THIRD PARTY INTERVENTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THEORY AND EVIDENCE

by

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Introduction

Why does the “international community” intervene in some international or civil conflicts, yet not in others? A “coalition of the willing” has intervened in Iraq over the unproven existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but not in North Korea, which admits to having them. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened (without UN approval) in Kosovo, but not in Bosnia between 1991 and 1995. The United Nations sent troops to halt an ethnocide in East Timor but had done nothing to prevent the same from happening in Rwanda, even though it had blue helmets already in country! Aside from case studies and “lessons learned” reports issued by various organizations, what can we say empirically about the decision to intervene or not to intervene over a long period, say the entire 20th Century? Moreover, what do we know empirically about the characteristics of certain types of conflicts that may “invite” third party interventions more frequently than others?

Once the decision to intervene has been made, there is an incredible variety of actions that can be, and have been, undertaken by the various actors of the international community. Political or economic sanctions; travel bans for government officials; UN-sponsored fact-finding missions; peacekeepers, etc. What are the most prevalent forms of interventions in international

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or civil conflicts? What do we know empirically about the preference of some actors for certain types of interventions as opposed to others?

A final set of questions on the topic of third-party interventions might relate to the outcome and results of third-party interventions in international or civil conflicts: what were the short and long-term effects of these interventions, and how effective were the interveners in managing conflicts? Is the “international community” doing a good job of living up to its primary goal, as stated in Article 1 of the UN Charter, which is “to maintain international peace and security, and…to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace”?

The questions outlined above serve as the guiding themes of this essay. Mostly intended as an extended literature review, it seeks to explore the state of theorizing across these three issue areas. Therefore, the structure of the paper follows the same order as the questions posed above: I begin by exploring the state of the literature in assessing theoretical and empirical links between the types of conflict and the probability of a third party intervening. This is followed by a review of the types of interventions most prevalent in the international system, followed by an exploration of the literature that assesses the effects of third-party interventions in international or civil conflicts. The final section looks at some of the promising empirical patterns and proposes questions to guide further research.

I would like to mention that this essay is among a set of “first cuts” at presenting research findings of the Canada Research Chair in International Security. The ultimate aim of the project is to add to our knowledge and capabilities in conflict management in order to enhance global

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2 Our Web site will soon be up and running in both official languages, please excuse the temporary mess: www.ulaval.ca/chaire/securite
security policy. If we eventually are to adopt better collective security policies for the 21st Century, we will require better models of third-party interventions in conflict management.

To intervene or not to intervene: a biased concept

An intervention by any third party occurs within the context of a conflict, crisis or war. Once a conflict occurs it can be managed in several ways, e.g., by violence, bilateral negotiation or by the involvement of a third party acting as an arbitrator or as a mediator between the parties (see Bercovitch 1991, 17). The role of a third party in non-violent conflict management is directed toward helping the actors in conflict to realize their own interests when various problems threaten to disrupt or downgrade their bargaining relationship (Young 1967). Third parties are useful in the process of conflict abatement, and they can make positive and direct contributions by focusing the parties on a termination agreement, providing an agenda and/or manipulating the timing of the negotiation process. They also can help to overcome constraints faced by the primary parties such as providing rationalizations for the disavowal of previous bargaining positions (face-saving), certifying the benefits of an agreement (guaranteeing), or providing insurance against the risks of the failure of an agreement (leverage) (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1997, 849). Yet third parties can also manage a conflict by violent means through military intervention.

The study of third-party interventions in conflict management is inexorably linked to the study of negotiation, and there is a rich body of literature on negotiation techniques and the role of third parties in conflict management. This literature spans several academic fields of study including, but not limited to, traditional political science & international relations (e.g., Zartman 1978), labor and industrial relations (e.g., Walton & McKersie 1991), and management studies (e.g., Lewicki & Saunders 1996); the literature also spans various methodological approaches
such as first-person accounts (e.g., Kissinger 1979; 1982), case studies (e.g., Zartman 1989; 1995), and rational choice-based approaches (e.g., Raiffa 1982). Thus, the issue of third parties and conflict management spans many disciplines and epistemological/methodological approaches, which leads to a certain level of confusion regarding the concepts and definitions to be analyzed.

James Rosenau exposed the confusion in his classic 1969 chapter titled “Intervention as a scientific concept.” Indeed, scientific research in this area was impeded due to the broad meaning of the term “intervention.” Rosenau argued that it is difficult to develop variables and models, and thus make scientific progress, when the existing literature “is pervaded with discussions of military interventions, propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic interventions, and ideological interventions, not to mention customs interventions and other highly specific actions through which one state experiences the impact of another” (Rosenau 1969, 344-345). In other words, if any act can be qualified as an intervention, any explanatory model we develop loses its meaning as the concept itself is somewhat meaningless.

Unfortunately, in many ways, Rosenau’s critique is still valid. This is obvious even when one narrows a literature review to the political science & international relations field; an extensive search yields the observation that authors have differing concepts of intervention. For example, Alastair Smith understands intervention as a third-party action in the context of alliance (Smith 1996); Thomas G. Weiss (1999) narrows his view of intervention to UN-sanctioned humanitarian interventions; David Carment and Dane Rowlands (1998) write about “biased interventions” in intrastate conflicts; John Burton (1986) is concerned with interveners in the mediation and facilitation process of conflict management, while Paul Diehl (1989; 2000) is well-known for his research on UN peacekeeping interventions. A very recent article by Michael
J. Butler (2003, especially pages 228-230) also briefly reviews the ambiguity of the concept of third-party intervention, and concentrates on cases of militarized interventions.

If one analyses the literature on interventions closely enough, some patterns emerge which help us to understand where the different authors are situated on a hypothetical “X-Y” axis that evaluates the literature on two fundamental dimensions:

1. **On the epistemological slant** of the authors – formal/universal v. qualitative; and

2. **On the ontological vision** of the bargaining process displayed by the authors – whether they focus on the “distributive” or the “integrative” aspects of negotiations.

These dimensions are represented in Figure 1. The Y-axis, representing the formal v. qualitative methodological foci found in the literature, is easily understood. The dimension represented on the X-axis, the ontological view of the bargaining process, signifies whether the authors view negotiations as ‘classical’ bargaining over values or issues (akin to the “zero-sum game” vision of bargaining) – which is distributive bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1991, 4). The other end of the spectrum is the integrative bargaining view of negotiation as a “variable-sum game”, where the actors are not necessarily in fundamental conflict and engage in joint problem-solving (Walton and McKersie 1991, 5). Examples of the first view (distributive) would include differences over territory in the case of an interstate conflict, or over ethnic discrimination in the case of an internal conflict. Integrative bargaining is closer to economic or political differences that can be resolved by accommodation.

(Figure 1 about here)

To illustrate this typology, some classic texts are mapped on the graph. Quadrant 1 features literature that is rational choice based and analyzes bargaining as a strategic game; an example to illustrate this tendency is Cliff Morgan’s 1984 article “A Spatial Model of Crisis
Bargaining.” Howard Raiffa (1982) would also be comfortable in this category. Quadrant 2 features the “management” approach to bargaining, and I feature Walton and McKersie’s 1991 classic *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interactive System* as an illustration. Quadrant 3 refers to the classical and biographical, and first-person type texts of diplomats; Kissinger is featured here but I could also have put Barston’s (1997) *Modern Diplomacy*. Finally, quadrant 4 regroups works that focus on non-conflictual and context specific problem-solving negotiation. The best example I could think of is John Burton and his “human needs” approach to conflict resolution.

This neat trick with the literature on negotiation does not, however, answer the fundamental question as to what exactly is a third-party intervention in conflict which is “universal” and which can be applied to various international events for the purpose of empirical examination and theory & model-building. A broad definition proposed by Oran Young, however, can serve as a good starting point. Young (1967, 34) defines an intervention as “any action taken by an actor that is not direct party to the crisis, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more of the problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the crisis itself.” Linking this broad definition to international relations shows that third party involvement can be of varying levels and take different forms such as:

- Discussion of the problem in international or bilateral fora;
- Fact-finding, which involves an inquiry by a third party as to the facts surrounding a conflict;
- Good offices, where a third party helps the parties to reinitiate direct negotiations, and has minimal involvement in both the content and the process of resolving a dispute (Monroy *et. al.* 1986);

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3 Dixon (1996) offers a slightly different listing of third-party management techniques.
Condemnation, which includes an implied or explicit demand to desist from hostile activities, and a request for aid to the victims of hostile activity by the third party (Brecher & Wilkenfeld 1997);

A “call for action” by adversaries includes a call for cease-fire, troops withdrawal, negotiation, and action to facilitate termination by the third party;

Mediation or conciliation, which involve a third party that actively participates in the settlement process. Mediation is generally constituted by a single third party, while in conciliation there may be a conciliatory commission. In both cases their aim is to propose an acceptable solution for the parties to a conflict (Monroy et al. 1986, 270-71);

Arbitration, which is a legalistic form of conflict resolution where the contestants select a third party who makes a judgment on the case. There is a formal binding settlement by an arbitration body, thus distinguishing it from mediation and conciliation (Raiffa 1982; Raymond 1994, 28);

Sanctions, which may include the complete or partial interruption of economic or political relations, and of rail, sea, air, postal, radio and other means of communication, are measures that often do not involve the use of armed force employed to make effective the decisions reached by international organizations (White 1990, 80);

Peacekeeping or military intervention by emergency military forces, whose primary task is to encourage conformity among the parties to a cease-fire or armistice. Methods include interposition (stationing troops between the forces of the disputants) and surveillance (Baehr & Gordenker 1994, 76-77). 4

As we look at the increasing levels of involvement or intervention by third parties listed above, it is also important to keep in mind that an intervention – or lack thereof – is fundamentally a political decision. Questions of power, interests, bureaucratic, international and domestic politics undoubtedly affect whether leaders chose to intervene, or consciously decide to

4 Diehl, Druckman and Wall (1998) offer a taxonomic analysis of peacekeeping operations, listing 12 types of mission categories. However useful this is, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) point out that modern peacekeeping is complex and multifunctional (the famous “Chapter 6½” missions) that these types of typologies can only be illustrative and not explanatory.
not intervene. As Chester A. Crocker put it, “intervention (just like nonintervention) is an inherently political action with inescapable political consequences” (cited in Weiss 1999, 41).

Moreover, the political aspect of the intervention decision-making process may blur the distinction between “unbiased” and “biased” third parties. At what point is an intervener an involved actor (a party to) or not in a conflict? Does it matter if third parties are biased or not? Regan (2002) argues that interveners definitionally seek to affect the duration of conflicts, which in is in effect a conflict-management function. Indeed, while it may be difficult to measure the interests of third parties we can more easily assess the motives of third party actors. If the purpose of the intervention is to manage a conflict – that is, to affect the process of the conflict in such a way as to hasten its abatement and to save lives, we can evaluate whether the intervention had a “lifesaving” function. Thus, Betts (1994) questions the whole idea of biased v. unbiased intervention, arguing that the point of an outside intervention is to manage the conflict, so interventions work best (i.e., end a conflict more efficiently and quickly) when “the intervener takes sides, tilts the local balance of power, and helps one of the rivals to win – that is, [when the intervention] is not impartial” (Betts 1994, 21).

Building on previous concepts and definitions (Young 1967, Rosenau 1969, & many others), and having as principal objective the empirical analysis of various interventions for the purpose of better conflict management and policy development, the Canada Research Chair in International Security’s “Third Party Intervention Project” adopts the following definition of intervention:

A third party intervention is a concrete action, be it political, economic or military, undertaken by a governmental or intergovernmental actor of the international system, the purpose of which is principally to affect the direction, duration or outcome of an internal/civil or international conflict. As such, an intervention is (as stated by Rosenau 1969) a response to an
ongoing crisis/conflict and has a convention-breaking character (i.e., it is an extraordinary measure).

A good operationalization of this concept will enable researchers to study the same phenomenon. This proposed operationalization is both inclusive (it recognizes that there are many reasons for third parties to intervene in conflicts) and useful because it is concerned only concrete steps undertaken by third parties – actual political or military decisions – which should simplify the data gathering process for empirical evaluations. In summary, the operationalization is action-based; it is not limited to militarized intervention yet neither does it include insignificant forms of interventions such as “calls for action.”

**Conflict Types and the Likelihood of Third-Party Interventions**

Having proposed an operationalization of the concept of third party intervention, I now turn to the question as to which types of conflicts have been more likely to “cause” a third party interventions? In other words, which types of conflicts are more strongly – or less strongly – correlated with third-party interventions? Regan (1998, 756) states that “[We] do not have a set of logically consistent and empirically verified conditions that increase the likelihood that outside actors will intervene in internal conflicts,” but several researchers have attempted to find some.

Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997), for example, examine the relationship between the level of violence experienced in a crisis and the probability of third party involvement. They find that the higher the level of violence, the higher the probability of third-party involvement, presumably because the superpowers “managed” their clients so as to not escalate a regional crisis into a Third World War. Smith (1996) also links third party interventions with alliance memberships. Judging by the sudden increase in UN activity since the end of the Cold War, there
certainly seems to be a relationship between the structure of the international system and intervention in conflicts.

The link between issues and conflict-proneness is well established. Many studies have shown that territorial disputes are those most likely to escalate to war (Holsti 1991, Vasquez 1993; Hensel 1994). Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) also link crisis escalation to threats to basic values such as the existence of the political regime and political influence. While several studies that examine empirical linkages between the characteristics of conflicts and third-party interventions have been published (e.g., Regan 1996; 1998), they tend to focus on the decision-making process of the intervener rather than on the issues. This is logical, since the decision-making process will take into account the interests of the interveners – interests which will be affected by the issues at hand! Nevertheless, there is little empirical data focusing exclusively in the relationship between issues and interventions.

The closest are the studies that examine the relationship between internal and/or ethnic conflicts and outside interventions. Carment and James (1997; 2001) show that third-party (outside) support for an ethnic group with some form of grievances increases the likelihood of conflict. The causal path here is reversed; the intervention causes the conflict rather than manages it.

Having surveyed some of the literature in this issue-area, it becomes clear that another two-dimensional graph can be constructed which assesses the literature along two dimensions. The first dimension, much like the preceding one, is also along methodological lines because the literature tends to fall within either the quantitative/empirical models or case studies. The second dimension pertains to the nature of the conflict; I have found that the literature tends to
“specialize” either in international (interstate) conflicts or in intrastate (civil) conflicts. These are presented in Figure 2.

(Figure 2 about here)

To illustrate the four tendencies in the literature pertaining to the problem of the types of conflicts and the likelihood of third-party intervention, in each quadrant some of the dominant representations for each tendency in the literature, representing their “load” on the two dimensions uncovered, were mapped.

Forms of Third Party Interventions

The last section analyzed the types of conflict that are more – or less – likely to correlate with a third party intervention. Once the decision to intervene has been made, another question of interest is who were the third party interveners and what forms do these interventions take?

Here, the dimensions uncovered in the literature review were along different axes from the previous ones. The tendency in the literature was to analyze third party interventions either along (1) the method of intervention, along “militarized” or “pacific” dimensions; and (2) the nature of the intervener: whether the intervener was the “international community” (or, as I labeled it for lack of a better term, “UN-centric”), or a unilateral actor, whereby the literature appears “state-centric.” These dimensions are represented in Figure 3.

(Figure 3 about here)

Here the astute reader will notice that at least one of the titles is repeated from the previous graph. This illustrates the fact that these concepts are not easily reduced to simple dichotomies. Nevertheless, several things appear rather clearly as the literature review progresses. First, it is that third-party interveners are either multinational coalitions or individual

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5 It is Malone 1998.
states; second, it is that those states which intervene in “other” conflicts are those with interest and power. Almost a generation ago Dunér (1981) found that the superpowers did not use “proxies” to fight their wars in the Third World – at least, not as much as was speculated. Indeed, if we limit the concept of intervention to the operationalization proposed earlier, we eliminate much of the chatter that emanates from the verbal “interveners” and the list of active interveners is reduced to those that can actually affect the course of events in a distant conflict.

Another clear finding is that conflict is a process with many phases, such as a beginning, an escalation, a de-escalation and abatement; a lot can happen involving many actors in all phases of conflict. As an illustration, Table 1 presents an analytical summary of conflict phases and potential third-party activity and actors. With such complexity, studies will rarely comply with the simple dichotomous dimensions presented here as heuristic tools. A future and more thorough literature review will also attempt to break down third party activity by conflict phase.

(Table 1 about here)

Effects of Third Party Interventions

In this section the purpose is to evaluate the legacy of third party interventions: which forms of interventions and which third party actors were most and least successful in helping to manage international conflicts?

The literature in this problem-area is not as obviously classifiable as the preceding ones, yet some dimensions stand out. A first dimension groups together the literature that focuses on formal or universal laws rather than specific cases of “lessons learned.” This is not an obvious dichotomy but much of the literature seems focused on the same kind of methodological biases as previously described, and thus either evaluates general models that seek to inform policy or on specific cases of interventions.
Yet, another dimension that clearly intrigues many authors is the problem of measuring the success/failure of third party interventions in conflicts. Much of the literature can be classified as either having a “failure bias” or an “efficiency bias.” In other words, research seems either focused on either seeking to explain the failures of third-party interventions (often in an attempt to improve decision-making in the future), or on measuring the efficiency of third party interventions. (It is interesting to note that the “failure biased” literature seems to correlate with “lessons learned” facet mentioned above). These two dimensions are presented in Figure 4.

(Figure 4 about here)

Consider the following example: the UN intervenes under a Chapter VII mandate to “manage” an interstate war between countries Y and Z. The mandate is the result of a Security Council resolution, and hence the result of a political process, and describes what the mission is to achieve. We can outline several ways to measure the success or failure of this UN intervention:

- Whether the goals and objectives listed in the resolution have been achieved by the end of the mandate – a “bureaucratic process” approach;
- How many lives were saved by intervening at time $t$ rather than letting the conflict settle itself – a “humanitarian approach”;
- In a variant of the first two points, can we measure the material and human costs of the intervention (in dollars, UN casualties, and/or civilian casualties) against the benefits achieved by the intervention (number of people fed or protected; conflict abatement; assistance in negotiating an end to the conflict) – a “utilitarian” approach;
- Has the war reignited between the two actors after the UN intervention – a “protracted conflict management” approach; and
- Have the fundamental underlying issues that led to the war been addressed – a “problem-solving” approach.
Obviously, other methods of evaluation can be found using variants of the points listed above. Yet each view has its strand in the literature. Indeed, one strong current along the success / failure dimension is the examination of the duration of the peace after a conflict. Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996), use a ten year rule to assess the effect of UN interventions in recurring conflicts in Latin America; if the conflict has not reignited within that 10-year period the intervention is deemed a success.\footnote{They find that the UN is not successful in preventing future conflicts because it is a reactive body which is not set up to address the underlying issues.} Hampson (1996) argues that a measure of success should take into account the cessation of hostilities as well as the how well the parties respect the settlement (which in many cases is achieved with the help of a third party).

The best peace accords are those in which the parties are jointly satisfied of the outcome and in which both parties find mutual gain. Hampson (1996; 2001) argues that third parties can often be very useful in bringing the parties to seek an accommodation and often have a moral obligation to do so, a view echoed by Licklider (2001). Yet, as Luttwak (2001) argues, the ‘curse’ of third-party interventions is often that it artificially interrupts conflicts that have yet to run their ‘natural course.’ This view was also pointed out by Diehl, Reifschneider and Hensel (1996) specifically regarding UN interventions in Latin America. Furthermore, Carment and Harvey (2001, 128) point out that third party interveners may often have a limited knowledge of the states and issues in which they get involved, and this in turn can lead to inefficient and short peace accords. Regan (2002) finds that third party interventions in general are inefficient and have little or no impact on the expected duration of conflicts.

**Conclusion: The Evidence So Far and a Research Agenda**

What do we know about third party interventions? This is the general aim of the “Third Party Intervention Project” of the Canada Research Chair in International Security. To
summarize a large bloc of literature, we can summarize some major evidence in the literature as follows:

1. The link between conflict and third-party involvement seems strongest along three axes: the traditional alliance link (conflict involvement and intervention *via* alliances); through ethnic ties; and due to internationally recognized humanitarian catastrophes accompanying civil wars in failed states. As interstate wars become rarer, the ethnic dimension remains important. International “humanitarian” interventions, while a promising objective after UNSC 688 (1991) and a string of interventions in the following few years, fell out of favor after Mogadishu and the (in)famous US Presidential Directive 25 that severely constrained American humanitarian activity since.

2. The interveners are those actors with interests and power. When the P-5 can work together, the UN is the vehicle of choice to “legitimize” interventions – either through an actual UN mission or, as seems to be the case more often nowadays, to authorize an intervention by a “coalition of the willing” (NATO, ECOWAS, etc.).

3. As far as the effects of third-party interventions, it appears that, consistent with previous research, “unilateral” or biased intervention is more effective than UN-sponsored intervention due to the increased efficiency of the former.\(^7\) Moreover, we also believe this to be the case due to the artificial attention paid by the UN to “neutrality” and “impartiality”, coupled with the lack of military structure of the global organization. Previous research has demonstrated that although the UN was involved more frequently in crises in Latin America

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\(^7\) Effective, that is, in a conflict management role. Also, by efficient, we simply mean the speed at which an organization can respond.
during the 1947-1994 period than the OAS, for example, it was less effective as a crisis
management actor than either the US or the OAS (Rioux and Pabón 2002).

Yet many fundamental questions remain, and many of these empirical findings could be
re-evaluated using the more comprehensive definition of third-party interventions proposed
earlier. The main axes of research for the Canada Research Chair in International Security in the
coming months will be to evaluate hypotheses using the newly released International Crisis
Behavior dataset (version 4, released in February 2003). The dataset contains information on
432 crises spanning the years 1919-2001, thus providing ample observations to evaluate various
hypotheses, which will be grouped along the three major sets of investigations outlined in this
essay:

1. Which conflicts are most (and least) associated with third-party interventions, and why?
   • We will examine factors associated with the onset of interventions.

2. What forms do these interventions take?
   • We will examine the different intergovernmental and state actors that regularly intervene
     (including, but not limited to, the UN, NATO, the regional powers)
   • This will include analyses of decision-making processes, since we have established that
to intervene is a fundamentally political decision; as such, some assistants will also
undertake the collection of data and case studies to examine “counterfactual” cases of
decisions to not intervene.
   • A “process” analysis also will examine the paths of involvement in cases where several
     actors intervene in conflicts.

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through ICPSR and through the ICB’s official Website: [http://www.icbnet.org/](http://www.icbnet.org/)
3. Finally, what are the effects of third party interventions, including their successes and failures?

- It is important to distinguish among the various measures of success and failure, and to properly identify the elements of an index of success;

- The development of conflict management policy based on the above.
References


Figure 1

Observed Dimensions in the Bargaining/Negotiation Literature: Concepts & Definitions

![Diagram of formal/universal models]

Figure 2

Observed Dimensions in the Intervention Literature: Conflicts and Interventions

![Diagram of quantitative/empirical studies]
Figure 3
Observed Dimensions in the Intervention Literature: Forms of Third Party Interventions

Figure 4
Observed Dimensions in the Intervention Literature: Effects of Third Party Interventions
|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Pre-crisis   | Conflict formation        | Prevention                | Early warning               | UN, OSCE, OAS, others  | Preventive diplomacy, Facilitation, Mediation | 1. Type of conflict
                |                            |                           |                            |                         |                           | Interstate, Intragate, P.C., etc.       |
|              | Conflict escalation       | Management                | Crisis intervention         | UN, NATO, others       | Coercion, Interposition, Mediation | 2. Type of intervener
                |                            |                           |                            |                         |                           | Who, Neutrality / impartiality, leverage (capacity & resources), Legitimacy |
|              | Conflict endurance        | Empowerment & mediation   | Empowerment & mediation     | UN, NATO, others       | Coercion, Interposition, Mediation | 3. Belligerents
                |                            |                           |                            |                         |                           | Will to fight, Balance of power, "ripeness" / hurting stalemate |
| Post-crisis  | Conflict improvement      | Termination               | Negotiation/problem solving | UN, OSCE, OAS, others | Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Mediation |                           |
|              | Conflict transformation   | Resolution                | New institutions & projects | UN, OSCE, OAS, others | Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, Peacebuilding |                           |

9 Partially adapted and inspired by Ryan 1998.