Canadian provinces: eligibility for Employment Insurance, eligibility for provincial social assistance, or eligibility for federal ALMPs. Training and assistance with finding employment provided under the Canada-Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement is only accessible for those who are eligible for Employment Insurance: a result of funds for the LMDA being derived from the EI operating account. To receive training, a person must be either an active Employment Insurance claimant or have been in the last five years or be receiving provincial benefits in support of pregnancy or care for a new-born child (Government of Canada, 1996, 2016). To be eligible for EI, though, a person must have worked sufficient hours in insurable employment and have not worked in at least seven days through no fault of their own – and be available for and actively seeking work (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018a). People must also apply for and have received this support. Those working in non-standard employment relationships like contract-based work are excluded (though some can opt in and pay coverage premiums), which is concerning considering that misclassification of workers as contract workers rather than employees is a known problem in Ontario (Mitchell & Murray, 2017, pp. 53–54). As a result, between 30 and 41% of Ontarians are actually eligible for EI (Bramwell, 2012, p. 402; Vosko, 2011, p. 33). Eligibility is also unevenly distributed across Ontarians: people aged 15-24, 55 and above, recent migrants, and rural residents are much less likely to be eligible and women are slightly less likely to be eligible than men – especially amongst self-employed workers (Vosko, 2011, pp. 33–35). As non-standard work continues to grow, so does the proportion of Ontario's labour force ineligible for retraining support offered under the LMDA.

This growing portion instead may be eligible for training under either the Province's Workforce Development Agreement, or through one of the Federal Government's targeted active labour market initiatives. The Workforce Development Agreement (WDA), signed in 2018, funds training, supports, and employment partnerships that provide assistance to Canadian citizens, permanent residents, protected persons under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act who are entitled to work in Canada,, and employers excluding governments and federal crown corporations and agencies (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018 Section 8). Eligibility is, of course, much more broad-based and is not even restricted to residents of the province: most people seeking assistance apart from those present on short-term visas are theoretically able to access support.

Additional access to training is available through federal programs, which tend to be targeted in order to address some of the inequalities of access created by tying access to EI eligibility (Bramwell, 2012). Two main steams of federal ALMP have been maintained throughout other reforms. The Youth Employment Strategy (YES) supports people aged 15-30 to find and maintain employment through programs delivered federally and locally. The three different streams of the YES have some additional eligibility criteria: all three require participants to be citizens, permanent residents, or have refugee protection. Career Focus is also restricted to those not receiving EI (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2016), while Canada Summer Jobs participants must be eligible to work and available for full-time work for between six and 16 weeks(S. C. Employment and Social Development Canada, n.d., pp. 13–14). The Indigenous Skills and Employment Training (ISET) program similarly provides support to a specific group: it funds training run by indigenous organizations for First Nations, Inuit, Métis, and urban/non-affiliated Indigenous people in Canada. Participants can receive EI while receiving support under ISET. The same applies to apprentices: apprentices in Red Seal trades can continue to receive EI while in training, and are also eligible for small interest-free loans to assist with their training costs once registered for an apprenticeship program (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018d). The Canada Job Bank, the final leg of Canada's federal ALMPs, is open access and so is the least restrictive form of the available employment support in Canada.

Eligibility rules make training under the LMDAs the most restrictive, while provincial support and the Job Bank are the least restrictive. Patterns in eligibility suggest that those with histories of gainful employment and eligibility for EI have access to the broadest range of training, while those in non-standard work – especially those over 30 who are non-indigenous – have the most limited range of supports available to them. Eligibility rules, however, do not tell the full story about who is able to access support. Access depends on depends on a combination of these rules and how street-level bureaucrats interpret and apply them – and street-level bureaucrats are subject to provincial-level management.[10] Application processes themselves can pose hurdles to accessing support: people may struggle with finding the documentation they need

[10] Future research will examine the role that street-level bureaucrats play in upholding or bending rules to facilitate or block access for people who do not clearly meet eligibility criteria.

to provide their eligibility, or with pursuing the appointments and time needed to register for different programs. Evidence suggests those who have not completed high-school face barriers in enrolling in training, even if eligibility criteria favour their acceptance over those with more education (Heckman & Smith, 2004). Access also, crucially, depends on what forms of training are actually available and whether people are able to participate in practice. The next section focuses on training availability and patterns of training participation.

Access: Training Availability in Practice

One key determinant of whether people can access training is the amount and location of available programming. Despite having much tighter eligibility criteria, the Federal Government allots more funding to training provided under the LMDAs than the WDAs. At the federal level, $1.8 billion is invested annually through the LMDAs, split between all provinces and territories, while the WDA provides $722 million annually along with a $900 million top-up each year from 2018 to 2023 – also split between the provinces and territories (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018; Morneau, 2019, p. 34). The Trudeau Government's top-ups do go a considerable way towards equalizing funding and should provide approximately 180,000 more training slots for people in Ontario over the six years for which the top up applies (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018b). At the provincial level, the amount of funding provided each year under the LMDA is tied to the proportion of people in Ontario claiming EI out of all claimants in Canada across a given year and the proportion of unemployed workers in Ontario out of all unemployed people in Canada in a given year (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2017). As a result, for 2018 and 2019, Ontario received $593 million for WDA-covered ALMPs and over $1.37 billion through the LMDA each year (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018b). This makes clear that at the provincial level, far more funding goes to those eligible for EI. It has been argued elsewhere that, from a national perspective, this model harms those who are unemployed in otherwise thriving regions (Pal & Choudhry, 2012), creating inequality of access for those who are probably most likely to be the least able to secure employment without retraining. Further, this inequity of funding suggests those on EI receive either more access to funding or higher quality training. Funding then has to be split across the different forms of support provided under the LMDA and the WDA – which serve slightly different populations.

Employment Assistance

There are striking similarities in the program offerings that are organized by each agreement – with the caveat that only those eligible for Employment Assistance can receive support to begin self-employment. Both focus on employment assistance primarily. The majority of spending under the LMDA goes to Employment Assistance Services (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, p. vii), which aim to 'help clients prepare for, find, get, and keep jobs' (Government of Canada, 2005, Annex 1). These programs tend to be short and "low intensity" and are relatively cheap, with an average cost of $840 per participant from 2002 to 2005 – significantly lower than the costs of job creation, self-employment, and skills-

development programs all of which cost over $8000 per participant in the same period (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, pp. vii, 27). While an exact breakdown of spending under the WDA is not readily available,[11] the Workforce Development Agreement language focuses on the importance of client-centered counselling and historically the province has prioritized structured job searching alongside training programs (Adams, Chow, & Rose, 2018). As part of these services, people might receive help with organizing CVs, preparing for job interviews, and improving their job-search skills.

While the content and delivery might be different, it appears recipients of either EI or Ontario Works have access to similar services and broadly similar outcomes. An evaluation of structured job-searching supports for people on Ontario Works from 2013 to 2013 found that participants had decreased subsequent spells on welfare, with a coefficient of -1.650 months, with an average spell duration 1.7 months lower than non-participants (Adams et al., 2018, pp. 7–8).[12] Similarly, those who participated in Employment Assistance Services provided under the Ontario LMDA has better labour market attachment over time (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, p. 29) – though the scale is unclear from existing reporting.

Training

Training programs offered to EI and social assistance recipients vary much more widely than employment assistance services. Under the LMDA, EI recipients can receive significant funding towards vocational training into occupations for which there is labour market demand (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, p. 9). In 2014-2015, the top five training occupations were: truck drivers, early childhood educators and assistance, accounting and other clerks, heavy equipment operators, medical administrative assistants, and social and community service workers. In contrast, training offered to those on Ontario Works focuses on basic skills acquisition, and should 'improve levels of literacy, essential and work-related skills; and support upskilling for the precariously employed and underemployed' (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018). This aligns with a plausible difference in capabilities between the populations eligible for each form of assistance, indicated by the differences in employment histories. However, such a difference may be unjustified: the recent evaluation of the Ontario LMDA (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c) repeatedly indicates that participants' low basic skills are a barrier to completing further training and to joining the labour market.

When it comes to results, if the probability of being employed can be seen as equivalent to the probability of moving off social assistance, then training offered through Second Career under the LMDA is markedly more effective than training offered under the WDA. Second Career participants saw their probability of being employed increase by 4.4 percentage points for active claimants and saw their likelihood of returning to EI decreased over the five years

[11] The Workforce Development Agreement is not mentioned in the 2019 Provincial Budget, though social assistance reform is promised (Fedeli, 2019, p. 192)
[12] Note that assignment to structured job search is non-random.

following training. Those who received training under the WDA saw their future likelihood of returning to social assistance decrease by only 1.1% (Adams et al., 2018, p. 10). The latter figure may also understate the effect of WDA training on employment outcomes, as people may stop receiving OW payments for reasons other than employment. Merging access to all training across both EI and OW claimants may help with creating a more even playing field of access to training that actually improves labour market outcomes for those experiencing unemployment.

Job placements and employer subsidies

Job placements, the final category of ALMP, are available to those receiving both Employment Insurance and Ontario Works – though only those on EI are able to receive support with beginning self-employment. These separate programs all aim to increase the work experience of participants, with the aim of improving their likelihood of securing unsubsidized employment and ending receipt of income support. Under the LMDA, EI recipients can receive targeted wage subsidies or placements under job creation partnerships. These two programs differ slightly: targeted wage subsidies are given to private employers, while job creation partnerships provide work experience to unemployed people through involvement with projects that should benefit the local economy or community (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, pp. 18, 24). Job placements for those on Ontario Works include both these forms of employment experience as they include subsidized and unsubsidized placements with employers alongside unpaid community placements. The opportunities available to OW and EI recipients are substantively similar once self-employment support is excluded – at least at the structural level. The forms of employment experience each provides in practice may differ, but data to this level of granularity is not available. In general, though, none of the programs significantly improve participants' labour market outcomes. Targeted wage subsidy recipients have some decent gains in employment, while the gains for job creation partnership participants peter out within five years of receipt (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, pp. 18, 24). Self-employment support has unclear outcomes due to a lack of data – though across Canada people who are self-employed tend to have lower incomes than other employees (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, p. 22). Job placements under Ontario Works have the worst outcomes of all: they actually increase spells on social welfare by 16.6 months compared to outcomes for those doing only independent job searching (Adams et al., 2018, pp. 9–10). Ontario Works recipients, who are most likely to lack labour market experience in the first place, are therefore significantly disadvantaged by the programming they are offered when it comes to job placements. While they can still access such support, the quality of the support they receive, judged form the outcomes, is significantly poorer than that offered to EI recipients.

Access Processes

When it comes to actually receiving access to these varying ALMPs, the processes are quite unclear from existing evaluations and government documentation. While LMDA training is supposed to be organized through a "one stop shop" model, a complex network of contracted

providers, the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities and the Ministry of Community and Social Services are all involved in assessing and facilitating access to training. The process of accessing training through Second Career demonstrates this complexity: to gain access, people who are interested must be assessed by a third-party service provider who considers their skills & barriers to employment along with their work history and then work with the applicant to find suitable training that aligns with labour market demand as indicated either by Second Career's own labour market indicators or by showing evidence of advertised job opportunities or from employers ready to hire workers (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018c, pp. 7–8).

Documentation suggests that work is underway to streamline processes under both the LMDA and the WDA in Ontario. The recent WDA even calls for training to be integrated with LMDA training provision, to 'inclusive integrated' approach to training and employment in the province (Employment and Social Development Canada, 2018). The recent provincial budget does not explicitly discuss merging access processes, but does outline intended reforms to training under the WDA to improve "efficiency and alignment" (Fedeli, 2019, p. 193). Existing detail from Toronto Employment and Social Services (2018, p. 3) suggests that the current trajectory for streamlining focuses on the continuous modernization of the "My Benefits" online portal for Ontario Works and more electronic document management, which shows little indication of merging processes with LMDA training. Access processes continue to be separate and so may throw up different barriers – further research at the street-level is needed to determine how these processes compare and shape who has access to training in practice.

Conclusion

Access to retraining for people experiencing unemployment across Canada is awkwardly split between provinces and the Federal Government, and between people eligible for Employment Insurance versus those who need to rely on provincial social assistance. This split has both advantages and disadvantages when it comes to inclusivity. On one hand, the complex of specialized programs and funds likely contributes to Canada's relatively decent level of inclusivity in comparison to other liberal welfare states, as indicated by PIAAC data. On the other, training offered to EI recipients, who are already closest to the labour market, tends to be more effective at improving labour market outcomes. Other forms of assistance like employment coaching are fairly similar, while job placement programs in general offer poor outcomes – especially for those receiving provincial social assistance. One solution offered by many is to merge together ALMPs and offer a wider array of options to those on EI or social assistance or to widen EI eligibility and so increase the share of the population able to access better training (Banting, 2012; Bramwell, 2012; Morden, 2016). From a practical level, equalizing access might rationalize the processes of access and ensure there are more options for tailoring support to people with different needs. Differential access creates administrative complexities, bars those with less employment history from more vocational training and makes it harder for people on EI to address any basic skills gaps that they have. While Canada's setup of ALMPs, using targeted support, helps to make training inclusive, these differences in what *is* available are significant.

Whether the processes of access exacerbate or mitigate these differences – whether supports are selected carefully for people with different circumstances or whether more barriers to access are thrown up in practice – is worthy of further examination for those concerned with labour market access in an age of technological disruption.

References

Adams, J., Chow, K., & Rose, D. (2018). *Accessing Active Labour-Market Programs: How Effective is Ontario Works?* [Education, Skills, and Labour Market]. Retrieved from C.D. Howe Institute website: https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/e-brief_285_web_0.pdf

Arntz, M., Gregory, T., & Zierahn, U. (2016). *The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries* [OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers]. Retrieved from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development website: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/workingpaper/5jlz9h56dvq7-en

Aronowitz, S., & DiFazio, W. (2010). *The Jobless Future* (2nd ed). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Autor, D. (2015). Why are there still so many jobs? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, *29*(3), 3–30.

Badgett, M. V. L., Lau, H., Sears, B., & Ho, D. (2007). *Bias in the Workplace: Consistent Evidence of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Discrimination*. Retrieved from https://escholarship.org/uc/item/5h3731xr

Bajwa, U., Knorr, L., Di Ruggiero, E., Gastaldo, D., & Zendel, A. (2018). *Towards an Understanding of Workers' Experiences in the Global Gig Economy* (pp. 1–42). Toronto, ON: University of Toronto.

Banting, K. (2012). Introduction: Debating Employment Insurance. In J. Medow & K. Banting (Eds.), *Making EI Work: Research from the Mowat Centre Employment Insurance Task Force* (pp. 1–34). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Berger, S. (2013). Jobs, Skills, and Training. In S. Berger & MIT Task Force on Production in the Innovation economy (Eds.), *Making in America: from innovation to market* (pp. 179–197). Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.

Block, S., & Hennessy, T. (2017). *"Sharing economy" or on-demand service economy?* Retrieved from Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives, Ontario Office website: https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sharingeconomy

Bonoli, G., & Liechti, F. (2018). Good Intentions and Matthew Effects: Access Biases in Participation in Active Labour Market Policies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, *25*(6), 894–911. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1401105

Bramwell, A. (2012). Training Policy for the 21st Century: Decentralization and Workforce Development Programs for Unemployed Working Age Adults in Canada. In J. Medow & K. Banting (Eds.), *Making EI Work: Research from the Mowat Centre Employment Insurance Task Force*. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Brynjolfsson, Erik., & McAfee, Andrew. (2011). *Race Against the Machine: How the Digital Revolution is Accelerating Innovation, Driving Productivity, and Irreversibly Transforming Employment and the Economy* (iBook Edition). Lexington, Massachusetts: Digital Frontier Press. (http://go.utlib.ca/cat/8312284).

Brynjolfsson, Erik., & McAfee, Andrew. (2014). *The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies*. New York: W.W. Norton & Company. (http://go.utlib.ca/cat/9149020).

Corak, M. (2013). Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and Intergenerational Mobility. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives; Nashville*, *27*(3), 79–102. http://dx.doi.org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1257/jep.27.3.79

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2016, December 20). Funding: Career Focus Local and Regional Projects - Eligibility [Assessments]. Retrieved May 15, 2019, website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/funding/career-focus/eligibility.html

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2017, March 30). Agreement to Amend the Canada – Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement. Retrieved May 14, 2019, website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/training-agreements/lmda/on-amending2016.html

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018a). Section 1: Applying for Benefits. Retrieved May 15, 2019, website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/ei/ei-list/reports/regular-benefits/apply.html#h2.2

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018, May 1). Canada - Ontario Workforce Development Agreement. Retrieved May 15, 2019, website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/training-agreements/workforce-development-agreements.html

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018b, May 2). Governments of Canada and Ontario reach agreement to give more people the tools they need to find and keep good jobs. Retrieved May 15, 2019, from https://www.newswire.ca/news-releases/governments-of-canada-and-ontario-reach-agreement-to-give-more-people-the-tools-they-need-to-find-and-keep-good-jobs-681496621.html

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018c, May 14). Evaluation of the Canada – Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement. Retrieved October 31, 2018, from aem website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/corporate/reports/evaluations/labour-market-development-agreement-ontario.html

Employment and Social Development Canada. (2018d, July 25). Support for Apprentices. Retrieved May 15, 2019, website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/apprentices.html

Employment and Social Development Canada, E. D., Strategic and Service Policy Branch. (2017). *Evaluation of the Labour Market Development Agreements: Synthesis Report*. Retrieved from Employment and Social Development Canada website: canada.ca/publicentre-ESDC.

Employment and Social Development Canada, S. C. (2019). *Canada Summer Jobs 2019: Providing Youth with Quality Work Experiences*. 36.

Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Esping-Andersen, G., Gallie, D., Hemerijck, A., & Myles, J. (2002). *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Retrieved from http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources__ID=955459&T=F

Fedeli, V. (2019). *2019 Ontario Budget: Protecting What Matters Most* (p. 382). Retrieved from Ontario Ministry of Finance website: http://budget.ontario.ca/pdf/2019/2019-ontario-budget-en.pdf

Frey, C. B., & Osborne, M. A. (2013). The Future of Employment: How Susceptible are Jobs to Computerisation. *Oxford Martin School*.

Gingrich, J., & Ansell, B. (2015). The Dynamics of Social Investment: Human Capital, Activation, and Care. In P. Beramendi, S. Häusermann, H. Kitschelt, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Politics of Advanced Capitalism* (pp. 282–304). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2009). Job Polarization in Europe. *American Economic Review*, *99*(2), 58–63.

Government of Canada. Employment Insurance Act (Consolidation). , S.C. 1996 c.23 § (1996).

Government of Canada. (2005). Canada – Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement [Government]. Retrieved May 15, 2019, from Employment and Social Development Canada website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/training-agreements/lmda/on-agreement.html

Government of Canada. (2016). Agreement to Amend the Canada – Ontario Labour Market Development Agreement [Government]. Retrieved May 15, 2019, from Employment and Social Development Canada website: https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/programs/training-agreements/lmda/on-amending2016.html

Grundy, J., & Rudman, D. L. (2018). Deciphering Deservedness: Canadian Employment Insurance Reforms in Historical Perspective. *Social Policy & Administration*, *52*(3), 809–825. https://doi.org/10.1111/spol.12230

Häusermann, S., & Schwander, H. (2012a). Varieties of Dualisation? Labour Market Segmentation and Insider-Outsider Divides across Regimes. In P. Emmenegger, S.

Häusermann, & M. Seeleib-Kaiser (Eds.), *The Age of Dualisation: The Changing Face of Inequality in Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Häusermann, S., & Schwander, H. (2012b). Varieties of Dualization? Labor Market Segmentation and Insider-Outsider Divides Across Regimes. In Patrick Emmenegger, S. Häusermann, & M. Seeleib-Kaiser (Eds.), *The Age of Dualization: The Changing Face of Inequality in Deindustrializing Societies* (pp. 28–51). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Heckman, J. J., & Smith, J. A. (2004). The Determinants of Participation in a Social Program: Evidence from a Prototypical Job Training Program. *Journal of Labor Economics*, *22*(2), 243–298. https://doi.org/10.1086/381250

Hemerijck, A. (2015). The Quiet Paradigm Revolution of Social Investment. *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, *22*(2), 242–256. https://doi.org/10.1093/sp/jxv009

Jansen, A. J., White, L. A., Dhuey, E., Foster, D., & Perlman, M. (2019). *Training and Skills Development Policy Options for the Changing World of Work* [Working Paper]. Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy.

Kenney, M., & Zysman, J. (2018). *Work and Value Creation in the Platform Economy* [Forthcoming in "Research in the Sociology of Work"]. Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy.

Lundvall, B.-A., & Lorenz, E. (2012). Social Investment in the Globalising Learning Economy: A European Perspective. In N. Morel, B. Palier, & J. Palme (Eds.), *Towards a Social Investment Welfare State* (pp. 235–257). Great Britain: Policy Press.

Manyika, J., Chui, M., Miremadi, M., Bugdin, J., George, K., Willmott, P., & Dewhurst, M. (2017). *A Future that Works: Automation, Employment, and Productivity*. McKinsey Global Institute.

Ministry of Finance. (2018). *Ontario Population Projections Update, 2017-2041*. Retrieved from Government of Ontario website: https://www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/economy/demographics/projections/

Ministry of Training, Colleges, and Universities, G. of O. (2019). Ontario's Labour Market [Government]. Retrieved May 14, 2019, from Ontario.ca website: https://www.ontario.ca/page/labour-market

Mitchell, C. M., & Murray, J. C. (2017). *The Changing Workplaces Review: An Agenda for Workplace Rights Final Report*. Ontario Ministry of Labour.

Monro, S., & Van Der Ros, J. (2018). Trans* and Gender Variant Citizenship and the State in Norway. *Critical Social Policy*, *38*(1), 57–78. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018317733084

Morden, M. (2016). *Back to Work: Modernizing Canada's Labour Market Partnership* (No. Mowat Research #123). Mowat Centre, School of Public Policy and Governance, University of Toronto.

Morneau, W. F. (2018, February 27). *Equality + Growth: A Strong MMiddle Class (Budger 2018*. Department of Finance, Canada.

Morneau, W. F. (2019, March 19). *2019 Federal Budget: Investing in the Middle Class*. Department of Finance, Canada.

Nedelkoska, L., & Quintini, G. (2018). Automation, skills use and training. *OECD ILibrary: OECD Social, Employment and Mgration Working Papers*. https://doi-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/10.1787/2e2f4eea-en

O'Connor, J. S., Orloff, A. S., & Shaver, S. (1999). *States, Markets, Families : Gender, Liberalism and Social Policy in Australia, Canada, Great Britain and the United States*. Retrieved from http://books2.scholarsportal.info.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/viewdoc.html?id=/ebooks/ebooks1/cambridgeonline/2013-02-13/1/9780511597114

OECD. (2019a). Adult Education Level (indicator). Retrieved May 13, 2019, from http://data.oecd.org/eduatt/adult-education-level.htm

OECD. (2019b). *Getting Skills Right: Future-Ready Adult Learning Systems* (No. 9789264311756). Retrieved from OECD website: https://www-oecd-ilibrary-org.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/docserver/9789264311756-en.pdf?expires=1550241706&id=id&accname=ocid177151&checksum=C0A27ACD8923984F50FAC6685D8C750C

OECD. (2019c). Labour Market Programmes: Expenditure and Participants [Database]. Retrieved January 21, 2019, from OECD Employment and Labour Market Statistics website: https://stats.oecd.org/BrandedView.aspx?oecd_bv_id=lfs-data-en&doi=data-00312-en#

OECD. (2019d). *OECD Skills Outlook 2019:Thriving in a Digital World* [Text]. Retrieved from OECD Publishing website: http://www.oecd.ilibrary.org/education/oecd-skills-outlook-2019_df80bc12-en

OECD. (2019e). Survey of Adult Skills (PIAAC): Public Data and Analysis. Retrieved March 18, 2019, from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development website: http://www.oecd.org/skills/piaac/publicdataandanalysis/

Pal, M., & Choudhry, S. (2012). The Impact of Regionally Differentiated Entitlement to EI on Charter-Protected Canadians. In J. Medow & K. Banting (Eds.), *Making EI Work: Research from the Mowat Centre Employment Insurance Task Force* (pp. 233–260). Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Patterson, M., Hazel, M., & Saunders, D. (2019). *Annual Review of the Labour Market, 2018* (p. 22) [Labour Statistics: Research Papera]. Ottawa, ON: Statistics Canada, Government of Canada.

Piketty, T. (2014). *Capital in the Twenty-first Century*. Cambridge, Massachusetts; London, England: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Scheim, A. I., Zong, X., Giblon, R., & Bauer, G. R. (2017). Disparities in Access to Family Physicians among Transgender People in Ontario, Canada. *International Journal of Transgenderism*, *18*(3), 343–352. https://doi.org/10.1080/15532739.2017.1323069

Schilt, K. (2010). *Just One of the Guys? Transgender Men and the Persistence of Gender Inequality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Silva, J. M. (2013). *Coming Up Short: Working-class Adulthood in an Age of Uncertainty*. New York: Oxford University Press. (http://go.utlib.ca/cat/9004027).

Thelen, K. (2014). *Varieties of Liberalization and the New Politics of Social Solidarity*. Cambridge ; New York, N.Y: Cambridge University Press.

Toronto Employment & Social Services. (2018). *Budget 2019: Toronto Employment & Social Services Budget Notes*. Retrieved from City of Toronto website: https://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2019/bu/bgrd/backgroundfile-123817.pdf

van Berkel, R. (2010). The Provision of Income Protection and Activation Services for the Unemployed in 'Active' Welfare States. An International Comparison. *Journal of Social Policy*, *39*(1), 17–34. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279409990389

Vosko, L. F. (2011). *The Challenge of Expanding EI Coverage | The Mowat Centre* (Mowat Publication No. 23). Retrieved from Mowat Centre website: https://mowatcentre.ca/the-challenge-of-expanding-ei-coverage/

Wood, A. J., Graham, M., Lehdonvirta, V., & Hjorth, I. (2018). Good Gig, Bad Gig: Autonomy and Algorithmic Control in the Global Gig Economy. *Work, Employment and Society*, 0950017018785616. https://doi.org/10.1177/0950017018785616

Zysman, J., & Kenney, M. (2017). *The Next Phase in the Digital Revolution: Platforms, Automation, Growth, and Employment* [BRIE Working Paper]. Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy.