“Political Rhetoric or Genuine Leadership: An Assessment of the ‘New Deal’ for Cities”

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What remains, finally, is the need for leadership. In these times, true leadership must be forceful yet collaborative, open yet determined. It means working with people to set goals, spelling them out clearly, and bring the nation together to work out how to get them done. That’s not the way that it’s always been done. But that’s the way it has to be done and the way that I will do it.

Paul Martin, November 2003

**Introduction**

As Finance Minister for nearly a decade between 1993 and 2002, Paul Martin earned a reputation as a highly effective steward of the public purse, ushering in five consecutive surpluses and an era of economic robustness after nearly three decades of abysmal fiscal management. A political consensus seemed to be emerging: Paul Martin had the mettle required to become prime minister. Liberal supporters and foes alike fully expected that Paul Martin would bring the same brand of decisive leadership to the post of prime minister and, as such, there was a great sense of optimism and anticipation regarding his expected future tenure as the head of the Canadian ship of state.

Indeed, Martin consciously promoted leadership and the lofty goal of pursuing the “politics of achievement” in his bid to succeed Jean Chrétien as prime minister. As he stated in his policy document for the leadership campaign: “That is the true challenge of leadership – to rally a nation to its unfulfilled promise. To help show the way and shape the course. That’s what I want to do. Because in these next few years, I believe Canada can make history” (Martin, 2003a: 1). Martin aspired to provide the prime ministerial leadership necessary to bring about transformative change and the nation embraced his ambition. This sentiment was particularly strong since the country had endured a decade of essentially uninspiring leadership under the Jean Chrétien regime.

However, the electorate’s munificent perception of Paul Martin was short-lived. Since succeeding Jean Chrétien as prime minister in December 2003, Paul Martin has been
beleaguered with a constant barrage of criticism about his leadership – or perceived lack thereof (Delacourt, 2005; Thorne, 2005; Hébert, 2005b). Critics have suggested that Martin has neither an agenda nor a vision for this country and is woefully unable to differentiate the urgent from the important when it comes to prioritizing public policies. There has also been disquiet regarding his reliance on asymmetrical federalism when dealing with the provincial governments (Hébert, 2005a; Kent, 2004). But perhaps the most damning indictment of Paul Martin came in February of 2005, when the *Economist* wrote a piece referring to the prime minister’s “faltering leadership…[that] earned him the sobriquet of ‘Mr. Dithers’” (“Mr. Dithers,” 2005; see also Travers, 2005) a moniker that seems to have resonated with both the opposition parties and general public.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a comprehensive assessment of the leadership skills and effectiveness of Paul Martin as prime minister. Instead, the focus will be restricted to his leadership with respect to the so-called ‘New Deal’ for cities and communities, which he has been strategically championing as one of three national imperatives since his final days as finance minister. Is it the case that he has provided genuine political leadership regarding the cities file or, alternatively, is it more appropriate to view his position to date as one of meaningless political rhetoric? It is a question of some import because, as Bradford (2002: 13) noted:

Canadian cities are at a crossroads. The intertwined pressures of globalization and decentralization threaten to overwhelm the country’s capacity to maintain the quality of local places. New ideas and political leadership are required to design strategies geared to an increasingly urbanized economy and society.

To what extent has Paul Martin stepped into the breech and filled this void? Has he provided the requisite vision and leadership to address the most critical challenges that threaten the vitality of all Canadian municipalities, especially our key conurbations? It will be argued that
despite his commendable and genuine efforts to place the so-called ‘New Deal’ on the public agenda, Prime Minister Martin has not provided the robust leadership required to successfully move this issue forward and, consequently, even if his government survives the damning revelations emerging daily from the Gomery Inquiry, will ultimately only be able to realize modest success in the area of federal urban policy. Important progress on the urban policy agenda has been made to be sure, but clearly these recent developments have not lived up to the grandiose history-making events that Martin (2004b; 2003a; 2003b) had intended to realize.

After situating the need and rationale for federal involvement in urban affairs in the first section of the paper, it will consider how the issue was prioritized and addressed by the Chrétien administration. This will be followed by an identification of the parameters for effective political leadership. It will do so by not only considering the political science literature on this subject matter, but also by undertaking a fuller analysis of the broader, multi-disciplinary field of leadership studies. The hope is that this effort will begin to incorporate the rather cursory and limited contributions of political science on the topic of leadership into the more mainstream literature, which is dominated by studies undertaken by management and psychology scholars. In the final two sections, the evolution of urban policy under Prime Minister Martin will be critically examined and assessed. By carefully considering the commitment and approach Martin has made to the cities agenda, it will be possible to draw some conclusions about the extent to which this issue represents genuine political leadership as opposed to well-calculated political pragmatism.

**Renaissance of the Urban Agenda**

Academic and journalistic commentaries, in addition to various reports emanating from business, social and political organizations, regarding the plight of Canadian cities have been so
ubiquitous in the past few years it is difficult to imagine a time when the urban agenda was not at
the forefront of the federal political agenda. But the current fascination with urban issues
obfuscates decades of federal indifference if not outright neglect of this file.\(^2\) The reality is that
attention to urban politics and public policy peaked in the late 1960s and 1970s and rapidly
d eclined shortly thereafter. Not since the disbanding of the Ministry of State for Urban Affairs
(MSUA) in March of 1979 has the federal government really concerned itself in any systematic
way with urban policy development and the national co-ordination of action.

Unlike the traditional departmental form, the MSUA was not designed to have any
program delivery capability; rather, its primary focus was to develop relevant research for
addressing longer term urban policies. Moreover, MSUA had a mandate to take the lead in the
development and co-ordination of urban policies across departments and levels of government.
Robert Andras, the first minister responsible, described the role of the MSUA in the following
terms:

\[\ldots\text{[it] will be }\text{coordinative}\text{ between federal policies and their departments. It will be }\text{supportive}\text{ to all relevant federal programs and projects on behalf of comprehensive urban policy. It will be }\text{consultative}\text{ with the provinces and their municipalities in achieving an integrated approach to solving urban problems that none of the three areas of jurisdiction can solve on their own (cited in O’Brien, 1981: 90).}\] \(^3\)

While perhaps too passive for some concerned observers, this low key approach to federal
involvement in urban affairs was quite sound. After all, municipalities were situated within the
constitution as ‘creatures of the provinces’ and, consequently, the federal government had no
legitimate authority to act in this area.

For a variety of reasons that have been detailed elsewhere, the MSUA was a short-lived
experiment that was widely considered to be a complete failure (Sancton and Young, 2004;
Crowley, 1982; Feldman and Milch, 1981; Higgins, 1977). Suffice it to say, there was simply too
much resistance to the MSUA from the central agencies, other government departments and even the constituency it was supposed to serve. Audrey Doerr (1981: 100), however, is of a different mindset: “The Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was an important catalyst in focusing on policy issues and designing a research agenda in the field…It stimulated critical thinking and provided a base of experience of the strengths and weaknesses of policy organizations.” Irrespective of how one views the MSUA experiment, the reality is that Prime Minister Trudeau took the extraordinary step of eliminating the unit in 1979, ostensibly as an austerity measure, although the savings to government were quite modest. Significantly, it marked the end, until very recently, of an overt and prominent federal presence in the realm of urban policy.

So why has it been the case in the late 1990s and beyond that there has been a federal renaissance in the urban agenda? It quickly becomes evident that the rationale for creating the MSUA in 1971 was not all that different from the one that is presented today when the need for a federal presence in urban affairs is discussed. Tindal and Tindal (1999: 208) have identified two major reasons why there was strong pressure at the end of the 1960s to have a stronger federal presence in local affairs. First, municipalities were interested in getting access to increased federal funds to enhance service provisions. Second, with the rapid urbanization of the country, the federal government began to realize that if municipalities were to meet their needs, assistance beyond the local and provincial level would be required. For his part, O’Brien (1982: 83) noted that the problems besetting municipalities in the late 1960s, ultimately giving rise to the MSUA, related to “…the absence of adequate financial resources to match the expenditure responsibilities associated with rapid growth, central city decay, social tensions and rising environmental concerns.”
Therefore, the reality is that little has changed. Some thirty years later, insufficient municipal revenues along with expanded populations and enhanced responsibilities, resulting from provincial downloading, would just as appropriately be offered as the rationale for the renewed interest in urban affairs. The key difference is that by the 1990s the problems identified in an earlier era had intensified considerably. Urbanization continued apace, to the point where, according to the 2001 census, some 80 percent of the population currently lives in urban areas. This figure is expected to increase to 85-90 percent by 2020 with the bulk of the population residing in the 25 largest urban regions (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force, 2002a: 1). This process has resulted in uncontrolled growth, leading to urban sprawl with all of its concomitant problems, including traffic congestion, unsustainable public transportation systems, environmental degradation and poverty. Rapid growth in cities has also fuelled a need for significant new investments in infrastructure, much of which is aging and in need of replacement. Estimates vary, but one a study conducted by the Association of Consulting Engineers of Canada in 1999 pegged the infrastructure shortfall across the country in 1996 at $44 billion and TD Economics (2002: 15) calculated that the shortfall is growing by $2 billion per year. Municipalities, dependent as they are on property taxes as the key source of revenue, have simply been ill equipped to address these problems.

But there are at least two additional reasons why urban issues have finally started to capture the imagination of policy makers. First, decisions taken by both the federal and provincial governments in the 1990s have only served to exacerbate the problems confronting municipalities. For example, the federal government, in its aggressive pursuit of deficit and debt reduction in the 1990s, drastically reduced expenditures in areas critical to municipalities, such as housing, immigration and transportation. At the provincial level, governments have responded
to reduced federal transfers by engaging in their own downloading exercises. In Ontario, it occurred in 1998 under the banner of ‘Local Service Realignment.’ Municipalities were given additional responsibility for a number of social programs, including social housing, land ambulances and public health, as well as police, transit and water and sewer systems. The province was to free up municipal resources to pay for these services by reducing their financial obligations for funding school boards. Although this transfer of responsibility was supposed to be revenue neutral, municipalities immediately began to contest such claims, arguing that they were being asked to provide additional services without any corresponding increase in provincial support (see Graham and Phillips, 1998; Downey and Williams, 1998). At the same time, there have been a number of municipal amalgamations, resulting in significantly larger cities with correspondingly enhanced political clout (Wolfe, 2003).

Second, the repeated references to competitive cities as the economic engines of the Canadian state were really a long overdue recognition of the profound impact of globalization. The world economy has increasingly become the transnational economy. Transnational corporations, which have discarded national identities in favour of global ones, have replaced multinational corporations as the key players in the global economy. In this new model, the entire world is seen as one market where goods and services are produced and sold. Concomitant with this development has been the recognition of the limitations of state sovereignty to the point where pundits have variously argued that we have been experiencing the “end of geography” (O’Brien, 1992), the rise of the “borderless world” (Ohmae, 1991), or even the “end of the nation-state” (Ohmae, 1995). While pronouncements regarding the death of the nation-state are clearly premature, globalization has ironically had the effect of changing our economic focus to a more micro level.
What exactly has emerged as the critical economic unit of analysis in the new global economy is a matter of some debate. For Naisbitt (1994: 228), the focus should be at the level of the individual or firm: “The more the economies of the world integrate, the less important are the economies of countries and the more important are the economic contributions of individuals and individual companies.” Other studies have given attention to how the process of globalization has created a “new strategic role for major cities,” places like London, New York and Tokyo, which have been dubbed “global cities” (Sassen 1991: 3-4; see also Sassen 2000), while Kenichi Ohmae (1995; 1993) has argued that “region-states” are the meaningful and natural economic units in the global economy. Region states have populations of between 5 and 20 million people, which may or may not be contained within the borders of a given state, and they possess the necessary infrastructure and professional services that are crucial to participation in the global economy. Finally, Gertler (1996: 12) has focused on the importance of city-regions: “[They] have come to be recognized as key nodes of the global economy; as places where capital, workers, institutions and infrastructure (soft and hard) come together to provide the foundations for successful economic activity.” Adopting a similar frame of reference, Bourne (2004: 4) has argued that any government strategy designed to improve the urban condition must focus on city-regions, as they “…more closely mirror the social and economic organization of contemporary urban society.”

Despite these somewhat different foci, one fact is clear: there is a high degree of consensus that the preconditions for economic success, namely whether a state is able to provide a high standard of living for its people and the extent to which this can be sustained and improved over time, have changed. Success in the new global economy will depend on two key factors: firstly, firms and sectors must be internationally competitive; and secondly, the state
must be seen as an attractive location for international investment, which will be accomplished by possessing sound infrastructure as well as an educated and highly-trained work force that can perform the complex tasks required of it (Moss Kanter, 1997; Ohmae, 1995; Ohmae, 1991; Reich, 1991; Porter, 1991). Quality infrastructure, it should be noted, has come to be regarded as more than a system of highly developed transportation and communication networks; it now includes those features, such as cultural and recreational activities, housing choices and the quality of the educational system, which are deemed to be essential to attract talented people to live and work in a particular area. In the words of Moss Kanter (1997: 332), “What keeps brainpower, labour or investors in an area is quality of life and quality of community....” Viewed from this perspective, it is not surprising that ensuring the vitality of cities has taken on new importance.

So, on the one hand, the situation for municipal governments in Canada became increasingly untenable. The dictates of globalization require robust cities, but as a result of a confluence of factors, namely provincial and federal downloading, rapid population growth, drastically reduced transfer payments and increased citizen expectations, most municipalities have been faced with trying to provide high quality programs and services to their residents at a time when costs have been rising and/or revenues have been shrinking. If this were not problematic enough, municipalities have also been constrained by virtue of the fact that their provincial masters have generally curtailed their ability to raise and spend money. On the other hand, municipalities, especially the large urban ones, have been less willing to passively accept their plight. Armed with the rhetoric of globalization, both municipalities and the peak associations that represent them began to clamour for a greater powers and additional financial resources – what eventually came to be labelled the ‘New Deal.’
The City of Toronto, in particular, has been leading the drive to strike a new arrangement between Canadian municipalities and the two higher orders of government. But while Toronto has worked collaboratively with other cities and municipalities to achieve municipal reform on a much broader scale, its principal objective has been to rectify the deficiencies in its current relationship with Queen’s Park and Ottawa by lobbying for the creation of a city charter. In July of 2000, Council adopted a report prepared by the CAO entitled “Toronto Charter City: Towards a New Relationship” (City of Toronto, 2000), which outlined the need for Toronto to become a charter city so that it could be competitive with other world city regions. The key elements outlined in that report were the need to acquire power and responsibilities that meet the City’s needs; ensure that the City had the requisite financial resources to meet its financial responsibilities; be recognized as a separate order of government that should be consulted when the province was contemplating financial and policy changes; and empower the City to communicate directly with the federal government on issues of mutual interest. Then, on September 22, 2000, former Mayor Mel Lastman attempted to develop support for the proposed City Charter for Toronto by sending a letter and information package to federal, provincial and municipal politicians as well as the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), the Association of Municipalities of Ontario (AMO) and other municipal associations across the country (Toronto City Council, 2002).

As part of the larger collective effort, in late October of 2001, the City of Toronto joined forces with the cities of Vancouver, Winnipeg, Saskatoon, Ottawa and Halifax to launch a national awareness campaign known as “Canada’s Cities: Unleash Our Potential.” At the official launch of the campaign, David Miller (2001), then a Toronto City Councillor, suggested the initiative was designed to “…promote the urgent need for the federal, provincial and municipal
governments to work together to give Canada’s cities the tools and resources they need to compete on the world stage.” The model that was being promoted at that time was to create a series of modern charters for the country’s largest cities. This was felt to be the best way that Canada’s cities could be provided with the tools and powers that they required to succeed while at the same time respecting the constraints imposed by the constitutional division of powers. While the campaign itself may not have generated a high degree of public awareness, this effort, involving collaboration with a number of municipalities and organizations over an 18 month time frame, undoubtedly provided the impetus for the many initiatives undertaken by other key stakeholders (Toronto City Council, 2002).

The period between 2001 and 2002 was perhaps the most critical juncture in the “New Deal for Cities” movement. Reports identifying the urgency of the crisis facing cities and the need for government action were both plentiful and diverse in origin. Some focused on the urban challenges faced by all cities (Bradford, 2002; Seidle, 2002; FCM, 2002a; FCM, 2002b; TD Bank, 2002a; Andrew et al, 2002a; FCM, 2001), while others were more concerned with highlighting the unique problems confronting Toronto and the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) (Toronto Board of Trade, 2002; TD Bank 2002b; United Way, 2002). It was also in 2002 that the Toronto Star embarked on its year long “crusade for a new deal for cities” (Honderich, 2002: A1). Throughout these documents, a common theme emerged, namely that the status quo was not sustainable and the assistance of the two higher orders of government was urgently required.

In addition to the publication of these formal reports and the growing media attention, a number of important meetings by both the Federation of Canadian Municipalities Big City Mayors’ Caucus as well as the C5 were convened, all of which were designed to discuss common issues of concern and to develop strategies for lobbying the federal and provincial
governments so that the country’s largest urban regions would be empowered and properly financed. For example, at least as far back as 1999 the Big City Mayor’s Caucus had been calling upon the federal government to transfer a portion of the gas tax to invest in highways and urban transit. As a result of this flurry of activity, the “New Deal for Cities” agenda had become firmly ensconced in the public consciousness; it was now incumbent upon the federal government to become fully engaged in the discourse and respond appropriately.

**Rhetoric Without Action: The Chrétien Response**

To be fair, the federal government was not completely devoid of involvement in this process; there was some tangible evidence that it recognized the need to champion the cause of cities. For example, the Liberal Party (2000: 26) actually campaigned in the 2000 election on a platform that included a commitment to “work[ing] with partners from across the country to enable citizens, experts and officials from all orders of government to engage in a dialogue on the opportunities and challenges facing our urban regions.” It was in partial fulfilment of that promise that in May 2001 Prime Minister Chrétien appointed Judy Sgro to head the Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force on Urban Issues.

The Task Force was created to consult with a range of stakeholders, from citizens to experts and other levels of government, and ultimately it received dozens of written submissions from various interested individuals and organizations. A central objective was to develop strategies for working more collaboratively with various partners to address some of the quality of life issues in the large urban centres. In particular, the Task Force was directed to examine key opportunities for enhancing the economic competitiveness of Canadian cities; environmental issues, such as water and air quality and land-use; urban transit; the special needs and circumstances of at-risk groups, such as Aboriginals and immigrants; and crime related issues.
The Task Force released an interim report in April of 2002 and its final report was made public in November 2002 (Prime Minister’s Caucus Task Force, 2002a; 2002b). Sgro and her colleagues made a number of important recommendations to the prime minister so that the government would be more focused and better able to address the needs of cities. Included in the final report was a call to create three priority national programs for infrastructure, social housing and transportation. Furthermore, the Task Force suggested that a cabinet minister should be appointed to oversee this file; this individual would ultimately be responsible for developing an urban strategy and implementing the action plan. Advising the minister on urban policies would be a newly appointed advisory committee, comprising representatives from academia, urban experts from NGOs and other national organizations such as the FCM, Conference Board of Canada, and the various Boards of Trade. In addition, the minister would be encouraged to chair a national urban summit each year with provincial ministers responsible for urban affairs and other key urban partners. This would help to facilitate an ongoing dialogue with those who had the power to move this agenda forward.

Furthermore, in the 2002 Speech from the Throne (Canada, 2002b), the government positioned the future prosperity of this country on our ability to create and maintain world-class cities and healthy communities:

Competitive cities and healthy communities are vital to our individual and national well-being, and to Canada’s ability to attract and retain talent and investment. They require not only strong industries, but also safe neighbourhoods; not only a dynamic labour force, but access to a rich and diverse cultural life. They require new partnerships, a new urban strategy, a new approach to healthy communities for the 21st century.

As Prime Minister Chrétien noted: “A comprehensive urban strategy for the 21st century requires everything from roads to transit, to affordable housing, to the information highway…This will help us meet our social, economic and environmental objectives…” (Canada, 2002a). To that
end, the government announced a ten-year program for long-term, strategic initiatives for infrastructure, additional investments in affordable housing, an expansion of existing pilot programs to combat poverty amongst Aboriginal people living in cities, and a new transportation strategy for reducing congestion. One commentator interpreted these commitments quite favourably, arguing that they were a “significant development,” and constituted “…major elements of an urban strategy for the Government of Canada…” (Seidle, 2002: 2). Andrew et al (2002b: 18), however, were much less charitable. While they did concede that the federal government was demonstrating some evidence of being interested in this area, they concluded “urban affairs – as urban affairs – are not back on the national policy agenda.”

With the release of the Sgro Report a few short months later, it was widely anticipated that the federal government had finally understood the nature of the urban crisis and that a significant policy response was imminent. Perhaps the federal Liberals were poised to do more than simply “…deliver the right platitudes about great cities…” (Honderich, 2002: A1). At it turned out, that was not the case. The leadership required to move this agenda forward was not forthcoming from Prime Minister Chrétien. The government’s actions and enlightened rhetoric belied Jean Chrétien’s true apathy regarding urban affairs. How else might one interpret his complete disregard for the recommendations outlined in the Sgro Report? Chrétien chose neither to create a special department for urban affairs not to appoint a minister who would spearhead this agenda. Furthermore, no action was taken with respect to creating an advisory board or convening a national urban summit. Aside from developing a new department, which, given the cost and complexity involved, would have required a fairly high level of commitment by the prime minister, these measures would have been relatively innocuous to implement but symbolically an extremely important gesture.
Keen observers of the urban agenda who did not want to condemn the prime minister prematurely were willing to reserve judgment until February to see whether the government would outline new priorities in Finance Minister Manley’s 2003 budget. In the end, they were severely disappointed. The federal government did not provide municipalities with a share of the gas tax they had been asking for and very little new money was earmarked for infrastructure and affordable housing. Manley promised a paltry $3 billion for infrastructure over a 10-year period, with only $100 million dedicated for 2003 and $150 million for 2004. Some new money was also provided for affordable rental housing to top up the $680 million commitment that had been previously announced. For good reason, the media were widely critical of the budget (Whittington and Lu, 2003; James, 2003). The stage had been set for action, but the Chrétien government did not address the urban strategy in any meaningful way in the budget. Instead, the public was offered the familiar refrain that there were simply too many priorities; given the available resources, it just was not possible to provide for all of the pressing needs that were identified.

Granted, Chrétien was preoccupied with internal party divisions that ultimately resulted in his unplanned early retirement as leader and prime minister, but that did not seem to detract from his willingness and ability to pursue an activist agenda in other policy areas during the waning months of his administration. The beleaguered prime minister was very much concerned with solidifying his political legacy; urban policy just did not factor very prominently into his plans. Why, then, would he have established a task force to examine urban issues? Clearly, it was a question of expediency. It became increasingly untenable for Chrétien to ignore the numerous calls within this particular policy community for federal initiatives pertaining to the plight of municipalities; therefore, some action, however modest, had to be taken. Striking a task force to
study the issue proved to be the preferred response. But, as is so often the case when a government appoints a task force or royal commission, the objective is not necessarily to take action but rather to make it appear as though the government is committed to a new policy or legislative agenda when in fact it is more interested in delaying consideration of an important issue or postponing an embarrassing problem (Kernaghan and Siegel, 1999: 148).

However, while Chrétien seemed content to pay lip service to the urban agenda, it became increasingly apparent that Paul Martin, the prime minister’s leadership rival, regarded the urban file as a defining issue from which to launch his succession bid. The question remains as to whether this was merely a strategic watershed for Martin and not a matter of conviction or if it represented a genuine attempt to exert political leadership. In order to make that assessment, the next section of the paper will examine the nature of leadership, both as it has been studied and understood by political scientists and in the wider field of leadership studies.

**A Leader is a Leader… – Leadership in the Political Realm: Towards an Integrated Understanding**

In their classic work on leadership, Bennis and Nanus (1985: 20) argued, “leadership is the most studied and least understood topic of any in the social sciences.” Despite some significant advances, this claim is as valid today as when they wrote their book twenty years ago. Consider the fact that the leadership literature has been estimated to comprise over 5,000 studies and increases by hundreds each year (Yukl, 1998: 494). Unfortunately, many of these studies lack the empirical evidence and academic rigour to truly enhance our collective understanding of leadership. Moreover, the field is riddled with conceptual confusion and a true understanding of the phenomenon of leadership defies the often simplistic explanations that are offered. One of the most commonly cited shortcomings of the state of research on leadership is that it has been
addressed in isolation from many different perspectives, including anthropology, social psychology, political science, history, military/strategic studies, human resources, sociology and, above all, business, but there have been relatively few attempts to incorporate advancements from each into a more holistic theory or approach. If our cumulative knowledge about leadership is to expand in any meaningful way, more researchers must strive to recognize the artificiality of their disciplinary boundaries and begin to theorize based on empirical studies from across the full spectrum of research.

It is in that spirit that this paper is written. The aim is to offer a preliminary attempt to bridge political science treatments of leadership to the broader field of leadership studies. As a starting point, it is worth noting that for the most part political scientists have not been overly concerned with the concept of leadership. An examination of the more than 2500 articles published in the *American Political Science Review* between 1906 and 1963, for example, revealed that only seventeen titles made reference to the words ‘leader’ or ‘leadership’ (Paige, 1977: 11). A decade later, Blondel (1987) still lamented that there were relatively few studies of leadership in political science, except with respect to the institutional study of political executives. The reality is that political scientists generally have not devoted their attention to understanding what constitutes a leader in the political realm, let alone an effective one, by explicitly situating their analyses in any of the four key approaches – behaviour, power-influence, trait and situational (Yukl, 1998) – that characterize the leadership field.

For political scientists, leadership tends to be equated with those who occupy the key positions in government. The focus, therefore, is on presidents and prime ministers as well as other party leaders and, in some cases, the political executive more generally. Studies in Canada typically focus on how these leaders are selected and how the institutions of our parliamentary
democracy serve to place restrictions on the power and authority of those who have ostensibly been chosen to ‘lead’ (Whittington, 2004; Mancuso et al., 1994; Hockin, 1971). From a public administration perspective, attempts have also been made to examine the “leadership paradigms” of prime ministers to determine the impact it had on the design of the machinery of government (Aucoin, 1986) and the public service (Zussman, 1986). In essence, scholars in the discipline have fallen into the trap of erroneously conferring leadership to an individual as a result of his or her status, position or power-base in the political organization. However, as Burns (1978: 18) noted, “all leaders are actual or potential power holders, but not all power holders are leaders.” While it may be true that “…no matter the circumstances, the prime minister remains ‘the boss’” (Savoie, 1999: 71), this is not akin to being a leader.

Being ‘the boss’ is more analogous to being a manager, and management, as several contributors to the study of leadership have noted, should not be confused with leadership. Joseph Rost (1991: 10), in his impressive critique of the state of leadership studies, has perhaps gone the furthest in that regard by issuing a passionate plea for a new school of leadership to replace what he termed the outmoded existing “industrial paradigm” of “leadership as good management.” In the realm of politics, however, equating good management with leadership might even be considered progress. The reality is that traditional political leadership, which “…relies on issuing commands, taking ownership, seeking credit, avoiding blame and declaring victory in a policy field or moving rapidly on if progress appears slower than expected” (Bradford, 2005: 45), has little, if anything, to do with either good management or leadership.

While a management-leadership dichotomy does exist in the literature, it is somewhat misguided. Effective management is probably more appropriately conceived as the foundation upon which leadership emerges and grows. In short, leadership complements management; it is
not a replacement for it. Nonetheless, when attempting to clarify the concept of leadership, researchers have frequently contrasted it with management. For example, according to Kotter (1998), management is about coping with complexity while leadership fundamentally concerns dealing with change. Leaders also challenge the status quo and develop new options, while managers promote consistency and order and attempt to limit organizational choices. Whereas managers spend their time on the routine planning, organizing, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting functions, leaders focus their attention on setting a direction or vision, aligning people and resources and motivating, energizing and inspiring those around them.

Another commonly cited difference is that the focus of managers and leaders is different; the former are concerned with operational issues and short-term planning while the latter tend to engage in long-range, strategic thinking. For the leader, the larger organization, including its external environment, is of critical importance as opposed to the unit or group being managed.

As for their key characteristics, managers tend to be impersonal, exhibit a low emotional involvement with people, focus on rules and procedures and typically resort to transactional interactions with others. Leaders, on the other hand, are often more personal and empathetic; they are often innovative risk-takers and rely more extensively on transformational influence by fostering a change in values, attitudes and behaviour in others (Mintzberg, 1998; Kotter, 1998; Zaleznik, 1998; Rost, 1991; Gardner 1990; Bennis and Nanus, 1985).

But what exactly constitutes leadership? Unfortunately, there has been no consistent definition, which is a central failing of the discipline (Yukl, 1998; Rost, 1991; Burns, 1978). The following definition of leadership is instructive because it identifies many of the commonly cited elements: “[it is] an influence relationship among leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes” (Rost, 1991: 102). Typically, definitions of leadership will
incorporate notions of power and influence (or persuasion) in the context of a group process. And, even though many definitions do not explicitly refer to leadership in the context of followership, they generally recognize that this phenomenon must be understood as a dynamic process of interaction between individuals in an organization. In short, it is difficult to be a leader if no one is willing to follow. While it may be the case that leaders define reality for followers, if the latter are unwilling to accept the articulated vision, leaders will be viewed as weak and ineffectual. Leaders and followers, therefore, are thought to have a symbiotic relationship and are ultimately unable to exist without each other (Bennis and Nanus, 1985).

The final element that is routinely incorporated into definitions of leadership is an emphasis on either fostering or coping with change. Senge (1990: 90) suggests that while leadership is about “initiating and sustaining change,” effective executive leaders do not actually drive change themselves but rather they help to eliminate the constraints to change and participate in the growth process. According to Bennis and Nanus (1985), one of the central tasks that leaders have to undertake is to position their organization in relation to the external environment, an endeavour that engenders the trust necessary to bind followers and leaders together. This necessarily involves influencing, directing or shaping change to best suit the needs of the organization. Leaders can choose to be reactive, that is to say wait for some change to impact upon the organization and then respond, or they can be more proactive by choosing one of the following courses of action: 1) anticipating the effects of change and reshaping the organization’s internal environments; 2) taking the initiative to foster change in the external environment; or 3) creating a new linkage between the internal and external environments of the organization. Given the inevitable resistance within the organization, this would not be an easy
task. However, rather than resorting to the use of power and control to overcome this resistance, they argue that leaders should work to develop a voluntary commitment to shared values.

Even with this admittedly cursory overview of the broader literature on leadership, it should be evident that irrespective of the type of organization in question, be it a private sector corporation, political party, government or non-profit, leaders exhibit some fairly uniform behaviours. Highly successful leaders have also been discovered to exhibit a number of common skills and traits (see Yukl, 1998: chapter 10). While these are two of the major theoretical approaches to the study of leadership, this author would agree with Fielder (1993: 2) that “it is meaningless to talk about leadership outside of the situational context.” Situational or contingency theories attempt to explain leadership in terms of contextual factors such as the nature of the work being performed, specific characteristics of followers or the external environment, or whether certain leader behaviours or trait patterns would be equally effective in all situations – the assumption being that they would not.

Nowhere is the need for a situational approach to leadership more evident than in the realm of politics. Political leaders have complex relationships with several different constituencies, including their political supporters and the electorate more broadly, caucus and cabinet colleagues, bureaucrats, the media, politicians from the opposing parties, and world leaders, which are attenuated by political institutions. In effect, political leaders are the products of three factors: 1) the constitutional provisions, both formal laws and political conventions, which shape the leader’s power and influence; 2) the nature of the events and circumstances that brought the leader to office; and 3) the unique skills and attributes that the leader possesses (Elcock, 2001: 62). Therefore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to divorce assessments of
leadership from the unique political, social and economic environment in which politicians operate.

_Carpe Diem: Paul Martin and the ‘New Deal’_

Sancton and Young (2004: 31) have made the rather cynical observation that “Paul Martin’s New Deal will be judged by the answer to one simple question: how much cash did he deliver?” While ultimately they may be accurate in their evaluation, is it really appropriate and reasonable to assess his leadership for this issue on resource allocation alone? Would it not be better to judge him on the basis of the sum of his efforts to move the urban agenda forward? While the task of evaluating Martin’s leadership from a broader perspective is obviously more intricate, it does allow for a fairer appraisal. Martin himself provided a useful standard against which his leadership should be judged. As he stated, “Canada’s greatest accomplishments have always come when the Canadian government has articulated a vision embodying great national objectives and then mobilized not just its resources but the spirit of our people to achieve those goals (Martin, 2003b: 15). The challenge is now to determine whether Paul Martin’s words and actions pertaining to the urban agenda measure up to that benchmark.

To begin, while Paul Martin has unquestionably been a prominent and vocal champion of a ‘New Deal’ for cities, it should be noted that he did not provide the intellectual genesis for this initiative. The term itself was actually coined by John Honderich (2002) in his editorial that launched a special series in the Toronto Star calling for national urban reform, but as was outlined earlier, this was really a fomenting of an idea that had been voiced for several years by a number of high profile voices in this particular policy community. Martin, therefore, clearly did not identify and articulate the vision for this agenda; rather, he embraced an idea that was already
very much a part of the public discourse. On the face of it, then, Paul Martin does not seem to meet the test of leadership for this issue. But while Martin may not have dreamed up the notion of the ‘New Deal’ for cities, he did enthusiastically take up the cause and delivered several noteworthy speeches on the subject. In this sense, he had the opportunity to shape and refine the vision that had been evolving from pronouncements elsewhere.

Martin first began to engage in discussions about the so-called ‘New Deal’ while he was still Finance Minister in the Chrétien government. In that capacity, on May 31, 2002, he delivered a landmark address at the annual general meeting of the FCM, which he concluded by imploring participants “[To] go from this meeting with one thought in mind. And that is to make a New Deal for municipalities a reality for Canadians” (Martin, 2002).

The speech itself was rather pedestrian; Martin spoke of the need to move from concept to implementation, but he provided no inspired vision of what the concept actually entailed or how exactly progress would be achieved. He surveyed several possible courses of action, from building on existing infrastructure programs to creating new infrastructure funds to providing funding through NGOs to providing municipalities direct access to new sources of revenue, but in the end only stressed that the government “need[s] to be open to considering all options.”

Martin was also careful to note that the co-operation and participation of the provinces would be essential if progress were to be made on the urban agenda and that “…any successful solution will give municipalities access to funding sources that are predictable and reliable…” (Martin, 2002). His sole firm commitment in that speech was to begin including a group of mayors, as selected by the FCM, in a pre-budget working session.

What makes this speech extraordinary is the fact that it ostensibly led to Martin’s expulsion from cabinet. It was rumoured that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) had demanded
that he eliminate all references to a ‘New Deal’ between Ottawa and the municipalities in his speech (of which there were fifteen), an unassailable indication that Chrétien did not place much of a priority on the urban agenda, but Martin chose not to do so and delivered the text as prepared. Within days, Martin’s long and prosperous stint as finance minister had come to an end (Taylor, 2002). Relations between Chrétien and Martin had been festering for some time given the latter politician’s very transparent leadership ambitions so this very deliberate transgression, which ultimately contradicted existing federal policy, was impossible to ignore.

Martin’s refusal to succumb to the demands of the PMO can be viewed in two ways: one is that he used the issue of urban policy strategically to distance himself from the prime minister, possibly even in the hope that it would result in his dismissal and expedite a leadership challenge; the other interpretation is that Martin was so firm in the belief that a ‘New Deal’ was essential to the future prosperity of this country that he remained true to his beliefs, calling for federal action in this area, irrespective of the potential political fallout. In reality, Martin’s motivations were probably neither as Machiavellian nor principled as each of these viewpoints would suggest. There is good reason to believe that he had grown restless waiting for Chrétien to retire of his own volition and regarded the ‘New Deal,’ which seemingly had considerable public support, to be an effective wedge issue. But there are equally strong indications that Martin truly understood that Canadian municipalities were on the verge of a crisis, which necessitated decisive federal action.

In any event, Paul Martin continued to speak about the ‘New Deal’ across the country, laying the groundwork for his bid to succeed his former boss as prime minister. Freed from the constraints of membership in the cabinet, one might have expected to hear more brazen speeches from Martin about how he would set out to renew federal-provincial-municipal relations on the
matter of urban issues. For the most part, however, he continued to play it safe. Addressing the delegates at the Creative Cities Conference in May 2003, Martin (2003b) reiterated his commitment to pursuing a “New Deal” for Canadian municipalities should he eventually become prime minister. One of the key messages he delivered was that a year after his infamous speech to the FCM the debate needed to be re-engaged because discussions about this issue on the Hill had become muted. This was not all that surprising really, given that Chrétien never strongly advocated this agenda and Martin was no longer in cabinet to champion the cause.

In addition to providing predictable and reliable funding for municipalities, Martin also identified the need to have an “open door” policy for municipalities. Critical issues, such as strengthening urban Aboriginal communities, improving the immigration process and building more affordable housing, he suggested, all required a more open and collaborative relationship with the federal government. That might mean working more closely with organizations like the FCM or working with individual mayors to resolve critical issues. He also addressed the question of gas taxes, promising that if municipal leaders decided this was the most desirable funding mechanism to satisfy their needs he would act on their request. The rhetoric was important, relevant and well received to be sure, but it could hardly be characterized as “…moral, uplifting, transcending leadership, a leadership of large ideas, broad direction, strong commitment (Burns, 1978: 452).

Subsequent speeches and documents were equally committed to pursuing a ‘New Deal,’ but disappointingly they were not any more illuminating in terms of clarifying what the concept actually entailed. For example, Martin’s policy document prepared for the leadership campaign did make reference to the ‘New Deal,’ yet it was subsumed under the larger priority of securing Canada’s social foundations. And he said little more than the fact that all three levels of
government must work together and municipalities need a voice at the national decision making table (Martin, 2003a: 7). A key speech he delivered just days before being sworn in as prime minister in December 2003 proved to be no more revealing; Martin (2004b) stated that the federal government needed to work better with city governments and a ‘New Deal’ was required to address the imbalance between what municipalities are providing in service and the resources that they have at their disposal to do so.

To confuse matters further, in his address to the FCM at the start of the 2004 federal election campaign, Martin (2004a) identified environmental sustainability, adequate housing and infrastructure and other funding as the three pillars of the ‘New Deal.’ The problem is that not only was this a deviation from the language that Martin had been articulating in previous speeches, but also it did not mesh with the three key elements his parliamentary secretary for cities had outlined in a January keynote address to the Summit of Canadian Hub Mayors – stable, predictable, long-term funding; the development of sustainable relationships; and looking at federal activity through an urban lens (John Godfrey, 2004). Given that the Infrastructure Canada web site currently lists vision, relationships, funding and a cities and communities lens as the key components of the ‘New Deal for Cities and Communities,’ the latter of these two portrayals is presumably the more accurate.

Therefore, judged on the basis of his inability to build on the pre-existing notion of a ‘New Deal’ by clarifying the concept and using this vision to develop shared values regarding an appropriate course of action, Paul Martin certainly did not provide robust intellectual leadership for the development of new urban policy. As Burns (1978: 461) noted, however, “the ultimate test of practical leadership is the realization of intended, real change that meets people’s enduring needs.” In that regard, Martin must be evaluated more favourably. Upon being sworn in
as prime minister on December 12, 2003, Paul Martin moved swiftly to implement several of the key recommendations emanating from the Sgro Report.

First of all, Martin decided to manage the cities file himself rather than giving this responsibility to another member of cabinet; he would, in effect, be the minister responsible for urban affairs. While it was perhaps not the best operational decision for the prime minister to burden himself in this way, symbolically it was extremely powerful. There could be no clearer indication that Martin was determined to successfully move this agenda forward. Wisely, he appointed Don Valley West MP, John Godfrey, as his Parliamentary Secretary for Cities and entrusted him with the day-to-day responsibility for achieving progress on developing a ‘New Deal.’

Second, Martin used the powers accorded to him as prime minister to reorganize the machinery of government. Rather than create a new department, which likely would have resulted in serious opposition from the provincial governments fearing overt federal intrusion into their constitutional area of responsibility, Martin chose instead to establish a Cities Secretariat in the Privy Council Office (PCO). This new unit was established to improve the government’s co-ordination of urban issues and to assist in both the development and implementation of the ‘New Deal.’

Third, he indicated that Mike Harcourt, former premier of British Columbia and mayor of Vancouver, would head up a new External Advisory Committee on Cities and Communities. This body would work closely with the Honourable John Godfrey, to assist him in developing the long-term vision for the role of cities in maintaining Canada’s quality of life, enrich the discussion around potential policies and provide advice on policies that are developed in relation to cities and communities, support the communication efforts and public activities of the Prime
Minister and Parliamentary Secretary and, perhaps most importantly, help devise strategies for enlisting the support of provincial, territorial and Aboriginal governments so that progress towards the realization of a ‘New Deal’ can be made.

Building on these critical foundational steps, Martin eventually announced his first significant new financial commitment that would begin to rectify the problem of municipalities not having long-term, stable funding. This came during the Speech from the Throne in February 2004 when the government decided to provide full GST relief for Canadian municipalities (retroactive to February 1\textsuperscript{st}), which was estimated to be worth some $7 billion over 10 years. Furthermore, the government gave notice that it would work with the provinces to provide municipalities with a share of gas tax revenues or, alternatively, “…to determine other fiscal mechanisms which achieve the same goals” (Canada, 2004b: 11)

Then, as a result of the June 2004 federal election, a completely new dynamic emerged. Martin continued to have an ambitious agenda, of which the ‘New Deal’ for cities and communities was a central component, but found himself in a much weaker position as the head of a minority government. Nonetheless, prime ministers do have formidable powers and therefore some progress was made. First, John Godfrey was elevated to the position of Minister of State (Infrastructure and Communities) and was given responsibility for the Office of Infrastructure of Canada, which, effective July 20, 2004, also included the Cities Secretariat (Order in Council 2004-0870).\textsuperscript{12} The role of the Secretariat in its new home was fourfold: 1) to provide critical analysis and advice to the Minister; 2) provide the necessary horizontal management for urban issues across government; 3) ensure that a cities and communities lens is applied to all government programs and policies; and 4) oversee the provision of secretariat services to the External Advisory Committee on Cities and Communities. Second, after strong
and persistent lobbying by the municipalities, Martin relented, announcing in the October 2004 Speech from the Throne that the government would provide them with a portion of the gas tax (Canada, 2004a). The proposed 2005 budget, which has yet to be approved by Parliament, indicated that between fiscal year 2005/2006 and 2009/2010 the government would be transferring $5 billion to the municipalities through agreements signed with the provincial governments. This represents some $2 billion a year (5 cents per litre) in the fifth and subsequent years of the program (Canada, 2005).

There should be little doubt that there has been some significant progress at the federal level with respect to advancing the urban agenda, which only has been complemented by initiatives undertaken by the provincial governments. The Ontario government, for example, has been working with bureaucrats from the City of Toronto over the course of the past year to negotiate city charter legislation. Furthermore, Premier McGuinty has made his own gas tax commitment to the municipalities, agreeing to share 2 cents per litre when the program is fully implemented. However, a couple of key issues still need to be addressed: the first is to critically evaluate the progress that has been achieved to date with respect to the ‘New Deal,’ while the second is to determine the whether Paul Martin’s leadership has been sufficiently strong to realize the requisite urban policy reform.

**Good Intentions and Moderate Reform Do Not Strong Leadership Make**

Remarking on the leadership of prime ministers like Macdonald, Trudeau, and Mulroney, Gibbons (1994: 420) argued that they “…did more than ride the political currents of their times; they shaped their political environment as much as they took shape from it.” The same simply cannot be said of Paul Martin. Many positive developments regarding urban policy have unquestionably materialized under Paul Martin’s tenure as prime minister, but he has not been
driving this agenda. Rather, he has mostly been reacting to the requests and vision of others. For instance, all of his notable organizational changes emanated from the recommendations of the task force struck by his predecessor. Even his first major financial commitment to increase the GST rebate to municipalities from 57.14 percent to 100 percent in 2004 was something the FCM had requested two years earlier (FCM, 2002).

Paul Martin simply has not used his position as prime minister effectively to assume leadership for the ‘New Deal.’ He was well attuned to the “signalizing” (Tucker, 1981: 31) about the growing ‘urban problem’ from the policy community, but the extent to which he was able define the problem in appropriate terms is questionable. Bourne (2004) has actually suggested that the current debate, with its almost exclusive focus on redressing the fiscal imbalance of municipalities, is too narrowly defined; a suitable policy response was thought be much more encompassing than what has been proposed.

However, it may actually be the case that the focus on local finances is simply imprudent. Consider the results of a May 2004 survey conducted by the Canadian Federation of Independent Business (CFIB). Some 55.6 percent of the 7,649 small and medium-sized enterprises that responded to the CFIB survey believed that their local governments can provide effective services with the same amount of money that they currently receive from taxes and government transfers. Only 29 percent of the respondents believed that they could not do so. Therefore, providing municipalities with additional resources was not perceived to be the best response; business owners seemed to be suggesting that local governments could do more to control the cost and direction of spending. Furthermore, only 13.2 percent of those surveyed suggested that local governments should be allowed to administer and collect additional forms of taxation. Business owners in Canada did not seem to be any more interested in providing municipalities
with senior status equivalent to that of a province. Some 20.7 percent of respondents felt that local governments should be allowed to have senior status, while nearly 64 percent believed that they should continue to be junior partners in the federation (Mallett, 2004). The relevance of these results is obvious given that the small and mid-size businesses play such a vital role in all communities across this country.

The ‘New Deal’ may be framed too narrowly in that it focuses mostly on the fiscal imbalance, but ironically it can similarly be criticized for being too broad in scope. Bourne (2004) makes the case that a sound national policy must focus on city-regions, not individual municipalities. In that way, any assistance provided would more closely approximate the reality of urban society; he also thought that such an approach might help to curtail potential conflicts with the provinces over jurisdiction. Given that the vast majority of MPs are elected from rural and small urban centres, it is easy to understand the political rationale for ensuring all municipalities, both large and small, benefit from the ‘New Deal.’ But that does not mean it was necessarily the right decision to make. A compelling argument can be made that the problems of the country’s major urban centres, particularly Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, are so significant and unique that they warrant the bulk of any forthcoming federal assistance. To focus the response on ‘cities and communities’ instead simply spreads the scarce resources too thin and potentially limits the impact of any proposed policy initiatives.

Certainly the big city mayors have chastized Martin for what they viewed as an abandonment of the cause of cities just prior to the 2004 election by broadening the focus to include all municipalities. This position is rather curious though since a closer inspection of Martin’s speeches reveals that he always endorsed a more inclusive definition of the ‘New Deal.’ In his address to the FCM in 2002, his position was unambiguous: “So let me be clear: when we
speak of a New Deal for municipalities, we are not talking of a side deal for large cities that cuts out the pressing needs of our rural towns and villages. We are talking about all our municipalities, large and small (Martin, 2002). The same message was offered a year later: “So I say here, as I have said before, that any New Deal for cities must be a New Deal for all municipalities – not only our biggest cities (Martin, 2003b: 7). Consequently, although the focus on cities and communities may have been ill-advised, it was not a new perspective.

Martin’s position may have been clear and consistent, the criticisms of the big city mayors notwithstanding, but it was hardly courageous or visionary. In fairness, this is not an easy policy area in which a prime minister can exercise political leadership since municipalities are a provincial responsibility and the provinces – Quebec in particular – are loath to endure federal incursions into their constitutional jurisdiction. As Crowley (1982: 115) wrote about the failed MSUA experiment:

Provincial governments were hostile from the outset to the concept of a federal agency concerned with what they considered their domain. They argued against it from the beginning and lobbied long and hard afterwards for the abolition of MSUA. At best, it was viewed as a needless intrusion and, at worst, an impediment to effectively coordinated actions….

The provinces certainly have not been as hostile recently to federal overtures to get involved in urban affairs, which undoubtedly reflects both a general financial malaise at the provincial level and the severity of the problems being experienced at the local level, but they have not exactly embraced the notion of an activist role for the federal government either. For example, when the premiers met with Prime Minister Martin for the first time in early 2004, Jean Charest was adamant that Quebec would oppose any attempt by Ottawa to deal directly with its cities (Campion-Smith, 2004).
Even though it would have been onerous, if not a non-starter, to get the provinces to endorse a strong federal presence in urban affairs, does that mean such a vision should not even have been developed and proposed? After all, whether the emphasis is on the micro-level influence process, whereby individuals are compelled to put the mission or organization above their own self-interest, or macro-level, in which power is mobilized to initiate political action or change social systems and reform institutions, transformational leadership is uniformly portrayed as the idealized model of leadership. Martin himself unmistakably aspired to have that type of impact on society with his leadership. That is ultimately why his conservative approach to conceptualizing the ‘New Deal’ was so disappointing.

In the final analysis, the urban agenda proved to be only one of several policy interests for Paul Martin. And, despite the favourable rhetoric, there is no clear indication of just how high it ranked in terms of his overall priorities. One thing is for sure: it was not his first priority. That distinction was reserved for health care (Martin, 2004c: 4). Therefore, cities and communities agenda was forced to compete with Aboriginal issues, early learning and child care, the environment and the international stage as well as democratic reform, ethics, public health and safety and financial accountability for the Prime Minister’s energy and attention (see Doern, 2004).

Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that Martin was not more innovative in his conceptualization of the ‘New Deal’; even a prime minister heading a majority government would be hard pressed to avoid being overloaded under the weight of these disparate priorities. But the fact that the Liberal Party, under a cloud of controversy surrounding the Quebec sponsorship program, was reduced to a minority government in the June 2004 election has had a crippling effect on Paul Martin’s ability to provide effective public policy leadership. Each new
scandalous revelation that has emerged out of the Gomery Inquiry, which ironically was established to assert the moral indignation and ethical leadership of the Prime Minister, has only served to undermine his authority and credibility even further. It will be exceedingly difficult for Martin to survive this scandal unscathed. Obviously, if Martin he knew about the existence and operation of the sponsorship program as Finance Minister, then he cannot help but be directly tainted by the malfeasance that occurred, effectively ending his political career. However, ignorance of the program does not necessarily protect him since the public should rightly be concerned about his competence given that he was the minister who was responsible for the public purse during that time. Although the government escaped the defeat of its budget by a single vote, Martin did make a pledge to Canadians to call an election within weeks of the final report of the Gomery Inquiry later this fall. The reality, therefore, is that another federal election is imminent and the Prime Minister is unlikely to accomplish much between now and then.

How the wider Canadian populace really feels about the ‘New Deal’ is unknown. There are no indications, however, that Martin generated a groundswell of popular support for this initiative. Neither the provinces nor their electorates have been mobilized by the Prime Minister; that being the case, Tucker (1981: 75) would argue that Martin has not yet become a leader. He has acted as a leader, both by attempting to define the situation and identifying a plan for action, but without mobilization he cannot become one. As the Martin government struggles for political survival, it seems highly unlikely that mobilization will happen any time soon.

**Conclusion**

As a society, we have a collective yearning for the type of strong, moral leadership that will help to guide our public, private and non-profit organizations through the complexity of an increasingly integrated world characterized by rapid technological change and myriad social,
economic and environmental problems. It is a formidable challenge, which explains why we are so desperate to identify and develop the cadre of men and women who will rise to the call of leadership. However, it is a critical mistake to automatically bestow the qualities, behaviours and actions of leaders on those who hold a particular office in an organization. This is just as true for prime ministers and members of cabinet as it is for the executive leadership of a private sector company. Political scientists must abandon their predilection for assuming that office holders in the political realm exude real leadership and begin to conduct research that incorporates the both the theoretical and practical knowledge being developed in the broader field of leadership studies. Much can be learned from the study of political leadership, but it must go beyond the narrow institutional focus that currently prevails.

This paper was written with that aim in mind. The objective has been to critically assess the extent to which Paul Martin has exhibited true leadership with respect to the urban agenda. In the end, he must be awarded a split decision. When compared to his predecessor, Jean Chrétien, or to Stephen Harper, the leader of the Conservative Party who was conspicuously silent on this issue in the 2004 campaign, Paul Martin’s leadership with respect to urban issues has been exceptional. Martin not only delivered high profile public speeches about the need for a ‘New Deal,’ but also immediately upon becoming prime minister made decisions that palpably demonstrated his commitment to this agenda. Several tangible and important steps have been taken to be sure; he appointed a minister, set up the Cities Secretariat, appointed an advisory committee and has made some notable expenditure decisions that will ensure some modicum of change with respect to the plight of our municipalities. In that regard, his political leadership has affected real change.
However, Paul Martin’s leadership must be assessed against own his self-imposed standard. Martin came into office on the desire and promise to make history through transformative change; he aspired to lead the country towards great accomplishments, an ambition that the nation fully embraced. In the context of what has been achieved to date with respect to the ‘New Deal,’ Paul Martin has undeniably demonstrated political leadership. However, the measures he has adopted hardly constitute the type of grandiose policy changes that would warrant the ‘New Deal’ label. His leadership has been transactional at best, which has only resulted in public disappointment regarding what might have been. Regrettably, Martin simply has not provided the robust leadership required to bring about historic or transformative change in the realm of urban policy. More disappointing is the fact that he likely will not get another chance to do so.
Notes

1 These were as follows: 1) strengthening the social foundations of Canadian life, which encompassed a new deal for municipalities; 2) the creation of a 21st century economy; and 3) ensuring Canada’s place in the world. See Martin (2004b; 2003a).

2 Bradford (2002: 27) has suggested that “the overall pattern of ‘ignoring the cities’ has been punctuated by two periods of intense localism – in the early twentieth century by the Progressive reformers and in the 1960s by regional and urban movements.”

3 The emphasis was in the original document.

4 The savings were only estimated to be between $500,000 and $4 million (Feldman and Milch, 1981).

5 There is some provincial variation in this regard. For example, Saskatchewan, Quebec and Manitoba allow their municipalities to levy amusement taxes, while several provinces have allowed certain municipalities to implement hotel taxes. Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver have also been reaping the benefits of sharing in their respective provinces’ gas and fuel taxes.

6 The C5 includes the mayors of Toronto, Vancouver, Winnipeg, Montreal and Calgary as well as key civic leaders from each city. It originated as a result of the efforts of legendary urban thinker and activist, Jane Jacobs, and Alan Broadbent, a high profile Toronto philanthropist who heads the Maytree Foundation.

7 The final report is also known as the Sgro Report.

8 This echoed an argument advanced by Burns (1978).

9 Notable exceptions include Fairholm (1998); Conger and Kanungo (1998); Gardner (1990); and Greenleaf (1991).

10 Martin (2003b) himself alluded to the impact of that speech to his political demise.

11 The Industry Canada web site can be accessed at www.infrastructure.gc.ca/ndcc/index_e.shtml.

12 Infrastructure Canada was created in 2002 and prior to these changes had been reporting through the Minister of the Environment.
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