

**CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION AND
THE FUTURE OF REGIONALISM IN CANADA**

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ABSTRACT

A large body of empirical research in Canadian political science points to regional differences in basic political orientations, or regional “political cultures.” One aspect of regionalism that has thus far received relatively little attention concerns the dynamics of regional political cultures. This paper focuses on one potential source of change in regional political cultures, namely, immigration. The conventional wisdom is that successive waves of European immigrants who settled in each region of the country had a significant impact on the founding political cultures of different regions, but far less is known about the relationship between contemporary immigration and Canadian regional political cultures. We rely on the 2000 Canadian component of the *World Values Survey* and the 1993, 1997, and 2000 *Canadian Election Studies*, to explore how immigrants adapt to regional political norms in the short and long term. Two possibilities are investigated: Do social pressures and networks may lead immigrants to conform to existing regional political norms? Or do the unique pre- and post-migration experiences of contemporary immigrants transform or attenuate regional differences in basic political orientations? The central finding is that the transformative impact of immigration on regional political cultures is both limited and short-lived. Interpersonal social networks appear to play an important role in the dissemination of regional norms to immigrant Canadians.

Introduction

A large body of empirical research in Canadian political science points to regional differences in basic political orientations, or regional “political cultures.” Whether regionalism is ultimately a consequence of different settlement patterns (Elkins & Simeon 1980; Schwartz 1974; Wiseman 1996), fundamental regional economic differences (Brodie 1990; Brym 1986; Wilson 1974) or Canada’s federal political institutions (Simeon & Elkins 1974, 1980) remains a matter of debate.¹ But one aspect of regionalism that receives far less attention concerns the dynamics of regional political cultures. As Mildred Schwartz recently noted, “If culture is truly important, we need to know much more, not only of its origins, but also of its adaptations and its transmission through time and space” (2002, x-xi). Understanding the historical origins of regionalism is certainly important, but root causes by themselves do not account for stability and change in regional political cultures.²

This paper focuses on one potential source of change in regional political cultures, namely, immigration. The conventional wisdom is that successive waves of European immigrants who settled in each region of the country had a significant impact on the founding political cultures of different regions (Blake 1972; Simeon and Elkins 1974: 433; Elkins and Simeon 1980). Far less is known about the relationship between contemporary immigration and Canadian regional political cultures, however. Unlike the first waves of newcomers, contemporary immigrants settle into regional environments where some political norms, attitudes and grievances are already established. And from that vantage point the expectation might be that new immigrants might have no impact whatsoever on the character of regional political cultures. By the same token it is also clear not only that immigrants account for a substantial proportion of Canada's population replacement but also that there have been dramatic shifts in the patterns of immigration over the past 30 years. While the founding waves of immigrants came from traditional source countries in Europe and the United States, the vast majority of new immigrants now come from Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Mercer 1995). The source countries of Canada's new immigrants are culturally, linguistically, religiously and racially more distinct from the founding regional cultures than ever before. Given these sharp differences, one expectation is that new immigrants have the potential to re-shape regional political cultures in significant ways. But another possibility is that for these new immigrants the dynamics of adaptation to their new environment may be more difficult. This raises questions: is there any empirical evidence indicating that immigrants have any impact on existing regional political cleavages? Do contemporary

¹ A secondary, and related, area of contention is boundaries of regions. For some, provinces are useful boundaries because they are “analytically distinct political systems” (Simeon and Elkins 1974, p.400; see also Schwartz 1974; Wilson 1974), while for others (MacDermid 1990; Henderson 2004) sociodemographic boundaries are more appropriate because they are the “constituent units of culture” (Henderson 2004, 602).

² Regardless of its origins or how precisely its boundaries are defined, there is a broad consensus that regional variations in political orientations exist, and that these variations are ultimately social constructions.

immigrants transform regional political cultures and attenuate regional cleavages? Or do they simply take on existing regional political orientations?

Regionalism and immigration are two central features of Canada's political system, but empirical analyses of the connection between the two are rare. One exception, Elkins' (1980) investigation of whether immigrants develop attitudes similar to those of the people already living in the host-province, found that immigrants generally conform to provincial, rather than national, political norms. But Elkins also concluded that provincial patterns were less pronounced among immigrants; he noted that "regional and provincial variations have, if anything, been muted by the vast numbers of immigrants to Canada" (Ibid, 122).

Those findings suggest that immigrants adapt to provincial political norms, but only partially so. One clear implication of this partial integration thesis is that the longer immigrants live in their new country the more integrated they should become to provincial norms. But on this point Elkins' analysis yielded a counterintuitive finding, namely, immigrants who had lived in Canada for a longer period turned out to be *less* likely than recent immigrants to have internalized provincial political norms (Ibid, 116-17). In many respects, Elkins' analysis generates more new questions than answers. How, for instance, do immigrants become acculturated to regional norms? And why do some differences between the immigrant and native born populations persist?

This paper reassesses the relationship between immigration and regional political cleavages in three ways. First, we replicate Elkins' original analyses, but the focus is on a much larger number of cases. Those cases, moreover, are of immigrants from very different source countries. Second, we examine in greater detail both the short term and long term dynamics of newcomers' adaptation. Third, we focus more precisely on the dynamics through which immigrants develop attitudes resembling those of native born populations in their regions of residence. The reproduction of regionalism rests in no small part on the capacity of each region to transmit the regional norms, values and political grievances not only to successive generations of citizens raised within that region but also to new citizens who are new to the region. On the one hand, if immigrants internalize dominant regional attitudes, the implication is that new waves of immigrants are likely to reproduce current regional cleavages. On the other hand, if new waves of immigrants hold attitudes rooted in their pre-migration experiences, or in their unique experience as newcomers, then contemporary immigration may have the potential to transform regional political cultures and possibly attenuate regional cleavages, at least among those provinces that receive substantial flows of immigrants.

Social Pressures and the Reproduction of Regional Cleavages

The first possibility that needs to be examined when investigating whether contemporary immigrants attenuate or reproduce regional cleavages is the impact of social pressures and networks. A large body of recent empirical research re-emphasizes the importance of local interpersonal communication networks to the formation of

political attitudes. The prevailing findings are that people tend to develop political attitudes that are consistent with the local majority opinion (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, Levine, & Morgan 1998); and people still favour interpersonal communication over other forms means of acquiring political information (Beck, Dalton, Greene, & Huckfeldt 2002).

Moreover, empirical research on contextual change indicates that, when it comes to racial attitudes and partisanship, people who move to new environments tend to develop attitudes that resemble those of the local population (Glaser & Gilens 1997; McBurnett 1991; MacKuen & Brown 1987; Brown 1981, 1988; Markus 1979). Although the precise elements of these dynamics remain somewhat unclear one possibility is that migrants take on the norms and attitudes that prevail in their new environments to lower the costs of "fitting in" to their new contexts (MacKuen & Brown 1987; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1987, 1991; Burbank 1995; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine 1995). The implication of this line of reasoning is that immigrants will not have a significant impact on existing regional political cultures. Rather, regional political cultures change immigrants.

The Homogenizing Effects of Immigration

The above expectation concerning pressures to conform to local norms rests on the assumption that immigrants adapt to the Canadian political environment in ways similar to that of locally born citizens. But at least two sets of considerations lead to the expectation that the dynamics of immigrants' political integration in Canada will be distinct from that of locally born Canadians. Together, these considerations imply that contemporary immigration transforms regional political cultures and possibly attenuates regional cleavages.

First, we know that the context in which people are socialized leaves a significant imprint on people's political outlooks (Almond & Verba 1963; Eckstein 1988; Inglehart 1990; Ichilov 1990; Niemi & Hepburn 1995). And if early socialization matters, then large flows of immigrants into different regions of Canada may have the potential to transform regional political cultures. The logic is simple: each immigrant brings a unique set of political and economic experiences reflecting the environment in which they were socialized, and pre-migration political experiences have a sustained impact on their political attitudes in the new environment (Finifter & Finifter 1989; McAllister & Makkai 1992; Black 1987). Thus, because immigrant citizens have a different stock of firsthand formative and politically relevant experiences, their political attitudes will necessarily be different from those that prevail among the local population. From this vantage point the expectation is that immigrant populations have the capacity to transform the general political outlooks of each region.

Second, in the process of adjusting to new environments immigrants face challenges, and experiences, that are profoundly different from those of the local population. For instance, in leaving their country of origin many immigrants experience

downward socio-economic mobility and they may even face discrimination in their new host-country. It is reasonable to suppose that these negative experiences may have a significant impact upon immigrants' political outlooks; they may induce disillusionment with the host-environment (Michelson 2001; Portes 1984). Thus regardless of the particularities of any immigrant's pre-migration experiences, the shocks associated with the challenges of adjustment may induce political attitudes that are divergent from those that prevail in the immediate regional environment. Some stigmata, such as race, are "non-adjustable" as it were, and may represent a further barrier to integration.

Finally, there have been significant shifts in the larger policy environment. One possibility is that the policy of multiculturalism promoted by the federal government over the last few decades could significantly reinforce the salience of newcomers' unique pre- and post-migration experiences. If multicultural policy both encourages immigrants to retain their cultural identity and encourages native born Canadians to respect cultural diversity, then the pressures on new immigrants to adapt to prevailing norms may be less forceful than they once were.³

In sum, if immigrants' political attitudes reflect both their unique pre- and post-migratory experiences, then we can hypothesize not only that they will fail to internalize regional norms, but also that their political outlooks will differ substantially from those of the native born population regardless of region of residence. This second hypotheses predicts that contemporary immigration will transform regional political cultures and possibly attenuate regional cleavages.

Research Design and Data

To explore these hypotheses we rely on two distinct sources of data. First, the 2000 Canadian component of the *World Values Survey* (WVS) and its special sample of recent immigrants in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver provide information about immigrants' internalization of regional attitudes for in the first ten years in Canada. Second, we also draw on the 1993, 1997, and 2000 *Canadian Election Studies* (CES), which include the responses of immigrant citizens who have lived in the country for 30 years on average. For reasons of sample size and population distribution, we limit the analyses to the immigrant rich provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia.

The paper proceeds in four parts. The first and second parts examine regional variations in immigrant and native born Canadians' political orientations with WVS data on new waves of immigrants and CES data on established immigrants, respectively.⁴ The

³ The merits and limitations of multiculturalism in Canada have been widely debated at the normative level (see Taylor 1994; Beiner 1995; Kymlicka 1995, 1998; Carens 2000). There is far less empirical evidence, however, about whether or not multiculturalism helps or hinders the dynamics of the integration of immigrants.

⁴ See Appendix B for more information on the CES.

third part investigates the factors that facilitate immigrants' integration to regional political norms, focusing specifically on the influence of social integration and ethnic origin of newcomers. The conclusion summarizes the central findings and discusses the impact of immigration on regional political cultures.

Four political dimensions of regionalism are examined. First, Western provinces' alienation from Canada's center and Quebec's alienation from the federal government are well documented (Clarke et al. 1979; Gibbins 1980; Henry 2002). Consequently, for the WVS data, we examine levels of diffuse political support, national pride, and specific political support, satisfaction with the performance of the federal government. The specific research question is: do immigrant respondents reflect the same kinds of "alienation" from the federal government as those found among native born Canadians in different regions? The indicators used for the CES data are a thermometer for Canada as well as respondents' perception as to whether or not their province receive less than other provinces from the federal government.

Second, most empirical studies of regionalism demonstrate variation in views about government responsiveness and trust in government (Simeon and Elkins 1974; Elkins and Simeon 1980; Henderson 2005). Consequently, we examine the extent to which respondents exhibit cynical attitudes towards public authorities; to what extent do they believe that politicians "do not care about people" like them? And because recent elections have shown major regional variations in terms of partisan preferences (Gidengil et al. 1999; Blais et al. 2002; Nevitte et al. 2000), we also examine the distribution of partisan preferences. To simplify that analysis we focus on support for the Federal Liberal Party.

The analysis begins by comparing the regional variations in the political orientations of native born citizens and those of immigrant citizens. The initial research question is: are differences in attitudes between locally born populations of all three provinces are replicated among the immigrant populations? The analysis then turns to a direct comparison of the political orientations of native born and immigrant citizens within each province. This strategy allows us to gauge the extent to which immigrant orientations are similar to, or different from, those of the local population within their own province.

The Short Term Dynamics of Regional Integration

To determine whether the same regional patterns observed for the native born population are reflected in the new immigrant population, we utilize a multivariate strategy which introduces controls for the potential effects of such other sociodemographic variables as sex, age, education, income, employment status, social network, and ethnic background. The approach ensures that regional differences are not just attributable to differences in sociodemographic composition.⁵ Regional differences

⁵ Gidengil et al. (1999) indicate that a portion of the difference between regions, at least in terms of voting behavior, is attributable to differences in social composition. Ethnic origin is not included for analyses

are measured by comparing residents of both Quebec and British Columbia to residents of Ontario.

The analyses presented in Table 1 show regional differences in four political orientations both between the local populations of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia (columns on the left) and between the immigrants of each of these three provinces (columns on the right). First, there are substantial regional variations in levels of national pride: native born Canadians in Ontario have the highest levels of national pride, about five points higher than that of British Columbians and 17 points higher than that of Quebecers. Levels of satisfaction with the federal government are also about 11 points higher in Ontario than in British Columbia, and five points higher in Ontario than in Quebec. Furthermore, respondents were asked whether they thought that a few big interests looking out for themselves ran this country, or whether it was run for the benefit of all the people. As it turns out, native born Canadians in Quebec are the least cynical about federal politicians (46% agree that "government is run by a few big interests"), followed by native born residents in Ontario (53%) and BC (59%).⁶ Finally, the WVS data are also consistent with other research (Nevitte et al 2000, Blais et al. 2002) in that they show large regional variations in terms of partisan preferences. Support for the federal Liberal party is higher in Ontario (46%) than in Quebec (30%) and British Columbia (19%).

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

These WVS data not only confirm conventional wisdom concerning regional differences in political outlooks, but they also serve as benchmark data for evaluating whether immigrants internalize dominant attitudes of their host-province, or develop attitudes that reflect their unique experiences as immigrants. The basic findings summarized in Table 1 show that regional differences observed for native born Canadians are partly reproduced among immigrant Canadians. First, the magnitude and direction of regional differences in levels of national pride among the immigrant population is broadly similar to the differences observed among the native born population: immigrants in Ontario exhibit levels of national pride higher than immigrants in either Quebec (by about 10 points) or British Columbia (by about 6 points). Second, the regional pattern in satisfaction with the federal government among immigrants also tends to mimic that of native born Canadians. Like the local population in British Columbia, immigrants in that province exhibit the lowest levels of satisfaction (about 12 points lower than immigrants in Ontario). Third, like the native born population, immigrants in Quebec are the least cynical (13%), and immigrants in BC are the most cynical (34%), in terms of outlooks about government responsiveness.

involving the local population because only 14 respondents among the local population are not of a Caucasian background.

⁶ The difference between local populations in Quebec and Ontario is statistically significant with a p-value of .073 where that between local populations in BC and Ontario is not statistically significant. All reported percentages are predicted probabilities based on the results of the multivariate analyses.

Although there is evidence that recent immigrants to Canada exhibit region-specific political orientations similar to those of their native born provincial counterparts, there are also striking differences between the two groups. For example, there are significant differences between native born populations in Quebec and Ontario in terms of satisfaction with the federal government. Intriguingly, no such differences emerge between immigrants in these two provinces. And there is one dimension along which recent immigrants do not appear to internalize regional norms: partisan preferences. Indeed, there are no significant differences in levels of support for the Liberal Party between immigrants in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia.

These initial findings suggest that recent immigrants start to internalize the prevailing attitudes of their host-province. The structure of regional cleavages observed between native born populations of Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia is somewhat replicated between immigrants of these provinces. These striking findings illustrate just how powerful regional political cultures can be. Within the relatively short time frame of just ten years, immigrants from widely different countries of origin and with different pre-migration political and cultural backgrounds already internalize regional attitudes. What needs to be examined now is whether, and how, immigrants *within* each province differ from their counterpart regional population.

To examine whether immigrants in each province exhibit attitudes distinct from those of the local population we perform separate analyses for respondents in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. In addition, immigrants are divided into two groups: those from a visible minority and those from a Caucasian background on the grounds that immigrants from a visible minority background are more likely than others to face such negative experiences as downward socio-economic mobility and discrimination in the host-environment. While immigrants across provinces differ from one another in approximately the same ways as do native born Canadians (Table 1), the findings reported in Table 2 indicate that immigrants nevertheless exhibit attitudes that differ from those of native born respondents in the province where they live. Moreover, there are greater differences between immigrants from a visible minority background and the local populations than there are between locals and immigrants from Caucasian background.⁷

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

First, immigrants in Ontario and British Columbia exhibit lower levels of national pride than the local population in their own province. In Ontario the gap is wider for immigrants from a Caucasian background.⁸ Second, immigrants in Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia express substantially higher levels of satisfaction with the federal government than do native born Canadians in the same province. And analyses for Quebec and Ontario further indicate that the gaps between immigrants and the native born population are usually larger for immigrants from a visible minority background

⁷ All immigrants in British Columbia are from a visible minority background.

⁸ This is the only case for which immigrants from Caucasian background differ more than immigrants from a visible minority background.

than for immigrants from a Caucasian background (.23 vs. .13 in Quebec, and .12 vs. .09 in Ontario).

Third, immigrants in all three provinces are less cynical than their native born counterparts, and, once again, analyses of Quebec and Ontario respondents indicate that immigrants from a visible minority background are even less cynical than Caucasian immigrants (13% vs. 18% in Quebec, and 20% vs. 30% in Ontario). There is one unifying theme from these findings: immigrants in all three provinces are also more likely to express support for the Liberal Party. And the gaps between visible minority immigrants and native born Canadians are, once again, widest when it comes to Liberal party support; indeed, there is no significant difference between immigrants of a Caucasian background and the local population in Ontario.

The overall picture in Table 2 is that even though from a cross-provincial perspective immigrants tend to develop attitudes that replicate regional cleavages observed between the local populations of their respective provinces, from a ‘within-the-province’ perspective, immigrants also develop their own unique set of attitudes that distinguishes them from the native born population of their own province, and is shared by immigrants living in other provinces. Regardless of where they live, immigrants tend to have lower levels of pride in Canada than does the local population; they also tend to be more satisfied with democracy, less cynical about politics, and more supportive of the Liberal party than their native born counterparts. Thus, even though immigrants seem to internalize regional norms and grievances quite quickly, they nevertheless also retain political outlooks that clearly distinguish them from the local population. Furthermore, immigrants from a visible minority background distinguish themselves both from other immigrants and the local population. It is not possible with these data to further investigate precisely why visible minority immigrants have more distinct attitudes from those of the local populations than Caucasian immigrants. One possibility, however, is that their status as visible minorities and some of the negative experiences associated with it might provide them with a unique political outlook.⁹

The Long Term Dynamics of Regional Integration

The next step is to ask whether these short term adaptations in immigrants' outlooks prefigure a sustained pattern of adjustment. To examine that question we rely on the 1993, 1997, and 2000 Canadian Election Studies. Immigrant respondents in those datasets have, on average, lived in their new regional environment for about 30 years. Most indicators available in the CES and WVS data are not identical and so there are good reasons for exercising caution when considering comparative interpretations from

⁹ Another possible explanation is that immigrants from visible minority background have distinct cultural background and accumulated different experiences prior to migration that leave an imprint on the political attitudes. For instance, many of the immigrants from a visible minority background also come from a non-democratic country. Additional analyses examined whether coming from a non-democratic country would be better predictor of immigrants' attitudes than being from a visible minority background. Results indicate that being from a visible minority background is a much better predictor of immigrants' attitudes than being from a non-democratic country.

these data. Nevertheless, the large numbers of immigrant respondents available in the two datasets, coupled with the multiple political orientations we examine, allow us to conduct a plausibility probe concerning the long-term dynamics of immigrants' regional integration.

The data Table 3 provide further evidence that attitudinal cleavages exist between native born Canadians in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia. First, respondents were asked how they felt about Canada on a scale from 0 (not favourable at all) to 100 (very favourable). As one would expect, people in Quebec tend to feel less positive than their counterparts in Ontario and British Columbia on this dimension (a difference of 20 points). Second, when asked whether they thought that their province was receiving less, more or about the same as other provinces from the federal government, native born respondents in Quebec and British Columbia are more likely (by 11 and 21%, respectively) than those in Ontario to say that their province receives less than other provinces. Regional differences also emerge in evaluations of government responsiveness. Respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree that with the following statement: "Politicians do not care about people like me". The results indicate that native born respondents in British Columbia are slightly more likely than Ontarians or Quebecers to agree with that statement. Finally, there are strong regional cleavages with regards to the partisan preferences. Native born Canadians in Quebec and British Columbia are less supportive (by 16 and 21%, respectively) of the Liberal Party than those in Ontario. Once again, this evidence corroborates the conventional wisdom: there are significant regional variations in political attitudes.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

Does the CES data also corroborate the findings from the WVS when it comes to regional variations between immigrants who are long time residents of Canada? The short answer is "yes." The political outlooks of immigrants who have lived in Canada for 30 years on average follow regional patterns similar to those of native born Canadians: immigrants in Quebec exhibit less positive feelings toward Canada than do immigrants in Ontario and British Columbia, and no difference is observed between immigrants in British Columbia and Ontario; immigrants in British Columbia are more likely than those in Quebec or Ontario to believe that their province receives less from the federal government than other provinces; and immigrants in British Columbia are also most likely to hold negative views about government responsiveness.

The only dimension along which regional cleavages among the immigrant population deviate substantially from those of the native born Canadians concerns partisan support. Whereas native born population respondents in Quebec are less likely to support the Liberal Party than that their Ontario counterparts, the opposite holds for newcomers: immigrants in Quebec are more likely than their fellow Ontarians to support the Liberal Party (p-value=.056). This finding will be explored further later in the paper.

Recall that the evidence presented Table 1 indicated that immigrants largely adapt to regional political norms within the first decade of migrating to Canada. The data from

the CES presented in Table 3 suggest that those regional patterns persist well beyond the initial years of migration. But what about the differences between established immigrants and the local population in each province? After an average of 30 years in Canada, are immigrants' attitudes still distinguishable from those of the local population in the province where they live?

The analysis presented in Table 4 examines whether differences are observed between established immigrants and the local population in each of the three provinces. As before, immigrants are once again divided in two groups: those from a visible minority background and those from a Caucasian background. Three key findings emerge from the analysis.

First, compared to the WVS data on new immigrants there are fewer significant differences between the political orientations of established immigrants and the native born populations of each province. This pattern is observed among both the visible minority and Caucasian immigrant populations. A simple count and comparison of the number of statistically significant differences (i.e., differences that we can be confident are not attributable to sampling error) between immigrants and native born respondents in Tables 2 and 4 illustrates this pattern. With the WVS data we analyzed 20 within-province differences between new immigrant and native born respondents, and 17 of those relationships reached conventionally acceptable levels of statistical significance. By contrast, we analyzed 24 within-province differences between established immigrant and native born respondents using the CES data, and only 10 of those relationships were statistically significant.¹⁰

Overall, these results indicate that immigrants take a local pathway to political integration. According to the WVS data, the same regional pattern in political orientations observed among native born Canadians are also evident among new immigrant Canadians, and the CES data suggest this pattern carries through after immigrants have lived in Canada for decades. What changes as immigrants live in the country longer is the within-province difference in political orientations between immigrant and native born Canadians. In other words, immigrants appear to adapt quickly to dominant regional political norms, and their political orientations become progressively more similar to those of the native born populations in those regions with the passage of time.

Nevertheless, the evidence in Table 4 also indicates that even among established immigrants, within-province differences between the political orientations of visible minority immigrant and native born populations remain larger than the differences between Caucasian immigrant and native born populations. On three out of four dimensions in Quebec and British Columbia, and on all four dimensions in Ontario, the gap between the political orientations of visible minority immigrants and native born

¹⁰ The statistical significance of a relationship observed in a set of sample data is a function of both the strength of the observed relationship, and the number of cases in the sample. Given the large number of cases in both the WVS and CES, it is unlikely that the smaller number of insignificant differences in the CES data is simply the result of fewer cases in that dataset.

Canadians is wider than the gap between Caucasian immigrants and native born Canadians. Immigrants from a visible minority background internalize regional political norms at a slower pace than do their Caucasian counterparts. However, the sources of these differences are not entirely clear. One potential roadblock to political integration is certainly discrimination, and we might expect racial prejudice to lead to negative views towards the Canadian political system. But the evidence suggests otherwise: visible minority immigrants are less cynical about politics, express more satisfaction with the federal government, and exhibit higher levels of support for the incumbent Liberal party than do their native born counterparts. A second possibility is that Canada's policy of multiculturalism might lead immigrants from a visible minority background to feel positive about the federal government and, more specifically, the Liberal Party of Canada. The Liberal Party, after all, introduced the policy of multiculturalism and is usually the strongest proponent of that policy. Immigrants from a visible minority might thus simply reward the government and the party that promotes a policy that they see as beneficial.

Finally, the data presented in Table 4 also shows that the differences between the political orientations of immigrants and native born Canadians are much larger in Quebec than in either British Columbia or Ontario. In Quebec, immigrants from visible minority and Caucasian backgrounds exhibit more positive feelings toward Canada than the local population by 15 and 12 points, respectively. In British Columbia and Ontario, the gaps are smaller, and immigrants from visible minority backgrounds actually exhibit more negative feelings towards Canada. And in comparison to Ontario and British Columbia, immigrants from visible minority and Caucasian backgrounds are less likely than the native born Canadians in Quebec to believe that their province receives less than other provinces from the federal government (p -value=.055), or that the government is unresponsive. Quebec is also an outlier where voting behaviour is concerned. Immigrants from a visible minority background are more likely than the native born population to support the Liberal Party in all three provinces, but the gap is largest in Quebec. Moreover, it is only in Quebec that immigrants from Caucasian background are more likely than the local population to vote for the Liberal Party.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

The persistent differences between immigrants and the local population in Quebec may be related to support for sovereignty. Indeed, it is possible that differences in support for sovereignty between these groups may colour a variety of related outlooks, including feelings toward Canada, regional alienation, evaluations of government responsiveness, as well as support for the Liberal Party. Fortunately, the CES data include an item that measures support for sovereignty in Quebec. To explore this possibility, the analyses in Table 4 were replicated for Quebec with support for sovereignty included in the model (results not presented). When controlling for support for sovereignty, differences in feelings toward Canada and evaluations of government responsiveness between the native born population and both groups of immigrants completely disappear. Moreover, the difference between immigrants from a visible minority background and native born respondents in the perception that Quebec receives less from the federal government than

other provinces also disappears. And finally, differences in terms of partisan support disappear for immigrants from a Caucasian background and are substantially reduced for those from visible minority background. Once support for sovereignty is controlled the differences between immigrant and native born Canadians are no greater in Quebec than in Ontario or British Columbia. That said, what remains to be explained is the longstanding question of why immigrants' support for sovereignty is so meagre.

Social Networks and Internalization of Regional Attitudes

The evidence presented so far suggests that, in the long run, immigrants tend to reproduce regional cleavages in Canada. After immigrants have lived several years in Canada, they tend to develop attitudes similar to those of the population of their regional environment. But what are the particular dynamics of this process? The main hypothesis proposed here is that social pressures through interactions in social networks encourage immigrants to develop attitudes similar to those of the local population (MacKuen & Brown 1987; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1987, 1991; Burbank 1995; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine 1995). To investigate this hypothesis, we examine the WVS data that oversample immigrants who have lived in Canada for up to 10 years.

The World Values Survey asks respondents how often they spend time with: 1) friends; 2) colleagues outside of work; 3) people in social groups and organizations; and 4) people in church and religious organizations. Those responses were combined to form a scale indicating the density of respondents' social networks. The purpose of the analysis is to examine whether immigrants with denser social networks exhibit attitudes more similar to those of the native born population of the regional environment than do immigrants with relatively sparse social networks. Because the impact of social networks may be non-linear, we divide immigrants' social networks into three variables indicating whether the density of social network is weak, medium or strong. Furthermore, because we know that the challenges of adaptation facing visible minorities are more difficult, we measure the impact of social network separately for immigrants from visible minority and Caucasian backgrounds.¹¹

The results reported in Table 5 suggest that integration into a dense social network does facilitate the development of attitudes similar to those of the local population in the regional environment. Intriguingly, however, it also seems that the impact of social networks is significant only for immigrants from a visible minority. The impact of immigrants' social network is most noteworthy when it comes to levels of satisfaction with the federal government. The more integrated immigrants are in a social network, the more their level of satisfaction with the government resembles that of the local population of their region. The gaps between immigrants from a visible minority and the local population in Quebec drop from .35 to .24 to .18 the more integrated

¹¹ The sample size of immigrants from Caucasian background is relatively small in Quebec (N=57). Therefore, only two categories of social networks are used instead of three. Moreover, all immigrants in the sample from British Columbia are members of a visible minority.

immigrants are. Similarly, the gaps in BC drop from .13 to .10, and in Ontario they drop from .15 to .09 when immigrants integrate a dense social network.

The impact of immigrants' social network is also significant when it comes to views about government responsiveness and the propensity to vote for the Liberal Party; on these two dimensions, the gaps between immigrants and the native born population diminish the more immigrants interact in social networks. Finally, social integration appears to increase conformity in levels of national pride, but only in British Columbia.

Social networks thus appear to have some effect on immigrants' internalization of regional norms. However, the impact of social networks is not systematic for each orientation, province, or group of immigrants. In most cases, the impact is non-linear (differences from the local population are usually largest for immigrants with weak networks) and restricted to immigrants from a visible minority background. The precise reasons why social network density is a more important determinant of how visible minority immigrants adapt to regional political norms remains to be explored.

INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

Conclusions

This investigation into the relationship between contemporary immigration and regionalism began by citing Mildred Schwartz's call for more research into how regional political cultures change, and how they are transmitted over time. As the birthrate in Canada continues to decline immigration becomes an increasingly important source of population replacement, as well as a potential source of change in Canada's regional political cultures.

This paper examined empirically whether contemporary immigration has the potential to transform regional political cultures, or whether regional cultures are simply reproduced within the diverse subpopulation of new arrivals. Our results are less ambiguous about the impact of immigration on regional political cultures than those reported by Elkins (1980). As it turns out, one central finding is that the transformative impact of immigration on regional political cultures is quite limited. Contemporary immigration only temporarily alters the overall distribution of opinions within each region, at least for the set of political attitudes examined in this paper. According to the World Values Survey data, within the first 10 years of residence in Canada, the attitudes of new Canadians are not carbon copies of their native born counterparts. There are, in fact, strong indications that immigrants initially develop their own distinctive orientations towards the Canadian political system regardless of the region in which they reside. This phenomenon is most striking for immigrants from visible minority backgrounds. Initially, in all three provinces examined, immigrants are less proud to be Canadian than local population, more satisfied with the federal government, evaluate more positively government responsiveness, and are more supportive of the Liberal Party. The reason why this is so has not been thoroughly investigated but different strands of socialization

theory suggest that this may be both a legacy of their pre-migration experiences and the results of their unique post-migration experiences with the Canadian political system.

A second significant finding emerging from this analysis is that the impact of immigration on the overall distribution of political opinion within a given region or province is short-lived. Even though there are initially differences between immigrants and the local population of each regional environment, immigrants already take on the characteristic hues of the dominant regional attitudinal patterns within the space of less than 10 years of residence. The cleavages observed between local populations of Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia are also observed between the immigrant populations of these three provinces. Evidence from the Canadian Election Studies indicates that in the long run immigrants become fully acculturated to regional political norms.

Third significant finding concerns the role of social networks. Interpersonal social networks, it seems, do play an important role in the dissemination of regional norms to immigrant Canadians. Within each region, differences between immigrants and the locally born population generally diminish as immigrants' social networks become denser, and this is especially the case for immigrants from a visible minority background. The primacy of local social networks in the development of political attitudes is well-documented. What this analysis provides is new empirical evidence of how dominant local norms are transmitted to newcomers, and this advances our understanding of why immigration fails to transform regional political cultures. At the same time, there is a clear need for further research on if and why post-migration social networks are particularly important to the adaptation of visible minority immigrants.

The main implication of these findings, taken together, is that immigration will likely not transform regional political cultures. Nor will it attenuate or accentuate regional cleavages. If flows of immigrants to Canada do not have a sustained impact on regional political cultures, then what other factors might transform regional differences in political outlooks? At least two possibilities we have not examined in this paper seem to merit attention. First, some researchers note that rising interregional mobility might also attenuate regional differences in Canadian political orientations (Schwartz 1974; Elkins 1980). The evidence presented here, however, suggests that this scenario may be somewhat unlikely. If migrants from other countries with very different political environments can adapt to regional norms, then why would migrants from within the Canadian political system behave any differently? A more promising prospect, perhaps, is that a shift from geographically concentrated to more geographically dispersed networks of social communication could attenuate regional cleavages. Baybeck & Huckfeldt, for example, contend that "lower density social networks created through spatially dispersed ties of association give rise to higher levels of political integration within the larger community" (2002, p. 217). The most significant finding of this exploration is that the movement of new people into old spaces has a minimal impact on regionalism: the arrival of new populations with diverse backgrounds does not diminish regional differences. It could be that, by making space less relevant, communication networks have the potential to powerfully transform regional political cultures. This is a possibility that requires some empirical investigation.

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Table 1: Regional Cleavages in the First 10 years in Canada (2000 World Values Survey – Canada)

	National Pride				Satisfaction with Federal Government				Negative Views about Government Responsiveness				Partisan Integration (Liberal Vote intention)			
	Local		Immigrants		Local		Immigrants		Local		Immigrants		Local		Immigrants	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Quebec (v. Ontario)	-.17	.02^a	-.11	.04^a	-.05	.02^a	.02	.02	-.29	.16	-.60	.29^b	-.67	.17^a	.06	.23
BC (v. Ontario)	-.05	.02^b	-.06	.03^b	-.11	.03^a	-.12	.02^a	.25	.24	.59	.27^b	-1.27	.29^a	-.33	.24
Age	.00	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^b	.00	.00	.01	.00	-.01	.00 ^b	-.00	.01	.01	.00	.00	.01
Education	-.04	.02 ^a	-.03	.03	.01	.02	-.00	.02	-.02	.14	-.47	.21 ^b	-.00	.14	-.28	.19
Female	.04	.02 ^b	-.04	.03	-.00	.02	-.01	.02	.18	.15	-.09	.20	-.25	.16	-.12	.18
Income	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.05	.03	-.00	.04	.05	.04	.04	.04
Employed	-.00	.02	-.04	.03	-.02	.02	-.00	.02	.21	.18	-.07	.26	-.16	.19	.07	.22
Ethnic Background																
Black			.11	.05 ^b			.07	.03 ^b			-.49	.41			.91	.35 ^b
South Asia			.11	.04 ^a			.10	.02 ^a			-.67	.31 ^b			.88	.26 ^a
East Asia			.04	.03			.08	.03 ^a			-.55	.29			.68	.25 ^a
Arabic			.06	.07			.02	.03			-1.07	.58			.99	.39 ^b
Latinos			.17	.11			.14	.04 ^a			-.06	.72			1.02	.74
Network	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^a	.02	.00 ^a	-.00	.00	-.12	.03 ^a	-.03	.04	.05	.03	.02	.04
Constant	.89	.06 ^a	.66	.11 ^a	.38	.06 ^a	.63	.07 ^a	1.46	.50 ^a	.97	.82	-.85	.53	.12	.76
Adjusted/Pseudo R-square	13.2		9.1		5.8		12.7		3.0		5.5		4.4		3.4	
N	813		590		793		564		820		590		820		590	

Source: 2000 Canadian section of the World Values Survey and its special sample of recent immigrants. See Appendix A for variable construction.

a: significant at .01-level; b: significant at .05-level (regressions with robust standard errors).

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “National Pride” and “Satisfaction with the federal government” and Logit estimates for “Views about government responsiveness and “Liberal vote intention”.

Table 2: Comparing Attitudes among Immigrant and Non-Immigrants by Province (2000 World Values Survey – Canada)

	National Pride						Satisfaction with Federal Government						Negative Views about Government Responsiveness						Partisan Integration (Liberal Vote intention)							
	Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario			
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE		
Immigrants																										
Visible Minority	.03	.04	-.10	.03^a	-.06	.02^a	.23	.02^a	.12	.03^a	.12	.02^a	-1.73	.32^a	-.94	.28^a	-1.45	.25^a	1.72	.26^a	1.42	.30^a	.79	.22^a		
Caucasian	-.08	.06			-.16	.04^a	.13	.03^a			.09	.03^a	-1.37	.44^a			-.89	.26^a	.92	.33^a			-.00	.24		
Age	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.02	.01 ^a	.01	.01	-.01	.01	.01	.00 ^b	-.00	.01	.00	.01		
Education	-.04	.02	-.02	.04	-.04	.02	.02	.02	.07	.03 ^b	-.02	.02	-.27	.18	-.36	.27	-.09	.18	-.10	.17	.25	.28	-.15	.17		
Female	.02	.03	-.02	.03	-.01	.02	.01	.02	-.02	.03	-.01	.02	.36	.19	-.31	.27	.05	.19	-.00	.19	.04	.29	-.42	.18 ^b		
Income	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.00	.01	.00	.02	-.00	.04	.02	.06	-.06	.04	.06	.04	.08	.06	.02	.03		
Employed	-.01	.03	-.05	.03	-.03	.02	-.03	.02	.01	.03	.00	.02	.28	.24	.09	.32	-.03	.25	-.21	.23	-.42	.33	.28	.23		
Social Network	.00	.00	.01	.00	.01	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^b	-.13	.04 ^a	-.05	.05	-.08	.04 ^b	.07	.04	.04	.05	.03	.04		
Constant	.64	.09 ^a	.84	.10 ^a	.92	.07 ^a	.23	.07 ^a	.28	.11 ^b	.56	.07 ^a	1.82	.66 ^a	1.43	.90	1.59	.69 ^b	-1.79	.64 ^a	-2.07	.98 ^b	-.24	.64		
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-square	6.1		9.0		9.3		19.4		10.8		9.7		12.5		5.9		8.3		8.8		9.0		3.8			
N	567		272		564		555		261		541		572		273		564		572		273		565			

Source: 2000 Canadian section of the World Values Survey and its special sample of recent immigrants. See Appendix A for variable construction.

a: significant at .01-level; b: significant at .05-level (regressions with robust standard errors).

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “National Pride” and “Satisfaction with the federal government” and Logit estimates for “Views about government responsiveness and “Liberal vote intention”.

Table 3: Regional Cleavages over the Long Haul (1993-2000 Canadian Election Studies)

	Feeling Toward Canada (0-1)				Regional Alienation (Province Receive less)				Negative Views about Government Responsiveness				Partisan Integration (Liberal Vote)			
	Local		Immigrants		Local		Immigrants		Local		Immigrants		Local		Immigrants	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Quebec (v. Ontario)	-.20	.01^a	-.08	.02^a	.50	.07^a	-.15	.24	.15	.07^b	-.15	.24	-.67	.08^a	.63	.33
BC (v. Ontario)	-.01	.01	-.02	.02	.87	.09^a	.50	.25^b	.22	.10^b	.48	.24^b	-.89	.12^a	-.77	.28^a
Female	.02	.01 ^a	.00	.02	-.01	.06	-.10	.20	.13	.07	.07	.19	.21	.08 ^b	.54	.26 ^b
Education	.01	.00	.03	.02	-.03	.06	.10	.18	-.29	.06 ^a	-.43	.19 ^b	-.13	.07	-.44	.24
Income	.00	.00	.00	.00	.02	.03	.04	.08	-.15	.03 ^a	-.15	.08	.02	.03	-.02	.10
Age	.01	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.01	.01	.00 ^b	.02	.01
Employed	.01	.01	.02	.02	.06	.07	.46	.24	.04	.08	.35	.23	.09	.09	.41	.29
Ethnic Background																
Jewish	.04	.03	.05	.04	.12	.48	-.23	.56	-.99	.49 ^b	-.22	.58	.24	.58	.62	.74
Middle East	.03	.09	.12	.04 ^a	-1.48	.99	-.22	.76	-1.69	1.33	-.65	.69	1.66	1.27	Na.	
Latin America	-.05	.09	-.00	.06	-.39	.66	-2.04	.99 ^b	.65	.82	-.30	.68	.31	.74	1.95	1.20
Eastern Europe	.02	.01	.01	.04	.27	.19	.07	.46	.03	.19	.46	.46	.16	.21	.71	.48
Southern Europe	.04	.02	.02	.04	-.02	.20	-.22	.42	.14	.20	-.63	.39	1.01	.26 ^a	1.09	.51 ^b
Asia	-.03	.04	-.02	.03	-.96	.37 ^a	-.29	.30	-.43	.35	-.15	.30	1.60	.43 ^a	1.72	.38 ^a
Black	.06	.06	.07	.04	2.00	1.23	.17	.46	-.92	1.51	-.48	.48	.82	1.17	Na.	
Western Europe	.00	.01	.04	.03	.06	.13	-.06	.38	.00	.14	.00	.36	-.16	.16	-.06	.40
Others	-.02	.01	.04	.03	.02	.11	.22	.31	.03	.12	.07	.31	-.18	.15	.95	.41 ^b
Election 1993	.01	.00 ^b	.08	.02 ^a	.08	.09	.85	.25 ^a	.48	.11 ^a	.68	.31 ^b	.11	.10	-.21	.29
Election 1997	-.00	.01	.06	.02 ^a	1.12	.07 ^a	1.91	.23 ^a	.05	.07	.09	.21	-.12	.09	-.41	.29
Constant	.77	.02 ^a	.64	.06 ^a	-1.60	.23 ^a	-2.16	.72 ^a	1.49	.24 ^a	1.76	.74 ^b	-.21	.29	.47	.98
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-square	18.8		12.6		6.8		13.7		2.7		4.5		3.9		11.6	
N	3852		466		4364		556		4200		543		2943		347	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000 Canadian Election Studies. See Appendix A for variable construction.

a: significant at .01 level; b: significant at .05 level (regressions with robust standard errors)

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “Feeling toward Canada” and Logit estimates for “Regional Alienation”, “Views about government responsiveness and “Liberal vote”.

Table 4: Comparing Attitudes among Immigrant and Non-Immigrants by Province (1993-2000 Canadian Election Studies)

	Feeling Toward Canada (0-1)						Regional Alienation (Province Receive less)						Negative Views about Government Responsiveness						Partisan Integration (Liberal Vote)					
	Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Immigrants																								
Visible Minority	.15	.03 ^a	-.06	.03 ^a	-.04	.02 ^b	-.69	.36	-.52	.32	.48	.22 ^b	-.74	.37 ^b	.20	.38	-.17	.23	2.62	.63 ^a	1.37	.38 ^a	1.34	.35 ^a
Caucasian	.12	.05 ^b	.02	.03	.00	.02	-1.00	.51 ^b	-.09	.33	.17	.27	-.36	.46	-.56	.35	.15	.26	2.08	.64 ^a	.34	.45	.05	.29
Female	.02	.01	.02	.01	.02	.01 ^a	.00	.09	.17	.14	-.13	.10	.09	.10	.06	.16	.19	.10	.21	.12	.23	.19	.21	.11
Education	.03	.01 ^a	.1	.01	.00	.01	.12	.08	-.16	.13	-.19	.10	-.23	.09 ^b	-.26	.16	-.52	.10 ^a	.00	.10	.04	.18	-.31	.11 ^a
Income	.00	.00	-.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.04	.11	.05 ^b	.04	.04	-.07	.04	-.25	.06 ^a	-.18	.04 ^a	.03	.05	-.05	.07	.02	.05
Age	.01	.00 ^a	.01	.00 ^b	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^b	.02	.00 ^a	.01	.00	.01	.01	.00	.00	.02	.00 ^a	-.01	.01	.00	.00
Employed	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.03	.10	.42	.17 ^b	.07	.13	.20	.11	.30	.19	-.19	.12	-.19	.13	.40	.22	.25	.13
1993 Election	.03	.01 ^b	.03	.01 ^a	.01	.01	-.93	.16 ^a	-.16	.19	1.5	.16 ^a	.38	.18 ^b	.21	.23	.70	.16 ^a	-.12	.16	-.19	.23	.33	.14 ^b
1997 Election	.00	.01	.02	.01	.01	.01	.99	.10 ^a	-.38	.16 ^b	2.5	.14 ^a	-.11	.10	.03	.17	.20	.11	-.11	.13	-.35	.22	.00	.13
Constant	.48	.04 ^a	.79	.04 ^a	.80	.02 ^a	-.87	.30 ^a	-.38	.47	-2.7	.38 ^a	1.22	.31 ^a	1.61	.55	2.38	.35 ^a	-1.35	.39 ^a	-.56	.66	.27	.41
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-square	3.5		2.5		1.9		7.5		2.1		17.7		1.4		3.2		4.9		3.9		3.7		2.0	
N	1845		771		1701		2172		858		1890		2116		812		1815		1386		598		1323	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000 Canadian Election Studies. See Appendix A for variable construction.

a: significant at .01 level; b: significant at .05 level (regressions with robust standard errors)

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “Feeling toward Canada” and Logit estimates for “Regional Alienation” “Views about government responsiveness and “Liberal vote”.

Table 5: Impact of Social Networks on Immigrants' Attitudes (2000 World Values Survey – Canada)

	National Pride						Satisfaction with Federal Government						Negative Views about Government Responsiveness						Partisan Integration (Liberal Vote intention)						
	Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		Quebec		BC		Ontario		
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	
Density of Immigrants' Social Network																									
Visible Weak	-.03	.10	-.16	.05^a	-.06	.07	.35	.06^a	.13	.05^a	.15	.04^a	-2.07	.78^a	-1.18	.53^b	-1.86	.67^a	2.54	.71^a	1.58	.54^a	1.45	.61^b	
Minority Med.	-.02	.06	-.11	.04^b	-.05	.03	.24	.03^a	.13	.04^a	.15	.02^a	-2.04	.50^a	-1.02	.38^a	-1.37	.33^a	1.85	.34^a	1.28	.38^a	.67	.30^b	
Immigrants Strong	.10	.05	-.06	.04	-.06	.03^b	.18	.04^a	.11	.04	.09	.03^a	-1.32	.44^a	-.71	.41	-1.40	.36^a	1.34	.37^a	1.45	.42^a	.77	.31^b	
Caucasian Weak Immigrants	-.03	.06			-.13	.08	.12	.05^a			.07	.05	-.82	.49			-.80	.48	.44	.42			-.54	.47	
Med.	Na				-.23	.06^a					.10	.03^a					-.96	.38^b	1.75	.57^a			.30	.35	
Strong	-.16	.11			-.11	.05^b	.13	.05^a			.08	.05					-.87	.43					.00	.39	
Age	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.02	.00 ^a	.00	.01	-.01	.00	.01	.00 ^b	-.01	.01	.00	.01	
Education	-.04	.02	-.01	.04	-.03	.02	.02	.02	.07	.03 ^b	-.02	.02	-.28	.18	-.34	.28	-.09	.20	-.09	.17	.25	.26	-.17	.18	
Female	.02	.03	-.03	.03	.00	.01	.01	.02	-.01	.03	-.04	.02	.39	.20 ^b	-.32	.27	.06	.19	-.05	.19	.04	.28	-.44	.18 ^b	
Income	.00	.00	.01	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	-.00	.00	.00	.00	-.00	.04	-.02	.05	-.06	.04	.06	.04	.08	.06	.02	.03	
Employed	-.00	.03	-.05	.03	-.03	.02	-.04	.02	.00	.03	.00	.03	.31	.24	.09	.33	-.04	.24	-.26	.23	-.42	.33	.33	.23	
Social Network	.00	.01	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^a	.02	.00 ^a	.00	.00	.01	.00 ^b	-.13	.04 ^a	-.08	.07	-.09	.05	.08	.05	.04	.07	.03	.05	
Constant	.64	.09	.87	.10 ^a	.94	.07 ^a	.25	.07 ^a	.27	.12 ^b	.55	.05 ^a	1.81	.66 ^a	1.59	.92	1.63	.70 ^b	-1.83	.64 ^a	-2.05	.99 ^a	-.26	.65	
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-square	7.2		9.6		10.3		20.2		10.9		20.6		11.9		6.0		8.3		9.8		9.1		4.3		
N	567		272		564		555		261		541		556		273		565		572		273		565		

Source: 2000 Canadian section of the World Values Survey and its special sample of recent immigrants. See Appendix A for variable construction.

a: significant at .01-level; b: significant at .05-level (regressions with robust standard errors).

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “National Pride” and “Satisfaction with the federal government” and Logit estimates for “Views about government responsiveness and “Liberal vote intention”.

Appendix A Construction of Variables

2000 World Values Survey (Canada) and its special sample of recent immigrants

Pride to be Canadian	0 to 1 scale where 1 means respondents express a lot of pride at being Canadian and 0 no pride at all.
Satisfaction with the federal government	0 to 1 scale where 1 means respondent satisfied are completely satisfied with the federal government and 0 means they are not satisfied at all.
Views about government responsiveness	Dichotomous variable where 1 means respondents believe that the government is run by a few big interested looking for themselves and 0 means respondents believe that the government is run for the interest of all the people.
Liberal Vote Intention	Dichotomous variable where 1 means respondents would vote Liberal if an election was held today and 0 otherwise.
Immigrants from a visible minority background	Immigrants from non-Caucasian ethnic background. Includes who report being either from a black, South Asian, East Asian, Latino or Arabic background.
Education	Highest degree attained.
Age	Age in years.
Female	1 = female, 0 = male.
Income	Household income on a 10 point scale
Employed	1 = full time or part time employed, 0 = all others.
Social Network	Scale from 0 to 1 indicating the extent to which respondents spend time with the following: friend, colleagues outside of work, people in groups and organizations, and people in church or religious organizations. 1 indicates respondents spend a lot of time and 0 indicates they spend no time at all.

1993-2000 Canadian Election Studies

Thermometer for Canada	0-100 scale where 1 means respondents feel quite positively toward Canada and 0 means they feel quite negatively.
Regional Alienation	Dichotomous variable where 1 means respondents believe that their province receive less than other provinces from the federal government.
Views about govt. responsiveness	Dichotomous variable where 1 means respondents believe that politicians do not care about people like them and 0 otherwise.
Liberal Vote	Dichotomous variable where 1 means respondents report having voted Liberal and 0 means they voted for another party.
Immigrants from a visible minority background	Immigrants from non-Caucasian ethnic background. Includes who report being either from a black, South Asian, East Asian, Latino or Arabic background.
Education	Highest degree attained.
Age	Age in years.
Female	1 = female, 0 = male.
Income	Household income in quintiles
Employed	1 = full time or part time employed, 0 = all others.

Appendix B: The Canadian Election Studies

Title	Principal Investigators	Data Collection	Distribution
2000 World Values Survey (Canada - including the New Immigrant Sample)	Neil Nevitte	Canadian Facts	The Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
2000 Canadian Election Study	André Blais Elisabeth Gidengil Richard Nadeau Neil Nevitte	Institute for Social Research (ISR), York University	Data available from the CES website: http://www.ces-ecp.umontreal.ca/ces.html
1997 Canadian Election Study	André Blais Elisabeth Gidengil Richard Nadeau Neil Nevitte	ISR	
1993 Canadian Election Study	André Blais Henry E. Brady Elisabeth Gidengil Richard Johnston Neil Nevitte	ISR	ISR; ICPSR