Deterrence, Protective and Preventive International Interventions in Civil War Contexts

Bridging the Gap between International Relations and Comparative Politics in the Study of Conflict Resolution

by

Fernando A. Chinchilla
(Ph.D. Candidate, University of Montreal)

Paper presented to the panel:
‘Violence, Democracy, and Political Trends in the Global South’
Annual Congress of the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA)

(Working paper. Not for citation)

This work is carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada. Information on the Centre is available on the web at http://www.idrc.ca. Comments and suggestions can be addressed to fernando.chinchilla@umontreal.ca

London (Ontario), June 3rd, 2005

1. Fernando Chinchilla is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Montreal, Canada. The author would like to thank M.Sc. Anna Victor (University of Montreal), who worked on the final version of this document.
Abstract

Why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence than others? This essay shows that the success or failure of peace missions depends, to an important extent, on the internal balance of power. As indicated in the first section, defining possible risks and obstacles to peace, that is, diagnosing internal power relations prior to the deployment of international interventions, in order to determine what is possible and what is not, could increase the probabilities of success of international peace interventions. However, bridging the gap between International Relations and Comparative Politics approaches requires a new classification of international peace operations, based on their impact on the ‘balance of power’. This ‘new’ typology, explained in detail in the second section, is constituted by three categories: deterrence, which causes an increasing of the costs of wars, protection, that diminishes the costs of peace, and prevention, designed to enhance the benefits of peace. The main arguments are supported by examples from the UN’s experiences in conflict resolution in Angola and Mozambique.

Key words:
Deterrence; protection; prevention; hard-line actors; soft-line actors; balance of power; uncertainty; risk; institutions;

On April 4th, 2002, ten years after the burst of the Bicesse’s peace process, the long and deadly Angolan civil war was ending again. By agreeing to replace the third and fourth annexes of the Lusaka Protocol, the signatories of the Luena Accords consented to the implementation of a cease-fire calling for, among other things, an amnesty law for all crimes committed during the armed conflict, the demobilization and disbanding of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) military forces, the reintegration of the UNITA officials and its ordinary fighters in both, the governmental Movimento Popular de Lebertação de Angola’s (MPLA) army and the national police, and the vocational reintegration of demobilized personnel into national life.2

2. Signed in November 20, 1994, the Lusaka Protocol was a number of documents covering legal, military, police and political issues of the peace negotiations, as well as the role on the United Nations in the pacification process. Concretely, the protocol provided for a cease-fire, the integration of the UNITA officers into an unified Angolan forces, demobilization (and demilitarization) under United Nations supervision, and others. For further details, International Crisis Group, Angola: Exorcising Savimbi’s Ghost; Human Rights Watch, Angola, Between War
The Luena Accords are, in fact, the last episode in a long series of efforts made by the international community to bring peace to Angola. Initially, the United Nations Angola’s Verification Mission, known as UNAVEM I, was mandated, in December 1988, to verify the retreat of the 50,000 Cuban MPLA supporters’ troops, a goal which was achieved in June 1991, but which did not impeed the re-eruption of war. After the signature of the Bicesse Accords in 1991, which provided for a new cease-fire and a peace process, UNAVEM II was established to supervise and verify their implementation. Talks in Addis Ababa (at the beginning of 1993), in Abidjan (between April and May, 1993), and Lusaka (October, 1993), followed the October 1992 resumption of war. UNAVEM III, and, after 1997, the Missão de Observação das Nações Unidas em Angola

---

3. Angola’s civil war was preceded by a 14 year-anti-colonial effort of three nationalists movements, the MPLA, UNITA, and the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA), against Portuguese rule. After independence (November, 1975), MPLA toke control of Luanda, the capital. A long and deadly civil war, principally between UNITA and MPLA, erupted as a consequence of the chaotic decolonization process, which kept from these groups establishing a power-sharing post-colonial arrangement. Estimates of the human costs of war are difficult to establish. However, it is calculated that more than a million people have died as a result of the war. In addition, according to the United Nations High Commissary for Refugees (UNHCR), more than 500,000 refugees were living in four neighboring countries in 2002. In the same vein, the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) estimated internal displaced persons to four millions. International Crisis Group, Angola: Exorcising Savimbi’s Ghost, http://www.currenthistory.com/org_pdf_files/102/664/102_664_206.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2005. Steve Utterwelghe, ‘Field Report. Conflict Management in Complex Humanitarian Situations: Peacemaking and Peace-building Work with Angolan IDPs’, Journal of Refugee Studies, Vol. 17, 2 (2004), 222-223; Assis Malaquias, ‘Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend: the impact of illicit wealth on insurgency strategy’, Third World Quarterly, 22, 3 (2001), 319.

4. UNAVEM I represent what is called a ‘traditional peacekeeping mission’, that is, in the words of Diehl (2001), ‘the stationing of neutral, lightly armed troops with the permission of the host state(s) as an interposition force following a cease-fire to separate combatants and promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution’. The UNAVEM’s mandate can be explained by an incomplete diagnosis of the causes of the Angolan civil war. It was understood that Angola was the theatre of a Cold-War confrontation. Involved sovereign states (the United States, the Soviet Union, South Africa and Cuba) came to the conclusion that the removal of external triggers would be sufficient to stop the war. Subsequently, UNAVEM I was a very small UN mission, consisting only in seventy unarmed military observers supported by some civilian staff. Norrie MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola’, The Journal of African Studies, 36, 3 (1998), 400-401; Paul. F. Diehl, ‘Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping’, in Paul F. Diehl, ed., The Politics of Global Governance. International Organizations in an Interdependent World. (Boulder : Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 217. Ian S. Spear ‘Angola, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Civil Wars’, http://www.dw.angonet.org/Peacebuilding/Activities/WORDdocsMaputo/AngolaTheUNAndTheChallengeOfCivilWars.doc. Accessed April 22, 2005.
(MONUA) tried to bring peace to Angola, but war erupted yet again. Finally, on October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council authorized the deployment of the United Nations Office in Angola (UNOA), in order to ‘explore effective measures for restoring peace, assist the Angolan people in the area of capacity building, humanitarian assistance, and the promotion of human rights.\footnote{5}{United Nations, United Nations and Angola \url{http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/Angola.pdf}. Accessed April 22, 2005.}

In the meantime, United Nations established, through the Security Council resolution 797 (1992) a ‘successful’ peace operation in Mozambique. Indeed, the Operação das Nações Unidas em Moçambique (ONUMOZ) succeeded in its task to push to the bargaining table the Frente de Libertaçao de Mozambique’s (FRELIMO) government, and the Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana’s (RENAMO) guerrilla movement.\footnote{6}{FRELIMO is the result of the unification of three independence movements, the Mozambique African National Uniot (MANU), the Uniao Nacional de Moçambique (UNAMI) and de Uniao Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (UDENAMO). In 1962, leaders from the newly Organization of African Unity (OAU) pushed for the creation of broad-based national movements to complete the decolonization process. In this context, Dr. Eduardo Mondlane, a respected intellectual, became president of FRELIMO. In 1975, FRELIMO attained victory over Portugal and declared Mozambican independence in June. In 1977, the Mozambique government declared its allegiance to Marxism-Leninism. Threatened by a socialist black-majority government in the region, Rhodesia and South Africa agreed on the necessity of the creation of a counter-revolutionary movement, RENAMO, in the late 1970s. When Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, the new government stopped the financing of RENAMO. South Africa then assumed the founding and training of RENAMO soldiers. For a detailed explanation, see Pekka Virtanen, ‘Defining the “Other”: Democracy in Mozambique Within. A Historical Perspective’, African and Asian Studies, 2, 3 (2003), 243, 246; Carrie Manning, ‘Armed Opposition Groups into Political Parties: Comparing Bosnia, Kosovo, and Mozambique’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 39, 1 (2004), 56.} The differences between Angola and Mozambique regarding the processes of conflict resolution is amazing. Indeed, both Angolan and Mozambican conflicts carried on for decades after an independence struggle with Portuguese colonial rule. In addition, both the MPLA and FRELIMO governments won important battles, but both UNITA and RENAMO guerrillas achieved control over large parts of the Angolan and Mozambican territories. Therefore, all sides in both countries were supported by external actors. Finally, an apparent ‘ripe moment’ emerged in both cases in the late 1980s, when the Cold War ended. Under these circumstances, one question
deserves to be addressed comprehensively: why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence than others?

In this essay, I argue that the successes and failures of peace operations depend, to an important extent, on the adaptability of international interventions with to the internal balance of power. As indicated in the first section, defining possible risks and obstacles to peace, that is, diagnosing internal power relations prior to the deployment of international interventions, in order to determine what is possible and what is not, could increase the probabilities of success. Bridging the gap between International Relations and Comparative Politics approaches requires, however, a new classification of international interventions, based on their impact on the ‘balance of power’. This ‘new’ typology, explained in detail in the second section, is constituted by three categories: deterrence, protection and prevention.

1. Success and Failures of International Interventions

Why are some international interventions more effective in ‘preventing’ new waves of violence than others? As explained in this section, there is at least two ways to respond to this question. On the one hand, by focusing on ‘external variables’, scholars have implicitly suggested that peace operations are hard to compare because they are deployed in very different contexts. It also has been argued that only ‘balanced’ or ‘neutral’ interventions have high probabilities of success. Finally, failures could be the result of imprecise mandates.  

hand, by focusing on ‘internal variables’, analyses have explored the conditions for the emergence of ‘ripe moments’. Issues such as the indivisibility of stakes in game, as well as the rational calculus of combatants, have been explored.

1.1. Analytical Ambiguity, Proliferation of Concepts

International Relations studies focusing on the ‘effectiveness’ of international peace interventions have explained their results in at least three ways. First, the search for peace has been viewed as an ad hoc technique. From this perspective, a civil war is defined as a unique event related to each country’s cultural and historical distinctiveness. Subsequently, international interventions should be adapted to specific situations and should avoid ‘occidental’ normative diagnostics.\(^8\) By underlying a central point in the understanding of effectiveness of peace missions (the necessity to detect particular risks and challenges), the analyses generated by this research agenda suffer from one central weakness: the absence of a comparative basis that would permit the elaboration of more general theoretical propositions.

Second, in the ‘mediation perspective’, researchers have suggested that analyses must relate goals to deployed means and to the degree of difficulty of each mission. It is not the same to launch a peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, where 120,000 soldiers were deployed, than to do the same thing in Guatemala, where only 1500 – 3000 soldiers, almost in a state of military collapse, were present.\(^9\) Subsequently, some researches have proposed to evaluate results in relation to the accomplishment of mandates. Under this criterion, missions as

---

UNAVEM I are dazzling, even if inaccurate mandates did little or nothing to end an internal conflict.10

Even if mandates are an essential aspect of an international peace mission’s success, the conclusions from this research agenda remain unclear. For example, while Collier, Hoeffler and Soderbom (1999) suggest that only ‘balanced (or neutral) interventions’, which do not favor any belligerents, can eventually succeed, while Regan and Stam conclude that diplomacy is important, but not necessary and probably not sufficient to resolve civil wars.11 At this point, Brahimi suggests that UN impartiality must be defined vis-à-vis the principles of the Charter: ‘Where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in best case result in ineffectiveness...’12

If the idea of an intervention was to increase the probabilities of success in reaching ‘peace’, proposing to apply ‘sticks and carrots’ is not sufficient. It is also necessary to determine which actor would receive sticks and which one must be rewarded.13 In December 1998, the Angolan government formally asked the Security Council to withdraw MONUA, considered ineffective in monitoring

UNITA’s disarmament and demobilization.\textsuperscript{14} This experience shows that a ‘neutral’ attitude could provoke a loss of legitimacy in United Nations missions.

Third, typologies of different types of peace missions have been proposed. The problem here is that there is not an academic inter-subjective consensus about the pertinence and validity of these suggestions. Hence, besides to the UN’s former Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, scholars like Durch, identified four types of international interventions.\textsuperscript{15} However, authors like Bellamy, Williams and Griffin have proposed a typology constituted by five categories while Demurenko and Nikiting found seven different types of international interventions.\textsuperscript{16} Today, we are witnessing an explosion of terms and typologies, which aim to describe the missions’ mandates. It is not my intention to present here an exhaustive account on this issue. However, it is important to underline that at the theoretical level, the obvious consequence of this conceptual proliferation is analytical ambiguity. If one defines, for instance, ‘peacebuilding’ as actions ‘...to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’, this could refer, among others, to disarmament and demobilization, (democratic) institutional construction or reconstruction, or even putting in place conditions that make possible sustainable economic development.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{14} Spears, ‘Angola, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Civil Wars’.
\textsuperscript{17} This definition of ‘peacebuilding’ is based on Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for peace’. According to Andy Knight, the effectiveness of international interventions had been linked to the resolution of the causes of civil wars. Hence, if one argues that the main causes of civil wars are political, peacebuilding should focus on the construction/reconstruction permanent peaceful conflict resolution’s institutions. However, if one views the relapse into violence as the result of an overabundance of arms, peacebuilding should be directed to suppress available armament. Finally, if sustainable peace is linked to developmental issues, peacebuilding should concentrate
Without a doubt, conceptual proliferation is an obstacle to generating a comprehensive view of successes and failures in international interventions. Therefore, few classifications focus explicitly on the impact of international interventions in variables such as the interests in game at the local level. Finally, there is not a clear definition of what constitutes a ‘success’ and what is a ‘failure’ as most scholars do not offer clear operational definitions of these results. Indeed, an enumeration of possible variables affecting successes and failures of international interventions is not enough to make intelligible interactions between structural conditions, perceptions, and choices.\(^1\) For this reason, the classification proposed here, constituted by three categories (deterrence, protective and preventive interventions), is related to the effects of international interventions on internal variables, such as the internal balance of power and the emergence of ‘ripe moments’.

1.2. Internal Power Relations and the Emergence of ‘Ripe Moments’

Comparative Politics specialists in conflict resolution have affirmed that international peace operations have a greater chance of ‘success’ when conflicts are ‘ripe for resolution’. In its original formulation, a ‘ripe moment’ emerges in situations of deadlock and deadline, in which parties who were predominant lost influence and other actors gain power. In short, a ‘ripe moment’ arises when actors who prefer multilateral solutions are able to impose themselves over actors who prefer unilateral solutions.\(^2\) From this starting point, scholars have followed on activities allowing economic growth (programs of reintegration, development of micro-credit projects, improve health and education, and others). Obviously, these tasks are not mutually exclusive. However, multiple meanings provoke a loss of specificity of the concept of peacebuilding. Therefore, even at this specific level, concurrent classifications have also been suggested. For example, Ricigliano proposes a typology constituted by ‘political peacebuilding’ (peacemaking, formal peace processes, reaching agreements, etc.), ‘social peacebuilding’ (radio soap operas that break stereotypes, truth and reconciliation commissions, and other strategies that affect held perceptions and attitudes), and ‘structural peacekeeping’ (rule of law, development assistance to redistribute economic assets and alleviate economic deprivations that lead to conflict, among others). Robert Ricigliano, ‘Networks of Effective Action: Implementing an Integrated Approach to Peacebuilding’, \textit{Security Dialogue}, 34, # 4 (2003), 447.


two roads. They have proposed typologies of civil wars to explain why some civil wars are more difficult to resolve than others. They have also applied rational choice models and focused on issues such as the divisibility-indivisibility of the stakes in game. These proposals have also failed to produce a comprehensive view of successes and failures in international peace operations.

On the one hand, what I call ‘traditional dichotomies’ (intra-inter state wars, and ethnic-ideological wars) have produced two kinds of ‘inflexible’ points of view. First, it has been suggested that inter-state wars turn around divisible interests while intra-state wars are confrontations between actors who defend indivisible interests. On the other hand, interests in game have been linked to the ‘nature’ – ethnic versus ideological – of civil wars. Here, the logic works as follows: when identity factors trigger ethnic wars, the conflict resolution is usually a more difficult task than when conflicts are ideologically motivated.

---


Linking the interests in game during a conflict exclusively to the ‘nature’ of civil wars, calling it internal, external, ethnic or ideological, generates static views that neglect the dynamic and fluctuant nature of civil wars. Not only external actors can influence domestic politics, as the involvement of South Africa, Cuba, the URSS and the United States showed in the Angolan ‘internal’ civil war, but also interests in game during a civil war change, even when natural resources are not available; ‘Over time, the war in Mozambique grew more complex. The war began to take on a different character from province to province; breakaway movements formed; and the original reasons for the conflict lost their significance as new participants saw opportunities for gain in the perpetuation of disruption’²²

Four additional points must be underlined here. First, it is not easy to establish a clear difference among ethnic, ideological, internal, and external factors. Second, the relation between ethnic-ideological, and inter-intra civil wars, on the one hand, and divisibility-indivisibility of interests, on the other hand, is not obvious. Third, there is no consensus about the nature of ethnic identities and the role of external factors in civil wars. Finally, suggesting that ethnic or intra-state wars centre on indivisible interests is like arguing that, by definition, a ethnic civil war cannot be resolved.²³ In Angola, for example, in addition to external factors, ethnic cleavages also existed, as Bacondo people backed the FNLA while UNITA represented the Ovimbundu from the central highlands. Therefore, Mbundu and mestiços (from the capital and other coastal cities) supported the MPLA. Even more, an ideological cleavage was also present, as the opposition fought against the Marxist-Leninist MPLA’s government.²⁴

²³. Ethnic identifications can be used for political goals, as well as ethnicity being a particular conception of a political or social group. In the same vein, it is also possible to suggest that conflicts are a result of the subjective evaluation of actors. For example, Sisk suggest that ethnicity is a social construct, more malleable and flexible than some researchers would admit. Timothy D. Sisk, ‘Ethnic Conflict. Approaches, Patterns, and Dynamics’, in Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), 13.
From a rational choice’s perspective, a ‘ripe moment’ arrives when benefits of peace are more important than benefits of war, or when costs of peace are less significant that costs of war. Basically, fighters can change their order of preferences in three ways. First, according to the ‘hurting stalemate’ and ‘imminent mutual catastrophe’ models, a conflict is ripe for resolution when actors foresee an accumulation of costs bigger than anticipated costs (if war is prolonged), and when fighters estimate a reduction of the probabilities of obtaining a military victory. In the second scenario, even in those conditions, belligerents could prefer continuing fighting. The ‘entrapment model’ explains this apparent irrational behavior, by suggesting that opponents can justify their military preferences in terms of ‘rewards’ (the possible gains give good reasons for sacrifices), ‘achieved efforts’ (‘investments’ could become, in a path-dependency logic, costs and sacrifices), ‘punishment’ (the adversary must pay for its actions), and ‘the final effort logic’ (all resources would be invested in a final attempt directed to wear away the enemy). Finally, the ‘enticiting opportunity’ model, based not in the augmentation of the costs of war, but in the increase of benefits from peace, opens explicitly the door to international peace interventions. In this view, peace missions could produce a change in the strategic order of preferences of actors, who re-evaluate costs and benefits of different alternatives, and finally choose negotiation. In short, a ripe moment can be created by increasing the ‘size of the cake’, that is, identifying new options and alternatives.

25. Originally, the ‘hurting stalemate’ and ‘imminent mutual catastrophe’ propositions are two distinct models. However, both of them suggest that a ‘ripe moment’ arrives when actors cannot engage necessary resources to win the war, and are simultaneously unable to avoid a heavy loss in ending the war. Walter, ‘The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement’, 347. Hence, the only difference between them is how costs are accumulated. For a detailed discussion, see Chirstopher R. Mitchell, Cutting Losses: Reflections On Appropriate Timing (George Mason University: Institute for Analysis and Resolution, ICAR). http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mico1. Accessed Mars 15, 2003, 2-3.
27. According to Lax and Sebenius (1986) ‘Especially in complex, protracted negotiations, new information and interpretations may become available about the external environment and about the bargaining situation itself (the real interests, aspirations, and tactics of other participants;
And what about the balance of power in the internal political spectrum? At this point, it is important to underline that rational choice studies have neglected the political dimension of the ‘ripe moment’ concept. For this reason, I would like to reintroduce the premise according to which the internal political arena is composed of two kinds of actors: extremist governmental and non-governmental actors (Hard-liners and Radicals), and moderate governmental and non-governmental actors (Soft-liners and Reformers).

Subjective probabilities of reaching different outcomes; as well as the likely costs in money, energy, and time required for a settlement. Thus, decision on the extent and intensity moves to affect alternatives should be conditioned by current assessments of the bargaining’s future course. Lax and Sebenius, quoted by Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War. International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980.

28. The ‘objective’ emergence of a ripe moment, measured in terms of an unhealthy stalemate or equilibrium/disequilibrium of military forces, among others, could or could not have an impact on the probabilities of conflict resolution. Masson and Fett (1996) conclude that elements like equilibrium (or disequilibrium) of forces, the increase of costs of war or the type of civil war do not have incidence over the probabilities of conflict resolution. This could be explained, at least in part, by the fact that military equilibrium is less important in a guerrilla war than in a conventional confrontation. Indeed, ‘Guerrilla war refers to military conflicts using unconventional tactics. Historically this has been the preferred tool of small, weaker insurgents involved in combat against much larger and stronger conventional armies. Guerrilla fighters are usually irregular forces who possess neither weapons nor the training to engage in a conventional war to achieve their political objectives. This mismatch, however, is not always disadvantageous to guerrilla forces. First, this type of warfare is much cheaper to conduct. Second, guerrillas have an important edge because they generally control the tempo of fighting: they choose when and where to strike’. See T. David Mason, and Patrick J. Fett. ‘How Civil Wars End. A Rational Choice Approach’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 4 (1996), 549-552; 558-562; Malaquias, ‘Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend’, 315; Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War. International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980, 4-5.

As long as Hard-liners and Radicals prevail over Soft-liners and Reformists war will probably continue, even if both the cost of war and the probabilities of defeat increase. In this ‘winner takes all’ scenario, in which the balance of power favors actors who defend perceived indivisible interests in a zero-sum game’s logic, the confrontation will be hard to stop. In Angola, an intensification of fighting and a sudden increase of violations of the cease-fire in the late November and December 1994 followed the signing of the Lusaka Protocol; ‘Military hard-liners on both sides were unenthusiastic about the agreement. On the government side particularly, military advances during 1993 and 1994 encouraged a “one more push” mentality which looked to the final defeat of an feeble UNITA. On the other side, a number of UNITA generals saw the agreement as the beginning of the end for the movement’.30 Conflicts such as Bosnia, Croatia, Rwanda, Burundi, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chechnya, Tajikistan and Sri Lanka are also situations in which groups identify each other as a threat to their own survival.31

When moderates impose themselves over extremists, probabilities for peace, and subsequently for the success of international interventions, increases. This situation can be explained by two key transactions made by moderate actors, which are unfeasible for hard-line fighters. First, Soft-liners accept to implement institutional reforms that bring military power under the ‘Rule of law’. In turn, guerrillas demobilize and agree to transform into political parties. Second, in conceding the legalization of revolutionary actors, Soft-liners weaken radical positions while Reformers lessen the legitimacy of Hard-liner positions. In short, a ‘ripe moment’ arises when moderate actors, which do not conceive stakes as a zero-sum game, impose their views over radical groups, by establishing a negotiated set of rules of the game. Far from the MPLA’s self-interest and corrupt attitude and Savimbi’s personalistic and greedy behavior, scholars have related

31. Kaufmann, ‘Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’.
the success of international intervention in Mozambique to the FRELIMO and RENAMO’s willingness to compromise.\(^3\)

The central question here is how to recognize a moderate actor from an extremist one? One option is to adopt a strategic view arguing that radical actors are willing to defend their interests by all necessary means (including hostilities) while moderate actors actively seek a negotiated settlement. Another option is to employ a definition based on risk aversion. From this perspective, while radical actors are insensitive to risks, moderates are much more careful. Thus, if a moderate were to interpret negotiation as a more dangerous option than, for example, prolonging war, this moderate would choose a bellicose strategy to defend its interests.\(^3\)

In this essay, I would like to propose the following definition of extremism and moderation: an actor \(x\) is ‘extremist’ if it is willing to use all possible strategies, including the use of force, to impose on the other political actors a set of rules of the game that protects its own interests. An actor \(x\) is ‘moderate’ if it is willing to use all possible strategies, including the use of force, to establish a bargained set of rules of the game that protects the interests of all internal political actors. Linking strategic actors’ choices and perceived risks to institutional variables is highly advantageous in analytical terms. According to Fred-Mensah,

‘...the major role of institutions in a society is to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable structure to human interaction (...) Thus, by reducing the costs of gathering information, monitoring, negotiating, enforcing contracts, and settling disputes, among others, institutions enable actors and agents to transform uncertainty into risks. This is


because “uncertainty cannot ascertain the probability of an event and therefore cannot arrive at a way of insuring against such and occurrence”, whereas risks “implies the ability to make an actuarial determination of the likelihood of an event and hence insure against such an outcome”\textsuperscript{34}

In a highly uncertain political environment or, using the International Relations’ terminology, in an ‘anarchic’ context, that is, where rules of the game do not exist, as in the case of civil wars, international conflict resolution interventions take on the role of a ‘temporary set of rules’ aimed to arrange interactions between actors in order to achieve peace.\textsuperscript{35} Those who are willing to call for, and accept these temporary constraints, are defined here as ‘moderate actors’. Those who avoid self-constraint are conceptualized as ‘extremists actors’. In Angola, 130 separate violations to the cease-fire between May and June 1995, as well as the use of dilatory tactics to postpone the quartering schedule, have been monitored by the United Nations. In this context, it is clear that extremist actors controlled the internal political agenda.\textsuperscript{36} For this reason, international peace operations should both, protect and strengthen moderate actors (disposed to bargain their ‘divisible’ interests), and weak those extremists who defend ‘indivisible interests’.

2. **Deterrence, Protective and Preventive International Missions**

The typology proposed in this essay (deterrence, protective, and preventive tasks), improves the understanding of the impact of international interventions at the local level. Concretely, by increasing the costs of war, deterrence interventions prevent the eruption of violence, its reactivation, or stop

\textsuperscript{34} Ben K. Fred-Mensah, ‘Social Capital Building as Capacity for Postconflict Development: The UNDP in Mozambique and Rwanda’, *Global Governance*, 10 (2004), 442.

\textsuperscript{35} A peace agreement provides an institutional framework to bring peace. ‘It is important that not only the details of the cease-fire and dealt with, but also the specifics of the disarmament process, the political and social reforms and the conditions and management of demobilization and reintegration support. The Rome Peace Accord created such a framework in Mozambique and included an agreement on the role of ONUMOZ. This made it possible to overcome the sensitive disputes between formerly warring parties. The attempted 1991-1992 demobilization in Angola, on the other hand, was disrupted because the process was not well outlined. Kees Kingma, ‘Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life’, *Policy Sciences*, 30 (1997), 160.

\textsuperscript{36} MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola’, 411.
an existing confrontation. Protective interventions create a political environment that encourages dialogue and agreement, by a reduction of the costs of peace. Yet, preventive interventions focus on preventing new waves of violence by instituting a *Rule of Law* that should be respected by all political actors, that is an inclusive and universal set of institutions that increases the benefits of peace.37

2.1. Deterrence International Interventions

The main objective of deterrence international interventions is not to push actors to sign a ‘peace agreement’, but to force the cessation of hostilities or to avoid a reactivation of violence. Frequently deployed in radicalized political environments, deterrence interventions usually need to use force to provoke a reduction of violence. Missions such as preventive deployments, interventions in support of democracy, pacification missions, and sanctions enforcement can all increase the costs of war.38

In some cases, especially when natural resources trigger benefits from war, increasing the costs of war to a superior level in relation to its benefits, could be a hard task to achieve. Today, there is a widespread consensus about the importance of oil and diamonds in the duration of Angola’s internal conflict. Not only oil money funded the purchase of state’s military equipment – five billions US dollars were spent between 1993 and 1994 to construct a powerful army able

37. This classification does not include interventions such as *Collective Enforcement* (a large-scale military operation designed to defend the victims of international aggression and restore peace and security by defeating aggressor state forces), *Humanitarian Assistance during the Conflict* (the transportation and distribution of life-sustaining food and materials and medical supplies, in coordination with local and international NGOs to threatened populations during a civil or interstate war), and ‘*Transitional Civil Administrations*’, where the UN is asked to assume the normal administrative tasks of a state bureaucracy. See Diehl, ‘Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping’, 217; and Brahimi, ‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations’.

38. *Preventive deployments* are defined as stationing troops between two combatants to deter the onset or prevent the spread of war; *Interventions in support of democracy* include military operations intended to overthrow existing leaders and to support freely elected government officials or an operation intended to protect extant and threatened democratic governments; by *Pacification* one means quelling civil disturbances, defeating local armed groups, forcibly separating belligerents, and maintaining law and order in an interstate war, civil war, or domestic riot. Finally, *Sanctions enforcement* implies the use of military troops to guard transit points, intercept contraband, or punish a state for transgressions. See Diehl, ‘Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping’, 217.
to lead military actions aimed at weakening the UNITA’s support in some regions but also contributed to maintain the Angolan nomenklatura’s high lifestyle.\textsuperscript{39} Equally important, the availability of alluvial diamonds allowed UNITA to acquire an expansive weapon system, which made possible the sustained return to war decided by Savimbi after the contested results of 1992 elections.\textsuperscript{40}

It is in these circumstances that the United Nations deployed, through U.N. Security Council resolution 696 (May 30, 1991) UNAVEM II, a very feeble, understaffed and under-funded mission created to monitor a cease-fire between the parties and the Angolan police without enforcement tools for deterrence (at its best, 350 military observers and 126 police observers constituted UNAVEM II).\textsuperscript{41} In March 1992, the UNAVEM II’s mandate was extended by resolution 747, in order to observe and monitor the elections of September 1992.\textsuperscript{42} However, it was too late to redress the process. Here, authors such as McMullin argue that one of the reasons of the failure of UNAVEM II was the lack of alternative of employment for MPLA and UNITA former combatants, coupled to weaknesses in the process of disarmament.\textsuperscript{43} Nevertheless, ever more important, military and political aspects of the peace process were disjointed, as a result of the U.N.’s

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{40} For UNITA, diamonds have been a source of founding since the late 1970s. Firstly, UNITA began to attack existing mines and taken their control. After 1983, UNITA professionalized this activity by investing in new equipment and training programs. According to Malaquias, between 1992 and 1997, UNITA raised US$ 3.7 billions from the diamonds trade. In 1999, after serious loses of territory, UNITA still generated US$ 300 millions from such operations. Le Billon, ‘Angola’s Political Economy of War: The Role of Oil and Diamonds, 1975-2000’, 67-71; Malaquias, ‘Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend’, 312.  \\
\textsuperscript{41} U.N. Security Council, Resolution 952, 1994.  \\
\textsuperscript{42} Spear, ‘Angola, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Civil Wars’.  \\
\textsuperscript{43} In November 1994, Angola started its demobilization process of 73,000 UNITA’s combatants (26,300 were to be integrated in the new national army. In December 1996, 69,800 UNITA members were registered in 15 encampment sites. However, in the first months of 1997, 26,400 deserted and some of who returned to their units. Jaremey McMullin, ‘Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?’, \textit{International Peacekeeping}, 11, 4 (2004), 625. Kingma, ‘Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life’, 152.
\end{flushleft}
exclusion of the bargaining process. This situation enabled UNITA to return to war immediately after the electoral results, as it maintained its military force.\textsuperscript{44}

2.2. \textit{Protective International Interventions}

Protective international interventions seek a reduction of the costs of peace. According to Barbara Walter, several peace negotiations fail because of a lack of credible security guarantees. Indeed, peace negotiations imply the acceptance of a certain degree of vulnerability produced by the establishment of transitory governments, maintaining cease-fires, and the translation of private security forces in a single state body. In these conditions, an ‘inverse security dilemma’ is created. Subsequently, the main task for a protective intervention is to identify the terms acceptable to all parties and establish a credible engagement to guarantee the execution of agreements.\textsuperscript{45} \textit{Traditional peacekeeping}, \textit{observation} missions, \textit{election supervision}, \textit{arms control and verification}, and the establishment of \textit{protective services}, can produce a reduction of the costs of peace.\textsuperscript{46}

These instruments of protection and security designed to reduce political uncertainty by transforming it into risks, favor peace negotiations. When extremist actors direct internal politics, protective missions should not try to

\begin{flushright}
44. Margaret Anstee argued vehemently that ‘UN should never become involved in monitoring any peace accord where it had not taken part in negotiations...’ MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola’, 419-420.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
46. For a definition of \textit{traditional peacekeeping}, see n. 4 above. An \textit{observation mission} implies the deployment of a small number of unarmed, neutral personnel with the consent of the host state to collect information and monitor activities (cease-fire, human rights, etc.) in the deployment area, sometimes following a cease-fire or other agreement. \textit{Election supervision} entails the observation and monitoring of a cease-fire, disarmament, and a democratic election following a peace agreement among previously warring internal groups. \textit{Arms control and verification} involves the inspection of military facilities, supervision of troop withdrawals, and all activities normally handled by national authorities and technical means as a part of an arms control agreement. Finally, the establishment of \textit{protective services} includes the establishment of safe havens, ‘no fly’ zones, and guaranteed rights of passage for the purpose of protecting or denying hostile access to threatened civilian populations or areas of a state, often without the permission of that state. See Diehl, ‘Forks in the Road: Theoretical and Policy Concerns for 21st Century Peacekeeping’, 217.
\end{flushright}
push them directly to agree in matters such as liberal democratic elections, even if it implies the acceptance of more modest goals, as power-sharing arrangements.\textsuperscript{47} In a climate of insecurity stemming from the fact that the disappearance of UNITA clearly favored MPLA interests, it was not unexpected to observe reluctances from the Angolan guerrilla to disarm and let go rich controlled regions.\textsuperscript{48}

In Angola, the Jonas Savimbi’s rejection of the 1992’s election outcome, when Eduardo dos Santos won the first round over him, with 49.57 per cent of the votes and 129 of the 220 seats in the national assembly (against 40.07 per cent of ballot and 70 legislative seats for the latest), UNITA did not hesitate to return to war. Taking into consideration the fact that the Bicesse Accords proposed a ‘winner takes all logic’ (embodied by liberal democratic elections) to hard-line fighters who wanted, precisely, to win and take all in order to be able to destroy their enemy, the return to war was not a surprising result.\textsuperscript{49}

From this angle, the Lusaka Protocol, designed to revitalize the Bicesse Accords’ process, is a turnaround of the UN objectives in Angola. After acknowledging the legitimacy of the 1992 Acordos de Paz, the new proposition was directed to the establishment of a power-sharing regime, a \textit{Gobierno de Unidade e Reconciliação Nacional} (GURN) – in which the 70 UNITA deputies

\textsuperscript{47} Power-sharing is far from constituting a conclusively successful experience. Agreements are short, difficult to negotiate and easy to brake. However, power-sharing solutions should be conceived as transitional arrangements, in a comprehensive strategy to focus also in the strengthening of moderate actors. Spear, ‘Angola, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Civil Wars’.

\textsuperscript{48} Spear, ‘Angola, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Civil Wars’.

\textsuperscript{49} According to Messiant, ‘\textsuperscript{49} the resumption of war was a logical corollary of the hegemonic ambitions of the two main parties, ambitions which had emerged from the “transition” not merely intact, but actually reinforced’. After economic crises, several years of civil wars, the departure of Cuban troops and the gain of new diamond-producer territories, UNITA leaders believed that there were real chances to win the war. Therefore, the governmental military, police, and security forces not only eliminated UNITA soldiers, but also hundreds of UNITA voters, identified by both political and ethnic affiliations. Messiant, ‘The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation : Or, How Angola’s Regime is Taking Over Civil Society’, 291. See also John Stephan Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, \textit{International Security}, 22, 2 (1997), 5; MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola’, 404; Malaquias, ‘Diamonds are a guerrilla’s best friend’, 320.
were asked to take their seats, four ministries were offered to UNITA members and three governorships, among others. The United Nations established in February 1995 a more robust peace operation, UNAVEM III, constituted by 7000 infantry troops, and 350 military and 260 police observers, is an improvement. Table 1 shows the principal tasks of this mission.

Table 1
UNAVEM III's Mandate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective peace actions in Angola</th>
<th>Preventive peace actions in Angola</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Control the quartering and eventual demobilization of the bulk of the UNITA army.</td>
<td>The definition of a formal political status for Jonas Savimbi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To supervise the collection and storage of UNITA armaments.</td>
<td>Return to Luanda of the UNITA deputies, and the UNITA's nomination of ministers and governors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To monitor and verify the expansion of the government administration to under-UNITA-controlled territories, and the general national reconciliation process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To verify the movement of Government forces (FAA) to barracks and the completion of the new national armed forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To verify and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan national police, the disarming of civilians, the quartering of the rapid reaction police, and security arrangements for UNITA leaders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verify the disengagement of forces.</td>
<td>Increase of the benefits of peace (for UNITA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervise and monitor the ceasefire.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide good offices and mediation to the Angolan parties.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


51. In comparison son UNAVEM II, UNAVEM III was well funded, with US$ 1.5 billions over four years. MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by attrition: the United Nations in Angola’, 408; Spear, ‘Angola, the United Nations, and the Challenge of Civil Wars’. 
Table 1 shows two additional elements. First, there was not an explicit effective ‘deterrence’ intervention. This was foreseeable if one considers that one of the conditions for the UNAVEM III’s deployment was the end of fighting. Yet, deterrence is a central task when extremists overshadow moderates. Second, in this context of extremism, the UN Security Council decided, in June 1997, to substitute the expensive and ‘ineffective’ UNAVEM III – approximately US$ one million per day for a mission that did not make ‘progresses’ – by the more modest MONUA. Without a doubt, avoiding winner-take-all elections, pushing fighters to implement a power-sharing arrangement, deploying more visible UN mission, and linking military and political aspects of the peace process constituted improvements in the UN intervention. However, the absence of deterrence and stronger prevention measures seriously undermined the prospects of obtaining a ‘successful’ result. In May 1998, UNITA refused to respect the implementation of the peace agreements, and in December of this year, fighting resumed again in many parts of the country.

2.3. Preventive International Interventions

A pact for peace should not be conceived only as a means to stop war, but also a tool in establishing peace in the long run. In other words, peace agreements do more than simply stop the fighting; they establish the rules of the political game for the post-conflict period. It is not my intention to present an

52. In reality, the UN Security Council has established economic and political sanctions against the Angolan fighters. Hence, resolution 864 (September 15, 1993) imposed an arms embargo on UNITA and created a sanctions committee. In the same vein, resolution 890 (December, 1993) strengthened sanctions against UNITA for its failure to respect the Lusaka Protocol. Therefore, resolution 1127 (August, 1997) banned both, travel for UNITA officials, and flights to and from UNITA-held territories, and imposed diplomatic sanctions (for example, the closing of UNITA foreign offices). Next, resolution 1173 (June, 1998) imposed an embargo on diamond exports not certified by the Angolan government. Resolutions 1136 (January, 2001), 1348 (April, 2001), 1374 (October, 2001), and 1404 (April, 2002) extended mandates of a monitoring mechanism established by resolution 1295 (April, 2000) to investigate relevant leads initiated by a panel of experts. However, sanctions were ineffective. Further research should be done on this issue. For the moment, it is important to underline that the UN was passive and sanctions enforcement were not a priority. In addition, UNITA found ways to avoid them. Alex Vines, ‘Monitoring UN sanctions in Africa: the role of panel of experts’. http://www.vertic.org/assets/YBo3/YV03_Vines.pdf. Accessed April 22, 2005.
exhaustive analysis on this issue here, but to focus on three elements that appear to be essential if the objective was to prevent new waves of violence.

First, reintegration of former combatants, and the destruction of weaponry (and not only their disarmament and demobilization), are crucial tasks. Mainly in cases such as Angola, this could prevent increases of the crime rate in the post-conflict period, the emergence of factionalized warlordism, and others. In its simplest form, reintegration is achieved when combatants become ex-combatants, that is, when direct risk from armed fighters is removed. In its ideal version, demobilization could mean training, founding micro-projects, and finding jobs for former combatants. In Mozambique, an interesting mix of both visions has been executed. On the one hand, US$ 35 millions (over a budget of 60 millions) were directed to compensation programs. On the other hand, three employment assistance plans, the Information and Referral Service, the Occupational Skills and Development Program, and the Provincial Fund, were established. However, internal political problems impeded the collection and destruction of arms, a situation that could explain, at least in part, the current spread of organized crime and the fact that this country is currently considered by some scholars as a 'criminalized state'. In spite of that, some authors suggest that the Mozambique demobilization and Reintegration Program (DRP), which was based on the harmful Angolan experience, was the ‘most comprehensive ever attempted at the time, aiming to ease the combatant-to-civilian transition of about 100,000 fighters’.

56. According to the United Nations, in Mozambique, the combatants received a pay equivalent to six months of salary at the moment of their demobilization. Furthermore, additional reintegration subsides represented a further 18 month pay. Kingma, ‘Demobilization of combatants after civil wars in Africa and their reintegration into civilian life’, 154.
57. Besides, ONUMOZ only collected 200,000 weapons (between 500,000 and one million of AK-47, according to the most conservative estimates, were imported to Mozambique during the civil war. In addition, collected arms were delivered to the government (as indicated in the peace agreement) to be used by a small new army, constituted only by 15,000 soldiers. Lodgaard, ‘Managing Arms in Peace Processes’, 146. McMullin, ‘Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?’, 626, 632.
Second, state/nation-building, which includes a reinforcement of ‘liberal’ institutions such as the judiciary and the electoral system, is a central task. At the judiciary level, the establishment of Truth Commissions, for example, could be an interesting starting point to weaken hard-liners indisposed to constraints themselves. Justice is an important permanent enforcement system that explicitly fixes the risks for actors who choose to avoid the rules of the game. Thus, Truth Commissions could legitimize this set of rules by punishing in some way at least some of the perpetrators of war crimes. At the electoral level, the transformation of the former guerrilla in a viable political party is vital to reinforcing political inclusion and representation, the system of checks-and-balances in the new regime. Reinforcing moderate agendas is likely to increase the chances for sustainable peace; while weakening radicalism constitutes an effort to reduce the probability of spoiling. Indeed, preventive interventions twist (or consolidate) a balance of power favorable to moderate actors, thus diminishing then the risks of spoiling.59

Third, it is important to emphasize that ‘weakening extremists’ is not a military issue but a political one. In other words, here ‘weakening extremists’ is not about the strategic neutralization of military groups (this is deterrence). Rather, weakening extremists implies a decrease of the political influence that actors who do not accept the peaceful rules of the game hold over the national agenda. In Bosnia, for example, the Office of Human Rights (OHR) and the OSCE have ‘...actively and explicit sought to use repeated elections at various levels to diminish the power of particular political parties that were seen as bearing a large part of the responsibility for the war there, and to encourage the emergence of “moderate” alternatives (...) from 1997, when the power to remove officials was

59. Stedman defines spoilers as ‘...leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’. Specifically, there are three types of spoilers: (a) hard-line ‘total spoilers’, for which goals cannot be changed; (b) ‘greedy spoilers’, that is, actors who attempt to increase benefits (form peace process) for they own interests; and (c) soft-line ‘limited spoilers’, who defend non-contradictory interests toward the peace process. The distinction between internal and external spoilers expresses the actor’s position (inclusion or exclusion) with respect to the agreement. John Stephen Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, 10-11; International Crisis group, Angola: Exorcising Savimbi’s Ghost, 212.
granted, to 2004, OHR removed or suspended 115 elected and appointed officials from public service’.  

Both protection and prevention are necessary activities for peacekeepers, as strengthening moderate actors without weakening extremist ones could result in precarious peace, permanently threatened by spoilers. This strategy implies a combination of carrots and sticks to link security necessities of the peace agreement to granting benefits to former combatants, and expecting compliance as well; ‘To have a fair chance of success, conflict prevention strategies have to be comprehensive. Security must be enhanced; the rule of law promoted; development stimulated; refugees repatriated; and the political system expanded so that all groups of significance may articulate their interests within the system’.  

Conclusion

Why are some peace agreements more effective in preventing new waves of violence than others? To answer comprehensively this question, research on conflict resolution must bridge the gap between international relations studies, which focus on ‘external variables’, and comparative politics studies, centered on ‘internal variables’. Indeed, stopping an armed conflict is not equal to

---


61. It is possible to find at least two different meanings of ‘prevention’. In a minimalist view, it can be associated to ‘preventive diplomacy’, ‘good offices’ or ‘mediation’ before violence breaks out; in a minimalist standpoint, it can be linked to ‘combating poverty and promoting sustainable development (...) democracy and the rule of law, and curbing the flow of small arms and light weapons...’ after a peacekeeping mission. Without a clear definition of tasks, it is hard to design well-defined mandates, and analyze the effectiveness of international interventions. For the minimalist definition of prevention, see Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘An Agenda for peace’. For a maximalist perspective, see Kofi Annan, ‘In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all’, United Nations. http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf. Accessed April 28, 2005.

62. In the light of the Angola reintegration programs’ experience, for example, the program in Mozambique neglected the ‘sticks’ and placed exclusive reliance on the carrots’. McMullin, ‘Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?’, 636.


64. In this sense, the work by Pushkina is a useful starting point. Based in a wide review of the literature, the author tests, using a qualitative method, ‘international’ and ‘domestic factors’ supposedly related to success and failure of international interventions. At the international level,
establishing permanent rules designed to manage sociopolitical disputes through peaceful means in the long term.

In this task, one should take into consideration at least three issues. First, the ultimate goal of international peace interventions is to reach an agreement between *main* participants, thus reinforcing the balance of power already present. In other words, if principal opponents were radicals, international interveners would reinforce this balance of power by institutionalizing their indivisible interests usually by a power-sharing arrangement. This agreement is often conceived as a ‘final’ solution to the conflict. Equally, if major fighters are moderate, international intervention will produce the same effect, that is, institutionalize divisible interests. International ‘failures’, such as in Angola, have clearly resulted from the first case whilst ‘successes’ frequently represent the second scenario. In short, international interveners have neglected the fact that establishing institutions that force division of ‘indivisible’ interest is not equal to institutionalizing rules of the game in order to permit a competition between actors who defend divisible interests. In other words, internal power relations have been glossed over by both, researchers in conflict resolution, and international interveners.

Second, like interests in game, balance of power also varies across time. Civil wars, like transitions to democracy, can be thought of as a ‘...logical tree, in which the knots are the particular conjunctures and branches represent the possibilities inherent in each conjuncture’65. Put in another way, the balance of power at \( x \) is not necessarily the same at \( x + 1 \). Subsequently, ‘solutions’ such as liberal democracy or power-sharing institutions should be conceived in relation

---

she finds that the level of UN commitment is a central variable whereas leadership of a great power, diplomatic efforts, regional support, and external support for belligerents, are not important. At the local level, she concludes that consent and cooperation of warring parties and the growing perception of the warring parties that conflict should be resolved by peaceful means increases the chances of reaching peace whereas military balance is not an important factor. Note that her analysis leads to the conclusion that international interventions have more chances of success when conflict is ripe for resolution.

to the internal power relation at a specific point of time. In addition, power-sharing should be considered as a temporal solution, applicable when interests in game must be devised by force, that is, when extremists overshadow moderates. In the meantime, moderates should be strengthened or, at least, protected from hard-line groups, in order to make possible an eventual less risky move to a more inclusive set of rules of the game.

Finally, political actors—both internal and international—do not act in a political vacuum. In this sense, international interveners, as fighters, are actors too, with their own constraints and interests. According to Bear (2003), ‘Many of the actors involved in peacebuilding activity are driven by self-interest (...) each brings to the table a particular vision of what works and how it might be attained. Competing visions and goals, and lack of co-ordination among these actors, can generally become obstacles to building peace’. In Angola, ‘With the end of direct intervention in the early 1990s, outsiders have taken a much subtler role in influencing the course of the conflict. Previously motivated by mostly geo-strategic objectives, foreign powers are now focusing on commercial and humanitarian/development agendas’. In other words, a comprehensive analysis of success and failures of international peace interventions should not only take into consideration internal variables such as the balance of power, but also link them to the ‘external’ interests in game.

There could be several ways to bridge the gap between International Relations and Comparative politics in the study of conflict resolution. Far from contributing to the proliferation of concepts criticized here, the deterrence-protective-preventive classification should be conceived not as a concurrent proposition but as a complementray analytical tool designed to make intelligible interactions between structural conditions, perceptions, and choices in the analysis of interventions in civil wars contexts, such as Angola and Mozambique.

Bibliography


MacLeod, Alex, Evelyne Dufault and F. Guillaume Dufour (2002), eds., Relations internationales. Théories et concepts (Montréal: Athéna Éditions.


