Hard Times for Citizenship:  
Women’s Movements in Chile and Mexico

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Recent decades in Latin America have witnessed growing demands for citizenship by women’s movements. Throughout the region, democratization and economic restructuring have created political opportunity structures more conducive (to varying degrees) to the framing of women’s gender-based demands in terms of citizenship. In many countries, the popular mobilizations that preceded transitions to democracy generated wholesale critiques of politics as traditionally practiced, calling into question patterns of clientelism, corruption, and especially the exclusion of broad segments of the population based on class, race, ethnicity, and gender. Processes of neoliberal economic restructuring, especially the structural adjustment programmes that followed the global debt crisis of the early 1980s, unleashed nearly a decade of severely declining living standards for the poor, and, in many cases even the middle-classes were negatively affected by austerity. The negative effects of neoliberalism have given rise to even more profound critiques of existing political and social arrangements, thereby adding social and economic rights to the agenda of expanding citizenship. Women’s movements throughout Latin America, many of them having emerged as part of broader popular movements, have seized on the opportunities to forward their own gender-based demands for citizenship as part of these processes. Unfortunately, despite some initial signs that democratizing states would be receptive to women’s claims for citizenship, the rhetoric of gender equality endorsed by many political leaders has not been turned into reality. Citizenship has fallen on hard times as women’s movements negotiate the rather narrow openings provided by democratic transitions amidst a backdrop of economic restructuring.

The fact that movements themselves are framing their demands in terms of citizenship has led to greater scholarly attention to citizenship studies. Maxine Molyneux, for example, notes that citizenship studies, along with the “shift away from state-centred analyses...of power and authority” constitute the two main trends in recent literature on gender and politics in Latin America (2000, 35-6). Molyneux further notes that the focus on citizenship allows for a fuller investigation of how changing relations between state and society generate processes of inclusion and exclusion that in turn become the focus of study (ibid.). But because these processes differ across the region, the nature of the citizenship demands made by Latin American women’s movements, along with state responses to these demands, are different in each national context. Our purpose in this paper is to explain some of these differences. Under what conditions do women’s movements adopt a citizenship frame to forward gender-based demands? How do movements contest or seek to expand the meaning of “citizenship” to include gender, race, and ethnic differences in various national contexts? What are the consequences of different strategies, such as “autonomy” versus “double militancy,” for women’s citizenship goals?

In the paper we use the cases of Mexico and Chile to answer the above questions. We look at how changes in political opportunity structures and framing processes have different consequences for women in Chile and Mexico. These different outcomes owe to a series of factors, including: the nature of the transition to democracy, the internal coherence of women’s movements in each country, the nature of alliances with other civil society actors, the ideological orientation of the newly democratized state, the form of women’s agency within the state, and the nature of the neoliberal economic reforms. Significantly, but at times under-theorized, is the extent to which processes of democratization and neoliberal economic restructuring are
simultaneous and overlapping. The effects of this are potentially contradictory: whereas the political opening represented by a democratic transition allows women’s gender concerns to be placed on the public agenda, the neoliberal citizenship discourse that accompanies economic restructuring has the effect of de-politicizing a range of issues of great concern to organized women, particularly the feminization of poverty and the increased welfare burdens that are falling on poor women. A serious problem for women in both Chile and Mexico, is that governments are themselves deploying the concept of citizenship as a way to legitimate their social and economic policies. While women’s movements seek to broaden the meaning of citizenship to include social rights that are guaranteed by states, neoliberal governments employ a rhetoric of citizen activism to encourage society to provide its own solutions to economic hardship and poverty. While this trend is occurring in both Chile and Mexico, there are other features of Chile’s political opportunity structure that enable organized women to contest the state’s more narrow vision of democratic citizenship. In Mexico, on the other hand, the neoliberal economic discourse of the current government is matched by a profoundly conservative ideological rhetoric, thereby reducing the political opportunities for women to forward a gender equality agenda.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING

Transitions to democracy potentially open up opportunities for women to challenge prevailing patterns of discrimination that undermine their access to the rights associated with citizenship. According to Jane Jaquette and Sharon Wolchik, “because transition politics are periods of crisis and thus of intense politicization, they bring new ideas and institutions into political life” (1998, 4). Processes of transition have varied widely throughout Latin America, however, and have invited similarly varying types of challenges to the meaning and content of politics. Most importantly, women’s citizenship demands are influenced by the extent to which politics is open to re-definition and to the insertion of feminist citizenship goals. Feminists, therefore, need to engage with and find space within the “discursive politics” (Beckwith 2000, 444) or the “universe of political discourse” (Jenson 1986) that accompanies, or often initiates, processes of political change. Consequently, the possibilities for inserting gender-based citizenship demands vary according to the discursive politics of democratic transition.

Gender issues have been politicized as part of processes of political change in both Chile and Mexico, but the very different types of transition produced different types of movements with varying demands. The extremely repressive and closed Pinochet dictatorship in Chile (1973-90) produced a broad-based opposition movement with one key goal: the return of democracy. A fairly unified and multi-class women’s movement emerged within the broader pro-democracy movement and succeeded in gendering the political discourse of the democratic opposition by claiming that democracy would be incomplete without attention to women’s citizenship goals. In Mexico, in contrast, women’s organizations have been plagued by sectarianism and unable to build a unified movement, probably a result of the less repressive nature of authoritarianism in that country and the success of the PRI regime for many years in dividing and co-opting opposition.

The type of citizenship demands women’s movements make is also affected by strategic considerations, specifically, whether movements, or key sectors within them, favour
“autonomy,” or “double militancy,” and what kind of alliance possibilities exist.\(^1\) Movements that are autonomous may be more free to make demands that political parties are unwilling to make given their desire to attract voters (see Friedman 2000). For example, the issue of reproductive freedom has not been taken up by Chilean feminists in political parties or in SERNAM (Servicio Nacional de la Mujer), the state agency created to promote gender equality, because it is an issue that deeply divides the Chilean population. In Mexico, in contrast, debates over abortion rights have been prominent in the post-transition period. Mexican “autonomous” feminists’ willingness to challenge the new Fox regime on this issue reflects the distance between the feminist movement and Fox’s socially conservative PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional) government. Prominent Mexican feminist Marta Lamas states, for example, that in an attempt in the early 1990s to build a broad pluralistic women’s movement with representation from women affiliated with various parties called de la A a la Z, PAN women were not included because feminists viewed the party so critically (1998).\(^2\) Thus the political opportunity structure of the democratic transition in Mexico differs considerably from the Chilean context, given the more conservative nature of the regime, which creates limits to the opportunities for feminists to work with the state. On the other hand, movements that are autonomous often lack influential allies, whether political parties or other social movements, that can help them place gender issues on the public agenda.

The question of movement “autonomy” versus “double militancy” emerges for feminists as part of the transition to democracy (see Friedman 2000; Waylen 1994; Serrano 1990). In most cases of authoritarianism, political parties were banned (as in Chile) or severely restricted and controlled (as in Brazil) thus granting women’s movements relatively greater autonomy. In Mexico, where political parties dominated, women’s movements were either co-opted or heavily marginalized from the political system. Democratic transitions, however, revive competitive party politics, creating opportunities for “double militancy”—i.e., for feminists to participate in both movement activities as well as bringing their feminism to other organizations (parties or state agencies). Karen Beckwith, reviewing the comparative research on the double militancy strategy, concludes that “there are circumstances where feminists, allied with progressive opposition parties, dramatically increase their policy influence under conditions where the political opportunity structures shifts,” for example, during democratic transitions (2000, 441). In Chile, the double militancy of many feminists had varying effects. It allowed feminist citizenship goals to be placed on the transition agenda, but also limited the content of these goals. In both Chile and Mexico, feminists in political parties or in the state appear less likely to promote a fully inclusive conception of citizenship, especially one that focuses on social citizenship rights. In both cases, post-transition governments have been committed to economic

\(^1\) Karen Beckwith (2000, 442) defines double militancy as “the location of activist women in two political venues, with participatory, collective identity and ideological commitments to both”.

\(^2\) Lamas states, “An alliance with panistas was impossible for me, since the dogmatic and moralizing ideology of the PAN is totally opposed to feminism” (Lamas, 1998: 108). Of course President Fox himself is not particularly conservative on social matters as witnessed by his own divorce and recent marriage to a divorced woman; he is also relatively independent from the traditional PAN machine. Nevertheless, the conservative nature of the governing party poses clear problems for Mexican feminists.
strategies that favour market and private-sector solutions to social problems deriving from poverty and inequality, strategies which might be undermined by the inclusion of socio-economic rights for citizens.

In addition to the political opportunity structure of the democratic transition, patterns of economic restructuring have important gender consequences which affect both the content of women’s citizenship demands and the strategies available for mobilizing around such demands. Janine Brodie (1996, 126-7) has identified a number of ways in which economic restructuring, especially through structural adjustment, affects women: it leads to the feminization of poverty, with women acting as “shock-absorbers” by curtailing their own consumption and finding ways to make up for declines in family income; the burdens on women increase as “social services are shifted from the paid work of women in the public sphere to the unpaid work of women in the domestic sphere;” and previous equality gains may be rolled back (e.g., state-funded child care declines or disappears). Throughout Latin America, restructuring has ushered in a “New Policy Agenda” emphasizing free-markets, privatization, state withdrawal from social service provision, and competition based on flexible and low-wage labour. All of this is premised on a citizenship model devoid of social citizenship rights with the result that citizenship is not terribly meaningful for the growing ranks of poor and un/underemployed (Richards 2000). Moreover, scholars of Latin American politics have noted that the neoliberal model depends upon the de-politicization of social issues (Craske 1999; Taylor 1998). This, in turn, raises immense barriers to expanding the content of citizenship to include social and economic rights which are often a priority for women given the extent to which the negative effects of neoliberalism fall disproportionately on them.

Hence, the political opportunity to promote women’s citizenship represented by democratic transition is partly undermined by the simultaneity of political transition and neoliberal economic restructuring. In the Chilean case, despite the social-democratic nature of the governing coalition, the transition to democracy produced enormous political changes but few social and economic changes. The neoliberal model put in place under Pinochet was not substantially altered, despite commitments by post-1990 governments to pay back the “social debt” of the dictatorship and to pursue “growth with equity”. Significantly, while poverty has been reduced in Chile from almost 40 percent to around 23 percent, inequality has been increasing (Weyland 1997). In Mexico, Fox’s pro-business orientation has raised concerns about his capacity to move forward on his promises of poverty alleviation. In particular, critics are concerned that the heavy emphasis of the new administration on such pro-market tactics such as promotion of micro-entrepreneurship (particularly among women) are insufficient to address the serious structural problems that foster poverty in the country and that have meant that the benefits of economic liberalization were not spread to the poor, especially women and indigenous peoples.

CITIZENSHIP AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS

Like most concepts in political science, “citizenship” and “women’s movement” are contested. At the most basic level, citizenship is about membership in a (national) community “and about the relationship between individuals and the state and between individual citizens within that community” (Lister 1997, 3). While the concept and practice of citizenship has been historically
bound up with patterns of exclusion based on class, race, and gender, members of excluded groups have nonetheless deployed the concept’s universalist aspirations to make demands for inclusion. Most women’s movements raise issues and put forth demands that, ultimately, are about the rights and obligations associated with citizenship. Following T.H. Marshall (1950), most current theorists of citizenship distinguish among civil, political, and social rights, while remaining sceptical of the evolutionary relationship that Marshall himself had posited among them (see Jelín 1996; Richards 2000; Schild 2000).

Defining “women’s movement” has been equally contentious and the comparative literature on women’s movements still lacks an effective conceptual framework, including definitions and typologies, in which comparative feminist research can be situated and cross-case generalizations made (Beckwith 2000, 434; Molyneux 1998, 223). Some authors only include activism and groups that are “feminist,” while others prefer the term “women in movement” (Rowbotham 1992) to encompass women’s activism in general, whether in women-only or mixed organizations. But while limiting the scope to “feminist” groups makes the analysis too limited, studying “women in movement” casts the net too widely. Sonia Alvarez specifies the condition of “autonomy” in defining women’s movements (1990, 23) that is, women’s movements need to be autonomous from other political or social organizations. In this sense, state-directed organizations such as the Centros de Madres in Chile initiated by Eduardo Frei in the 1960s, and women’s wings in political parties such as the Asociación de Mujeres Nicaragüenses Luisa Amanda Espinosa (AMNLAE)—the women’s wing of the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional, do not, in and of themselves, constitute women’s movements. This does not mean, however, that women in these groups do not also participate in women’s movements, or that women’s movements do not eventually develop out of state-directed or party-dominated organizations. Indeed, Teresa Valdés and Marisa Weinstein (1993) argue that the state-directed Centros de Madres laid the foundation for the Chilean women’s movement in the 1970s and 1980s, and Karen Kampwirth (1998) points out that the AMNLAE ensured that women’s gender concerns were addressed by the Sandinista government.

To avoid the above problem, Molyneux prefers the term “female collective action” and categorizes such action according to its autonomy from traditional political actors, differentiating among “independent movements,” “associational linkage,” and “directed mobilizations” (1998, 225-31). Molyneux makes a further useful distinction between the form of women’s collective action (i.e., the extent to which it is autonomous) and the kinds of interests that movements promote, differentiating mainly between “strategic” and “practical” gender interests. “‘Practical’ interests [are] those based on the satisfaction of needs arising from women’s placement within the sexual division of labour; and ‘strategic’ interests [are] those involving claims to transform social relations in order to enhance women’s position and to secure a more lasting re-positioning of women within the gender order and within society at large” (ibid., 232).

The practical/strategic interest dichotomy has been criticized, however, especially for privileging “feminist” activism over women’s activism that may not explicitly challenge gender hierarchies. In practice, there is often a class dimension at work here, with middle-class and professional women being more likely to mobilize for specifically feminist goals, such as reproductive rights, while poor and working-class women mobilize around “practical” interests such as access to material resources. Another problem is the potential blurriness of the
distinction. Some issues, such as the demand for state-funded day care, are not easily placed exclusively within the category of practical or strategic interests. While it is more likely to be poor women who demand public child-care services (middle-class and wealthy women can purchase these services), thereby indicating that the demand is a “practical” interest, when women demand that the state support women’s reproductive roles, they are also challenging unequal gender relations which assign reproductive duties entirely to women. This makes public child-care demands a strategic gender interest.

In order to avoid the potentially problematic strategic/practical dichotomy, and a typology of women’s movements according to their promotion of practical versus strategic interests, we look at the types of citizenship demands being made by movements, especially whether or not demands for socio-economic rights are expressed. Framing the issue in terms of citizenship allows us to focus on the political and economic contexts to which contemporary movements are responding, and, within this focus, we are made more sensitive of the differences among women. Secondly, while women’s movements are often assumed to be inclusive and socially progressive, in reality, in promoting women’s equality, movements do not necessarily address other bases of subordination based on race, ethnicity, or class (Beckwith 2000, 438). Promoting socio-economic rights is one way of challenging the exclusion of groups that cannot exercise their political citizenship because of a lack of material resources. Material deprivation and the absence of resources such as education and time are crucial impediments to one’s full participation and membership in political communities (Hershberg and Jelín 1996). But demands for social citizenship rights also cross the practical versus strategic distinction, as in the demand for public child-care listed above. Moreover, the extent to which movements make demands for socio-economic rights is likely to reflect the make-up of the movement itself, particularly whether it includes women from a variety of class, ethnic and race groups.

In the Chilean case, demands for social citizenship rights were stronger in the 1980s when the movement was more inclusive, with fluid links among popular sector women’s organizations and middle-class and professional activists. In the 1990s, the loss of many of these linkages has resulted in citizenship demands that vary significantly between the movement’s “integrationist” segment (i.e., in SERNAM and/or political parties) and those portions of the movement that are more autonomous and made up of popular sector, rural, and/or indigenous women. The loss of cross-class linkages is a result of both the democratic transition and the process of economic restructuring. In brief, these processes open up opportunities for professional (normally middle-class) activists to put their gender expertise to work, either in the state or in NGOs that are contracted by the state to carry out gender policy research or implementation. Popular sector, rural, and/or indigenous women do not enjoy such opportunities and, in fact are negatively affected by Chile’s prevailing economic model with its focus on market and private sector solutions to poverty alleviation (Franceschet 2003; Richards, forthcoming).

In Mexico, as discussed above, cross-class unity among women was never achieved, and the organizations formed by upper- and middle-class women in many cases failed to reach out to working-class and peasant women. As in many other Latin American countries, the more elite groups tended to focus their activism on cultural issues as well as the types of “strategic” demands described by Molyneux like reproductive rights. As in Chile, the 1980s was a period of
increased social mobilization by women in the popular sectors in pursuit of social rights, and some links were forged between middle-class feminists in non-governmental organizations and the popular movements comprised largely of women. Divisions persisted, however, into the 1990s. For example, some Mexican feminists were reluctant to embrace the cause of the Zapatista rebels in Chiapas, despite the strong participation by women in that movement, because of the heavy role played by the Catholic Church in support of the Zapatistas.

In the remainder of the paper we comparatively analyze the Chilean and Mexican cases, showing how the processes described above played out differently in each country’s democratic transition. For both cases, we focus on the political opportunity structure generated by transition politics against the backdrop of economic crises and deepening commitments to (different forms of) neoliberalism. We argue that, in each country, different transition politics produced divergent types of movements with varying opportunities for activists to move into institutionalized arenas of the state and political party systems. We conclude that the diluted conception of citizenship promoted by the “institutionalized” segment of the women’s movement in Chile today should serve as a warning to Mexican feminists where the more recent democratic transition and accompanying political openings are causing some to rethink their previous emphasis on movement autonomy.

CITIZENSHIP AND WOMEN’S MOVEMENTS IN CHILE

In this section, we address the political opportunity structure of democratization and economic restructuring in Chile to determine its conduciveness to improving women’s citizenship. The post-transition government created a well-institutionalized women’s agency in the state to address women’s issues. While this development created some opportunities to improve women’s citizenship, it also created tensions within the broader women’s movement. This has led to two competing meanings of citizenship, one emanating from within the state and the other being advocated by women organized in civil society.

The Chilean women’s movement has changed dramatically since the transition to democracy in 1990. The dictatorship-era movement was broad-based, multi-class, and, at least in the early to mid-1980s, relatively autonomous from political parties and completely autonomous from the state. Since 1990, the movement is considerably more fragmented and key segments of the movement are far less autonomous—a number of feminists moved into the political parties of the Concertación while others can be found in SERNAM or in NGOs that work with SERNAM. These changes are reflected in the conceptions of citizenship promoted by different segments of the movement. Most importantly, there is a vast difference in the types of citizenship demands emerging from SERNAM and from movement organizations that are more autonomous.3 SERNAM’s conception of citizenship is best reflected in the Equal Opportunity

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3 We do not wish to conflate the aims of SERNAM with the aims of individuals (who may or may not consider themselves feminists) who work within SERNAM. We are aware that feminists within SERNAM may hold views that go well beyond what could reasonably be promoted from within the confines of a state agency. That being said, however, SERNAM itself can still be considered to represent one segment of a broader women’s movement.
Plans (1994-2000 and 2000-2010), which have served as the main mechanism for promoting gender equality. Both Plans reveal a feminist conception of citizenship, connecting women’s social and political marginalization to the exclusive assigning of reproductive responsibilities to women. These Plans stop short, however, of elaborating demands for socio-economic rights that would enable women from marginalized groups to make claims on the state, claims that would reduce women’s welfare burdens and provide them with the material resources necessary to exercise their citizenship identities. The absence of such demands in SERNAM’s discourse reflects an understanding of citizenship that, while acknowledging the gendered sources of women’s exclusion from citizenship, fails to fully acknowledge the additional sources of marginalization experienced by poor women. If we look at the demands of women’s movement organizations that are autonomous from the state, however, we find a conception of citizenship that is much more inclusive and that connects gender subordination to the class, race and ethnic discrimination that crosses Chilean society.

In the 1980s, when the women’s movement was characterized by greater cross-class linkages, citizenship demands made on behalf of Chilean women were extensive, calling for the creation of gender policy machinery within the state, quotas for women in government and parliament, and an end to a gender ideology that limited women’s identities to their motherhood roles. In one document, an important women’s organization of the period stated: “We value our maternal role and exercise it with great commitment and responsibility, but our realization as persons is not exhausted by it.”4 Women’s organizations in this era also focused on socio-economic rights, calling on the state to eradicate unemployment, and provide sources of dignified labour, adequate housing, free education, debt relief, and better salaries.5 Even more significantly, women demanded socio-economic rights on the basis of women’s “difference”. Movement activists argued that there ought to be greater social and economic value attached to the motherhood roles that were such a key feature of their identity, acknowledging that women’s “domestic work is one of the pillars on which the national economy rests, although it is neither recognized nor valued.”

In sum, the movement’s citizenship demands in the 1980s were clearly feminist: they challenged the gender division of labour, demanding that the responsibility for social reproduction be shared more equitably (even supported publicly), and acknowledging that women’s exclusive association with the “private” realm of the family undermined their taking on of a “public” citizenship identity. Moreover, the movement’s citizenship demands included socio-economic rights, reflecting the cross-class nature of the movement as well the economic issues of the day. The political opportunity structure for the women’s movement was shaped by the broader struggle against Pinochet and the eventual transition to democracy amidst the backdrop of economic crisis and its eventual resolution (at least for the middle- and upper-classes).

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4 “Demandas de la Mujeres a la Democracia,” reproduced in Gaviola et.al. 1994, 251-56.
5 These demands are found in Movimiento Feminista’s “Manifesto Feminista,” Mujeres Por la Vida’s “Pliego de las Mujeres” as well as in MEMCH ‘83’s “Principios y Reivindicaciones que Configuran la Plataforma de la Mujer Chilena”. All of these documents are reproduced in Gaviola et al, 1994, 234-47.
There are two features of the Chilean democratic transition that are significant for the present purposes: first, the way in which Pinochet’s defeat required a fairly unified opposition; and second, the economic crisis in 1982 and its ultimate resolution by the time of the actual transition. Pinochet’s dictatorship was extremely repressive, succeeding in inhibiting any substantial opposition until the early 1980s when plummeting living standards associated with the 1982 economic crisis produced a wave of popular protests. When these protests failed to topple the dictatorship, a divided and fragmented opposition made greater efforts at cooperation. Two main opposition groupings eventually emerged: the Centre-Left Democratic Alliance (AD), who focused on a moderate and non-violent strategy and displayed a willingness to negotiate with the military regime; and the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), formed by groups and parties excluded from the AD (such as the Communists, the Revolutionary Left Movement, and some factions of the Socialist Party). The strategy of the MDP was to provoke a complete collapse of the dictatorship through continued popular mobilization. The strategy was successful from the perspective of drawing out people—especially from the popular sectors—to protest the dictatorship. These mass popular protests, mostly occurring in Santiago’s poblaciones (shantytowns), clearly demonstrated the extent of popular anger directed at the military regime. Throughout the country, the poor and working classes were paying the greatest costs of the 1982 economic crisis in terms of unemployment and growing poverty. Some estimates place unemployment in certain poblaciones at eighty percent (Chuchryk 1989).

The violent clashes between the police and the angry pobladores, combined with improving economic conditions in the mid-1980s, led many middle-class Chileans to favour the more moderate strategy of the Democratic Alliance. Ultimately, then, the tactic of negotiating with the military and presenting demands and manifestos at public assemblies became more dominant. The more radical opposition, the MDP, was increasingly marginalized. By the mid-1980s, political parties were re-emerging and taking the leading role in organizing opposition activities. The main successes of the opposition included ensuring that the 1988 plebiscite on the continuation of Pinochet’s rule would be relatively free and fair, and after winning the plebiscite with 55 percent of the vote, negotiating some changes to the Constitution to remove its more authoritarian features. In 1989, elections were held for Congress and for the presidency. The Centre-Left Concertación de los Partidos por la Democracia won the presidency and a majority of seats in Congress. On March 11, 1990 Patricio Aylwin was sworn in as president, ending seventeen years of dictatorship.

While the political context changed considerably when a democratic regime replaced an authoritarian one, the economic policies of the new regime changed very little. The neoliberal

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6 The extremely bitter partisan conflicts that helped to create the conditions for the 1973 coup also helped to keep an effective pro-democratic opposition from forming. Indeed, the divisions among the pro-democracy forces were a key motivation for the formation of Mujeres Por la Vida, a cross-party alliance of women to protest human rights violations and to struggle for democracy (Valenzuela 1991).

7 The Chilean Constitution was revised by the military in 1980 and contained a clause specifying a plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule in 1988.
orientation of the Chilean economy has been maintained by successive *Concertación* governments. Indeed, some analysts have argued that maintaining the neoliberal model was the “price” of democracy (Silva 1991; Garretón 1995; cf. Haggard and Kaufman 1995). Since the *Concertación*, which includes the main Centre and Left parties, promotes a very moderate position on how to respond to issues such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality, the “universe of political discourse” in Chile has narrowed considerably since the early 1980s. To some extent, this moderation occurred because the economic crisis of the early 1980s had been “resolved”—growth resumed and unemployment declined. Although the middle- and upper-classes benefited from the resumption of economic growth, the benefits were much less noticeable for the poor. Although, to be sure, poverty has declined in Chile, from 38.6 per cent in 1990 to 23.2 per cent in 1996 (Oppenheim 1999, 257). Despite positive trends in poverty reduction, researchers have noted other disturbing trends: inequality has increased (Hojman 1996; Weyland 1997); the poverty that remains is proving more difficult to eradicate (Hardy 1997); and poverty is increasingly being feminized, especially among women-headed households, estimated at over 40 percent of all Chilean families (Montecinos 1994, Valenzuela 1994).

The nature of the democratic transition in Chile continues to affect the types of economic and social policies that governments pursue. Although the current (Socialist) government of Ricardo Lagos is from the Left of the *Concertación* coalition, the strength of the political right in congress, along with a deeply conservative and pro-business media, have meant that some of Lagos’ more ambitious plans for reform are continually watered down. The political right remains over-represented in congress due to the existence of the “designados” (designated senators) and an electoral system that favours the right. As a result, reforms of the labour code, and, more recently, a reform of health care policy to improve health care for those who rely on the under-resourced public sector, have been extremely difficult to carry out.

The political and economic context briefly sketched above affected the kinds of citizenship demands elaborated by organized women. Most importantly, the sheer intransigence of the dictatorship which ultimately compelled fragmented opposition groups to co-operate also led to the formation of broader networks of women opposed to the dictatorship. The multi-class nature of the movement was also a reflection of a variety of factors. The neoliberal restructuring that got underway by 1975 had extremely negative effects on the poor, leading to increased unemployment, higher levels of poverty, and a growing burden on women as the state withdrew from the limited social services it previously provided. Women’s organizations aimed primarily at economic survival emerged throughout the country. At the same time, professional and

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8 Both features were put in place by Pinochet prior to the transition to democracy. The binomial majoritarian electoral system divides the country into 2-member districts in which winning both seats requires that a party double the votes of the second highest vote-getter. Where it does not, the second seat goes to the second-placed party. This system replaced the proportional representation one in place prior to the dictatorship.

9 Lagos’ “Plan AUGE” would prioritize certain medical conditions and guarantee universal access to health care (http://mujer.tercera.cl/2002/05/11/plan-auge.htm). However, it has come under very heavy criticism from the private sector and from the political right.
middle-class women were moving into the burgeoning NGO sector, many of them supported by international funding agencies. Given the growing international attention to gender issues in this period (because of the UN Decade for Women 1975-85), international funds were available to NGOs to carry out work specifically with women. The resulting interactions between middle-class feminists and popular sector women’s organizations, although not without serious tensions, laid the groundwork for a multi-class women’s movement whose citizenship demands focused on both the political and socio-economic rights that were crucial for the effective exercise of women’s citizenship.

In terms of placing women’s citizenship demands on the public agenda, the discursive politics of the transition facilitated critiques of traditional politics from a feminist perspective (see Kirkwood 1986). Furthermore, the fact that political parties were declared “in recess” by the dictatorship forced them underground and seriously weakened their links to social organizations. The weakness of parties meant that social organizations enjoyed much greater autonomy than normally from partisan actors. In this atmosphere, women’s organizations had the necessary space to develop alternate styles of participation and, most importantly, to raise gender issues and develop critiques of traditional political practice. In this context, where the meaning of “politics” and “democracy” was open to challenge, feminists eventually argued that democracy had never really existed for women in Chile.

Although greater autonomy from partisan actors facilitated the emergence of women’s citizenship demands, a strategy of “double militancy” was key to placing these demands on the agenda of the transition. A number of women’s organizations participated in activities organized by the main opposition groups, and in this way, some of women’s citizenship demands were eventually incorporated into the overall opposition movement’s demands for democracy. When the main opposition parties became the post-transition government, some of women’s citizenship demands were reflected in their mandate. These demands included Civil Code reform and other legislative changes to promote equality; policies to address gender-specific sources of poverty; and national policy machinery to promote women’s equality (Concertación 1989).

Because the nature of the women’s movement changed so dramatically following the transition, we must look to both its various segments in order to see the variety of citizenship demands being forwarded. What is clear today is that there are both advantages and disadvantages to the “double militancy” strategy pursued by a number of activists. On the positive side, there is a clear recognition by SERNAM that women’s citizenship is undermined by a wide variety of factors reflected in the Civil and Criminal Codes, labour laws, education system, the sexual division of labour, and a gender ideology that associates women exclusively with their motherhood roles. This means that SERNAM’s objectives for promoting gender equality are far ranging, including, for example, recommendations that negative gender stereotypes be removed from the educational curriculum (SERNAM 1994). Furthermore, SERNAM argues that legislation to combat gender inequality is insufficient if women themselves are not “empowered” with the necessary knowledge and information to exercise their rights. To this end, SERNAM has initiated awareness campaigns, and programs such as the
Women’s Rights Information Centres (CIDEM) as a mechanism to promote women’s access to citizenship rights (Weinstein 1997), and the “Woman with Rights, Woman Citizen” campaign.¹⁰

SERNAM has elaborated far-ranging objectives to promote women’s civil and political citizenship rights, but in terms of socio-economic rights, SERNAM’s discourse is considerably weaker. While recognizing the fact that women are more likely to be poor and more likely to be employed in precarious jobs, the solutions proposed are embedded within the Concertación’s neoliberal view on solving poverty issues (see Richards, forthcoming). Instead of granting that all citizens, by virtue of being citizens, are entitled to “dignified jobs,” as the dictatorship-era women’s movement demanded, the Concertación’s view is that marginalized groups (youth, indigenous peoples, and women) need to be targeted, especially with training programs that will improve their chances of accessing jobs. SERNAM’s second Equal Opportunity Plan outlines objectives “oriented to eliminating the obstacles and discriminatory practices that operate in access to the labour market and productive resources...” (SERNAM 2000, 43). Reducing women’s poverty is also to be addressed by the market, including “developing measures of stimulation of the private sector in its efforts to overcome female poverty” (ibid., 48).

SERNAM, therefore, has adopted a view of women’s citizenship that lacks the social citizenship rights associated with the earlier movement’s discourse. But women’s groups outside of the state are highly critical of the extent to which a more inclusive and robust conception of citizenship is being sacrificed to the narrow aims of the neoliberal state. There are growing indications that women’s organizations are dissatisfied with the narrow scope of SERNAM’s policies. One community activist points out that because gender policy is made by professional (middle-class) women with no experience of life in the poblaciones, the policies promoted by SERNAM do little to improve the conditions of marginalization experienced daily by popular sector women (Interview, October 20, 1999, Santiago, Chile). More significantly, because of the lack of linkages between popular sector women’s organizations and activists with access to the state, programs and policies that would promote socio-economic rights for poor, working-class, rural, and/or indigenous women are not proposed largely because the voices of these women are not heard.

If we look at the citizenship demands of women’s organizations outside the state, we see a more inclusive conception of citizenship being promoted, most notably, one that recognizes the class, race, and ethnic components of women’s identities and how these identities intersect with gender to create different experiences of marginalization. For example, REMOS (Network of Women’s Social Organizations), a fairly new organization linking over 20 popular sector women’s groups, states that its mission is “to contribute to improving the situation of discrimination, both of gender and of class, that women of the popular sectors suffer in our country” (REMOS n.d.). According to one of REMOS’ leaders, part of their strategy is to make SERNAM aware of the realities of class inequalities and to have popular sector women’s citizenship demands heard by women in SERNAM (Interview, October 4, 1999, Santiago, Chile). Another recent network that promotes a more substantive and inclusive citizenship is the Asociación Nacional de Mujeres Rurales e Indígenas (ANAMURI), with origins in the rural

women’s movement. According to one of its leaders, a key concern of ANAMURI is that the “official” women’s rights agenda promoted by SERNAM fails to address the concerns of rural and/or indigenous women (Interview, August 31, 1999, Santiago, Chile).

More inclusive citizenship demands are also forwarded by the Grupo Iniciativa Mujeres (Women’s Initiative Group), comprised of eleven NGOs that work on women’s issues in Chile:

From women’s point of view, the notion of citizenship implicitly contains the principle of equality and the respect for difference. This means that it’s important to claim universal rights and equal treatment for men and women, and treatment differentiated for women according to their social class, life-stage, sexual orientation, ethnicity, etc. Equality and difference aim at ending gender discrimination, and [instead] acting according to criteria of social justice (“Nueva Agenda, Nuestra Agenda, 1999).

The fairly wide-ranging citizenship demands expressed by autonomous movement actors signify an important point: that non-state or civil society actors can make more radical demands for change than can state actors. This may seem obvious, but the point needs to be made, especially in an era when movements, for a variety of reasons, have become increasingly institutionalized within states. But there is a second conclusion we can draw. The emergence of networks like ANAMURI, REMOS, and the Grupo Iniciativa and their efforts to link dispersed groups, gathering and prioritizing issues and movement demands indicates a potential re-mobilization of women’s movements despite significant institutionalization (Franceschet 2003). This can be attributed to a fairly successful political transition to democracy in Chile (at least the re-institution of competitive party politics and the respect for the rule of law) alongside continued neoliberal economic restructuring which has not been beneficial for most women. The continued relevance of issues like poor working conditions, lack of access to adequate health care or community service, lack of dignified employment opportunities, etc., especially for poor women, in a democratic context with a state agency that is failing to adequately address those issues, is producing important efforts by women’s organizations to respond collectively. One of the ways they are responding is by promoting a conception of citizenship that challenges the narrow one encapsulated in SERNAM’s discourse and programs. Citizenship is understood by movement actors like REMOS, ANAMURI, and Grupo Iniciativa as including social and economic rights in large part because these groups themselves are more inclusive, bringing together women from different class, race, and ethnic groups, rather than the professional (mostly middle-class) women with access to employment opportunities in SERNAM. While SERNAM may house feminists that feel an allegiance to the women’s movement as a whole, it remains constrained by an overall political discourse that prioritizes neoliberal solutions to poverty and therefore a sense of citizenship devoid of social and cultural rights.

CITIZENSHIP AND WOMEN’S ORGANIZATIONS IN MEXICO

Much of the information in this section comes from Blacklock and Macdonald, 2000.
While Chile’s democratization came relatively late as a result of the intransigence of the Pinochet regime, Mexico’s democratization is even more recent. Since truly free and fair elections and a transfer of presidential power away from the traditional governing party in Mexico took place only in August 2000, it is difficult to predict the impact of democratization on women’s citizenship in Mexico. Mexican women’s movements have much to learn, however, from the experiences in Chile and other cases of democratic transition in Latin America. The quite unique nature of Mexican authoritarianism means, however, that the nature of transition differs considerably from the Chilean example, as do its consequences for women’s citizenship.

As elsewhere in Latin America, though, recent years have seen the flourishing of citizenship demands in Mexico and the entry into the political life of the country a number of actors who were largely excluded from the political process, including women (Rodriguez, 1998: 3; 2003). Mexican women were active participants in the citizenship movement that emerged in recent years to undermine the semi-authoritarian political system. Democratization resulted from a number of factors, including intra-elite ruptures opened up by the rapid economic changes the country experienced in the 1980s. It is unlikely that democratization would have proceeded quickly, however, without the active protagonism of mobilized citizens, especially women. The democratic opening thus appears propitious in many respects for women’s citizenship demands. Nevertheless, as the Chilean case, like others in Latin America, demonstrates, democratization can be accompanied by backward movement both in terms of the level of public organization and contestation, as well as specifically in attentiveness to gender concerns among the new state elites. Mexican women need to learn from cases like Chile in order to take fullest advantage of the opportunities that do exist in contemporary Mexico. In this section we outline the historical development of women’s citizenship struggles in Mexico, as well as indicate some of the areas of concern arising out of the analysis.

As Blacklock and Macdonald (2000) argue, Mexico has come relatively late to the shift toward the adoption of a discourse of citizenship in popular struggles. The unique brand of authoritarianism adopted in Mexico was less conducive than the Chilean one for the adoption of this discourse. In Mexico, the revolutionary heritage created the conditions for the long survival of corporatism and a top-down inclusionary political system. The incorporation of peasant, worker, and “popular sector” organizations into the governing party, and the cooptation of many other organizations, precluded the development of the strong division between state and civil society that existed in many Latin American countries. Women were even denied formal political citizenship status and the right to vote until 1953 despite a strong and unified women’s suffrage movement that had emerged in the 1930s. When it was finally granted, women’s suffrage came fore as a “gift from above” than as a result of active contestation by women’s organizations, since the early women’s movement was largely demobilized after the failure of an earlier attempt by a wide and active women’s movement to win the vote in the late 1930s (Rodríguez 2003, 98-101). In the early period, therefore, political and civil society remained terrains occupied by men, while women were largely relegated to the private sphere, although some ambitious, well-connected women were able to make their way into the political elite. The few women’s organizations that did exist in this period were tied to the PRI; the result was not truly “double militancy” but primacy of the party identification over the promotion of women’s interests. As a result of the success of these mechanisms of governance, citizenship discourses
arrived late to Mexico. Widespread clientelism undercut demands around citizenship by presenting political participation and state social programmes as pay-offs for support of the dominant party, rather than as a response to inalienable human rights (Craske, 1998: 124).

The feminist movement emerged as part of the Mexican left and was composed primarily of middle-class, highly-educated women. As part of their largely Marxist orientation, feminists repeatedly attempted to build links with working women, with little success. The problems in building a cross-class, united women’s movement would continue to plague feminism up to the present. These problems existed partly because of the inherent problems middle-class women face in communicating with working class women, and also because of the continued strength of traditional gender ideologies among poor, peasant, and working-class women. According to Lamas, “Working-class women’s vision of the world corresponded with the dominant ideology. Women workers considered the double day and sexual harassment as ‘private’ problems, which bore no relation to their work situation” (Lamas 1994). On the other hand, unlike in Chile, demands around formal democracy and civil and political human rights were not initially central demands of the women’s movement. An important precursor of the contemporary Mexican human rights movement was the Committee in Defense of Prisoners, the Persecuted, the Disappeared, and Political Exiles, organized by Rosario Ibarra de Piedra and other mothers of the approximately 500 Mexicans who were disappeared during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the mothers’ movement for human rights was not as prominent as in Chile and other Latin American countries, reflecting the absence of the extreme forms of repression in those countries which politicized women’s roles as mothers.

As in Chile, the economic crisis of the 1980s gave rise to new ways of “doing politics” as the fiscal crisis made corporatist strategies of political incorporation less viable. As discussed above, in the 1970s and 1980s a wide range of popular movements arose, such as independent unions and urban popular movements, whose demands were phrased in terms of social rights. These movements had a largely female face, with heavy female participation, although they were usually led by men. A human rights movement also began to emerge, challenging the dominant international image of Mexico as a human rights promoter. However, the Mexican human rights movement of the 1980s was not openly about citizenship, since politics (understood as the formal political sphere) had been delegitimised by the regime’s manipulation of the electoral process. As Nikki Craske argues, in the 1980s, even though popular sector women of the colonias populares were in fact raising citizenship demands – demands for genuine representation and state accountability as well as social citizenship rights, “These citizenship demands generally do not include proposals for structural changes necessary to advance the position of women in Mexican society. Citizenship is still largely based on the ideally gender “neutral” but substantively masculine model, and demands are kept within the narrow remit of elections” (Craske 1989). The sectarian and non-inclusionary nature of the Mexican women’s movement failed to dislodge or even substantially challenge this male model of citizenship. While contacts between middle-class and popular sector women continued during the 1980s, and popular sector women increasingly adopted feminist slogans, conflicts continued, which were expressed both at a series of national feminist encounters, and at the Latin American feminist encounters. Any cooperation between the two groupings has occurred on a short-term basis, and the movement as a whole remains atomized.
At the same time, new ways of doing politics and framing citizenship demands have also been influenced by the process of economic restructuring adopted first by the PRI regime (which year?) and continued by the current PAN regime. As in Chile, the Mexican government and dominant classes have adopted a clear “restructuring discourse” in support of their project of neo-liberal restructuring and trade liberalization. This discourse is largely centred on the privatization of functions previously performed by the state. Economic restructuring has also led to increased numbers of women entering the paid workforce either in the maquiladoras or in the informal sector. While women were increasingly entering the public sphere of the labour market, their employment was usually in precarious, poorly remunerated sectors. Especially in the maquilas, unions were either absent or company-controlled. At this point, feminists turned to new institutional forms in the 1980s, shifting away from the earlier small consciousness-raising groups toward work in NGOs. Prominent Mexican feminist Marta Lamas notes that in this period, feminist groups were still plagued by what she calls “mujerismo” (“womanism,” a form of identity politics) and hyper-radicalism (2001, 100-103). Mexican feminists retained their autonomy from the state and from other political forces and their non-hierarchical forms of organization, but they did so at the expense of their political marginalization.

In the 1990s, however, a rapid shift occurred in opposition politics that led to a new turn toward the citizenship discourse, both generally in the popular movement and specifically among women’s organizations. After the PRI declaration of victory in the highly controversial 1988 elections, many activists re-evaluated their previous rejection of electoral struggle and civic action, and human rights campaigners came together with democratic reformers to challenge the political system from below in a non-partisan way. For example, a group called Alianza Cívica emerged that brought together hundreds of small NGOs in a joint campaign to clean up the electoral system and implement citizen observation of elections. Large numbers of women participated in these exercises, both within mixed organizations of men and women and within women-only groups like Mujeres en Lucha por la Democracia. About half of the participants in Alianza Cívica are women, although they tend not to occupy leadership positions and although the organization does not focus specifically on gender issues or women’s political participation (Pérez 2001). As well, feminist organizations began to add demands around political citizenship to traditional demands for reproductive rights and freedom from violence. In the 1990s, according to Lamas, the majority of feminists began “[p]ositioning themselves as politically republican and democratic subjects, rather than as victims or oppressed women”. Organizations like DIVERSA, founded in 1996, abandoned identity politics for a “broader, more citizen-oriented focus to carry out the democratic transition. DIVERSA seeks to redefine the frontiers of citizens’ agency and to create an exercise of citizenship that could open politics to new identities as well as new political practices (Lamas 2003, 134).

Despite the rise of a citizenship discourse, it is important to emphasize the distinct nature of the transition to democracy in Mexico in order to appreciate women’s limited role in the new democratic system. While the women’s groups and citizen’s organizations discussed above did play a role in the transition, their role was more circumscribed than in the Chilean transition. Mexican democratization was more a result of the decomposition of the previous order than the result of a massive opposition between state and civil society (Bizberg, 2003: 159). No strong organized opposition with roots in labour or peasant movements emerged to challenge the dominant regime, and once elections did occur, it was a pro-Church party of the centre-right, the
Partido de Acción Nacional (PAN), that was able to take advantage of the democratic opening. While President Vicente Fox is relatively independent from the more socially conservative elements of his party, this is not a propitious political opportunity structure for dramatic improvements in the position of women. The 2000 elections were the first to reduce the number of women in the Mexican Congress, and despite his promises, Fox did not increase the number of female cabinet members over the level under the previous PRI administration (Rodríguez, 2003: 249). Confrontations between feminists and the PAN emerged early in his presidency, when, not a month after Fox’s election, the PAN governor in Fox’s home state of Guanajuato moved to restrict further women’s abortion rights by banning abortions even in the case of rape. This proposed legislation was eventually reversed after considerable public protest. In this case, women’s movements’ autonomy from the new regime clearly contributed to their outspoken and successful opposition to this move and their ability to speak out forcefully on abortion rights. Even more significantly, the left-wing PRD government in Mexico City, headed by feminist Rosario Robles, moved to expand abortion rights in cases of fetal impairment or when the health of the mother is threatened (Lamas, 2003: 132).

Another early controversy arose when a speech written by Fox’s Secretary of Labor Carlos Abascal (and delivered by one of his undersecretaries) commemorating International Women’s Day took a reactionary stance on women’s roles in society. As Secretary of Labor, Abascal’s statement that women’s primary responsibility is motherhood, and that work outside the home undermines their sacred duty, was astonishing. Abascal also condemned feminism as the source of many moral and social ills, such as “so-called free love, homosexuality, prostitution, promiscuity, abortion, and the destruction of the family” (quoted in Rodriguez, 2003: 255-6). There are widespread concerns about a right-wing backlash against feminist demands, and pro-choice groups are increasing in visibility and political astuteness, benefiting from support from a larger number of PAN senators and deputies in Congress (Stevenson, 2001: 5-6). While the PAN does contain significant numbers of women militants who have fought for democracy and for women’s participation in politics, panista women leaders tend to promote views about the moral superiority of women because of their spiritual and moral capacities, and believe that public life should be open to women because of their distinctive capacity to enrich it (Ibid: 119)

The economic policies of the Fox administration also give rise to concerns about the prospects for women’s citizenship demands in the context of democratization. As noted above, the continuity of neo-liberal policies under Chile’s democratic regime created concerns among Chilean feminists. Nevertheless, the Chilean centre-left governing coalition maintained a discourse of growth with equity, and poverty was reduced through targeted anti-poverty programs financed through a modest tax reform in the early 1990s. In contrast, the version of neo-liberalism that has been adopted in Mexico under both the previous PRI and the current PAN regimes is discursively and practically more radical, and poverty and inequality have increased despite impressive economic growth rates. Mexico’s Gini coefficient of 0.54 is one of the highest in the world (Ranis, 2003: 285). The Fox government has committed to extending and expanding the PROGRESA (Program of Education, Health and Food) Program, which targets poor mothers for social programs, since mothers were made the recipients of state handouts, as long as they ensured their children attended school and that they themselves participated in health programs. The Fox government also touts micro-enterprise as the solution to the
economic problems of poor Mexicans, and since women make up much of the informal sector, they are targeted for support. The language of citizenship is used to justify the shift away from corporatist social programs. The Ministry of Social Development (SEDESOL) has thus published a “Citizenship Manual” that outlines the government’s various social programs, and which states that the government’s social programs are based on a series of principles, including “respect for the freedom, dignity and autonomy of persons”, “promoting equality of opportunities between men and women”, “stimulating responsibility and co-responsibility” as well as “promoting solidarity” and “promoting integral actions of social policy and inclusion” (SEDESOL 2002: 14). Mexican feminists are legitimately concerned about the capacity of programs of support to small and medium-sized enterprises to make more than an extremely limited contribution to the reduction of poverty among women. In Chile, in contrast, the centre-left Concertación governments have demonstrated greater commitment to real poverty reduction.

The one area in which Mexican women’s citizenship struggles are registering some important advances lies in the growing institutionalization of gender issues within the Mexican state. Despite Mexican feminists’ grave concerns about the PAN regime, their increasingly pragmatic political orientation has led to some adoption of the strategy of double militancy in the context of limited political opportunities opening up within the state. The Panista government is not homogeneously anti-feminist, and its pro-citizenship rhetoric does open up some space for promotion of women’s citizenship rights. For example, in the Interior Ministry’s “Programa Especial para el Fomento de la Cultural Democrática”, it is recognized that “the culture of gender equity and of political participation has increasingly permeated the different levels of the social structure, gradually defeating existing cultural resistance” (2001: 50). As this statement indicates, however, obstacles to gender equity are generally conceptualized as cultural in character, resulting from discriminatory values and orientations rather than economic structures. The Fox administration has expanded the institutional space for women’s policy machinery within the state. Prior to his election, women’s interests were represented by the Programa Nacional de la Mujer (PRONAM), created by the Zedillo administration in 1996 as a result of the 1995 Beijing conference. PRONAM was placed within the Ministry of the Interior, rather than following the suggestion of women who wanted to create a new ministry, the Secretaría de la Mujer, similar to Chile’s SERNAM (Rodríguez, 2003: 131) with the objective of coordinating all state programs and actions related to women and to promote the implementation of women’s programs within regional and local bodies. PRONAM was also designed to establish dialogue with the broader society around women’s issues. The major weaknesses of the body were its very low levels of funding (an annual budget of 26 million pesos), and lack of political influence (2003: 133). During the 2000 election campaigns, all three presidential candidates committed themselves to create a new independent women’s institute, and on March 8, 2001, the new Instituto Nacional de las Mujeres (Inmujer) replaced PRONAM. The institute was given the status of a “deconcentrated entity” (organismo público descentralizado) and with a budget almost ten times that of its predecessor (230 million pesos). The organization no longer depends on any ministry and all decisions are made by a board, currently dominated by panista women. In a controversial decision, President Fox chose Patricia Espinosa, who was supported by ProVida, an anti-choice group, because of her public position opposed to abortion, over two pro-choice candidates supported by feminist organizations.

Since the organization is quite new, it is perhaps too early to evaluate its work to date. However, Inmujer’s first annual report provides some preliminary indications of its orientation. The report
puts heavy emphasis on integrating gender-based analysis into all elements of public policy in Mexico, in accordance with the recommendations of Beijing. Considerable attention has been paid to developing tools and methodologies for promoting this gender based analysis and training government functionaries. The report also deals with the issue of poverty, and says this is the main problem that confronts the country, but focuses on problems of women’s equitable access to resources and education, rather than structural problems of Mexico’s outward-oriented political economy and decline in state social services as the main causes of women’s poverty (Inmujer 2001: 6-13). Inmujer is responsible for promoting and evaluating a National Program for Equality of Opportunity and non-Discrimination against Women (Proequidad) within the National Development Plan. To develop Proequidad, the Institute carried out 50 state-level and 4 national consultations with women, as well as consulting Mexico’s commitments in international fora. Among the general objectives of the program, in addition to the promotion of a gender perspective in state programs, the participation of civil society in public policy concerning women and attention to vulnerable groups, is mentioned “the promotion of family values, as a sign of respect of the diversity of the Mexican nation” (Inmujer 2001: 52). This objective appears to reflect the attitudes of the PAN government regarding women’s issues. Like SERNAM, Inmujer’s programs seem generally in line with the government’s neo-liberal priorities. Important initiatives around gender-based analysis and reducing violence against women have been announced, and the Institute has also highlighted proposals around “una convivencia democrática en la familia” that would support the democratic transition in Mexico (as recommended by numerous Mexican women’s groups). However, there is no mention of reproductive rights in the report, and the approach to women’s poverty appears to follow the government’s neo-liberal approach, based on targeting and the integration of women within the small and medium sized enterprise sector.

In general, the progress to date of incorporation of women’s broad range of citizenship demands within the process of democratization in Mexico is significantly more limited than in Chile as the result of a number of factors. First, the transition in Mexico came much later than in Chile, and was more the result of schisms within the elite resulting from economic crisis than from a broad movement of organized civil society. Secondly, and related to the first, partly because of the nature of authoritarianism in Mexico, Mexican women’s groups have never been able to achieve the level of unity experienced by Chilean feminism under the dictatorship, and remains, in Victoria Rodriguez’s words, “fragmented and unfocused” (Rodriguez 2003: 249). In particular, the gap between more elite feminist organizations and popular feminism remains fairly strong, reducing the capacity of the women’s movement in general to promote women’s social and economic citizenship rights. As well, the centre-right ideological character of the PAN government in Mexico, compared to the centre-left government coalition in Chile, also limited openings to promote women’s social and economic rights. In both countries, neo-liberalism shaped and constrained the character of citizenship struggles, but the Mexican version of neo-liberalism is more extreme than in Chile.

CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined the importance of comparatively studying women’s movements using the conceptual framework of citizenship. Our main purpose was to understand the differences in movements’ conceptions of citizenship, the strategies they pursue to promote women’s citizenship, and the state’s openness to women’s citizenship demands. We argued that factors
such as the nature of democratic transition, the process of economic restructuring, and the types of alliance possibilities that exist are key in determining the effectiveness of a citizenship discourse.

Our comparison of the Chilean and Mexican cases shows how the political opportunity structure of democratization affected women’s movements differently in each case. The more repressive dictatorship and economic crises in Chile produced a significantly unified women’s movement with socio-economic rights forming a key part of their citizenship agenda. The less repressive PRI government in Mexico succeeded in coopting and dividing opposition movements, and hindered the early development of a discourse around citizenship rights. Cross-class linkages among women’s organizations continue to be weak in Mexico, although some recent initiatives seek to overcome this historic problem.

The women’s movement in Chile today, however, is no longer characterized by the same degree of cross-class solidarity as it was in the era of the dictatorship. While this may be seen as part and parcel of the “normalization” of politics that accompanies democratization, it is a problem precisely because many women’s organizations feel that their views are being marginalized. The citizenship discourse of the more “institutionalized” segment of the movement fails to fully promote the socio-economic rights that continue to be key for poor and working-class women to exercise their citizenship.

In sum, the analysis presented here indicates that while democratization presents opportunities for women’s movements to promote their citizenship goals through institutionalized spaces created by newly democratizing states, there are both advantages and potential disadvantages embedded within these opportunities. While Chilean women have made significant gains, the loss of strategic cross-class linkages among women has had serious consequences for the movement’s citizenship agenda. As Mexican feminists re-evaluate their historic rejection of institutional politics in the context of the more recent democratic transition, they can learn important lessons from the experiences of women’s movements in countries like Chile where democratization has profoundly altered the terrain on which citizenship struggles are played out.
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