A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping

Michael Lipson
Department of Political Science
Concordia University
1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.
Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8
Tel. (514) 848-2424, ext. 2129
Fax (514) 848-4072
e-mail: mlipson@alcor.concordia.ca

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As the Cold War came to an end, UN peacekeeping changed dramatically. Traditional principles of peacekeeping were discarded, peacekeeping missions were deployed in the midst of ongoing civil conflicts, and the number of missions doubled in a few short years. Previous studies have explained this shift in terms of changes in the global distribution of power, the nature of post-Cold War security threats, norms and ideas, and organizational behavior within the UN. This paper treats the post-Cold War transformation of peacekeeping as an agenda-setting problem, and employs a garbage can model of organizational choice to explain how peacekeeping came to be considered, in the context of the UN Security Council’s agenda, an appropriate solution to problems for which it had previously been regarded as inappropriate, or not considered at all. The UN fits the defining criteria of an organized anarchy, to which the garbage can model can be expected to apply: unclear preferences, opaque organizational processes, and fluid participation. Drawing on Kingdon’s adaptation of the garbage can model, this paper explains changes in peacekeeping as the result of the linking by policy entrepreneurs of a solution stream (peacekeeping) to a problem stream (post-Cold War civil conflicts) in the context of a policy window created by the end of the Cold War.

I. Introduction

The period since the end of the Cold War has been a turbulent one for United Nations peacekeeping. As the Cold War came to an end, the UN Security Council rapidly and dramatically transformed the practice of UN peacekeeping. Between 1988 and 1995, the Security Council authorized 27 missions, compared to 13 in the preceding 40 years.¹ From fewer than 10,000 troops deployed in five missions in 1988, the number of personnel deployed in the field in peacekeeping missions peaked in 1994 at 77,783, with an annual cost of $3.6 billion as compared to $230 million six years earlier.²

* Author’s note: The author would like to thank Roland Paris, Nathan Funk, and Matthew Hoffman for comments on a previous draft, and Melanie Anestis for research assistance. The Centre d'études des politiques étrangères et de sécurité (CEPES) provided funds for research assistance. All errors, shortcomings, and omissions are the sole responsibility of the author.

² The 1994 personnel figure is from United Nations 1996, 4. This included several thousand civilian personnel. The 1988 cost figure is from Lewis 1996, 27. The 1988
were deployed to settings that were considered unsuited to peacekeeping under the recognized traditional principles of peacekeeping formulated during the Cold War. Accompanying these quantitative changes came a qualitative shift in the nature of peacekeeping: the development of "second generation" peacekeeping missions in which peacekeepers were sent to intrastate conflicts and the traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and limited use of force were stretched. These missions addressed intrastate, rather than interstate, conflicts, and involved significant nation-building activities in addition to the traditional truce observation role of peacekeepers.

High profile problems and failures in second generation missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda brought a crisis of confidence in UN peacekeeping and a period of

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personnel figure is from Hillen 1998. In just one year, 1992, peacekeeping deployments rose from 11,000 to more than 52,000. Goulding 1993, 451.

3 There are a number of different typologies and systems of classifying generations of peacekeeping. Doyle 2001 and Mingst and Karns 2000 identify three generations, though they define them differently and classify missions differently. Thakur and Schnabel identify six generations. I use the term second generation peacekeeping to encompass the entire spectrum of what others call multidimensional, second generation, and third generation peacekeeping operations. By second generation peacekeeping, I mean missions that, to a significant extent, undertake peace enforcement or peacebuilding activities in addition to traditional interposition and truce observation functions. For statements of principles of traditional peacekeeping, see Uruquart 1990, Goulding 1993. On different types and generations of of peacekeeping, see Mackinlay and Chopra 1992, Berdal 1993, Goulding 1993, Ratner 1995, Karns and Mingst 2000, Doyle 2001, Thakur and Schnabel 2001. A significant problem in distinguishing generations of peacekeeping is that early peacekeeping missions—ONUC and UNSF/UNTEA—performed peace enforcement and peacebuilding activities. However, as Daase (1999, 242-246) explains, these missions were regarded as failures not to be repeated, and thus are better viewed as aberrations within the first generation, not as establishing precedents for a new type of peacekeeping. See also Ratner 1995, 102-112. This paper considers Cold War missions in the Congo and West Irian as aberrations—deviations from traditional peacekeeping—rather than true second generation missions. An alternative perspective is to see them as early examples of a new form of peacekeeping that was not recognized until the early 1990s. See Ratner 1995, 110.
retrenchment in the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{4} By the late 1990s, however, a revival was underway, with new missions established in Kosovo, East Timor, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Liberia in the last five years. The UN has also authorized political and peacebuilding missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Ivory Coast since 2001. A peacekeeping mission to the Ivory Coast was established in April and a UN Mission takes over from the U.S.-led Multinational Interim Force in Haiti on June 1.\textsuperscript{5} The creation of new UN peace operations, and the continuation of existing ones, is likely in the coming years.

Existing research on second generation peacekeeping has focused on questions of effectiveness, to the neglect of explaining its origins. Yet the dramatic changes in peacekeeping practice that coincided with the end of the Cold War remain puzzling, and unsatisfactorily explained. And understanding how and why peacekeeping was transformed, with mixed results, in the past, is important to shaping its future. While existing studies routinely note a number of relevant factors, they do not identify causal mechanisms through which these factors produced second generation peacekeeping, or trace the process by which peacekeeping came to be placed on the Security Council’s agenda as a solution for problems previously considered not amenable to peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{6}

This is essentially a question about agenda setting, but has not been analyzed in terms of agenda setting models. A large literature in organization theory addresses

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{4} Paris 1997 ("Blue Helmet Blues"); Jett 1999.
\item \textsuperscript{5} UN News Service 2004; Hedges 2004; Wurst 2004.
\end{itemize}
agenda setting processes, and has been extensively applied to domestic decision-making, but only rarely been applied to multilateral settings. The UN is particularly amenable to models focusing on agenda setting and decision-making in “organized anarchies,” or settings characterized by uncertain preferences, unclear organizational processes, and fluid participation in decision-making, since these features accurately describe the UN. These so-called “garbage can” models explain organizational decision making under conditions of ambiguity as the result of the partially random coupling of independent streams of problems, policies, and politics. Problems are joined to policies, in such settings, as a result of their coming to the fore at the same time, rather than due to a rational calculation that the solution was an optimal response to a preexisting problem.

This paper proposes an analysis of peacekeeping-related agenda setting of the Security Council in the period 1988-1995 in terms of a modified garbage can model, hypothesizing that conditions at the end of the Cold War produced a “policy window” within which peacekeeping was coupled to the problem of intrastate conflict.

II. The Puzzle

Existing accounts of the development of second generation peacekeeping typically recite a list of factors that were permissive of or favorable to the deployment of missions into conditions not meeting the criteria for traditional peacekeeping. These

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7 For a review and critique of the literature, see Bendor, Moe, and Shotts 2001. For applications to multilateral settings, see Cherry 2000, Richardson 2001, Tomlin 2002.
9 1995 was selected as an end date in part both to limit the scope of the project, and because the key elements of the transformation of peacekeeping this paper seeks to explain were established in practice by 1995. Preliminary research suggests that the origins of traditional UN peacekeeping may be explained well by a garbage can model. I will address this in later iterations of this project.
include: the end of the Cold War; foreign policy shifts by both the Soviet Union and the United States; increased cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council (P-5); the effectiveness of Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar; the "ripeness" for settlement of superpower proxy wars; the increased willingness of Western states to assert a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of states; the rise in prominence on the international agenda of intrastate conflicts, success in early multifunctional missions in the waning years of the Cold War; and a "sense," or "mood," or "atmosphere" of optimism and enthusiasm for UN peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{10}

Typical explanations of the emergence of second generation peacekeeping are exemplified by the following passage in the UN's official review of peacekeeping, \textit{The Blue Helmets}:

\begin{quote}
The easing of the East-West confrontation enhanced cooperation in the Security Council and provided excellent opportunities to resolve long-standing conflicts. But the end of the Cold War also saw other conflicts erupt, giving rise to fierce claims of subnational identity based on ethnicity, religion, culture and language, which often resulted in armed conflict. Responding to the new political landscape, the international community turned to peace-keeping, which grew rapidly in size and scope.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{11}{United Nations 1996, 4.}
\end{footnotes}
But conventional accounts such as this one do not explain why the UN turned to peacekeeping, or elucidate the politics or decision-making process underlying the transformation of peacekeeping described. While the factors included in these rote listings were indeed permissive conditions, they do not explain the shift from traditional to second generation peacekeeping. Until not long before, peacekeeping had been considered an inappropriate solution to such conflicts. And alternative responses—ranging from doing nothing to full-scale military intervention—were possible. Thus, it is not enough to note the favorable conditions at the end of the Cold War as if they were sufficient explanation of the contemporaneous transformation of peacekeeping. This transformation requires further explanation.

A few scholars have attempted to go beyond the conventional listing of permissive conditions, and directly address the challenge of explaining the development of second generation peacekeeping. Michael Barnett has argued that the shift to second generation peacekeeping occurred due to a prior shift in elites' shared understandings of the relationship between sovereignty and international order: As the leaders of member states came to view internal order, or "empirical sovereignty," as necessary to international order, they changed their collective conception of the appropriate functions of peacekeeping. Peacekeeping came to be seen as an appropriate means of addressing internal conflicts that were now viewed as threatening to international order. Barnett's argument is framed in the English School's constructivist language of shared rules and norms of international society. Similarly, Roland Paris has argued that a change in global culture—the acceptance of liberal democracy as a standard of legitimate governance—led

to the development of post conflict peacebuilding as a form of UN peace operation.\textsuperscript{13} Global culture causes, as well as constrains, changes in the nature of peacekeeping.

While persuasive, these normative-ideational accounts omit the process or mechanism by which a shift in intersubjective understandings of order and legitimacy is transmitted to the conception and practice of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{14} A garbage can model supplements the constructivist/international society explanation by providing a process by which ideational change was converted to changed practices. Specifically, the end of the Cold War constituted a policy window in the context of which UN policy entrepreneurs coupled the solution of peacekeeping to the problem of intrastate conflict. This modifies Paris's and Barnett's accounts, however, by treating ideational change as a necessary but not sufficient cause, and the effects of the ideational change as highly

\textsuperscript{13} Paris 2003, 451; forthcoming, 34-37.

\textsuperscript{14} The garbage can provides a causal mechanism, missing in the normative-ideational explanation, by which ideational change produces second generation peacekeeping. Here, I take issue with Barnett's (1995) assertions (p. 91 and twice on p. 95) that post-Cold War changes in peacekeeping were a "direct" reflection or extension of changed understandings of the relationship between sovereignty and international order. The relationship was not direct, but operated through the bureaucratic apparatus of the UN and the politics of the Security Council. This interpretation is more consistent with Barnett's more recent work focusing on the UN's organizational culture and internal politics (e.g., Barnett 2002). The argument in Barnett 1995 lacks a specification of a causal mechanism. (The article employs the congruence procedure to support its argument.) The garbage can interpretation presented below complements normative-ideational accounts by providing a causal explanation. According to Goertz (2001), the garbage can model is an example of a particular type of causal explanation. Goertz argues that Kingdon's model, adapted below, is an example of a "necessary condition theory" characterized by "multiple necessary conditions that are jointly sufficient." Goertz (pp. 5-6) qualified this by defining sufficiency in probabilistic rather than deterministic terms. I adopt a conception of causal mechanisms based in scientific realism. See Yee 1996, Dessler 1989, 1991, Bennett 2003.
contingent on the serendipitous opening of a policy window and developments in other streams.\footnote{Paris (forthcoming, 17) discusses both "supply" and "demand" factors which were required for the development of peacebuilding. Thus, he does not claim that changes in global culture were sufficient to cause change in peacekeeping. However, he does not generalize this explanation. Casting it in terms of a garbage can model allows wider application of the basic model.}

Two pathbreaking studies have explained the transformation of peacekeeping in non-ideational terms.\footnote{Fosdick 1997, Daase 1999. See also Fosdick "Using Organization Theory..." and "Conflict Management Learning?"} These analyses explain second generation peacekeeping as the byproduct of a series of individual decisions on missions and mandates that produced unintended consequences. By conceptualizing the development of second generation peacekeeping as a product of incremental decision-making, however, these studies neglect the role of agenda-setting in the process by which the international conditions of the late 1980s and early 1990s produced the decisions that established second generation missions.

Anna Fosdick proposes four models drawn from the organization theory literature.\footnote{Fosdick 1997, 1999 ("Using Organization Theory..."). Fosdick treats the four models as complementary, at least in terms of generating policy recommendations. However, they emphasize very different factors and causal relations, and their combination does not generate a single coherent explanation of peacekeeping change. Her cognitive ambiguity and bounded pragmatism models emphasize the unintended and incremental nature of the change, while the latter two models portray the expansion of peacekeeping as more rational.} Her four models—cognitive ambiguity, bounded pragmatism, organizational expansion, and political interests—highlight different factors suggested by alternative strands of organization theory. However, Fosdick treats the development of second generation peacekeeping as a decision or series of decisions, rather than a consequence of agenda change. The analysis presented here treats agenda change—the placement of
peacekeeping as a possible solution to intrastate conflict on the Security Council's agenda—as prior to peacekeeping decision making.

Christopher Daase treats peacekeeping as a "spontaneous institution," or "convention" arising as an unintended consequence of individual actions. He proposes an "invisible hand" theory of spontaneous institutions to explain its origin and evolution. The theory distinguishes two stages in the evolution of conventions: individual actions motivated by reasons, and the aggregation of these actions into rules that produce outcomes that may not have been intended by the actors or conform to the reasons motivating their actions. While a full explication of its logic is precluded here due to space limitations, spontaneous institutions theory "conceptualizes institutional change as the incremental transformation of conventions through continuous marginal adjustments of practice and explains it as the cumulative causal consequence of many separate functional decisions by political actors." Actions that deviate from the rules of a convention may or may not feed back into the convention to change the rules, depending on processes of positive and negative selection that lead to some deviations being treated as violations and others as extensions of the prior rules.

Daase argues that the end of the Cold War created a "zone of uncertainty," within which states adapted the ready-made framework of peacekeeping to new circumstances. These adaptations — involving peacekeeping in states' domestic affairs and in enforcement actions—produced an unintended transformation of the basic convention of peacekeeping. The trend towards regional subcontracting further modified peacekeeping's

\[\text{Daase 1999. This explanation bears a close resemblance to Fosdick's bounded pragmatism model.}\]
\[\text{Daase 1999, 251.}\]
institutional form. Spontaneous institutions theory explains the institutionalization of these changes in the nature of peacekeeping as an unintended consequence of actions that diverged from the convention, and produced a redefinition of the rules constituting peacekeeping.

In explaining the process by which actions divergent from the existing convention were taken in the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, Daase falls back on the conventional recitation of supply and demand factors: P-5 cooperation, optimism regarding the UN's role, and the salience of regional and intrastate conflicts.\(^2\) He does not trace the process by which such factors produced the series of decisions that incrementally transformed the convention of peacekeeping. Thus, he misses an important part of the story by neglecting the process by which peacekeeping was coupled to intrastate conflict on the Security Council's agenda.

All of these analyses omit organizational agenda change as a variable intervening between the international conditions they highlight causes—the end of the Cold War, ideational change, increased uncertainty, etc.—and the transformation of peacekeeping they attribute to those conditions. Thus, the literature on peacekeeping typically explains the post-Cold War transformation of peacekeeping inadequately, merely listing factors that permitted or encouraged the use of peacekeeping in situations unsuited to traditional peacekeeping, without addressing the relative causal significance of those factors or specifying the mechanism or mechanisms by which these factors brought about the change. The few studies, discussed above, that squarely address the puzzle of explaining

\(^2\) Daase 1999, 252.
the emergence of second generation peacekeeping do not fully solve the puzzle, and may be complemented by a garbage can model. We now turn to this model.

III. Garbage Cans and Multiple Streams

A. The Original Model

The garbage can model of organizational choice (GCM), originally proposed by Cohen, March, and Olsen, has been highly influential in organization theory and, through its adaptation by John Kingdon, in public policy studies. Cohen, March, and Olsen proposed the garbage can model to elucidate processes of decision-making in what they termed "organized anarchies," which are defined by three characteristics: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. "Problematic preferences" refers to ambiguity regarding problems and goals. Organizational actors may be uncertain as to both the nature of problems they face and what they hope to accomplish; they may, in fact, discover their preferences through acting, rather than acting to achieve their preferences. This inverts rationalist models of decision-making.

In organizations with unclear technology, organizational members are uncertain of the rules, structures, and processes by which decisions are made. The term technology refers here, following standard usage in the organization theory literature, not to

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21 Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972. In the 1972 article, Cohen, March, and Olsen present both a verbal model and a formal model in the form of a FORTRAN program. This paper relies on the verbal model. Bendor, Moe, and Shotts 2001 argued that the verbal and computer models are incompatible, and that many of the properties associated with the garbage can model are artifacts of the computer model. In a reply, Olsen (2001) argued that Bendor, Moe, and Shotts misconstrued the model. Zahariadis (2003, 126-151) develops an alternative computer model, taking into account some of Bendor, Moe, and Shotts' criticisms.

22 Ambiguity is distinguished from uncertainty in not being resolved by additional information. Zahariadis 2003, 3.
technological artifacts but rather to organizational processes and methods.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, in organized anarchies, organizational members do not fully understand the workings of their organization.

Finally, fluid participation means that different actors are involved in different decisions, or in the same decision at different times. This arises through turnover, happenstance, and organizational rules that introduce changes in participation, and makes the organization's boundaries variable. The mix of participants interacts with problematic preferences and unclear technology to produce distinctive patterns of decision-making.

The GCM conceives of decision-making in organized anarchies in terms of independent streams of problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities.\textsuperscript{24} In contrast to rational choice theory, in which solutions are chosen for their optimally efficient resolution of preexisting problems, garbage can theory sees problems and streams as, for the most part, independent. "Solutions," or inherently preferred policies, may exist prior to any problem, and advocates of particular solutions will seek to attach them to any problem and choice opportunity that promises to serve as a vehicle for the policy's adoption. The linking of problems and solutions is determined more by "temporal sorting"--in which problems and solutions that arise at the same time become linked in choice opportunities--than by rational fitting of solutions to problems.

The model's name derives from an awkward metaphor. As Cohen, March, and Olsen put it:

\textsuperscript{23} Hatch 1997, 127-160.

\textsuperscript{24} This claim has stimulated significant controversy. Mucciaroni (1992) and Bendor, Moe, and Shotts argue that the streams are, in fact, interdependent. Olsen (2001) replies that stream independence is an assumption in the "pure" garbage can model but is loosened elsewhere. Kingdon (1995, 222-230) concedes that the streams are loosely coupled rather than wholly independent.
To understand processes within organizations, one can view a choice opportunity as a garbage can into which various kinds of problems and solutions are dumped by participants as they are generated. The mix of garbage in a single can depends on the mix of cans available, on the labels attached to the alternative cans, on what garbage is currently being produced, and on the speed with which garbage is collected and removed from the scene.\textsuperscript{25}

Cohen, March, and Olsen originally applied the model to explain decision making in universities. However, it was subsequently applied to public schools, military operations, and government agencies.\textsuperscript{26} The model has received the widest attention, however, through its adaptation by John Kingdon.

**B. Kingdon's Policy Streams Model**

John Kingdon has modified and popularized the garbage can model through his multiple streams model of agenda-setting.\textsuperscript{27} His book, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* is a classic in the field, and received the most votes as top policy piece of all time in a 2001 ranking by the Public Policy Section of the American Political Science Association.\textsuperscript{28} In fact, the garbage can model is sometimes attributed to Kingdon rather than Cohen, March, and Olsen.

Kingdon modified the original garbage can model in three significant ways. First, he reduced the four streams (problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities) to three: problems, policies, and politics. Kingdon's politics stream incorporates the participants and choice opportunities streams of the original. Second, Kingdon added the

\textsuperscript{25} Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972, 2.
\textsuperscript{26} Sproull et al. 1978; March and Olsen 1979; March and Weissinger-Baylon 1986.
\textsuperscript{28} Shoup 2001. The second edition received the second highest number of votes as top policy related work (books and articles) in the last ten years.
concepts of policy windows and policy entrepreneurs. Kingdon's model seeks to explain change in policy agendas, rather than organizational choice more broadly. According to Kingdon, agenda change occurs only when the opportunity arises with the opening of a policy window, an infrequent and fleeting opportunity to connect problems and solutions and move them onto the government's agenda for decision. Kingdon defined policy windows variously as "an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems," and as "opportunities for action of given initiatives."²⁹ Policy windows may open due to regular events, such as a budget deadline or election, or due to irregular occurrences such as crises or major shifts in political power. Kingdon describes two categories of policy windows; problem windows and political windows. The former result from problems that arise exogenously to the political stream and demand a policy response. The latter occur due to political events: changes of government, shifts in the "national mood," and the rise and fall of political fortunes.

Open policy windows do not automatically bring policy change, however. "Policy entrepreneurs" play a critical role in "coupling" problems and solutions during such windows of opportunity. If policy entrepreneurs do not take advantage of the opportunity, it will pass. Even if policy entrepreneurs are present and act promptly, their efforts may fail. Though a window may arise due to a particular problem or event, when windows open they become focal points for the efforts of many policy entrepreneurs seeking to advance solutions and address problems that may be little or not at all related to the proximate cause of the particular window. Kingdon explains that "More solutions are

available than windows to handle them. So when a window does open, solutions flock to it.\textsuperscript{30} This produces "overloading," which can result in failure of all proposals, or selection of some for attention while others are ignored or abandoned.\textsuperscript{31}

Finally, Kingdon added an evolutionary component to the model by reformulating the solution, or policy, stream. In Kingdon's version, the policy stream corresponds to a "policy primeval soup."\textsuperscript{32} Within this soup, policy alternatives originate, mutate, and recombine into new forms. Kingdon sees mutation and recombination of existing policies, rather than the generation of entirely new policies, as the main processes by which new policy alternatives develop. Policy communities select alternatives from the soup according to criteria of technical feasibility, consistency with the policy community's values, and judgments of what is acceptable in the larger political system.\textsuperscript{33} Kingdon's reformulation of the four streams into three, his evolutionary conception of the policy stream, and the addition of the concepts of policy windows and policy entrepreneurs constitutes a significant modification of the original garbage can model.

**C. Zahariadis's Extensions of the Model**

Most recently, Nikolaos Zahariadis has further modified the garbage can model and widened its application.\textsuperscript{34} Zahariadis, basing his work on Kingdon's model, extends what he calls the "multiple streams" approach, using it in a comparative study of policy-

\textsuperscript{30} Kingdon 1984, 185
\textsuperscript{31} This may help explain the overloading of UN peacekeeping in the early 1990s.
\textsuperscript{32} Kingdon 1984, pp. 21, 122-151. The nature of the correspondence is unclear; is the soup in the policy stream, or vice versa, or are they coterminous?
\textsuperscript{33} Kingdon 1984, 138-146.
\textsuperscript{34} Zahariadis 1999, 2003.
making in different countries, in domestic and foreign policy, and across the entire policy process. To accommodate a focus on policy-making in parliamentary democracies rather than Kingdon's focus on U.S. federal politics, Zahariadis redefined the political stream in terms of governing party ideology rather than Kingdon's combination of "national mood," pressure groups, and turnover in office. This adaptation makes sense in centralized political systems, but not for an analysis of UN peacekeeping decision making.

D. Adapting the Garbage Can to International Organizations

The garbage can model has received limited application to foreign policy and to decision making in multilateral settings. However, studies of garbage can processes have for the most part focused on national and subnational phenomena. But there is no reason that organized anarchies should be limited to organizations at these levels. The analysis of garbage can processes in international organizations, however, requires adjustment to the model. The politics stream, which has been operationalized in ways specific to national politics by Kingdon and Zahariadis, has to be defined differently in a multilateral setting. For the context of US federal government policy-making, Kingdon describes the politics stream as consisting of three elements: national mood, pressure groups, and turnover. Zahariadis reformulates it in terms of governing party ideology.

36 For applications to foreign policy making, see Tomlin 1998 and Zahariadis 2003, 87-125. March and Beissinger-Waylon apply the model to military operations. Tomlin 2002 explains multilateral negotiations regarding the Inter-American Democratic Charter in terms of a garbage can process. Olsen 2001 suggest an application to the European Union. Richardson 2001, and to a limited extent Pollack 1997, present such an applications.
Both of these conceptions are inappropriate in the context of UN peacekeeping. Instead, I conceptualize the politics stream as consisting of actors, interests, and ideas at three levels: (1) the multilateral setting; (2) politics within UN member states (i.e., support or hostility toward UN peacekeeping, and willingness to pay dues); and (3) politics and organizational culture within the UN.

IV. A Garbage Can Model of UN Peacekeeping

A. The UN as Organized Anarchy

The United Nations is an organized anarchy. The organization is characterized by all three of the defining characteristics of organized anarchy: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Therefore, the garbage can model should have some relevance to explaining decision-making within the United Nations. This section presents a plausibility probe of the development of second generation peacekeeping through the establishment of a series of new peacekeeping missions in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Only a preliminary account of a garbage can explanation of the development of second generation peacekeeping can be presented here. There was never a discrete decision to create a new generation of peacekeeping. Rather, the new practices of peacekeeping were developed on an ad hoc basis through the planning of individual missions, changing the nature of peacekeeping incrementally over time. Therefore, a

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37 Although I do not defend the point here, I would contend that the UN—due to its essentially "open system" nature—exemplifies these characteristics to a greater extent than most other bureaucracies, and should thereby be particularly likely to display garbage can processes. On open systems, see Scott 1998.
study of the development of second generation peacekeeping must proceed through
analysis of individual missions. Space and time precludes a comprehensive analysis of all
27 missions established between 1988 and 1995. However, this section will provide a
general overview of the development of second generation peacekeeping in this period,
through the lens of the garbage can model.

1. Problematic Preferences

The United Nations is not a unitary rational actor. Even if we focus on the core
bodies of the UN, rather than the United Nations system, it is still a set of more or less
loosely coupled elements. To the extent that it makes sense to talk of elements such as the
Security Council, General Assembly, and Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC)
having preferences, these preferences are primarily a function of the preferences of UN
member states. Differences in member-states' preferences render the identification and
existence of collective UN preferences problematic. Further, the preferences of the
Secretariat, or its constituent elements, are influenced by member states, but are also a
function of the Secretariat's organizational culture. Preferences vary across different UN
bodies. Even within a single UN body, such as the Security Council, ambiguity regarding
problem definition or conceptions of policies may inhibit actors' ability to determine their
own preferences. Thus, the UN is characterized by problematic preferences along several
dimensions.

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2. Unclear Technology

The United Nations is similarly characterized by unclear technology. This is captured by the observation of a political advisor at the U.S. Mission to the UN that "although it was possible to sit down with paper and pen and draw a coherent organizational chart, what was reproduced on paper bore little resemblance to practice, which itself was an ever-changing reality." The persistent problem of delineating and distinguishing the responsibilities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA) illustrates the ambiguity in the Secretariat's functions. Expressions of bewilderment at the UN's byzantine procedures from high-level UN officials clearly demonstrate the extent of uncertainty about the UN's procedures by its own personnel. Former Under Secretary General Marrack Goulding recounts that, when he was transferred by Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali to the Department of Political Affairs, his lack of familiarity with procedural intricacies was a handicap:

Arguments with my colleagues in the administrative offices revealed that they could draw on an inexhaustible armoury of rules, regulations and resolutions to shoot down an unwanted proposal from a 'programme manager'. In an attempt to level the battlefield, I asked for a day's briefing on the Organization's administrative, financial, and personnel procedures. Though repeated frequently, the request was never met. A couple of years later, I complained about this to an Argentine friend, Luis María Gómez, a wise and cynical operator who had become acting head of administration. "But my dear Goulding," he said, "what on earth caused you to think that they would let you into their secrets?"

While this quote nicely illustrates the strategic use of information asymmetry in a principal-agent relationship, it also indicates the lack of clarity among UN personnel

39 Barnett 2002, 32.
regarding the organization's procedural technology. In the same vein, Boutros-Ghali notes that when he met senior U.S. diplomatic officials shortly after taking office as Secretary General, the Americans "were far more familiar than I with the intricate mechanisms of the United Nations." And Mats Berdal has observed of UN peacekeeping that “the management of UN field operations continues to rely on improvisation, ad hoc arrangements, and ‘close working relationships’ among members of the Secretariat and between officers and civilian personnel in the field.” Thus, the organizational "technology" of UN decision-making is largely opaque to UN personnel.

3. Fluid Participation

Decision-making regarding UN peacekeeping is also characterized by fluid participation. This was particularly the case during the 1988-1995 period in question. Fluid participation is, of course, institutionalized in the system of rotation of non-permanent members of the Security Council. But there are many other sources of changes in who is involved in peacekeeping decisions. The organizational apparatus of the Secretariat has been changed several times, for instance by the folding of the Office for Special Political Affairs into the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the creation of a Department of Political Affairs, and the creation and subsequent dismantling of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs. Such restructuring has continued through the

43 Berdal 1995, 182.
44 This can be exacerbated by the involvement of member-state governments, with their own relatively more or less clear decision-making technology. For example, troop contributor decisions may be dependent on the bureaucratic autonomy of foreign ministries. Zisk 2000.
implementation of the influential August 2000 Brahimi Report on peace operations
reform.\textsuperscript{46}

Personnel change also takes place in the Office of the Secretary General as one
Secretary General is replaced by another, and appoints new officials below him.
Decision-makers are shifted within the Secretariat. And changes in national governments,
or cabinet shakeups, produce new permanent representatives to the UN, and new faces in
the Security Council and in other UN bodies, such as the General Assembly's Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. In addition to changes of government, there are
occasionally changes such as the replacement of the Soviet Union on the Security
Council with the Russian Federation.

As peacekeeping expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, countries that had not
previously participated in peacekeeping—both major powers and developing countries--
became troop contributors, introducing a further set of participants into the mix. As the
particular mix of contributing states varies from mission to mission, participation
becomes even more fluid. The involvement of regional organizations, such as NATO in
the former Yugoslavia and ECOWAS in Liberia, introduces another layer of complexity,
and NGOs yet another. The coming and going of different actors throughout the decision
process, and during planning and implementation, is one of the problems that
arrangements such as Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs), humanitarian operations
centers (HOCs) and Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) have been developed to
address.

\textsuperscript{46} United Nations, \textit{Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations} A/55/305-
4. Ambiguity

In organized anarchies such as the UN, organizational choice takes place under conditions of ambiguity, in which alternative interpretations or perspectives on the situation are available, and actors are unable to choose. Zahariadis distinguishes ambiguity from uncertainty because additional information may reduce uncertainty but does not resolve ambiguity.\footnote{Zahariadis 2002, 3.} Ambiguity arises from (and in some formulations in the literature, seems nearly synonymous with) the defining characteristics of an organized anarchies—problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation.\footnote{See March and Weissinger-Baylon 1986, 1; March and Olsen 1979, 12.} Ambiguity short-circuits the operation of comprehensive rational decision-making. Instead, decisions are determined by the temporal sorting of the streams, and the attention of decision-makers, itself determined by contextual factors.\footnote{Zahariadis 2002, 4-5.}

Peacekeeping-related decision-making in the Security Council, Secretariat, and member-states during the period 1988-1995 was strongly characterized by ambiguity. There was widespread uncertainty (or rather, respecting Zahariadis's distinction between ambiguity and uncertainty, incertitude) regarding the nature and sources of proliferating interstate, ethnic, and civil conflicts, the nature of post-Cold War order, the role of the United Nations, and the implications for peacekeeping.

B. The End of the Cold War as a Policy Window

The thawing of the Cold War is almost universally described as the primary factor making possible the shifts in peacekeeping practice that occurred at the end of the 1980s,
and is sometimes portrayed as their direct cause. As a dramatic development that opened up previously foreclosed policy options, a clearer example of a policy window is hard to imagine. However, designating the end of the Cold War as either a problem or political window, according to Kingdon's discussion of the two types, is a more difficult proposition. It was, in different ways, both. The shift in superpower relations, and increase in cooperation among the P-5, was a dramatic turn in the politics stream, and created a political window. The shift highlighted by Barnett in intersubjective understandings of the relationship between sovereignty (juridical and empirical) and international order can be interpreted as another political window. However, the increased visibility of ethnic and tribal conflicts in the early post-Cold War period also opened a problem window through which the solution of peacekeeping was linked to the problem of intrastate conflict.

Operationalizing the policy windows metaphor quickly becomes problematic, indicating that the conception of policy windows may require further specification. For instance, can there be multiple, related windows simultaneously? Are the power/polarity and ideational aspects of the end of the Cold War different "panes" in the same window? Are there policy "storm windows"—two layers of window that can open and close independently? Also, Kingdon writes that the opening of windows "usually comes about in response to developments in the problems and political streams, not in the policy stream." The word "usually" suggests the possibility of unusual windows opening in the policy stream, however this is not pursued. Kingdon goes on to describe "the two categories of windows—problem and political windows—[which] call for different

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51 Kingdon 1984, 182.
borrowings from the policy stream." However, Tomlin argues that the Inter-American Democratic Charter was facilitated by the "opening of a window in the policy stream." Kingdon's discussion portrays windows as opening in response to developments in the streams: Streams open windows. However, Zahariadis portrays windows as opening in either the problem or solution stream as opposed to in response to developments in the streams. (He also argues that windows that open in the problem stream are associated with a more rational matching of appropriate solutions to prior problems, while political windows are associated with inherently preferred solutions chasing problems which can serve as rationales for the policy, or what Zahariadis terms an "ideological" decision process.) The policy windows metaphor is vague regarding whether the streams are joined by policy entrepreneurs and then fed through the windows, or whether windows open in the streams and coupled policies and problems are then fed through. Another interpretation is to see windows as temporal phenomena: Streams are coupled during windows of opportunity. However, these alternatives produce very different visualizations of the process, and different implicit causal or process models.

Regardless of how it is conceived, however, the end of the Cold War was a clear—and large—policy window. A garbage can model sees the application of expanded peacekeeping practices to interstate conflict as the result of the linking of independent streams in the context of the end-of-the-Cold-War policy window.

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52 Tomlin 2002, 14.
53 Kingdon 1984, 181-183. Pollack (1997, 125) interprets Kindgon to mean the coupling of streams causes windows. Kingdon's discussion (1984, 187) suggests that windows open in either problem or political streams, and the windows are a context within which coupling of streams may advance an item on the decision agenda.
54 Zahariadis 2003, 12.
55 Cherry 2000, 361.
C. Loosely Coupled Streams

Using Kingdon's three-stream framework adapted to the UN context, the evolution of UN peacekeeping can be explained in terms of the coupling, within policy windows, of problems (intrastate conflict, and the need of national political elites to be seen as "doing something" about it), solutions (peacekeeping, with non-traditional elements) and politics (the unsettled configuration, increased cooperation, and general optimism of the early post-Cold War period) streams in the context of the policy window created by the end of the Cold War. The streams are interdependent, though loosely so. This is inconsistent with the ideal-typical assumptions of the original garbage can model, which regarded the streams as independent. However, the assumption of strict independence was only a simplifying assumption.\textsuperscript{56} In the peacekeeping setting, the streams were distinct, but not fully independent.

1. The Problems Stream

Developments in the problem stream in the late 1980s and early 1990s included the Central American peace process; peace processes in Angola, Cambodia, Western Sahara; political upheaval, famine and tribal war in Somalia; the breakup of Yugoslavia, and accompanying ethnic conflict; a peace process, then genocide and civil war in Rwanda, followed by a refugee crisis in Zaire/Congo; the resolution of the Iran-Iraq War; the 1991 Persian Gulf War; and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

Although the widespread view that the number of ethnic conflicts increased dramatically at the end of the Cold War is wrong, conflicts arising from the breakups of

\textsuperscript{56} Olsen 2001, 191; Kingdon 1995, 229.
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union received a great deal of international attention, and served as focusing events in the problem stream. Another misunderstood post-Cold War phenomenon, the so-called "CNN effect," as well as evolving norms of humanitarian intervention helped connect these events in the problem stream to the solution of humanitarian intervention in states' domestic affairs. Similarly, the resolution of other conflicts in Central America, Haiti, and Cambodia was thought to require holding elections, as well as economic liberalization, requiring the international community to take broader, more invasive actions than had previously been considered warranted. Thus, the rapidly changing international situation as the Cold War came to an end constituted a rapidly changing problem stream.

2. The Policy Stream

Second generation peacekeeping was a change in the solution, or policy, stream. It involved the addition to peacekeeping's traditional functions (interposition and truce observation and monitoring) of activities such as establishing and monitoring elections; overseeing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD&R), providing humanitarian relief; protecting "safe areas"; and providing the political foundations for transition governments.

Many of these roles and functions had precedents in past activities of the League of Nations and the United Nations. After the First World War, the Treaty of Versailles assigned the League of Nations roles in the Saar Basin and the city of Danzig that

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57 Sadowski 1998.
59 Paris 1997 ("Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism").
presaged UN second generation missions and transitional administrations in Namibia, Cambodia, Kosovo, and East Timor. And in what Ratner terms the UN's "aborted cases," in Trieste, Jerusalem, Korea, and (prior to 1978) Namibia, plans that foreshadowed the later development of multidimensional peacekeeping were floated but not implemented, which called for the UN to play a direct role in several peace settlements. In the Congo and in West Irian, the UN undertook missions that involved nation-building and peace enforcement actions. Because these missions were regarded as failures, however, the precedent they set was a negative one, and they were held up as object lessons in the need to adhere to core traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense. By 1990, however, Brian Urquhart, who had helped define the traditional principles, could confidently state that, "It seems likely that one result of the new unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council will be a considerable broadening of the range of situations in which the council may agree on the use of peacekeeping operations."

In Kingdon's policy streams model, the policy communities draws from a "policy primeval soup" corresponding to the policy stream. Policy alternatives and ideas develop within the policy primeval soup largely through mutation and recombination. The development of second generation peacekeeping conformed to this model. It was not a wholly new creation, but a novel (in some respects) recombination of elements that had been present in the "soup" of peacemaking and collective security policy alternatives at least as far back as the interwar years. The establishment of UNTAG was a critical

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60 Ratner 1995, 91-95; Arnold and Ruland 1996.
63 Urquhart 1990, 201.
element of this process. Negotiations aimed at producing agreement on Namibian independence proceeded from the mid-1970s through 1991. In 1978, Secretary General Waldheim formulated a plan for Namibia's independence in response to a proposal resulting from negotiations between South Africa, the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Contact Group (consisting of Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, and the United States), and the so-called "Front Line States" (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, with the sometime participation of Nigeria). Waldheim's plan called for the deployment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) to oversee the process leading to Namibian independence. This plan, endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 435 of September 1978, stalled for over a decade, caught up politically in the conflict in neighboring Angola, and the broader Cold War struggle. Marrack Goulding observes that "Because of the delay in implementing SCR 435, UNTAG was more thoroughly planned than any previous peacekeeping operation—and any since."\(^6\) The decade of planning contributed to UNTAG's success.\(^6\) UNTAG was the prototype of the multidimensional missions of the period, establishing an important precedent, as subsequent missions adopted the extensive civilian and peacebuilding components included in UNTAG's mandate. Planning for a UN mission in Namibia between 1978 and 1989 was a key instance of recombination taking place in the policy primeval soup.

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\(^6\) Goulding 2002, 143.

\(^6\) Goulding 2002, 175; Ratner 1995, 118-119. Fortna (1993, 363-364) argues, however, that the UN failed to take full advantage of the information it gathered in this period, and that operational plans grew "stale" during the long delay.
3. The Politics Stream

As previously discussed, the politics stream with respect to UN peacekeeping includes multilateral, national, and organizational elements. The multilateral politics of the Security Council were transformed by the thawing of the Cold War. This opened a political window within which the problem of intrastate conflict was linked to the solution of multidimensional and complex peacekeeping. The mood, or atmosphere, of optimism prevailing in the Security Council until about 1993 corresponds to the "national mood" that Kingdon identified as an element of the political stream in the context of US federal government agenda-setting.

National-level politics were important in the multilateral shift. For example, the Soviet shift towards supporting peacekeeping and its expansion was tied to both ideational changes within the Gorbachev regime and, more loosely, to Gorbachev's perestroika reforms, themselves a response to recognition of Soviet economic decline. The decline in Reagan-era U.S. hostility towards the UN, in the context of the first President Bush's "New World Order" rhetoric, also facilitated an expansion of the role of peacekeeping, furthered by early Clinton administration enthusiasm for "assertive multilateralism." These shifts likewise had bases in domestic politics.

The normative-ideational shifts highlighted by Barnett and Paris – changed understandings of the relationship between sovereignty and international order, and the acceptance of liberal democracy as the standard of legitimate governance – can be conceptualized as elements in the political stream. These ideational changes occurred

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67 These ideational factors bear a more than passing resemblance to the "national mood" that Kingdon identifies as a component of the political stream at the domestic level.
among elites who were key actors in the political stream. They had the effect of coupling elements – intrastate conflict and peacekeeping – in the problem and solution streams. Adopting the view that internal (empirical) sovereignty is necessary for international peace and security implies nation-building. Viewing liberal democracy as necessary for legitimacy and the promotion of peace implies a liberal internationalist approach to peacebuilding.

Finally, organizational culture and politics are a central consideration in analyzing change in international organizations. Factors internal to the UN Secretariat—from the division of bureaucratic "turf" between different offices and officials, to the personal initiatives of Secretaries General Peréz de Cuéllar and Boutros-Ghali, to the basic values of the Charter—constituted important elements of the political stream. In particular, Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* report was both a reflection and catalyst of developments in the political stream.

**D. Policy Entrepreneurs**

In Kingdon's models, coupling of issues within policy windows is accomplished by policy entrepreneurs—advocates of particular policies who will seek to advance them

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68 However, classifying these ideational factors in the political stream could be contested, it could be objected that these understandings are too closely tied to the problem and policy streams to be classified within the politics stream. The changed understandings described by Barnett and Paris are understandings *about* problems of international peace and security, suggesting classification within the problem stream. And, to the extent that they *directly* implied changes in peacekeeping (that is policy), as Barnett claims, it could be argued that they are inextricably tied to all three streams, and therefore cannot be categorized in any one. One way to resolve this is to loosen the assumption of stream independence. Another is to consider ideational and normative factors as external to the streams, part of the social context within which garbage can processes operate.


on the policy agenda. Policy entrepreneurs are strategic actors. In the original Cohen, et al. garbage can model, participants are treated as a separate stream, and considered largely independent of problems and solutions. Participants do not strategically act to advance problems or solutions, but are instead pushed and pulled by a flow of problems and decisions over which they have little control. The development of second generation peacekeeping appears to fall somewhere between the two models in terms of the role and significance of actors intentionally promoting particular policies. However, Kingdon's claim that disparate actors can play the role of policy entrepreneur, and that different actors will play this role at different times and in different decision settings, is consistent with a first cut at UN peacekeeping decision making in the 1988-1995 period.

William Durch identifies three sources of initiative for UN peacekeeping operations through 1991. Of those initiated between 1988 and 1991, he identifies UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group), and UNIKOM (Un Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission) as missions arising from initiatives of the Security Council, and ten other missions as resulting from "brokered requests for UN assistance," or calls for peacekeepers arising from mediated peace settlements. The third source of initiative—unbrokered local requests for peacekeepers—led to the establishment of five missions between 1947 and 1964, but did not account for any of the 1988-1991 cases. Thus, the source of political entrepreneurship promoting peacekeeping as a solution

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71 Durch 1993, 17. The ten missions resulting from mediated peace settlements were: UNGOMAP, UNAVEM I, UNTAG, ONUCA, ONUSAL, UNAVEM II, MINURSO, UNTAC, UNPROFOR, and UNOSOM I. The acronyms stand for, respectively and in English: UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, UN Angola Verification Mission, UN Transition Assistance Group, UN Observer Group in Central America, UN Observer Mission in El Salvador, UN Angola Verification Mission II, UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UN Protection Force, and UN Operation in Somalia.
varies from case to case, and can lie in the Security Council, the Office of the Secretary General, third party mediation, or the initiative of local parties to the conflict.

Complex multi-party peace negotiations led to the establishment of UNTAG and UNTAC.\textsuperscript{72} According to Ratner, the UN Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) and ONUCA were initiated by the parties to the Esquipulas agreement, with Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar taking a proactive role. The election monitoring mission in Haiti (ONUVEH) was instigated by a request from the Haitian provisional government, while a request from the Salvadoran government and the FMLN as part of a negotiated settlement gave rise to ONUSAL. MINURSO and UNAVEM II similarly arose from mediated settlements.\textsuperscript{73}

The Gorbachev regime also acted as an important political entrepreneur in the late 1980s revival of peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{74} After decades of opposition to and obstruction of UN peacekeeping operations that it regarded as supportive of Western interests, the Soviets in 1986 began to shift towards a supportive posture. Beyond payment of arrears and current dues, and Gorbachev's rhetorical support, the Soviets began to advocate more expansive use of peacekeeping as a collective security instrument. For example, Uruquhart wrote in 1990 that, "It is already being suggested by the USSR, for example, that one party to a conflict situation may ask for peace-keeping elements without the consent of the other."\textsuperscript{75}

Finally, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's advocacy of an expanded role for the UN in peace and security, as articulated in \textit{Agenda for Peace} and pursued through his efforts to reform the Secretariat and enhance its capacity to support peace operations, was an

\textsuperscript{72} Ratner 1995, 138-155; Fortna 1993; Schear 1996.
\textsuperscript{73} Ratner 1995, 117-132.
\textsuperscript{74} Belonogov 1990, Norton and Weiss 1990.
\textsuperscript{75} Uruquhart 1990, 201.
important attempt at entrepreneurship, though one with mixed results. *Agenda for Peace's* advocacy of an expanded role for the United Nations across the range of peace operations contributed to the high point of second generation missions in 1992-1993. However, failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda led to retrenchment, reflected in the 1995 Supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*. A Secretary General less enamored of peacekeeping might have been more reticent about expanding the UN's role in intrastate conflict.

**E. Summing Up**

While existing accounts routinely identify the end of the Cold War as main cause, or permissive condition, accounting for the rise of second generation peacekeeping, the garbage can model of UN peacekeeping adds to our understanding of how the end of the Cold War contributed to the transformation of peacekeeping: it opened a political window in which the solution of complex peacekeeping was coupled with the problem of intrastate conflict. This happened incrementally through the establishment of successive late- and post-Cold War peacekeeping missions. Different "policy entrepreneurs" played varying roles in the different missions.

Furthermore, in contrast to accounts that present the transformation of peacekeeping as a natural or inevitable consequence of the end of the Cold War, the garbage can model highlights the contingency of the process, emphasizing temporal sorting over rational fitting of solutions to problems. Second generation peacekeeping emerged through the coupling with the problem of intrastate conflict with new (or in some cases, old) roles and functions, such as election observation, disarmament and demobilization supervision, and peace enforcement, that were incorporated into
peacekeeping within an evolving policy stream. Coupling and agenda change was largely
a function of simultaneity: the rise of the problem of intrastate conflict and the
availability of complex peacekeeping as a solution corresponded with the end of the Cold
War policy window. The simultaneous presence of all three factors was required.

This account of the development of second generation peacekeeping goes beyond
the standard superficial listing of factors that contributed in some way to the
transformation of peacekeeping by developing a causal narrative of the process by which
these factors led to changes in peacekeeping. A garbage can model of peacekeeping also
complements studies that go beyond the conventional approach but that nonetheless leave
processes and mechanisms underspecified. However, while the above account establishes
the plausibility of the model, this paper has only developed a preliminary analysis.

V. A Research Agenda

Extending the Empirical Analysis

A number of tasks remain. First, the empirical analysis should be developed
beyond a plausibility probe, through careful case studies of the origins and planning of
specific missions in the period 1988-1995. UNTAG, UNPROFOR, and UNTAC are
promising cases, as these missions established important elements of second generation
peacekeeping, serving as precedents and focusing events.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{76} Further study may also employ counterfactuals as a form of analysis. Following
Goertz's (2001) identification of the garbage can model as an example of necessary
conditions theory, counterfactuals positing the absence of one or more of the conditions
(policy window, political entrepreneur, coupled streams) would imply the development of
second generation peacekeeping not taking place. I thank Roland Paris for suggesting
employing counterfactuals. On counterfactuals and hypothesis testing, see Fearon 1991.
Further, while this paper has applied the garbage can perspective to the development of second generation operations, it should also be applied to Cold War peacekeeping, and in particular to the establishment of the UN Emergency Force during the 1956 Suez Crisis, commonly considered the origin of UN peacekeeping. Later adaptations such as the redefinition of the non-use of force exception to cover defense of the mission could also be brought into the analysis. Extended empirical analysis should also evaluate alternative explanations, and explore opportunities for integration with complementary frameworks.

Alternative and Complementary Explanations

I have argued above that the garbage can model complements constructivist explanations. If this is the case, it should be integrated with these approaches to generate a more powerful framework. I discuss this briefly below. More generally, garbage can processes in international organizations and international relations deserve further study. The garbage can model should also be tested against alternative explanations. These include explanations in terms of comprehensive rational decision-making, inevitability, and powerful state interests. For example, it could be that the post-Cold War extension of peacekeeping to intrastate conflicts was a byproduct of U.S. interests in which the UN was delegated the responsibility of dealing with conflicts that the U.S. did not want to be.

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78 By inevitability, I mean the view that something like second generation peacekeeping was a direct and inevitable outcome of the end of the Cold War and the rise in prominence of intrastate conflicts. Students in my Winter 2003 Masters seminar on peacekeeping expressed this view. If these students are correct, there is no puzzle to solve. An inevitability perspective seems to be implicit in conventional narratives that leap directly from the changed conditions of the early post-Cold War period to the expansion of peacekeeping.
dragged into, but which media coverage and public pressure (the "CNN effect") required be addressed. If this is the case, it should be evident from a process tracing of the establishment of post-Cold War second generation missions, as the U.S. should be the primary policy entrepreneur.

The garbage can model may also complement previous explanations for the transformation of peacekeeping, discussed below. Earlier, I argued that Fosdick's and Daase's explanations neglected the importance of agenda setting processes captured by the garbage can model. The garbage can model is loosely related to Fosdick's cognitive ambiguity model, and to some extent the bounded pragmatism model. However, neither Fosdick's individual models nor their combination fully describe the process by which these factors produce the development of second generation peacekeeping. Thus, the garbage can model may complement Fosdick's framework.

Daase's portrayal of the transformation of peacekeeping is reminiscent of the garbage can model's conception of decisions under conditions of ambiguity in seeing decisions as unintended outcomes of incremental processes. And the process of incremental modification to standard practices by which conventions change is similar to the evolutionary model of policy change, in John Kingdon's classic adaptation of the garbage can model, in which policies evolve through mutation and recombination in a "primeval soup" of policy alternatives. These similarities point to a basic compatibility of Daase's theory of spontaneous institutions with a garbage can framework. However, Daase does not specify a mechanism by which actors shift practices within the zone of uncertainty. The garbage can model provides the mechanism by which incremental change within this zone takes place.
In addition, analysis of peacekeeping in terms of a garbage can model suggests the further exploration of theories of policy-making to international relations. Other policy theories, such as punctuated equilibrium theory, or theories of policy communities and coalitions could well be fruitfully applied to policy making in multilateral settings, to the extent that conditions for their applicability pertain in such settings. These perspectives have received significant attention in the literature on policy making in the EU, but deserve more consideration in the wider IR literature. While garbage can and multiple streams approaches have been applied predominantly to domestic and national-level settings, organized anarchies are certainly not limited to the domestic sphere.

*The Social Construction of Garbage Cans*

The preceding discussion has proposed the incorporation of constructivist arguments into the framework of a garbage can model, by including ideational and normative changes within the political stream. This builds on previous discussions of the garbage can model as related to, and compatible with, social constructivist perspectives. Charles Perrow has written that, "Embedded in garbage can theory, but unfortunately still not explicated, is the notion of the social construction of reality." The garbage can model's critique of rationalism and emphasis on contingency and path dependence are shared with constructivist perspectives. The model's conception of

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79 Baumgartner and Jones 1993; True, Jones, and Baumgartner 1999; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999.
ambiguity in terms of differing interpretations of reality and problematic preferences is congruent with constructivism's emphasis on the role of intersubjective understandings in giving meaning to objective reality, and its focus on the social bases of individual preferences. However, constructivism also contains an implicit critique of the garbage can model. As Perrow notes, unclear technology, or "uncertain means and ends," is a defining characteristic of organized anarchies within which garbage can processes develop, but "certainty over means and ends is a social construction that must be explained itself."\(^8\) Organized anarchies are socially constructed.

Garbage cans operate within a larger social context. Or, put differently, "Garbage comes from somewhere and belongs to someone."\(^8\) This social context reduces the randomness that is a characteristic of the garbage can model. Global culture, in the sense of the world polity literature, constitutes both actors and practices that comprise the various streams.\(^8\) Heimer and Stinchcombe argue that organizational environments, with significant intersubjective elements, can affect which actors are able to couple streams successfully.\(^6\) It is also possible that multiple policy entrepreneurs could be socialized into the same international or global cultural norms, thereby reducing the degree of randomness regarding their attempts to couple streams, or which agenda items they seek to advance.\(^7\) Thus, "Garbage, after all, retains its essentially social character."\(^8\)

However, the preceding discussion has argued that the garbage can framework provides

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\(^3\) Perrow 1984, 138.
\(^4\) Heimer and Stinchcombe 1999, 25. See also Christensen and Røvik in the same volume, on the relationship between ambiguity and logics of appropriateness.
\(^6\) Heimer and Stinchcombe 1999, 42-43.
\(^7\) I thank Matthew Hoffman for suggesting this point.
\(^8\) Heimer and Stinchcombe 1999, 55.
something that constructivist accounts of the transformation of peacekeeping are missing: a causal mechanism by which ideas are translated into specific policy changes.

VI. Policy Implications

The preceding analysis does not yield simple or direct policy implications. Organized anarchies, by their very nature, are not conducive to the identification of specific and easily manipulable means to desired ends. To the extent that policy implications do follow, they tend to relate to the question of how to be a successful policy entrepreneur. If one seeks to place major peacekeeping reforms on the UN's agenda, the garbage can model offers some useful pointers. For example, Kingdon argues that successful policy entrepreneurs should have expertise or authoritative position, political influence, and persistence. Further, Kingdon's model highlights the importance of waiting for, recognizing, and seizing the opportunity presented by policy windows. Thus, the peacekeeping reform proposals contained in the August 2000 Brahimi Report were for the most part not new, but were presented by a figure with the required qualities, and in the context of a political window created by a recognition of peacekeeping failures in the 1990s. In accordance with the predictions of the policy streams model, the Brahimi Report has had greater impact than previous efforts to implement such reforms.

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89 One reader of a previous draft expressed concern that an analysis of UN peacekeeping change in terms of a garbage can model might undermine political support for peacekeeping, and the UN more generally. While an academic paper such as this one is unlikely to have that sort of influence, I hasten to emphasize that it is written from a perspective sympathetic to both the UN and the practice of peacekeeping.
90 Kingdon 1984, 189-190.
91 Kingdon 1984, 173-204.
92 Durch et al., 2003.
Conversely, reforms are likely to fail in the absence of a policy window, appropriate problems and solutions available for coupling, or a suitable policy entrepreneur.

More broadly, the analysis presented here suggests a need for an appreciation of the impact of bounded rationality in peacekeeping, and a need to regard major organizational or operational innovations with caution. To the extent that garbage can dynamics characterize UN agenda-setting, sweeping changes in peacekeeping are likely to produce unintended consequences as policy entrepreneurs seek to attach their own preferred solutions to priority problems and agenda items, and as temporal sorting rather than rational optimizing directs the coupling of streams. Whether it generates easily implementable policy recommendations or not, however, a garbage can model of UN peacekeeping is valuable for its ability to fill gaps in our understanding of how peacekeeping was transformed in the context of the Cold War's ending, and under what conditions peacekeeping, or other policy responses to international threats and challenges, might be similarly transformed.

References


93 Hood (1999, 61) describes this point as the "Greek Chorus approach to organizational theory" in which the analyst plays the role of the "chorus in classical Greek theatre [which] periodically comes on to the stage to stress the folly and unpredictability of human affairs." Hood also suggests that garbage can decision-making can have positive effects, such as facilitating the transfer of knowledge and ideas and inhibiting corruption, and that it may therefore be advisable to encourage the development of garbage can processes in some circumstances.


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