The Three Uses of Glocalization

Paper prepared for the 78th Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association
June 1-3, 2006
York University, Toronto

Joseph Román
PhD Candidate
Department of Political Science
Carleton University
jroman@connect.carleton.ca

(DRAFT – PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR'S PERMISSION)
Introduction

Understanding change is never easy. More often than not, change gets recognized only after it has occurred. Yet there are moments where something different is happening and it can be identified. Unless one possesses clairvoyance, what exactly will end up being is anybody's guess. A host of contingencies, accidents, interests, ideas, and so on will interrupt whatever political projects powerful social actors may or may not have in mind. In the meantime, social scientists of whatever ideological stripe will try to make sense of social, political, and economic shifts as transformations continue apace.

Globalization has been identified as today's main factor for change. Of course, how it is understood is another matter. Employing familiar analytical language is among the many favourite strategies social scientists have when they try to comprehend globalization's social maelstrom (Arrighi 1994; Mann 1997; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Weiss 1998; Harmes 2004). Arguing that the old ways of doing analysis disable comprehension of contemporary global transformations without offering new frameworks to replace them with is another strategy (Strange 1996; Rosenau 1997). And then there are those who seek to come up with new terms to make sense of what is going on around us. Sometimes these terms do provide novel ways of thinking, but they also run the risk of putting old wine in new bottles. Perhaps even more problematic is the potential for abusing the term. Jumping on the terminological bandwagon, scholars begin to load a term with so much meaning, all reflexivity is lost. Glib uses set in, leading to a term which means everything and, as a result, can end up meaning absolutely nothing in the end.

A relatively recent term that has come into favour to shed light on the transformative processes of globalization has been "glocalization." In a very general sense, "glocalization" has come to suggest the interplay between the global and the local to produce very different kinds of political, social, and economic relations. Although the literature on glocalization has not swelled to the point of filling multiple libraries, cross-disciplinary interest in the term has led to an increasingly sizeable literature focusing on the theory, method, and case studies of glocalization. With cross-disciplinary interest comes heterogeneous ways of interpreting what exactly glocalization means. No doubt, this is healthy for it can sensitize disciplines sensitive to issues they may otherwise ignore.

A risk does exist with myriad interpretation, though. As previously mentioned, a term becomes too loaded, losing all analytical value. In order to achieve greater accuracy with glocalization as a term, this paper will examine three specific uses of glocalization. It will proceed in three ways, each of which examines its specific uses and misuses. First, this paper will examine sociological notions of glocalization. Second, scalar interpretations of glocalization will be examined. The final section of this paper looks at neo-liberal uses of glocalization.
Sociological Glocalization

Sociological glocalization tends to emphasise the new cultural experiences being produced by globalization. Roland Robertson's work on the production of new cultural experiences has been especially salient. Identifying his interests in the field of cultural sociology, Robertson expressed concern over the easy treatment of globalization as a homogenizing tidal wave which washes over any and all differences in its path. According to Robertson, globalization as a level of and for analysis was increasingly leading to a form of methodological imperialism; globalization was coming to muscle out all other forms of analysis by laying claim to analytic superiority girded on being the determining explanatory variable (Robertston, 1994).

Many analyses simply climbed upwards from the level of the national state to the global. The introduction of the global as a variable for social relations resulted in a greater number of social actors able to operate outside the confines of the national state was the justification for this. Thus, the only reasonable means to come to grips with complexity was to study how these actors interacted on a global scale. Furthermore, the rise of globalization meant the demise of the national state as a determining factor in structuring social relations within borders. Globally oriented perspectives could thus explain what newly obsolescent nationally oriented perspectives could not (Rosenau 1997: ch. 7; Tarrow 2001; Schneiderman 1996).

Following Anthony Giddens (1985: 290), Robertson expresses concern over the dichotomy between macro-sociologies and micro-sociologies, with the latter being relegated to the study of novelties or agency minus the structures studied by macro-sociologists. He argues that any focus on the global must have a focus on the local for the two are mutually constitutive of each other; it is not as simple as the global being proactive and the local being reactive. Robertson attributes this to the debates centring on the relationship between the global and the local. The global was scripted as being homogenizing because of the economic and cultural flows associated with it (proactive) and the local being a site of heterogeneity fighting to keep out globalization (reactive). A binary was thus erected along macro/micro lines: look at the ineluctable structural forces of globalization and inquire about how locales are uniquely fighting losing battles temporarily staving off the inevitable. Much of Robertson's concerns may have to do with those earlier explanations of globalization (O'Brien 1992; Cerny 1990; Strange 1996), critical or not, positioning it as the next stage of a teleological modernity inducing inevitable sameness (Robertson 1995: 25-27; Roudometof 2003). Levels of analysis below the global would unfortunately be quickly dismissed.

Returning to Robertson's suggestion that the global and the local mutually constitute each other, by this he means a process where the global and the local mesh to form the "glocal." Contending that globalization has been treated as an
esoteric process, he points out that it must nevertheless be grounded somewhere and somehow. Accomplishing this means developing a greater perceptiveness towards the dynamics of the local (Robertson 1994: 30). Paying heed to spatio-temporal transformations are required to accomplish this for, again following Giddens (1990), Robertson claims that globalization is able to link locales closer together materially and ideationally. As he puts it in his discussion on how a specific conception of a locality gets reproduced globally:

"A 'lifted' locality ... has to be a standardised form of the local (whether it be a neighbourhood, a city, a country, or even a world region). An 'international' TV enterprise like CNN produces and reproduces a particular pattern of relations between localities, a pattern which depends on a kind of recipe of locality. This standardisation renders meaningful the very idea of locality, but at the same time diminishes the notion that localities are "things in themselves" (Robertson 1994: 38; emphasis in original).

This particular quote, however, highlights a significant problem in his analysis, namely his very loose use of the "local." Claiming that a country can be seen in local terms is not problematical per se. Social actors can produce national communities that give them a sense of being "at home" no matter where they are within a juridical border's space. They can also produce competing political visions of what makes a national community (Anderson 1991; Agnew 1997). What is problematic, however, is that Robertson does not pay enough attention to how the "local" gets produced. As Agnew states: "The 'local', for example, can in different cases refer to areas of vastly different sizes. Even the 'global' may not mean 'worldwide' but, rather, a geographical scope extending beyond the 'continental'. Relevance can be established only in relation to particular empirical cases and the usage that arises from the practices of specific groups and institutions" (Agnew 1997: 100).

Though Robertson is correct to express concern with typifying globalization a-sociably by ignoring how it gets produced, he nevertheless takes the local for granted by not paying attention to how it becomes formed. But it may also do likewise for the idea of what constitutes "global." For example, in his discussion of cultural imperialism, Robertson argues that the forms of entertainment being emitted from the USA are inherently global, yet they must be articulated in ways which are recognizable to local audiences (Robertson 1994: 46). A question needs to be posed here, though: What is intrinsically "global" about "American culture" and what is intrinsically "local" about non-American cultures? The point here is not to rehearse a debate from the 1990s which asked whether something is global or local. Rather, it is to state that greater consideration needs to be attended to the kinds of social processes which create the global or the local.

The aforementioned problem has shown up in those works which have picked up on Robertson's glocalization thesis. Little attention is paid to how "global" and "local" spaces get constructed. Studies examining identity formation under glocal conditions tend to portray the global and the local in very stark
terms: the global is a homogenizing force that is relentlessly trying to wash away the uniqueness of the local. At the same time, they demonstrate the impossibility of this occurring, due in large part to the concrete nature of the local. Regardless of how the local may get interpreted — national, regional, city, neighbourhood, and so on — it is where global homogeneity gets, metaphorically speaking, articulated into the local dialect. New cultural hybrids become produced, manifesting into the glocal (Kraidy 1999; Khan 1998; Raz 1999; Nicholson 1998: chapter 6). But presenting glocalization this way intimates a mechanical relationship between the global and the local: the global penetrates the local, the local reacts, and the glocal emerges.

Even more problematic about such uses of Robertson's glocalization is the characterization of the global and the local. Here, Doreen Massey's insights are particularly instructive for she highlights the shortcomings of theoretical treatments assigning concreteness to the local, i.e. where social relations can only truly transpire, and abstractness to the global. She argues that neither the global nor the local are innately abstract or concrete respectively, but can, in fact, be both at once. As she puts it: "Those who conflate the local with the concrete, therefore, are confusing geographical scale with processes of abstraction in thought" (Massey 1994: 129).

Angeleno geographer Edward Soja has attempted to build on some of the shortcomings of Robertson's glocalization. Soja attempts to be more specific with terminologies, even if it does lead to a certain bounding of territories. For instance, the national may never be able to be seen as something local because the former does not necessarily engender the kind of materiality usually (and often erroneously) associated with a neighbourhood. Nevertheless, according to Soja, the steely binaries expounded by the social sciences' positivist orientations rust away as new flows begin to emerge. The flows of money and people associated with globalization must land somewhere and it is in cities where they do so. It is definitely the urban which guides Soja into a more precise conceptualization of the local because he admits to situating himself at the point of the urban to think over globalization. By utilising such an analytic gestalt, he implies a better view of the bigger picture can be gained by staring upwards, giving a more human-like investigation into globalization's effects on the local and vice-versa rather than like a deity looking down from atop (Soja 2000: 192-199).

Soja then furthers Robertson's glocalization through what could be described as a butterfly effect theory. His cosmopolitan view of the world puts forward how small actions in, say, a neighbourhood can have wider implications for the world as a whole. According to him, "rethinking globalization leads to the recognition that it is not a process that operates exclusively at a planetary scale, but is constantly being localized in various ways and with different intensities at every scale of human life, from the human body to the planet" (Soja 2000: 200). How each scale of human life relates to each other becomes an important variable in making sense of a glocal world. The kinds of connections between
and within the scales of human life may help to shed light on the complex relationship between the local and the global. Eric Sheppard has attempted to come to theoretical grips with this through his notion of "positionality."

Positionality can best be understood as a way of asking how places are connected with each other and how these connections affect them over space and time (Sheppard 2002).

Of course, Soja emphasises the importance of looking within the local to be better aware of how they get constructed and how they related to the global level, but not at the expense of the wider spatial relations surrounding the local. His concept of "mutable nested hierarchies" argues places are always situated in a spatialized matrix. Social relations may be occurring somewhere — at home, at work, in a neighbourhood, in a city — but they can never easily be divorced from the wider processes taking place at other spatial scales (Soja 1988: 148). Each spatial scale gets implicated with another, albeit in ways that may not always be immediately observable or permanent. It is perhaps for this reason that Soja's insights can push Robertson's examinations further for the latter ends up treating glocalization as an end-state and the hybrid cultures produced are evidence enough for this. What a Robertsonian view of glocalization may therefore be pointing to is a periodization of timeless spaces. Forces from above periodically emerge to interrupt local serenity. With local cultural stasis upset by outside forces, a re-stabilization process sets in to enable the emergence of a new culture more able to cope with the disorder brought on by, in this case, globalization. Until another process from above decides it is time for a social shake-up again, the glocally-mediated, recently normalized cultural hybrid will (quite literally) stay in place.

The Glocalization of Scale

Although the sociological use of glocalization has thus far been more popular as a theoretical framing device, scalar understandings of glocalization have become increasingly prevalent. The most influential scholar in this approach has been Erik Swyngedouw. While not explicitly referring to Soja's idea of mutable nested hierarchies, Swyngedouw expresses similar concerns over the imbrications and implications of spatial scales which help to shape global and local spaces. Unlike Robertson who appears to treat the global scale as an independent variable, Swyngedouw argues against an a priori privileging of spatial scales. For him, scales are historically constructed and mediated through social relationships constructing possible terrains for action and inaction (Swyngedouw 1997a).

Though debates over what exactly constitutes scale have ensued (Marston 2000; Brenner 2001; Marston and Smith 2001), the terms of these debates are beyond the scope of this essay. Nevertheless, a definition of scale is first required to better appreciate the scalar use of glocalization. Here, scale is understood as the particular political terrain social actors act upon and construct.
to advance or discourage particular social, political, or economic projects (Jonas 1994; Miller 1997; Howitt 2004; Mamadouh, Kramsch, and van der Velde 2005). These politics can be located through the kinds of spatial politics mentioned by Henri Lefebvre (1991). A Lefebvrian politics of space argues that everyday life is bound up in certain places which may or may not be logically connected.

How everyday life moves forward depends on a constellation of scripts prescribing and proscribing the appropriate activities allowed within certain social settings. But it should not be forgotten that these scripts are always contested. People are aware of spatial scripts and a desire to overcome, replace, or change them may ferment. These spatial politics develop in places that are dependently defined by social actors’ cognitive frameworks and where immediately observable material and discursive manifestations of transpiring social relations appear (Miewald and McCann 2004). Part of this process is seeing places relationally. Notions of place do get defined materially and discursively by the actors, but they do so under conditions of cognitive bounding: the imagining and making of a place by social actors is always done so with another place in mind (Hudson 2001: 256). For example, Thomas Sugrue’s historiography of post-war Detroit demonstrates how White neighbourhoods and workplaces sought to keep out Black Detroiters by invoking racialized explanations of how places function (Sugrue 1996); Setha Low’s ethnography of gated communities in the USA sought to show how a (wrongly) perceived fear of crime led to the erection of gated communities, giving residents the feeling that the place they resided in was safe while the place(s) beyond their gates were not (Low 2004). So, despite scholars of the "post" variety proclaiming binary thinking as analytically disabling (Gibson-Graham 1996; Luke 1994, 1995), such studies point to its continued persistence in everyday life and usefulness in understanding how the processes of place come about. And as Pries has pointed out, without knowing where one is located, action may not be possible (Pries 2005: 173)

If places do get envisaged of in binary terms, then this leads to place as the prize under glocalizing conditions. As Swyngedouw has put it, "If the capacity to appropriate place is predicated upon controlling space, then the scale over which command lines extend will strongly influence the capacity to appropriate place" (Swyngedouw 1997b: 169). Part of Swyngedouw’s rationale for emphasizing the importance of place rests with his criticisms of how the local and the global are exhibited: place is socially frozen whereas globalization is precisely the opposite. This approach Swyngedouw criticizes stakes out an ontological separateness that restricts taking emerging intertwining complexities seriously for his glocalization is rooted in the political economy of time-space compression’s de- and re-territorializing effects under conditions of global economic disorder.

Capitalism’s drive to overcome space runs up against a contradiction: realizing value requires settling somewhere. Globalization’s spatio-temporal
quickening has compelled enterprises to operate under conditions of short-term profitability. To achieve higher profits in shorter periods of time, space and place come to be used strategically, occasioning what seems like an endless cycle of destabilizing spatial and scalar fixes (Swyngedouw 1992). As he puts it, "If the capacity to appropriate place is predicated upon controlling space, then the scale over which command lines extend will strongly influence the capacity to appropriate place. More importantly, as the power to appropriate place is always contested, struggled over, then the alliances social groups or classes forge over a certain spatial scale will shape the conditions of appropriation and control over place and have a decisive influence over relative socio-spatial power positions" (Swyngedouw 1998: 86). Because place is the prize in glocalization, it thus become important to see how places unfold since they are "moment, photographic stills, instances of socio-spatial processes in which the thing is defined and constituted throught the process" (Swyngedouw, Mouléart, and Rodríguez 2003: 11).

Notwithstanding the contributions made by Swyngedouw to the development of the glocalization of scale, his analysis falls short of fully developing his interest in seeing how spaces and scales shape each other. Specifically, there is a strong tendency by Swyngedouw to downplay the importance of scales between the local and the global once rescaling moves apace. In part, this may be due to his criticisms of state-centric analyses which treat the national state as the *sine qua non* social container and need to be overcome (Swyngedouw 1998: 85-86). This is not to suggest that the national state does not figure into Swyngedouw's analysis for he highlights important national state initiatives and historical legacies do influence the shape of glocal politics. Taking up Bob Jessop's idea of the Schumpeterian workfare state (Jessop 1993), Swyngedouw demonstrates how national state responsibilities get moved upward, downward, and horizontally to produce competitive locales under globalizing conditions, causing a denationalization of policy. But he then takes it one step further by illustrating how devolved responsibilities produce new local coalitions that become exclusionary, thereby bringing into being what Della Salla (2001) has called a hardening of the state. Under hardening conditions, these coalitions make an attempt to monopolize the policy process at the local level, creating new difficulties for subaltern groups seeking to express their concerns to certain state administrative apparatuses (Swyngedouw 1996; Swyngedouw 2000; Swyngedouw and Baeten 2001). Yet Swyngedouw may go too far by arguing glocalization's accompanying denationalization processes unavoidably "altered and diminished the relative importance of the national institutional level" (Swyngedouw 1996: 1503). Viewing it this way, he intimates a zero-sum game of political power whereby policymaking abilities are the bellwethers of scalar political power. Prior to globalization, then, all regulatory capacities were located at the national scale. Globalization then came along to destabilize this scalar fix, goading Schumpeterian workfare statism (Swyngedouw 2004).
Neil Brenner's studies on glocalization may serve as an antidote to Swyngedouw's characterization of the national scale under glocalizing conditions. Agreeing with Swyngedouw's criticism of state-centrism because the naturalization of the national state blocks a potentially more nuanced analysis of social formations relationship to globalization's time-space compression (Brenner 1999a) and proceeding from a political economy approach, he is nevertheless more perceptive towards the disposition of state spatiality as it relates to scales and the politics of place. Differences are noted between state space in its narrow and integral sense. A narrow sense of state space draws attention to the particular territorial configuration marked by a delineation of administrative responsibilities at particular levels of government. An integral sense of state space seeks to interrogate the mobilization of institutions which regulate and potentially influence social relations at certain spatial scales, primarily through projects of place-targeting (Brenner 2004: 78).

Narrow state space enables the sorts of explanations treating state transformations as zero-sum games of power. It presupposes tools come with responsibilities during downward shifts in policymaking. It may also conflate responsibilities with tools (Lefebvre 2001). Integral state space, on the other hand, emphasises the importance of contextualizing glocal strategies: it makes a plea to be more sensitive towards territorially-mediated regulatory regimes which, when mobilized, produce new forms of scalar overlapping, spatial connections, spatial disconnections, and the makings of newborn conflicts (Auyero 2001). How particular places are able to react to spatial transformations largely depends on their positions within, as well as vis-à-vis other spatial scales (Savitch and Kantor 2002; Gilman 2001; Palmer 1994; Hill and Kim 2000; McGuirk 2003). For that reason, it is not always as simple as local reactions to global processes because national regulatory regimes have shrunk in importance. Local reactions get shaped by and shape the spatialized regulatory regimes enveloping them. Consequently, while these regimes may get reworked, their transformative inclinations can be determined by spatio-temporally historicized legacies (Brenner and Theodore 2002).

Though unexpected ruptures within a spatial matrix can occur exogenously — for example, we can perhaps think of how the continuing high price of petroleum set by international commodity markets could serve to corrode the political economy of Canadian federalism as the province of Alberta could potentially forego their national political commitments given their ascending economic fortunes — important continuities from within may persist. Under these circumstances, key places for states' spatialized national accumulation strategies, while not always static given the opportunities and constraints presented by positionality, become identified through past practices as the gospel logic of global competition is invoked to justify particular political projects (Brenner 1998). Still, it is important not to forget a particularized politics of place exists, potentially serving to alter even the best laid glocalization plans. A number of particularities exists, such as competing administrative visions in the
local state, local authorities' tolerance of contestations over how a place should be used, mistrust between places based on race and social class, and so on (Rutheiser 1996; Keil 1998; Abu-Lughod 1999; Leibovitz 1999; 2003; Reichl 1999; Vicari Haddock 2003; Blackwell and Goonewardena 2003).

The scalar use of glocalization has come under fire as of late, though. Whereas it has been previously argued that a Robertsonian conception of glocalization became prone to misuse due to the ambiguous employment of "global" and "local," with both seemingly meaning whatever one wanted them to mean, subsequently resulting in a one-dimensional reflexivity, glocalization's meaning as taken up in a scalar analysis has been prone to misuse by its sceptics. Often, this leads to straw-man arguments. Antti Pelkonen has produced a critique of glocalization as used by Brenner and Swyngedouw (Pelkonen 2005: 687-688). He makes three critical points:

1. Holist treatments of the state are applied by glocalization theorists, overlooking important nuances in policies targeting place.
2. Glocalization's reterritorialization processes neglects emerging inter-scalar tensions. According to Pelkonen, then, a territorially consensual politics reigns in glocalization studies.
3. The portrayal of changed territorialized power structures indicates straightforward effects starting at the top of the scalar hierarchy, the global, that trickles down to its very bottom, the local. As Pelkonen states at length:

"The linearity of the model neglects the complex nature of such changes and the possibilities that decisions at the national and regional levels may also have increasing influence at the supra-national level. The thesis has linear and deterministic characteristics also in its outcomes, i.e. the alleged emphasis put by the nation state on few urban growth poles. Furthermore, it can be argues that the term 'glocal' refers to a stagnant process. The evidence put forward by the authors, however, at best refers to processes of glocalization, but there is a lack of evidence as to the 'end' of such processes. Thus it would seem to be more appropriate to talk about glocalization rather than glocal nation states" (Pelkonen 2005: 688).

Insofar as his first two criticisms are concerned, both can be refuted on the ground that Brenner and Swyngedouw have not argued either point. Their theoretical and methodological commitments do not enable this for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, both Brenner and Swyngedouw refuse to accept state-centric explanations positioning posit the state as a territorial whole, devoid of space and time. Epistemologically, Pelkonen's assertion cannot hold up. And, he may be overlooking Brenner's state spatiality in its narrow and integral sense, both of which draw attention to the shortcomings Pelkonen argues is present. Second, the political pressures caused by capitalism's tendencies towards uneven development do act to constantly redefine the kinds of policies ably pursued by and at all spatial scales of the state (Brenner 1999b; Swyngedouw 1999). To argue, as Pelkonen does, that this connotes a politics of consensus seems unfair. It is not so much a matter of mediating inter- and intra-scalar...
conflicts. Instead, it may be more plausible to suggest it is a matter of managing spatial tensions rooted in the politics of place to prevent serious political crises from emerging. Managing spatial tensions can be achieved in a variety of ways. Depending on a specific group's standing in a certain power configuration, state agencies may give in to demands, negotiate settlements, refuse to listen to demands, threaten material deprivation, or apply physical violence to mute demands. These strategies may or may not be temporary since changing political and social circumstances dictate materializing contingencies for strategic actions.

Pelkonen's final criticism of glocalization as a process-based explanation that ignores end-states seems, in my view, to be misplaced. Pelkonen is partially correct to argue glocalization studies focus their attention on processes, but his concerns about absences of end states is particularly perplexing given no claim is made to this. Though not all scholars of the political economy of scale may invoke "glocalization," a consensus is present among glocalists and non-glocalists that rescaling exercises are symptomatic of global economic disorder. Peck and Tickell (1994) especially have noted how the myriad territorial experiments laying emphasis on invigorating local economies indicate a desperate groove for economic revitalization in the absence of a defined regime of accumulation like the Fordist type associated with post-war capitalism. The lack of an "institutional fix" comes to signal a number of trial-and-error runs until the right regulatory mix has been found. So far, no stable framework for accumulation has been found. The search for the (always temporary) end state Pelkonen wants identified is still well underway. On this point too, Pelkonen may have erected a false dichotomy between the "glocal state thesis" and "glocalization" to create a non-existent target. Most notably, he cites Neil Brenner's (1998) work on glocal states which examined the very thing his argument suggests glocalization would do well to look at: processes which unfold.

A more sustained critique towards glocalization, however, has come from Bob Jessop and Ngai-Ling Sum's admission that it is perhaps time to stop using glocalization and replace it with the idea of "glurbanization." Jessop and Sum argue glurbanization denotes strategies undertaken by cities under conditions of inter-urban competition to "secure the most advantageous insertion of a given city into the changing interscalar division of labour in the world economy" while glocalization is "a strategy pursued by global firms that seek to exploit local differences to enhance their global operations" (Jessop and Sum 2000: 2295). This view is problematic on two fronts. First, Jessop and Sum do not appreciate the very different outlook on the global-local dynamic held by firms. To be more specific, the business literature on firms' glocalizing strategies views the local much differently than Jessop and Sum. "Local" is habitually used as a synonym for "national" in much of this literature because literally catering to local markets would simply be too costly. The operating conditions of the very things business scholars study, i.e. cost-conscious firms operating under competitive conditions,
dictate parsimonious accounts that must cut out as much background noise as possible. Where change does occur, this can lead to putting old wine in new bottles to make sense of what is going on for there is nothing novel about global firms re-jigging products to make them more marketable to a foreign audience (Macrae and Uncles 1997; Svensson 2001; Tixier 2005).

Second, Jessop and Sum’s contention of glurbanization’s greater analytical preciseness wrongly attributes certain conceptual limitations to glocalization. Even though pat uses of glocalization do abound, Jessop and Sum do not provide any evidence to demonstrate that this is indeed the case in the scalar literature. They fail to cite one single author who has done this. And not unlike Pelkonen, Jessop and Sum construct a target that is easy to hit by attributing four shortcomings to glocalization that glurbanization can aptly address:

1. Glocalization works with a global-local binary that is not sensitive to globalization’s multi-scalar nature. Glurbanization would be more mindful of this and “that might weaken traditional ideas of ‘nested’ territoriality.”
2. Glocalization privileges space over time, giving short shrift to the complementarities between space and time in a sped-up world.
3. Extra-economic considerations are missing, crucial to the questions of social reproduction in capitalist societies.
4. Glocalization examine opportunities at the expense of the problems caused by spatio-temporality and entrepreneurial activity. “These include the tendential exhaustion of the ‘rents’ derived from any given entrepreneurial innovation …, the costs of ‘glurbanization’ strategies for less privileged or powerful group and the typical forms of failure of entrepreneurial city strategies” (Jessop and Sum 2000: 2295).

If Jessop and Sum intend for glurbanization to replace glocalization on these accounts, a closer look suggests otherwise. Many of the claims they make are, in fact, addressed. Granted, little attention has thus far been paid to the role extra-economic relationships play under glocalizing conditions; Jessop and Sum are entirely correct on this point. The rest of their points are questionable. In arguing that a crude global-local dichotomy is erected, precluding any examination into scales in-between, they overlook the scalar scaffolding Brenner and Swyngedouw consistently point to. Neil Brenner has called for a decentring analysis of the state to get away from state-centrism and move towards more territorially nuanced enquiries recognizing complexity (Brenner 1999b: 52). In this way, the orthodoxy of nested territoriality is challenged because a decentred state analysis rejects the a priori favouring of one scale over another. Instead, changing scalar architectures produce new forms of nested territorialities that serve to shape other spatial scales’ opportunities and constraints.

Contra Jessop and Sum, space and time do figure into glocalization accounts. One of Erik Swyngedouw’s first articles invoking glocalization hits on how space and time are intimately intertwined to produce new territorialities. Here, he
shows how enterprises' shorter-time horizons for realizing value leads to locational strategies for global companies that may lead to seriously undermining particular spatial fixes. While capitalism does seek to overcome time and space, it all the same requires spaces and places to carry out production and consumption. Spaces and places come to be used strategically to realize values. This, however, results in the almost never-ending destruction of place due to the kinds of rent exhaustion Jessop and Sum pointed to. It is the very manipulation of spaces and places through scalar strategies which enable innovative ways of managing temporality (Swyngedouw 1992). Given the critical interpretation of glocalization by Pelkonen and Jessop and Sum, then, a tendency appears to be materializing where arguments surrounding the glocalization of scale become misconstrued in order to produce arguments which do not otherwise hold up under closer readings. If Roland Robertson's glocalization was susceptible to unmindful usage by those accepting his ideas, the glocalization of scale may have the opposite problem: careless usage by those rejecting it.

**Neo-liberal Glocalization**

The final understanding of glocalization is that of the neo-liberal kind. This may perhaps be the most interesting one because it does not approach the questions raised by the other two forms in a critical manner. Rather, neo-liberal glocalization examines how particular places experience economic growth. It examines the possibilities for growth under a globalizing world through the formulation of place-sensitive policies.

Among neo-liberalism's proponents,\(^5\) it appears that only Thomas Courchene has had any interest in developing the notion of glocalization. In certain respects, Courchene gives the impression of being greatly influenced by Manuel Castells's work on the rise of sub-national states. Castells's argument in brief is as follows: with the rise of new information technologies, sub-national states, especially cities, are increasingly able to bypass national states and pursue their own paths of development (Castells 1996: chapter 6; 1997: chapter 5). New territorial configurations and relationships get mapped out in the process as certain spaces and places outside national borders may become more vital to a city's success. According to Courchene, some regional economies in very different parts of the world actually have more in common with each other than with regions in their home national state (Courchene 2001a: 60-61).

Economics rather than politics are seen by Courchene as the factor responsible for propelling space-widening. Information flows are the medium to achieve this (Courchene 1995: 7, 11). This does not lead to the unimportance of politics, though. Notwithstanding differing epistemologies, similar to Neil Brenner's spatialized matrix, Courchene points out cities are territorially nested. In reorienting certain economic scales' geo-economic compasses, Courchene believes the national state plays a vital role in doing so through its negotiation of trade agreements which facilitate a greater internationalization of the economy,
shaping policy choices (Courchene 2001b: 159-161). The kinds of political representation and responsibilities had by each layer of the state are of prime importance here; it determines the sorts of possible rooms for manoeuvre in a glocal world.

In his comparison of policy responses elicited by Germany's Länder and Canada's provinces facing the spectre of trade agreements, Courchene says "negotiations relating to international agreements involving the constitutional competencies of the Länder are handled by the Bundesrat or by representatives of the Länder. This differs radically from the Canadian reality. On the other hand, the Canadian provinces have much more in the way of legislative and policy freedom than does Baden-Württemberg; i.e. Canada is much more decentralized than is Germany" (Courchene 2001a: 61). The outcome of this has been to see cities and regions mapping out their nearest competitor(s) to develop more effective policies to counter other jurisdictions' attempts to gain a competitive advantage (Courchene 2001b: 177).

What is interesting to note about Courchene's analysis is that its neo-liberal use of glocalization has not been subject to criticism of any sort. This is problematic for the reason that the theoretical developments surrounding glocalization have been of a critical sort and a very real danger exists: critical stances become translated into more orthodox approaches to justify various projects of social retrenchment. Courchene discusses the importance of "untraded interdependencies" in advertising a city's attractiveness for doing business. Untraded interdependencies are institutions which are immobile but their presence can provide firms with tremendous cost and competitive advantages (Courchene 2001b: 162). These can take a number of forms from research agencies operating in the public sector, university research centres, centres of excellence, utilities, and even social entitlements since these decrease the costs of benefit plans employers (might) give their employees. But these untraded interdependencies are only deemed as useful as they are market-enhancing. In some respects, then, Courchene's call to continue pan-Canadian social entitlements, albeit under very different forms, can be understood as a way to temper political animosities between the "winners" and "losers" in a glocal world, thereby preventing political interference with the putatively correct functioning of free markets (Courchene 2000: 176-178). Questions of uneven development thus get shunted aside by assuming tensions can be frozen.

Conclusion

This paper has endeavoured to give a clearer picture of the differing conceptualizations of glocalization. Sociological glocalization's focus on how local cultures are modified along global lines indicates the need to take more seriously how actors redefine themselves when frameworks become dislodged from their social foundations. The glocalization of scale has indicated that it is essential to avoid omitting scales between the global and the local. By doing so,
greater observance can be paid to the contingencies and spatio-historical legacies of inherited territorialities. Indeed, glocalization as used by the neo-liberal Thomas Courchene has been cognizant of this, in spite of any economistic leanings.

In general, a broad agreement between the three perspectives identified does exist. Something is definitely changing. Unfamiliar waters are being charted as the transformation of spatial and place-based relationships move forward. And while glocalization as a term has been abused based on misreadings of key arguments and on a failure to be more specific with what is meant by "global" and "local," there is nonetheless much usefulness in the term's analytic value regardless of which of the three perspectives is taken.

Endnotes

1 For example, John Agnew (1997) has demonstrated how "Italy" was produced by various political parties rising out of the debris caused by the collapse of its post-war political parties between 1992 and 1994.

2 The debate between Neil Brenner and Sallie Marston in the journal *Progress in Human Geography* surrounded the use of scale in scholarship. Brenner suggested Marston's use of scale led to slippages between place, space, and scale. As such, he argued that more precise uses of scale had to be developed in order to avoid such problems in the future.

3 A tendency to automatically assume resistance is always engendered and it is always for noble ends exists in much of the literature on space and scale.

4 The scalar literature focusing on capitalism's reterritorialization processes have regularly been criticized for being reductionist in its approach to rescaling. However, such criticism are, in my view, unfair given similar charges could be levelled against scalar literatures focusing on gender, race, culture, and so on, in an equally unfair manner.

5 It is vital to remember that not all neo-liberals adhere to the cold free market economics of the type associated with F.A. Hayek or Milton Friedman. Many neo-liberals do recognize the importance of taming market excesses by providing protection for economically vulnerable populations.

Citations


Massey, Doreen (1994) *Space, Place, and Gender*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.


