FAMILY AND RELIGIOUS NETWORKS: STIMULANTS OR BARRIERS TO CIVIC PARTICIPATION AND THE INTEGRATION OF NEWCOMERS?

Paper presented to the 78th Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association
York University
Toronto, Ontario
June 1-3, 2006

Dr. L.S. Tossutti
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
Brock University
St. Catharines, ON L2S 3A1
Email: ltossutt@brocku.ca
Phone: 905-688-5550 (ext. 5005)

Dr. Mark Wang
Associate Professor
Department of Political Science
National Taiwan University
21 Hsu-chow Rd.
Taipei, 100, Taiwan.
E-mail: dmwang@ntu.edu.tw
Phone: 886-2-2351-9641 (ext. 369)
Although families have been fundamentally transformed by divorce and declining fertility rates (Ambert, 2005; McDaniel and Tepperman, 2000), and religious institutions by waning attendance at regular services (Nevitte, 2002), Canadians continue to regard these institutions as important to them (Bibby, 2004a; 2004b). Family and religious networks are our first connections to the social world, providing us with emotional, spiritual or economic support. Given their central role in early childhood socialization, they are in a position to transmit the attitudinal and behavioral components of social capital – trust in others, norms of reciprocity, and participation in social networks that foster coordinated action - to younger generations (Coleman, 1990; 1991; Stolle, 2003). Family and religious institutions also play a critical role in helping immigrants adapt to a new society by providing vital information about their place of destination (Burnet, 1988; Boyd, 1989). For all these reasons, it is important to understand the role of these ascriptive networks in the intergenerational and intercultural transmission of democratic orientations.

Some empirical studies have shown that people who are closely integrated into family and religious social networks are more likely to vote or participate in voluntary organizations than individuals who are not as closely tied to these networks (Cento Bull, 2000). Other researchers have argued that social networks based on ascriptive bonds have delayed the development of democratic life in some settings. They hold that individuals who are in close and frequent contact with family members turn inward and focus their efforts on achieving private, material interests at the expense of engagement in broader community affairs (Banfield, 1958; Ginsborg, 1995). Religious networks that institutionalize hierarchical relationships of obedience between clerical authorities and their followers, rather than “horizontal” relationships of reciprocity and cooperation, have also been blamed for depressing civic engagement in southern Italy (Putnam, 1993).

Debates about which forms of social bonds and networks are most conducive to the functioning of wider society and democracy lie at the heart of sociological thought. de Tocqueville described the voluntary, non-hierarchical social networks of nineteenth century America as the foundation of its democracy, and as distinct from the unthinking bonds of status and obligation that he had observed in Europe (1832). Durkheim argued that the habitual solidarity found in feudal societies was based on fixed hierarchical structures and the obligations of individuals who knew their place with respect to authority figures. In contrast, people in modern, urban, capitalist societies voluntarily entered into looser social connections with strangers in order to achieve broad community goals (1933). Tönnies’ analysis of purposive association (Gemeinschaft or community) and instrumental association (Gesellschaft or society), reached a different conclusion, however, arguing that modernity was the “enemy of civility” (Field, 2003: 33).

The potential impact of family and religious social networks on political and civic participation should be of interest in Canada where participation in federal elections and voluntary organizations has been on a long-term decline. These activities are also increasingly becoming the preserve of older, well-educated, wealthier, long-term residents or nonvisible minorities (Black, 1982; 1991; Curtis et al., 1999; Gidengil et al., 2004; Tossutti, 2003; 2005). In the 2006 federal election, approximately 65 per cent of registered voters cast a ballot, down from an average 75 per cent in the mid-1980s. Between 1997 and 2000, the number of Canadians who volunteered for a group declined from 31 to 27 per cent (Hall et al., 2001). In 2000, just 51 per cent of Canadians reported membership in at least one voluntary organization (McKeown et al., 2004), down from an estimated 64 per cent in the early 1990s (Curtis et al., 1999: 374-5). In light of these trends, the first objective of this study is to investigate whether
Canadians who are more closely integrated into family and religious networks are also more likely to vote and participate in a voluntary association.

The second goal of this study is to examine the relationship between attachments to these ascriptive networks and the diverse ethnocultural makeup of Canada. In addition to the fact that first-generation immigrants constitute 18 per cent of the total population, the highest it has been since the early twentieth century (Beyer, 2005), the political and civic integration of immigrants also involves the experiences of their offspring. Unfortunately, we know little about the involvement of second generation Canadians in political and community activities, relative to first and third generation Canadians. Understanding the extent to which immigrants and their offspring participate in broader public affairs has become increasingly important in the face of evidence that the economic performance of immigrants who arrived since the 1970s has declined (Reitz, 2001). Canadian-born visible minorities, many of whom are the offspring of immigrants, have experienced net earnings disadvantages relative to Canadian-born whites (Li, 2000; Pendakur and Pendakur, 2002). Given the well-documented relationships between socio-economic achievements, electoral participation and associational activity, the declining economic prospects of more recent immigrants and their offspring have the potential to deter their full participation in democratic life.

Therefore, following a brief description of inter-generational patterns of political and civic engagement, this study will investigate whether ascriptive social networks stimulate or inhibit the involvement of members of different generational groups and of four of Canada’s largest ethnocultural communities. There are several reasons why it is important to approach this study’s initial research question from a perspective that is sensitive to the complex demographic makeup of the Canadian population. Since family and religious institutions play a unique role in facilitating the social and economic adaptation of immigrants and their families, the potential impact of these networks on the civic integration of first and second generation Canadians should not be ignored. Second, in light of evidence from both Canada and the United States that the socioeconomic integration of immigrant offspring is partially contingent on their ethnocultural origins, it is reasonable to ask whether the impact of ascriptive networks on their political and civic integration varies between ethnocultural groups. Finally, given the profound changes in family structure and modes of religious observance that have taken place in recent decades, the salience of ascriptive social networks might be expected to vary between first, second and third generation Canadians.

The research goals of this paper will be achieved through an analysis of Statistics Canada’s 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS). This unique survey contains sufficiently large sample sizes from subgroups of the Canadian population that allow researchers to test the links between attachments to family and religious networks and participation rates in fundamental and low-cost modes of democratic participation such as voting in national and sub-national elections and active participation in a voluntary group.

**Family, Religion and Civic Engagement**

Several studies have painted a benign portrait of the family’s role in transferring the attitudinal components of social capital to younger generations. They have found that the family remains the most important determinant of the degree of trust developed by an individual (Stolle, 2003), and that children who are socialized in a more trusting atmosphere are more likely to be trusting and want to reciprocate (Uslaner, 2002). The potential for families to reinforce political and civic behaviour, however, is disputed and contingent on geographic context.

Ginsborg has argued that strong family units, a weak civil society and distrust in the state
in Italy contributed to the persistence of “familism”, which he defined as a relationship between family, society and the state in which the values and interests of the family are balanced against those of other “principal moments of human association” (2003: 97). Although Ginsborg conceded in a later work that the interests of the family and civil society were congruent in specific places and periods of Italian history, Putnam has pointed to amoral familism, or the tendency to pursue the material, short-run interests of the nuclear family rather than cooperate with others to achieve broader community goals, as the reason why some regions in southern Italy were less civic and less well-governed than other regions (1993: 121-148).

Putnam’s influential thesis has been criticized for presenting a stereotyped and unilateral vision of southern Italy that ignored existing forms of social cooperation and intra-regional variations in social capital (Sabetti, 1996), for its determinism, and for underestimating the state’s role in producing clientelism and patronage (Huysseune, 2003: 212). His perspective on the role of the Italian family has also been challenged by another study that examined the connection between family attachments and civic affairs in two northern Italian towns (Cento Bull, 2000).

While Cento Bull’s survey of residents in Sesto and Erba also found that people who considered family interests to be the most important life value (the familists) were less likely to participate regularly in apolitical voluntary associations (i.e. sport/leisure, religious, voluntary, artistic/cultural, environmental, charity and professional groups) than the solidarists who valued universal/collectivist goals or the individualists who valued personal fulfilment (71-6), the familists were more likely than the individualists to participate in political associations such as parties and trade unions (82). Italians reporting close social relations with family members and friends were also more likely to participate in voluntary associations, probably because they received information and positive feedback about the group from a relative or friend (76).

Religious organizations and rituals have long been recognized as agents for community solidarity, and for their role in helping newcomers adapt to life in host societies (McLellan and White, 2005). The capacity for religious networks to stimulate political and civic engagement, however, depends on the social, economic and political context in which human relations evolve. Putnam’s study of Italy linked indicators of Catholicism such as attendance at Mass, religious marriage rates, opposition to divorce, and expressions of religious identity to lower rates of newspaper readership and discussions of politics (1993: 107). Cento Bull has criticized Putnam for ignoring the role that Catholic associations and unions have played in fostering networks of civic engagement in northern and central Italy. Her own study found that devout Catholics who attended Church and believed in Catholic values could be more civic-minded than non-Catholics (71). Although lay people in both Sesto and Erba participated more often in trade unions or political parties (91), Erba’s Catholics were as or more likely to take part in apolitical voluntary associations and to read the local press than non-Catholics (70, 78, 91). In the United States, religiosity and church attendance have been positively associated with electoral turnout (Miller and Wattenberg, 1984; Wuthnow, 2003) and with volunteering and philanthropy (Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow; Greeley, 2001).

In Canada, self-reported religiosity or regular attendance at religious services have been linked to higher rates of volunteering and donating in the general population (Gidengil et al.; Bowen, 2004; McKeown et al., 2004), although religious commitments were reported in one study to have no discernible impact on watching the news, voting and participating in a protest march (Bowen). The connection between religious commitments and giving one’s time may be explained by the fact that weekly attendees were more likely to volunteer for religious groups and to say they gave their time in order to fulfil religious obligations (McKeown et al.).
Despite these positive signs about the potential for religious ties and networks to stimulate engagement in public affairs, religious faith has sometimes been associated with lower levels of educational and economic achievement. This is relevant because political and civic engagement tends to be correlated with upper socio-economic status, and closer attachments to religious groups might depress rather than stimulate involvement in public affairs. For instance, individuals who were less ethnically connected by virtue of their identity with the dominant Anglican and United Churches in Canada or with no church at all, achieved higher educational and economic-status attainment than individuals affiliated with ethnic churches (Kalbach and Kalbach, 2000: 183-4). Immigrants with Buddhist and Sikh religious identities also reported significantly lower levels of educational attainment, although those differences did not extend to the Canadian-born offspring (Biles and Bramadat, 2005).

The Political and Civic Participation of Immigrants and Second-Generation Canadians: the research landscape

The potential for family and religious-based networks to stimulate the civic involvement of immigrants lies in their role as socializing agents that transmit norms about the meaning of migration, and as sources of information about destinations and settlement assistance (Harbison, 1981). Religious traditions also form the “moral, social and spiritual bedrock of many communities and individuals” (Bramadat, 2005). Despite the centrality of these institutions in the migration process and to peoples’ lives, empirical research on the political and civic participation of immigrants and ethnocultural minorities has focussed on the influence of personal markers such as socio-demographic attributes and the timing of immigration, or on community-level variables such as the size and democratic orientations of minority groups, and the role of elite mobilization (Wood, 1981; Black, 1982; 1991; Lapp, 1999; Blais et al., 2002; Statistics Canada, 2003; Tossutti, 2005).

Black’s analysis of the 1974 Canadian National Election study found that Canadian-born British and the foreign-born, non-British voted at significantly lower rates than Canadian-born French (1982). His comparison of the turnout rates of British, North European, South European, East European, and West Indian immigrants to Canadian-born British respondents in Toronto found that only the West Indian respondents (all of whom were foreign-born) voted at significantly lower rates than the benchmark group in the previous federal and provincial elections. These differences held even after controlling for socio-economic status, age, political attitudes and organizational involvement (Black, 1991).

In their comparison of the political involvement of immigrants and the Canadian-born, Chui, Curtis and Lambert studied seven measures of political involvement including campaign work, contacting politicians, voting, political organization membership, exposure to political stimuli, interest in the 1984 federal election, and general political interest. For the voting and election interest measures, they found no significant differences between immigrants and Canadian-born respondents. They also noted that political involvement tended to peak in the second generation and decline in subsequent generations (1991: 375-96). Evidence from the World Values Survey conducted in the early 1990s showed that racial status was related to expectations of voting in the federal election and political interest, with whites more active than other groups. Immigrant status was related to just one measure of political activity, with the
native-born more active in discussing politics (Curtis et al.: 377,379). Neither nativity nor race-based characteristics were significantly related to participation in voluntary groups (380).

Election studies conducted over the past decade have shown that recent immigrants and non-Christians were less likely to vote in 1997 (Nevitte et al., 2000). In the 2000 federal election, recent arrivals also reported lower turnout rates, although these differences became insignificant once levels of political interest, information, party attachments and party contacts during the campaign were held constant (Blais et al., 2002; Gidengil et al.). Statistics Canada’s analysis of the Ethnic Diversity Survey concluded that people who emigrated to Canada since 1981 were less likely to vote than the Canadian-born, although the participation gap disappeared after twenty years of residency (Statistics Canada, 2003).

This author’s analysis of the EDS confirmed there were no significant differences in the turnout rates of immigrant and Canadian-born citizens in the most recent federal and municipal elections (Tossutti, 2005). However, a closer examination of the relationship between voting and the intersection of nativity, race and age markers found that both Canadian-born and foreign-born citizens of Chinese, South Asian and Black origin voted at lower rates in the previous federal, provincial and municipal elections than their nonvisible counterparts from the same nativity group. Of all the respondents, Canadian-born Blacks, in addition to Chinese and nonvisible immigrants under the age of 30, reported the lowest turnout rates in the 2000 federal election (2005). Gidengil and her colleagues have attributed the lower rates of turnout reported by visible minorities born in this country and abroad to the youthful composition of the country’s visible minority population (2004: 109).

Personal markers of ethnocultural ancestry, immigrant, and visible minority status have also been linked to indicators of civic engagement. An analysis of the 2000 National Survey of Giving, Volunteering and Participating found that immigrants under the age of 35 were less likely than Canadian-born youths to participate in 13 of 14 group-based volunteering activities and to join four of seven types of volunteer organizations (Tossutti, 2003). The Equality Security Community Survey showed that immigrants who had resided in Canada between five-nine years were significantly less likely to join clubs or organizations than the Canadian-born, holding other individual and contextual-level factors constant. Visible minorities and respondents of Eastern European, Filipino and other Asian ancestry also reported lower rates of involvement than individuals with a British background (Aizelwood and Pendakur, 2005).

Second Generation Canadians
By international standards, Canada hosts a large and ethnically diverse foreign-born population, particularly since policy reforms in the 1960s removed race and nativity as criteria for selecting independent immigrants. Despite this demographic complexity, only one empirical study to date has explored the political and civic integration of immigrant offspring. In Canada, social research on the second generation has historically been limited by the failure of censuses since 1971 to include questions on parents’ birthplace (Boyd, 2003: 99; 2000: 137), and by the paucity of surveys with sufficiently large sample numbers from generational groups. This represents a gap in our knowledge of political behaviour since second-generation Canadians have a more complex relationship with broader Canadian society than do their parents, and possibly, a greater sense of personal investment in the country (Reitz and Somerville, 2004).

The consideration of generational status as an important variable in social research can be traced to the late nineteenth century. Richard Mayo-Smith identified three major groups among what he called the “whites” in America: the first were the native-born of native parentage; the second were “the whites of foreign birth (the immigrants), and finally, the “native-born of
foreign parents…the second generation of immigrants” “…who stand half-way between the native and the foreign element…They represent the process of assimilation in the act” (1894). While this schematic hardly captures the complexity of contemporary society, and there has been a shift from the ideal of assimilation to diversity at an official level in Canada, the idea that the children of immigrants are caught between the “worlds” or “cultures” of their parents and host society persists in academic works and the autobiographies of immigrants and second generation Canadians (Karakayali, 2005). The proponents of the “two-worlds” thesis contend that members of the second generation share a similar subjective experience, most of all, “feelings of marginality”. The autobiographies of second generation Canadians reveal that an even more intense experience of “duality” emerges in the texts of authors from racialized communities (327-9).

Since there are no well-developed models of the political and civic integration of second-generation Canadians, let alone how ascriptive networks might affect their engagement in broader public affairs, this review draws on American models of the socio-economic integration of immigrant offspring to consider possible civic outcomes for the Canadian-born offspring of immigrants. In the United States, the classical model of linear assimilation implies that as immigrants spend more time in the host society or as each generation becomes further removed from their foreign-born predecessors, the behaviour and socioeconomic characteristics of newcomers and the native-born will converge (Gans, 1992). The second model of “segmented assimilation” proposes two scenarios: the first expects that some groups will experience socioeconomic advancement, but with deliberate preservation of ethnic membership and values, and continued economic attachment to their ethnic communities (Boyd, 2003). In the US, the immigrant offspring most likely to display these patterns are members of immigrant groups with well-developed ethnic enclave economies such as the Chinese or Cubans (Portes, 1995). The other scenario or “second-generation decline” thesis implies socioeconomic disadvantages, particularly for groups that are visibly distinct from the “white” majority and in which parental and community-based resources are few (Portes). According to Portes and Zhou, the pathway that is followed by members of the second generation is influenced by the values and norms transmitted by parents to their offspring, and by the relationships that link parents and children to others (1993).

In contrast to our dearth of knowledge about the civic integration of second generation Canadians, we know more about their socioeconomic circumstances. In general, those from non-European ethnic backgrounds were usually the most disadvantaged, and living in households or families with poor economic resources was particularly likely for immigrant offspring whose ethnic origins were Arab, Black/Caribbean, Latin/Central, South American, Spanish, Vietnamese and West Asian (Boyd, 2000). Boyd also found similar rankings for both foreign-born and Canadian-born children of the same ethnic origin groups, indicating the presence of ethnic stratification. Regardless of birthplace, children in some groups were more likely than those in other groups to be in disadvantaged households characterized by higher density, lone-parent families and low economic status (145-50).

Inter-generational changes in educational achievements displayed a more optimistic pattern as two-thirds of Canadians exceeded their parents’ achievements. It was more difficult for individuals under 40 to surpass their parents’ level of education than it was for their parents to surpass their grandparents. This was because almost 70 per cent of the parents of Canadians aged 65 and over had only an elementary education, making it difficult for their children to achieve a lower level by comparison (Fournier et al., 1999: 132-6). Upward educational mobility was also observed between immigrant and native-born members of visible minority
groups (Guppy and Davies, 1998), although educational attainment for the racial minority second generation was not necessarily higher than that of their “young, urban-majority group competition” (Aizelwood and Reitz, 2005).

The availability of the unique Ethnic Diversity Survey, which measures the generational status of respondents and their participation in elections and voluntary activities, will allow political researchers to add to the growing body of knowledge about the socioeconomic outcomes for second generation Canadians.

**Hypotheses**
The bulk of research that has been reviewed in this paper suggests the following hypotheses about how ascriptive networks might influence rates of political and civic participation for the general population, for different generational groups, and for members of visible and nonvisible ethnocultural groups:

H1: Respondents who are more tightly integrated into family networks will be less likely to have participated in a voluntary organization in the previous year and to have voted in the previous federal, provincial and municipal elections.

H2: Respondents who are more tightly integrated into religious-based networks will be more likely to have participated in a voluntary organization in the previous year and to have voted in the previous federal, provincial and municipal elections.

H3: In line with the linear assimilation model, second and third generation Canadians will display higher rates of participation in voting and volunteer associations than first generation Canadians.

H4: The effects of ascriptive networks on the political and civic participation of Canadians will vary across different generational groups.

H5: The effects of ascriptive networks on the political and civic participation of Canadians will vary between ethnocultural communities.

**Data and Methodology**
This study is based on an analysis of the 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey (EDS), a post-censal, national survey of 41,666 citizens, landed immigrants and temporary residents. The survey used a two-phase stratified sampling design to reach persons aged 15 years and older in two main groups. One third of the sample was composed of persons reporting Canadian ethnic origin, with the remainder composed of individuals belonging to non-Canadian, non-British or non-French ethnic groups (Statistics Canada, 2002). Respondents indicating Aboriginal ancestry or identity were excluded from the analysis. Population and bootstrap weights were used for all estimates and analysis, ensuring that the EDS sample was representative of the target population.

Access to the EDS was critical because it included four dependent variables of interest – turnout in the previous federal, provincial and municipal elections, and active involvement in a voluntary group in the previous year. Unfortunately, it did not feature questions on participation in interest groups or in unconventional political activities such as protests and boycotts. In keeping with previous scholarship, three items probing the frequency of contact with family
members, the intensity of family attachments, and trust in family members, were selected to measure family bonds. Involvement in religious networks was measured by evaluations of the personal importance of religion and by the frequency of worship/meditation on one’s own and with others at regular services.

The first step in the analysis was to examine the bivariate relationships between family, religious bonds and the four measures of civic engagement for the full sample. Due to the binary nature of the dependent variables, four logistic regression models were developed to analyze whether close ties to these networks increased the likelihood of voting or volunteering after controlling for other predisposing factors known to influence political and civic engagement. The socio-demographic controls included age, gender, education, personal income, small town or rural residency, marital status, the presence of children in the household, the timing of immigration, the language in which the interview was conducted, and the ethnic and racial origins of respondents (Black, 1982; 1991; Lapp, 1999; Hall et al., 2001; Blais et al, 2001; Blais et al., 2002; Young, 2002; Pammett and LeDuc, 2003; Statistics Canada, 2003; Tossutti, 2003; 2005; Gidengil et al., 2004: 149-51, 9). Attitudinal controls measuring life satisfaction and generalized trust in people, family members, neighbours and people at work/school were also considered because interpersonal trust and civic engagement share a reciprocal relationship (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Variables measuring attachments to Canada, the province and town were added to the federal, provincial and municipal turnout models, respectively, since territorial affinities may increase a respondent’s interest in electing representatives to that jurisdiction’s legislative body. Finally, since perceived discrimination influences naturalization and voting rates (Bloemraad, 2003), and visible minorities reported that they were more likely to face discrimination than nonvisible Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2003), an item on perceived discrimination was added to all four models. Detailed information about the multivariate models, reference groups for the independent variables, and significance of the coefficients can be found in the endnotes.

This study is also concerned with how well second generation Canadians have been integrated into the civic community, and the extent to which family and religious networks inhibit or encourage the participation of different generational groups in the broader public sphere. To explore these questions, the study first measured the voting and volunteering activities reported by first, second and third generation Canadians. Then it examined the bivariate relationship between the four dependent variables and attachments to religious and family networks for each generational group.

Since the precise meaning and importance of family and religious networks is strongly influenced by ethnocultural and religious traditions, this study examined whether these bonds exerted a significant impact on democratic participation for subgroups of Canadians, holding other predisposing factors constant. To achieve this end, multivariate models of federal election turnout and voluntary association participation were developed for each of the four ethnicultural groups with sufficiently large sample sizes of first, second and third generation Canadians. The four groups are the British, French, Italian and Chinese, and include respondents who mentioned that group first when asked about the cultural origins of their ancestors.

**Family, Religion and Democratic Citizenship**

Respondents who initially reported closer attachments to their family members and more frequent contact with them were more likely to have voted in the last federal, provincial and municipal elections and to have participated in the activities of a voluntary association in the previous year (Table 1). Religious individuals and people who worshipped frequently at regular
services and on their own were also more likely to have voted and to have volunteered for a group in the previous year (Table 2).

INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 HERE

After controlling for other socio-demographic and attitudinal determinants of political and civic engagement, religious worship on a weekly or monthly basis in both formal and informal settings continued to influence associational involvement, although religiosity did not (Table 3). These findings reflect the capacity of the religious domain to provide the infrastructure where the leadership and organizational skills necessary to participate in civic life are learned. Religious institutions in the United States have historically played this role for Afro-Americans, who are more likely than Anglo-Whites to spend time on social, educational or charitable activities within a church (Verba, Schlozman and Brady: 243-244, 317). In Canada, Blacks were also more likely than the reference group of other visible minorities (not including the Chinese and South Asians) to have participated in a voluntary group (Table 3). Since religious-affiliated groups were among the most popular forms of voluntary associations mentioned in the survey (data not shown), Canada’s religious institutions may be performing the same function for Blacks as they are in the US. The findings provide support to arguments that religious-inspired values - the subordination of an individual’s particular ends to the common good - can help sustain democracy (Reichley, 2002). In contrast, frequent contact with family members and trust in them did not influence associational involvements after controlling for demographic attributes, worship habits and several measures of trust in non-family members (Table 3).

While self-described religiosity, frequent worship and frequent contact with family members were not related to turnout, there was striking and consistent evidence that Canadians who placed more trust in their families were less likely to cast a vote in all types of elections (Table 3). This provides some support for the view that attachments to family networks can dissuade citizens from participating in public life. It also suggests one of two possibilities with profound consequences for Canadian democracy; either people who are indifferent or disillusioned with electoral politics turn inwards to more immediate social connections, or respondents with more confidence in their family members view public affairs as relatively unimportant to their lives.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Regardless of an individual’s family and religious attachments and other socio-demographic attributes, immigrants who were eligible to vote in 2000 and who had arrived in Canada since 1991 were less likely to cast a ballot in national and subnational elections (Table 3). The relative marginalization of cultural minorities was most pronounced in municipal elections, where respondents from British, French, Canadian, or any mixture of these ethnic backgrounds were more likely to vote than citizens of mixed non-European/European ancestry or mixed non-European/Charter group/Canadian origins. Other barriers to voting included youth, lower personal income, single marital status and weak attachments to Canada or to one’s town. Canadians who volunteered for groups in the previous year were also more likely to be male, highly-educated, upper income individuals who expressed more generalized trust in people, and, intriguingly, to have experienced discrimination in the previous five years (Table 3).

With respect to the first hypothesis presented in this study, there was some evidence that
tighter integration into family networks, in the form of higher levels of family trust, increased the likelihood of non-voting. However, closer family attachments neither increased nor reduced the probability of becoming involved in a voluntary association. The second hypothesis was also partially confirmed as tighter integration into religious networks (as measured by frequent worship) increased the probability of active involvement in a voluntary group. However, religious attachments and behaviour had no impact on the likelihood of voting in national and subnational elections, with all else considered equal. In sum, the balance of evidence thus far suggests that ascriptive networks usually play a positive or neutral role in stimulating political and civic engagement.

Ascriptive Social Networks, Inter-generational and Inter-cultural Patterns of Involvement
The linear assimilation model best describes the political and civic integration of immigrants and their offspring, confirming this study’s third hypothesis. First generation Canadians voted at significantly lower rates than second and third generation Canadians in national and subnational elections, although the differences were very slight (data not shown). Furthermore, second generation Canadians voted at equal and sometimes slightly higher rates than third generation Canadians in all forms of elections. The same pattern of second generation equality with third generation Canadians was apparent with respect to associational involvement. Interestingly, the largest differences in the participation rates of immigrants and the Canadian-born were observed for group-based volunteer activities (data not shown).

In general, Canadians across all generational groups who expressed strong attachments to their families, who were in weekly or monthly contact with them, and who attended regular religious services on a weekly or monthly basis, also participated in voting and voluntary associations at higher rates than those who were not as close to their families, were in less frequent contact with family members, and who attended regular services less frequently (Tables 4-5). Other measures of integration into ascriptive networks were not as consistently associated with political and civic engagement. For example, self-described religiosity was not associated with higher rates of volunteering for any generational group (Table 4).

INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 HERE

Some differences were noted in the relationship between ascriptive networks and public sphere involvement for different generational groups. Religious immigrants were no more likely to vote in federal or provincial elections than their less religious counterparts, but second and third generation Canadians who indicated that religion was very important to them turned out to vote at higher rates than their less religious generational cohorts (Table 4). Frequent worship on a solitary basis was not linked to higher rates of turnout in federal, provincial and municipal elections for second generation voters, but it was for first and third generation Canadians (Table 4). In sum, although tighter integration into family and religious networks was not negatively associated with public sphere engagement for any generational group, the links tended to be slightly more consistent for third generation Canadians than for immigrants and their offspring, confirming the study’s fourth hypothesis.

The multivariate models that were developed for members of the British, French, Italian and Chinese ethnocultural groups will first reveal whether immigrants and their offspring vote in federal elections and volunteer for groups at the same rates as third generation Canadians, with all else equal. They will also show how ascriptive networks influence these modes of
engagement, controlling for other predisposing factors. What we found was that first and second generation Canadians were no less likely to be involved in these activities than third generation Canadians, confirming that the linear assimilation model best describes the civic integration of immigrants and their offspring, at least for these four groups (Tables 6-7). The results suggest that the federal electoral participation disadvantage that was observed for recent immigrants in Table 3 should disappear with the passage of time for members of these groups, if past experience is any guide.

INSERT TABLES 6 AND 7

Canadians of British, French and Italian ancestry who attended religious services on a weekly or monthly basis were more likely to vote in federal elections and to participate in voluntary groups than people who attended religious services less frequently or not at all (Tables 6 and 7). The literature has argued that religious behaviour can encourage democratic participation by inculcating the values of community service. The failure of all forms of religious attachments to increase the likelihood of turnout and associational involvement amongst Canadians of Chinese ancestry shows that religious networks were not fora where political and civic values were transmitted to the same extent as in other communities (Table 6 and 7).

No other measures of family or religious networks influenced electoral participation in any of the cultural groups. This not only underscores the importance of religious behaviour in a group setting as a stimulant of turnout (Table 6), but the relative ineffectiveness of family networks in encouraging voting behaviour. People reporting close attachments and contacts with their families, in addition to higher levels of trust in them, were no more likely to have turned out to vote than people with looser family networks.

Ascriptive networks exerted a stronger impact on active participation in voluntary associations. Canadians of French ancestry who prayed or meditated on a weekly or monthly basis on their own or at regular services, and who were in more frequent contact with their families, were also more likely to have participated in a voluntary group in the previous year (Table 7). This was the only cultural group where family contacts and personal forms of worship mattered, with all else held equal. Interestingly, Canadians of French ancestry who professed higher levels of religiosity were less likely to join groups than individuals who indicated that their religion was of middling or no importance to them. For these Canadians in particular, religious behaviour, as opposed to psychological attachments, was the key to engagement in community affairs.

Earlier in this study, it was revealed that the more one trusted one’s family, the less likely one was to vote in any type of election (Table 3). When turnout rates for the subpopulations were examined, the coefficients remained negative, but statistically insignificant, for three of the four groups when other factors were held constant within the community (Table 6). However, higher levels of family trust became significant and positive predictors of the likelihood of voluntary involvements for Canadians reporting British ancestry (Table 7). Two main observations can be made about these results, the first of which is that the negative relationship between family trust and electoral participation holds for members of cultural groups other than those examined in this study. Second, the public consequences of private social networks are partially contingent on the meaning and functions of these bonds in different cultural communities. For respondents from French and British backgrounds, closer family connections, either in the form of contact or trust, were significantly related to participation in voluntary
associations. For the Italians and Chinese, family ties were not connected to participation in the broader public sphere.

Overall, the influence of family networks on voting and group participation is best described as circumscribed and sometimes negative, depending on the cultural group. This raises the intriguing question of why such a critical institution that has the potential to serve as a recruitment network for political and civic activities, or as a forum where public issues are discussed, is generally not performing this role in the Canadian context.

Conclusion
This study set out to examine the impact of religious and family networks on the engagement of Canadians and subgroups of the population in electoral and community activities. With respect to the first two hypotheses, it found no evidence that religious attachments or behaviour impedes political or civic engagement. In fact, frequent worship at regular services and on one’s own stimulated group-based voluntary activity. Family networks, however, did not draw people into associations or encourage voting habits with all things being equal. In fact, family trust was generally linked to lower rates of turnout in all three types of elections. These observations raise fundamental questions about why the potential for family members to encourage people with whom they are in close and frequent contact to participate in public affairs has not been fully realized in Canada.

Yet it is also important to remember that in contrast to research on the allegedly negative role that religious and family networks have played in the development of democratic life in southern Italy, family networks did not generally depress participation in public affairs in Canada. This may reflect the possibility that family and religious networks have evolved into less hierarchical forms of human association in this country, although it is beyond the scope of this article to test this hypothesis.

With respect to the third hypothesis, this study concluded that the linear assimilation model best describes the political and civic integration of Canadians, and more specifically, the integration of Canadians drawn from the four ethnocultural groups examined here. It also confirmed the importance of adopting a nuanced approach to understanding the potential forascriptive networks to transmit democratic orientations to new generations and arrivals. Third generation Canadians benefited slightly more from these bonds than first generation citizens and their offspring. These networks were also relatively unimportant for Canadians of Chinese ancestry and more important for Canadians of French ancestry. Given the critical role these institutions play in early childhood socialization, researchers may want to look into why the civic consequences of these networks varies across cultural communities.

Table 1 - Family Networks and Political and Civic Engagement (column percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity of Family Attachments</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last federal election*</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>67.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last provincial election*</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last municipal election*</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in associational activities*</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of Family Interactions</th>
<th>Once week/month</th>
<th>1-3 times/year</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last federal election*</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>73.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last provincial election*</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 – Religious Networks and Political and Civic Engagement (column percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Importance of Religion</th>
<th>Not Important</th>
<th>Medium Importance</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last federal election*</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>83.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last provincial election*</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last municipal election*</td>
<td>58.4</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>70.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in associational activities*</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Frequency of Institutional Worship**

| Voted in last federal election* | 85             | 79.9 | 76.6 |
| Voted in last provincial election* | 83.9        | 78.8 | 74.9 |
| Voted in last municipal election* | 73.4          | 63.3 | 59.7 |
| Participated in associational activities* | 54.3          | 45.4 | 35.1 |

**Frequency of Worship on Own**

| Voted in last federal election* | 82.7          | 80   | 77.7 |
| Voted in last provincial election* | 81.8        | 77.6 | 75.9 |
| Voted in last municipal election* | 69.1          | 63.4 | 61.4 |
| Participated in associational activities* | 49.4          | 47.4 | 38.7 |

Source: 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted data; ***p < .001

Table 3: Election Turnout and Associational Involvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socioeconomic Variable</th>
<th>Federal</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Municipal</th>
<th>Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sociodemographic: 20-29 years</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>-.90 (.20)</td>
<td>-.75 (.20)</td>
<td>-.75 (.19)</td>
<td>.01 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/University Degree</td>
<td>-.04 (.14)</td>
<td>-.05 (.13)</td>
<td>-.08 (.12)</td>
<td>.25 (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some College/University</td>
<td>.12 (.21)</td>
<td>-.06 (.20)</td>
<td>-.38 (.18)</td>
<td>.45 (.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td>.04 (.27)</td>
<td>.04 (.26)</td>
<td>-.38 (.23)</td>
<td>.14 (.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Income: &lt;$20,000</td>
<td>-.44 (.21)</td>
<td>-.27 (.23)</td>
<td>-.32 (.20)</td>
<td>.16 (.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$20,000-$50,000</td>
<td>-.56 (.21)</td>
<td>-.40 (.19)</td>
<td>-.04 (.16)</td>
<td>-.20 (.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English Language</td>
<td>-.48 (.18)</td>
<td>-.19 (.17)</td>
<td>-.10 (.12)</td>
<td>-.29 (.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Language</td>
<td>-.52 (.57)</td>
<td>-.59 (.44)</td>
<td>-.67 (.44)</td>
<td>-.08 (.25)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted data; ***p < .001

14
Table 4 – Religious Networks and Intergenerational Patterns of Participation (column %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal Importance of Religion</th>
<th>Very Important</th>
<th>Not Important/Medium Importance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last federal election</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>81.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>81.6**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>79.7***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last provincial election</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>77.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79.8**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>78.8***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last municipal election</td>
<td>67.7</td>
<td>63.7***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>66.2***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>64.1***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted; coefficients significant at p < .05 are reported in bold.
Note: Unstandardized logistic regression estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
### Table 5 - Family Networks and Intergenerational Patterns of Participation (column %)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intensity of Family Attachments</th>
<th>Strong</th>
<th>Medium/Weak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last federal election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>68.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>81.4</td>
<td>73.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third generation</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>69.9***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last provincial election</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First generation</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>65***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>79.4</td>
<td>71.3***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third generation</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>67.5***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: First line in each cell represents first generation; second line in each cell represents second generation; third line in each cell represents third generation.

Source: 2002 Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted data; ***p < .001; **p < .01
Voted in last municipal election  
64.1  
65.5  
65.7  
Participated in associational activities in last 12 months  
40.1  
49.6  
48.6  

**Frequency of Family Interactions**  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Once week/ month</th>
<th>1-3 times/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last federal election</td>
<td>80.7 76.3**</td>
<td>81.7 77.5***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last provincial election</td>
<td>77.6 73.8*</td>
<td>79.6 75.6***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voted in last municipal election</td>
<td>65.5 61.5***</td>
<td>65.3 60.1***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participated in associational activities in last 12 months</td>
<td>41.8 33.7***</td>
<td>49.6 38***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey, weighted data; ***p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05
*Note: First line in each cell represents first generation; second line in each cell represents second generation; third line in each cell represents third generation

### Table 6: Determinants of Federal Turnout for Selected Ethnic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Italian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>.16(.19)</td>
<td>.12(.39)</td>
<td>.11(.40)</td>
<td>-.71(.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>.09(.12)</td>
<td>.36(.22)</td>
<td>.09(.28)</td>
<td>-.33(.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec residency</td>
<td>.82(.23)</td>
<td>.93(.18)</td>
<td>.83(.31)</td>
<td>1.0(.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>-1.35(.15)</td>
<td>-1.25(.22)</td>
<td>-1.08(.29)</td>
<td>-1.33(.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.09(.12)</td>
<td>.19(.19)</td>
<td>.10(.25)</td>
<td>.04(.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married/Common Law</td>
<td>.09(.12)</td>
<td>.37(.20)</td>
<td>.41(.28)</td>
<td>-.26(.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>British</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Socio-demographic characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Generation</td>
<td>-.12(.12)</td>
<td>-.42(.26)</td>
<td>-.26(.26)</td>
<td>.05(.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>.07(.08)</td>
<td>.13(.15)</td>
<td>-.31(.20)</td>
<td>1.09(.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quebec residency</td>
<td>-.13(.15)</td>
<td>.01(.12)</td>
<td>-.08(.19)</td>
<td>.69(.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>-.10(.12)</td>
<td>-.08(.17)</td>
<td><strong>.33(.23)</strong></td>
<td>.29(.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>.09(.08)</td>
<td>.23(.13)</td>
<td>.68(.19)</td>
<td>.20(.34)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey (weighted); coefficients significant at p < .05 reported in bold.
Note: Unstandardized logistic regression estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Married/Common Law</th>
<th>.01(.10)</th>
<th>.23(.14)</th>
<th>.39(.22)</th>
<th>.09(.46)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children in Household</td>
<td><strong>.08(.04)</strong></td>
<td>.02(.06)</td>
<td>.06(.09)</td>
<td>.34(.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College/university degree</td>
<td><strong>.97(.14)</strong></td>
<td><strong>.58(.22)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.15(.30)</strong></td>
<td>.31(.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some college or university</td>
<td><strong>.75(.16)</strong></td>
<td>.22(.24)</td>
<td><strong>.98(.34)</strong></td>
<td>.02(.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School</td>
<td><strong>.53(.14)</strong></td>
<td>.16(.21)</td>
<td><strong>.67(.33)</strong></td>
<td>- .03(.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Income: &lt; $20,000</td>
<td>-.02(.11)</td>
<td>.06(.18)</td>
<td>.18(.24)</td>
<td>.25(.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Incomes $20,000- less than $50,000</td>
<td>-.01(.09)</td>
<td>-.03(.15)</td>
<td>.14(.19)</td>
<td>-.30(.44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Religious and Family Networks**

| Personal importance of religion | -.01(.04) | -.14(.06) | -10(.08) | -.09(.18) |
| Worship at regular services (once a week/month) | **.42(.10)** | **.86(.15)** | **.47(.20)** | .36(.39) |
| Sole worship activities (once a week/month) | .09(.09) | **.42(.15)** | .31(.19) | -.14(.41) |
| Strong sense of belonging to family | .12(.19) | .26(.22) | -.23(.43) | -.15(.63) |
| Contact with family (once a week/month) | .21(.12) | **.37(.18)** | .32(.29) | -.15(.63) |

**Trust and Life Experiences**

| Satisfaction with life | .00(.04) | .09(.08) | -.06(.11) | .14(.20) |
| Trust in people in family | **.29(.08)** | .09(.12) | -.02(.19) | .05(.41) |
| Trust in people in neighbourhood | .05(.05) | -.02(.07) | **.29(.09)** | -.29(.23) |
| Trust in people work/go to school with | .04(.04) | -.04(.08) | -.08(.10) | -.08(.23) |
| People in general can be trusted | **.30(.09)** | **.50(.13)** | .16(.17) | **1.43(.44)** |
| Has not experienced discrimination/unfair treatment in previous five years | **-26(.11)** | **-54(.18)** | -.18(.25) | **-66(.34)** |
| Intercept | **-2.74(.49)** | **-1.71(.62)** | -2.08(.106) | **-1.28(2.6)** |
| -2LL | 5158155 | 2636899 | 616077.4 | 184089.7 |
| Likelihood Ratio (Cox Snell) | .065 | .086 | .101 | .171 |
| N (unweighted) | 6649 | 2528 | 1249 | 526 |

Source: Ethnic Diversity Survey (weighted); coefficients in bold significant at p < .05
Note: Unstandardized logistic regression estimates (standard errors in parentheses)

---

**Endnotes**

1 The term “amoral familism” was coined by Edward Banfield to describe the inability of the residents of Chiaromonte in the southern Italian region of Basilicata to act together for the common good, or for any objective transcending the material interests of the family. This organizational incapacity produced a culture of mutual distrust that accounted for the economic underdevelopment of the village (1958).

2 Surveys tend to overestimate turnout and the EDS is no exception. Misreporting of voting due to social desirability is one reason for this problem. However, there is evidence that this misreporting is not correlated with

3 See below for additional information about the models and reference groups in Tables 3, 6, 7. The family attachment item was omitted from Table 3 because it was collinear with trust in family members for the full sample. All coefficients significant at .05, .01 or .001 were highlighted in the model output. For more information about the significance levels of specific coefficients, please contact the author.

**Reference Groups for Table 3:**

**Socio-demographic variables**  
AGE: 30 years and over  
SEX: Female  
LANGUAGE: Survey interview conducted in language other than English or French  
MARITAL STATUS: Single/Separated/Divorced/Widowed  
EDUCATION: Less than high school education  
PERSONAL INCOME (annual): $50,000 or more  
RURAL RESIDENCY: Urban residency  
VISIBLE MINORITY STATUS: visible minorities not including Chinese, South Asians and Blacks  
ETHNICITY: Mixed Non-European and European only or Mixed Non-European, European, British Isles, French and/or Canadian/Canadien only.  
YEAR OF ARRIVAL IN CANADA: From 1991 onwards

**Religious and Family Ties**  
WORSHIP AT REGULAR SERVICES IN PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS: not at all  
WORSHIP ON OWN IN PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS: not at all  
PERSONAL IMPORTANCE OF RELIGION: Measured on a 1-5 scale with 5=very important  
FREQUENCY OF CONTACT WITH FAMILY MEMBERS IN CANADA IN PREVIOUS 12 MONTHS: not at all

**Trust and Life Experiences**  
LIFE SATISFACTION: 1-5 scale with 1=not satisfied and 5=very satisfied  
PEOPLE CAN BE TRUSTED: You can’t be too careful  
TRUST IN PEOPLE IN FAMILY: 1-5 scale with 1=people can’t be trusted at all and 5=people can be trusted a lot.  
TRUST IN PEOPLE IN NEIGHBOURHOOD: 1-5 scale with 1=people can’t be trusted at all and 5=people can be trusted a lot.  
TRUST IN PEOPLE IN WORK OR SCHOOL COLLEAGUES: 1-5 scale where 1=people can’t be trusted at all and 5=people can be trusted a lot.  
EXPERIENCE WITH DISCRIMINATION: In the past five years, do you feel you have experienced discrimination or have been treated unfairly because of your ethnicity, religion, skin colour, culture, race, language, accent or religion: Yes

**Territorial Attachments**  
ATTACHMENTS TO CANADA: weak sense  
ATTACHMENTS TO PROVINCE: weak sense  
ATTACHMENTS TO TOWN: weak sense

**Table 3 Model Information:**
Federal Vote
-2LL  1051340
Cox Snell Likelihood Ratio = .115

Provincial Vote
-2LL   1169197
Cox Snell Likelihood Ratio = .117

Municipal Vote
-2LL  1424186.91
Cox Snell Likelihood Ratio = .123

Associational Involvement
-2LL  1994038
Cox Snell Likelihood Ratio=.079

Reference Groups for Tables 6 and 7:

Same as Table 3 with the following changes:

REGQUE: Province of residency outside Quebec
WORSHIP AT REGULAR SERVICES: 1-3 times per year/not at all
WORSHIP ON OWN: 1-3 times per year/not at all
SENSE OF BELONGING TO FAMILY: Medium/weak sense of belonging
CONTACT WITH FAMILY: 1-3 times per year/not at all

Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, and the comments of Osvaldo Croci and participants at the 2005 Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association on previous drafts of this article. This article was prepared with the research assistance of Amanda Coffie and Sanne-Kaas Mason.

The research and analysis are based on data from Statistics Canada and the opinions expressed do not represent the views of Statistics Canada.

References


Postwar Immigrants.” In M. Kalbach and W. Kalbach (eds.), Race and Ethnicity, pp. 182-201.


Tönnies, F. 2001. *Community and Civil Society*. Jose Harris (ed.). Translated by Jose Harris and Margaret Harris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


Surveys tend to overestimate turnout and the EDS is no exception. Misreporting of voting due to social desirability is one reason for this problem. However, there is evidence that this misreporting is not correlated with specific traits of individuals and does not alter the findings. See Brady et al. “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation”, *American Political Science Review* 89(2): 271-94.

\[2\]