A Reconsideration of Tolerance:
Racist Organizations and Civil Liberties Judgments

Allison Harell
PhD Candidate, Political Science
McGill University
allison.harell@mcgill.ca

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On September 30, 2005, the Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, published a series of 12 cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed. Over the months that followed, Muslims around the world expressed anger and outrage – some peacefully and others quite violently – over the images.[1] The Danish paper argued that they commissioned the cartoons "in response to several incidents of self-censorship in Europe caused by widening fears and feelings of intimidation in dealing with issues related to Islam" (Rose 2006). There defense, then, was to underline an inherent right to freedom of speech and the press. Many Muslims, however, were offended. In Islam, images of the Prophet are prohibited and those that portray him negatively, as in two of the cartoons in particular, were seen as particularly insulting.[2] The images were said to be offensive and represented a larger intolerance and disrespect towards Muslims in Denmark and the West more generally. Publishing (and re-publishing) the cartoons were, from one perspective, evidence of mass intolerance of a minority in modern democracies, particularly vulnerable to prejudice after the September 11th attacks. At the same time, others saw allowing the publication as representing precisely the type of tolerance required of Muslims if they are to integrate into Western democracies.

In Canada, several papers re-published the cartoons and the resulting controversy, although much milder than the riots and violence that have occurred around the world, raises questions about the limits of free expression. In particular, the choice of an Alberta publication, the *Western Standard,* to reprint the images has lead to a complaint being filed with the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship Commission by a group called the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada. Whether the commission sides with the complainants or the *Western Standard* is yet to

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[1] Newspaper coverage of the controversy has been extensive. Newspapers in over 50 countries have republished the cartoons, while many major papers, notably in North America and Britain, have refrained from reprinting the images while still arguing in editorials for freedom of the press.

[2] The two most controversial images include one of the Prophet with a bomb in his turban and another where the Prophet is turning back suicide bombers because they have 'run out of virgins'.

be seen, but the complaint highlights the tension between freedom of expression and increasing concern about being tolerant and inclusive toward minorities in modern, multicultural democracies. How do people balance the right to freedom of expression with the promotion of social inclusion? In this paper, I will focus on how young people are balancing these competing demands in Canada by examining their attitudes toward different types of controversial groups and how their experiences with diversity affect them.

Political Tolerance: Its Meaning and Application in Comparative Context

Despite the variety of uses of the term tolerance in everyday language, "tolerance" in political science and philosophy is usually understood to imply restraint when confronted with a disliked group or practice (Cohen 2004; Heyd 1996; Horton and Mendus 1991; Horton and Nicholson 1992; Mendus 1988, 1989, 2000; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979). A key component is disapproval. If a person is indifferent or endorses the perspective, restraint is not necessary because there is nothing the person objects to (Mendus 1989, 8; Sullivan et al. 1979; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982). Empirical political science has typically defined political tolerance as "a willingness to 'put up with' those things one rejects or opposes." (Sullivan et al. 1982, 2). The extent to which citizens do (and should) live up to this ideal has been much debated.

Beginning with Stouffer's (1963) groundbreaking work on American's civil liberties judgments towards communists in the 1950s, studies have focused mainly on the level of political tolerance among general publics (and whether it has changed over time) (Mondak and Sanders 2003; Sullivan et al. 1982; Wilson 1994) and individual-level explanations of the causes of political tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Duch and Gibson 1992; Gibson 1987, 1989;

Kuklinski et al. 1991; Marcus et al. 1995; Sniderman et al. 1989; Sullivan et al. 1981; 1979; 1982; 1993). While originally based almost exclusively in the U.S. context, comparative work on political tolerance is increasingly being conducted (see, for example, Andsager, Wyatt, and Martin 2004; Barnum and Sullivan 1990; Duch and Gibson 1992; Gibson 1998a, 1998b; Karpov 1999; Sniderman et al. 1996). It is noteworthy that political tolerance as a democratic ideal is assumed in all these studies, and the comparative context in which these studies are conducted is rarely problematized. While the targets of tolerance judgments vary by context, it is assumed that the factors explaining tolerance are similar across different countries (Sullivan et al. 1985).

This is problematic for two reasons. First, there are cross-national differences in the actual legal limits of speech. This is especially evident with forms of expression commonly referred to as hate speech. The United States stands as an exception rather than the rule with its near absolute guarantee of expression (Appleman 1996; Bird 2000; Boyle 2001; Cohen-Almagor 2000; Coliver, Boyle, and D'Souza 1992; Douglas-Scott 1999; Moran 1994; Parekh 2006; Rosenfeld 2003).[3] Canada and many European countries have regulations that ban some forms of hate speech. The legal justifications vary from protection of public order in Britain (Feldman 2000) to understanding rights within the framework of multiculturalism in Canada (Greenawalt 1995; Martin 1995; Moran 1994; Sumner 1994, 2004) and the inherent falseness and danger of racial arguments, especially holocaust denial, in France (Bird 2000; Imbleau 2003) and Germany (Appleman 1996; Stein 1986). In all these contexts, citizens are in fact not expected to 'tolerate' certain forms of expression.

The second problem is that while many of the psychological variables that help explain tolerance are likely to function similarly across different countries, the increasing recognition of the role that value conflict plays in tolerance judgments provides another reason to expect cross-

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[3] See Walker (1994) for a detailed description of the hate speech controversy in the United States.

national variation in the etiology and meaning of tolerance. Early studies on political tolerance in the United States noted that many citizens do in fact endorse principles of free expression in the abstract (McClosky and Brill-Scheuer 1983). It is when citizens are asked to apply these principles to specific groups that tolerant answers are harder to come by. One reason for this difficulty appears to be that political tolerance judgments often conflict with other important values, such as community, public order, or social tolerance (Gibson 1998a; Marcus et al. 1995; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001; Sniderman et al. 1996). When values do conflict, it appears that politically tolerant attitudes are often the ones that suffer (Gibson 1998b; Peffley et al. 2001). One form of speech, in particular, raises serious conflicts between the rights of the speaker and the rights of those the speech is attacking: namely, hate speech.

Hate speech is used to designate a variety of forms of expression that involve the advocacy of hatred, genocide or inferiority of individuals or groups based on their race, colour, religious beliefs or other ascriptive category, sometimes including sex and sexual preferences (Cortese 2006; Delgado and Stefancic 2004; Matsuda et al. 1993; Parekh 2006; Sumner 2004).[4] It can take many forms, including incitement to violence, fighting words, and group defamation and is usually limited to speech that is directed at historically disadvantaged groups. Hate speech pits the values of free speech against those of equality, which raises the question of whether hate speech should be protected speech, i.e. speech that citizens are expected to tolerate.

The alleged conflict between social and political tolerance has recently received more scholarly attention (Chong 2006; Cowan et al. 2002; Dow and Lendler 2002; Druckman 2001; Gross and Kinder 1998; Sniderman et al. 1996). In the United States, the growing debate over hate speech regulations has prompted an interest in tolerance judgments towards racist speech.

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[4] Hate speech is sometimes used as an inclusive category to include pornography. I will restrict my discussion to speech directed at ethnic, racial, religious and sexual minorities.

Initial studies in this area have provided mixed results. On the one hand, Gross and Kinder (1998) in their analysis of the 1990 General Social Survey argued that freedom of speech principles dominated respondents answers about racist speech; feelings about racial equality issues did not. In stark contrast, Chong (2006) has argued that citizens are increasingly willing to deny racists basic civil liberties, despite the fact that such speech is legal in the United States. After showing that general levels of tolerance have remained the same over 25 years of US General Social Surveys, he shows that those who attended university beginning in the 1980s when concerns about multiculturalism and hate speech first arose on college campus are less likely to tolerate racists. Chong argues that universities are increasingly exposing students to the competing demands of multiculturalism and a rhetoric of political correctness that undermine this effect. Among this cohort, Chong shows that those who endorse multicultural principles[5] are less likely to tolerate racists.

Chong's findings are surprising because education has consistently been found to increase tolerance which is usually explained as resulting from increases in cognitive sophistication that help people apply abstract principles to specific situations (Bobo and Licari 1989; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; Stouffer 1963; Vogt 1997). Yet, there is unlikely to have been changes occurring in universities that would negatively affect their acquisition of cognitive skills. Stouffer's original explanation of the education effect provides a slightly different answer. He argued education forces individuals to think about topics in less rigid, more nuanced ways (Stouffer 1963, 94) and encourages respect for dissenting views by exposing people to them (ibid, 99). While clearly cognitive, the exposure aspect of his argument seems to me key, and fits in with research that shows discussion about democratic values and exposure to

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[5] Endorsement of multicultural principles was measured with a battery of questions about racial equality and group-specific treatment. See Chong (2006, 51-51) for specific questions included in scale.

democratic politics in the classroom can have a significant impact on adolescents' tolerance judgments (Avery, Sullivan, and Wood 1997; Bird et al. 1994; Finkel and Ernst 2005). While Stouffer attributed such exposure to increases in tolerance, Chong's study implies that students can also be exposed to countervailing values.

The incongruence between attitudes toward hate speech and other forms of speech has been studied in Canada as well. Sniderman and colleagues (1996, 64) report that 74% of Canadians support hate speech legislation in Canada as evidence of value conflict between social and political tolerance. [6] Among both the elite and general sample in their study, racists tend to be the target of the most intolerance (55-60). This is true even among the elite who normally show greater levels of tolerance than the general public (66-69). Yet, their analysis does not extend beyond a basic demonstration that racists are 'harder' to tolerate than other groups and that raising issues of ethnic discrimination makes people reconsider their political tolerance judgments. Yet, in a country where multiculturalism has been an official policy since 1972 and hate speech is illegal, one might expect such a value conflict to play a more prominent role in citizens' civil liberties judgments. [7]

The differences in attitudes towards racist groups (and the value conflict that affects these) in the United States and Canada may well reflect the different weight that such values are accorded among citizens. While Chong's research suggests this might be changing in the United States, the differences in the role that free speech and equality issues plays in citizen judgments

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[6] Hate speech legislation is an example of how a democracy can set limits on certain forms of speech. In Canada, Section 318 and 319 of the criminal code prohibits the promotion of hatred against or genocide of identifiable groups, including groups defined by race, color, religion, ethnic origin, and, more recently (bill C-250, passed in 2004), sexual orientation. See the Keegstra and Zundel cases for the courts rationale to uphold this legislation.
[7] Experimental research tends to support the view that social tolerance issues make political tolerance more difficult. Several studies have shown that when respondents are primed about equality issues before being asked to make a tolerance judgment for racist groups, they are more likely to oppose the expression of such groups basic civil liberties (Cowan et al. 2002; Druckman 2001; Sniderman et al. 1996).[7] When issues of racial equality are raised, it seems, people are more willing to curb the civil liberties of intolerant groups.

about the willingness to extend civil liberties to oppressive groups represents the larger legal structures in which such attitudes are embedded. Several studies that compare American and Canadian free speech jurisdiction have noted that while the U.S. jurisprudence values individual liberties over other rights, Canadian jurisprudence usually attempts to balance individual and community rights (Greenawalt 1995; Moran 1994). Indeed, in societies like Canada that have an explicit policy of multiculturalism, ensuring social tolerance becomes a much more prominent policy goal than simply ensuring non-discrimination. La Selva (1999, 51), for example, argues that "… a society that endorses multiculturalism brings into existence categories of harm and offensiveness that are not universally recognized." The harms of hate speech are recognized in Canadian law, and one would assume that such a recognition should play some role in the way citizens decide to tolerate (or not) different types of objectionable groups.

Only a few studies have focused on specific types of outgroups, such as extreme religious sects (O'Donnell 1993), racists (Chong 2006; Davis 1995; Gross and Kinder 1998), pornographers (Lambe 2004) or social categories (Sniderman 2000). The assumption has largely been that tolerance judgments require a disliked target group, but there is little focus on how the type of target group affects tolerance judgments. In this paper, I set out to test whether or not young people in Canada make a distinction between oppressive speech and other forms of potentially objectionable speech.

The current definition of tolerance specifies the extension of civil liberties to a disliked group, without any distinction between what types of groups are found offensive (See Table 1). Political tolerance is measured based on how respondents answer questions about allowing a given political group to participate in activities such as giving public speeches, holding rallies, running for office, having books in local libraries, and other similar activities. The extension of

such rights is usually taken for granted as a cornerstone of democratic governance.   When

respondents agree to extend civil liberties, they are providing tolerant answers. When they

disagree, it is considered intolerant. The implication is that the 'democratic' answer when

confronted with offensive groups is tolerance. This largely American conception is inadequate

for cross-national research precisely because there are legitimate reasons that some people

support the restriction of certain forms of speech. The way that tolerance is conceptualized, and

in turn measured, needs to allow for this.

In Table 2, I propose a different way of thinking about political tolerance which allows

for a distinction between target groups. Groups are distinguished as either assertive or

oppressive. Assertive groups include most advocates of different perspectives in a democracy

which are promoting their own interests, critiquing current practice, or promoting new ways of

thinking. Oppressive groups, on the other hand, are groups whose speech is aimed explicitly at

denying the equal rights of disadvantaged groups in societies, i.e. hate speech. Obviously, such a

distinction is a difficult one to make. In the U.S. context, the courts have decided to avoid

making any distinctions between speech for fear that legitimate speech will be censored if the

state strays from strict content neutrality (R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul 1992). In Canada, the courts

are asked to balance individual rights to freedom of expression against the rights of minorities to

enjoy equal protection and benefit of the law (see also R v. Keegstra 1990; see also Sumner

2004).[8] The question that has rarely been explored whether or not citizens are capable of making

such distinctions, and if they do, what helps to explain this.

Hate Groups and Tolerance Judgments

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[8] For a critique of the Court's rationales protecting hate speech legislation in Canada, see Braun (2004).

The previous section has highlighted the special challenge that hate speech poses for civil liberties judgments, especially taking into consideration the experiences of countries other than the United States. In this paper, I will develop three specific hypotheses that attempt to explore differences in tolerance judgments toward oppressive and assertive groups. I assume that:

H1: Young people will be less willing to extend civil liberties to oppressive groups

than assertive groups, even after controlling for different levels of disagreement.

This is because oppressive groups are more likely to raise value conflict between social tolerance (i.e. inclusion of minorities) and political tolerance (freedom of expression).

The focus on young people is intentional. Young people have grown up in an increasingly diverse Canada. Official multiculturalism and increasing diversity among the general public means that the next generation of citizens is likely to be exposed to very different attitudes about democratic rights and its implications for social tolerance than generations that grew up during the sixties and seventies when anti-discrimination was largely focused on extending equal rights. In an age of identity politics and groups rights, equality takes on a much more complicated meaning.

Social tolerance involves a lack of prejudice, instead of one's ability to overcome such prejudice, and is usually considered a separate concept that can contribute to political intolerance (Gibson 2004; Gibson and Gouws 2000; Sniderman 2000; Sniderman et al. 1996; Stenner 2005). While there seems to be agreement in the literature that political tolerance is defined by disagreement towards objectionable groups participating in public life, its relationship and distinctness from social tolerance receives divergent responses in the literature. On the one hand, evidence suggests that when in-group favoritism and out-group animosity (social intolerance) are in play, political

intolerance is more likely. Yet, when individuals who are socially tolerant are faced with the specific case of hate speech, they also show an arguably targeted intolerance toward racist groups.

This leads to my next set of hypotheses. I agree with the evidence that social and political tolerance often stem from a general underlying intolerant disposition, as Stenner (2005) has compellingly argued. However, the opposite does not seem to necessarily flow logically from this. Those who are more socially tolerant may in fact show more political intolerance towards groups that threaten that value of social tolerance. I draw on the extensive research on the contact hypothesis in social psychology, which maintains that when certain conditions of contact can be met (i.e. members of different groups have equal status in a cooperative setting with shared over-arching goals and opportunities to develop friendships), then exposure to out-group members can result in a reduction of prejudice (Abrams, Hogg, and Marques 2005; Allport 1958; Dovidio, Gaertner, and Kawakami 2003; Pettigrew 1998). While exposure to diversity has played a prominent role in explanations of political tolerance, it is rarely actually measured. The two studies that have been done show that the contact hypothesis works to increase political tolerance when the contact is with the target of intolerance (Golebiowska 1996, 2001) and that political diversity in one's social networks increases political tolerance more generally (Mutz 2002), however the role that exposure to racial, ethnic and religious diversity plays in tolerance judgments toward different types of groups has yet to be explored. Therefore, I propose that:

H2: Diverse networks will *increase* tolerance of assertive groups.

H3: Ethnically diverse networks will *decrease* tolerance of oppressive groups.

The rationale behind hypothesis two is that research in political tolerance often explains key demographic relationships to tolerance with exposure to diversity (such as education, rural/urban, political participation). Such exposure, it is thought, increases people's cognitive ability to consider alternative perspectives. On the other hand, hypothesis three stems from the very value conflict that I have highlighted results between political and social tolerance.

Data and Methods

In order to test the hypotheses set out in the previous section, I rely on a new data set that is part of the *Bridging Differences: Youth, Diversity and Civic Values* research project (Stolle et al. 2006). The study involves surveys with over 4000 young people in 7 cities in Quebec and Ontario. The cities were selected to vary in size (large, medium and small). Within each city, schools, youth groups and youth events were surveyed. The data used in this paper is limited to the school sample, which currently entails approximately 2100 students between the ages of 15 and 20 surveyed in schools that were chosen to intentionally vary in terms of diversity and socio-economic status.[9] Within each selected school, one to two classes of 10th or 11th grade students were surveyed between October 2005 and May 2006.

Included in the Bridging Differences survey was a measure of political tolerance which included twelve questions about six different potentially objectionable groups: Gay Rights Activists, Quebec Separatists, Skinheads, Black Rights Activists, Racists and Radical Muslims. For each group, respondents were asked if they should be allowed to "hold a peaceful march in your neighborhood" and "talk on public television about their views". The two activities are both forms of public expression, however, the former increases the threat to the respondent by specifying the activitytake place in their neighbourhood. The groups were selected to vary in

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[9] The final school dataset will include approximately 200 more surveys from Toronto schools.

terms of left-leaning and right-leaning groups and resemble group selections from previous studies.[10] Two of the groups included (Skinheads and Racists) were selected to represent what I refer to as oppressive groups: i.e. groups that use their rights to promote the *intolerance* of other groups in society. The other four groups were selected to represent assertive groups: i.e. groups that use their civil liberties to promote their own group members' rights, however contentious those may be for the majority. This intentional selection of groups allows for me to make distinctions between tolerance judgments toward different types of dislike groups. In addition, an 11 point agree/disagree scale was included for each group to control for situations where the respondent supports the group (in which case the willingness to extend civil liberties would no longer constitute political tolerance).

The dataset is also designed to measure the diversity of both strong and weak ties on five dimensions: religious, official language, socio-economic, racial and political. (See appendix for more details.) Every respondent was asked the extent of their close friends (strong ties) and acquaintances (weak ties) who differed from them in each of these dimensions on a 7-point scale from none to all. I have created two measures from this battery of questions. "Ethnic Diversity" is an additive scale of religious and racial diversity in both strong and weak ties (alpha cronbach=.77). "Political Diversity" is an additive scale of how many of the respondents close friends and acquaintances disagree with them about politics (alpha cronbach=.68). These two forms of diversity are particularly salient for my hypotheses. Whereas political diversity has

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[10] However, unlike other studies, no explicit social groups are listed. For example, the US General Social Survey includes homosexuals in its list of objectionable groups. The list I created, while it may link people to particular social groups, is intended to reference 'political' groups rather than general social categories. I have also include Quebec Separatists in the scale because of the saliency of this category in Canadian politics. Finally, some terms that are often used (Black Panthers, KKK members) which reflect the American context have been revised to make them more applicable in non-US contexts.

been shown to increase political tolerance, I have proposed that ethnic diversity may have a different impact depending on the type of target group.

Results

The first hypothesis focuses on establishing a distinction between two different types of groups: assertive and oppressive. My argument has been that in comparative perspective, we do not expect people to extend freedom of speech irrespective of the group. The presence of hate speech legislation in Canada and most of Western Europe is evidence that in many democracies, there are limits to what citizens are expected to tolerate. In table 3, I present a graph of tolerance at the aggregate level for each type of outgroup. It should be noted that the bars for each group are based *only* on respondents that disagree with the target group. Table 4 shows that the mean disagreement with the groups varies in a predictable way, with black rights activists being the least-disliked. The solid bars in Table 3 vary quite significantly, as high as 63% for some activities of some groups and as low as 10% for others. When we isolate only those respondents who reported highly disagreeing with the target group (i.e. reported a 10 on the agree/disagree scale) we see that the variation between groups is reduced by as much as 20% in some cases. However, even after controlling for levels of disagreement, racists and skinheads are still far less tolerated than other types of objectionable groups.

When we look at young people's overall tolerance scores, it is important to note that respondents were allowed to disagree with as many groups as they wished.[11] Two tolerance scores have been created that vary from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates tolerance of all targets the respondent (highly) disagreed with, and 0 implies intolerance toward all targets the respondent

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[11] Respondents tended to disagree with 3.38 targets, and highly disagree with 2.28. Of the four assertive groups, respondents chose on average 1.75 targets. Of the two oppressive groups, respondents chose on average 1.62.

(highly) disagreed with. Respondents who did not find any of the listed groups objectionable are dropped from the analysis.[12] Scores were similarly created based only on tolerance toward assertive groups and oppressive groups. Table 5 provides similar evidence as table 1: respondents appear to be more willing to tolerate assertive groups than they are oppressive ones, even after controlling for level of disagreement and number of targets the individual disagreed with.

These scores are used to test hypothesis 2 and 3. Linear regression is used to test for a relationship between the diversity in one's social networks and tolerance judgments. In order to isolate this relationship, I include a number of important controls that have been found to affect tolerance judgments. I control for demographics (female, rural, Francophone, minority status, province, age and cognitive ability). I also include three general attitudes dispositions: endorsement of free speech in general; endorsement of hate speech restrictions and ethnocentrism. Finally, I include four political variables including political knowledge, parental discussion of politics, involvement in extracurricular activities and reported political activism. (See appendix for details).

Table 6 presents the results based on tolerance for groups the respondent disagrees with. As expected, general endorsement of free speech principles has a significant, positive impact on political tolerance, generally and for both types of target groups. Endorsement of restrictions on hate speech, on the other hand, has a negative impact on overall tolerance and tolerance of assertive groups, but does not have any effect on oppressive groups. This finding is counter-intuitive. Yet, we know that different forms of intolerance often correlate together (Stenner 2005). Interestingly, when we look at 'social tolerance' in practice, i.e. the extent that one's

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[12] Measured based solely on disagreement, this means 75 respondents. Measured on high disagreement, this includes 272 respondents.

networks are diverse, we find the hypothesized effect, at least for assertive groups. The effect is highly significant and positive. In contrast, there is only a weak effect on overall tolerance (likely because 4 of the 6 groups are assertive groups) and absolutely no impact on tolerance of oppressive groups. Thus, I find support for hypothesis 2 but not hypothesis 3. These finding also hold when we look at tolerance only for those groups with whom the respondent highly disagrees (see table 7). Interestingly, exposure to political diversity becomes more significant when we consider groups that are more objectionable to the respondent, implying that other forms of diversity may also increase tolerance, although not in the case of oppressive groups.

Discussion

Part of understanding people's politics is understanding the social context in which they find themselves, both as they grow up and as adults. While political science tends to take an overly individualistic view of the sources of people's political values and behaviours, social relations can play an important role in shaping our understanding of what community life requires of us, especially among youth who are in the process of developing the attitudes many of them will hold over their lifetimes. The limited literature on how exposure to diversity affects tolerance judgments lacks concrete measures of actual exposure and fails to measure diversity in its different dimensions. Particularly lacking is any consideration of how religious, racial and ethnic diversity affects tolerance judgments. In this paper, I have proposed how social relations might affect tolerance judgments, specifically by shifting the balance of values depending on the targets of intolerance.

The evidence provided here supports the assertion of the importance of considering the targets of tolerance. I have provided a theoretical distinction between assertive groups and

oppressive groups, and have argued that the causes of intolerance may well vary depending on the type of objectionable group involved. I provided evidence that levels of tolerance vary depending on the target of intolerance, even after controlling for the level of disagreement. Highlighting the role of diversity, and especially ethnic diversity, in increasing certain types of tolerance judgments, I have argued that exposure to diversity may have opposite effects on different types of targets. In the end, I have only found a positive effect for diversity on assertive groups. No evidence was found for the hypothesized negative effect on oppressive groups.

While the evidence provided here is preliminary, it provides grounds for further research into the impact of diversity on tolerance judgments. The next steps in the current research project will include further exploration of different types of diversity, including the addition of more dimensions of diversity and distinguishing whether strong or weak ties have stronger impacts on attitudes.   Furthermore, a likely but unexplored component in this paper is how ties affect the level of disagreement that precedes any tolerance judgment. The present analysis focuses only on those who disagree with a given group. It is likely that diverse networks have an impact on the initial disagreement as well. Particularly puzzling is the lack of an effect of diverse networks toward oppressive groups. This is perhaps because the research on intolerance is correct: intolerant attitudes tend to correlate. Those who are socially tolerant are less likely to display other forms of intolerance. Yet, diversity does have an impact, and its impact is on the types of groups that, while objectionable, contribute to democratic debate in modern, multicultural democracies.

Table 1
Traditional Conception of Tolerance

Table 2
Conception of Tolerance that Recognizes Target Group Distinctions

Table 3: Tolerance Levels by Target Group and Level of Disagreement

Legend:
- Peaceful March - Disagree
- Peaceful March - Highly Disagree
- Talk on TV - Disagree
- Talk on TV - Highly Disagree

Note: The solid bars are calculated on only those respondents who reported a 6 to 10 for the group on a 0 to 10 agree/disagree scale and striped bars only for those who reported a 10 on the same scale (highly disagree).

Table 4: Mean Disagreement with Target Groups

	Mean	(s.d.)	N of Disagree	N of Highly Disagree
Black Rights Activists	8.19	(1.54)	398	129
Quebec Separatists	8.80	(1.42)	1082	542
Gay Rights Activists	8.98	(1.41)	683	411
Radical Muslims	9.08	(1.34)	1366	833
Skinheads	9.41	(1.15)	1542	1139
Racists	9.77	(0.71)	1726	1512

Table 5: Tolerance by Type of Target Group

Table 6: Effect of Ethnic Diversity on Political Tolerance (Linear Regression)

	Overall Tolerance			Tolerance of Assertive Groups			Tolerance of Oppressive Groups		
	B	(s.e.)		B	(s.e.)		B	(s.e.)	
Constant	0.440	(.154)	***	0.637	(.183)	***	0.387	(.154)	**
Female	0.053	(.016)	***	0.070	(.019)	***	0.068	(.016)	***
From a small town	0.040	(.025)	*	0.057	(.030)	*	0.059	(.024)	**
Francophone	-0.114	(.019)	***	-0.103	(.023)		-0.044	(.019)	**
Ethnic Minority	-0.077	(.018)	***	-0.122	(.022)		-0.030	(.019)	a
Quebec	-0.061	(.017)	***	-0.065	(.021)	***	-0.061	(.017)	***
Age	-0.006	(.008)		-0.009	(.010)		-0.010	(.008)	
Average grades in school	0.011	(.009)		0.013	(.011)		0.000	(.009)	
Free Speech Principles	0.031	(.009)	***	0.033	(.011)	***	0.022	(.009)	**
Hate Speech Restrictions	-0.032	(.007)	***	-0.023	(.009)	***	-0.041	(.008)	
Ethnocentrism	-0.010	(.002)	***	-0.023	(.003)		-0.004	(.003)	
Ethnic Ties Scale	**0.012**	**(.007)**	*	**0.023**	**(.008)**	***	**0.003**	**(.007)**	
Political Diversity Scale	0.012	(.008)	a	0.014	(.009)	a	0.000	(.008)	
Political Knowledge Scale	0.015	(.008)	*	0.025	(.010)	**	0.001	(.008)	
Parental Discussion of Politics	0.012	(.010)		0.032	(.012)	***	-0.017	(.011)	a
Organizational Involvement	-0.029	(.019)	a	-0.023	(.023)		-0.020	(.019)	
Political Activism	0.011	(.030)		-0.018	(.035)		0.061	(.030)	**
Adjusted R-Squared	0.095			0.125			.054		
N	1549			1460			1504		

*** < .01 ** < .05 * <.10 [a] <.15

Note: This is based on tolerance scores calculated for groups respondent <u>disagrees</u> with.

Table 7: Effect of Ethnic Diversity on Political Tolerance (Linear Regression)

	Overall Tolerance			Tolerance of Assertive Groups			Tolerance of Oppressive Groups		
	B	*(s.e.)*		*B*	*(s.e.)*		*B*	*(s.e.)*	
Constant	0.385	(.164)	**	0.641	(.222)	***	0.318	(.166)	*
Female	0.052	(.017)	***	0.078	(.023)	***	0.056	(.017)	***
From a small town	0.062	(.026)	**	0.110	(.037)	***	0.061	(.026)	**
Francophone	-0.089	(.020)		-0.114	(.028)	***	-0.035	(.020)	*
Ethnic Minority	-0.074	(.019)	***	-0.126	(.026)		-0.038	(.020)	*
Quebec	-0.057	(.018)	***	-0.074	(.025)	***	-0.036	(.019)	*
Age	-0.005	(.009)		-0.010	(.012)		-0.007	(.009)	
Average grades in school	-0.005	(.010)		0.000	(.013)		-0.007	(.010)	
Free Speech Principles	0.034	(.009)	***	0.034	(.012)	***	0.025	(.009)	***
Hate Speech Restrictions	-0.033	(.008)	***	-0.029	(.011)	***	-0.041	(.008)	
Ethnocentrism	-0.009	(.003)	***	-0.021	(.003)		-0.004	(.003)	a
Ethnic Ties Scale	**0.005**	**(.007)**		**0.024**	**(.010)**	****	**-0.001**	**(.007)**	
Political Diversity Scale	0.015	(.008)	*	0.022	(.011)	**	0.002	(.008)	
Political Knowledge Scale	0.005	(.009)		0.011	(.012)		-0.002	(.009)	
Parental Discussion of Politics	0.001	(.011)		0.008	(.015)		-0.012	(.011)	
Organizational Involvement	-0.036	(.020)	*	-0.035	(.028)		-0.019	(.020)	
Political Activism	0.039	(.031)		-0.005	(.042)		0.079	(.032)	**
Adjusted R-Squared	0.072			0.118			0.044		
N	1430			1028			1335		

*** < .01 ** < .05 * <.10 [a]<.15

Note: This is based on tolerance scores calculated for groups respondent <u>highly disagrees</u> with.

Political Tolerance: Two part question including a control for level of dislike.

> 1) For each of the following groups, can you please indicate on a scale from 0 to 10, the degree to which you agree or disagree with their beliefs: Gay Rights activists; Quebec Separatists; Skinheads; Black Rights Activists; Racists; Radical Muslims.
>
> 2) Now, for each of these groups, please indicate if they should be allowed to do the activities listed: (*yes/no*)
> a) Hold a peaceful march in your neighborhood
> b) Talk on television about their views

Network Diversity: Response categories are a seven point scale, including: none, almost none, a few, about half, many, almost all, all.

> 1) How many of your close friends…
>   a. Speak [French/English] as their mother tongue/first language?
>   b. Come from a family with much more or less money than yours?
>   c. Have a different religion than you (or are religious if you are not)?
>   d. Often disagree with you about public affairs or politics?
>   e. Are a different race than you?
> 2) At school, how many of the people you talk to *besides your close friends…*
>   a. Speak [French/English] as their mother tongue/first language?
>   b. Come from a family with much more or less money than yours?
>   c. Have a different religion than you (or are religious if you are not)?
>   d. Often disagree with you about public affairs or politics?
>   e. Are a different race than you?

Controls

Female: coded 1 for female, 0 for male.

Town: coded 1 for small towns in sample.

Francophone: coded 1 if respondent has French as mother tongue/first language

Minority: coded 1 if respondent reported a non-white background

Quebec: coded 1 for Quebec, 0 for Ontario.

Age: Age

Grades: 5 point scale indicating grades respondent usually receives, from "below 60%" to "90% and above".

Free Speech Principles: 4 point scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly for statement: "We are all better off if everyone is free to speak their mind in politics, even if some of the things people say are obnoxious and offensive."

Hate Speech Restrictions: 4 point scale from disagree strongly to agree strongly for statement: "It should be illegal to say hateful things publicly about racial, ethnic and religious groups."

Ethnocentrism: Additive scale of responses to 5 following statements (alpha cronbach=.74):

- "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions"

- "If a country wants to reduce tensions, it should stop immigration"

- "The presence of too many minorities is a threat to our way of life"

- "The arrival of new immigrants will make it harder for me to get a decent job later"

- "Religious headscarves should be forbidden in our schools"

Political Knowledge: Additive scale for correct responses given to Provincial Premier, Governor General, and Supreme Court's authority.

Discuss: 4 point scale of how often parents discuss public issues and politics

Organizational Involvement: Coded 1 if respondent reports being involved in a club or organization.

Political Activism: Additive scale (alpha cronbach= .70) of whether respondent has done following activities never, a few times or often in the past 12 months:

- worn a patch, sticker, button or t-shirt for a political or social cause

- signed a petition

- taken part in a legal march or protest

- boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons

- deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons

- participated in illegal protest activities

- forwarded an email with political content

- wrote or displayed a political statement publicly

- attended a show or cultural event with political content

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