Dilemmas of Global Governance: Organized Hypocrisy and International Organization

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Critics of international organizations on the political left and right frequently accuse international institutions of hypocrisy. Yet the academic literature on international organizations lacks an explicit theory of the sources of inconsistencies on the part of international institutions. This paper argues that hypocrisy on the part of international organizations is an inevitable consequence of contradictory pressures in their organizational environments. Drawing on neo-institutionalist organizational sociology and work on “organized hypocrisy” applied to other settings, the paper presents a typology and framework for analyzing the bases and consequences – both positive and negative – of different forms of hypocrisy in global governance and formal international organizations. The argument is illustrated with reference to organizational hypocrisy on the part of the United Nations and the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Dilemmas of Global Governance

Introduction

In the last century, international organizations have come to play central roles in an increasing range of issues in world politics. The number of international organizations in the world has increased dramatically in the last century (Shanks et al., 1996). Initially involved in primarily technical issues such as postal standards, international organizations are increasingly enmeshed in highly politicized problems such as postconflict nation-building, weapons proliferation, and aspects of national economic policies with major domestic implications (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Paris, 2004; Braun and Chyba, 2004). Multilateralism has become institutionalized as a norm, such that unilateral conduct is often seen as illegitimate. As challenges such as climate change, public health, and transnational terrorism increasingly transcend the capacities of individual states to manage, IGOs have come to play a greater role in filling the need for collectively coordinated responses to common problems in the absence of a world government – global governance.

Until recently, the IR literature on international organizations (IOs) has tended to assume that IOs are instruments of member states, and that because member states join IOs voluntarily, they must benefit from their memberships. IOs, therefore, have been

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1 While I include both nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) under the rubric of international organization, this paper focuses on the latter. NGOs, however, are also subject to the sort of dilemmas that are the focus of this paper (Cooley and Ron, 2002).
regarded as pareto-improving tools with little autonomy or power of their own.\textsuperscript{2} Realists regard IOs as generally ineffectual; liberals claim that they can give rise to significantly greater cooperation than would develop in their absence (Jervis, 1999). Non-academic perspectives on IOs, however, have been much less charitable.

International organizations are assailed from the left and right. The anti-globalization movement accuses the WTO, World Bank, and IMF of imposing a harsh and exploitative “neoliberal” capitalism on the world.\textsuperscript{3} Right wing critiques of the same organizations allege that, while claiming to promote market-based economic reforms, they actually distort market incentives, creating “moral hazard.”\textsuperscript{4} The UN Human Rights Commission was widely regarded as discredited due to the membership of serious human rights violators such as China, Cuba, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, and Libya’s election to the chair the Commission in 2003. Its replacement, the Human Rights Council, is viewed with similar cynicism by many.

Some of these criticisms specifically allege that international organizations behave hypocritically. A former World Bank chief economist has claimed that the IMF and World Bank have betrayed the principles they were founded to promote, and still espouse (Stiglitz, 2002). Neoconservative political advocates have accused the United Nations of contravening its founding ideals (Muravchik, 2005). International organizations proclaiming a commitment to democracy and national sovereignty are accused of eroding both (Rabkin, 2005). Critics of the United Nations point to the

\textsuperscript{2} For exceptions, see: Gruber (2000); Dijkzeul and Beigbeder, (2003); Barnett and Finnemore (2004); Weaver and Leiteritz (2005).

\textsuperscript{3} See, for example, the web site of the “50 Years is Enough” network, at 50years.org.

presence of human rights violators on the now defunct Human Rights Commission, and
the Security Council’s lack of representativeness coupled to its claims to speak on behalf
of international community. The UN is also criticized for betraying its principles in the
face of mass atrocities and genocide in Rwanda and elsewhere (Barnett, 2002; Polman,
2003).

Recently, IR scholars have begun to consider the sources and implications of
hypocrisy in international organizations, developing theoretical accounts of hypocrisy
across a range of organizations (Héritier, 1999; Steinberg, 2002; Wade, 2002; Iankova
and Katzenstein, 2003; Weaver, 2003; Bukovansky, 2005; Lipson, 2006).
Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the UN and World Bank proclaim
reforms that are not carried out (Weaver, 2003; Lipson, 2006). The WTO advocates free
trade but wealthy member states maintain agricultural subsidies and tariffs that harm
developing world farmers (Bukovansky, 2005). IOs proclaim commitment to the norm of
sovereign equality, but in practice agenda-setting and decision-making reflect the relative
power of member states (Steinberg, 2002; Wade, 2002). Organizational aspects of the
nonproliferation regime such as the IAEA and Australia Group are regarded as implicated
in the hypocrisy of nuclear weapons states’ failure to fulfill their Article VI disarmament
commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (Lipson, 2005).

Yet the academic literature on international organizations lacks an explicit theory
of the sources of inconsistencies on the part of international institutions. I argue that
hypocrisy on the part of international organizations is an inevitable consequence of
contradictory pressures in their organizational environments. International organizations
are often expected to fulfill inconsistent and irreconcilable requirements, such as
promoting the interests of both developing states and wealthy, powerful countries, advancing conflicting norms such as sovereignty and human rights, and achieving accountability and efficiency. Drawing on neo-institutionalist organizational sociology and the “neoclassical” realist perspective on foreign policy, I present a typology and framework for analyzing the bases and consequences – both positive and negative – of different forms of hypocrisy in global governance and formal international organizations. I illustrate the argument with discussions of organizational hypocrisy within United Nations peacekeeping and in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

**Defining Hypocrisy**

Hypocrisy refers to actions that contradict proclaimed values, and is generally condemned as a form of dishonesty. However, Machiavelli argued that hypocrisy was a political virtue. As Ruth Grant delineates his argument: “Hypocrisy will arise in relations of mutual dependence among people with conflicting interests who cannot be relied upon to adhere to moral prescriptions. The nature of political relations, along with the morally retrograde character of humanity, dictate hypocritical behavior” (Grant, 1997: 29).

The term hypocrite characterizes individuals, or coherent collective actors that can be expected to coordinate statements and behavior. Organized hypocrisy has a slightly different meaning, referring to inconsistent organizational rhetoric and behavior responding to conflicting external demands – usually inconsistent norms and material pressures. However, since organizations are not necessarily coherent, unitary actors,
organized hypocrisy need not be intentional. It can arise as an unintended consequence of separate, uncoordinated behavior by people in different elements of an organization.\footnote{This has implications for evaluations of the moral responsibilities of international institutions. See, for example, Barnett, 2002; Erskine, 2003; Lang, 2003; Oestreich, 2004.}

Identifying hypocrisy can be problematic. Not all behavior inconsistent with stated values is hypocritical. As Grant (1997: 26) writes, “To profess principles that one has no intention of following is hypocrisy; to be unable to live up to our best expectations of ourselves is not hypocrisy but human nature.” Suzanne Dovi (2001:12) differentiates “vicious hypocrites” – who dishonestly proclaim a commitment to standards they intend to breach – from “tragic compromisers,” who are confronted with irreconcilably conflicting values and must violate a genuinely held moral principle. While Dovi identifies criteria intended to distinguish the two, reasonable people will differ on their application in specific cases.\footnote{Dovi (2001: 16) claims that vicious hypocrisy is characterized by (1) actions contravening stated values; (2) the availability of alternative actions; (3) evidence of conscious deception; and (4) “when the political actors aim to profit from that manipulation to the detriment of those being deceived.” She relies on U.S. behavior in the 1999 Kosovo air campaign as her prime example, arguing that the Clinton administration’s conduct was hypocritical (because the US claimed to be upholding international norms and acting in the name of the international community, but acted without Security Council authorization). In a critique of Dovi’s article, Jeffrey Isaac writes that, “Certainly it is impossible to doubt that U.S. policy was hypocritical or that this hypocrisy had the negative consequences that Dovi recounts” (Isaac, 2001: 32). While space does not permit a full rebuttal, Isaac is certainly wrong, and I believe Dovi to be as well. In my view, US policy in Kosovo presents a clear-cut case of a tragic compromiser. Dovi’s underplays the domestic political constraints that the Clinton administration faced, and adopts a flawed understanding of international law governing the use of force. She therefore overestimates the feasibility of alternative courses of action, and the negative consequences of the Kosovo campaign. The mere fact of my disagreement with Dovi serves to make the point that any objective identification of hypocrisy is problematic.}

6 Therefore, hypocrisy can be regarded as subjective, in the “eye of the beholder,” and attention focused on “hypocrisy attribution” and its effects, rather than the question of distinguishing hypocrisy from other forms of inconsistency
between word and deed (Cha, 2004). However, the difficulty of objectively identifying hypocrisy is less severe in analyzing organized hypocrisy. Disputes over whether inconsistencies between statements and actions are hypocritical generally concern the sincerity of the actor’s commitment to the stated values. This issue is less salient when dealing with collective, possibly non-unitary actors. I define as organized hypocrisy any persistent inconsistency between organizational rhetoric and behavior that arises as a response to conflicting normative and material pressures in the organizational environment. An attribution of organized hypocrisy, however, does not carry the negative moral connotations that the term hypocrisy usually implies, as organized hypocrisy may be unintended or unavoidable.

**Conceptions of Organized Hypocrisy**

There are two major variants of the concept of organized hypocrisy. The concept was originally formulated by the Swedish organizational theorist Nils Brunsson, who initially called it (in translation from the Swedish) “organizational hypocrisy.” Brunsson roots his conception of organized hypocrisy in the neo-institutionalist school of organization theory (also known as institutional theory), a close cousin of International Relations

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7 In fact, Cha and Edmondson (2006) focus on a case they identify as a false attribution of hypocrisy; a charismatic organizational leader sincerely committed to organizational values but perceived by employees as hypocritical due to incongruence between the leader’s and employees’ interpretations of the organization’s values.

8 Dovi (2001) also seems to regard the harmful effects of vicious hypocrisy as flowing from the lack of sincerity. While I discuss harmful, as well as positive, effects of organized hypocrisy below, I do not see them as a function of actor sincerity.

constructivism usually termed “sociological institutionalism” in political science.\textsuperscript{10} For Brunsson, organized hypocrisy results from conflicting pressures emanating from organizational environments, and consequent “decoupling” or inconsistency within organizations.

In the IR literature, the term organized hypocrisy is associated with Stephen Krasner’s (1999b) analysis of sovereignty. Krasner’s formulation of organized hypocrisy, while drawing on Brunsson’s work, is distinct from and not wholly compatible with Brunsson’s. Krasner develops an understanding of organized hypocrisy implicitly founded in a perspective that has come to be known as “neoclassical realism,” which places political elites and executive decision-makers at the center of the analysis, rather than the conventional realist focus on states (Rose, 1998).

While standard realist theories make states the unit of analysis, the “ontological givens” of Krasner’s analysis of sovereignty are “rulers, specific policy makers, usually but not always the executive head of state. Rulers, not states—and not the international system—make choices about policies, rules, and institutions…The assumption of this study is that rulers want to stay in power and, being in power, they want to promote the security, prosperity, and values of their constituents” (Krasner, 1999b: 7). For Krasner, organized hypocrisy is a means by which rulers manage conflicting domestic and international imperatives – in particular institutionalized sovereignty norms, on the one hand, and the imperatives of both domestic and international power politics on the other. When these conflict, rulers display “decoupled” responses to each, addressing

\textsuperscript{10} On neo-institutionalist theory, see: Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Finnemore, 1996; Meyer et al., 1997.
sovereignty norms symbolically while acting in accordance with material pressures. This produces inconsistent rhetoric and action, or organized hypocrisy.

Thus, for Brunsson, organized hypocrisy is a characteristic of organizations, and arises from their lack of internal coherence, which permits different elements of an organization to operate in contradictory ways. In Krasner’s view, by contrast, organized hypocrisy is a deliberate choice by (unitary, rational) rulers of states, allowing them to manage conflicting normative and material demands. Although it concerns the institution of sovereignty, “Krasnerian” organized hypocrisy is not centrally concerned with formal organizations.

Although Brunsson and Krasner reference each others’ work, neither has explicitly addressed the contrasts or inconsistencies between their understandings of organized hypocrisy, or the extent to which they can be reconciled. In the next section, I explain the theoretical background and logic of each, and propose a framework for integrating realist and sociological institutionalist understandings of organized hypocrisy based on the organization-theoretic distinction between open and closed systems.

**Integrating Conceptions of Organized Hypocrisy**

Organized hypocrisy is a response to conflicting material and ideational pressures. The concept, therefore, lies at the intersection of rationalist and constructivist theorizing. Its roots, however, are in the neo-institutionalist school of organizational sociology, known

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11 This section is revised from Lipson (forthcoming).
as ‘sociological institutionalism’ in the international relations literature.\textsuperscript{12} Organized hypocrisy is a variant of the institutionalist concept of “decoupling” between organizational structure and behavior.\textsuperscript{13}

Sociological institutionalism emphasizes the importance of cultural aspects of organizational environments in determining the structure and activity of organizations. Organizational environments impose upon organizations both material and resource constraints related to competitive efficiency (“technical” pressures, in institutionalist terminology) and societal expectations of conformity with external normative and cultural (“institutional”) standards. In modern societies, this approach maintains, institutional environments—the cultural and normative dimension of organizations’ environments—increasingly outweigh technical (or “material-resource”) environments as determinants of formal structure.\textsuperscript{14} Organizations adopt formal structures, and other forms of presentation, to symbolize conformity with legitimized standards in their respective “organizational fields” (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Organizational structures reflect institutional more than technical pressures. However, global standards are often practically unsuited to local conditions and available resources. Consequently, formal structures adopted in response to institutional pressures are often inappropriate to the technical requirements of organizational tasks. Developing states, for example, may

\textsuperscript{12} Finemore (1996b). Neo-institutionalist theory includes a domestically-oriented strand (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) and the world polity school (Meyer et al., 1997) more familiar to IR scholars, which addresses international relations. The latter, in particular, is closely related to IR constructivism (Finemore, 1996a: 1-33).
\textsuperscript{13} Meyer and Rowan (1977). Throughout, I use the term institutionalist to refer to sociological, not rational institutionalism.
\textsuperscript{14} Meyer and Rowan (1977); DiMaggio and Powell (1983). On technical and institutional environments, see: Scott and Meyer (1991: 123-24); Scott (2003: 138-140). Environments can be simultaneously weakly or strongly technical and institutional, and technical criteria can be institutionally constituted.
attempt to conform to standards of modern statehood, but lack the resources to give effect to the formal trappings of sovereignty (Meyer et al., 1997).

In response, organizations will often develop separate, ‘decoupled’ responses to conflicting demands (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Decoupling allows organizations to buffer their technical cores—the techniques and processes by which organizational tasks are fulfilled—against disruptive institutional pressures. Typically, formal structures are created to symbolically comply with cultural expectations, but are decoupled—causally disconnected—from incompatible internal organizational activities. Thus, firms may formally establish affirmative action offices, but not change their hiring practices (Edelman, 1992). Because they are decoupled, inconsistent structures and processes do not interfere with each other. When this takes the form of inconsistent rhetoric and behavior, it constitutes organized hypocrisy.

Starting from this point, Krasner and Brunsson offer distinct conceptions of organized hypocrisy. Each modifies the basic concept of decoupling. As I describe below, Brunsson’s version retains the original sociological foundations, but elaborates different forms of organizational hypocrisy, moving well beyond the seminal concept of decoupling (Brunsson, 1989). Krasner’s adaptations—to which I turn first—are more radical, transplanting the concept of organized hypocrisy from its sociological origins into a rationalist, “actor-oriented” model embedded within realist international theory (Krasner, 1999b).

Realism, conceiving of international politics in terms of the struggle for power among states in an anarchic system, emphasizes material, technical environments (Morgenthau, 1948; Waltz, 1979). Adopting March and Olsen’s distinction between
instrumental logics of consequences and cultural-normative logics of appropriateness, Krasner argues that the former dominate the latter in world politics.\textsuperscript{15} Logics of consequences correspond to technical, and logics of appropriateness to institutional environments. Krasner argues that the international system is weakly institutionalized, and lacks legitimate authority. Domestic and international norms are inconsistent, while material pressures—competition for power under anarchy—are strong. Logics of appropriateness, such as sovereignty norms, are therefore ambiguous, and subordinate to logics of consequences (Krasner, 1999b: 5). In world politics, then, “clubs can always be trump,” and sovereignty is symbolically affirmed but often violated by powerful states (Krasner, 1999b: 238).

Krasner, however, departs from conventional realism in making rulers, rather than states, the unit of analysis (Krasner, 1999b: 7). In doing so, Krasner implicitly adopts a neoclassical realist perspective. As Bruce Cronin notes, Krasner’s rulers, “political elites who rule in the name of the state,”

...are primarily motivated by a desire to maintain their authority within the domestic sphere, so they can adopt a ‘logic of consequences’ that is not consistent with either the norms or structural dynamics of the international system. In this sense, Krasner’s world is not a Hobbesian state of nature in which states act according to the necessities produced by international anarchy but, rather, a Machiavellian one, in which leaders act to maintain and expand their own power (Cronin, 2001: 261).

This “Machiavellian” form of realism, emphasizing that systemic and structural pressures are filtered and mediated by perceptual and institutional factors and the domestic political interests of elites within states, has been labeled “neoclassical realism,” indicating the attention to individual and domestic factors that it shares with classical realism, and the greater theoretical sophistication with which it treats such factors (Rose, 1998).

Neorealist theory, with its theory of the systemic consequences of anarchy, serves as a point of departure for neoclassical realism. Neoclassical realists aim to develop theoretical explanations of foreign policy, in contrast to neorealism’s status as a theory of international relations. As a systemic theory, neorealism predicts that bipolar systems will be more stable, that balances of power will recurrently form, and that great power military strategies and force structures will converge (Waltz, 1979). But it does not specify the foreign policies of specific states under particular circumstances, merely holding that states that disregard systemic constraints will tend to suffer negative consequences so that over time the international system will select for states that adapt to structural pressures. Neoclassical realists, by contrast, aspire to explain foreign policy, which requires theorizing unit-level variables such as elite perceptions, domestic political structures, and state-society relations.

A neoclassical realist perspective on organized hypocrisy sees it as a behavior of foreign policy decision-makers, in which political demands and normative pressures are met by rhetoric but divergent behavior responds to prevailing material pressures. Jennifer Sterling-Folker describes this dynamic in U.S. foreign economic policy:
[U.S. leaders] public and rhetorical support for cooperation serves an important causal function, but it does not derive from the discovery that cooperation is efficacious in interdependent economic conditions. Nor should rhetorical support be confused with behavioral and institutional adjustments implied and which never actually materialize. Cooperation derives instead from domestic pressures and threats confronting decisionmakers, who discover that gesturing at cooperation can be an effective means of deflecting internal threats in the midst of a domestic political crisis. Such gestures have proven so effective that real adjustment is never necessary and, not surprisingly, rhetorical support for international economic cooperation never lasts for long within American policymaking circles (Sterling-Folker, 2002: 32).

Similarly, for Krasner, rulers decouple norms and behavior with respect to sovereignty, proclaiming commitments to the norm of Westphalian sovereignty, but infringing it (rulers of powerful states) or agreeing to sovereignty-violating arrangements (rulers of less powerful states) according to the dictates of domestic and international power politics.

Krasner’s rulers are rational, unitary actors, relatively autonomous from societal influences and pursuing exogenously given preferences (to remain in power and promote the interests of the constituencies that maintain their position). They are closed-rational systems in organization theory’s terms, clearly bounded and distinct from their
environments, with goals set exogenously from their environments. In fact, although they act through states, Krasner’s individual rulers—the “ontological givens” of his analysis and the actors exhibiting organized hypocrisy—are not themselves organizations. Thus, organized hypocrisy as portrayed by Krasner is largely devoid of organizations.

In Brunsson’s formulation, organized hypocrisy is fundamentally about organizations. Organizations, not rulers, face competing logics of consequences and action. These organizations, in turn, are not unitary actors but collectivities constituted and endowed with social agency by their social environments (Meyer and Jepperson, 2000). Thus, Brunsson’s perspective falls within the “open systems” approach to organization theory, which regards organizations as possessing porous boundaries, and as constituted by and reproduced through their interactions with their environment (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Ansell and Weber, 1999; Scott, 2003). In such organizations, organized hypocrisy often arises unintentionally as a byproduct of uncoordinated responses to conflicting environmental pressures by loosely coupled or decoupled internal organizational elements. Thus, the negative moral connotation usually attached to hypocrisy does not apply in this understanding of organized hypocrisy. Condemnations of hypocrisy, in the normal sense of the term, assume that the hypocrite is a coherent, unitary actor. The moral stigma attached to hypocrisy flows from this assumption. Just as it makes little sense to speak of an individual afflicted with schizophrenia or dissociative

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16 Scott (2003). Realism conventionally conceives of states as closed systems (Ansell and Weber, 1999). Krasner’s treatment resembles the open systems perspective of resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which describes managers (rulers) as actively reducing and buffering firms’ (states’) dependencies. However, in Krasner’s analysis rulers—the referents of organized hypocrisy—are closed systems.

17 On loose coupling, see Weick (1976).
identity disorder (i.e., multiple personalities) as hypocritical, the censure associated with
the term is inappropriate to consideration of organized hypocrisy in open systems
organizations.

Brunsson introduces two significant innovations. First, he offers a distinction
between decoupling of divergent internal aspects of an organization, which he terms “the
organization of hypocrisy,” and decoupling of inconsistent organizational outputs—for
which he reserves the term “organized hypocrisy.”18 Second, he revises the conventional
understanding of decoupling by interpreting organized hypocrisy in terms of an inverse,
rather than absent, causal relationship between rhetoric and action.19

The concept of “the organization of hypocrisy” (OOH) builds on Meyer and
Rowan’s (1977) classic argument that organizations in institutionalized environments
reflect their organizational environments in their internal structure. In environments
characterized by contradictory imperatives, these contradictions will be incorporated into
organizations’ internal structures. Brunsson refers to such organizations—those operating
in institutional environments characterized by conflicting values and preferences—as
“political” (as opposed to action) organizations.20 If a political organization’s structures
and processes for responding to these pressures are decoupled, they can each
independently respond to their corresponding external demands, and—because they are

18 This distinction is introduced in the introduction added to the otherwise unrevised
second edition of The Organization of Hypocrisy (Brunsson, 2002). Brunsson’s writings
relationship between different forms of organizational hypocrisy.
19 Although Brunsson discusses this relationship in the first edition (Brunsson, 1989: 168-
173, 188-189), he does not distinguish it from decoupling. The distinction is made
corresponding to technical and (conflictual) institutional environments (and therefore also
to logics of consequences and appropriateness), respectively.
decoupled—not be significantly affected by the inconsistency between them. Thus, the inconsistent pressures of the organization’s environment are “reflected in organizational structures, processes, and ideologies,” within the organization, and “these incorporated inconsistencies define the ‘organization of hypocrisy’.”21 Because the inconsistencies stem from the organizational environment, OOH is a property of open systems.

Organized hypocrisy, as opposed to OOH, refers to inconsistencies between organizational outputs. Brunsson identifies three fundamental types of organizational output—talk, decisions, and action.22 In organized hypocrisy, talk and decisions are inconsistent with action. But they are not decoupled. Rather, as Brunsson (2003: 205-206) explains:

In the model of [organized] hypocrisy talk, decisions and actions are still causally related, but the causality is the reverse: talk or decisions in one direction decrease the likelihood of corresponding actions, and actions in one direction decrease the likelihood of corresponding talk and decisions. The model of [organized] hypocrisy implies that talk, decisions and actions are “coupled” rather than “decoupled” or “loosely coupled,” but they are coupled in a way other than usually assumed.

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22 Brunsson (1989: 26) describes decisions as “a form of talk important enough to warrant classification as a separate category.”
Talk and decisions “compensate for” inconsistent action, and vice versa.\textsuperscript{23} Talk and decisions can satisfy demands to address an issue without actually taking action. Action can be insulated from opposition by contrary formal decisions that diffuse pressure to change the action. Thus, the causal relationship under organized hypocrisy between action, on the one hand, and talk and decisions on the other, is one of “reverse” or “compensatory” coupling. I will use the term counter-coupling to describe this relationship.\textsuperscript{24}

Figure 1 summarizes the distinctions presented above, between decoupling and counter-coupling, and between OOH and organized hypocrisy. OOH–internalized and decoupled inconsistency—occupies the upper-left quadrant. The lower-left quadrant—counter-coupled internalized inconsistencies—is empty. Krasner’s understanding of organized hypocrisy as decoupled norms and behavior corresponds to the upper right quadrant. Brunsson’s more recent (2002, 2003) definition in terms of counter-coupled outputs falls in the lower right-hand cell. His initial (1989) discussion is consistent with the upper right-hand cell. The open and closed system distinction could be conceived as a third dimension in Figure 1 (extending out from the page), separating the two entries in the upper right-hand cell along this dimension. Both types of coupling relationship are compatible with either open or closed systems. However, as noted above, OOH is

\textsuperscript{23} Brunsson (2002: xiv). Italics in original.
\textsuperscript{24} Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2005, 1383) use the term “radical decoupling” to refer to the condition “wherein treaties have an effect opposite to what are [sic] intended.” Counter-coupling is a mechanism that can produce radical decoupling.
specific to open systems. And *internal* decoupling or counter-coupling cannot arise in closed-rational systems, which are internally coordinated and coherent.\(^{25}\)

\[\text{Figure 1}\]

Typology of Organizational Hypocrisies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locus of organizational inconsistency</th>
<th>Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong> (between structures, processes, ideologies)</td>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong> (between talk, decisions, actions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decoupling</strong></td>
<td>OOH (Brunsson 1989/2002) OH (Krasner)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Form of coupling</td>
<td>OH (Brunsson 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Counter-coupling</strong></td>
<td>OH (Brunsson 2002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

OH: Organized Hypocrisy
OOH: Organization of Hypocrisy

Interpreting the two conceptions of organized hypocrisy in terms of the distinction between closed and open systems points to the conditions under which each concept will be analytically appropriate. “Krasnerian” organized hypocrisy is suited to the analysis of autonomous rational, unitary actors while Brunsson’s conception is superior for the analysis of organizational actors with porous boundaries, interpenetrated and constituted by their institutional environments.

Intergovernmental organizations are open systems. Their member states also comprise the most prominent aspects of their organizational environments, making the specification of their boundaries somewhat arbitrary. Their internal structures reflect and are constituted by institutionalized features of their environments, such as state sovereignty, norms of self-determination and democracy, and conceptions of legitimacy. Brunsson’s institutionalist conception of organized hypocrisy is generally more appropriate, therefore, for the study of intergovernmental organizations. Analyzing an organization such as the UN in terms of a closed system conception of organized hypocrisy poses difficulties, such as identifying an appropriate analogue for Krasner’s unit of analysis – the ruler. Befitting its origins in neoclassical realism, closed system organized hypocrisy is better suited to circumstances—such as national security policy within states—in which organizational decisions and behavior are likely to be produced by a unitary rational actor or its functional equivalent.26

The following sections present brief, illustrative case studies of organized hypocrisy in United Nations peacekeeping and the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the first, organized hypocrisy characterizes an open-system organization and conforms to the institutionalist conception developed by Brunsson. In the nuclear case, what I call “nuclear organized hypocrisy,” is exhibited by decision-makers in states designated nuclear weapons states by the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

Organized Hypocrisy and the United Nations

Notwithstanding the negative connotations associated with the term hypocrisy, organized hypocrisy can have positive effects. Indeed, it can be necessary for organizational survival. Brunsson argues that hypocrisy “is not necessarily a problem; sometimes it can be a solution. And hypocrisy can be seen as morally valuable, at least as compared to its [alternatives]” (Brunsson, 2003: 203). However, organized hypocrisy can also have dysfunctional, even pathological, consequences, fitting Barnett and Finnemore’s definition of organizational pathologies – “dysfunctions that are attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-professed goals” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 8). In the discussion that follows, I describe examples of pathological and functional organized hypocrisy in UN peacekeeping.

A. Peacekeeping Commitment Gaps

Peacekeeping can be dysfunctional when pressures to ‘do something’ in response to political or humanitarian crises are met by symbolic responses not supported by the resources or political commitment necessary to act effectively. Michael Doyle (2001: 537) describes this syndrome as ‘an irresponsible divorce between the Security Council

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27 This section is excerpted from Lipson (forthcoming).
28 Organized hypocrisy can characterize activities of the UN system other than peacekeeping. On the World Bank, see Weaver (2003). On UN system reform, see Lipson (2006).
29 Such pressures are often attributed to the so-called CNN effect (Jakobsen, 1996; Robinson, 1999).
and the UN operation in the field’. It is sometimes called a “commitment gap” (United Nations, 2000: 11).

This gap renders Security Council resolutions merely symbolic ‘talk,’ decoupled from, or even counter-coupled to, action. Resolution 918 of May 17, 1994, for instance, authorized an expansion of the previously gutted peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. However, this formal decision was not matched by action, as UN member states declined to provide troops to implement the resolution. Michael Barnett (2002: 141) argues that this path was chosen over than a more limited but feasible American option, because the American proposal “would not represent the public relations coup desperately desired by a UN that was increasingly embarrassed by its inaction.” Thus, the primary purpose of Resolution 918 was to ritually enact a show of concern and demonstrate that action was being taken. Barnett (2002: 143-144) points out that,

Passing resolutions that did not stand a chance of being implemented, and sending emissaries into the field to try to produce a cease-fire when it was clear that none would be had—these and other diplomatic undertakings can be reasonably and rightly justified on the grounds that attempts had to be made...But these activities also served another function: they helped to hide the UN’s reluctance to act. Consider the council’s endless meetings. Although their ostensible purpose was to try to achieve collective action, they also served to hide collective inaction.
In other words, talk and decisions responded to institutional norms, while inaction resulted from a political logic of consequences. Rhetoric compensated for a lack of action.

The establishment of safe areas in Bosnia was another instance in which a Security Council decision was not positively coupled to action, because the Council did not authorize the necessary forces and resources. As David Rieff (1996: 173) recounts:

As was so often the case with United Nations resolutions on Bosnia, the stated purpose of a given decree was rarely the same as its real goal. The Safe Havens policy was adopted after the Bosnian Serbs had turned Srebrenica into a real killing ground. In France, in particular, there was great pressure on the Mitterand government for military intervention, and pressure was building in Britain. In the view of many observers at the United Nations, in and out of the Secretariat, the French and the British had to be seen to be doing something, and designating some towns in Bosnia demonstrated resolve without actually committing the United Nations and NATO to very much.

UN Security Council Resolutions 819, 824 and 836, establishing “safe areas” in Srebrenica and five other cities, were symbolic, not connected to effective action. Only 7,600 troops were authorized when UNPROFOR’s Force Commander had estimated that
34,000 would be required to deter attacks on the safe areas.\textsuperscript{30} Thus safe areas were not adequately protected, and the tragedy of Srebrenica ensued.

In the cases of Rwanda and Bosnia, passing Security Council Resolutions – organizational “decisions”—diffused and deflected political pressure to act in response to ethnic cleansing and genocide. There was, therefore, an inverse causal relationship between Security Council rhetoric and decisions, on the one hand, and effective action to back up the decisions on the other. Rhetoric and action were counter-coupled more than decoupled.

\textit{B. Rhetoric and Practice in Complex Peace Operations}

The core principles of peacekeeping—consent, neutrality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense—retain significant normative force. Yet they are widely recognized as inconsistent with the requirements for operational effectiveness in complex peace operations—in which consent is often uncertain and significant force may be required to fulfill the mandate (Betts, 1994; Ruggie, 1998; Jett, 2001: xviii). Regarding UN operations in the former Yugoslavia, one authority notes that “the very insistence on adhering to the normative principles of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defense have, with the exception of Macedonia, undermined the military effectiveness of UNPROFOR operations.”\textsuperscript{31} This constitutes a conflict between a

\textsuperscript{30} United Nations (1999: 26, 39). This, and Bosnian Serb forces’ prior defiance of UN forces escorting relief convoys, militate against an alternative explanation that the Security Council, relying on the symbolism of UN “blue helmets,” simply miscalculated the necessary force strength.

peacekeeping logic of appropriateness with consent, impartiality, and non-use of force as central principles, and a logic of consequences defined by the political, military, and strategic imperatives of so-called “stability operations.” Reflecting this conflict, the influential August 2000 Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations’ [Brahimi Report’s] recommendations on peacekeeping doctrine display a remarkable inconsistency by asserting traditional peacekeeping principles—consent, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defense—while simultaneously endorsing so-called robust peacekeeping, which can involve the use of force beyond self-defense against one party to the conflict in situations in which consent is lacking.32 Dennis Jett observes that the Brahimi Report, clings to the idea that “the bedrock principles of peacekeeping” are the consent of the local parties, impartiality, and the use of force only in self-defense. At the same time, it acknowledges that in today’s conflicts, none of those principles are possible. Yet it fails to describe effective ways to deal with these facts (Jett, 2001: xviii).

Organized hypocrisy is evident in the continued assertion of the norms of consent, impartiality, and force only in self-defense as fundamental principles of peacekeeping while at the same time, when push comes to shove, either these principles or the mission itself is abandoned. In Bosnia, when UNPROFOR was unable to stop Serb attacks on safe

32 United Nations (2000: 9-10). The rhetorical contradiction itself, which reflects different conceptions of peacekeeping and its relation to sovereignty (Barnett 1995), displays ‘the organization of hypocrisy’. Reaffirming that consent, impartiality, and non-use of force are ‘bedrock’ peacekeeping principles while practicing robust peacekeeping constitutes organized hypocrisy.
areas or the Sarajevo market, the UN authorized NATO air strikes (under the ‘dual-key’ arrangement). UNPROFOR was, at this point, operating in an environment in which Serb consent to the terms of the mission had been, for practical purposes, withdrawn. The mandate could not be implemented without the use of force against one party, on behalf of another. And the use of force, though not by UN forces, was authorized by the UN and went beyond self-defense. This disjuncture between peacekeeping norms and operational requirements can be a source of dysfunction and failure. However, decoupling talk from action in complex peace operations can enable the UN to take, or authorize others (NATO in Bosnia, U.S. forces in Somalia) to take, actions inconsistent with those norms but necessary to achieve operational goals.

Such a disjuncture between practice and rhetoric has been evident in ‘talk’ and action surrounding recent peacekeeping operations. Peacekeepers in the Congo and Haiti have recently undertaken significant offensive operations against armed spoiler groups, including the use of air support from assault helicopters, and cordon and search tactics to search for weapons. In early March 2005, following the killing of nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers, MONUC forces using armored vehicles and supported by an attack helicopter killed as many as 60 militia fighters of the ethnically Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) in an offensive operation in the eastern Ituri province (Associated Press 2005b, c). There were reports of civilian casualties (Associated Press 2005a). The MONUC Force Commander commented regarding such operations that, ‘It may look like war but it’s peacekeeping’ (Lacey, 2005). At the end of the month, the Security Council passed Resolution 1592 “welcoming the robust action [MONUC] is undertaking in pursuit of its mandate.” In July, UN forces in Haiti launched “Operation
Iron Fist,” involving 1400 troops employing armored personnel carriers and supported by helicopters in a large-scale attack on a pro-Aristide gang in the Port-au-Prince slum of Cité Soleil blamed for violently resisting efforts to establish law and order and disarm local gangs. Several gang members, including the leader, were killed, and many civilian casualties were reported (Lindsay 2005; Lynch 2005).

Yet there is still widespread support for the core traditional peacekeeping principles of consent, neutrality, and non-use of force. For instance, the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations’ report on its 2005 meetings notes that,

Many delegations observed that peacekeeping operations should strictly observe the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and those that have evolved to govern peacekeeping and have become basic peacekeeping principles, namely the consent of the parties, the non-use of force, except in self-defence, and impartiality (United Nations 2005: 4).

Recent practice in complex peace operations reflects an emerging consensus in peace operations doctrine on the need for peacekeepers to possess, and be mandated and prepared to use, robust capabilities to deter spoilers and defend civilians (Jakobsen, 2000). Peacekeepers facing spoilers attempting to undermine a peace settlement will lack consent, and will be unable to fulfill their mandate and protect civilians without using
significant force against spoiler groups, thereby straining the principle of impartiality. However, as a political organization, the UN must also contend with political and normative commitments to core traditional peacekeeping principles inconsistent with robust peacekeeping. The result is institutional rhetoric either decoupled from, or even – by satisfying political pressure to reaffirm traditional principles, thereby compensating for action that violates those principles – counter-coupled with robust peacekeeping in complex peace operations. In such cases, organized hypocrisy can facilitate operational effectiveness.

Organized Hypocrisy and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

In 1963, President Kennedy predicted that 15 to 25 states would obtain nuclear weapons by 1975. Concern over this prospect led the United States and Soviet Union to propose draft nonproliferation treaties in 1964 and 1965. These proposals ultimately led to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT distinguishes nuclear weapons states (NWS) from non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS). Under Article IX.3, any state that had “manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device

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33 Impartiality, in such contexts, may be defined in terms of the mandate, allowing peacekeepers to respond to any party opposing the mandate (Donald, 2002).
34 This section is excerpted from Lipson, 2005.
35 Lavoy (2004).
37 The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. It currently has 187 state parties (the five nuclear weapons states – the U.S., Russia, China, UK, and France) and all non-nuclear weapons states except India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba. North Korea withdrew from the treaty in 2002.
prior to January 1, 1967” was designated an NWS. Thus, all states except the permanent members of the Security Council are NNWS under the NPT. The NPT is often described as comprising three “pillars”: nonproliferation, disarmament, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear technology. NWS agree not to assist in the spread of nuclear weapons to NNWS. NNWS agree not to try to obtain nuclear weapons, and accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear facilities to verify their non-military use of nuclear technology. NNWS are guaranteed the right to peaceful use of nuclear technologies. And NWS committed, in Article VI, to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the nuclear arms race, and to achieve nuclear disarmament and “general and complete disarmament.”

The Treaty had an original duration of 25 years, with review conferences held every five years, and a conference of the parties to be held at the end of that period to decide on indefinite renewal of the treaty. At the 1995 Review Conference, the parties agreed to renew the treaty indefinitely, continuing the practice of five-year review conferences. The 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences adopted measures reaffirming the pillars of the treaty, including Article VI. As part of the overall agreement to extend the treaty, the 1995 Review Conference adopted a set of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament,” including a reaffirmation of Article VI by the NWS, and the listing as a measure important to fulfillment of Article VI of,

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38 Article VI reads, in full: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.”
The determined pursuit by the nuclear-weapon States of systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goals of eliminating those weapons, and by all States of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.\(^{39}\)

At the 2000 Review Conference, the parties adopted a final document including the so-called “thirteen steps,” contained in paragraph 15 of the final document’s section on Article VI. This provision lists 13 items, characterized as “practical steps,” towards fulfillment of Article VI and the relevant portions (paragraphs 3 and 4c) of the 1995 Principles and Objectives. The 13 steps include ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), reduced reliance on nuclear weapons for security, and the “engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.”\(^{40}\) Thus, the NPT links nonproliferation to disarmament, and the nuclear-weapon states have regularly reaffirmed their formal commitments to pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet their actions belie any intention to relinquish their nuclear arsenals.


The nuclear nonproliferation regime is part of an inconsistent environment, characterized by nonproliferation and disarmament norms that contradict the perceived self interest of states concerned with power and security in an anarchic international system. Realist international theory holds that states, driven by the security dilemma and self-help imperative of the anarchic international system, acquire nuclear weapons in response to perceived security threats. In addition, domestic political pressures from groups such as nuclear scientists and the military, and from nationalist movements and parties seeking enhanced status for their country, sometimes promote the acquisition of nuclear weapons. These internal and external pressures constitute logics of consequences with which states and rulers must contend. At the same time, norms of nonproliferation and disarmament work in opposition to these domestic and systemic pressures. According to Scott Sagan, a “major discontinuity—a shift in nuclear norms—has emerged as the result of the NPT regime.” Nonproliferation norms have shifted the significance of nuclear weapons acquisition from the prestige that previously attached to being a member of the nuclear “club,” to the status of rogue state defying international norms. These norms both constitute part of the international environment facing state actors, and are also transmitted through domestic mechanisms, becoming elements of national identity.

41 Frankel (1993); Sagan (1996/97). Waltz notes that many states will regard nuclear weapons as unnecessary or counteproductive. Anarchy does not automatically lead to widespread proliferation (Waltz, 2003). Security concerns also affect states’ willingness to sign and ratify the NPT (Way and Sasikumar, 2004).
42 Sagan (1996/7, 76). Mutimer (2000) deconstructs NP norms, pointing to way in which construction of “proliferation” as threat understood in terms of autonomous technological diffusion has effect of defining recipient states rather than nuclear weapons states as threat to international peace and security. Paul notes that “India often couches its challenge to the nonproliferation regime in normative and idealistic terms, such as the sovereign equality of states and the need for global disarmament.” (Paul, 1998: 1). By coupling at least partially inconsistent disarmament and nonproliferation frames, the NPT’s drafting puts it in an environment of inconsistent norms.
when they are internalized. Thus, the NPT and the nonproliferation regime form part of the sort of inconsistent environment that gives rise to organized hypocrisy.

The behavior of nuclear weapons states constitutes organized hypocrisy. Nuclear weapons states are committed by Article VI to pursue nuclear disarmament, yet maintain nuclear forces and military strategies that presume the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. Article VI commits states parties to pursue negotiations towards disarmament in good faith. However, the current policies, ongoing planning, and force structures of the nuclear weapons states make clear that they intend to retain nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, and regard any commitment to disarmament as applying to the indefinite future.

A recent assessment of French nuclear forces noted that,

Although France is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and is bound by Article VI’s goal of nuclear disarmament, it shows no signs of giving up its remaining arsenal. Instead, it is making plans to develop, procure, and deploy new weapons, and to maintain its arsenal without nuclear testing, for years to come.

This observation in fact applies to all of the NPT-designated nuclear weapons states. The British government has reportedly decided to develop a replacement for the United Kingdom’s fleet of Trident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in advance of their


Norris and Kristensen 2005a.
scheduled 2024 decommissioning.\textsuperscript{45} Russia, while cutting its stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons under the 2002 Moscow Treaty, is also developing a new land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and a new class of ballistic missile submarines.\textsuperscript{46} The SS-18 ICBM, which had been slated for retirement, is now expected to remain in service until between 2015 and 2020.\textsuperscript{47} Similarly, the People’s Republic of China, as part of its overall modernization of its strategic nuclear forces, is developing new ICBMs (DF31 and DF31A models) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (JL-2 SLBMs).\textsuperscript{48} In July 2005, a Chinese General stated that the PRC would have to use nuclear weapons were the United States to intervene militarily in a conflict over Taiwan.\textsuperscript{49} A joint project by two NGOs advocating nonproliferation and disarmament concluded that, “China claims to be contributing to nuclear disarmament through its longstanding policy of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons but it currently appears to be neither ready nor willing to enter the disarmament process itself.”\textsuperscript{50}

The United States likewise has plans and programs in place to maintain its nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review proposed changes

\textsuperscript{45} Brown (2005).
\textsuperscript{46} Norris and Kristensen (2005b), Cirincione et al. (2000, 109).
\textsuperscript{48} U.S. Department of Defense (2005, 28). [“Chinese Military Power 2005”]; Norris and Kristensen, (2003). However, China’s strategic nuclear forces have traditionally been deployed in a nonprovocative minimal deterrence profile, and not fulfilled predictions of arms racing, undermining alarmist portrayals of the Chinese threat.]
to the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal to ensure, “over the coming decades, a credible
deterrent at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with U.S. and allied
security.”51 The 2001 NPR proposed a “New Triad” comprising offensive capabilities,
(including nuclear and non-nuclear weapons), defensive forces, and enhanced defense
industrial, procurement, and nuclear weapons infrastructures. The NPR envisioned an
operationally deployed force of 1,700-2,200 nuclear warheads, by 2012 with the higher
figure later formalized in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with
Russia.52

The U.S. Department of Energy oversees a stockpile stewardship program and
Stockpile Life Extension Programs (LEPs) for individual warhead types.53 The U.S. plans
to extend Minuteman III service life beyond 2020, and the Navy plans to replace its
existing class of SSBNs in 2029.54 In 2005, Congress established the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) program, with initial funding of $9 million, to explore the
feasibility of redesigning existing warheads to make them easier to manufacture and
maintain, and increase their reliability.55 The RRW program is to some extent an
alternative to the LEPs, regarded by its proponents as a more effective way of ensuring
the continued reliability of weapons in the stockpile without the need for testing. A recent

51 “Nuclear Posture Review [Excerpts],” GlobalSecurity.org,
2005).
52 A “responsive force” of non-operationally deployed weapons is available to
supplement the operationally deployed force as contingencies require.
53 A life extension program is underway for the W87 warhead (deployed on the MX
ICBM, and scheduled to replace W62 warheads on Minuteman III ICBMs as the MX is
retired. LEPs are scheduled for the B61-7/-11, W76, W78, W80, B83, and W88 warheads
(Norris and Kristensen, 2005c).
converting some Minuteman ICBMs to conventional uses.
Congressional Research Service report on the RRW program noted that, in evaluating the relative merits of the LEP and RRW programs, “The issue for Congress is how best to sustain the nuclear stockpile and its supporting infrastructure for the long term.”\textsuperscript{56} Thus, the U.S. clearly intends to maintain its nuclear arsenal, adapted in accordance with the 2001 and future Nuclear Posture Reviews, indefinitely. Moreover, the Bush administration has pushed for the development of a new type of nuclear weapon, seen by critics as lowering the threshold for use of a nuclear weapon, in seeking funding and development of a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP) or nuclear “bunker buster.”\textsuperscript{57} U.S. strategies, plans, and programs are strikingly incompatible with the proclaimed commitment to disarmament under Article VI of the NPT.\textsuperscript{58} Moreover, the U.S. is no exception among the recognized nuclear weapon states, which as one observer notes “preach but do not practice nuclear abstinence.”\textsuperscript{59} The nuclear nonproliferation regime conforms to the overall framework of organized hypocrisy.

\textsuperscript{56} Medalia (2005a, CRS-1).
\textsuperscript{57} Medalia (2005b). The RNEP has encountered Congressional resistance (Ruppe, 2005). To the extent that they make nuclear weapons more “useable,” bunker-busters are inconsistent with the U.S. commitment, as part of the thirteen practical steps towards disarmament adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons (Grotto, 2005).
\textsuperscript{58} Assistant Secretary of State Stephen G. Rademaker has forcefully defended the record of the United States with respect to Article VI, arguing that it is “unassailable,” and that the U.S. is in full compliance. He points to, \textit{inter alia:} the end of the Cold War arms race; the ongoing U.S. moratorium on nuclear testing; strategic arms reductions under START II and SORT; dismantling of non-strategic nuclear weapons; non-production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium; and fissile material destruction (Rademaker, 2004).
Rademaker’s argument implicitly interprets nuclear disarmament, under the terms of Article VI, to mean arms reduction rather than nuclear abolition. Although the U.S. may be, in a strict legal sense, in technical compliance with Article VI’s nuclear disarmament requirements, its clear intention to maintain its nuclear arsenal indefinitely is at odds with its Article VI commitment to pursue nuclear disarmament (and general disarmament as well), understood to mean the elimination of nuclear weapons.
\textsuperscript{59} Thakur (2005).
Organized hypocrisy under the NPT has allowed the regime to successfully respond to inconsistent pressures: normative and political pressures for disarmament, and great power unwillingness to relinquish nuclear weapons; sovereignty norms and intrusive nuclear inspections; demands to spread nuclear technology for development and energy generation, and controls on such technologies to prevent proliferation. In particular, organized hypocrisy in the nonproliferation regime has allowed for the establishment and maintenance of relatively successful arrangements for limiting nonproliferation to coexist with a lack of progress towards genuine disarmament. Given the unwillingness of the NWS to relinquish their nuclear arsenals, without at least the symbolic commitments of Article VI it would have been politically difficult for developing countries to sign and ratify the NPT.60 Without renewed rhetorical commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, and the “thirteen steps” adopted at the 2000 Review Conference, the treaty’s indefinite renewal and continued support would have been questionable. The U.S. stance at the 2005 Review Conference, refusing to acknowledge continued commitment to the thirteen steps or seriously engage in efforts to strengthen the regime, raise the prospect that, by failing to cultivate the organized hypocrisy that underlies the regime, the U.S. may be endangering its continued viability.61 Thus, for advocates of

60 Non-aligned states made clear in early negotiations in the Disarmament Commission during 1964, and in response to a 1965 draft treaty proposed by the US without a disarmament article, that linkage of nonproliferation with disarmament was a priority for them (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969: 17-20). The Soviet Union also resisted linkage between nonproliferation and disarmament (United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1969: x).

nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear organized hypocrisy arguably has beneficial effects (assuming the political infeasibility of near-term nuclear abolition). It stabilizes the regime in the face of NWS disregard of Article VI. But this stabilizing effect may be endangered.

Conclusion

International relations is characterized by the conditions that produce organized hypocrisy, and there is reason to suspect that it is a pervasive, if unrecognized feature of international organization. Stephen Krasner observes that:

Brunsson and other organizational theorists, who suggest that hypocrisy might be a normal state of affairs, have focused their attention on domestic political settings. The logic of these analyses suggests that organized hypocrisy will be even more prevalent in the international environment. There are more constituencies to manage, because domestic actors are joined by international ones. Norms of appropriateness emanating from the international environment could be inconsistent with those originating from domestic sources. The authoritative decision-making role often assumed by courts in a domestic setting, which can sometimes resolve conflicts between conflicting rules, does not exist in the international environment” (Krasner, 1999b: 66).

The conditions that give rise to organized hypocrisy – political organizations facing inconsistent and irreconcilable normative and material pressures are pervasive and
enduring features of world politics, and a persistent challenge to global governance. This paper has argued that organized hypocrisy is a standard response to such dilemmas, one that has been underappreciated to date in the International Relations literature.

The illustrative cases presented above of organized hypocrisy in UN peace operations and the nuclear nonproliferation regime demonstrate that organized hypocrisy can have both positive and negative effects. In the UN peacekeeping case, organized hypocrisy characterizes an open system, making a Brunssonian institutionalist perspective appropriate. In the nuclear nonproliferation case, organized hypocrisy is product of state parties to the NPT, resulting from policies developed by foreign policy elites in the secretive and centralized area of nuclear strategy. A Krasnerian neoclassical realist perspective is more suitable for the latter case. This points to the possibility of synthetic theorizing recognizing complementarities across paradigmatic boundaries (Fearon and Wendt, 2002).

Recognizing organized hypocrisy’s basis in conflicting pressures on organizations also points to greater appreciation of the genuine dilemmas international organizations frequently confront. Faced with internal and external constituencies with fundamentally opposed preferences, and the need to satisfy inherently irreconcilable demands to maintain their legitimacy and secure the material resources necessary for organizational survival and functioning, IOs cannot resolve these contradictions and cannot escape them. Their only option is to manage them. Organized hypocrisy is a standard way of managing these dilemmas of global governance.

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62 Although these cases are restricted to issues involving international peace and security, organized hypocrisy has been identified in international political economy as well. Steinberg (2002); Weaver (2003); Bukovansky (2005).
The preceding discussion suggests a need for further attention to further research treating international organizations as bureaucracies subject to dynamics identified in organizational theory and suited to the tools developed by organization theorists (Finnemore, 1996a; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004; Weaver and Leiteritz, 2005; Barnett and Coleman, 2006). It also calls for more attention to the inconsistent pressures in IOs’ organizational environments, as well as the better appreciated political imperatives facing state leaders. The dynamics of international organizations are more complex than extant IR theory recognizes, and a clearer appreciation of these dynamics would facilitate both better theory and more effective global governance.

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