

Marx's Concept of Freedom as a Normative Foundation of Dialectic in *Capital*

Nakjung Kim (204-850-269) Political Science at York University

<Abstract>

I argue that it is not the case that Marx's dialectic and his way to describe the mechanism of capitalism are a scientific methodology aiming at discovering law-likeness in the social phenomena. Rather, as a social criticism, Marx's dialectic is based on a concept of freedom that is different from the utilitarian notion of it. Thus, his explanations of economic categories are critical judgments of social relations that were based on their ethical-normative premises and are open to empirical social research. For this, I will illuminate Marx's concept of freedom as a counterpart of liberalist definition of freedom. I will also argue that Marx's concept of freedom is an ethical foundation of the dialectic that he develops throughout his works.

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1. Introduction

In this paper, I will attempt to highlight Marx's concept of freedom that is an ethical foundation of his dialectic. This paper is divided into five parts. First of all, I explain Marx's first concept of freedom as individuals' collective use of rationality to reconcile individual freedom and public freedom. Next, I illuminate Marx's second concept of freedom as both an aesthetical appreciation of the result of labour and a normative reflection of the relations of the production. In the third part, I examine Marx's third concept of freedom as realization of all-round human and increase of disposable leisure time. In the fourth section, I clarify Marx's fourth concept of freedom as critical awareness of commodity fetishism and overcoming it. Finally, I argue that Marx's concepts of freedom listed above provide an ethical foundation of the dialectic used throughout his works.

It has been believed that Marx' usage of dialectic is purely as a methodology which allows him to explain the mechanism of capitalism. Many leftists and Marxists have adored his dialectic as a scientific social research program that can be applied to the disciplines of the humanities, social sciences and natural sciences as well. However, I argue that it is not the case that Marx's dialectic and his way to describe the mechanism of capitalism are a scientific methodology aiming at discovering law-likeness in the social phenomena. Rather, as a social criticism, Marx's dialectic is based on a concept of freedom that is different from the utilitarian notion of it. I also argue that his explanations

of economic categories that appeared in *Capital* are critical judgments of social relations that were based on their ethical-normative premises and are open to empirical reputation and social research program. For this, I will illuminate Marx's concept of freedom as a counterpart of liberalist definition of freedom. I will also argue that Marx's concept of freedom is an ethical foundation of the dialectic he develops throughout his works.

2. Marx's First Concept of Freedom.

Marx's concept of freedom as reconciliation between individual freedom and communal freedom: a positive transcendence of private property.

Before I illuminate Marx's concept of freedom, I will summarize liberalists' understanding of freedom. Then, I will explain how Marx criticizes liberalists' concept of freedom and its premise of human beings. In 1979, Milton Friedman claimed that we should remove "restrictions on our freedom" by government in order to fully realize the ideal of freedom.(Friedman, 1979, 61) Without considering the historical political context of England, he exactly repeats what Thomas Hobbes claimed 320 years ago as follows: liberty(freedom) means "the absence of external impediments that may take away part of a man's power to do what he would do." (Hobbes, 1651, 79) Friedman defines three types of economic freedom. First, an essential feature of economic freedom is "freedom to choose how to use our money and to decide the amount of expenditure and saving, and how to inherit our money to others." (Friedman, 1979, 56) His second concept of freedom is "freedom to exploit the resources we have in accordance with our own aims."(Friedman, 1979, 57). The third definition of freedom is to "freedom to own property" which is based on his characterization of individuals that they should be

members of “a free private enterprise society, as a capitalist society.” (Friedman, 1979, 56-58)

Friedman's definition of freedom corresponds to the neo-classical views of individual as “subjectively a preference ordering, and objectively an endowment of resources.”

(Albritton, 2002) However, it is less likely that they properly suggest a solution to solve the contradictions between the individuals' pursuit of the maximization of their own interests and the common good of a society. This concept of freedom characterized by Friedman and neo-classical economists is historically found in Bentham's premise that one's rational choice is based on one's selfishness can be compatible with the common wealth and harmonized with the interest of all under the provision of “the auspices of an all-shrewd providence.”(Marx, 1976, 280) In defending usury, he claims that human nature is selfish: “no man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view to his advantage, from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit.” (Bentham, Defense of Usury, 1787)

Marx objects to this classical political economists' understanding of freedom, because their concept of freedom, for him, mistakes the negative tendencies of human beings, their egoism, for their true essence. In addition, Marx claims that their approach to human nature is both totally ahistorical and excludes the social-political situation in which man shapes his true nature. Thus, he rejects classical political economists' assumption of human nature throughout his works. In *On The Jewish Question: Zur Judenfrage*, he says that the liberal concept of freedom is wrong because it regards a human being as “an

isolated monad” (MEW¹ 1, 364) that pursues his own private happiness while avoiding conflict with others. (MEW 1, 370) By criticizing this negative and abstract liberal understanding of human beings, Marx refuses the dualistic distinction between individuals as isolated atoms and a society as just arithmetic aggregate of parts. In addition, unlike Hobbes' presumption of the nature state of human beings, i.e., a war of all against all, Marx posits that human beings could build positive and co-operative relationships with others to live together as species-beings (*Gattungswesen*). Marx tries to justify this claim with aid of socio-anthropological understanding of human beings. He says that because “the individual is the social being, the expression of his life, thus, is an expression and statement of his social life.” (MEW 40, 538-9) For him, as human beings are essentially social beings, they can achieve their freedom by positively developing their concrete social relations.(MEW2, 138)

Second, Marx dismisses classical political economists' ahistorical explanation of freedom. He explains that bourgeois ideals such as freedom, equality, and property do not generate from the natural phenomenon common to all societies, but from the forms of economic life based on capitalistic modes of production. This capitalistic form of life premises two different types of commodity owners; “on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of substance, who are eager to valorize (*verwert*) the sum of values they have appropriated by buying the labor-powers of others; on the other hand, free workers, the sellers of their own labor-power, and the sellers of labor.” (Marx, 1976, 874) Within this setting of the labour market, ‘the free workers’ have double meanings; First, they are free, because they can dispose of their labor power as their own commodity:

¹ MEW = Marx Engels Werke published by Dietz Verlag Berlin 1975

Second, they are free, because they are free of all the objects needed for the realization of their labor power.

Thus, for Marx, the political economists' liberal concept of freedom means freedom to be a seller and a buyer of commodity called labor power. Because the principle of social interactions for them is “the selfishness, the gain and private interest of each,” (Marx, 1976, 280) they did not need to reflect on this utilitarian notion of freedom appeared in Friedman's three concepts of freedom. Accordingly, this isolated monad does only have interest in its own benefits and never concern about others while soaking itself “in the water of egotistical calculation.” (MEW 4,465) In particular, Marx criticizes liberal concept of freedom for its reductionistic- economic understanding of human beings. In reality, bourgeoisie as the buyer of labor power replaces personal dignity by exchange value, and “in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - FREE Trade.” (MEW 4, 464)

Moreover, Marx specifies the hypocrisy of liberal concept of freedom in *Capital*. By showing the fact that the use value of labor power produces surplus value added by the worker as well as the production of commodities, Marx claims that use value of labor power surpasses exchange value of it called the wage of workers. If the owner of labor power takes this difference between the use value of and the exchange value of labor power, it is against their original contract and so-called equal law of commodity exchange. (Marx, 1976, 343) But the free workers as sellers of their labor power have no choice but to enter into the market again and again in order to survive while capitalists strive for buying labor powers that will produce surplus value in order to make more

profits. Thus, Marx points out that “the capitalist process of production produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital-relations itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other hand the wage-laborer.” (Marx, 1976, 724) While classical political economists mention freedom of the contract between managers and workers, Marx points out inequality of that contract from the beginning under the labour market in capitalism. “The worker has no right to interfere in the division of social wealth into means of enjoyment for the non-worker and means of production.” (Marx, 1976, 760)

If it is obvious that there is difference between Marx and the classical political economists in terms of their understanding of human nature and the concept of freedom, how does Marx want to reconcile individual freedom and public general freedom? In *1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, Marx claims that political economists do not explain private property and the foundations of economic laws while regarding private property as the essence of human beings. Thus, Marx suggests that this private property system should be sublimated (*aufgehoben*) for the abolition of class antagonism. Marx says, “communism is the positive abolition of private property, of human self-alienation, and thus the real appropriation of human nature through and for man.” (MEW 40, 537) Under this communism, an egoistic independent individual can return to a social, really humane, being, because it can resolve the antagonism between man and man. Especially, in the *Critique of the Gotha Program*, Marx suggests that we should abolish the institution of the wage-labor as a slavery system. (Marx, 1994, 326) If we sweep away class antagonism and state as an oppressing apparatus of class dominance, we can secure “an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free

development of all.” (MEW 4, 482) This association guarantees reconciliation between an egoistic individual's pursuit of personal freedom and a society's public freedom.

In conclusion, Marx posits that the reconciliation between individual freedom and communal freedom can be accomplished through the abolition of private property on the one hand and the communistic regulation of production on the other hand. For this, “the process of material production should be managed by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned control.” (Marx, 1976, 173) Therefore, for Marx, the concept of freedom cannot be achieved through isolated man's calculation of his interests, but gained through the community where each individual has the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions. In comparison with classical economists' concept of freedom which consists in the maximal absence of restraints on the individuals' choices for increase of their interests well summarized Friedman's concepts of freedom, Marx's concept of freedom lies in individuals' collective use of rationality (reason) that can develop their concrete social relations as a proper sphere of realization of human freedom.

3. Freedom within the process of production: Labor and Freedom

I claim that Marx's second concept of freedom can be achieved through the improvement of workers' abilities to reflect on the products created by them in terms of aesthetical evaluation on the one hand, and on the social relations reproduced by them in terms of normative judgment on other hand. In *Hegel*, Charles Taylor interprets Marx's understanding of labour as an expressive model that regards human beings' production as self-creation, (Taylor, 1975, 548) whereas Juergen Habermas relates human beings'

labour with cognitive-instrumental reason without explaining the relationship between labour and normative elements within it. (Habermas, 1986, 81-82) But I argue that both narrowly interpret Marx's concept of labour while highlighting only one aspect of it. I posit that workers can achieve freedom by aesthetically appreciating their spirit (mind:*Geist*) in the result of their labour and at the same time critically reflecting on the consequences of social relations reproduced by their labours within production.

Before I explain Marx's second freedom as a capability of workers' reflection on the products and social relations, I will briefly compare Marx's understanding of labour with Smith's. Marx criticizes Adam Smith's economistic reductionistic understanding of labor in *Grundrisse*. Marx says that labor, for Smith, is a fundamental unit of measurement of a price paid for things and “a definite amount of labor” is “a sacrifice of the same quantitative magnitude.” (Marx, 1973, 610-612) For Adam Smith, labor is understood only as a measurement of a worker's wage. It is also an economic moment appearing as a natural spontaneous form of human exertion in the production process. In comparison with Smith's economistic interpretation of labor, Marx tries to find the philosophical implications of “the semi-artistic worker of the Middle Age” in the labor process. For Marx, labor is not a passive and negative, but “a liberating activity” as “self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom” through controlling all the forces of nature. Marx criticizes Adam Smith for his narrow one-sided understanding of labor as “an external forced labor” originated from slave-labor, serf-labor, and wage-labor.

Now I will explain Marx's second concept of freedom by clarifying how Marx relates freedom with workers' productive activities. Marx posits that human beings can achieve

freedom if they discover the world of their own spirit (*Geist*) in the final result of their productive activities. For him, productive activities become free only if human beings can discover their free and creative consciousness in the products they made. Marx argues that just as a potter appreciates a piece of china once he has finished making it, so workers can discover their thoughts, energies and emotions in the products. As human beings' production is a representation of their minds by pouring their physical and mental power into nature, according to him, workers' appreciation of their products includes their satisfaction, their dissatisfaction, and their reflection of them. It is needless to say that human's productive activities are open to improvement and rectification.

According to Marx, human's productive activities are processes by which they develop their senses and minds as well. Because human beings are capable of noticing the gap between the original purpose of their productive activities and the results of them, they would not just be satisfied with the result of their works. Rather, they try to fill the gap between their original intention of production and the products they made by devising new solutions to overcome the weakness of their past activities. For Marx, human beings' free activity means the self-development of their spiritual worlds and elaborating on sensitivity of their five senses by transcending their current faculties and their needs. Marx finds the main characteristic of human beings in this process of innovation of human spirit and five senses.

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Marx says that human's productive life not only aims at maintaining his biological existence, but also revealing his creative mental worlds in the result of his labor. If human beings must work in order to satisfy their direct physical needs, there is no difference between human productive activities and animals' production. Marx claims that animals can not separate themselves from their activities while human beings can decouple their activities from their beings. He claims that human beings' free will and consciousness allows them to set up and correct the ends of their activities.

However, Marx posits that alienated labor prevents workers from discovering their mental lives in the products by reducing their free conscious works into a means of their maintenance. He discovers that freedom as human beings' reflective appreciation of the products made by their free consciousness degenerates into animals' maintenance of their existence under the alienated labor in the capitalistic process of production. Free and conscious activity as the species-trait of human beings deteriorates into animals' repetitive activities to only meet the compulsion of direct physical needs. Thus alienated labor transforms human beings' free and self-directed activity into the level of animals'

existence and the species-life of human beings into a means of physical means. (MEW 42, XXIV) This alienated labor won't allow workers see their own reflections in the results of their free activity and forces them work to achieve a means for their existence. Therefore, in contrast with free productive activities, “the alienated labor degenerates the performance of work [*Verwirklichung der Arbeit*] into a vitiation of the worker[*Entwirklichung des Arbeiters*], transforms the objectification of workers' mind into a loss and servitude to the object, and deteriorates workers' self-appreciation and self-apprehension of the product into alienation.” (MEW 42, 512) In sum, the alienated labour will not allow the workers to think over the meaning of their production and the purpose of their activities.

Here I will explain the developmental process of Marx's explanation of the alienated labour from 1844 to 1867. While in 1844 Marx showed his philosophical diagnosis of alienated work within the process of work, he explained specific aspects of the alienated workers' life in the capitalist society throughout his later works. In the *Communist Manifesto*, he assertively claims that the bourgeoisie reduces personal indignity into exchange value as follows:

The bourgeoisie has set up that single, unconscionable freedom - Free Trade- in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms. In one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusions, it has substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation. (Marx, 1968, 38)

In *Capital*, Marx tries to explain the social conditions which tend to perpetuate the reverse relationship between the ends and means of the workers' mode of life in the

production. He specifies a process of the vitiation (loss) of workers in the process of production in capitalism. For Marx, the labour process is purposeful activity producing use-values fulfilling humans' desires and needs. Humans' performance of work changes nature into useful things through the metabolic interaction between humans and nature. (Marx, 1976, 290) Marx points out that this interaction between humans and nature, however, does not guarantee the workers' discovery of their spirit (*Geist*) in the products but separates workers' labor power from their condition of work under capitalist production. This is because free laborers do not own the means of production and have no choice but to sell their labor powers in the labor market to maintain their lives.

Marx explains the two main features of the labor process under the capitalist production. First, workers should work under the control of the capitalist to whom their labors belong. In other words, the capitalist manages the means of production, workers' labor power and the products made by them, while the workers are alienated from the condition of labor. Second, the results of the labor process are the property of the capitalists and not that of the worker. (Marx, 1976, 291-292) Under this capitalist process of labor, workers have no choice but to sell their labor powers and transform their own products into a means by which the capitalist can purchase them.

In *Capital*, Marx describes how workers continually reproduce their masters and the controllers of their labor in the capitalist process of production. Workers' labour under this capitalist system is not only a means of their existence, but also is a production of the conditions under which they are exploited. Worker's labor is not a self-creation of the world but a loss of themselves. Thus, workers paradoxically contribute to the destruction

of their mentality and the economic bondage of them as well through their labor process under the capitalist production. What Marx tries to emphasize the main characteristics of this capitalist production is that the alienated and exploited workers play a significant role in producing both material useful commodities and social conditions. He mentions this paradoxical phenomena as follows: “The capitalist process of production produces not only commodities, not only surplus-value, but it also produces and reproduces the capital-relation itself; on the one hand the capitalist, on the other hand the wage-laborer.” (Marx, 1976, 724)

Therefore, besides the concept of freedom as workers' appreciation of their spirit in the product and the labor process, we can infer another substantial concept of freedom from Marx's above explanation that workers can be free only if they are capable of abolishing the wage-labor system that forces them to sell their labour power to the owners of the means of production in the labour market. The question whether or not this abolition of the wage-labor is a necessary and sufficient condition for worker's discovery of their spirit in the product and labor process is still open. But it is obvious that the wage-labor system prevents workers from making their labor an autonomous and free activity in the labour process, because the wage-labour system forces workers to get back into the market again and again not as a director of production but as a seller of their labor powers and allows the capitalist to control the workers' labour power, its results and the means of production. Thus, in *Capital*, Marx's concept of freedom suggests that workers should critically reflect on the social relations and institutions such as wage-labour system, collectively participate in governing social wealth and socially own the means of production.

It is true that there is a gap between freedom as workers' discovery of their spirit in the product and productive activity, and substantial political freedom as an abolition of wage-labor. What if workers can not make their works into an autonomous and free activity, nor find their spirits in the product under a non-capitalist process of production even after the abolition of wage-labour? I argue that Marx tries to propose a determinate social condition under which workers can achieve freedom as their discovery of their spirit in the product and their enjoyment of their free activities in the labor process. The abolition of wage-labor can not absolutely guarantee the freedom defined by Marx in 1844, but provide workers with material social prerequisite to acquire it. Despite the gap between the aesthetical aspect of labour and the normative facet of labour, Marx combines the two by claiming that freedom can be realized if workers improve their aesthetical capabilities to appreciate the products created by them and also develop critical abilities to judge the social relations reproduced by them.

4. Marx' third concept of freedom outside “production: a realm of necessity”

Now I will clarify Marx's third concept of freedom outside the sphere of production. In *Capital III*, Marx distinguishes between “a realm of necessity” and “a true realm of freedom.” (Marx, 1981, 959) Marx says that freedom in the arena of material production can be achieved through freely associated producers' collective and rational control of nature with the minimum expenditure of human mental physical energy and the maximum satisfaction of human needs. This idea seems to in line with utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. However, Marx furthers his concept of freedom by transcending this

sphere of necessity of a basic condition of human civilization. He claims that genuine freedom can be acquired only in the condition in which we can develop human potentials as an end in itself.

For this, he suggests that we should reduce the working day. This reduction of labour time is a primary condition of the development of human powers. In *Grundrisse*, Marx claims that a nation can be truly wealthy when the working day is 6 rather than 12 hours. “Wealth is not command over surplus labor time(real wealth), but rather, disposable time outside that needed in direct production for every individual and the whole society.” (Marx, 1973, 706)

Hence, the criterion of measuring wealth is no longer labor time, but disposable time. He also believes that the reduction of the necessary labour of society can guarantee the artistic and scientific development of individuals. (Marx, 1973, 706) I argue that the argument that the development of human powers is an end in itself which Marx makes in *Capital* is one of Marx's fundamental ethical viewpoints in order to describe the specific loss of subjectivity while criticizing classical political economists' understanding of human beings under the process of the capitalist production. With this ethical postulation of realization of human potential in itself, Marx tries to reveal the pathological and contradictory aspects of the capitalist modern industry accelerated by the development of technology and the division of labour. Marx links the sacrifice of workers freed from feudalistic status with the development of technology and productivity under the capitalism. By revolutionizing the division of labor, modern capitalist industry makes workers and their labor powers superfluous while at the same

time forcing them to only work in the specialized area.

Now I show how Marx develops the concept of freedom as an actualization of “all-round man” from 1844 to 1867. Marx tries to explain the cause of the subjection of workers to the capitalistic process of production. In the *Philosophical-Economic Manuscript 1844*, he criticizes private property for its exclusion of developing other potentials in human beings. Marx also points out that the private property is not a sufficient condition for realizing human essence as a self-creative being and a whole man [*ein totaler Mensch*],(MEW 40, 539;MEW 42, 95) because it makes him obsessed with money and profit. He believes that humans can find diverse enjoyments not only in the possession of private property, but also in other activities actualizing various talents latent in them. But by developing human beings' potentials in a stupid and one-sided way, the private property reverses the relationship between ends and means of life. Because private property strives for increasing the magnitude of surplus value made by wagers under capitalism, it has nothing to do with the development of workers' physical and intellectual senses. Thus Marx thinks that the private property is an obstacle to completely emancipate all the human qualities and senses. (MEW 40, 539-541)

His emphasis on the education and development of workers' physical and intellectual senses draws from his understanding of history of human beings. He says, “the cultivation of the five senses is the work of all previous world history.”(MEW 40, 541-542) Once human beings satisfy their basic needs to sustain themselves, they should create and humanize their five senses in order to realize all the richness of human and natural being. Marx claims that private property is not a sufficient condition for the

development of our five senses, although it provides us with the necessary materials for the development of culture [*Bildung*], because it selectively and one-sidedly develops workers' capabilities in order to increase profits for the capitalist. (MEW40, 542) In addition, Marx points out that the political economists supporting the private property are entrapped in a superficial utilitarian point of view that regards the worker as a sheer animal whose needs are firmly limited to bodily needs. In contrast with this utilitarian understanding of human nature, he asserts that human beings can find out all-round aspects of themselves and use possible ways to actualize their potentials. Thus, for Marx, human beings are total (all-round) beings who cannot be reduced into a certain partial being. As a total being “a rich all-round and profound man should realize their abilities in the open book of human history by cultivating their five senses and their intellectual capacity. (MEW 40, 542)

Thus, for Marx, a true realm of freedom beyond the realm of necessity can be achieved through the cultivation of workers' five senses and intelligence, because as all-round beings they possess the will to realize their potentials by discovering diverse parts within themselves. Thus, a true emancipation of alienated workers under the process of capitalist production is an abolition of private property, because it tends to reduce workers as total humans into a machine to produce surplus value while being forced to function as a fixed part of the whole industry. In *Capital*, Marx furthers his philosophical abstract criticism of private property and the division of labor under the process of capitalist production. He shows how insecure workers are with the rapid development of technology and the differentiation of labor. He says that “the blindly destructive action of a natural law” (Marx, 1976, 618) of large-scale industry forces workers to learn the maximum number

of different kinds of labor. In other words, the rapid advance of the division of labor becomes “a general law of social production” under which workers strive for their survival in order not to be a member of industrial reserve. If this is so, how can we liberate ourselves from this inhumane destructive natural law of capitalism and in turn control it?

In *German Ideology* and *Marx, 1976*, Marx suggests that workers themselves should control the change and the division of labor accelerated by large-scale industry. This absolute government by the workers can prevent workers from being a victim of the changing requirement of capitalist exploitation. He believes that workers' autonomous control of the division of labor can allow them to cope with the changing requirement of labor. He claims that workers should not surrender themselves to the changing requirement of capitalist exploitation by heteronomously learning different types of work, because it would make them just an agent of society as a partially developed individual. Marx claims that workers' rational control of the differentiation of labor and the development of large-scale industry can guarantee the totally developed individual [*das total entwickelte Individuum*] that will take charge of different social functions in turn. (MEW 23, 512;MEW 42, 95) Thus, for Marx, the abolition of the division of labor enforced by the varying demand of capitalist exploitation can be accomplished through the workers' rational control of social production. If they rationally arrange social production, they would voluntarily cultivate various kinds of faculties required to acquire the goal of production. It should also allow the cultivation of various faculties of the workers.

Considering the concept of the totally developed individual, do we have to say that Marx only conceives that concept within the process of production? How can we cultivate humans' five senses and develop their faculties in a total way? Although Marx does not believe that leisure and productivity are not sufficient conditions in which humans can develop their potentials and cultivate their five senses (Marx, 1973, 711), he suggests that the increase of the leisure time can allow workers to produce and enjoy culture. (MEW 40, 478) Thus, free time is a necessary condition to achieve the concept of freedom as humans' appropriation of their all-round beings in an all-inclusive way. Under the capitalist division of labor, a worker is a hunter, a fisherman, a Shepard, or a critic, and must keep his/her one job if he/she does not want to lose his/her means of existence. In contrast with the above society, under the truly free society where humans should and can completely emancipate all the human characteristics and senses. (MEW 40, 541) Marx describes this free society as follows:

In communist society, where nobody has one exclusive realm of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. (German Ideology, 47)

For Marx, unlike Bentham, these various types of activity do not only aim at maximizing the net amount of pleasure human beings experienced. They attempt to realize the *telos* of human beings as all-round beings. Marx criticizes Bentham's utilitarianism for its economic reductionism. According to him, Benthamite utilitarianism is an attempt to

explain the principle of utility as only type of rationality (reason) that justifies preference for an alternative without further moral discriminations. (Miller, 1992,278-283) In *Capital*, Marx points out that Benthamite utilitarianism intermingles all the diverse relations of human beings into the one relation of utility. But Marx claims we should clarify the universal character of human nature and its specific historical features in order to apply the principle of utility to our judgment of all human acts, movements, and relations. (Marx, 1976, 758-759)

However, neglecting historical changeability of human nature, Bentham regards the principle of utility as a fixed eternal criterion by which to judge humans' activity. Contrary to Bentham's one principle of utility, Marx includes morality, cooperation, and expression of the subject in order to achieve freedom as an actualization of all-round human beings. Freedom as a cultivation [*Bildung*] of humans' five senses and an achievement of their ends of life [*telos*] can be acquired within the process of labor and outside it as well. However, Marx suggests that the necessary labor time should be reduced to the extent of guaranteeing increase of free disposable time to develop other aspects of human beings. Therefore, for Marx, the true realm of freedom, “the development of human powers as an end in itself” can be achieved through the absolute reduction of necessary labor time (i.e 8 hours) and the comparative increase of the disposable time needed in developing all-round aspects of the human beings.

5. Freedom as a positive transcendence [*Aufhebung*]of fetishism

I will explain Marx's fourth concept of freedom. Marx's concept of freedom lies in

workers' critical self-awareness of fetishism and reification originated from capitalistic production of commodity. Moreover, freedom can be achieved through the workers' practical positive transcendence of fetishism and reification. Just as Jesus reconciled the God with humans as the offspring of the God through accomplishing the reconciler (*Jesus*)'s death (*Versöhnungs-tod*), so do the alienated workers reconcile themselves with the products and social realities alienated from them through critically understanding the whole process of the reification and practically overcoming this self-contradiction. In the place of Jesus' sacrifice (*reconciler's death*), Marx puts the alienated workers' self-awareness of the reified social realities and their practical and autonomous management of the means and modes of production. For this, he asserts that the self-management of the material production can be accomplished by “the freely associated men's conscious and planned control of it”.(Marx, 1976, 173) However, Marx's ideal of “the freely associated men's conscious and planned control of the process of material production” now becomes an empirical topic of the real politics in terms of the possibility of its realization. Here, I only clarify Marx's suggestion of the preconditions of the achievement of this freedom.

For Marx, freedom can be achieved through critique of ideology. He believes that this critique of ideology makes clear not only the veiled interests behind theories, but also the false characteristics in current theories of reality. In order to be freed from the alienated labor, workers should theoretically know the origin of this ideology and practically overcome it. In other words, the alienated (exploited) workers should understand the whole process of alienation under the capitalism and apprehend the origin of fetishism. For Marx, these critiques are preconditions of the achievement of freedom. According to

him, human's work as an objective expression of one's free mind(*Geist*) degenerates into alienated labor under the capitalist process of production. Moreover, the workers under the capitalism continuously produce a reified social reality in which they reproduce themselves as a machine generating surplus value appropriated by capitalists. Marx points out paradoxical social phenomena that the products of humans' hands reversely dominates their original producers rather than are used in satisfying their various needs and subject them to the natural law-like market of labor independent from workers' voluntary will.

Thus, Marx believes that freedom can be achieved through the restoration of the workers into a master of the products of their labor. He suggests that the workers should understand how and why the products of their labor power could reversely dominate them in order to achieve freedom. In other words, they critically apprehend the reverse control of the offspring of the workers over its producers. For this, Marx tries to show the reverse relationship between master and slave under the capitalist process of production by critically examining the economic categories such as value, commodity, exchange, money, and capital and their relationships. When he explains two-fold aspects of the development of market, Marx pinpoints that the exchange of commodities transcends all the individual and regional constraints of the direct exchange of products and accelerates the differentiation of human labor. This expansion of the exchange of commodities begins to be beyond the control of the human agents. (Marx, 1976, 207)

In *Capital*, Marx elaborates on how “my free activity” transforms itself into “the alienated and inhumane power” with the fetishism of the commodity. (MEW 40, 554)

By positing the dual aspects of a commodity, as a contradictory combination of as a useful thing and as a value, on the one hand, Marx tries to clarify the opposition between use value and value in the commodity and, on the other hand, the process of animation of that commodity that is an origin of the inhumane (alienated) power. For Marx, the precondition of the commodity production is the social division of labor, not the other way round. In the process of the production of commodity for the exchange of it, human labor is split into two kinds; one is concrete useful labor that produces use-value of the commodity, the other is equal and abstract human labor that forms the value of the commodity. (Marx, 1976, 137) According to Marx, the commodity as a useful value is concrete, physical, visible, indivisible, plural, qualitative, whereas the commodity as a value is abstract, social, invisible, divisible, universal, and quantitative. Marx thinks that the mystical feature of the commodity does not originate from its use-value, nor the determinant of value, because they are easily palpable to us.

If this is so, why does Marx dub “commodity fetishism” as the enigmatic characteristic of the commodity? What's the relationship between the origin of inhumane power and this commodity fetishism? He thinks that the commodity fetishism originates from the exchangeability of it. Through the exchange, the social characteristics of human labor that makes the products of their labor socially and objectively universal becomes the social Nature-characteristics of these products. (MEW 23, 86) In result, the social relations of the products are in place of the social relations of the workers who created the products. With this substitution, the social relations of private producers do not appear as direct social relations between persons, but rather as thing-like relations of persons and social relations of things. (MEW 23, 87) By pointing out that classical political

economists regard this replacement as self-evident, Marx clarifies fetishism as follows:

What is also brought to fulfillment here is the fetishism peculiar to bourgeois economics, which transforms the social, economic character that things are stamped with in the process of social production into a natural character arising from the material nature of these things. (MEW 24, 228)

In other words, the origin of commodity fetishism comes with the process of differentiation of the initiative unity of value and use-value of a commodity. Thus, commodity fetishism is to be seen when exchange-value as an appearance form [*Erscheinungsform*] of value becomes independent and autonomous after the explosion of inner contradiction between value and use-value of the commodity. With the concept of commodity fetishism, Marx can explain how the inner-contradiction of the commodity as a complex of a useful thing and a thing having value explodes through the exchange and at the same time how the value character of the commodity becomes independent and autonomous from producers and reversely controls them. Because the workers under the production of commodity produce useful things for the purpose of exchanging them to realize the value of them, the will and motivation of the workers are subject to the labor-time determining the value of the products.

Thus, I claim that Marx's explanation of the origin of the fetishism of commodity is not just an objective description of the differentiation of value and use-value of the commodity, but also a criticism of the reduction of the social characteristics of human labor and human relationship into the objective nature-like characteristics. We can find ethical implication of his diagnosis of commodity fetishism inherent in the inner

contradiction of the commodity as a use-value and value in capitalistic market. In order not to be a slave of the law of value of the commodity, i.e., the labor time socially necessary to produce the products, but to be a master of it, Marx claims that the producers should be aware of the commodity fetishism and control the law of value. As he suggests, if “freely associated men consciously control the material production and the process of the exchange of products,” (Marx, 1976, 137) they can become masters of labour time not slave of them. If this is the case, the role of the labor time plays two roles as follows:

Its apportionment in accordance with a definite social plan maintains the correct proportion between the different functions of labor and the various needs of the associations. On the other hand, labor-time also serves as a measure of the part taken by each individual in the common labor, and of his share in the part of the total product destined for individual consumption. (Marx, 1976, 172)

If workers can control this labor time to satisfy people's needs rather than to increase the amount of the exchange value, they can achieve freedom.

In comparison with Marx's critical explanation of the commodity fetishism² originated from the inner conflict between use value and value embedded in the exchange of

² Marx also explains the fetishism of money as follows; “Consequently, it was solely the analysis of the prices of commodities which led to the determination of the magnitude of value, and solely the common expression of all commodities in money which led to the establishment of their character as values. It is however precisely this finished form of the world of commodities – the money form – which conceals the social character of private labor and the social relations between the individual workers, by making those relations appear as relations between objects, instead of revealing them plainly. (Marx, 1976, 168-9)

commodities in capitalism, classical political economists regard it as a fixed doctrine. Marx's main criticism of the political economists is that they regard the movement of social relations as that of the heavenly bodies in the universe in which people's power and their interactions are disappeared. Marx sees the extreme case of this fetishism in the "interest-bearing capital," (Marx, 1981, 968) because it can reproduce itself by extracting capital from its own independent sources. It means that "the interest-bearing capital" is independent from people, in other words, from the wageworker and capitalists' own labor as well. Marx finds this loss of subjects and their subjection to things they made in the process of "the personification of things and reification of the relations of production". (Marx, 1981, 969)

In sum, the origin of the inhumane power residing in capitalism is revealed in the process of explosion of inner contradiction of the commodity composed of use value and value. With the differentiation of the two elements of the commodity, exchange value as an appearance form of value becomes a third party independent from two. This process of the achievement of independence of exchange value entails the reification of human relations, because the social relations of human beings transforms into social relations of things in the exchange value. (MEW, 42, 91) Thus, we can call the generation of the process of loss of subjects that are subject to the law of value determined by labour time. From the viewpoints of workers, this differentiation of the two aspects of the commodity corresponds to workers' inner-conflicts with themselves. It also amounts to the split between labor as alienation and labor as self-creation. Thus, the achievement of freedom can be accomplished through the workers' critical insight into the commodity fetishism and their practical overcoming of it by rationally controlling the law of value originated

from it. This realization of freedom is a true reconciliation between labour as alienation and labour as self-creation.

6. The Characteristics of Marx's Dialectic Based on His Concept of Freedom and Conclusion.

I classified four types of Marx's concept of freedom as follows: freedom as reconciliation between individual freedom and communal freedom, freedom as aesthetical appreciation of the result of labour and normative reflection of the relations of the production, freedom as actualization of all-round human and increase of disposable time, and freedom as critical awareness of commodity fetishism and the overcoming of it. I argue that Marx's concepts of freedom listed above are ethical foundations of his methodology called dialectic throughout his works. Just as dialectic, for Hegel, is a being-mode of IDEA (*Idee*), as for Marx, is that of economic categories such as value, commodity, and money and capital. However, for him, these economic categories are not just descriptive terminologies, but rather Marx's ethical-normative judgments of the process of the transformation of them. Thus, his critical conceptual reconstruction of economic categories as the objects of explanation is based on Marx's concepts of freedom.

Now I explain the main features of Marx's dialectic that was established by the concept of freedom and at the same time will find new concept of freedom. Before I illuminate the characteristics of Marx's dialectic appeared in his works, I will briefly mention the relationship between Marx and Hegel. I claim that Marx obtains an insightful idea of a model of independence of IDEA (*Selbstaendigkeit der Idee*) from Hegel that is made

through the abstraction of concretes. With the aid of the model of independence of IDEA from concrete realities, and by examining the formal logical structure of the movement of particularization of the IDEA into reality, Marx applies it to his diagnosis of the origin of commodity fetishism and his criticism of the inverted relationship between the ends and means of production. I claim that there is a formal similarity between Hegel's model of independence of IDEA as a living, self-differentiating, and moving Absolute being (MEW 2, 61) and Marx's paradigm of independence of exchange value [*Selbstaendigkeit der Taschwertes*] from use-value that both are components of a commodity. In addition, the process of the particularization of the IDEA into the reality formally corresponds to the transformation process of value in *Capital*.

Marx says that Hegel is the first person who has explained a universal form of dialectical movement of IDEA as the principle of being in a comprehensive and conscious way. (MEW 23, 27) As well known, Marx claims that he stands Hegel's dialectic on its head. However, he tries to discover “the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (MEW, 23, 27) by learning Hegel's enquiry of the activities of the subjects while correcting his inverted relationship between the subject and the predicate. Hegel regards the process of thinking as an “independent and autonomous subject” under the name of IDEA (*IDEE*). For Hegel, it is “the creator of reality which only makes its external appearance”, while the IDEA itself, for Marx, is “the material converted and translated into human brain and mind.” (MEW 23, 27) Thus, Marx claims that the independent and autonomous subject is not the IDEA, but people and their purposeful activities that make a real world. However, when Marx describes the movements of social realities, concepts, and categories in *Capital*, he uses the method of presentation originated from Hegel's dialectic, because, he

thinks, it can reveal the trajectories of the moving subject's journey while differentiating itself into particulars.

It is believed that Hegel's dialectic composes three stages such as “an initial condition of immediate undifferentiated unity”, “a period of differentiation or separation, or the first negation,” and “the establishment of a higher differentiation of unity, or reconciliation, the negation of the negation.” (Smith,1992,89) When Marx explains the process of differentiation of the components of commodity composed of use-value and value, he also follows the method of Hegel's tripartite stages of the dialectical movement.³ The first step of the commodity is that use value and value are both initial components of the commodity. The second step of the differentiation of the commodity is that the inner contradiction of the commodity as a use-value and a value explodes to the extent that they stand against each other in the market. The third step of this differentiation of the commodity is that value takes a form of exchange-value in the market in which two commodities realize their values. This third stage is the achievement of derivation of exchange value and its independence from use-value.

In order to show the reason why Marx learns Hegel's method of dialectic, I will explain

³. In *Grundrisse*, in order to explain the relationship between value and exchange value, he mentions Hegel's dialectic as a constant negation of negation follows: “real value itself – independently of its rule over the oscillations of the market price – in turn negates itself and constantly posits the real value of commodities in contradiction with its own character, that it constantly depreciates or appreciates the real value of already produced commodities.” (MEW 42, 72-73)

two main features of Hegel's dialectic. First of all, for Hegel, dialectic means an autonomous self-criticism of the subject and the inner development of the subject and the object relations. It is through the tripartite stages of the subject's movement that the subject produces particular contents and results of it revealed in different aspects. Thus, Hegel says that dialectic does not mean just a method with which philosophers can explain the relationship between the subject and the object to find truth as correspondence of the two. Rather, for him, dialectic itself is a development of spiritual activity of the subject, because it produces a new aspect of itself by negating itself. (Hegel, 1821, 84) Therefore, for Hegel, dialectic is a life-mode of IDEA as a living, self-differentiating, and moving Absolute being.

Second, like Plato's negative way, Hegel's dialectic as a tripartite movement of transformation of the subject shares the common ground with skepticism, because it negates itself and transfers into its opposite standing against it. However, in comparison with skepticism, Hegel's dialectic aims at revealing genuine essences of the subject and inner necessary relations of particularized aspects of it. Thus, it can be called as a reflection that enables us to transcend the determination of the isolated subject while comprehending it. In other words, this reflection of the subject, for Hegel, is a circular movement of the subject's returning into itself that allows it to see other aspects of itself in the specific phases in which it, as a moving subject, particularizes itself in order to project its free will into the world. (Hegel, EN III 1830, 168-177)

I claim that Marx develops Hegel's dialectic as an epistemological self-reflection of the subject into a social criticism that enables us to reveal the relationship between the ruler

and the ruled under class society. While Hegel tries to show how the moving subject with free will feels completely at home in others, i.e., other aspects of the subject by experiencing inner-contradictions of it and particularizing itself in the specific real life (Hegel, 1807, 20), Marx tries to explain how capitalists and the classical economists of 19th century feel completely at home “in these estranged and irrational forms of capital-interest, land-rent, labour-wages.” (Marx, 1981, 969) In order to criticize the false belief of the economic trinity that capital produces profit, land ground-rent, and labour wages, Marx explains the entire inner connection of these categories by explicating the origins and transformation process of them. According to Marx, this economic trinity aims at perpetuating the self-interest of the ruling classes by concealing the real sources of income. (Marx, 1981, 969) As for the origin of national wealth, whereas Marx admits that political economists such as Smith and Ricardo discovered human labour as the resource of the national wealth and the substance of the value of commodity, he points out that they regarded private ownership of the means of production and laws supporting it as natural phenomenon like a movement of heavenly bodies in the sky.

In addition, Marx claims that classical political economists did not explain the structure of exploitation embedded in the capitalistic process of production, because they did not find the concept of surplus value originated from surplus labour that enables the process of M-C-M' producing the increment of over the original value in capitalism. As Marx regards the formation of surplus value as the transformation of money into capital, he tries to clarify the origin of money-form originated from the value-relation of commodity. (Marx, 1976, 139) Thus, the difference between Marx and the political economists lies in that Marx explains the inner connections of these economic categories such as value,

commodity, money and capital by tracing back to the process of the transformation of them. He does not reify these economic concepts, but explain social relations within them. Marx uses Hegel's dialectic, i.e., the tripartite stages of the particularizing (differentiating) subject in explaining the transformation of the economic categories such as value, commodity, money, and Marx, 1976n order to criticize the reification of the relationships of economic categories. Therefore, Marx's dialectic originated from Hegel's tripartite stages of the subject's movement of returning into itself and attempts to critically examine the cause of the reification of the relation of production.

Before I explain the main characteristics of Marx's dialectic based on the concept of freedom, I will summarize how Marx explain the process of the transformation of economic categories as social relations such as value, commodity and money to show their inner connections. Marx says that a commodity consists of use value originated from useful concrete labour on the one hand and value formed by equal, abstract and human labour on the other hand. In addition, Marx defines value known as “the objective expressions of homogeneous labour” or “an expenditure of human labour-power, i.e., human brains, muscles, nerves, hands etc., (Marx, 1976, 134) as follows: “all crystal of communal and social substance of the commodity is value, vale of commodity”⁴ (MEW 23, 52) The definition of value shows that it is not just a thing measurable by labour time, but a social relation.

How does Marx explain the movement of inner contradiction of the commodity? In the

⁴ Alles Kristalle dieser ihnen gemeinschaftlichen gesellschaftlichen Substanz sind sie Werte – Warenwerte. (MEW, 23, 52)

first stage of the dialectical movement of the commodity, it is an initial condition of immediate undifferentiated unity composed of use-value as a natural physical body and value as a social ideal body. In the second stage of dialectical movement of the commodity, as the first negation of the first stage, it enters into the process of exchange between commodities. According to Marx, this exchange differentiates the commodity into two elements, commodity and money. In the second stage of the dialectical movement of the commodity, its internal potential opposition between use-value and value inherent in it explodes to be an external opposition. The result of this external opposition makes two elements of the commodity as independent poles: on the one hand, commodity as use-value and the other hand, money as exchange-value. In the third stage of the dialectical movement of the commodity, exchange value of it becomes an independent and autonomous being. In this stage, the exchange value begins to make another types of relationship with use-value while keeping inner contradiction within itself as money.

Thus, Marx characterizes the main feature of the dialectical movement of the commodity as follows. The process of differentiation of the two poles of the commodity results in the becoming-independent-of-exchange-value [*Selbststaendigkeit des Taschwert*] from the use value of the commodity. Through the process of the differentiation of the commodity, exchange value defined as “the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value [*Erscheinungsform des Werts*]”(MEW 23, 53), manifests itself as something absolutely independent of the use-value of the commodity. This separation of exchange value form the use-value of the commodity paves a way for the change of the purpose of production. Having in mind the increase of the exchange value, an embryonic form of

money, producers would make useful things rather than satisfy people's needs in the production of the commodity under capitalism.

In addition, this phenomenon of the becoming-independent-of-exchange-value from the use value of the commodity entails a crisis of the realization of value of it in the market. Thus, Marx's critical explanation of the differentiation of the commodity as a useful thing and a value and the process of becoming independent of exchange value does not mean a neutral description of mechanical transformation of it, but aims at showing his ethical diagnosis of inverted purpose of the production under the capitalism. He says, “the power of money, i.e, the exchange relation establishes itself as a power external to and independent of the producers” (Marx, 1973, 146) by widening the gap between the commodity as use-value and the commodity as exchange value.⁵

Another characteristic of Marx's dialectic revealed in his presentation of the process of differentiation of the commodity lies in the distinction between phenomenon and essence. As I mentioned above, whereas Marx defines value as “all crystal of communal and social substance of the commodity is value, value of commodity” and exchange value as “the necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value [*Erscheinungsform des Werts*].”(MEW 23, 53) In addition, he calls the value of the commodity as its real exchange value determined by the labour time socially required to produce it. (MEW 42,

⁵ Marx uses this model of achieving the independence of exchange value from the commodity: *Selbstaendigung* model” in explaining fetishism of money and the transformation of value into capital. For Marx, money as the value-form of commodity on the one hand and the imaginary price-form on the other hand, should express the magnitude of its value only in the relationship with other commodities.

72) Marx also defines price as the exchange-value of the commodity expressed in money. For him, the price as nominal value is called as an accidental ratio between a single commodity as value form and a money-commodity external to it. The necessary relationship between the commodity (as value-form) and the money-commodity appears in the process of the transition from the magnitude of the value into the price. (MEW 23, 117) Thus, the price, as an accidental ratio between the commodity and the money-commodity moves through the value as a law of movement. (MEW 42, 73)

Why does Marx distinguish between phenomenon (*Erscheinung*: appearance) and essence (*Wesen*) when he explains the relationship between value and exchange value? He criticizes the vulgar economists for their worshiping of appearances [*Erscheinung*], because they did not analyze the relationship between the market price of commodity (or labour power) and its value, especially relationships among these economic categories. (Marx, 1976, 679) He also points out that “Ricardo and Smith equate exchange-value with cost-price or natural price” (Marx, 1976, 269), as they posit that “exchange value is formed by putting together the values of wages, profit and rent.” (Marx, 1976, 269) By separating essence from appearance, Marx tries to explain the inner connections among economic categories such as labour, value, exchange value, commodity, money, and price etc., The distinction between essence and appearance shows both identity and difference of the categories by revealing the process of transformation of one category into another. Because of this, for him, the concept of value measured by labour time is essence, whereas commodities and money is its form.

Besides his criticism of the vulgar economists' fusion between essence and appearance,

the distinction between them allows us to separate the origins of the economic categories from their derivatives. When he explains the relationship between the modern primary form of capital and merchants' capital (or interest-bearing capital), although the latter appears before the former, they are derivative forms of capital. (Marx, 1976, 267)

Exchange value is also a derivative form of value, because Marx says, "it is a necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value." (MEW 23, 52) However, it suddenly presents itself as a self-moving substance absolutely independent of the use-value of a commodity. Thus, Marx's distinction between essence and appearance does not guarantee the ontological priority of the former (e.g. value) over the latter (e.g. exchange value), but clearly reveals the process of differentiation between the two categories and how their relationship change.

Marx says that this process of extracting derivative forms from their original unity is a procedure of the explosion of the inner contradiction within it and at the same time the birth of reverse relationship between the two. By explaining how the exchange value of the commodity as a derivative form of value becomes an independent entity as a social relation reversely dominates the relationship between producers, Marx shows that his dialectic does not just neutrally describe the process of the transformation of one category into another after the explosion of the inner contradiction inherent in it, but also critically diagnoses the fetishism about commodity, money, and capital and the inverted relationship between end and means of production that deprived workers of their freedom.

Whereas Hegel's understanding of dialectic as a development of spiritual activity of the subject and a self-reflective activity seeking to find the first and ultimate principle of

universe aims at reaching the reconciliation of the spirit of subject estranged from itself and suffered from inner conflicts, Marx's dialectic is a probe to reveal the process of differentiation of the concept of value in *Capital* and explain its derivative forms attempts to show how the derivative forms of the value such as exchange value, money, and capital become independent from their original unity and reversely dominates their initial producers. Although Marx does not clearly state the ethical foundation of his dialectic, it is obvious that he has in mind the possibility that use value should and can control exchange value separated from it, when he critically points out that exchange in turn dominates the subject itself. In addition, Marx's dialectic based on his concepts of freedom will find new types of freedom.

7. Conclusion

Thus, Marx's dialectic as a conceptual reconstruction of the social realities is closely related to his ethical viewpoint of freedom. Marx's dialectic is aimed at revealing social contradictions while critically judging the process of transformation of the basic social-economic categories such as value, commodity, money, and capital etc., Like the hypothetical-deductive model in the philosophy of science, functionalism, system theory and the theory of evolution, Marx's dialectic also deals the structural differentiation of the system, especially that of economic categories. But it is different from them because it is based on the concepts of freedom that attempt to criticize reification (*Verdinglichung*) and the reverse relationship between means and ends happened in capitalistic process of production.

In addition, Marx's dialectical explanation of the process of the transformations of basic categories such as value, commodity, money and capital, etc., is different from the way in which biologists describe the differentiation of cells without projecting their purposeful intentionalities on to them, because Marx's dialectic deals the direction of human beings' purposeful activities and their ultimate goals. Moreover, it is different from functionalistic approaches to the systemic differentiation of parts within a whole.

Whereas, this functional approach attempts to describe the processes of the inclusion of subsystems under the whole-system in order to broaden its boundaries while continuously assimilating the elements of it, Marx's dialectic undertakes to find the causes of the crisis of the system and seeks to solve the problems generated from it.

Thus, in comparison with the above models of explanations of the differentiation of the parts within a whole, Marx's dialectic, which is based on the concept of freedom, will be used as a compass seeking to achieve other types of freedom. It is a history of the expressions of the moving subjects who set up the goals of their lives while preparing for the means by which to achieve them, and assess the results of their practices. In conclusion, I characterize Marx's dialectic based on his concept of freedom as a critical judgment of concepts and subjects' specific participation to social realities in order to achieve their goals. Marx's dialectic in turn allows us to find new types of freedom that can be acquired through people's conscious practice in specific historical political situations.

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