Gendered Social Capital and Its Political Implications: The Canadian Case in Comparative Perspective

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The recent revival of interest in civil society in advanced industrialized democracies has raised interesting questions about what makes a successful democracy work (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). A cornerstone of democratic governance has always been the participation of the electorate in the decisions that affect it, or at least in selecting those people who make such decisions. Yet political participation studies have long documented the inequalities that exist in participation. Almond and Verba (1967), in their seminal study, were among the first to document empirically cross-national differences in political attitudes and political participation. Interestingly, their study, and many that have followed, have pointed out intra-country differences in participation as well, stemming from gender, racial and socio-economic differences in the population (Verba, Nie and Kim, 1978; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Norris and Inglehart 2001).

To understand the roots of these imbalances, authors have often examined the factors that facilitate participation, such as resources, networks and psychological engagement (Verba et al. 1995). In this paper, we will focus on gender differences in these factors. In particular, we are interested in a puzzle. In many advanced industrialized countries, such as Canada and the U.S., women now vote at similar rates as men, but the resources and networks they have at their disposal are not similar, and neither is their psychological engagement. What explains their similar levels of engagement, despite the disadvantage they face in terms of key facilitating factors? We will demonstrate that expanding our understanding of resources and networks to include gendered forms of social capital can partly explain the different ways that women and men are mobilized.

Understanding Women's Political Participation

Political participation generally, and voting in particular, are the focus of an immense amount of scholarship in political science. One result of this research has been a better understanding of many of the major correlates of participation. While there are multiple models and nuances in the literature, Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s (1995) Civic Voluntarism Model captures the major components that appear in virtually every study. These include resources, networks and psychological engagement. Resources refer to time, money and skills that are often associated with elevated socio-economic status. Networks refer to institutions that link individuals together such as the workplace, voluntary associations, and church. Finally, psychological engagement refers to interest in politics. Resources make participation easier, networks facilitate mobilization, and psychological engagement increases awareness and provides motivation for getting involved.

If we consider the situation of women with respect to these key variables, we find that in many respects, women are at a disadvantage. First of all, women tend to have access to fewer resources than men (Schlozman, Burns and Verba 1994; 1999). In Canada, as in many industrialized countries, women are more likely to be out of the paid workforce, to have lower aggregate levels of education, and to make less money than men (Statistics Canada, 2001). Socio-economic factors have always played an important role in explaining the ability of individuals to engage in politics. Resources mean more than simply socio-economic advantage, though. They also refer to civic skills, information, and time. While we are not aware of an aggregate analysis that looks at men's and women's differential civic skills, women have less access to the spaces in which such skills are learned, such as the workplace (Schlozman et al. 1999). In terms of information, women tend to know less about politics (Mondak and Anderson
Finally, in terms of time, we know that women remain the primary care givers in the home and perform the bulk of unpaid household labor, despite the increasing number of women in the paid workforce (Statistics Canada, 2001). While the inequalities in the home might be empowering for men (Burns et al. 1997), it is not helping women. The time and otherresources they spend caring for their families takes away from other civic activities (Herd and Harrington Meyer 2002). Clearly, in terms of the resources that are usually considered important, women are at a disadvantage. It has even been argued that when women do have access to the same resources as men, they are less likely to translate these resources into political engagement (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978).

Is it possible that women make up for their lack of resources through access to important networks? Networks are usually thought of in terms of associational life, church and the workforce. As we already mentioned, women do not have as much access as men to networks in the workforce. When women are in the workforce, they are more likely to be in lower status positions that do not facilitate political participation or teach civic skills. In terms of traditional political organizations, such as political parties, women are also less involved. (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Young and Cross 2003). The one exception to this is in the realm of religion. Women are more religious than men in general and are more likely to be involved in church life (O'Neill 1996, 2001). Yet their increased level of church involvement is unlikely to balance the compounded disadvantage accrued through fewer resources and networks.

Finally, even if women have fewer resources and mobilizing networks, perhaps they are simply more interested in politics and this fuels their involvement. This is clearly not the case. Women tend to be less interested and informed about politics than men (Mondak and Anderson 2004; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Verba, Burns and Schlozman 1997). This may partly result from the view of politics as a man's game, discussed in male terms and focusing on issues that women do not find as salient as men (Bégin 1997, Gidengil and Everitt, Gidengil 1995). It is interesting to note that when issue frames are recast to resonate with the social roles and responsibilities that women hold, they can legitimize participation of groups in politics like women (Goss 2003). Yet at this point, women do demonstrate less psychological engagement with politics, at least with politics as it is traditionally defined.

To summarize, many of the key correlates of voting show that women, in general, do not have as many resources, access to important mobilizing networks, or as much psychological engagement with politics as men. These correlates have been the prominent explanatory variables for explaining political participation, yet the gendered distribution raises interesting questions about how well they can account for basic forms of political participation such as voting.

These aggregate-level gender differences present a paradox. There is clearly evidence that men and women have different concerns and focus on different issues when it comes to politics (Inglehart and Norris 2003; Gidengil 1995; Everitt 1998). There also continues to be small but consistent gaps in political participation (Schlozman et al. 1999). However, these gender gaps in resources, networks and engagement have not translated into women being less engaged in the most common and basic forms of participation, namely voting in national elections (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997; Burns, Schlozman and Brady 2001). In fact, women are slightly more likely to vote than their male counterparts in many countries. This is despite the fact that women remain highly under-represented in most forms of elected office (Trimble and Arscott 2003; Bashevkin 1993). This is the main puzzle that this paper attempts to explore. Why do women vote at the same or greater levels than men when we assume they
should vote less based on traditional models? If women are disadvantaged at the aggregate level with respect to the key correlates of voting, why are they voting nonetheless?

One potential explanation is that our conception of the correlates of participation has been too narrowly construed (or at least measured). The emergence of the concept of social capital in political science provides one way of broadening our understanding of the types of resources and networks that facilitate political participation. Putnam (1993, 2000) has defined social capital as social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust that facilitate collective action. Social capital, he argues, is embedded in all sorts of formal and informal social networks, from rotary clubs and PTA meetings to bowling leagues, card parties, and socializing with neighbors. Social capital links the idea of resources and networks, because networks are defined as resources that individuals can draw on.

The extent to which this conception challenges traditional conceptions of what is political is interesting. Feminist critiques of political science have often pointed out the false, or at least blurred, dichotomy between the public and private spheres (Pateman 1988; Philips 1991). The social capital literature creates space for a discussion of the myriad ways in which women engage in their communities, often informally. Yet, as Vivien Lowndes (2000) has pointed out, while the concept of social capital provides a lot of leeway in the inclusion of gendered forms of networks, it has often failed to do that in practice. Indeed, social capital is held up as a gender-neutral concept, but in practice the ways in which women participate in a variety of social institutions is downplayed.¹

So how might women's social capital differ from men's? First of all, the literature on gendered attitudes and gender socialization suggests that women should in fact be good 'social capitalists'. Social capital focuses on the maintenance of social relationships, a role that is disproportionately played by women. Studies have found that women in a marriage are better at building and maintaining ties with friends and family (Gerstel 1988) and are more concerned with the maintenance of the relationship with their mate (Weigel and Ballard-Reisch 1999). This focus on social relationships also is congruent with the work by Carol Gilligan (1982) and others showing that women have a different set of moral priorities than men, with an increased focus on caring and nurturing instead of competition and autonomy. In terms of politics, this translates into what Sandra Burt (1986) has called an 'ethic of care'. While her work was based on a small sample of in-depth interviews with Canadian women and men, survey-based research has also yielded evidence that women are more concerned with social issues like education and welfare, and men are more concerned with economic issues (Gidengil 1995, Everitt 1998). This implies that women are socialized to care more about social relationships, both personally and within politics (see also Vickers 1997). If social capital is truly a resource that can facilitate political participation, then this may be one way that women are mobilized, through the social relationships that they maintain.

One reason these social relationships have been overlooked is partly because they differ from the forms of organization often considered political. Three aspects of these gendered forms of organization are noteworthy. First of all, women are more likely, as we implied earlier, to be engaged in voluntary work, especially care work (Eliasoph 1998; Vickers 1988). Second, because this kind of work is usually done informally, i.e. not through an organization, it is not captured by standard questions about organizational membership. Its informal nature also overlaps with the public/private sphere divide. Childcare, helping neighbors or caring for the

¹ See Young (1990) for the development of the idea that 'neutral' standards are often constructed in such a way as to obscure the contributions of disadvantaged groups.
elderly fall outside of the "public" sphere because they are done outside of formal organizations. The care work not only takes place informally, but is often done for family and friends. Politics is often seen as a game played beyond such close ties, with unnamed citizens in large-scale electorates. Finally, a third reason that gendered forms of social capital are often overlooked is because they are simply not thought to be important for political participation. This could be because of the public/private divide, but it could also result from the differences in the ways that women organize. Women are more likely to engage in local politics and social movement activities than in traditional forums focused on national politics (Vickers, 1997) and they are more likely to organize themselves in less hierarchical ways and to focus on creating consensus (Kennedy 2003; Eliasoph 1998; Ferree and Martin 1995). These different forms (care-focused, less formal, and less hierarchical) make them harder to recognize within the discourse of political participation studies. They are often overlooked and dismissed for not conforming to our traditional understanding of civic engagement which takes place in structured organizations such as political parties or professional associations.

In this paper, we attempt to bring these gendered forms of social relationships back into the picture. Are they successful at mobilizing women to vote, or are they overlooked in the literature because they fail to have political implications?

Data

In order to investigate these questions, we rely on the Canadian National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating (NSGVP). This survey provides a rich battery of both informal and formal volunteering activities and associational involvement that extends beyond traditional measures of political activities. This dataset is particularly well-suited for our analysis because it allows us to capture activities in which women are disproportionately involved, such as informal caring activities for extended family. The survey contains over 14,700 respondents aged 15 and above. We dropped those not eligible to vote in the last federal election from our analysis and end up with a sample size of just over 14,100.2

Canada provides an interesting case in several respects. Canadian men and women vote at similar levels, but men and women differ in regards to key correlates of turnout. Table 1 shows these differences in the NSGVP. In terms of resources, a smaller percentage of women than men have university degrees, are members of the labor force, and make $60,000 or more a year. Regarding their networks, more women than men reported attending church once a week, but more men belong to at least one political organization. Finally, we examined media consumption as an indicator of psychological engagement in politics; a larger percentage of men than women responded that they follow news and current affairs daily. These findings are generally consistent with the results of other studies.

The availability of a survey with such detailed measures of a variety of forms of social capital also makes the case empirically convenient. Thus, Canada is similar to other advanced industrialized democracies in that voting levels between men and women have converged, even though they remain different with regard to the main correlates of voting.

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2 This effectively creates a sample of respondents who are at least 18 years old at the time of interview.
As discussed in the previous section, we are most interested in the effect of various forms of social capital on the likelihood of voting. We are particularly interested in forms of social capital that are understudied and more often associated with the private sphere or women more generally. The NSGVP allows us to do this. We have created three types of social capital measures: associational membership, volunteering through formal associations, and informal volunteering activities. (See appendix for detailed descriptions of each variable). For both the associational membership and volunteering in formal associations measures, we have divided the responses into political and social forms. Political associations include political parties, labor and professional associations, and service clubs and fraternal organizations. These are the types of associations which are typically considered political participation in their own right. Social organizations, on the other hand, include cultural, education and hobby organizations, sports and recreation clubs, religious-affiliated groups, and school groups and neighborhood associations. While this distinction between the political and social can be criticized, we impose this division in order to test if the distinction makes any difference as a correlate of voting.

The same distinction is made in terms of the types of volunteering done in these organizations. Civic skills are considered by Verba et al. (1995, chapter 11) as an invaluable resource for political participation. They bring our attention to education, verbal skills and (while not measured directly) leadership skills gained through organizational involvement and higher status professions. We capture these civic skills with a variable indicating whether the respondent has voluntarily canvassed, lobbied, served on a board, organized an event, or done consulting and administrative work for an organization. These we call political volunteering because they capture the types of experiences which are considered transferable to the public sphere. We also create a measure of other types of more social volunteering. These include collecting food, providing care and companionship, coaching, and other services on a voluntary basis through an association. We call this variable social volunteering.

Finally, we also create a variable for informal volunteering activities. This includes non-paid activities the respondent did outside the auspices of an association. These include doing housework, yard work, shopping, caring for the sick, visiting the elderly, babysitting and doing paperwork for someone outside your household. These activities capture what Vivian Lowndes (2000) points out as the multiple ways in which women create networks of trust and reciprocity often ignored by social capital research. The political and social associational membership, political and social volunteering and informal volunteering measures are all coded 1 for respondents who have done any of the activities and 0 otherwise.

We also include a host of control variables that the literature has established as important correlates of turnout. These include a dummy variable for Quebec, marital status, gender, age, income, employment status, presence of children, degree of religiosity, whether the respondent has a university degree, how much the respondent follows current events, and whether the respondent was foreign-born. (See appendix for more detailed descriptions.) These controls help us to capture the effects of the standard predictors of turnout. Including them makes our findings that much stronger, because it reduces the potential that our findings are spurious and simply a result of the different structural position of women in society.

The main dependent variable is whether or not the respondent voted in the last federal election. As the outcome is binary, we use logistic regression to analyze the independent effects of our various social capital measures on the likelihood that the respondent voted. In addition, we use the models that we run to simulate turnout levels based on gender and presence of
different types of social capital. To do this, we use the CLARIFY program developed by King et al. (2000).

Results

We first examine the descriptive differences between men and women on each of the social capital measures. In Figure 1 below, we report the percentages of men and women in the sample who participate in each type of activity. The largest difference between men and women appears in the political organizations category; 55 percent of men responded that they are members of at least one political organization, compared to 45 percent of women. For the other three measures, more women than men indicated that they participate. The difference is slight for membership in social organizations, but the differences are larger and statistically significant for both formal and informal volunteering. This corresponds with what we know about differences in women's and men's types of social capital, both in Canada (Gidengil et al. 2005) and cross-nationally (Lowndes 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2001).

One of the interesting aspects of this dataset is that it captures informal volunteering activities that are often left out of studies of men's and women's social capital (Lowndes 2000). The differences we observe in participation become more pronounced when we break down the informal volunteering measure and look at men’s and women’s responses to specific items. As shown in Figure 2, more women than men reported participating in all of the informal volunteering activities, with the exception of yard work. All of the differences, except for shopping, are statistically significant. Based on these results, we have evidence to support our hypothesis that men and women possess different types of social capital. Men appear to have an advantage over women in a “traditional” form of social capital – membership in political organizations – but women participate more in informal volunteering activities. While these findings are interesting by themselves, we would like to see how gender differences in social capital translate into participation. This is in fact the key test for understanding whether or not these more gendered forms of social capital have the same beneficial impact on those who possess them as more traditional forms of social capital.

We first estimated a logistic regression model to assess the impact of gender and different forms of social capital on the likelihood of voting in the last federal election. In addition to dummy variables for gender, informal volunteering, membership in political associations and membership in social associations, we also include a number of demographic control variables such as marital status, education and age. The results of the model are displayed below in Table 2. The female dummy variable, as expected, is not statistically significant because men and women vote at virtually the same rates. Not surprisingly, the political association variable is positive and highly statistically significant. Membership in social organizations, on the other hand, is positive but does not significantly affect the likelihood of voting. By itself, the informal volunteering variable is not statistically significant, but we also entered an interaction variable.

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3 Data has been weighted to make it representative of the Canadian population.
for gender and informal volunteering. The coefficient on this interaction variable is statistically
significant and actually larger in magnitude than the political association coefficient. Informal
volunteering clearly has a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for women.

To make this result more concrete, we simulated turnout levels for different age cohorts
of men and women who volunteer either informally or formally.\(^4\) The results of the simulation
are depicted graphically in Figure 3 below. First, voter turnout rates are quite low for the
youngest age group and increase steadily with each successive cohort. This pattern holds for
both men and women. More important are the differences that appear between men and women
with regard to informal versus non-informal volunteering. For men’s turnout, the two lines in
the graph are virtually indistinguishable; their simulated voting rates are nearly the same for both
types of volunteering. Women who participate in informal volunteering, however, have a
considerably higher rate of turnout than women who do not. For example, the simulation
predicts a turnout rate of 62 percent for women who are in the 1970s age cohort and engage in
informal volunteering. The turnout rate is 49 percent for women in this cohort who do not do
informal volunteering. That is over a ten-point gap in expected turnout for women based on
whether or not they partake in activities such as babysitting for a friend or helping an elderly
neighbor.

Given the results of the previous regression model, we ran a very similar model but for
men and women separately. We included all of the social capital measures as independent
variables: membership in political associations, membership in social associations, formal
political volunteering, formal social volunteering, and informal volunteering. The control
variables remained the same. The results for these two models are presented in Table 6.
Consistent with the results we observed earlier, the political association variable has a positive
and statistically significant coefficient in both models, but it is the only social capital measure
that achieves statistical significance for men. In contrast, all of these measures have a positive
and significant effect on the likelihood of voting for women, except for the formal social
volunteering variable.\(^5\) Again, the informal volunteering variable has the largest coefficient.

We ran another simulation based on these regression models to further illustrate the
impact that these differences in social capital have on men’s and women’s voting rates. As
shown in Figure 4, women with no social capital are predicted to vote at lower rates than men
with no social capital, and while involvement in political organizations boosts women’s turnout
by a few percentage points, it has a larger effect on men’s turnout. Possessing multiple forms of
social capital has virtually no effect on the predicted turnout for men. However, women with

\(^4\) We use the CLARIFY program to conduct the simulations, as developed by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000).
\(^5\) The lack of significance for the social organization variable may result from the inclusion of the formal
volunteering variable. As formal volunteering usually takes place within social organizations, this implies that
women's membership in social organizations is not as important as their actual involvement in these organizations.
multiple forms of social capital, including formal and informal volunteering, have a predicted turnout rate of 82 percent, which is almost 20 percentage points higher than the predicted turnout rate for women who are only involved in political organizations. Finally, the results of the simulation demonstrate the “equalizing” influence of multiple forms of social capital: while women with either no social capital or political organization membership alone lag behind men in turnout, women with multiple forms are predicted to vote at a slightly higher rate than men.

<figure 4 about here>

**Politics in the Private Sphere**

The results presented here provide a possible explanation to an interesting but overlooked puzzle. Why is it that women vote at similar or higher rates than men when they lag behind men in many of the key correlates of voting? The answer is that women *do* have important resources but that these resources are often left out of standard voting models. The concept of social capital, especially when we examine forms in which women are more likely to participate than men, provides a useful way of thinking about the resources that women accrue through their involvement with others in their communities. In this section, we will explore some of the implications of these findings.

*Questioning the Public/Private Divide*

Politics has long been constructed as a man's game. While women have been enfranchised and legal barriers to their participation have been removed, they continue to be less interested in politics and less involved in many forms of political participation, with the exception of voting. While many commentators have asked the question of why women are less 'political' than men, we have tried to reframe the question in terms of *how* women participate in public life. In order to do this, our analysis has lead us to question the usefulness of the public/private divide that is so pervasive in the analysis of politics. The private sphere, when considered apolitical, effectively erases many of the contributions women make to community life from our analyses.

This is problematic, as we have shown, because the networks and norms of reciprocity that develop among friends and neighbors and for which women are the primary participants, *do* have the same beneficial effects for voting as other forms of social capital, at least for women. This challenges the impression developed in the literature that women's resources are not translated as easily into political participation as men's (Verba *et al.* 1978). This perspective was most recently elaborated by Vivian Lowndes (2000, 2003) that while women are rich in social capital, they use it do different, often less explicitly political ways. She argues,

"As women draw on their hard-earned social capital as a resource in the day-to-day management of their own and their family’s lives, there may be little left to spend on politics. Women’s social capital may be more likely than men’s to remain within the community sphere, rather than spilling over into the political domain." (2003: 16)

While this might be true for some forms of political participation, it is not the case with voting. Showing up at the ballot box is arguably one of the most traditional and basic forms of political participation in a democracy and as such, provides a critical test for the usefulness of less traditional, more gendered forms of social capital. The contention that women may take a
different path to political participation is true. The fact that this path includes many components of the "private sphere" is not surprising either, as women's lives often entail the maintenance of family life and social relations with friends and relatives. However, the argument that this path is less effective in terms of voting simply does not hold up to analytic scrutiny.

Explaining the Causal Mechanism

The relationship between informal networks and voting is clear in our analysis, yet the reasons that this is the case are less clear. While the analysis we have presented is correlational, our argument has been causal. Social networks, in myriad forms, foster political participation. In this section, we will examine some of the causal mechanisms that might explain this relationship. Causal mechanisms represent the process that links one set of factors to an outcome, thereby explaining a relationship instead of merely describing it.

The relationship between social capital and political participation has been demonstrated but its explanation is often unclear (see, for example, Stolle 2003). Why is it that involvement in a community organization or helping out one's neighbor would make an individual more likely to vote in a federal election? While this relationship seems easier to accept for formal organization involvement, the link between informal types of social relations that we have highlighted in this paper and political participation seems hard to imagine. We propose two main mechanisms that can account for this relationship: the enforcement of social norms and mobilization.

Coleman (1990) has pointed out that one of the values of social networks are the internal norms that develop and dictate appropriate and desirable behavior for its members. In democracies, a very powerful norm is that citizens should vote, that it is both our right and our responsibility. This social pressure can be seen in the over-reporting of voting in survey based research. Blais (2002) has also shown that feeling that voting is a duty is also an important predictor of turnout. Social networks can function to enforce this norm of voting through casual conversation. "Who did you vote for?" or simply "Did you vote last week?" puts individuals in a position where not voting requires a justification for non-compliance with the norm. Social networks may promote political participation, then, by creating pressure for individuals to be able to say they have been involved in the behavior dictated by group and social norms.

For informal networks such as those highlighted in this paper, this would involve the casual conversations that go on between friends and neighbors. While politics is not a very common topic in conversation, especially for women, it is most likely to occur between the sorts of acquaintances that women maintain through informal volunteering activities (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1995). People are most likely to talk to close friends and family about politics, not the causal acquaintance at the local soccer club. And it is precisely those individuals closest to an individual for whom norm enforcement might be the most effectively. We care what those people close to us think. This line of argument implies that informal social networks may be especially important to women as a source of political participation because they create social pressure to vote. This is particularly relevant because informal volunteering networks are more likely to contain close family and friends with whom an individual is more likely to discuss politics and whose opinions we feel more pressure to meet.

A second possible mechanism linking informal social networks to political participation is their mobilization potential. By mobilization, we mean aspects of the social networks that

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However, the idea that attending a PTA meeting and voting are necessarily linked is not as clear as the literature often assumes. The same sorts of mechanisms that we discuss for informal networks may also apply to formal organizational involvement.
make an individual more interested in politics or actual create a situation where an individual can participate more easily. This, again, can occur through the conversation potential in social networks (ibid). For example, if the person you visit every week at the nursing home talks to you about the growing health care crisis in Canada, this might make the issue more salient. When the hot topic in the next election is health care, you might be more likely to cast your ballot in hopes of addressing this issue. These weekly casual conversations might also increase your knowledge about the subject. Knowledge about politics is an important predictor of voting. Along with perking interest and providing information, social networks also might literally facilitate your presence at the polling booth. The elderly neighbor who does not drive anymore and wants a ride to the polling booth might mean taking the time to stop to cast a ballot. Once there, going in and casting the ballot is easy. While mundane examples like these

Similarly to social norms, there are reasons that women in informal social networks are particularly likely to be mobilized. As we discussed in the beginning of this paper, women are often less interested and informed about politics than men (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). As such, any discussion that takes place might have a larger impact on their level of interest and information than a similarly situated man with more interest and information. Further, women are socialized to be more concerned with social relations than men (Gilligan 1982) and they show this "different voice" in issues that they find most salient (Gidengil 1995; Everitt 1998). It should be no surprise than that social networks may play a more important role in women's politics (see for example, Elder and Green 2003; Gidengil, O'Neill and Harell 2004). This is in line with our finding that these informal networks are only significant for women, in both the combined and separate models.

Conclusion

In this paper, we have argued that based on standard models of turnout, women should not vote at similar levels as men. However, we find that in many advanced industrialized democracies, they vote at similar or higher levels than their male counterparts. In order to explain this puzzle, we have relied on the concept of social capital and the critiques of the public/private divide to broaden our understanding of the mobilizing forces in women's lives. In particular, we have focused on the importance that informal social networks can have for women's political participation, especially by encouraging participation through norm enforcement and by providing an opportunity to become more interested and informed about issues that affect the community. By including such variables in our model, we have shown that predictions of voter turnout would more accurately reflect women's actual participation in elections. Our analysis has not only highlighted these differences, but we have challenged the conception that more gendered forms of social capital are somehow less 'transferable' to the politics. Future research will need to address if the mechanisms we describe are empirically valid and how far our conclusions extend to other forms of political participation.
### Tables and Graphs

#### Table 1: Gender Differences in Key Correlates of Voting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have a university education…</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>48.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a high income bracket…</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the workforce…</td>
<td>57.3%</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Networks</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involved in one or more political groups…</td>
<td>25.1%</td>
<td>32.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular religious attendance…</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological engagement</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pay attention to the news daily…</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Differences in Types of Social Capital by Gender

![Bar chart showing differences in social capital by gender.]

Figure 2: Informal Volunteering by Gender

![Bar chart showing informal volunteering by gender.]

- Men
- Women
Table 2: Effect of Social Capital and Gender on Likelihood of Voting  
(Logistic Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>β</th>
<th>(s.e)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Association</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Association</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal Volunteering</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal * Female</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-Squared 0.1945  
N 11,941

Controlling for region, marital status, presence of children, university degree, religiosity, how much respondent follows current events, foreign-born, age, income and employment status (Not shown).
Figure 3: Simulation of Voting by Gender and Informal Volunteering

The probabilities were obtained using CLARIFY (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). N.B. Other variables were set to 0, except watching the news, religiosity and income, which were set at their means, and generation, which was set to individuals 31 to 40 years old at the time of the survey.
Table 3: Effect of Social Capital on Likelihood of Voting by Gender (Logistic Regression)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>β</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
<td>β</td>
<td>(s.e.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Association</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>(.015) ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Association</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>(0.13) **</td>
<td>-0.19</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Political Volunteer</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>(0.12) ***</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal Social Volunteer</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Informal Volunteer</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>(0.13) ***</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
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<td>R-Squared</td>
<td>0.1901</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2076</td>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>6804</td>
<td></td>
<td>5110</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Controlling for region, marital status, presence of children, university degree, religiosity, foreign-born, how much the respondent follows current events, age, income and employment status (not shown).
The probabilities were obtained using CLARIFY (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). N.B. Other variables were set to 0, except watching the news, religiosity and income, which were set at their means, and generation, which was set to individuals 31 to 40 years old at the time of the survey.
Bibliography


