Electoral Participation among Immigrants in Ethnic Enclaves: 
Some Evidence from Australia

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Abstract
This paper investigates whether immigrants in Australia residing in ethnic enclaves, electoral constituencies with high concentrations of ethnic minorities, participate more in electoral politics than other immigrants. The results indicate that not only immigrants participate more when living in ethnic enclaves, but also feel politically more efficacious and show greater homogeneity in their partisan preferences. The analysis also indicates that not all groups of immigrants benefit from living in ethnic enclaves; the benefits are observed among immigrants from ethnic minority background such as those from South East Asia and Southern and South East Europe but not among those from British origin.

I would like to thank Nicki Doyle for her research assistance on this project.
In settling into the host society, immigrants have a tendency to regroup together into certain geographical areas (Ley 1999). There is a debate about whether such geographical concentration of immigrants facilitates or impedes their adaptation to the host society. On the one hand, the classical assimilation perspective sees ethnic segregation as an obstacle to immigrants’ adaptation. Segregation would limit opportunities for contact and participation within the host society and therefore slow down or even stop immigrants’ adaptation (Duncan and Lieberson 1959, Massey and Denton 1993, for a review see also van Kempen and Özüekren 1998: 1633-1634). On the other hand, others have argued that the best chance for immigrants to adapt, especially those groups culturally and racially more distinct from the local population, resides in their capacity to live apart within their own communities (Portes and Zhou 1993). The ethnic enclave literature thus posits that the concentration of ethnic minorities and immigrants within specific geographical areas reinforces ethnic communities, protects immigrants against feelings of social alienation and provides easier access to employment and social mobility (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Rumbaut 1990).

This debate, however useful, has focused more specifically on the social and economic adaptation of immigrants. Immigrants’ successful adaptation to the host society also has a political component. As it is for all citizens, immigrants’ voice must be clear and loud so that public authorities can listen, understand, and properly respond to their demands (Verba et al. 1995). Without such clear expression of their voice, immigrants are unlikely to see their unique needs, preoccupations, and preferences adequately addressed. Our concern here then is with the political adaptation of newcomers. The question addressed is: does the concentration of immigrants into certain geographical areas increase or decrease their participation to the political process in the host society?¹ Research on immigrants’ participation has made tremendous progress in assessing the role of individual and institutional factors on immigrants’ political participation (Junn 1999; Jones-Correa 2001; Tam Cho 1999; Uhlner et al 1989; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade 2001; Black 1987; Chui, Curtis and Lambert 1991; McAllister and Makkai 1992) but to this point little attention has been devoted to understanding the role of contextual factors such as the concentration of ethnic minorities in the immediate environment of immigrants.

The evidence regarding the impact of ethnic concentration on the participation of immigrants is scarce and limited to the context of ethnic minorities in the United States. Overall, however, it highlights positive consequences for immigrants who reside in areas with high concentrations ethnic minorities. First, using aggregate-level analysis, Schlichting, ¹ There is also a debate about whether immigrants’ concentration into certain areas is voluntary or forced (see Logan et al 2002, for a review). This paper does not, and cannot take into account whether the concentration of immigrants is voluntary or not. It focuses exclusively on the political consequences of ethnic segregation.
Tuckel and Maisel (1998) have shown that voter turnout is higher in areas with higher concentrations of African Americans. And the same findings have been replicated using individual-level analysis; Ramakrishnan (2005: 114) indicates that Latino and Asian immigrants participate more when living in areas with high concentrations of people of similar ethnic background. And similarly, Leighley (2001) demonstrates that Latinos living in areas with high concentrations of other Latinos participate more in politics.

We thus know little about how and why immigrants respond politically to the racial composition of their immediate environment, and we do not know whether the trends observed in the United States replicate into other national contexts. This paper examines the impact of high concentrations of ethnic minorities on the political participation of immigrants in Australia. Its large and increasing ethnically diverse population (with more than 20% of the population born in another country) makes Australia an ideal case to assess the conditions leading to a successful adaptation of immigrants. Moreover, patterns of settlement among immigrants in Australia have been characterized by a remarkable degree of residential segregation between the immigrants and the local population. So at the same time Australia is becoming more diverse it is becoming more ethnically divided in the sense that ethnic groups live more apart than together and this raises the question of whether such segregation helps or impedes immigrants’ political adaptation.

This paper is divided into five sections. The first section reviews the reasons why residing within areas of high concentrations ethnic minorities could increase immigrants’ participation. The second section presents the research design and the third, fourth and fifth sections present the empirical evidence. The contribution of this paper is to improve our understanding of immigrants’ political adaptation and the specific impact of living into areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities. But it is also to understand how the voice of immigrants contributes to democratic dynamics in their host-country. At stake is not only immigrants’ capacity to have their voice heard and listened to, but also the development of a vibrant and inclusive democracy.

**Why Should We Expect Immigrants’ Participation to Increase in Enclaves?**

The obvious question to begin with is why would immigrants residing in an ethnic enclave participate more than other immigrants? Many studies in the United States indicate a higher participation of immigrants residing in ethnic enclaves; but what explains this greater

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2 There are only few studies systematically reporting that the concentration of ethnic minorities in a geographical area decreases political participation. Cho, Gimpel and Dyck do so but their findings apply only to Asian immigrants in the United States (2004).

3 The expression “ethnic enclave” here refers to a geographical area in which immigrants and ethnic minorities constitute a substantial proportion of the population. Others have used the
political activism? Very few studies have examined immigrants’ participation in enclaves and even fewer have tried to empirically identify the roots of the effect. There are several possible explanations.

A first possibility links immigrants’ participation to their greater social integration and social connectedness when living in ethnic enclaves. It is well-known that people participate when they are asked to do so and when they are well-integrated into social networks (Verba, Brady and Schlozman, 1995). In ethnic enclaves, there are reasons to believe that immigrants might be better integrated or connected socially. Ethnic networks and associations should certainly have more prominent and extensive presences in areas where there are many immigrants and such networks could in turn very effectively mobilize their members. In fact, a few studies have shown the crucial role that social and ethnic organizations play in mobilizing immigrants and ethnic communities (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Tillie 2004). Therefore, immigrants within ethnic enclaves could participate more simply because ethnic and other social organizations are more active in asking them to do so.

Second, political parties could also mobilize immigrants in ethnic enclaves. During elections, parties contact people either by sending pamphlets, calling, or canvassing an area door to door. Such contacts initiated by political parties have proven efficient for increasing voter turnout and political participation among the general population (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). In the specific case of immigrants living in ethnic enclaves, we can speculate that political parties will make greater effort to contact and mobilize them. The argument is that in ethnic enclaves the payoff of building bridges with immigrant communities are greater and the cost of mobilization lower than in areas where there is only a small concentration of newcomers (Ramakrishnan 2005: 99). As a result, immigrants living in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities would be more likely to be contacted by parties and hence more likely to participate.

Third, immigrants living in ethnic enclaves could also be more inclined to participate because of the ethnicity of the local candidates that run in these areas. The literature on African Americans’ empowerment has shown that having African American public officials in certain areas helps mobilize members of that community (Bobo and Gilliam 1990). The same dynamic could hold for other ethnic groups. Therefore, candidates could be more likely to run for office in areas with a higher concentration of their own ethnicity which would in turn create greater enthusiasm among members of that ethnic community to participate and support their local candidate.

label “ethnic enclave” in reference to the structure of ethnic minorities’ economic organizations within a given area and as being distinct from an “ethnic neighborhood” and a “ghetto” (Logal et al. 2002).
Finally, a last possibility evokes the notion of strength in numbers. The size of the ethnic community within a specific area would provide members of that community with the feeling that they can make a difference and together influence the political outcome. In ethnic enclaves, immigrants’ perception about their chance of influencing the outcome would increase because of their large number within the area (Leighley 2001: 25-26). Thus, the larger the size of an ethnic group within an area, the more members of this group would participate because of the belief that their participation can yield some benefits for them and for the group (Leighley 2001: 146).

The four hypotheses presented above consistently lead to the same expectation, namely that immigrants living in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities should participate more in politics than immigrants living in areas with low concentration of ethnic minorities. The rest of this paper explores whether immigrants’ participation does increases when living in areas with large proportions of other immigrants and ethnic minorities and why this might be the case.

Research Design and Data

To assess whether immigrants living in ethnic enclaves participate more that other immigrants, several decisions must be made. A key decision relates to how to define an ethnic enclave. First, one can choose different units of analysis in setting the boundaries of an ethnic enclave: city, neighbourhood, or electoral constituency. In this paper, I use the federal constituency as a unit of analysis. Several reasons justify this choice. The federal constituency offers a mid-sized geographical unit that is most likely to capture the extent of immigrants’ daily living environment. As Branton and Jones (2005) argue, peoples’ lives are not limited to a small geographical area. Immigrants’ interaction with ethnic minorities and other immigrants extends beyond their immediate neighbourhood. Therefore, selecting a small geographical unit would not capture the extent of immigrants’ interactions with other ethnic minorities. But selecting such a large unit of analysis as a metropolitan area is not refined enough and might miss the specificity of the particular environment where immigrants live. More importantly, the electoral process in Australia makes the constituency level a highly significant political stage. Various communities within a constituency compete or cooperate with each other to elect the representative of their choice at times of elections and later on to influence their decisions. Hence when people become active (vote, contact politician, work for a party, attend a political meeting), this is usually done within the boundaries of their federal constituency. The inner dynamics of the constituency therefore make it a significant geographical area to study immigrants’ participation within ethnic enclaves.

Beyond selecting the boundaries of an ethnic enclave, one must also define the threshold of what qualifies a constituency as an “ethnic enclave”. There are no set criteria for
identifying what proportion ethnic minorities and immigrants must represent within an area to constitute an enclave. The strategy used here is to classify electoral constituencies into three categories: those with a small proportion of immigrants (from 0 to 15%), those with a sizable proportion of immigrants (from 15 to 30%), and those where immigrants represent a substantial proportion of the population, the real enclaves (from 30 to 50%). Such a strategy allows us to identify whether there is a linear relationship between the proportion of immigrants within a constituency and their participation or whether only immigrants residing in constituencies with very large proportions of immigrants participate more.

The logic of inquiry is to study the participation of immigrants using individual-level data. The strategy is to examine whether or not individual immigrants participate and then examine the ethnic composition of the federal constituency in which they reside. The individual-level data are drawn from the Australian Election Studies. Because we need a large sample of immigrants residing in areas for each of the three densities of immigrants specified above, the analysis relies on a pooled data set of the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Australian Election Studies as well as the 2004 Australian Election Study special sample of immigrants, which altogether provide a sample of 1507 immigrants and 4285 members of the Australian-born population. The contextual data for each constituency are derived from the 1996 and 2001 Census data.

Ideally, the analysis should examine different groups of immigrants because the impact of living in an ethnic enclave might vary across groups of immigrants as demonstrated by previous research (Ramakrishnan 2005; Leighley 2001). There are two major obstacles to such a strategy. First, the Census data do not provide detailed information about the ethnic composition of federal constituencies. It only provides information regarding the presence of three groups of immigrants from: the United Kingdom and Ireland, Southern and South Eastern Europe, and South East Asia. Second, limiting the analysis to these three immigrant communities would not yield reliable analyses because the sample size for each subgroup is relatively small. Therefore, the proposed strategy is to focus on immigrants from non-English

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4 2004 Australian Election Study special sample of immigrants was conducted as part of the 2004 Australian Election Study. 790 questionnaires were mailed to six constituencies (Fowler, Reid, and Watson in NSW, and Gellibrand, Holt, and McMillan in Victoria) with large proportions of immigrants from non-English speaking countries. 250 questionnaires were returned of which 81% were immigrant respondents.


6 The samples of immigrants from South East Asia, Southern and South Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom and Ireland are respectively 184, 233 and 488.
speaking countries as a whole. The Census data do provide information about the presence of this group of immigrants within each federal constituency and this strategy offers the advantage of targeting groups of immigrants that are for the most part more recently arrived, from countries with different political cultures and are members of visible minority groups. These immigrant communities are the most likely to experience challenges in adapting to the new political environment and from the ethnic enclave perspective, the most likely to benefit from living in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants (Portes and Zhou 1993). As much as possible, some exploratory analyses are conducted to examine whether the patterns observed for immigrants from non-English speaking countries as a whole are replicated for each of the three immigrant communities mentioned above (United Kingdom and Ireland, Southern and South Eastern Europe, and South East Asia).

Immigrant respondents to the *Australian Election Studies* are thus classified according to whether or not they were born in an English speaking country. English speaking countries include the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, the United States and South Africa, and all other countries are to be considered non-English speaking. The pooled sample thus provides 932 immigrant respondents from non-English speaking countries and 575 immigrant respondents from English speaking countries.

The percentage of immigrants from non-English speaking countries is used to measure the ethnic composition of each federal constituency. Analyses were also performed using the percentage of people not fluent in English and the results do not differ significantly. Immigrants from non-English speaking countries do not have the same demographic weight everywhere in Australia. In 2004, in two-thirds (or 100) of the 150 federal constituencies, immigrants from non-English speaking countries represent less than 15% of the population, in 38 of them they represent between 15 and 30% of the population and in 12 others they represent more than 30% of the population. The proportion of immigrants from non-English speaking countries even reaches almost 50% in the one constituency of Fowler (NSW). Not surprisingly, almost all constituencies where immigrants from non-English speaking countries represent more than 15% are located in either New South Wales (Sydney) or Victoria (Melbourne). The next section begins the empirical investigation.

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7 See Appendix A for the list of countries in each category.

8 The two variables essentially measure the same concept: the correlation (Pearson’s coefficient) between the percentages of people not fluent in English in the electorate and immigrants from non-English speaking countries is .985.
Electoral Participation among Immigrants in Ethnic Enclaves

Do immigrants from non-English speaking countries living in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants participate more than other immigrants? The normal starting point of the analysis to answer this question would be to examine whether immigrants actually vote or not. However, because Australia has a policy of compulsory voting with an enforcement mechanism and a subsequent turnout in federal elections of around 94%, the expectation is that there should not be large differences in the turnout between areas with high and low proportions of immigrants. Table 1 presents a brief examination of voting turnout at the aggregate-level across the constituencies for the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections. Results indicate that areas with more than 30% of immigrants exhibit a turnout broadly similar to that of areas with only up to 15% of immigrants; the difference is less than one percentage point. These results are supported by the individual-level analysis: immigrant respondents living in ethnic enclave participate as much as immigrants living in areas with only a small proportion of immigrants. Given the lack of variation in voter turnout in Australia, the rest of the paper focuses on immigrants’ participation in campaign activities such as discussing politics, talking about voting intention, giving money and working for a candidate or a political party, and attending a political meeting.

Descriptive data presented in Figure 1 indicate that generally immigrants from non-English speaking countries tend to participate as much or more than the local population. However, with the exception of discussing politics, the differences with the local population are usually larger for immigrants living in constituencies with large proportions of ethnic minorities.

First, immigrants talk more often about their vote intention when they live in areas where there is a high concentration of other immigrants. While 39% of immigrants living in

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9 In order to lighten the text, the expression “immigrants” now on refers to immigrants from non-English speaking countries.
11 According to McAllister and Makkai (1993), concentrations of immigrants recently arrived and with weak English abilities are related to the proportion of spoiled ballots in constituencies. They demonstrate that the higher the proportion of recent immigrants and those with weaker English proficiency in constituency, the higher the proportion of rejected ballots. This conclusion, however, does not necessarily points out a special dynamics in ethnic enclaves; rather, it suggests that immigrants recently arrived and who have weak English abilities tend to spoil their ballots more than other people.
12 Local population includes all people born in Australia, excluding the second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries.
areas of immigrant concentration of up to 15% report having talked about their vote intention, this proportion increases to 43% when immigrants live in concentration areas with 15 to 30%. But the most striking result is that the percentage of immigrants discussing their vote intention jumps to 54% when living in areas of immigrant concentrations higher than 30%.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

Immigrants do not simply talk more about their vote intention when living in constituencies with a large proportion of other immigrants; they also work more frequently for a political party or local candidate. The proportion of immigrants reporting having worked for a party or candidate increases from 12 to 18 to 21% depending on whether the immigrant concentration of their constituency is up to 15%, 15 to 30%, or more than 30% respectively. Note that immigrants living in areas with immigrant concentrations of up to 15% are as likely as the local population work for a party or candidate.

Finally, when immigrants cohabitate in constituencies with other immigrants they also attend political meetings more often. While five per cent of immigrants living in constituencies with an immigrant concentration of up to 15% report having attended a political meeting during the last electoral campaign, this proportion increases to eight per cent for those immigrants living in constituencies where the population is between 15 and 30% immigrant, and reaches 11 per cent for immigrants living in areas where the immigrant population is more than 30%. Participation in political meetings thus doubles for immigrants living in constituencies where the proportion of immigrants is more than 30% compared to when they live in areas where the proportion of immigrants is up to 15%. Again, there is no difference between immigrants in areas with immigrant concentration of up to 15% and the local population.

The impact of living with other immigrants does not extend to all forms of participation however. First, there is no consistent impact on the propensity of immigrants to give money to a candidate or political party, which is not surprising as it is probably more a function of individual financial resources. And second, there is no impact on discussing politics. The reason here might be that this type of political activity is already quite widespread and therefore leaves little room for variation.

Two main findings emerge from these preliminary data. First, for three of the five campaign activities, immigrants participate more when living in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants.

Second, the greater participation is not limited to those immigrants living in areas that are more than 30% immigrant, and extends to those living in areas with a sizable proportion of immigrants (15-30%); moreover there seems to be somewhat of a progression in the participation of immigrants as their concentration within an area increases. Thus, immigrants
Participation among Different Immigrant Communities

The evidence presented so far indicates that immigrants benefit from living in areas where there is a high concentration of other immigrants; their political participation increases significantly. Immigrants, however, do not constitute a homogeneous group and therefore it is possible that some groups of newcomers benefit more than others from living in an ethnic enclave. To examine such a possibility, the analysis now breaks down the immigrant population into three subgroups, namely immigrants from South East Asia, Southern and South Eastern Europe and the United Kingdom and Ireland. Figure 2 presents the involvement in campaign activities for each of the three groups of immigrants. To simplify the interpretation of the results, the analysis relies on a scale of participation composed of the three types of activities for which immigrants participate more when living in ethnic enclaves, namely discussing vote intention, working for a candidate/party and attending a political meeting. Here, constituencies are classified according to the proportion of immigrants for the specific immigrant community examined (namely percentage of immigrants from South East Asia, Southern Europe and the United Kingdom).

Data in Figure 2 indicate that not all three groups of immigrants equally benefit from living with members of their ethnic community. The impact is most important for immigrants from South East Asia. The average participation score among this group of immigrants, on a scale ranging from 0 to 100 where 100 means frequent participation, increases from 23 to 39 points when living in areas with up to 15% and more than 30% of other immigrants from South East Asia. A significant impact is also observed for immigrants from Southern and South Eastern Europe; their average participation score increases by 11 points from areas of low and high ethnic concentration. Finally, no consistent impact is observed among immigrants from the United Kingdom and Ireland; if anything, their average participation score decreases in areas of high concentrations of other fellow British immigrants (from 19 to 14 points). These findings suggest that living with fellow members of the same ethnic community does not benefit equally every group of immigrants; it benefits only immigrants from ethnic minority background such as immigrants from South East Asia and Southern and South Eastern Europe. Note that it is striking that both immigrants from Southern and South Eastern Europe, and those from South East Asia participate more when living with members of their ethnic community as the former have been in Australia for a few decades and the latter are more recently arrived.
But is the relationship unique to the immigrant population or is the same relationship observed among the local population? Answering this question is a first and important step to understanding the dynamics of political participation among immigrants living in ethnic enclaves. If the local population, like the immigrant population, were to participate more when living in areas with high concentrations of immigrants from non-English speaking countries, this would suggest that there is something in those constituencies that affect everybody, and not just immigrants. It could mean that multicultural contexts create some microcosms of richer and more widespread political participation than context of ethnic homogeneity or it could mean that it is the urban location of most ethnic enclaves (Sydney, Melbourne) that drives participation up. To answer this question, the analysis now examines whether the total population participates more when living in areas with large concentrations of immigrants from non-English speaking countries.13

Figure 2 presents the average participation score among the local population living in constituencies with three different concentrations of immigrants. The results confirm that living in ethnic enclaves positively impact only the political participation of immigrants from ethnic minority backgrounds. Like immigrants from the United Kingdom and Ireland, members of the local population do not participate more when they reside in constituencies with large proportions of immigrants. The proportion of immigrants in the constituency has no effect at all on the participation of the local population. These findings are consistent with Leighley’s (2001) who finds no evidence linking the presence of ethnic minorities to whites’ participation in the United States.14

Another test is to examine whether the relationship is replicated among the second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries.15 Here, the data point to a pattern of participation among the second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries that is consistent with that of the first generation but that is too modest to be significant. The participation score for the second generation of immigrants only increases by three points (from 19 to 22). The reason why the relationship is weaker for the second generation is unclear; one possibility is that living in the ethnic community matters less or is less meaningful to them.

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13 Further analyses for the second generation of immigrants for each of the three specific immigrant communities are not possible because the samples are very small.

14 Although Leighley (2001) finds a significant and negative relationship between whites’ perception of diversity within their immediate environment and their political participation. Unfortunately, it is not possible to explore such a possibility with the Australian data.

15 The second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries is define here as those people born in Australia who have one or two parents born in a non-English speaking country.
Explaining Dynamics of Electoral Participation in Ethnic Enclaves

The previous section demonstrated that immigrants from non-English speaking countries living in constituencies with higher concentrations of other immigrants participate more across a wide range of campaign activities than other immigrants. It also demonstrated that the dynamics of greater participation in those ethnic enclaves is unique to immigrants and does not extend to the local population. The task now is to investigate which specific dynamics within these ethnic enclaves lead immigrants to participate more in the political process. Several hypotheses were presented earlier in this paper. This section empirically investigates whether any of these proposed hypotheses can explain why immigrants participate more when they live in ethnic enclaves.

The first hypothesis presented linked the greater participation of immigrants to the mobilizing impact of social and ethnic organizations. Unfortunately, with the data used for this project, it is not possible to directly examine the extent of immigrants’ involvement in ethnic organizations as the Australian Election Studies do not provide any information in this regard. But, the 2001 and 2004 Australian Election Studies do provide information about respondents’ involvement in three types of social organizations (charitable organizations, sport or recreational organizations and professional associations) and these will be used as a proxy for the degree of immigrants’ social integration.16

Figure 3 reports the percentage of immigrants and members of the local population that were involved in at least one of the three types of organizations. First, the evidence indicates that overall immigrants’ involvement in charitable, recreational and professional associations is lower than that of the local population. Moreover, immigrants living in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants are less involved than other immigrants. The proportion of immigrants involved in at least one of these three types of organizations is 26% in areas with more than 30% of immigrants as opposed to 31% in areas with up to 15% of immigrants. Even though such evidence cannot rule out the possibility that immigrants in enclaves are more involved in ethnic organizations more specifically, it appears that in general when living in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants, newcomers tend to be less socially involved, not more, which runs counter to the first hypothesis.

Social organizations do not appear to be the source of greater mobilization and participation within immigrant communities living in enclaves, but what about political parties: are they more active in reaching out to immigrants? Respondents to the 2001 and 2004 Australian Election Studies were asked to indicate whether they had been contacted by a

16 This information is not available for the 1998 Australian Election Study.
political party during the campaign.\textsuperscript{17} If party mobilization were to explain immigrant participation in enclaves, immigrants living in enclaves should report in a greater proportion having been contacted by a party than immigrants who do not live in enclaves.

The empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis. First, immigrants regardless of the characteristics of the constituency where they live are generally contacted less often by parties. Moreover, immigrants living in areas with high concentrations of other immigrants are even less mobilized by political parties than those living outside enclaves. While 23\% of the immigrants living in constituencies with immigrant concentrations of up to 15\% report having been contacted by a party, only 18\% of the immigrants living in areas with concentrations of more than 30\% report having been contacted. Once again, the differences are not large but they run counter to the expectations and hence cannot explain the greater political participation of immigrants in enclaves. This evidence is in fact consistent with Leighley’s (2001) indicating that parties in the United States do not mobilize immigrant more in areas with large concentrations of immigrants.

The third hypothesis speculated that in ethnic enclaves, parties would more often present local candidates that are members of ethnic communities and that this would stimulate the participation of immigrants. Ideally, validating or discarding the local candidate hypothesis would require examining the ethnicity of all candidates in all of the constituencies and assess how it mobilizes immigrants, a task well beyond the scope of this study for the moment.\textsuperscript{18} The proposed alternative strategy is to examine which factors immigrants identify as the main determinant for their voting decision. Respondents to the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Australian Election Studies were asked to identify which factor (leader, specific issues, local candidate or party as a whole) was most important in deciding how to vote. The expectation is that the larger the proportion of immigrants within a constituency, the greater the proportion of immigrants who identify the local candidate as the main factor in deciding which party to vote for.

For a third time the evidence fails to support the hypothesis. Overall very few immigrants (and non-immigrants), regardless of the constituency in which they live, actually claim that the local candidate best explains the way they voted; only between three and five percent of immigrants and eight percent of the local population identify the local candidate as the main motivation behind their vote. Of course, that does not say whether or not the local

\textsuperscript{17} This information is not available for the 1998 Australian Election Study.

\textsuperscript{18} This would be an entire study in itself. Just make the inventory of the number of ethnic candidates in each constituency would not be sufficient as it is quite probable that the larger an ethnic community within a constituency, the larger the number of local candidates that are members of that community. Such evidence would be sufficient to demonstrate why immigrants participate more in ethnic enclaves.
candidates were members of ethnic communities nor does it mean that the local candidates
did not play a role in shaping immigrants’ decisions to vote or become politically involved,
but minimally we would have expected more immigrants to identify the local candidate as the
main motivation behind their vote in areas where local candidates could be more likely to be
members of ethnic communities, and this is not the case.

None of social groups, parties or local candidate explanations appear to account for the
greater political participation among immigrants in ethnic enclaves. What about the argument
that numbers bring a sentiment of strength and the perception that they have a better chance of
affecting the political outcome? Do immigrants participate more among other immigrants
because they have the feeling, altogether, that they can make a difference? This hypothesis
parallels the well-known argument in studies of political participation that people participate
when they feel they can make a difference, when they feel politically efficacious (Milbrath
1965). Therefore, in order to evaluate the validity of the “strength in number” hypothesis, the
strategy is to examine whether immigrants’ sense of political efficacy is greater when living
in ethnic enclaves.

The 1998, 2001 and 2004 Australian Election Studies asked their respondents whether
they thought that political parties in Australia cared about what ordinary people think. Figure
3 reports the proportion of immigrants and non-immigrants who said they strongly believed
that political parties do not care about ordinary people (those who scored 1 on a 1 to 5 scale).
The results suggest that immigrants living in areas with higher concentrations of other
immigrants feel politically more efficacious. The proportion of immigrants reporting that
parties really don’t care about the ordinary people were 11 and 13% when living in areas of
concentration with respectively more than 30% and between 15 and 30%. In comparison,
more than one fifth (22%) of immigrants living in areas with up to 15% immigrants reported
that parties really don’t care about what ordinary people think; this is twice as many as in
areas with more than 30% immigrants.\footnote{19} These findings are consistent with the hypothesis.
We know that individuals who feel politically more efficacious participate more in politics,
and we observe that immigrants who live in ethnic enclaves both feel politically more
efficacious and participate more that other immigrants.

\textit{Multivariate analysis}

What is missing yet is the direct connection between the two phenomena: do
immigrants living in ethnic enclaves really participate more because they feel more

\footnote{19} If we report the average score of efficacy, the results show a similar trend, although of
weaker magnitude. The average score of efficacy on a 0-100 scale where 100 means
respondents feel strongly efficacious are 42, 44 and 46 respectively for immigrants living in
areas with up to 15% of other immigrants, between 15 and 30%, and more than 30% of other
immigrants.
efficacious? In order to answer this question, the paper now turns to a multivariate analysis in which the dependent variable is the participation scale used in Figure 2. The main independent variable is the percentage of immigrants from non-English speaking countries and the control variable is immigrants’ sense of political efficacy. Because political participation tends to be the prerogative of people of high socio-economic status, the analyses also includes variables measuring immigrants’ age, income, sex, level of education and employment status. Finally, some contextual economic variables are included to ensure that the economic situation of immigrants’ enclaves does not interfere with immigrants’ propensity to participate. The analysis is limited to immigrants from non-English speaking countries only.

Table 2 reports the results of OLS multivariate analyses. Two models are presented. Model 1 presents the analysis without the variable measuring immigrants’ sense of political efficacy and Model 2 presents the analysis when the variable is included. Such a strategy allows us to identify the extent to which political efficacy can explain the contextual effect associated with the concentration of other immigrants, after controlling for all other variables.

First, the analysis in Model 1 confirms that living in an ethnic enclave increases the political participation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries. The B coefficient of a value of .28 signifies that, everything else being equal, for every increase of one percentage point in the concentration of immigrants within the constituency, immigrant respondents’ participation in campaign activities increases by .28 points. For instance, this model indicates that everything else being equal, an immigrant living in a constituency with an immigrant population of 30% will exhibit a participation score superior by 8.4 points to that of an immigrants living in a constituency with a concentration of five percent immigrant. More importantly, this relationship holds even when controlling for the socio-economic situation of immigrants as well as the economic context of the constituency in which they live. In short, the reason why immigrants in ethnic enclaves participate more than other immigrants is not because they have a higher socio-economic status. Note in fact immigrants have a lower income and ethnic enclaves overall are not as well provided economically as other areas.

What about the greater sense of political efficacy that immigrants express in ethnic enclaves? Can it explain why they participate more? Model 2 answers this question. Not surprisingly, the analysis demonstrates that the more immigrants feel politically efficacious the more they participate. Everything else being equal, immigrants who feel highly efficacious exhibit a participation score superior to that of immigrants who feel weakly efficacious by 9.7 points.
What is more surprising is that including the political efficacy variable in the analysis does not explain why immigrants living in ethnic enclaves participate more than other immigrants. The B coefficient for the percentage of immigrants within the constituency drops only from .28 to .27 when political efficacy is included in the model. Practically, it means that, everything else being equal, an immigrant living in a constituency with a 30% ethnic concentration exhibits a participation score superior to that of an immigrant living in a constituency with only five percent of immigrants by 8.1 points (as opposed to a difference of 8.4 points in Model 1). When living in ethnic enclaves, immigrants do feel more efficacious but the reason why immigrants participate more when living in ethnic enclaves is not that they feel more efficacious than other immigrants.20

An Alternative Explanation: Ethnic Community Ties

The obvious question then is: why do immigrants participate more in campaign activities when living in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities? What other explanations can account for such dynamics? One hypothesis presented earlier but for which the data used for this project did not allow for a reliable analysis linked the greater participation to ethnic community ties. Essentially, the “ethnic community ties” hypothesis claims that the presence of large numbers of the same ethnic community reinforces the presence and role that ethnic organizations play within the community. These ethnic organizations could act as mobilizing agents of immigrants, driving them to participate. But the ethnic community ties hypothesis encompasses more than simply formal ethnic organizations. Informal community ties could also explain the greater political involvement of immigrants in enclaves. For instance, high concentrations of ethnic minorities in a geographical area could produce some peer pressure effect. The community dynamics would put greater pressure for immigrants to participate and stick with the group.

Consistent with this hypothesis, Uhlaneer presents an interesting approach that emphasizes the “neglected” role of groups in mobilizing citizens for participation (1989). Her argument claims that group leaders mobilize members of their community in order to negotiate political goods (policies, money for community projects…) with party candidates

20 The analyses do not control for the other possible explanations presented in Figure 3. The reason is twofold. First, descriptive data have shown that such explanations were unlikely to account for the impact of living in ethnic enclaves because immigrants living in enclaves are not more but rather less likely to be involved in social groups, contacted by parties or to vote for a local candidate. Second, the indicators for involvement in groups and contact by parties are not available for the 1998 Australian Election Study which reduces substantially the number of cases available for the analysis. Nevertheless, the analyses were performed with these alternative explanations included in the model and the results do not differ significantly from those presented in Table 1. Results not presented.
Party candidates enter the negotiations in order to increase their support among the group and thus increase their chances of winning the election, and members of the group comply with the directions from the group leader in order to obtain the promised benefits.

It is not possible to demonstrate directly that such dynamics does indeed occur in our case but the hypothesis is consistent with our findings: in enclaves, immigrants participate more. Moreover, we can also indirectly test the relevance of such a hypothesis by asking what would be the consequences of such group leader-candidates negotiation. Were group leaders to make a “deal” with a party or candidate we should expect immigrants not only to participate more but to regroup behind the party or candidate involved in the alliance. That, we can verify by examining the level of homogeneity in partisan preferences (reported vote). Because immigrants and ethnic minorities usually tend to support the ALP in Australian politics, the analysis is limited to support for the ALP.

Figure 4 reports the percentage of first preferences given to the ALP by immigrants from non-English speaking countries in constituencies with different concentrations of ethnic minorities. Because the ethnic enclaves are for the vast majority located in urban areas, which are known to be ALP strongholds, Figure 4 also presents the distribution of first preferences of the local population. The data indicate that there is a greater homogeneity in immigrants’ partisan preferences in supporting the ALP when the concentration of ethnic minorities is high in the constituency. In areas where there is up to 15% of ethnic minorities, 44% immigrants from non-English speaking gave their first preferences to the ALP, which confirms that immigrants overwhelmingly support the ALP regardless of where they live. But that proportion further increases to 51 and 60% in areas with respectively between 15 and 30% or more than 30% of ethnic minorities. Immigrants from non-English thus do demonstrate greater homogeneity in partisan preferences when living in ethnic enclaves. Note that the differences are statistically significant when controlling for individual and contextual-level socio-economic variables in a binary logit regression (results not presented).

Not all groups of immigrants though do exhibit greater homogeneity in their partisan preferences when residing in areas where their community has a great numerical importance.

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21 The Australian electoral system uses Alternative voting, a system in which electors are asked to rank from the most preferred to the least preferred all the candidates that run in a constituency. When none of the candidate gets the majority of the vote, the votes of the weakest candidates are redistributed according to the second and following preferences until one of the candidates obtains the majority.

22 Support for all other parties declines in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities (results not presented).
Homogeneity effect is most important among immigrants from South East Asia whose support for the ALP increases from 41 to 71% when living in areas with low and high concentrations of people of their community, a 30-point increase. The effect is also notable among immigrants from Southern and South Eastern Europe whose support for the ALP increases from 53 to 61, an eight-point increase. But like it was observed for campaign participation, no effect is observed among the community of British immigrants. When living in areas where they are numerous, British immigrants do not exhibit greater support for the ALP. One could argue that we should not be looking at support for the ALP for British immigrants, but rather look at support for their favourite party, namely the Liberal-National coalition. In fact, there is not obvious trend either for British immigrants’ support for the Liberal-National Coalition or for any other parties. Partisan support simply does not vary in any consistent way for British immigrants with the concentration of their community in the area where they reside. Similarly, there is only a small increase in support for the ALP among the local population when living in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities (from 35 to 40%). Such weak or inexistent effect for the local population is important as it indirectly controls for the urban character of ethnic enclaves; were the increase in ALP support among immigrants from non-English speaking countries attributable to the urban location of these constituencies, the expectation would have been to observe the same pattern among the local population living in these enclaves. The fact that the partisan homogeneity among the local population does not increase as much as among immigrants when living in ethnic enclaves suggests that the urban location of these enclaves is not responsible for the observed pattern.

Finally, the second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries also exhibit stronger homogeneity in its support for the ALP when living in areas where there are high concentrations of ethnic minorities (an 8-point increase). This result shows once again that the dynamics of ethnic enclaves affect primarily and more strongly first generation immigrants than immigrants of second generation. We can speculate that first generation immigrants are more integrated and dependent upon ethnic networks than second generation immigrants and that such integration and dependence explain the greater impact of ethnic enclaves and ethnic community ties on first generation immigrants.

These results suggest that the same groups of immigrants that demonstrated greater involvement in campaign activities when living in areas with high concentrations of co-ethnics, also exhibit greater homogeneity in their partisan preferences. As expected then, immigrants in enclaves do not simply participate more, but also participate in a more homogeneous way. Such evidence does not confirm Uhlmaner’s hypothesis as it only investigates the consequences of Uhlaner’s hypothesis, but it is consistent with the
hypothesis: immigrants in ethnic enclaves do not only participate more but also exhibit greater homogeneity in their partisan preferences.\textsuperscript{23}

Conclusion

There is a debate about whether or not it is good for immigrants to live among themselves, whether it helps or impedes their integration. Previous research has demonstrated that from an economic and social perspective it is often good for immigrants to regroup in some geographical areas (Portes and Bach 1985; Portes and Rumbaut 1990). The evidence in this paper indicates that there are also important positive political consequences for immigrants to regroup together into certain geographical areas. This paper provides findings consistent with previous research in the United States on that immigrants in Australia participate more in a wide variety of campaign activities when living in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities and immigrants. Ethnic enclaves are thus not pockets of political marginalization but rather help immigrants adapt to the host political system.

This paper also demonstrates that not all groups of immigrants benefit from living within their ethnic communities and the dynamics of ethnic enclaves affect primarily immigrants from ethnic minority background, such as those from South East Asia and Southern and South Eastern Europe. Immigrants from British origin did not exhibit a stronger propensity to participate when living with large numbers of their community. This finding, even though only exploratory given both the size of the samples used for the analysis and the small number of specific immigrant communities examined, lends support for the view that the road to successful political adaptation differs for each immigrant community. Like other have stated before, immigrants from communities with more visible ethnic background or cultural specificity benefit from uniting together into certain geographical areas and from integrating into their own ethnic community (Portes and Zhou 1993).

That immigrants living in ethnic enclaves participate more than other immigrants is a non-ambiguous finding that replicates that of previous research. What is less clear, however, is the reason why that happens. Four hypotheses were examined in this paper to account for such a dynamics, and none were supported. The contribution of this paper here then is to rule

\textsuperscript{23} An alternative argument would be that such patterns are attributable to strategic voting. Since an ALP victory is often likely in urban areas and especially in those with large immigrant population, than people might simply rally behind the ALP to avoid wasting their vote. There are two counter-arguments here though. First, the impact is still stronger among immigrants, and there is no reason to expect immigrants to have a stronger desire to avoid a wasted vote. Second, and more importantly, the dynamics of the Alternative vote reduces the salience of strategic voting as there is in effect no wasted vote under the Alternative vote; when your first choice does not win, it is likely that your second preference will be taken into account.
out some possible candidates to explain what lead to greater political participation in ethnic
enclaves rather than identifying exactly what account for it. Immigrants in ethnic enclaves do
not participate more because they are more socially connected or mobilized by parties; in fact
immigrants in enclaves are less likely to be members of group and to be contacted by parties.
Immigrants in enclaves do not participate more because of the ethnicity of the candidates.
Well, there are major limitations to the demonstration here but at least we can say that
immigrants in enclaves do not mention the local candidate as being the reason for voting the
way they do. As mentioned before, to rule out this explanation we would need to identify the
ethnicity of all local candidates in all constituencies and then evaluate whether individual
immigrants are more likely to support candidates of the same ethnicity as them, a length study
on its own. Finally, the analysis did demonstrate that immigrants living in enclaves have a
stronger sense of political efficacy than those living in areas with a low concentration of
ethnic minorities. However, such greater sense of efficacy did not explain why immigrants in
enclaves participate more. Immigrants’ participation in enclaves goes beyond the greater
sense of empowerment that immigrants feel when living altogether.

Arguably, the ethnic enclave effect is associated to some ethnic community ties that
prevail when the community is large within a constituency and has the potential to influence
the election results. It was not possible to directly demonstrate the validity of this hypothesis
but our analyses lent some indirect results to this interpretation. In ethnic enclaves, immigrants
do not only participate more, but also participate in a more homogeneous way,
and this is what we would expect in situation where community leaders mobilize members of
the community in order to bargain with party candidates in the constituency. The evidence
presented, however, is only indirect and would require some more investigation in order to be
validated.

Overall, then, living in ethnic enclaves has positive consequences for the political
adaptation of immigrants: they participate more, feel more efficacious, and participate in a
more homogenous way which we can think provide them with a stronger influence on the
election results. This, it can be argued, can only help them in articulating a political voice that
truly represents their needs and preferences and that can be heard by officials. We are far from
the image of ghettos that are pockets of political alienation and apathy. Ethnic enclaves
constitute space through which immigrants learn to become active citizens.

As to whether or not public officials do pay greater attention to immigrants’ voice
when they live in areas where they are numerous, that remains to be demonstrated but
immigrants do certainly have such a positive impression and participate accordingly. And this
can only both facilitate their adaptation and integration to the political dynamics of the host
society and help sustain the quality of our democracies.
The evidence about the increased participation among immigrants living in areas with high concentrations of ethnic minorities raises some questions though with regards to the future of race relations. The local white population usually tends to have more negative racial attitudes and attitudes toward immigrants when living in areas with high concentration of ethnic minorities (Taylor, 1998; Glaser, 1994) and this paper and more and more evidence indicates that a very successful way for immigrants to adapt and integrate the host political system is to live separately in ethnic enclaves. Those conclusions when presented next to each other are quite troubling. If the local population has more positive racial attitudes when living segregated from immigrants and immigrants integrate better politically, socially and economically when living segregated from the local population, does this mean that our societies are condemned to be segregated? Is segregation a positive social organization? But if so, what does it say about the future of social cohesion in societies that host large immigrant population? And what does it say about the real levels of tolerance and mutual understanding that prevail in multicultural societies? These are troubling questions that researchers and public officials need to address.
### Appendix A: Classification of Immigrants

#### Non-English Speaking Countries

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<th>Region</th>
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#### English Speaking Countries

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Appendix B: Construction of Variables

**Participation scale**
Scale ranging from 0 to 100 that indicate the participation of respondents in three types of campaign activities (discussing vote intention, attending a political meeting, and working for a party or local candidate). 0 = no participation, 33 = participation in one activity, 67 = participation in two activities, and 100 = participation in all three types of activities.

**% of immigrants from non-English speaking countries (in constituency)**
Percentage of immigrants from countries other than Canada, United States, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and South Africa. Source: Kopras (2000, 2004)

**Weekly median income (in constituency)**

**Unemployment (in constituency)**

**% finish school at age 15 or younger (in constituency)**

**Education**
0 = finished high-school; 1 = post-secondary technical training; 2 = professional diploma; 3 = university degree

**Age**
Age in years.

**Female**
1 = female, 0 = male.

**Income**
Household income on a 16-point scale.

**Employed**
1 = full time or part time employed, 0 = all others.

**Group Membership**
Percentage of respondents that are a member of at least one of the following three types of groups: charitable organizations, sport and recreational organization, and professional associations.

**Contacted by parties**
Percentage of respondents indicating having been contacted by a party during the campaign either by telephone, mail or face-to-face contact.

**Vote for local candidate**
Percentage of respondents identifying the local candidate as the reason for their vote decisions (as opposed to the leaders, some specific issues or the party as a whole).

**Politicians don’t care about ordinary people**
Scale ranging from 0 to 5 where 0 means respondents strongly disagree and 5 means respondents strongly agree with the following statement: “Politicians do not care what ordinary people think in Australia”.
Tables and Figures

Table 1. Federal Election Turnout (Aggregate and Individual-level data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concentration of immigrants from non-English speaking countries</th>
<th>0-15%</th>
<th>15-30%</th>
<th>More than 30%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% who voted in constituency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate-level Turnout (Official turnout 1998, 2001, 2004))</td>
<td>94.9</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(298)</td>
<td>(106)</td>
<td>(44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual-level Turnout (1998, 2001 and 2004 AES data)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(292)</td>
<td>(294)</td>
<td>(282)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Numbers in parentheses report the number of cases (number of constituencies for aggregate-level turnout and number of respondents for individual-level turnout).

Figure 1. Participation in Campaign Activities among Immigrants from Non-English Speaking Countries (by proportion of immigrants from non-English speaking countries in constituency)

* Difference with local population is statistically significant at least at .05-level (t-test).
Figure 2. Participation in Campaign Activities among Three Immigrant Communities and the Australian-born Population
(By proportion of immigrants of the same origin in constituency)

South East Asia

Southern and South Eastern Europe

United Kingdom and Ireland

Australian-born Population**

Second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries**

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45

Participation scale (Mean score 0-100)

0-15%

16-30%

More than 30%


Note: Participation scale is composed of the following: discuss vote intention, work for a candidate/party, and attend a political meeting.

* Difference with constituency with up to 15% of ethnic minority group is statistically significant at least at .05-level (t-test).

** Contextual information for the Australian-born population and the second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries is the percentage of immigrants from non-English speaking countries.
Figure 3. Explaining Dynamics of Political Participation in Ethnic Enclaves (by proportion of immigrants from non-English speaking countries in constituency)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Local population</th>
<th>0-15%</th>
<th>16-30%</th>
<th>More than 30%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Involved in at least one type of group (%)**</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by parties (%)**</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted the way they did because of local candidate (%)</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties don't care about people</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Difference with local population is statistically significant at least at .05-level (t-test).
** 2001 and 2004 Australian Election Studies only.
Table 2: Dynamics of Participation among Immigrants in Ethnic Enclaves

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPATION IN CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES (0-100 SCALE)</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>RSE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contextual Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of immigrants from non-English speaking</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>countries</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly median income (in constituency)</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (in constituency)</td>
<td>-.47</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% finish school at age 15 or younger (in</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>constituency)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Individual Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-3.14</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>2.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001 election respondent</td>
<td>2.71</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 election respondent</td>
<td>12.27</td>
<td>4.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politicians care what ordinary people think</td>
<td>9.70</td>
<td>4.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>43.63</td>
<td>23.37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Entries are OLS unstandardized B coefficient (regressions with robust standard error).

* p<.05; ** p<.01
Figure 4. Support for ALP in Constituencies with Low and High Concentrations of Ethnic Minorities


* Contextual information for the Australian-born population and the second generation of immigrants from non-English speaking countries is the percentage of immigrants from non-English speaking countries.
References


