Multiculturalism in the City:
A Comparative Analysis of Municipal Responsiveness To Immigration in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and the Greater Vancouver Regional District

(Some Preliminary Findings)

By: Kristin Good

University of Toronto
Department of Political Science

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For comments please e-mail:

kristin.good@utoronto.ca
One of the reasons I do believe that municipalities must play a role [in immigrant settlement] is because people settle in municipalities, they live in cities, they don’t live in jurisdictions, they don’t define themselves in constitutional jurisdictional things, they don’t care. Immigrants have come here, they have come to Canada, they have chosen Toronto or Mississauga or Markham and that’s where they’re living their lives and the nearest level of government to them is the municipal government.

Uzma Shakir (2003, personal interview)

Introduction:

In the Canadian constitution, immigrant selection and settlement are primarily responsibilities of the federal government. However, managing social diversity and the effects of immigration is largely an urban challenge. Immigrants tend to gravitate overwhelmingly to Canada’s largest city regions – especially the Greater Toronto Area and the Greater Vancouver Regional District. While immigrants constituted about 18% of Canada’s population in 2001, they accounted for approximately 49% of the City of Toronto’s population and 46% of the City of Vancouver’s population respectively in the same year.

The dominant perception is that inter-ethnic relations are fairly positive in Toronto, Canada’s most ethnically diverse city. Some prominent Canadian academics hypothesize that Canada’s national policy context and more specifically its “official multiculturalism” has helped ease the immigrant integration process (Reitz and Lum, 2001; Kymlicka 1998). At a national scale, there is some evidence to suggest multicultural policies encourage immigrant integration as measured by rates of naturalization, rates of intermarriage, political participation and rates of proficiency in one of Canada’s two official languages (Kymlicka, 1997: 18-21). Nevertheless, the evidence is divided if one considers different spatial scales and indicators. For instance, the more recent Ornstein Report (2000) – a report commissioned by the City of Toronto to study the integration of immigrants in Toronto – found that it is now taking immigrants 10 years longer to reach income levels of Canadian born residents and that poverty in Toronto is “racialized”.

Few Canadian political scientists have shown interest in the politics and policy activities of local jurisdictions. Canadian political science has tended to focus on the institutions and policy-making processes of governing jurisdictions with constitutional status. Local governments have been viewed as they are formally described in section 92 (8) of the Canadian constitution, as “creatures of the provinces” with little political autonomy due to their lack of independent constitutional status and tightly constrained ability to raise revenue. However, this paper presents clear evidence that local agency matters to immigrant settlement and “multicultural” policy. Since federal and provincial legislation endorsing multiculturalism provide few concrete behavioral guidelines, and since there is a lack of societal consensus concerning the goals of multiculturalism, there is a great deal of room for municipal agency in the way in which diversity is managed in Canadian cities. Essentially, understanding the role of multicultural policy in immigrant integration requires that one discover the mundane experience of multiculturalism in the city.

The empirical analysis presented here originates from a normative question: How can ethnically diverse municipalities be encouraged to respond equitably to the concerns and policy preferences of their diverse constituencies? As will be seen below, Canadian municipalities vary a great deal in terms of their responsiveness to ethno-cultural diversity. This paper documents the nature and extent of municipal variation in responsiveness to the needs of an ethnically diverse and largely foreign-born population in Canada’s most diverse cities and explores the conditions under which a municipality tries to and succeeds at accommodating and including the
particular needs of its newcomers and ethno-cultural minorities in its policies. More specifically, it examines the corporate policy responses, practices and implementation of policies designed to accommodate ethno-racial diversity and manage immigration in four cities in Canada’s largest immigrant-receiving region.

The central empirical puzzle driving the analysis in this paper is expressed in the following question: “Given similarly high levels of immigration and ethno-racial diversity, what explains the variation in municipal responsiveness to the needs and preferences of immigrants, refugees and “racialized” communities in Canada?” Understanding “why” and to what effect municipalities adopt diversity-friendly policies is important in terms of assessing the extent to which municipalities are able to play, do play, as well as ought to play a role in immigrant settlement broadly defined. Moreover, it is the first step toward reconstituting the city in a more ‘socially sustainable’ form.

This paper presents the initial findings of an ongoing research project that compares eight cities four of which are located in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) – Toronto, Mississauga, Brampton, and Markham - and four of which are located in the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD) –Vancouver, Richmond, Surrey, and Coquitlam. The research presented here is drawn primarily from cities in the GTA. It begins by outlining and defending the project’s research design and case selection. The paper then describes and evaluates the way in which municipalities vary in terms of their responses to immigrants and ethno-racial diversity. Next, the paper turns to a discussion of the theoretical framework of the inquiry. Despite the reservations of prominent Canadian urbanists, this section of the paper argues that the dominant paradigm in the American urban politics literature – urban regime theory - provides a fruitful theoretical starting point in the quest to explain municipal responsiveness to immigration in Canada. To this end, this section of the paper reviews the core elements of urban regime theory by returning to Clarence Stone’s seminal *Regime Politics* (1989) and explains why some have doubted this paradigm’s value in the Canadian context. The final section of the paper presents evidence that an urban regime has developed in Canada’s largest city, the City of Toronto, and that this regime coalition has spread regionally. The paper concludes by setting a research agenda for the next stage of research in the larger study of which this paper is a part.

**Research Design and Case Selection:**

This paper presents the preliminary findings of an ongoing research project that compares the municipal responsiveness to immigration of eight municipalities within and between the two largest immigrant-receiving city-regions in Canada: the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and the Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD). The project examines the following cases: Toronto, Markham, Brampton and Mississauga in the GTA and Vancouver, Richmond, Coquitlam, and Surrey in the GVRD. The data presented in this paper were gathered primarily in the GTA as the research project is in its initial stages.

The research project is designed as a “most similar systems” research design employing what Lijphart refers to as the “comparable-cases strategy in comparative research” (Lijphart, 1975: 159) and uses the urban regime literature to guide the interpretation of data. The “comparable cases” strategy involves selecting highly similar cases that vary in terms of the political behaviour or policy output/outcome under investigation. The logic of the design is that if cases are tightly matched then the variation on the dependent variable (in this case municipal responsiveness to immigrants and to ethno-racially diverse communities) can be explained in
terms of the remaining differences between cases. As will be seen below, the cases under investigation are tightly “matched” on a number of factors.

In addition, the way in which this research project is designed has the benefit of bringing different variables, which could affect the way in which municipalities respond to immigration into focus, and allowing them to fade depending on the comparison. In doing so, this design permits the exploration of several hypotheses concerning what might explain how municipalities “govern” immigration and diversity. In a broad way, the intra-provincial municipal comparisons bring to light the micro-dynamics of policy innovation and development by controlling for both provincial and national policy context. Comparisons across city-regions test the extent to which provincial policy context matters by holding the national policy context constant. The city-region comparisons, highlight the extent to which each region has cooperated to meet the challenge of immigration and, more specifically, whether or not the regional institutions of the Greater Vancouver Regional District have facilitated inter-municipal partnerships in this area relative to the Greater Toronto Area which has no formal mechanisms of regional co-operation; whether a spatial pattern might be discerned – for instance whether there is a stark urban-suburban divide in both regions; as well as how much provincial policy context and provincial-municipal relationships matter in terms of either creating conditions favorable to or impeding the development of diversity-friendly governance structures within municipalities. This is an important element of the design as recent urban regime theory literature suggests that actors from other levels of government might become important regime actors (Jones and Bachelor, 1993; Burns, 2002). Furthermore, observing the effects (or lack of effects) of regional institutions in the GVRD-GTA comparison will be interesting in light of the fact that recent work has uncovered regional regimes in urban areas (Clarke, 1999; Leo, 1998).

Overall, this design enables one to discern in a broad way whether and where elements of what Sellers (2002) calls the national “infrastructure” such as Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism matters to the way in which diverse immigrant-receiving cities are governed “on the ground”. As will be seen below, the variable levels of responsiveness to immigrants, refugees and ‘racialized’ communities in urban centres means that Canada’s official policy of multiculturalism does not matter to the way in which immigrants experience Canadian citizenship on a day-to-day basis in some cities.

The causal importance of level of ethno-racial diversity and the number of immigrants in the population is a well-documented explanation of municipal responsiveness to immigration in Canada (Wallace and Frisken, 2000; Tate and Quesnel, 1995, Edgington, Hanna, Hutton and Thompson, 2001, Edgington and Hutton, 2002). Essentially, previous studies suggest that high-levels of immigration and ethno-racial diversity are necessary but insufficient conditions for municipal responsiveness to the preferences of diverse groups. Thus, in order to uncover the sufficient conditions for municipal responsiveness to changing ethnic demographics, these “necessary” factors are held constant in all cases. More specifically, this paper compares municipalities with no less than 33.2% foreign-born individuals and no less than 34.3% visible minorities in their population. Table 1 illustrates the diversity of all eight cities under consideration.
Table 1: Immigration and ethno-racial diversity in the municipal cases under investigation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Foreign-Born #</th>
<th>Foreign-Born %</th>
<th>Immigrated between 1991-2001</th>
<th>Visible Minority #</th>
<th>Visible Minority %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toronto</td>
<td>2,456,805</td>
<td>1,214,630</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>516,630</td>
<td>1,051,125</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississauga</td>
<td>610,815</td>
<td>285,650</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>114,150</td>
<td>244,330</td>
<td>40.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brampton</td>
<td>324,390</td>
<td>129,280</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>43,880</td>
<td>130,275</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markham</td>
<td>207,940</td>
<td>109,930</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>46,070</td>
<td>115,485</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vancouver</td>
<td>539,625</td>
<td>247,635</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>106,245</td>
<td>264,495</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond</td>
<td>163,395</td>
<td>88,300</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>48,710</td>
<td>96,385</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrey</td>
<td>345,780</td>
<td>114,725</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>47,040</td>
<td>127,015</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coquitlam</td>
<td>111,425</td>
<td>41,295</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21,940</td>
<td>38,190</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This data is Statistics Canada data from the 2001 Census.

Designing a project where, with each comparison, all factors except for one are common to the cases and where the variation in that single factor (the independent variable) can be linked to variation in the dependent variable (in this case the level of responsiveness to increasing ethnic diversity) would be ideal. The inability of “most similar systems” designs to do this has led Przeworski and Teune (1970) to criticize them for not being able to sufficiently falsify rival hypotheses. In my design this concern arises most forcefully with city-region comparisons since the controls are not as tight. For instance, one issue with city-region comparisons is whether the variation under study can be attributed to city level or provincial level factors. Being able to assess the influence of provincial level factors such as the effect of the provincial policy context and of provincial political leadership is particularly important in the Canadian context since Canadian municipalities have often been dismissed as mere administrative arms of provincial governments and reflections of provincial policy. Thus, this research project deals with this issue in two ways: First, it attempts to discern whether the overall direction of change and policy development in GVRD municipalities and GTA municipalities differs. Second, cases were chosen in such a way as to observe highly similar cases in the two regions (and provincial contexts). If these cases are similarly responsive to diversity then it is less probable that provincial context matters. Conversely, if the differences observed in the highly similar municipalities in each region seem to fit the overall policy pattern of the city region, it is more likely that one would find that provincial context (and perhaps regional institutions) matters a great deal.

Many qualitative research projects are inspired – as this one was – by uncovering puzzling variations on “dependent variables”. King, Keohane and Verba (1994) argue that when cases are selected on the dependent variable, a “retrospective design” is in order. A “retrospective design” selects cases on high and particularly low values of the dependent variables in hopes that it “may help us to gain some valuable information about the empirical plausibility of a causal inference” since we may find that “high and low values of the dependent variable are associated with high and low values, respectively, of potential explanatory variables” (ibid). Before interviews were conducted, the cases were selected in order to cover what appeared to be a range of high (Toronto and Vancouver) to very low (Mississauga) values on the dependent variable as well as values in between (Markham, Brampton). This evaluation was made on the basis of secondary sources and website analysis. However, the measurement has been and continues to be refined through key informant interviews. The findings presented below are drawn from the GTA. However, the discussion will focus on the two cases with the
highest and lowest values on the dependent variable – the City of Toronto and the City of Mississauga respectively.

While scientifically rigorous comparative research necessitates that one is able to assess the causal effect of various factors in the way described above, comparing similarities and differences at one point in time offers a rather static picture of politics and policy-making in diverse municipalities. Thus, interviews with key local actors such as mayors, councillors, regional chairs, civil servants and executive directors of immigrant-serving advocacy and service organizations serve to highlight the dynamism of this process through personal accounts of policy innovation and change and of local agency. Fifty interviews will be conducted in each region. However, the data presented here is based on 41 key informant interviews with local actors in the GTA and in Toronto and Mississauga in particular.

**Measuring Municipal Responsiveness to Immigration in Canada:**

In *Making Democracy Work* (1993), Robert Putnam evaluates the performance of regional institutions according to whether or not citizen preferences are considered (what Putnam refers to as “responsiveness”) and according to whether the acts of government are “successfully” implemented (what Putnam calls the criterion of “effectiveness”) (Putnam, 1993: 63). However, in this paper’s view, it is very difficult to separate these two criteria and thus they are conceptualized together as municipal “responsiveness”. Considering policy preferences is rather meaningless if concrete actions are not taken to incorporate those preferences into actual policies and practices with “teeth” or, in other words, if they are ineffectively incorporated into the policy-making process.

More specifically, the research presented here evaluates two broad elements of policy-making: 1) policy pronouncements and 2) policy implementation. The following indicators are used to measure the “responsiveness” and the “effectiveness” of Canadian municipalities:

3. Bureaucratic Implementation of Departments and Agencies (listed above beside indicator #2).
4. The commitment of resources (financial, staff, and providing public space) by Council, Departments and Agencies.

The paper uses several principles to evaluate policy outputs, policy pronouncements and initiatives. More specifically, it assesses municipal policy responses according to the following values: *comprehensiveness*, the extent to which they are *proactive or targeted*, and the extent to which they are *innovative*. It also employs a second broad dimension of responsiveness, *bureaucratic responsiveness* “on the ground”, or “implementation” to evaluate each municipality. This measurement is based on evaluating the policy outputs and implementation at the level of municipal departments and service agencies.  

This paper’s assessment of the nature and scope of multicultural policy outputs and pronouncements is made by collecting data in the available secondary sources, municipalities’ (and their agencies) websites, government policy documents, and through key informant interviews with mayors, councillors, civil servants and actors in the immigrant serving sector (primarily executive directors of immigrant-serving agencies). Interviews are especially important to assessing the extent to which policies have been effectively implemented.
Comparing Municipal Responsiveness in Canada:

The findings of this paper support earlier research that suggests that the extent to which municipalities are responsive to the changing needs and preferences of their constituents due to immigration varies significantly, even among cities with similarly high levels of ethnic diversity (Tate and Quesnel, 1995; Edgington and Hutton, 2002; Wallace and Frisken, 2000; Frisken and Wallace, 2002; Frisken and Wallace, 2003).

Of the GTA municipalities, the City of Toronto is clearly the most responsiveness to immigrants, refugees and “racialized” communities in all aspects of this study’s measurement including content of policy outputs, bureaucratic implementation, and commitment of resources. The amalgamated City of Toronto built upon the strong policy foundation in diversity policy of the former Metropolitan Toronto and City of Toronto.10

The initial findings indicate that the City of Toronto has responded to its immigrant population in a comprehensive way. Most broadly, the City’s responsiveness to diversity is reflected symbolically in its motto - “Diversity Our Strength”. However, the City is also highly responsive in more substantive ways. In 1998, the City set up a Task Force on Access and Equity whose recommendations in the form of an “action plan” were adopted by council in 1999. As a result, in 1999, a Race and Ethnic Relations Advisory Committee “to advise City Council on issues of access, equity and human rights” (Public Health, 2000 in Frisken and Wallace 2002) and four working groups made up of representatives of diverse community agencies were created to deal with issues of particular importance to immigrant, refugee and “racialized” communities. These working groups included: “Immigration and Refugee Issues”, “Language Equity and Literacy Issues”, “The Elimination of Hate Activity”, and “Employment Equity”. These working groups provide important access points to policy-making for the diverse leadership of Toronto’s communities. In addition, the City of Toronto is currently conducting what it calls a “social audit” of its departments to assess the extent to which the recommendations of the Task Force on Access and Equity have been implemented (Mihevc, 2003, personal interview).

The City of Toronto is proactive insofar as it conducts research and consultations in order to ascertain community needs. For instance, in 2000, the City commissioned the first ever report of its kind to be conducted at the city level in Canada – the Ornstein Report (2000). This report revealed that newcomers to Toronto are taking 10 years longer than previous immigrants to reach income levels of Canadian born residents and that poverty in Toronto is “racialized”. In response to this report, the city held community consultations resulting in the development of the Plan of Action for the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination in 2002.

Toronto’s commitment to access and equity issues is also reflected in the existence of a special unit to manage these issues - the “Diversity Management and Community Engagement Unit” in the Chief Administrator Officer’s (CAO) office. This unit is one of four units of the CAO office’s strategy and corporate policy division. It supports the above-mentioned working groups of council as well as provides corporate leadership to line departments and agencies in diversity policy. The City of Toronto has numerous formal policies in place including an employment equity policy, a non-discrimination policy, a human rights policy (1998), and a hate activity policy (1998). The “Diversity Management” unit enforces formal policies but is also a flexible unit that initiates action when unanticipated needs arise. For instance, one community leader mentioned that her best experience with the City of Toronto was when the Diversity Management unit hosted educational events about anti-Muslim discourse after the backlash against Muslims post-September 11 (personal interview, 2003). The unit is designed to be a “catalyst” and “facilitator” of the entire corporation and to serve as a “bridge” between council,
the civil service and the community (Lee, 2003, personal interview). The existence of this unit ensures that the principles of access and equity permeate the entire municipal organization. In addition, since it is located at the locus of decision-making in the civil service and interfaces with both political leadership and the community it has the capacity to be highly innovative and responsive.

Toronto’s responsiveness to its immigrant population is also apparent upon examination of policy, practices and discourse, as well as “governance” structures of the city’s departments and agencies. For instance, the Toronto Board of Health has three internal committees that have been set up to deal with access and equity issues and Toronto Public Health has recently developed a “Toronto Public Health Access and Equity Policy Framework” that is grounded in “public health practice, principles of social justice and fairness, and municipal, provincial and federal legislation, by-laws and policies” (Toronto Public Health Department, 2002). More substantively, the Toronto Public Health Department practices employment equity and, as one civil servant put it, “intentionally hires” people from diverse communities for specific programs where outreach to newcomer and diverse communities is particularly needed (Civil servant, 2003, personal interview). In addition, the department recruits bilingual staff and offers services in 25-30 languages (ibid). According to a civil servant in the department, the Toronto Public Health Department embraces diversity and rejects the “melting pot model” (ibid). Rather, the principle guiding service delivery in the Toronto Public Health Department is “equity” rather than “equality” (ibid). As Rose Lee (personal interview, 2003) explains, the principle of equity requires that Toronto residents derive equal benefit from municipal services (which is not always the case when services are provided to everyone in the same way). Interviews with officials in other departments and agencies in Toronto revealed similarly high levels of responsiveness relative to other municipalities. Corporate responses at the level of council and direction from the CAO’s office helped create a comprehensive and coherent policy context in diversity policy.

The attitudes, perceptions, observations, and expectations of local actors also suggest that Toronto is highly responsive to its diverse communities. For instance, when asked what it means for a municipality to be “responsive” to immigrants, Rose Lee of the CAO’s “Diversity Management Unit” had the following to say:

Being responsive has a positive connotation. But, on the other hand, I feel that the word can mean begin reactive. …To me the city should be proactive. That’s why research and planning play such an important role in being responsive. You have to be proactive in order to be able to respond, I think. We have to know the demographics and we have to know the socio-economic indicators that point to us whether there has been any progress made by immigrants and refugees in settlement and integration in the city. We need to have the research data so that we can plan proactively, to know whether we should keep going in this direction or we should steer in another direction or we should modify the services we deliver to a diverse population (Lee, 2003, personal interview).

The view that the City of Toronto ought to be proactive in diversity policy is shared by community organizations in Toronto as well. One community leader articulated that the language of responding to a need must change. In her view, a “fundamental shift” is needed where the municipal role is seen as helping “newcomers negotiate their way through a system that doesn’t include them” (Chatterjee, 2003, personal interview). In this actor’s view, this means that municipalities must proactively use their experience to realize what immigrants need and to adopt a “concerted, holistic definition of what it means to be a newcomer” (ibid). In other words, there is a congruence in the language used by civil servants and by immigrant-serving community agencies in Toronto.

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Toronto’s high level of responsiveness to the needs and preferences of immigrants, refugees and “racialized” communities is also evident in these communities’ higher expectations of local governments than in other municipalities. Community leaders in Toronto acknowledged that the City of Toronto is more responsive than other municipalities in the GTA but stressed that a great deal more must be done. These leaders mentioned that while the City has initiated several policies and action plans, they have not been adequately funded or monitored. For instance, several community leaders remarked that despite the stark findings of the *Ornstein Report* (2000), the city shelved the report for two years. It was only after being pressured by community organizations to act, that the city held the community consultations that resulted in the City’s *Plan of Action to Eliminate Racism and Discrimination* (2002). However, as several community organizations pointed out, the plan to eliminate racism did not result in any new expenditure of financial resources. Rather, like many diversity policies, the plan carried the rider that “this policy has no financial implications”. According to one prominent leader in the immigrant-serving sector, the plan was also based on a misconceived notion of the nature of the policy “problem”. More specifically, the plan was without financial implications according to this community leader, because racism was conceived as a behavioural rather than structural issue (Shakir, 2003, personal interview). As Uzma Shakir (2003, personal interview) points out, if racism were viewed as a question of power, an issue of adapting and including “racialized” communities fairly in power structures, then the “solution” would clearly require financial resources (ibid).

While the City of Toronto could indeed be doing more to respond to the needs of its ethno-racially diverse and highly foreign-born population, when one compares it to other Greater Toronto Area municipalities it is clearly the most responsive. According to initial findings, the City of Toronto has been proactive and innovative and has responded in a comprehensive and coherent way in relation to the other municipalities under investigation.

This is most apparent when one compares it to the City of Mississauga, the Greater Toronto Area’s second largest city, and the city that appears to be the least responsive of the cases under investigation. Mississauga does not have any official “access and equity” or “diversity policies”. The only “corporate” responses to diversity in Mississauga are the Mayor’s annual multicultural breakfast and an annual multicultural festival. 11 Despite the fact that its foreign-born population represents 46.8% of the municipal population and that its population is 40.3% visible minority, Mississauga does not have an anti-racism policy. Moreover, notwithstanding pressure from community organizations, Mississauga has not set up a race relations committee as several other diverse suburban municipalities have done in lieu of an anti-racism policy (including both Brampton and Markham). 12 What is more, Mississauga does not translate important municipal documents into the most common non-English languages in the municipality. 13 In fact, according to conversations with municipal staff, the municipality has a policy against translating documents into other languages. For instance, despite requests from various ethnic groups for it to be translated into their community’s language, the City of Mississauga’s new Master Plan is only available in English (Civil Servant, City of Mississauga, 2003, personal interview). This English-only policy starkly contrasts with the approach taken in Toronto where key planning documents are available in 10 languages (ibid). The policy against translation is a tacit one that is reinforced by what is perceived to be Mississauga’s Mayor Hazel McCallion’s position on the issue (ibid). A city councilor in Mississauga, confirmed this language policy adding that if staff were to use other languages to deliver services it would be by “happenstance” (Iannicca, 2004, personal interview). More generally, this councillor said that
while existing resources (bilingual staff for instance) might be marshaled to deal with issues arising out of diversity, no new financial resources would be expended (ibid). The Mayor of Mississauga also confirmed this corporate policy stating that Mississauga does not “adopt language issues” because “if they [immigrants] come to Canada they should adopt the Canadian way” and because adapting services linguistically is “a very costly item [which] would be another burden on the property tax” (McCallion, 2004, personal interview).

Many leaders in the immigrant-serving sector spoke of the importance of employment equity to municipal responsiveness to their concerns (personal interviews with various actors 2003, 2004). For instance, one leader of a well-known ethno-racial organization described employment equity as the “fairest social policy one can adopt” and remarked that there is an expression in Mississauga (among immigrant-serving organizations) that the municipal civil service is “lily white” (personal interview, 2003).

However, preliminary findings in the suburban municipalities in the GTA indicate that these municipalities have not adopted employment equity policies without provincial guidance. In contrast, the former City of Toronto adopted such a policy in 1985 in the absence of provincial direction. More specifically, the “edge” municipalities in the GTA generally began compliance with the Provincial Rae government’s Employment Equity Act in 1993 but abandoned it when the provincial legislation was rescinded by the neo-conservative Harris government.

Mississauga, Brampton and Markham must also be situated within their regional contexts. The findings concerning the extent to which the Region of Peel is responsive to the changing ethno-racial demographics of its population are conflicting at this point. According to one local civil servant, the region is unresponsive and only beginning to develop a corporate diversity policy. What is more, this staff member dismissed this policy as tokenism because it was developed without consulting key stakeholders (Civil Servant, 2004, personal interview).

Nevertheless, there are also some indications that Peel Region is more responsive than its constituent municipalities and Mississauga in particular. For instance, the Region of Peel has had a formal Employment Equity Policy since 1986. In addition, there is evidence of responsiveness in its departments including, for instance, that the Peel Public Health Department has dedicated a staff member to diversity issues.

This study found that York region is also beginning to respond at the corporate level. York’s Planning department began developing a human services strategy in March 1999. Since then a coalition emerged – the Human Services Planning Coalition -that includes participation from most municipal service areas, community groups and business. The coalition’s charter identifies immigration as a central challenge to human services planning and the immigrant-serving sector is represented on this coalition’s board. Thus, the preferences of immigrants and ethnic minorities are now injected directly into the planning process in York Region (Taylor, 2004, personal interview).

**Urban Regime Theory: Is this American-developed theory useful in understanding municipal policy-making in Canada?**

Canadian municipalities vary a great deal in terms of the extent to which they are responsive to change in their municipal populations. This finding is puzzling in light of the traditional conception of Canadian municipalities as highly constrained “creatures” of their respective provinces. Given Canadian municipalities’ constitutional, legal and financial constraints, what explains their variable levels of responsiveness to the changing ethno-racial
demographics of their populations? This question is especially pertinent given the high level of variation within provinces since these differences cannot be explained in reference to differences in provincial policy.

This paper employs urban regime analysis to shed light on why municipalities vary in their responsiveness to immigration. However, some prominent Canadian urbanists have suggested that urban regimes are unlikely to develop in Canada due to constitutional, legal, and cultural differences in relation to the United States. This section begins by reviewing the core elements of urban regime theory by engaging with the work of one of its most important pioneers – Clarence Stone (1989). It explains why many prominent urbanists have viewed urban regime theory as of limited utility in Canada. It is the view of this paper that by focusing analytical attention on the conditions that lead to co-operative governance and the development of policy capacity at the local level, regime analysis is as valuable in terms of understanding why urban regimes emerge as it is in terms of shedding light on why they might fail to develop.

According to Stone, “[a]n urban regime may…be defined as the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone, 1989: 6). Urban regimes consist of three related parts – a capacity, a set of actors, and a relationship (ibid: 179). While informal arrangements vary from city to city, they are driven by two needs: “(1) institutional scope (that is, the need to encompass a wide enough scope of institutions to mobilize the resources required to make and implement governing decisions) and (2) cooperation (that is, the need to promote enough cooperation and coordination for the diverse participants to reach decisions and sustain action in support of those decisions)” (ibid: 6). These needs arise out of a city’s constraints in terms of resources and therefore policy capacity, as well as out of the fragmentation of power in urban systems. Essentially, to say that a “regime” exists is to say that a cooperative arrangement between private sector actors (including, but not limited to business actors) and city officials has developed to achieve particular policy goals.

At the foundation of urban regime theory is a novel conception of power that emphasizes capacity to achieve policy goals rather than control of one set of actors over another. Stone refers to his innovation in this respect as the development of a “social production model” of power which he distinguishes from the traditional “control model” that dominated the community power debate between pluralists and elitists in the American urban politics literature in the 1950s and 1960s. In Stone’s words: “[t]he power struggle [in cities] concerns, not control and resistance, but gaining and fusing the capacity to act – power to, not power over” (Stone, 1989: 229). The American city has been portrayed variously as an “ecology” of sector-specific “games” (Long, 1968), as the politics of resource dependence (Kantor, 1988), and as generally “limited” (Peterson, 1981). Stone’s Atlanta-grown model demonstrates how local politics matters despite limited resources and fragmentation. In fact, an implication of his work is that within a constrained environment, politics matters more than it otherwise would since it is through the politics of cooperation and compromise that policy capacity develops. Thus, to summarize the theoretical puzzle to which regime theory is a response, regime theory is “based on the question of how, in a world of limited and dispersed authority, actors work together across institutional lines to produce a capacity to govern and bring about publicly significant results” (Stone, 1989: 9). According to Stone (1989), policy capacity results from the blending of public and private resources with city mayors playing a central role in bringing the disparate sectors together.
There is a general consensus in the American urban politics literature that local governance involves public-private partnerships between government and business and that urban policy tends to focus on growth (Vogel, 1992: 12-21; Imbroscio, 1997). The prevalence of business participation and growth policies is explained in terms of structural elements of the national and urban political economies. According to one line of argument, what Imbroscio (1997) refers to as the “external dependency” argument, growth policies tend to dominate because cities compete for capital and residents based on the package of services and taxation they offer (Peterson, 1981). According to this argument, cities cannot pursue redistributive policies for fear of capital and residential flight (ibid).

Another literature - the urban regime literature - also suggests that urban governments are constrained but attributes more agency to urban actors. This literature argues there is a structural bias toward business participation in regimes because these actors possess a disproportionate share of resources. In addition, growth policies tend to dominate both because they are preferred by business but also because, by providing material selective incentives to regime participants, they tend to provide the “glue” needed to maintain governing coalitions. For instance, in Stone’s (1989) study of Atlanta, the coalition of the downtown business elite and Black mayors generated selective incentives for the participation of the Black middle class in the form of opportunities to prosper and participate more equally in business. In return, the Black middle class organized the Black vote to elect a mayor who was supportive of growth policies generally and downtown redevelopment in particular. In response to the external dependency theorists, those who adhere to the local politics explanation (Elkin, 1987; Stone, 1989; Swanstrom, 1988; Waste, 1993; Mollenkopf, 1989; Logan and Molotch, 1987) counter that capital is not as mobile as those scholars suggest since investing in a city involves huge “sunk costs”\(^\text{20}\). In short, according to this argument, the business community has a stake in the fate of the city in which they do business.

In addition, Stone’s (1989) seminal work implies that the way in which civil society is organized conditions urban regime formation. One reason the “downtown elite” was so powerful in his study of Atlanta was because of the Central Atlanta Progress (CAP)\(^\text{21}\), its business organization that provided it with a strong unified voice (Stone, 1989: 169). While Stone’s work emphasizes the ability of business groups to generate a stream of selective material benefits that help keep the inter-sector regime coalition in place, it should be added that these resources are also important in terms of generating the selective benefits necessary to overcome collective action problems within a single group or sector. Thus, the ability to overcome collective action problems at the sector (rather than the inter-sector) level might be yet another form of structural business privilege.

More generally, what is important to take note of at this point is that “collective action problems” affect the possibility of regime formation at two levels of analysis: first, at the individual level in civil society where groups are formed, and second at the “regime” level where these groups must overcome collective action problems in order to cooperate. Leadership is central to generating the incentives necessary to overcome collective action dilemmas at both levels. The role of the Mayor is particularly important in bringing disparate groups together.

The image of the constrained or limited local state is a familiar one to Canadian political scientists (Tindal and Tindal 2000; Frisken 1997). Thus, on this basis, it might seem logical that Canadian local officials would also co-operate with the private sector to achieve policy goals that would otherwise be impossible within their resource constraints. However, the differences
between the American and the Canadian intergovernmental contexts and political cultures have led to some doubts concerning the usefulness of urban regime analysis in Canada.

Based on one strain of literature, one might deduce that differences in political culture in the United States and Canada mean that it is unlikely that private-public regime relationships will develop in Canada. More specifically, in their *The Myth of the North American City*, Goldberg and Mercer (1986) have suggested that the way in which Canadian cities are governed reflects Canada’s more general collectivist and interventionist orientation as compared to the United States. In a collectivist political culture, urban regimes would be unnecessary given the strong level of public support for policy. In addition, political actors would be less likely to turn to the private sector to develop capacity. In essence, in a collectivist political culture, the “pooling” of resources would happen between governments rather than between the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, more recent and broad-based work on political culture suggests that these differences are exaggerated. More specifically, this work suggests that when one includes Western European countries in the fray, the United States and Canada stand out for their similarities in values, attitudes and beliefs rather than their differences (Nevitte, 1996). This work implies that if political culture drives political behaviour one should expect similar behaviour in Canada and the United States.

Similarly, in their article reconsidering the “Myth of the North American City”, Imbroscio and Garber (1996) argue that the growth concerns of private property dominate Canadian urban politics as much as in the United States. These authors squarely reject what they call “cultural determinism” suggesting that the primary differences between in the two countries are institutional and constitutional. However, in their view, urban policy outcomes are largely similar despite different loci of policy-making. More specifically, they suggest that in the United States, cities can construct their growth policies directly, whereas in Canada, “the locus of progrowth policy making is often the province rather than the city itself” (Imbroscio and Garber, 597). They develop the concept of “constitutional regime” to theorize the differences between Canadian and American cities’ legal contexts suggesting that Canadian local governments have little autonomy in policy-making as compared to cities in the United States.

Such institutional differences have led prominent Canadian urbanist, Andrew Sancton to argue that “[t]he concept of urban political regimes is unlikely to be of much assistance in analyzing Canadian urban politics because massive provincial influence makes business involvement in such regime politics unnecessary” (Sancton, 1993: 20 in Urbaniak, 2003: 11). Canadian municipalities are “creatures of the province” in the Canadian Constitution and, as such, have been subject to pervasive provincial policy interference and indeed, in many instances, institutional re-organization by provincial authorities. It is also worth mentioning that, in relation to American state governments, Canadian provincial governments are able to act relatively decisively given the way in which power is concentrated in the parliamentary system. Thus, Canadian provinces have both the authority and the capacity to interfere in local affairs. For this reason, on the surface, the development and maintenance of lasting public-private coalitions of the kind theorized in urban regime theory at the local level seems less likely in Canada than in the United States.

Also, given the constitutional relationship between municipalities and provinces in Canada, local governments have tended to look to provincial governments (and not to actors in the private sector) to meet their resource requirements. In other words, it is not only the behaviour of provincial governments that is at issue but also the type of behaviour and self-conception that the municipal-provincial relationship (as defined in the Constitution and in
provincial legislation and behaviour) engenders in local government officials themselves. Since urban regime theory gives local political leadership (often in the person of the Mayor) a prominent role in regime organization, maintenance and change, its applicability in Canada also depends upon the conception that local elected officials have of their role in policy-making and how willing they are to seek new, innovative ways of developing policy capacity. In the Canadian context, local political officials have traditionally behaved as supplicants to upper level governments rather than political entrepreneurs. In sum, on the basis of their constitutional context and the behaviour it has engendered, there is good reason to doubt that urban regimes would form in Canada.

This paper demonstrates that the extent to which a limited conception of municipal governments is appropriate in Canada varies. In addition, it is the view of this paper that recent trends in Canadian intergovernmental relations have created conditions that are more conducive to the development of innovative urban governance arrangements than in the past. Historically, conditional grants to municipalities have been powerful tools of provincial control. However, municipal political autonomy has been enhanced in Canada in recent years with the trend toward “disentanglement” of services. What is more, since “disentanglement” has been coupled with cutbacks in fiscal transfers or what has been referred to as “downloading” (Graham, Philips, and Maslove, 1998: 173-174), municipalities find themselves in a situation where they have the political autonomy to do more but are given fewer public resources from provincial governments. As will be seen below these trends have encouraged some municipal officials to seek innovative ways of building policy capacity. More specifically, it has contributed to the development of an urban regime in Toronto.

In a recent review article of the diverse urban regime literature, Mossberger and Stoker summarize the core properties of regime theory as such: [1.] partners drawn from government and nongovernmental sources, requiring but not limited to business participation; [2.] collaboration based on social production – the need to bring together resources for the power to accomplish tasks; [3] identifiable policy agendas that can be related to the composition of the participants in the coalition; [4] a longstanding pattern of cooperation rather than a temporary coalition (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001: 829).

Moreover, urban regime theory suggests that the key “[p]olicy innovations – the critical decisions made in response to social change – emerge from and reflect the character of a city’s governing coalition [emphasis added]” (Stone, 1989: 160). As will be seen below, despite Canada’s “constitutional regime”, an urban regime coalition exists in Toronto. In addition, levels of municipal responsiveness to immigrants, refugees, and “racialized” communities in the GTA are correlated with factors associated with urban regime analysis.

**Explaining Municipal Responsiveness to Immigration in the GTA: A Regime Analysis:**

The initial findings of this research project indicate that municipal responsiveness to the needs and preferences of immigrants, refugees and “racialized” communities is correlated with several related factors identified as important in urban regime theory and identified above. These factors include: the way in which the municipal role is conceptualized by local actors including whether or not immigration is “framed” in such a way as to be considered a municipal responsibility; levels of organization, activism, and leadership within civil society; and strength and style of political leadership. Despite similar constitutional, jurisdictional and financial constraints, the extent to which municipal actors have accepted these systemic constraints varies.
The extent to which local political actors internalize formal “limits” is especially important in immigration and settlement policy since, constitutionally, it is primarily a federal responsibility. As will be seen below, where immigration and settlement is framed as a municipal responsibility and where structural conditions permit, policy capacity to respond to immigration and ethnic diversity develops through the emergence and maintenance of co-operative arrangements between elected municipal officials, leaders in civil society representing these communities, and civil servants. In addition, as will be seen below, co-operation begets co-operation. In the GTA, where they exist, municipal regime coalitions in immigration and diversity policy feed into a larger, more all-encompassing regional alliance that developed to deal with immigrant employment – the Toronto Regional Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC). TRIEC, in turn, is part of a broader governing coalition that began in Toronto and has since spread throughout the region (GTA).

Role of Municipal Governments in Immigration: The Importance of “Framing”:

In the Canadian constitution, immigration is a concurrent federal-provincial responsibility where the federal government is paramount. The federal government is responsible both for immigrant selection and for immigrant settlement both of which are administered through its Department of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC). With some provinces, the federal government has entered into federal-provincial immigration agreements that decentralize settlement including an agreement with British Columbia. However, Ontario does not currently have an immigration accord with the federal government. Since the federal government does not have a constitutional relationship with municipalities, and because the Ontario government does not require that municipalities involve themselves in “settlement”, there is a great deal of room for municipal agency in this area in Ontario.

All of the actors interviewed for this paper agreed that immigrant selection ought to be a federal responsibility although many expressed the view that the primary immigrant-receiving municipalities ought to be at the decision-making table on this issue (personal interviews 2003, 2004). However, there was a great deal of variation in the way in which municipalities viewed their role in immigrant settlement.

While there is some variation in the opinions of local officials in Toronto, the municipality that has been the most active in diversity policy, elected officials are more likely to envision a broad role for municipalities in immigration and settlement than officials in other GTA municipalities. They also tend to emphasize the opportunities for municipal action and to downplay the constraints. In other words, political leaders in Toronto were more likely to mention ways in which they can surmount their formal legislative and constitutional limitations than to internalize them. For instance, when asked how the City of Toronto was able to initiate access and equity initiatives despite its constraints, Toronto Councillor Joe Mihevc offered the following response:

That’s the beauty of local government. That’s why we do feel we are a level of government. The legislative framework that allows local government to exist is so broad you really have a lot of scope for whatever you want to do. Just pick a different piece of legislation or you just do it because there’s a legislative vacuum at the provincial level. And this is one area, Access and Equity, where they don’t care, they don’t know they don’t care. In many ways that’s federal stuff... who’s coming into the country. So, I mean this area has a lot of scope for imagination, creativity and variation (Mihevc, 2003, personal interview).
In contrast, in Mississauga, the least responsive municipality in this policy area, local political leaders tend to emphasize the limits to their ability to innovate generally as well as to respond to immigration in particular. They offer a rather apolitical conception of the municipal role in policy-making. For instance, according to Mississauga Councillor Nando Iannicca, municipalities are responsible for the “grunt work for the castle” (Iannicca, 2004, personal interview). In his view, municipalities are “pure administrators” that plough snow, remove garbage, and ensure that sewage is flushed; for this reason, immigration and settlement is not on their “radar” (ibid).

In addition, political leadership in Mississauga tends to stress its financial constraints more than other municipalities (Iannicca, 2004, personal interview; McCallion, 2004, personal interview). Similarly, political leadership in Mississauga is inclined to emphasize the costs of immigration and, more specifically, to point out that the federal government has abdicated its responsibility for immigrants (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). Thus, with the strong support of Mississauga’s political leadership, Peel Region passed a by-law that the region will bill the federal government for the costs incurred by its social services department due to sponsorship breakdowns and refugees. To a certain extent, there was a sense in Mississauga that a refusal to respond to immigration is a political strategy where political leaders in Mississauga were holding their ground with upper levels of government who have been downloading services to the municipal level without transferring additional resources (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). As Councillor Iannicca stressed, municipal roles and financial capacity “go hand in hand” (Iannicca, 2004, personal interview).

Nature of Civil Society:

Clear differences also emerge when one examines the level of organization and the nature of relationship between immigrant serving organizations in civil society. The immigrant-serving sector is well-developed in Toronto and leaders of these organizations in Toronto indicated that they find it relatively easy to co-operate with one another (Douglas, 2003, personal interview, Melles, 2004, personal interview; Shakir, 2003, personal interview). When needed, coalitions develop between organizations around issues of common concern. Some leaders mentioned that co-operation among immigrant serving agencies builds upon a long tradition of co-operation among civil society actors more generally (Melles, 2004, personal interview).

In addition, the immigrant-serving sector is comparatively well resourced. It has strong relationship with several private foundations including, for instance, the Maytree Foundation (McIsaac, 2004, personal interview) and the Laidlaw Foundation (Richmond, 2004, personal interview). These foundations conduct important research on immigrant and refugee concerns, train leaders in the immigrant and refugee sector, give grants to immigrant-serving organizations, and participate in coalitions around immigrant and refugee issues. In addition, the federally funded Centre of Excellence in Research on Immigration and Settlement (CERIS) is also located in Toronto. This center is one of several federally funded research partnerships under the Metropolis project – an initiative that brings together academics and not-for-profit agencies in collaborative research dealing with the effects of immigration on cities.

In stark contrast to Toronto, the research uncovered that a culture of competition rather than co-operation pervades the immigrant-serving sector in Mississauga. One executive director of an immigrant serving organization in Mississauga described the nature of relations between immigrant-serving organizations in Peel Region as a “back biting, back stabbing affair” due to
the scarcity of funding (personal interview, 2003). Similarly, another actor expressed that “we’re all trying to get money from the same pot” which makes it hard to partner with someone who is applying for the same grant (personal interview, 2003). Another actor put it rather bluntly: “I don’t see that spirit of cooperation”, stating that even when it happens it leads to a dead end (personal interview, 2003). This actor contrasted Mississauga with Toronto where, in her experience, organizations are willing to share information and partner and where the approach to delivering services is client-centered (rather than driven by the interests of the organization) (ibid).

Actors interviewed for this study also tied inaction on the part of Mississauga to a more general lack of political efficacy among people in Mississauga. In one immigrant community leader’s words:

The people in Mississauga don’t think much can be done by themselves. It’s sort of relax and let others do it for them. So if they don’t like the way garbage is picked up they’re not thinking we can change this by doing things differently by getting somebody who is more with the community to sit on the council that actually makes decisions around these kinds of things [adding] let’s start getting our people in there (personal interview, 2003).

Furthermore, it was common for leaders of immigrant-serving organizations to stress that newcomers are themselves partly “responsible” for the lack of municipal responsiveness to their concerns (personal interviews, 2003, 2004). For instance, one community leader suggested that immigrants tend to feel that they are only responsible for participating in federal and provincial elections (Chaudhry, 2004, personal interview). Others mentioned conflict between ethnic groups that has been transferred from other countries as a barrier to the electoral success of visible minorities in municipal elections (personal interview, 2003).

More generally, the initial findings of this study indicate that civil society in Markham is relatively under-developed in comparison to both Toronto and Mississauga. It appears as though only a few prominent ethno-racial advocacy organizations exist and one major social services agency serves the entire region of York. Nevertheless, the few organizations that do exist appear more willing to challenge political authority than those in Mississauga. In addition, these organizations appear to cooperate with one another.

**Strength of political leadership:**

Another factor that differed across cases was the extent to which the municipality was led by a strong Mayor and council. When discussing the effects of leadership in the GTA, it makes sense to begin with Hazel McCallion, the Mayor of Mississauga, who according to initial findings appears to be the most powerful of municipal leaders in the GTA. Many residents of Mississauga appear to revere Hazel McCallion. In fact, her influence seems so pervasive in Mississauga that local actors in all sectors (including the municipal bureaucracy) are aware of her personal opinions on issues and tend to defer to them.

Outside observers also recognize her power. According to one prominent activist in the immigrant-serving sector in Toronto, Mississauga is “run like a personal fiefdom…with personal dispensations” (personal interview, 2003). According to this actor, for this reason, despite Mayor McCallion’s lack of support of diversity policies, there are as many ethno-racial communities who would speak up against her as would defend her. From the perspective of several Toronto based immigrant-serving organizations, this was apparent when they organized a rally in Mississauga in response to comments made by Mayor McCallion that portrayed
immigrants and refugees as a burden on municipalities and on public services generally. While political leaders in other GTA cities have also made discriminatory remarks, the response of civil society leaders in Mississauga was qualitatively different than in the other municipalities. According to one leader’s account, immigrant-serving organizations in Mississauga were generally uninterested in participating in rallies organized in response to McCallion’s comments (personal interview, 2003). In fact, one local immigrant leader went out of her way to publicly disassociate her organization from protests organized by Toronto-based agencies. When pressed about why Mississauga’s immigrant-serving organizations might behave this way, one Toronto-based community leader hypothesized that local agencies were concerned that Mayor McCallion would withdraw scarce sources of funding including money associated with advertising in local ethnic media (personal interview, 2003). Similarly, a civil servant with Peel Region suggested that civil society actors do not oppose McCallion because they know that she could simply make a phone call to the appropriate decision-maker at the regional level and have an organization’s community grant withdrawn (personal interview, 2004).

The research did not uncover any instance of where Mayor McCallion did in fact act with such a heavy hand. In addition, according to Mayor McCallion, the City of Mississauga has a policy against advertising in ethnic media because, in her view, it would be unfair to do so unless the city could advertise in all community newspapers (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). Nevertheless, what is important for this discussion is that perceptions of Mayor McCallion’s personal opinions on issues and of her power appear to affect political behaviour.

What is more, it is important to note that Mayor McCallion does not only derive power from her perceived ability to punish but also from a deep sense of respect for her political success and strength. Many community leaders expressed that despite their differences on policy, they liked “Hazel”. Mayor McCallion is known for being a strong advocate on behalf of the municipality and for “showing up” at community events (Seepersaud, 2003, personal interview). An outside observer confirmed this by stating that the fact that “Hazel” could withdraw her “presence” at events was also seen as an important incentive for complacency on the part of community leaders in Mississauga (personal interview, 2003). In addition, upon speaking with McCallion, it is apparent that she is highly knowledgeable about the community including about ethnic community organizations and events and that she participates in many community events (McCallion, 2004, personal interview).

Mayor McCallion’s description of how ethnic relations are managed in Mississauga also supports but qualifies the above suggestion that Mississauga is run like a “personal fiefdom”. More specifically, while McCallion would deny that her relationship with community organizations is based upon material dispensations, her description of how community conflicts are handled reveals that she is personally involved in disputes. When conflict arises between ethnic groups, she makes personal phone calls to the relevant community actors and tells them how to resolve it. In her words, “it’s a different approach [in Mississauga in relation to other GTA municipalities that have policies and committees to deal with such issues], and it’s an open approach. If you’ve got a problem, if anyone is treated with disrespect or indication of racial discrimination, the way we [Mississauga] operate is I want them in my office, I want to know why and I want to investigate. I investigate every issue” (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). McCallion stressed that she does not want city staff handling such issues and therefore handles them personally (ibid).

The variation between Mississauga and Brampton, two highly similar municipalities within the same region – Peel Region- illustrate the particular importance of political leadership.
The lack of a Mayor who adamantly opposes adopting diversity policies and initiatives resulted in the establishment of the Brampton Race Relations Action Council. Mississauga Councillor Iannicca confirmed that Mayor McCallion’s personal opinion on the issue was decisive stating that there has “always” been pressure for a race relations committee in Mississauga but that Mayor McCallion has a really strong view on this - that municipalities are simply “not in the business of race relations” (Iannicca, 2004, personal interview). When asked about why Mississauga does not have a race relations committee McCallion replied that the city set one up and they disbanded themselves (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). It is likely that both accounts are accurate since race relations committees tend to fail if political leadership does not support them.  

The independent importance of strong political leadership is also apparent in the transition from Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman’s leadership to Mayor David Miller’s. According to a senior civil servant in Toronto’s CAO’s office, unlike under Mayor Lastman’s direction, the City Summit Alliance (to be discussed below) and other networks in civil society are now deferring to Mayor Miller’s leadership (Abrahams, 2004, personal interview). Miller’s leadership style is also very different from Lastman’s. To put it bluntly, Miller is more co-operative than Lastman. The difference in leadership style was evident from the beginning of his tenure when he asked prominent community leaders to participate on his “transition team”, a non-partisan group of public and private sector leaders who he selected to advise him on the direction the city ought to take. It was also evident in a new participatory budget progress that he introduced. In addition, there is good reason to hypothesize that Toronto will be more responsive to immigrant, refugees and racialized communities with David Miller’s Mayoralty than under Lastman’s tenure as Mayor. Mayor Miller was a champion of immigrant and refugee issues as a city councillor and chaired Toronto’s “Immigration and Refugee Working Group”. As chair of this working group he had the opportunity to develop relationships with various civil society leaders in this sector upon which he can now draw to lead on these issues. As a city councillor, he also sat on the Toronto Regional Immigrant Employment Council (to be discussed below) with Mayors and Regional Chairs of other highly diverse municipalities.

*How Local Differences Matter To Municipal Responsiveness to Immigration: An Urban Regime Analysis*

The findings of this paper demonstrate that, despite the assumptions of a great deal of the Canadian political science literature, local agency matters to public policy-making in the GTA. Urban regime analysis helps one to explain the patterns in municipal responsiveness to immigration in the GTA, or, in other words to understand how local governance matters in this area. Toronto, the most responsive of the GTA municipalities, is the only municipality where an urban regime appears to exist in immigration and settlement issues. The regime is supported and maintained by a “frame” that recognizes a role for municipalities in immigrant settlement and symbolically, by a city motto – “Diversity our Strength”.

Administratively, the regime is maintained by the “Diversity Management” unit in Toronto’s CAO’s office and politically, through several working groups and committees that provide regular communication between the public (both elected and administrative) and private spheres. Toronto’s regime builds upon the capacity of a strong immigrant-serving sector and a variety of ethno-racial advocacy organizations including, for instance, ethno-specific planning councils. Private foundations including the Laidlaw Foundation and the Maytree Foundation...
provide the regime with important resources in the form of research, community capacity building grants, and leadership training in civil society.

Politically, a network of councillors who are strong advocates of immigrant settlement and diversity policy provide leadership to the regime. In addition, the particularities of Toronto’s institutional structure facilitate the maintenance of urban regimes even with Mayoral change. Given Toronto’s weak Mayoral system and relatively large council, there is more room for “politics”. Civil society actors are likely to maintain strong relationships with some councillors even if the Mayor has not made these issues a priority. Essentially, while Mayoral leadership matters, since Toronto Mayors must build coalitions on council if they are to govern effectively it is more likely that advocates on behalf of immigrants and ethno-racial minorities will be included in decision-making even if the Mayor has not made these issues a personal priority.

In addition, Toronto’s “access and equity” policies follow a pattern of policy change described in Stone’s (1989) original *Regime Politics*. More specifically, urban regimes are self-perpetuating to a certain extent. The policy responses and initiatives of the past cause a certain form of politics to emerge that, in turn, makes related policies more likely. Thus, while establishing Toronto’s “Diversity Management” unit is an example of responsiveness, it now also supports a “politics” of stakeholders in these policies and, as such, has graduated from a “dependent” to an “independent variable”.

As will be seen below, Toronto’s high level of policy capacity in immigrant settlement and diversity policy is being pooled in a Toronto-led regional regime with broad inter-sectoral participation. The focus on employment policy has led to a widening of the stakeholders and of the governing coalition.

Urban regime analysis draws attention to the importance of political leadership, helping one understand why Mississauga has remained relatively unresponsive. A strong Mayor who does not see a role for municipalities in immigration and settlement leads Mississauga. Her influence is so pervasive that her personal opinion against municipal action in immigration and settlement policy “pre-empts” any local attempt to act in this area. This strong leadership is reinforced by and perpetuates a civil society in which the immigrant-serving sector is fragmented and largely disengaged from local politics. Together, these factors explain why an urban regime has not emerged in access and equity policy in Mississauga and why Mississauga is the least responsive of the municipalities in the GTA.

*The Intergovernmental Context:*

The initial research in this study also confirmed the importance of provincial leadership to municipal responsiveness in the GTA. The shift between the Ontario Premier Bob Rae’s NDP government (1990-1995) and Premier Mike Harris’ neo-conservative government (1995-2003) had a dramatic effect on the politics of immigrant integration and accommodation at the local level. Premier Rae was highly supportive of policies designed to include immigrants and ethno-racial minorities in Canadian society and in policy-making. During its term in office, the NDP government created an Ontario Anti-Racism Secretariat, and passed an *Employment Equity Act (1993)* both of which were terminated upon the election of the Harris government. The Harris government also eliminated several additional programs aimed at immigrants and reduced funding to immigrant-serving organization to the point where many people viewed the provincial government as “unsympathetic or indifferent to this policy realm, or simply irrelevant to what they were trying to do” (Frisken and Wallace, 2002).
The effect of the changes in provincial policy context on municipalities took many forms some more direct than others. It also varied from municipality to municipality. For instance, while the Ontario Employment Equity Act reinforced Toronto’s existing commitment to Employment Equity policy, it pushed the other Greater Toronto Area municipalities to adopt and implement a policy. When the Harris government rescinded the policy, so too did the suburban municipalities and all municipalities (including Toronto) were ordered to destroy any ethno-racial data collected about their employees.

The provincial policy context also affected municipal policy-making as it relates to immigrants in a more indirect way – it created more need in the municipal populations since the number of immigrant-serving organizations and services declined. In addition, the provincial “downloading” of services meant that municipal governments had fewer resources with which to respond to their residents generally.

In addition, according to some observers, the Harris government actively fostered an antagonism between the “905” (GTA suburban municipalities) and “416” (Toronto) aligning itself with the suburban “905” areas. For instance, under Harris, new rules for “pooling” finances across GTA municipalities that have created some antagonism between municipalities given their already tight financial constraints were introduced. Many suburban municipalities have argued that property taxes should not be used to fund social services in Toronto, one of two net beneficiaries in the relationship. Harris’ antagonism toward Toronto was evident according to many observers in his willingness to amalgamate Toronto despite the protest on behalf of Toronto residents. It is possible, as some observers suggest, that Harris was antagonistic toward Toronto because of the City’s inclination to vote NDP. Some have also argued that provincial leaders have an interest in “dividing and conquering” cities in the GTA, since, as a group, they would constitute a formidable alliance and potential rival to provincial power.

The way in which local political leaders frame both municipal roles and immigration policy can also be understood within the intergovernmental context. It appears as though the variation in the way in which political leadership frames these issues is related to different political strategies to gain more resources from other levels of governments. Local leadership in Mississauga frames immigration in terms of “costs” and stresses the limitations of municipalities in order to highlight the federal government’s fiscal responsibility. In contrast, local political officials in Toronto stress the importance of municipalities and their role in immigration in hopes that responsibility and resources will be decentralized to the City. 38

Finally, as will be seen below, the lack of political leadership at upper levels of government was a decisive factor in the development of a broad-based urban regime in Toronto.

**The City Summit Alliance and TRIEC: The emergence of a regional regime:**

Since 2002, governing capacity in Toronto has been enhanced by a broad inter-sectoral coalition of local government actors and “blue-chip” private sector actors in Toronto and the surrounding areas – the Toronto City Summit Alliance (TCSA). The alliance began with a conference of leaders representing various sectors and communities in Toronto – the Toronto City Summit in June of 2002 – that was organized by the City of Toronto at the request of the Mayor. This alliance has representation from a very broad base including for instance business, labour, the not-for-profit sector, cultural industries, and universities. It also includes participation from past mayors, and a past Premier of Ontario. The Toronto regime is interesting
comparatively as it includes a much broader level of participation than what is described in most American urban regime analyses.

The Toronto City Summit Alliance (TCSA) is part of an urban autonomy movement in Canada seeking a “New Deal” for Canadian cities including a new fiscal and political relationship with provinces and the federal government. However, this alliance also includes more specific goals related to “social production” one of which is “becoming a center of excellence in integrating immigrants”. To this end, the alliance established the Toronto Region Immigrant Employment Council (TRIEC) to help deal with one of the most important challenges facing newcomers – access to employment.

TRIEC is supported by a secretariat which is funded by the Maytree Foundation, a private foundation established by Alan Broadbent, prominent businessman and philanthropist and who is a member of the TCSA. TRIEC’s membership includes various stakeholders including: assessment service providers, community organizations, employers, foundations, labour, occupational regulatory bodies, post secondary institutions, and all levels of government - federal, provincial, and municipal. Local policy networks interested in immigrant employment issues coalesce in this alliance creating increased capacity in immigrant employment at both the city and at the regional level.

The Council’s purpose is the following:
1. Engaging stakeholders proactively and strategically in the integration of immigrants in the labour force; 2. Creating a local environment of collaboration in the delivery of innovative and effective labour market integration programs for immigrants; 3. Championing the labour market integration of immigrants broadly; 4. Facilitating the provision of accurate and relevant information on Toronto region labour market issues to immigrants through existing portals; and, 5. Providing a local perspective in all areas of federal, provincial and municipal policy and program development as they relate to the labour market integration of immigrants.

In other words, TRIEC’s purpose is to create policy capacity in the area of immigrant integration into the economy through public-private collaboration. It arose out of the need to bring together a diverse set of actors to deal with barriers to immigrant integration into the labour market. Thus, as urban regime theory would predict (Stone, 1989: 6), it arose out of a need for “institutional scope” and “co-operation” as a result of the fragmentation of interests that affect or have a stake in the issues surrounding immigrant employment. To date, TRIEC has developed and implemented several programs including a mentorship program where immigrants are placed in cities and in private corporations to gain valuable Canadian experience – the “Career Bridge” program. Thus, the relationship has been a productive one.

According to former Toronto Mayor and Toronto City Summit conference co-chair, David Crombie, the TCSA emerged as a result of a leadership vacuum at upper levels of government and a confluence of interests between the former Toronto Mayor Mel Lastman and prominent actors in civil society (Crombie, 2004, personal interview). More specifically, while Lastman and several actors in civil society and the private sector viewed holding a summit as an opportunity to take on the province and the federal government, it also appealed to those who simply wanted to tackle important issues facing the city of Toronto. The alliance began in Toronto and has since spread regionally.

The urban regime literature helps one understand how urban regimes are maintained in Canada. Drawing upon the rational choice literature, Stone (1989) explains regime development and maintenance by the ability of a regime to provide “selective incentives” to its partners. In addition, his more recent work draws on the literature dealing with problem definition and issue framing to explain regime decline in Atlanta and invites urban scholars “to consider how issue
concerns come to be specified as purposes, and how they are linked, enlarged and refined for action” (Stone, 2001: 20). Immigrant employment was chosen as the first concrete policy step in the TCSA’s goal of becoming a “center of excellence in the integration of immigrants” because it was a goal upon which a broad cross-sectoral alliance could agree. Furthermore, as urban regime theory would predict, TRIEC is supported by exchange relationships of the type emphasized in Stone’s (1989) early work. Business supports the council because it would like to see the GTA and its business community benefit from highly-skilled immigrant labour. Immigrant organizations participate because the programs developed by TRIEC provide immigrants with mentoring opportunities and, ultimately, jobs. The regional regime is also maintained through networks at the municipal level where Toronto’s network is particularly strong.

Interestingly, the nature of municipal governance appears to affect the likelihood and nature of co-operative efforts at the regional level. Local actors from Toronto are over-represented in the Toronto City Summit Alliance and its offspring, the Toronto Regional Immigrant Employment Council, because of Toronto’s high level of capacity in immigration and settlement. However, the effort is meant to be regional. The Regional Chairs of regions with high levels of diversity (Peel Region and York Region) as well as one municipality from each region were asked to participate. Mississauga was the clear choice in Peel and Markham in York region. Thus Mayor McCallion of Mississauga and Mayor Counsens of Markham were invited to sit on the council. Tellingly, both regional chairs and Mayor Counsens of Markham accepted the invitation to participate while Mayor McCallion of Mississauga declined. According to an actor close to the process, Mayor McCallion refused to participate until the federal government reimbursed Peel Region for the “costs” of immigration incurred by municipalities due to sponsorship breakdowns (personal interview, 2004). According to McCallion, she did not participate in TRIEC because its mandate was too limited (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). Mayor Susan Fennel of Brampton accepted the invitation to participate in lieu of Mayor McCallion.

Given Mississauga’s lack of participation on TRIEC, one can expect that the distance between the level of municipal responsiveness to immigration in Mississauga and the rest of the region will grow as the other immigrant-receiving jurisdictions pool their resources and embark upon another “path”. The region has a formidable amount of resources with which to deal with issues arising from immigration. Thus, municipalities that chose not to participate in co-operative efforts, such as TRIEC, will not have access to these resources. In addition to the resources that the private sector and civil society bring to the relationship, the coalition has the benefit of a central city with a great deal of policy expertise (housed both in civil society and in the city’s civil service) that has been accumulated over more than 30 years.

However, Hazel McCallion pointed to another reason for not participating in TRIEC that raises important questions for urban scholars interested in the extent to which urban regime are in fact socially productive. While she was not aware of all of its current activities, McCallion suggested that it seems as though TRIEC is a “big administration and possibly little effort” (McCallion, 2004, personal interview). In her view, “some of these groups get off on a tangent with doing a lot of things” remarking that “the thing is, I don’t know where they’re getting the funding to do it” (ibid). Similarly, the regional chair of York Region, Bill Fisch (a member of TRIEC) suggested that there was pressure for the region to take over the administration of programs initiated by TRIEC and that the Region was not prepared to do so (Bill Fisch, 2004, personal interview). In his view, when government takes over programs too soon after they have
been initiated, it risks losing the involvement or “buy in” of the private sector (Fisch, 2004, personal interview). These observations raise important questions about the difficulty of maintaining inter-sectoral “buy-in” in urban coalitions, and of the delicate balance between public and private involvement that must be maintained. Ultimately, they raise questions concerning the extent to which and the conditions under which urban regime coalitions are in fact socially productive. These are the central questions in the urban regime literature. Canadian political scientists ought to engage with this literature in the quest to better understand how policy capacity develops and is maintained at the local level in Canada.

**Conclusion and An Agenda for the Next Phase of Research:**

Urban regime theory is useful in terms of helping one to understand policy outcomes at the urban level in Canada, and more specifically, in the Greater Toronto Area. This body of literature draws one’s attention to the important role of political leadership, civic capacity, and issue “framing” and the way in which they come together in urban governance structures. It is also useful in helping one to understand how regional governance arrangements can emerge and be maintained in the absence of regional institutions.

The preliminary findings reported in this paper indicate that the extent to which the province provides leadership on important urban issues affects the likelihood of the development of broad regime coalitions such as the City Summit Alliance and TRIEC. More specifically, the lack of provincial leadership on important issues makes the development of “grassroots” urban regimes likely where civic and municipal capacity is strong.

The next stage of research will involve an inter-regional comparison between the four municipal cases discussed above and four cases in the GVRD. It will be interesting to compare the level of co-operation between municipalities in the GTA with the level of inter-municipal co-operation among municipalities in the GVRD, which has a formal regional structure (the GVRD) to facilitate regional co-ordination.

In addition, the inter-regional comparison will highlight the extent to which a federal-provincial agreement on immigration matters to municipal responsiveness. While BC has such an agreement with the federal government (the *Agreement of Canada - B.C. Cooperation on Immigration*) Ontario has yet to negotiate such an accord. In fact, members of TRIEC are currently working on developing models for such a deal and the City of Toronto is fighting to be treated as a partner in the agreement (McIssac, 2004, personal interview; Abrahams, 2004, personal interview).

Finally, the findings discussed above indicate that local agency matters. Canadian municipalities must not be painted with the same brush. The cities discussed here are not mere administrative arms of provinces and reflections of provincial policies. Rather, they are democratic governments that are variably responsive to changes in the preferences and needs of their constituents.
Endnotes:

1 This paper defines “immigrants” as Statistics Canada does, as foreign-born individuals.
2 This is based on Statistics Canada data (2001).
3 Reitz and Lum (2001) make this observation citing several popular media sources including National Geographic, Fortune Magazine, and Maclean’s (Reitz and Lum, 2001: 2).
4 Ornstein, Michael (2001). “Racialized” communities are equivalent to “visible minority” communities. The word is used by many local actors in Toronto and is meant to convey the idea that racial categories are socially constructed.
5 Citing a study conducted by Jack Synder (1991), King et al. (1994) suggest that a valuable strategy for isolating the causal effect of variables of interest is to control for variables that are “obvious and well documented” (King, Keohane and Verba: 140) by holding them constant. In my study, controlling for demographic change allows me to focus on the factors associated with an urban regime “without suffering the effects of omitted variable bias” (ibid).
6 See Statistics Canada website “community profiles” at: http://www12.statcan.ca/english/profil01/PlaceSearchForm1.cfm
7 All six of the suburban cases have similar numbers of foreign-born and visible minority residents in their population; similar socio-economic profiles; and are characterized by high rates of growth. However, Richmond, Surrey and Coquitlam are located in the GVRD and Mississauga, Brampton, and Markham are located in the GTA. In addition, the design allows one to test the effects of ethnic configuration on municipal responsiveness. On the one hand, Richmond, Markham and Coquitlam have similarly high levels of Chinese residents in their populations while in Mississauga, Brampton, and Surrey “South Asian” immigrants predominate.
8 Looking at several policy areas within individual municipalities offers additional opportunities to consider what leads to policy responsiveness as well as allows one to assess whether variation is greater between municipalities or between policy areas/agencies. This paper uses the following services and departments as tests of policy responsiveness and effective implementation: police services, public health, planning, public recreation, and public libraries. These areas were chosen because they are clearly local responsibilities and thus good tests of municipal responsiveness.
9 Conducting interviews with key actors allows me both to compare the various actors’ perceptions of the scope of municipal policies with my own assessment as well as to compare the perception of the municipality’s responsiveness and effectiveness across sectors. Essentially, following King, Keohane and Verba’s (1994) advice concerning how to increase the number of observations in a “small n” study, this paper employs different measurements of ‘multicultural responsiveness’ in order to ascertain precisely how municipalities vary as well as to explore the implications and the validity of my measurement at different levels of analysis and in different sectors (223-224). This way of measuring “responsiveness” leaves open the possibility that a municipality could adopt many multicultural policies all of which are deemed ineffective by the beneficiaries themselves.
10 The newly amalgamated City of Toronto builds upon the strengths in diversity policy of the former City of Toronto and of Metro Toronto which began acting in this area in the mid-1970s. See Wallace and Frisken (2001) and Frisken and Wallace (2002).
11 In contrast, the Town of Markham, another suburban municipality in the GTA, is in the process of developing a corporate “diversity policy” within its Human Resources department. This is despite the fact that Mississauga is a much larger city and has been an immigrant-receiving destination for a longer period than Markham.
12 Markham has had a Race Relations Committee (with several changes in name) since 1985. A community leader who is chosen by council chairs the current Race Relations Committee in Markham. The Committee is a citizen committee with three councillors sitting on it to serve as liaisons between the committee and council. Such committees generally deal with issues arising in the community reactively. That is, they address issues as they arise rather than plan for future needs. This is reflected in the budget of the Markham’s Race Relations committee that is only $7,500/year.12
13 Punjabi, Polish and Chinese.
14 The former City of Toronto adopted an employment equity policy in 1985, the former Metro Toronto in 1989, and the province in 1993.
It should be noted that, despite the absence of formal policies, there was some evidence of employment equity “practices” in Markham. According to local actors, regardless of the absence of a formal policy, Markham council asks the CAO’s office to report on employment equity and Markham conducts consultations aimed at recruiting diverse workforces (Usman, 2004, personal interview; Sales, 2004, personal interview).

The former two municipalities are two of three municipalities in Peel region. Markham is one of nine municipalities in York region. In the GTA, regional governments have responsibility for many core municipal services and thus affect the ability of their constituent municipalities to respond in a comprehensive way to demographic change. For this reason, several key actors suggested that the regional governments are a better comparison with Toronto than the lower-tiered municipalities.

More specifically, according to this civil servant, the policy was adopted out of embarrassment of not having what has become a “basic” policy among diverse municipal governments.

For a more detailed analysis of service departments in Peel Region see Frisken and Wallace (2002).

See Chapter 11 of his Regime Politics entitled “Rethinking Community Power: Social Production versus Social Control”.

This concept was developed by economists to express the idea that once an investment into an economic relationship is made, all things being equal, the arrangement is likely to continue because not all of the costs are recoverable and changing the arrangement would require a re-investment in start-up costs.

This organization was described as very cohesive in Stone’s work (1989: 169).

Graham, Phillips and Maslove (1998) define “disentanglement” as a word “intended to characterize an assignment of responsibilities among governments more akin to the watertight compartment image of federalism, in which the functions and responsibilities of different levels of government are much more clearly separated” (Graham, Phillips, and Maslove, 1998: 173). Canadian municipalities became “entangled” in shared cost programs after the Depression and especially following WWII when “Canada’s social infrastructure was heavily influenced by federal roles in housing and social welfare and accompanying provincial initiatives, both in the social service sector and in the major push to provide the physical infrastructure to service rapid urban growth” (Magnusson, 1983: 24-25 in Graham, Phillips, and Maslove, 1998: 173).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that local autonomy is a complex concept that cannot be measured by formal provincial disengagement of municipal affairs alone. In fact, in the United States recent urban regime analyses point to the importance of state governments to regime policy successes (Burns, 2002, 2003). State Governors have been conceptualized as “regime partners” in some urban regimes. Given this, the way in which Canadian Premiers participate in urban governance is an empirical question and the way in which they influence on policy-making at the local level can take many forms. For instance, it is equally possible that provincial policy and agency could have the effect of enhancing rather than detracting from local agency.

For instance, Toronto Councillor Joe Mihevc’s believes that Toronto has several roles to play: first, they are facilitators – including everything from connecting immigrant organizations with one another, to connecting these organization to job training organization and school boards; second, they are funders of ethnocultural organizations and social services agencies that cater to ethnocultural needs in particular; third, they are advocates on behalf of immigrants to other levels of government; fourth, elected municipal officials have a role to play in terms of being present in the community and at ethnocultural events. In other words, they have a role to play in terms of making immigrants and ethno-racial minorities feel like they belong; fifth, municipalities have a role to play in terms of encouraging immigrant integration into the labour market and, more generally, in terms of economic development; finally, they have a role to play as service providers in terms of offering services in culturally appropriate ways. The executive directors interviewed for this study would agree with this list. One additional role that is mentioned by almost all immigrant advocates is the municipal role as employer (and as a promoter of employment equity).

While understanding the precise way in which immigration is framed in Brampton and Markham will require more research, it appear as though they both envision a limited role for municipalities in this area (albeit a much more limited role than in Toronto). As will be discussed later, the Mayors of these two municipalities are currently participating in a regional effort to assist immigrant integration into the economy. Parenthetically, one interesting difference in terms of “framing” between the City of Toronto and Markham that has become apparent is that while in Toronto, responsiveness to immigration is often
couched in “social justice” language, in Markham it is often justified in terms of the “effectiveness and efficiency of the corporation”.

26 For instance, an Elections Equity Coalition developed during the last municipal election campaign in Toronto in order to ensure that equity issues where on the agendas of the Mayoral candidates.

27 For example, one leader observed that if an East Indian were to run in a municipal election, Pakistanis would mobilize against the candidate. These findings suggest that the ethnic configurations within municipalities matter to policy responsiveness as the “social diversity perspective” developed by Rodney Hero (1998), student of state and local politics suggests. Similarly, it highlights the importance of both intra-group “social capital” and bridging social capital to policy outcomes as Orr found in his study of education reform in Baltimore – *Black Social Capital* (Orr, 1999).

28 The most prominent are the Chinese Federation of Markham, the African-Caribbean Association, and the Markham Federation of Filipino Canadians.

29 This is apparent upon comparative consideration of the reaction of these organizations to inflammatory comments made by former Deputy Mayor Carole Bell about the Chinese “taking over” in Markham. Her comments resulted in petitions and protests, the resignation of the Race Relations Committee and ultimately to convening a Task Force to look into the issue. As will be seen below, when similarly inappropriate comments were made in Mississauga, local immigrants leaders were unwilling to protest.

30 See Francis, Diane (2001).

31 For instance, Markham’s “race relations” committee had to be re-established after the committee disbanded itself after former Deputy Mayor Carole Bell made inflammatory remarks about the Chinese in Markham. Richmond’s equivalent committee - the Richmond Intercultural Advisory Committee- has been disbanded and twice to date (it is in its third incarnation).

32 As David Crombie (2004, personal interview) put it, Mel Lastman is not a “tenter”.

33 As Stone explains: “Social scientists are accustomed to an analytical framework where there is a clear distinction between independent and dependent variables… But policy and politics are related in more complex and less linear ways than this construct allows. The regime analysis I am employing offers a different dynamic. Politics in the form of the governing coalition shapes policy, and policy also shapes the regime. The reasoning here is not a simple reversal of the policy-causes-politics argument but rather that policy and politics are circular, each at various points causing and being caused by the other. In this view, causation is in part a matter of enacted change… Sometimes changes in policy come first; sometimes politics (the character of the governing coalition) forges policy. Either can have a profound impact – illustrating that the interplay of event and structure is a process of structuring” (1989: 164).

34 Bachelor and Jones (1993) developed the notion of “solution set” to express the regime maintenance function of policies. A “solution set” constitutes a dominant understanding of the nature of a policy problem and the types of solutions appropriate to such problems. The suggest that a great deal of policy-making occurs through “reasoning by analogy” where similar policies are adopted because current policy challenges are interpreted through the lens of past “solution sets” (Jones and Bachelor, 1993: 249).

35 The middle-range levels of responsiveness in the municipalities of Brampton and Markham, and of Peel and York Region might be explained by reference to more moderate values on all of the above “independent variables”. However, it is worth mentioning that based on the dynamics of policy change described above, the York Region’s Human Services Coalition which includes participation of members of over 10 sectors including business and the immigrant-serving sector could lead to an accelerated level of policy change in the that region.

36 The importance of leadership at all levels is also evident in the current sense of optimism that now pervades the City of Toronto’s civil service and Toronto’s community organizations. For instance, the manager of inter-governmental relations with the City of Toronto suggested that one might expect a lot of movement on issues of concern to cities. In his words, the “alignment of strategic intent” (the urban regime coalition to be discussed below) will be enhanced by what he described as an “alignment of the stars” (Abrahams, 2004, personal interview). More specifically, in addition to electing a new Mayor (David Miller) with a clear urban agenda in Toronto, both a more city-friendly Premier (Dalton McGuinty) and Prime Minister (Paul Martin) have been elected within less than a year of one another. For local actors in the GTA, this is widely seen as the opening of what John Kingdon (1995) refers to as a “policy window.” Kingdon (1995) defines “policy windows” as “the opportunities for action on given initiatives” (166). Ini his view, policy windows “open infrequently, and do not stay open long” and “major changes in public policy result from the appearance of these opportunities” (ibid).
For a more complete discussion of changes in the provincial policy context with the shift from Rae to Harris see Frisken and Wallace (2002).

In fact, “becoming a center of excellence in integrating immigrants” is a primary goal of the Toronto City Summit Alliance, an alliance that is actively seeking a “New Deal” for Toronto.

The goals of this movement are somewhat contested. See Heather Murray’s dissertation research for a more in-depth discussion of urban autonomy movements in Canada.

Others include, new fiscal deal for cities, shoring up Toronto’s physical infrastructure, reviving tourism in Toronto, creating a world-class leading research alliance, investing in people (through early childhood education, public education, and post-secondary education), strengthening the social and community infrastructure, and supporting the arts and culture industry. See the Toronto City Summit Alliance’s Enough Talk: An Action Plan for the Toronto Region, April, 2003.

This is quoted from an untitled, one-page summary of TRIEC’s mandate, structure and stakeholders given to me by someone at the Maytree Foundation.

The idea that in order to overcome the “free-rider problem”, either coercion or selective (individual) incentives are needed originates from Olson’s publication of The Logic of Collective Action (1965). As with the group politics literature that followed Olson’s influential work, in urban regime theory, the nature of the selective incentives differ according to the “regime” and have implications for the ease with which the regime is maintained. A steady flow of material selective incentives is generally considered the most conducive to both urban regime and organizational maintenance.

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