Title: Globalisation and Social Protests: Where and How? The case of
Canada and France

prepared by

Pascale Dufour
Department of Political Science
University of Montreal

pascale.dufour@umontreal.ca

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Abstract:
Although, in these times it could be considered a good ‘marketing’ strategy to discuss 
globalisation, it is increasingly difficult to choose how to address it, given the 
abundance of literature that has been produced concerning this subject. In this paper, 
we do not seek to address economic globalisation or the objective trends of 
globalisation that occur in the economic sphere. Moreover, we do not analyse 
globalisation as an external factor that can contribute to national economic 
development, nor as an hegemonic economic force preventing societal development. 
In other words, the term globalisation, as utilised, is not a causal factor. Instead, this 
paper attempts to apprehend the relationship between globalisation as a new space of 
social protest (a space of action, as well as an issue of discourses) in two countries: 
Canada and France. We observe that the fight for global justice is embedded in 
national contexts, each of which uniquely translates the global problematic. The role 
of the state is particularly central to an understanding of this variation. In the same 
way, globalisation, as a space of debates and conflicts, effects the form of national 
social protest, modifying both its frame and scale.

As Beck has recently noted, globalisation has produced a new space and a new 
framework of action. Policy is less dependent on borders and state power, new actors 
have emerged, new roles, new resources, new rules of the game, new contradictions 
and new sources of protest or disputes have appeared (Beck, 2003: 29). The 
temptation is high for social scientists to be over-enthusiastic or over-sceptical when 
confronted with globalisation, or to be overwhelmed by these new events. Every field 
of political science seems to be affected by the globalisation problematic in at least 
two ways. First, discussing globalisation seems to be a good marketing strategy, 
however, in order to study globalisation, ones must also accept some of the 
challenges poses by this problematic. In the field of social protest, in which we 
include the social movements and contentious politics literatures, (economic) 
globalisation is predominantly seen as an external factor impacting on the types of 
collective actions undertaken against it (Tarrow, 2002) (possibly leading to a
tansnationalisation of protest), or on the forms and framework of national social protest (Ancelovici, 2002; Keck and Sikking, 1998). Our point of departure is slightly different. We claim that whatever globalisation is or is not, it occurs somewhere. Thus, globalisation is not external but occurs here, in our backyard, with all actors (local or not, collective or not, social or not) participating in its construction. Furthermore, if globalisation can be located, it should be possible to describe a particular form of it depending on the place considered. In other words, globalisation should be viewed as a specific field of protest, who’s forms vary depending on the time and place under consideration. Finally, if globalisation as a space of protest is not unique, we should be able to explain why this is the case.

Consequently, this paper has two main objectives. In the first part of the paper, we propose a theoretical framework that allows for the differentiation of the forms of the globalisation space between Canada and France, concentrating the analysis on a short period of time (1993-2003). In the second and third parts of the paper, the empirical analysis demonstrates how, depending on the way nationally situated actors invest and invent this space, forms of globalisation differ. The distinctive role of the state (part IV) in the two cases considered is central. We show that in the case of France, the relative consensus against economic neo-liberal globalisation and the relative openness of the state to critical forces have produced sharper divisions for progressive social forces, while in the Canadian case where political and social actors were more divided on the issue of globalisation (including the state), progressive social forces are been more involved in rebuilding their movement and new, more clear, political cleavages are emerging around this issue.

I - Globalisation as a space and an issue

While it is impossible within this paper to provide an exhaustive review of the literature concerning globalisation in the field of social protest, we can simplify the incredible amount of work done on this subject into two main camps. In the first group, an important part of the research analyses the supranational effects of globalisation. For some, economic globalisation is closely linked with the long history of capitalism (Waterman, 2001) and, thus, should generate, in this new stage of development, global counter-hegemonic forces or a global civil society (Archibugi,
Held and Köhler, 1998; Klein, 2001). Others consider the fight against globalisation or for another form of globalisation as a potential opportunity structure for national collective actors to use the trans-nationalisation of their actions to make future national gains (Tarrow, 2000; Ayers, 2001; Guidry, Kennedy and Zald, 2000; Della Porta and al., 1999). In the other camp, analysts are less interested to the global level of protest per se and more in the impact of globalisation at the national or even local level (Diani, 2003). Most of the research focuses on the changing national framework of protest accompanying the emergence of the economic globalisation phenomenon and problematic. In particular, some really interesting empirical work has demonstrated how previous national framework of protest have had an impact (or a path-dependant effect) on the way the framework will become global for dominant collective actors (Ancelovici, 2002). From another perspective, but in the same family of national research, some recent work has begun to build a genealogy of globalisation for some case studies (Agrikoliansky, 2003), explaining the particular conditions prevailing in the society (in terms of social forces and the relationships between them, and in terms of ideas and interests) before, during and after the globalisation of national protest.

This paper addresses this second camp of the literature and proposes two “new” elements. First, we suggest the need for increased formalisation of the field of globalisation studies at the national level and, second, the need to address the question of the state, which has been largely absent from the studies regarding this subject. In our view, globalisation is a new space and a new issue of social protest, constantly in progress. According to analysis in the tradition of Bourdieu, it is possible to dissect empirical reality using the notion of field. A field is “a structured space that includes various positions, the properties of which depend on their position within this space and can be analysed independent of the characteristics of their occupants” (Bourdieu, 1980: 113). In other words, the political field will have a given form for a given society and is characterised by a collection of positions that are relatively fixed within the structural relations in which they are involved. Furthermore, their variability is due not to the characteristics of individuals, but

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2 For a good sample of this kind of research, see the papers presented in Paris, « Colloque Les mobilisations altermondialistes », 3-5 décembre 2003, GERMM.
rather to the particular structure of the field. The notion of political space that we propose is much more open and fluid than that of field as proposed by Bourdieu. We regard political space as spaces that are not pre-existent and fixed, but are in perpetual construction as a result of the struggles of various actors. That said, from Bourdieu’s approach we retain the idea that a political space is a process of the structuring of the positions of actors in relation to a given issue, as well as the idea that certain positions can potentially be structurally determined, even if this probability is never fixed in times. In particular, political spaces involve an “unequal structure of representation” (Mahon, 1977) linked to the position of actors within the system of production, with the interests of capital generally occupying a privileged place in this structure. But, inequality must always remain an empirical question, with social actors having the ability to make themselves ‘autonomous’ from the sphere of production, and bring into the public space (and within the state) other issues that, at certain times, can supplant capitalist concerns (Smith, 2003; McKeen, 2001).

Furthermore, the political spaces that we refer to are not the same as ‘sectors’ of public policy, as conceptualised within the literature concerning networks (Montpetit, 2003), as they can emerge from outside the ‘normal’ frame of public action. The outside signifies at the same time a different level of action (the global level) as well as those terrains that are not part of the ‘regular’ or traditional register of public action (for example, environmental issues). In other words, political spaces are the terrain of political action that may not be linked to any sectors of public policy and that may be linked with several of them. Differing from conceptualisations that make use of the notion of governance or multi-level governance, a political space can be found in a ‘state’ of non-governance or only partial governance. Thus, a political issue can constitute a ‘space’ from the moment where collective actors (state or non-state, institutional or non-institutional) seize, appropriate, and enter in relations revolving around the issue. The state, or public authorities, or international organizations can, at a given moment in the process of the construction and structuring of a space, become key actors, however, they are not necessary conditions to the emergence of this space. Within this perspective, political spaces can contain

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3 My translation.

4 We go back to this concept later on.
different levels of action (that are often political issues of the first order) that are relatively institutionalized, and can be global or regional (Masson, 2003; Sewell, 2001). The level here being the extent and scope of the action, and not the level of decision-making to which the action is addressed.

Political spaces are, at the same time, discursive places, where interests are build where ideas are exchanged and where new normative frames of actions are imposed, as the « framed analysis » has begun to demonstrate. From Seattle to Porto Alegre, something has happened in the world’s streets (Ayres, 2001). Social forces everywhere have developed numerous discourses concerning globalisation, relating to its negative effects (the anti-globalisation perspective), its status as the last chance of defeating the capitalist hegemony (the counter-globalisation perspective), or the need to propose an alternative globalisation. Globalisation, as an issue, is involved in a multiplicity of discourses. A large variety of actors are working to give specific meanings to what globalisation is or is not. These actors, although sharing some common minimal social representations, disagree on other issues. In this sense, globalisation is the issue through which several discourses are built.

In this paper, we wish to study the links between this new space and the issue of national social protest in two cases, France and Canada, during the last ten years. We observe in Part II the way in which globalisation has served as the main element of integration of social protest in Canada, especially through the re-definition of Canadian nationalism. In the case of France, in part III, the picture is less clear, but it appears that globalisation is an issue which occupies a space, and has accentuated the division of social forces on the left part of the political spectrum. In the final section, we consider the main elements of differentiating the two cases, namely, the specific relationships of each national state with national social movements. While in Canada, during the period under analysis, the state was fairly reluctant to engage with social movements, in France, the state demonstrated a certain degree of openness towards social actors and their discourses. In that respect, the relationship between state and collective actors on the terrain of globalisation appears crucial to explaining the

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5 For a more detailed discussion of scale, see Masson, 2004.
6 Even if for this analysis, frames are only strategically build. Here, we consider that in a given political space interests are built (through actions) and are not pre-existing entities.
differences between the spaces of globalisation and the way these spaces are structured.

If we follow the work of Tarrow, the very nature of the political system explains the degree of openness or vulnerability to mobilisation. With regard to equivalent mobilisations, political contexts raise or diminish the opportunity of success for social movements. Nevertheless, the state is not yet considered a full player as it functions solely as the target of demands (Tarrow, 1998). Instead of the concept of “structure of political opportunity”, we propose the need to consider the “unequal structure of representation” that reflects the inequalities of social forces (Mahon, 1984). For Mahon, “inside the state, the structure of representation is unequal with one hegemonic class and subordinate classes that have a “room” inside the state but a pre-defined room”. While, Mahon speaks only of interests inside the state, we can easily transpose this idea inside the political system to capture the fact that at any moment in a given political system, there is a pre-determined hierarchy of legitimate representation (even if this structure is always open to change). Within this perspective, the state is influenced by collective action, but also influences it. Even if there is no clear border between state and civil society, a continuum of positions inside the political system exists and it is possible to reveal this continuum for a better understanding of actors structured relations. We demonstrate, in part III, that in the case of Canada, during the period considered (1993-2003), the state was reluctant to address social protest, while in France the state became progressively open to social protest. Differences in the “structure of representation” influenced the manner globalisation interacted with national social forces and determined, in part, which forms globalisation had taken.

II - Canada: Globalisation of national framework of protest

The globalisation of the national framework of protest implies that all actors involved in this space recognize the existence of a more or less coherent global level of action. At this level, each party is posed as interdependent. Furthermore, the scale

7 We speak only for Canada at the federal level. If most of the analysis is also valid for the
of actions changes, becoming more transnational. In the Canadian case, at the federal level, between 1993 and 2003, a double process occurred. On one side, we observe a redefinition of the problematic of Canadian sovereignty through a global perspective within actors’ discourses, corresponding to the three elements presented, and, on the other side, we observe a reframing of the subordination problematic beyond traditional employment relationships. This double process works as a significant factor in the integration of separate social movements in Canada and the opening of new avenues for a political alternative to emerge on the left side of the political spectrum.

Redefinition of Canadian sovereignty in a global perspective

We do not wish to imply that free trade or economic globalisation has created new forms of national social protest but rather to argue that this new field of action has aided the crystallisation of social protest in English Canada. It is only in this area that it has been possible for social actors to redefine their struggles in a common direction.

In Canada, the question of (economic) globalisation was born in the field of trade with its powerful neighbour, the United States. Until the 1970s the issue of free trade was not posed in terms of the dependence or independence of the Canadian economy with regard to the American economy. Trade with the US was negotiated sector by sector, and neither the federal state, nor unions questioned the rising global dependence of Canadian economy that resulted from these local decisions (Smith, 1990). Between 1975 and 1990, the question of trade became central. The federal state actively encouraged trade agreements with both the US and other countries within the continent. A mobilization against free trade emerged involving unions and diverse social movements, with political parties remaining divided on the issue. Sharp differences in the positions of the actors towards the issue of free trade were noticeable, however, no actor was able to exit the “nationalist” and protectionist perspectives they had inherited.

More precisely, the “short story” of the globalisation of social protest begins...
with the formation of the Pro-Canada Network (which later became the Action Canada network), during the state-level negotiations surrounding the free trade agreement (FTA), that later became the North American Free trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Ayres, 1997). The Network became particularly publicised during the 1988 federal elections campaign. Formed in 1987, the Network was a grouping of divergent interests (trade unionists, environmentalists, religious groups, women’s groups, group representing those receiving social assistance benefits, aboriginal groups, farmers, cultural groups, students and senior citizens) (Bashevkin, 1991:110). Joining this vast movement were nationalist economists, notably the Edmonton editor Mel Hurtig, founder of the Council of Canadians (January 1985) and the Centre of Policy Alternatives. The Network was made up of 35 organizations, including the Council, and had a membership numbering in the millions. The coalition, due to the disparity of interests that were present, cultivated an ambivalence regarding the motives of its opposition to free trade. Within the Network, the more conservative nationalist tendency, economically sympathetic to free trade but strongly appreciative of the problem of national sovereignty and identity, rubbed shoulders with the more progressive tendency that opposed free trade in the name of the distinct social character of the Canadian welfare state. The synthesis of these two positions, although partially contradictory, occurred within the struggle to safeguard Canada as nation distinct from the United states, one that was both more generous and more concerned with the well-being of its population. As Bashevkin has noted, the majority of the groups implicated, independent of their political orientations, believed in the distinct character of Canada and the necessity to conserve its economic sovereignty (1991: 109). English-Canadian left nationalism perceived the contestation of free trade as a fight against the potential Americanization of Canada.

While the results of the 1988 federal election proved sobering to nationalist and social activist groups across Canada, the Action Canada Network could be considered a creative response to the defection of political parties on the subject of free trade (especially the defection of the New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP), the most

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8 Le Conseil des Canadiens a été crée pour protéger et promouvoir la souveraineté canadienne et la démocratie. En particulier, le Conseil publicisera l’idée de défendre la spécificité des programmes sociaux dont l’assurance-maladie, présentée comme le pilier de l’identité canadienne.

9 This nationalist characteristic of free-trade protest is the main reason why the network did not cross the Quebec border.
important left party in the country, who never managed to articulate a clear position during the period (Clarkson, 1988: 34)). Nevertheless, since the beginning of the nineties, the Network has declined as a defensive national coalition. The negotiations of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (that extended the Canada-U.S. treaty to include Mexico) represented a turning point in the story of the emergence of Globalisation as a political space. In 1994, the opposition against NAFTA crystallized around chapter 11 of the agreement which gave private firms the right to payments for ‘damages’ resulting from government measures deemed obstructive to their activities. The ensemble of social actors mobilised to denounce the potential harmful consequences of this aspect of NAFTA on environmental legislation, subsidies for certain sectors of the economy (in Canada, for instance, the battle over soft-wood lumber continues presently) and at the same time, theoretically, employment regulations (Duchastel, 2003 : 74 ; Klein, 2001). Although still centred on the defence of national interests, the opposition to NAFTA has promoted, since the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a Globalisation of struggles and claims at the continental level.

The October 1993 election and the Liberal Party’s subsequent implementation of NAFTA forced groups in Canada to re-evaluate the near decade-long commitment to the opposition of free trade (Bleyer, 2001; Clark, 2002). From 1993 to 1997, we can observe a retreat from larger national campaign mobilization to more disparate challenges in the social, economic and cultural realms. This situation could quite easily be explained by context: provincial fight-back struggles against social services cutbacks have left many social groups across Canada with little energy or resources for joint pan-Canadian mobilizations (Ayres, 1997). This period of time also corresponds with tremendous cuts in the financing of social groups from the federal government, changes that have destabilised many organisations and forced them to redirect their actions in order to survive (Philipps, 1991). Nevertheless, since 1997 – 1998, we can observe a revival of social protest on the issue of trade. And this time the frame has changed.

Instead of a sustainable coalition (like the Action Canada Network), we find more sporadic coalitions organised for specific events (the G8 meetings, FTAA events, the World March of Women and the Canadian March of Women, People Summit of the Americas), including national, local and trans-
national groups, even if the groups involved in these coalitions are almost always the same. The Pro-Canada network today (whose name changed to the Solidarity Network in 1999) includes more than forty-five national groups and provincial coalitions, however, it now serves more as a facilitator of communication between groups (Ayers, 1997: 10). The main collective actors engaged in the fight against NAFTA and the FTAA is Common Frontiers, who brought together unions and other social groups in English Canada, and the Continental Social Alliance who operate at the continental level and of which Common Frontiers is a coordinating member (Gabriel et MacDonald, 2003). The creation of Common Frontiers resulted from the desire to construct a solidarity project between Canada and Mexico concerning the FTAA. This initiative, launched initially by a group of trade unionists and workers in Toronto, progressively transformed into a solid continental coalition, gaining the support of the Canadian Labour Congress in the middle of the 1990s. Today, Common Frontiers is a coalition of Canadian groups whose claims involve issues encompassing the whole of the Americas and that aim to create solidarity beyond national borders (Common Frontiers, online, www.web.net/comfront/).

Compared to the end of the eighties, enemies have changed. Instead of the US, multinational corporations and international organisations, such as the IMF, have become the main targets of protests. Of course, to defend Canadian values against market globalisation is still an argument that prevails, and Maude Barlow, the President of the Council of Canadians, one of the most important actors opposing neo-liberal globalisation today, remains a Canadian Left Nationalist (Stinson, 2002). But, it is no longer the Americanization of the country that is fought against but the marketization of it (even if this process is facilitated by the domination of America). Canada is no longer alone in this fight, and fighting for Canada is also fighting for other countries. Global protest transforms the anti-Americanism in Canada into a broader movement that situates itself within the international economy (Bashevkin, 2000). This redefinition of nationalism in a global perspective also allows coalition building with non-English speaking actors, especially in Quebec. In this respect, the mobilization that occurred all over the country around the Quebec Summit in April 2001 should be considered as a new phenomenon (CommenTerre, 2002; CLAC, 2002; Clark, 2002).
Reframing of the subordination problematic outside traditional work relationships

While in the past “class differences were never a strong line of cleavage (in Canada) and (if) the parties which claimed to be representative of workers seldom gained strong support from that constituency” (Brodie and Jenson, 1988: 1), today the question of subordination not only refers to capitalist relationships between workers and business owners or between women and men inside nuclear family. Subordination is being re-conceptualised and re-shaped in the context of global interdependence.

Beyond all the subtleties and differences that may exist between groups fighting for another globalisation that we met, it is possible to extract a common set of coherent values. First, they view the world as divided into two sides. On one side, are virtuous and democratic civic politics, on the other, corrupt antidemocratic market forces. Within this framework, one class is not oppressed by another, rather global solidarity is proposed. This solidarity is not only constructed between unions or the poor, but between all of those who consider themselves affected by neo-liberal globalisation. The focus is not only on poverty but also on the environment, on fair production, and on food safety. In well-off Canadian society, each act of consumption by a citizen has an impact on the exploitation and subordination of somebody elsewhere. With the Globalisation of protest, it is possible to differently articulate the question of subordination, as subordination does not pass through a single social relationship (work) but through the necessary co-existence of conflicting individual identities (consumers, workers, citizens of a country and world consciousness).

This reframing of subordination-domination relationships is not self-evident for all social actors. It is a constituent characteristic of social movement discourses, however, for more traditional social actors, like unions or leftist women’s groups, it is a delicate situation (Panitch, 2002; Giraud, 2001). For Penny Richmond, from the Canadian Labour Congress, these elements are both profoundly disturbing and very stimulating for unions (Richmond, 2001). In addition, the necessary revisiting of Left ideology that accompanies this, challenges left political parties in Canada. Thus, the NDP has gone through a period of turbulence since the beginning of the 1990s. For many of the groups involved in the anti-globalisation fight, the NDP died in 1988,
with the discussions on the American free trade agreement (the position of the NDP was never clear). In 1993, when the party officially committed itself to the FTAA, it was buried. For Peter Bleyer, of the Council of Canadians, the very existence of the NDP at the federal level could be interpreted as a brake to the possibility of finding a political voice for social protest around the globalisation issue (Bleyer, 2001). For other observers it is precisely the incapacity of the NDP to be a transmission point for social protests that allowed the re-awakening of Left social forces all over the country (Bradford, 2002). In that perspective, the new and more progressive leadership of the NDP since 2003, could be the result of this rebuilding process. Whatever the precise role of the NDP in the building of a new integrated social protest is, the possibility of rebuilding the political left on a field other than that of class struggle, appears more open in Canada today than it was during the 1990s, and globalisation as a political space appears as a very good candidate in that respect. Perhaps, this probability is higher also because in the country class struggles did not form the basis of Left parties.

In the case of Canada, globalisation as an issue and a space worked at the beginning of the nineties as a factor of integration for quite disparate social protest. Even if at the end of the period, this integration is open to dispute, the transformation of Canadian nationalism into the defence of values, shared by other people in other countries and places, opens the opportunity to build new forms of protest. While coalition building continues to occur mainly at the national level, these coalitions are increasingly pan-Canadian, rather than only Quebec-based or English Canada-based, and they address the global problematic. In France, a different process seems to be at work, where the trans-nationalisation of social forces corresponds to an increased division of actors.

III - France : Trans-nationalisation of national social forces and sharper division of actors

Unlike what we observed in Canada, globalisation, as a new space and a new issue of protest, was not directly linked to free trade and has had a more ambiguous history than in Canada. Progressively incorporated into national struggles organized
more by sector, the emergence of globalisation has produced some degree of transnationalisation for only some social forces. Very sharp cleavages remain between social actors regarding the globalisation issue, even if there is a quasi-consensus among actors in terms of a reluctance towards (economic) globalisation, including actors situated on the right of the political spectrum.

The non-consensual origins of globalisation as a political space

There exists an ‘official’ story of which today is called “alterna-Globalisation” (or the fight for another globalisation), which in France is shared by certain analysts (Pleyers, 2003; Wieviorka, 2003; Béroux et al., 1998; Sommier, 2001) and the majority of the social actors involved in the issue (Contamin, 2003). This story begins during the strikes of November and December 1995 that shook the country and forced the government of the period, led by Prime Minister Alain Juppé, to rethink its version of reform of the French social protection system. These strikes played the role of the catalyst for French social forces and permitted the subsequent development of a large trans-nationalisation of social movements. According to other analysts, anti- and alterna-globalisation discourses were present prior to the mythical date of 1995. Furthermore, alterna-globalisation, as a category of collective action, found its origins and influences elsewhere. According to Contamin (2003), it was in within the extreme-left (and in particular the political parties of the extreme-left), as well as certain intellectuals and journalists that one can find the premises for this passion for the fight against globalisation. Agrikoliansky (2003) states that its was during the 1980s, with the emergence in France of a mobilisation for the elimination of Third-World Debt that one can find the background for the story of alterna-globalisation. Beyond these divergent interpretations, what can we retain?

1) In contrast to Canada, in France there was no sole theme behind the mobilisation (free trade) but many points of entry into the space of Globalisation, because of the way public action and social protest are organised sector by sector.

2) As noted by Agrikoliansky, the configuration of actors that today prevails in alterna-Globalisation struggles is, as in Canada, characterised by eclecticism, but this is a particularly ‘new’ element in the French context (if as his analysis
proposes, the mobilisations of the 1980s were the precursors to the current mobilisations).

3) In contrast with the Canadian story, political parties did not play only the role of defender of economic Globalisation but were (and still are, although in a less visible form) principal actors in the struggle against Globalisation.

In order to provide a more precise insight into the ambiguous relations in the space of Globalisation in France, we will focus on one ‘sector’ in particular, that of the collective action of the unemployed, who we see as existing at the edge of many worlds.

Progressive trans-nationalisation of some social forces: the case of the movement against unemployment

From the middle of the 1980s, from within a context of high unemployment, emerged social actors who wished to speak for the voiceless, those that had been forgotten by rapid economic change, namely, the unemployed (Demazières, 1997; Pendaries, 1995). These movements were the basis of what became known as “the social movement of December 1995” or “the Left of the left” (Ancelovici, 2002). The movement against unemployment is comprised by three main organisations: the Mouvement national des chômeurs et des précaires (MNCP); the Association pour l'emploi et la solidarité des chômeurs et des travailleurs précaires (APEIS) and the Collectifs Agir contre le chômage (AC!). One of the French unions, the Confédération générale des travailleurs (CGT) also has a special committee on unemployment, CGT-chômeurs.10

If, at the beginning of the 1990s, these actors could be considered as an isolated phenomenon, today they belong to the core of social protest. From March 1994 to the

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10 For a complete presentation of these groups, see (Clot and Pendaries, 1997). The story of the movements against unemployment begins in the 1980s related to the changes affecting the organization that manages the payment of unemployment insurance (UNEDIC). During the 1980s, no real unity exists between these movements and no real successes in terms of mobilisation were gained. At the beginning of the 1990s, the complete reform of the UNEDIC was followed by the creation of AC! in 1993. All organisations have strong links
successful mobilisation of the winter of 1997 and 1998, the movements against unemployment, despite the division of organisations, have progressively reached the stage of a unified protest around some key common claims (the reduction of the duration of work, urgent measures for all unemployed people, a guarantee of a minimum wages for all) (AC!, 2001; MNCP, 2001; APEIS, 2001; CGT-chômeurs, 2001). Moreover, during the large strikes of December 1995, they were fully acknowledged as mainstream actors, like unions. Today, associated with the Mouvements des sans (the “without movements”, including people without legal status or documentation, and the homeless), they constitute a potential oppositional force in France

These mobilizations of unemployed people, outside traditional forms of workers’ representation, are also an attempt to create new solidarities with the employed. From the right to work and the defence of work-as-we-used-to-know-it (tasks that were performed by unions), movements against unemployment promote the adoption of an unconditional minimum wage for all (worker or not) at the level of the actual minimum wage for workers. In the longer run, they aim to eradicate precarious jobs, as well as the exploitation of workers by conferring the right to refuse a job to all citizens. In the short run, this proposition is considered an answer to the situation of urgency and material needs of most unemployed people and precarious workers (AC!, 1998-2002). This position was a central element for the unity of the movement at the national level, and also a frame that supported its transnationalisation, at least at the European level (AC!, 2001; MNCP, 2001; APEIS, 2001; CGT-Chômeurs, 2001). On the other hand, it was also a significant source of conflict with more traditional actors like the CGT and the French Communist Party who retained a defensive position related to work (CGT, 2001; PCF, 2001; Ariane and Fenoglio, 1996). Nevertheless, organic relationships with some alternative unions (like the SUD) existed and they managed to build an overall solidarity with two of the traditional unions (CGT and Force Ouvrière, FO) (SUD-PTT, 2001).

Increasingly, the solidarity promoted by movements against unemployment reaches beyond national borders. Not only do movements like AC! and APEIS...
sustain close links with associations such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transaction for the Aid of Citizens (ATTAC)\textsuperscript{12} (the most important movement in France against neo-liberal globalisation), but all the movements have European counterparts in Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium with which they work. Here, we can observe a true trans-nationalisation of social forces that began with the creation of a European organisation, the European March Against Unemployment, in 1996. Progressively, alliances were enlarged to include the European Farmer Coordination and actions against neo-liberal globalisation, at Nice Summit (2000), in Québec (2001), in Genova (2001). This trans-national coalition acted against European Union economic and social orientations. The long-term aim was to build a European social movement (an idea also pursued by some French intellectuals during the period, such as Pierre Bourdieu with his association Raisons D’Agir!), capable of proposing a viable alternative to the neo-liberal agenda. It is in the name of world citizens that they claimed the right to speak and the right to actively participate to the decision-making process.

In the construction of this opposition, the movements against unemployment are more visible on the “ground”. They are characterised by direct action, promoting the illegal occupation of strategic places, using civil disobedience in certain situation (public transportation, for example) and placing the emphasis on spectacular actions, in order to obtain the attention of the media. They are specialised in the systematic denunciation of the abuse of the system, and associations such as ATTAC serve as more of a leader in the intellectual aspect of the work, proposing alternatives and above all, providing meanings to the fight. In European and international demonstrations, the national state is not the sole target of claims: global institutions, international corporations, even neo-liberal ideology, are identified as enemies to fight against\textsuperscript{13}.

The increasing visibility of the trans-nationalisation of social forces, and its increasing integration into national actors’ discourses accompanied a sharper division of national social protest.

\textsuperscript{12} ATTAC was created in 1998.

\textsuperscript{13} “From Porto Alegre to Davos, from the insecurity fo work to the employment of the undocumented, it is all of us together that must struggle...The project is global, and we must globalize our struggles and maintain solidarity in the face of the repression of our movements, amplifying the resistance.” (Bulletin, AC! Rhône Info, n.8, February 2001). Translated from the original French publication.
Division of national social protest

Contrary to the Canadian case, the French map of social protest remained highly fragmented during the period. In this sense, globalisation did not serve as a factor of integration. Two elements should be stressed. First, the retention of the traditional division between the fields of action of unemployment and exclusion, and second, the manner in which the emergence of new forms of social protest accentuated the divisions between social actors.

The terrain of poverty (as a generic term) has for a long time been separated into two camps in France. During the period under review, on one side the fight against unemployment developed, and on the other side, the fight against social exclusion spread (Dufour, 2000). Even where actors attempted to build some bridges between the two, these attempts were not completely successful.

The movements against unemployment benefited largely from the transnationalisation of forces and from the problematic that we just described (that the spreading of the European movement against unemployment was concomitant with the development of national movements). Thus, in this case, the boomerang effect, described by Tarrow, worked (Tarrow, 2002). For Christophe Aguitton, first involved with AC!, the mobilisation at the European level served to globalise claims in terms of rights (the right to work and the right to have a wage) (Aguittion, 2002). Although movements against unemployment remained fragile, they were able to obtain certain access to the state and make certain gains, in part, because of this European visibility. For example, in 1998, they were formally recognised by the state and for the first time invited to the consultation table (against the opposition of some Unions). They also obtained substantial material gains through the adoption of the Fonds d’urgence social, and some gains with respect to the law against social exclusions; finally, some small improvements in terms of financial revalorisation of social minima were obtained (CERC, 1997; Belorgey, 2000). Furthermore, with regard to discourses, the globalisation of claims served to give a second life to the movements which were destabilized by the reduction of unemployment at the end of the 1990s and disoriented by their previous success (AC!, 2001; MNCP, 2001).
With regard to social exclusion, the focus of the period was the fight for a law preventing various forms of social exclusion. After a very chaotic process, the *Loi de prévention et de lutte contre les exclusions* was finally adopted in 1998 (Dufour, 2000). The social movements that pushed for this law were composed of coalitions of NGO’s (such as the network ALERTE), movements against unemployment, movements against social exclusion, a national coordination of people without documentation, the national organisation of women, associations such as Act Up, and some alternative unions (Druesne, 1994). The formation of small bridges was possible with more mainstream unions, except the CGT who supported the mobilization from the beginning. Although all the groups were working in the same direction (the adoption of the Law), the differences within the coalitions proved too stark for the coalitions to survive after the parliamentary process. In 2000, when the law was evaluated for the first time, strong divergences between actors appeared (ATD-Quart Monde, 2001). In particular, movements against unemployment refused the “management of exclusion” proposed by the Law and prefer the claim for social and political rights for all (MNCP, 2001; AC!, 2001).

In that field of battle, some trans-nationalisation of forces occurred between large NGO’s, (Médecins du Monde, ATD-Quart Monde), but no substantial supranational links were created for more grassroots movements. At the European level, the Amsterdam Treaty (June 1997) marked the formal recognition of the fight against poverty and exclusion as a European mandate. Since 2001, every two years, national states have had to present a national plan directed towards the reduction of exclusion. In this process, some trans-national links between European social actors have been created, especially around the European network of associations devoted to the fight against poverty and social exclusion (REALPES)\textsuperscript{14} and the European anti-poverty network (EAPN). For the moment, these networks act more as social partners with the European Commission than as a real oppositional force, similar to the trans-national actions against unemployment. Moreover, these more institutionalised actors are seen as overly compromised by the system, and too close to private charity or social assistance by more radical national actors fighting on the unemployment and globalisation fields. Nevertheless, French NGO’s, and especially confessional ones,
could also be considered central elements in the building of alterna-globalisation as a legitimate political space (Agrikoliansky, 2003). But this is another story.

The partial trans-nationalisation of some social forces and issues was also followed by a deepening of the divisions between national social actors.

The strikes of December 1995 were followed by a new line of demarcation between the main unions in France. Before the strikes, the CGT, FO and the Confédération française des travailleurs (CFDT) were generally unified and formed a common front against business organisations (the Conseil du patronat français that became the Mouvement des entreprises de France (MEDEF)). After December 1995, the CGT and FO dissociated themselves from the CFDT who refused to legitimate unemployment movements and new unions, such as SUD (SUD-PTT, 2001). MEDEF found a new interlocutor in the CFDT for the promotion of its project of reforms, named the project of Refondation sociale. For several observers, it is this new distance between the CFDT and the other unions that has opened the possibility of reform of the social security system in France (Palier, 2003).

Finally, the political left were (and still are) very divided on the question of the significance and the legitimacy of these new forms of social protest. Between 1995 and 1998, the French Communist Party (PCF) acted as the “privileged speaker” of the excluded; it claimed a monopoly of representation of the poorest and presented itself as the best medium for the associations fighting on the field of exclusion (Dufour, 2000). On the other side, the PCF was less favourable to unemployed movements, because they continued to consider the unemployed as workers without jobs (and in that sense, the representation by the workers party or by traditional unions should be sufficient) (PCF, 2001). During the same period, and more so following its election in 1997, the Socialist Party (PS) adopted the position of the ostrich (PS, 2001). Even though strong dissidence within the party existed previous to the presidential election in 2002, the main position between 1997 and 2002, was to ignore extreme left movements and the potential dangers they represented for the party. The socialist government also adopted a ambiguous position towards alterna-globalisation movements (Olivier, 2003). The Green Party, because of its origins and its

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14 The REALPES is composed of 25 organisations dealing with social exclusion, including ATD-Quart Monde, the Red Cross, the European network against unemployment. This
discourses, should have “naturally” been the party of recent social protest (Parti des Verts, 2001). It was one of the first parties to support ATTAC and it has always recognized the unemployment movement as a legitimate actor. The Green Party was also actively implicated in the “without movement”. However, the Green Party, while very popular inside the educated middle-class, is much less so with the people they pretend be the voice of.

More generally, as was evident during the municipal election in France in 2000, it is the partisan left which is in crisis in France. Traditional left parties are not working anymore, the Green party is not a leftist party that is able to answer the preoccupations of more traditional workers, and the most successful list (on the left side) was comprised of those who labelled themselves “citizens lists”, such as the list motivé-e-s in Toulouse (which split in 2003). While the defeat of the PS at the presidential election in 2002 is complex, it revealed the crisis of the left that is directly linked with the emergence of these new forms of protest. Some actors taking over globalisation issues and space, others refusing to address them; but also, the space of globalisation itself is being divided by old French social and political divisions.

In Canada, globalisation, as a new space and a new issue of protest, was used as an integrating factor by national progressive social actors. In France, globalisation was followed by some degree of trans-nationalisation of some social forces but sharp division remained at the national level between progressive forces. In order to partially explain the differences observed, in the final section of the paper we consider the unequal structure of representation at work in each country.

IV- A key issue: The unequal structure of representation

Within our analysis one option would have been to emphasise the similarities between the two countries, such as the common characteristics of the new actors fighting for global justice, either nationally or trans-nationally. In the recent literature, the organisational characteristics of movements are said to contain the network is financed by 90% by the European Commission.
following elements: working largely through networks (more or less formal), favouring direct democracy in the decision-taking process within decentralised structures; promoting and implementing non-hierarchical mode of organisation (Tarrow, 2002, Sommier, 2001). We also know quite well that anti, counter and alterna-globalisation movements endorse multi-organisational belongings and concerns and that civil disobedience and illegal actions constitute a “normal” element of the repertoire of actions (Yeates, 2002). Finally, one of the effective elements of these movements is their comfort with the use of media power, particularly evident during spectacular direct actions (Waters, 1998). However, beyond these elements, the marginal position of these movements in the political process and the position of autonomy in relation to institutionalised politics that they pretend to have (Waters, 1998:183), require a deeper analysis of their relationships to the national state that they continue to be confronted by. This is precisely what the concept of unequal structure of representation previously described, allows.

In the case of Canada, the structure of representation dramatically shifted during the period considered. The very existence of a state reluctant to engage with extra-parliamentary representation at the beginning of the period (1993) has encouraged the radicalisation of progressive social forces, who where then able, within this oppositional position to re-build a certain unity around the globalisation problematic (1995). At the end of the period (since 2000), the federal government seems to adopt a slightly different position especially towards social groups, but the impact of this change, which remains largely rhetorical, is not yet clear.

The Canadian federal state has officially supported and recognised social actors since 1942, with levels of support increasing until the end of the 1980s (Phillips, 1991; Pal, 1993). In this respect, the political space occupied by social groups and social movements was historically important in Canada, and could be considered as a traditional element of the structure of representation. This particular trend changed dramatically in 1993. The previous valorisation of the representational role of civil society actors was progressively transformed into representation of “particular interests” at the federal level (Dobrowolsky, 2000). Since the middle of the 1980s, the political space for social movements both within the state and within the political process has been seriously damaged. One of the primary examples of this transformation is the place occupied by, and permitted to, the women’s movement
(Brodie, 1997). Not only did the movement lose its direct access to the state with the abolition of the Council of the Status of Women in the middle of the 1990s, but becoming identified more and more as a “special interest”, it was pushed outside the political game (Dobrowolsky, 1998).

The exclusionary nature of the “political opportunity structure” was marked not only by the changes in terms of access to the state or to state resources (by changing financing mechanisms), but also by the exclusion of ideas, what Brodie calls “restructuring discourse” (Brodie, 1997). The de-legitimization of intermediate representation or of extra-parliamentary representation was also an attack on unions. During the 1990s, unions adopted a defensive mode, fighting more to preserve their very existence than seeking to extend new workers’ rights (Richmond, 2001). This important shift in the federal Canadian structure of representation also emerged at the moment when the federal government decided to radically transform the way Canadian social protection was organised.

More or less excluded from the political process, and confronted with severe cutbacks in the financing of essential social programs, unions and social movements progressively radicalized their positions and turned their actions first toward local and urgent problematic (poverty, housing, homelessness). This first period of exit from the state was thus also a period of rebuilding in terms of the balance of power with the state. When the framework of protest progressively changed to become more global, around the mid-nineties, as we have previously shown, unions and social groups were not unified (even if they had an experience of working together on the trade agenda) but ready to enter a process of reunification around the globalisation problematic, because their point of departure was situated, for most of them, outside the state. In the case of Canada, this conflicted nature of the relationships between unions, social groups and the federal state has served as a motor of the building of the globalisation political space and explains, in part, the integration role played by the globalisation building process. In the last part of the period studied (around 2000), the federal government has changed its pro-continental free trade-business agenda to a more complex rhetoric that present Canada has the potential leader in the defence of “globalisation with a human face” (Departement of Foreign Affairs and International

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15 A parallel global framework also developed at the federal level in the same time around the FTAA negotiations.
Trade, 2004). Since 1998, the federal government also developed a “community development” orientation that is supposed to be more inclusive towards (some) social groups and to formalize more its relationships with the community sector (White, 2004; Phillips, 2001). The combining of these two changes (one is almost only rhetorical and the second one is well applied through new structures\footnote{An Accord between the government of Canada and the Voluntary and Community sector was signed in 2001. See (White, 2004; Philipps, 2002).}) may have an impact on the balance of power inside the social protest movements we are considering, breaking the fragile consensus among actors concerning the need to fight for “a better world”. But is far too early to conclude on that point.

In the case of France, the political context is quite different. Following the big demonstrations of November and December 1995, the Socialist Party came to power in 1997 and progressively open state institutions towards new social movement representation and claims. Nevertheless, the level of satisfaction towards the Jospin government was low inside progressive social forces (and especially what have been called “la gauche de la gauche”) only three years after he came to power.

Traditionally analyzed as an almost neo-corporatist state (Palier and Bonoli, 1996), the French unequal structure of representation was partially modified between 1995 and 2002. Not only is the beginning of this period characterized by a new openness of the dominant political discourses toward social groups claims (some times against unions positions), but this openness was also followed by formal recognition of these actors inside institutions. In 1998, movements against unemployment were officially invited to participate in the renewal process of the UNEDIC convention. Furthermore, they obtained a permanent seat inside the administrative council at the Agence nationale pour l’emploi (ANPE), the French public employment services agency. Moreover, the 1998 law against exclusion was in large part the government response to years of pressure from social protest. Even if these gains remain fragile and even if the state continues to favour largely traditional unions, the French situation clearly contrasts the Canadian example.

This formal recognition has created new sorts of problem for groups that build themselves in an oppositional context rather than a context of partnership with the state. Thus, movements against unemployment disagree on the function of political
representation they should adopt (AC!, 2001). The permanent seat obtained at the ANPE is often empty, due to the lack of consensus that exists concerning their role within institutions. With regard to all radical organisations, the manner in which the state re-defines their claims in terms of citizenship and better access to services creates an unbalanced situation inside groups. To their militant base, this new position within the political process may appear as means of deserting their initial role, which was significantly distanced from the promotion of co-operation with and within the state. The openness of the decision-making process in relation to movements also factored in the disunion between groups and, sometimes, served as a brake to the durability of their life. Following the 1997 presidential election, when the PS came to power, it became more difficult for social movements and unions to maintain the same level of activity after 1995 general strikes. Faced with a government that had implemented the 35 hour work week, that had adopted the law against exclusion, and that had created thousands of jobs with the emploi-jeunes measure\textsuperscript{17}, in a context of reduced unemployment, movements against unemployment were, at least at the national level, highly destabilised. In contrast to their predecessor, the Jospin government works more in concert with civil society. While the differences in terms of real policies adopted are not entirely clear between the right and the left, the manner in which reforms were conducted was different (Lévy, 2000).

Facing both a “soft” government with quite a progressive agenda, as well as a business organisation that wished to remake its image through its \textit{Refonadion sociale} project, unions increasingly disagreed on the behavioural line to follow. Other social movements, for their part, partially recovered their autonomy from the state and from political organisations through the contestation process at the end of the period, in a large part thanks to the globalisation issue and European building process. Nevertheless, extreme left parties remained closely linked with the emerging protest for another globalisation, even if it is now through individual militants and not through institutional cooperation between the two worlds. Here too the space and issue offered by globalisation was a mean to re-build radical protest on a new terrain,

\textsuperscript{17} This measure creates part-time jobs for young people in the form of five year work contracts. These jobs were meant to become permanent and self-viable at the end of the period.
however, the divisions among national actors remained very high, in a large part because of the problematical relationships they have with the state.

Finally, the very space of globalisation in France is differently structured from its Canadian counterpart and could explain some of the differences observed. Being anti or for another globalisation in France is not a rare position, all the actors, including economic interests actors and extreme rights parties or groups having something to say against globalisation. In contrast to Canada, in France, there exists a consensus against economic globalisation seen as imposed from the exterior and by, in particular, the United states. It is not very difficult to mobilise at large in the population against the American hegemony, political, economical or cultural (Meunier, 2001). By contrast, actors positions differentiated increasingly with regard to European construction. Thus, the conservative opponents of globalisation have also had a tendency to oppose the construction of a united Europe that they judge dangerous to the preservation of national identity and overly liberal, while the more progressive opponents hoped to be able to make the construction of a European Union a tool for achieving a “different globalisation” or, at least, a rampart against the Americanization of European societies, as well as a rampart against populist reflexes, always very present in Europe (Betz, 2003).

The political and social actors seem less divided than the Canadian ones on the question of neo-liberal economic globalisation. However, as the political space of globalisation was not constructed on the same foundations, and because the configuration of relations between the actors, and between the actors and the state are dissimilar in the two cases, the forms of the political space are today divergent. As we have seen, it is in France that the divisions at the heart of the alterna-movement are the more persistent. In the same way, globalisation as a constructed space, has not had the same impact on the national configuration of relations between actors.

**Conclusion**

Globalisation, defined as a space and an issue, follow divergent tracks in Canada and France during the 1990s. In Canada, the fight against globalisation and free trade was an efficient tool for the integration of progressive social forces at the
Canadian scale, with Quebec history becoming increasingly convergent with the English-Canadian ones. In France, we have noticed a progressive autonomy of national social protest from traditional left political actors (including political parties and unions) on the issue of globalisation, but high tensions remain inside the movement itself. Beyond the differences between the two cases, due in large part to the variations in the unequal structure of representation during the period of time under consideration, and in the different history of the space building in each country, globalisation seems to represent a heavy challenge for the political left within the two countries.

If the issue of globalisation aided the emergence of new forms of social protest, the undetermined problematic and the large subjects that it involves do not favour the construction of movements with a strong coherence between the various positions adopted. As a transition point, for an individual the fight against globalisation renders possible the condition of being a member of a national party, a sporadic supporter of a specific coalition, and an active militant within a radical national social movement, without the need for a global congruence between these different affiliations. In this sense, globalisation is also a process of autonomy of the individual from the organisation, and left parties are not used to such moving political borders. One of the main consequences of the emergence of the globalisation political space is precisely to change the framework of the debates and the way actors named who they are, what they want and in the name of what. In this respect, globalisation, as a political space, is always an open process.
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