Sub-State International Actors:  
Ontario’s Foreign Policy

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Is the state the only actor in international politics, or does the international community consist of a myriad of state, sub-state and non-state actors? Moreover, is it possible to understand the actions of states and other actors in the global arena without first understanding the internal composition of such states and actors? To fully understand international politics it is important to have first a comprehensive understanding of domestic politics. This is especially important to the understanding of Canada’s and other federal states’ foreign polices. It is impossible to understand how the federal level of government will act without first taking into consideration the interests of the sub-state actors. Moreover, in many instances, sub-state levels of government have formulated extensive and comprehensive foreign polices of their own, independent of the actions of the federal government.

Theory of International Politics

Traditionally, the power to set the foreign policy agenda of a state and determined how it should be best carried out; specifically in Canada and other federal states, this is the federal government. The Federal Government has traditionally been responsible for defining what policies are most important to the state with respect to its foreign policy and which ones are the best to achieve these objectives. Traditionally, matters of national security and diplomacy have usually have been afforded primacy. According to the Realist paradigm, scholars have used the typology of ‘high’ and ‘low’ politics to categorize the actions of the state at the international level. Within this dichotomy, ‘high’ politics includes policies of military, diplomatic and security matters, such as the deployment of military resources, weapons and defence procurement, and the declaration of war. High politics also includes matters of international diplomacy, such as representing the state abroad, signing international treaties, recognizing other states, to name a few. Correspondingly, ‘low’ politics has traditionally included such international activities as the regulation and promotion of trade and commerce.

According to realist theory, scholars have traditionally argued that states first and foremost concern themselves with ‘high’ politics. In other words, the primary interest of the state is to provide for its own security. Although a full explanation of realist theory is beyond the scope of this essay, it is important to understand the rational behind this assumption. Since there exists no formal authority above state actors, the international system has been categorized in an anarchic fashion. Therefore, since no formal authority exists above the state level of analysis, thus the international community is described as anarchic. Given this assumption, states are assumed to operate in an environment where self-help prevails. In other words, since states are assumed to provide for their own security within the international community, and since the survival of the state is its most important concern, then policies that help to ensure the survival of the state, must have primacy. Although scholars recognize that states pursue other interests and a varied degree of foreign policy interests, they state that matters of security must always remain the most important foreign policies.

Since foreign policy has been traditionally defined in terms of military and security and since such policies have traditionally fallen within the domain of state action, realist theory assumes that the state is the only actor in international relations,
while sub-state and non-state actors have been largely omitted from such theory. Realists have often used the heuristic ‘billiard ball’ model to describe international relations, such that states are assumed to be like actors in terms of providing for their own security (billiard balls are all the same), anarchy prevails (there is no overarching authority organizing the billiard balls), and states are assumed to be the only actors in international politics (only billiard balls exist on the table). The traditional realist theory of international politics has existed as the dominant paradigm for the better part of the 20th century, promoted by the work of scholars such as Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, and John Mearsheimer. However, in the last 30 years the realist school of thought has been challenged by all sides. In the last few decades the traditional assumptions of the realist theory have come under serious attack and criticism. Firstly, scholars indicate that the ‘high-low’ dichotomy of international relations is increasingly unable to explain how states develop their foreign policy agendas. Scholars indicate that policies that deal with the economy have been and are increasingly a more important policy objective for the modern state; scholars point to the devastating effect of the Asian Financial Crisis and the importance of the negotiation of trade and tariff agreements for governments. Secondly, theories that describe the international community as highly interconnected on many state, sub-state and non-state levels are increasingly the norm in academic discourse. Although few scholars would disagree that an overarching authority is still lacking internationally, the international community can no longer be represented by the ‘billiard ball’ model. Lastly, scholars are challenging the assumption that the state is the only actor in international politics. Increasing importance has been given to the number and role of sub-state and non-state actors in the international arena, as the proliferation of various non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations, transnational actors and in some instances individuals, increases in international relations. Also, scholars point to the increasing importance of sub-state governments, such as states, provinces, and cities in international politics. This is where this discussion will now turn.

**Canadian Foreign Policy – Historical Evolution**

The division of powers which define the nature of Canada’s federation are clearly outlined in the British North America Act (BNA) of 1867; whereby the division of the legislative powers have been divided between the provinces and the federal government. This division does not mean that one level, i.e. the federal government, can assume primacy over the provincial governments, rather this division means that each level of government is autonomous within its own area of jurisdiction (although one can debate the extent to which the federal government has attempted to exert influence over the provincial area of jurisdiction, however such a discussion is beyond the scope of this essay). Section 91 of the BNA clearly outlines the powers given to the federal government, such as the power to regulate trade and commerce 91(2), military and defence 91(7), immigration 91(25), and the responsibility to make laws in accordance with Peace, Order and Good Governance (POGG) which will play an import role in the

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evolution of Canada’s foreign policy. Correspondingly, the provinces have been given the jurisdiction by section 92 to make laws in the areas of management of public lands 92(5), property rights 92(13), and natural resources 92A. These are by no means an exhaustive list of the powers given to the federal and provincial levels of government; rather they are many of the powers that are important in the creation and evolution of Canada’s foreign policy.

Moreover, it is the division of jurisdictional powers that has, in part, lead to the cross jurisdictional authority to conduct many aspects of Canada’s foreign policy. As is the case with other nations, it is inappropriate to assume, in Canada’s case, that the foreign policy of the nation is the responsibility of the federal government. In fact, the BNA is incredibly silent on the issue of foreign policy since at the time of its inception Canada had no international autonomy as a colony of Great Britain. However, as Canada began to gain increasing amounts of autonomy in the 20th century and as the role of the federal government with respect to foreign policy began to increase, so too did the role of the provinces.²

By no means can one begin to say that the debate concerning Canada’s foreign policy has been resolved. Like many issues that arise between the federal government and many of Canada’s provinces, issues flare and then subside, only to have new issues take their place (or old ones rekindled). Depending upon the province and the resources it has to exert in the area of foreign policy and the goals that it wants to achieve, foreign issues have been handled quite differently by each province. Although this study focuses primarily on Ontario, attention will be given to Quebec, specifically how its foreign policy differs significantly from that of Ontario. However, before the specific provinces are examined, this study will focus generally on how the jurisdictional debate surrounding Canada’s foreign policy has evolved since Canada’s inception.

In the 1930’s there were three cases that were brought before Britain’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC), that specifically pertain to the evolution of Canada’s foreign policy. In 1932, two constitutional challenges were launched by the provinces to clarify the role of the federal government in the area of foreign policy. The Aeronautics Reference was an attempt by the provinces to question the control that Ottawa was exerting over civil aviation. Since legislation governing civil aviation was the result of a treaty which the British Empire signed in 1919, this case fell under section 132 of the BNA and not sections 91 and 92 which pertain to issues of transportation. The JCPC ruled that the federal government did have a right to intervene in matters of civil aviation. More importantly though, than the ruling, the JCPC also ruled that POGG had a role in the interpretation of this matter, such that in 1952, “the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the regulation of aerial navigation was of such fundamental importance that it should fall under the jurisdiction of Parliament defined by the POGG clause.”³

In the same year, Radio Reference was also brought before the JCPC regarding the International Radiotelegraph Convention. This legislation enacted by the federal government sought to regulate radio frequencies that crossed certain jurisdictions so as to avoid interference for broadcasts. Again in this case, the JCPC ruled on the side of the

³ Ibid 134.
federal government, stating that the POGG clause of the BNA gave the authority of regulating radio broadcasts to the federal government, even though in section 92(16) the provinces are given the sole authority on all matters of a local nature.

These two decisions were beginning to create a concern amongst the provinces that the federal government would be permitted to implement a centralized foreign policy. The provinces were specifically worried that a centralized foreign policy could begin to encroach on their jurisdictional powers. However, unlike the Aeronautics and the Radio References, the JCPC would interpret the 1937 Labour Conventions challenge in a much different fashion.

Canada joined the International Labour Organization (ILO), at the end of WWI. At that time the federal government allowed the provinces the authority of whether or not to implement the provisions of the treaty. These actions were upheld in 1925 when the Supreme Court of Canada ruled on Legislative Jurisdiction over Hours of Labour. However, in 1935, R.B. Bennett attempted to impose federal legislation that impacted on several provincial powers as defined by the BNA. Bennett believed the federal government had the jurisdiction to act on these matters since they were directly linked to Canada’s membership in the ILO. Moreover, Bennett also believed that he had a constitutional mandate to enact legislation within provincial jurisdiction because of the previous Aeronautics and Radio rulings. However, in 1937 the JCPC decided to rule in what would seem to be a manner contrary to its two earlier rulings:

Lord Atkin of the JCPC made it clear that in areas where the provinces had explicit jurisdiction, the federal government did not have the authority to unilaterally enter into international agreements, regardless of the POGG clause or section 132. Therefore, unlike Aeronautics or Radio, Labour Conventions was a separate matter, not bound by precedent as it involved an issue under direct provincial control as defined by section 92 of the BNA act.

The Provinces

As one can assume, the provinces in Canada’s federation have not all exercised their jurisdiction to conduct foreign relations in the same manner. There are two possible explanations for these differing policies; first, not all provinces have the same resources at their disposal, and secondly, provinces have differing policy objectives that they want to achieve with their foreign policies.

The answer to the first explanation is relatively straightforward. Conducting a coherent and extensive foreign policy can be expensive; many of the smaller provinces in the Canadian federation simply do not have the resources available to conduct an extensive array of foreign activities. Rather large bureaucracies are required to promote a province’s interests abroad; opening overseas trade offices and maintaining a bureaucracy capable of operating such a network is expensive. Many provinces in Canada do not have the resources to conduct a wide variety of these activities.

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Determining the foreign policy goal of a province requires a much more complex analysis than simply determining the resources available to a province for conducting a foreign policy. To examine the foreign policy of each province would certainly be beyond the scope of this essay. This section will briefly focus on Ontario and Quebec since their foreign policies are both rather extensive, but the policy goals of each province differ somewhat.

Quebec has one of the most extensive and active foreign policies of any Canadian province. The debate concerning provincial involvement in foreign policy has been largely driven by the actions of Quebec in the last thirty years; however, as the constitutional evolution indicates, this debate began much further back than this. Nonetheless, Quebec’s international activity has been largely responsible for fuelling the debate in Canada around this topic. This is largely because, unlike the foreign policy of Ontario or many other provinces, the foreign policy of Quebec stands to threaten the Canadian federation and is conducted in a manner so as to gain the largest degree of autonomy possible within the Canadian federation. Quebec wants to act in the most visible manner with respect to foreign activities. Quebec wants other Canadians and the international community to know about its international actions; “hence, Quebec deliberately challenges the government of Canada, especially in the francophone world, demanding to represent internationally the francophones of North America.” Quebec has historically maintained a high profile foreign policy, such as attending conferences of les francophonie as an independent envoy. Moreover, on May 5, 2006, the federal government announced that it would give Quebec special status as part of Canada’s delegation at the United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Despite the political motivations for this announcement it might appear as if Quebec’s strategy to gain international autonomy is working.

Contrastingly, Ontario’s foreign policy, although quite extensive and quite active, is conducted in a way which is much more symmetrical to the interests of the country as a whole. In other words, despite the large role that Ontario has assumed in the area of foreign relations, its activities do not threaten the federation as do the activities of Quebec. Ontario acts much less visibly as its main foreign policy goal is to secure the interests of the province economically, rather than to draw international attention to itself. Ontario’s foreign policy appears to be conducted in a manner so as to not draw attention away from the activities of Ottawa which would present internationally a fragmented vision of Canadian foreign policy.

**Typology and Methodology**

This paper will use three typologies to categorize the activities of the Ontario government with respect to its foreign policy – diplomatic activities, trade and investment promotion, and international agreements.

Firstly, the Ontario government has opened foreign offices in various countries across the globe, from China and Korea, to the United States. The primary purpose of these offices is to promote Ontario abroad; either to attract business and investment to the province, to help Ontario business export their products and services abroad or to help

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promote Ontario as a tourist destination for foreign visitors. In addition to operating foreign offices, Ontario’s diplomatic activities also include conducting official trade and diplomatic missions to various parts of the globe, including the most recent mission to China by the Premier and the Minister of Economic Development and Trade. Also, Ontario officials attend many international and bi-national summits, including many conducted jointly with officials from the North Eastern and Mid-Western American states.

Secondly, the Ontario government conducts a foreign policy aimed at soliciting international investment and trade, while also helping Ontario business promote their goods and services abroad. Many of these activities can take a visible diplomatic role, as mentioned in the previous typology; this section will focus primarily on the many important although much less visible activities undertaken by elected officials as they attempt to attract and facilitate international investment to their ridings. This section will focus primarily on the activities of the MPP and how they can help secure investment to the province and their riding by focusing on some recent examples.

Lastly, the province of Ontario can help influence the negotiation on international agreements and treaties. This type of activity can take place in two ways: directly – the province can assume an active role in such negotiations, or as is more often used, but more difficult to chart, the province can exert pressure by influencing the actions of the federal government internally. Although this activity is much less visible and more difficult to trace, nonetheless these activities are an important way that Ontario, and other provinces and sub-state actors can influence the foreign policy of the federal government.

This essay, although largely based on academic research, relies for much of its content on the result of interviews conducted with current and former MPPs. This approach was used to offer a third dynamic; in addition to the theoretical foundations which argue that non-state and sub-state actors are playing an increasing role in international relations and in addition to the official foreign policies enacted by the Ontario government, this paper will also draw upon many of the informal activities of Ontario elected officials as they pertain to Ontario’s foreign activities. These informal activities are an important tool with which to better fully understand Ontario’s role and actions in the international community. This study is in no way an exhaustive examination of the entire legislature in describing and analyzing the activities of each individual MPP and their office. Rather, the MPPs chosen for this study were chosen based on their particular role within the government, i.e. because they were a Parliamentary Assistant to a particular ministry, or because of the particular profile of their riding, i.e. it is located near the border or because of the investment that has taken place in their riding. Moreover, MPPs were also drawn from all three of Ontario’s political parties in an attempt to maintain a measure of balance.

**Diplomatic Activities**

Ontario, not unlike many other provinces in Canada, has operated a wide array of foreign offices across the globe. Given Canada’s geographic proximity to the United States and the vast amount of trade that Canada and Ontario do with American companies and firms, it is not surprising to find that at one time or another, the majority of the foreign offices operated by the provinces were located in the United States. As of 1991,
23 provincial foreign offices were operating in the United States; as a province Ontario operated the largest number, seven, followed closely by Quebec with six. Although historically, Ontario has a record of volatility in operating foreign offices abroad, especially in the United States; Ontario has opened many offices only to have them close and then reopen years later. It would seem that in part this volatility is based on the province’s prosperity, that offices are opened when Ontario is experiencing an economic boom, but this fact alone cannot explain the cycle of opening and closing foreign offices in the United States. However, the economic prosperity experienced in the late 1980’s was witness to the expansion of Ontario’s commitments south of the border, only to see many offices close as recession hit in the 1990’s.

When surveyed, all the MPPs that were interviewed expressed a positive attitude towards the opening and maintenance of foreign offices. Moreover, many explained that they would like to see Ontario expand its foreign presence, not only in the United States but overseas as well. All believed that these activities were an integral component of Ontario’s foreign policy and important to the health of Ontario’s economy. Recently, the Ministry of Economic development and Trade (MEDT) has made a concerted effort to target its activities towards the east, specifically to China, India and South Korea as the MEDT operates offices in each of these countries.

Moreover, Premier Dalton McGuinty and Joe Cordiano, Minister of MEDT, visited China in the fall of 2005 in an effort to promote Ontario’s economic interests in China. Often new high profile activities, although in 1984 Tourism Minister Frank Miller visited China, followed by Premier David Peterson in 1986, can rouse opposition criticism; however, in this case all opposition MPPs, were supportive of these initiatives. All those interviewed recognized the opportunities for Ontario that exist in the expanding economies of India and China. Moreover, those MPPs who represented northern ridings emphasized the importance of promoting Ontario’s natural resources to the expanding economies of the globe.

In addition to operating foreign offices and organizing official trade missions to other countries, members of the Ontario Legislature attend conferences and summits, such as the Eastern, Western and Central States Legislative Organization, also attended by their American colleagues. Many states, such as Michigan, Ohio, and New York, which are located in the Great Lakes region, share a strong trade relationship with Ontario. Many types of business, such as the auto sector, forestry, pulp and paper and a host of other manufacturing sectors operate on both sides of the Canada/US border. Those MPPs who were interviewed indicated that those meetings were quite helpful in creating relationships with their state level counterparts because they realize the mutual dependence that Ontario and those regional states share. The members that were interviewed indicated that fostering new relationships with governors, state legislators and the public service of these states will only be a positive for the future of the Ontario economy.

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Facilitation

The institution of government, specifically government ministries and bureaucracies are immense; it is often difficult to find the right person to contact regarding a specific issue or project and it is often quite difficult to wade through the appropriate levels and protocols. This can be difficult even for those who have significant government experience, let alone someone not familiar with its inner workings. Some of the members that were interviewed for this study were specifically chosen because foreign businesses had recently located in or were in the process of locating in their ridings. Much of the literature concerning the topic of foreign investment and Ontario’s foreign relations discusses Ontario’s international image and highly visible international negotiations. Little time is spent analysing the dynamics of the relationship between Ontario public officials and foreign investors as this relationship unfolds. Much of this section focuses on the immediate period after investors have chosen Ontario as a place to locate. This section is important to understanding the relationship between foreign investors and Ontario public officials.

Many of those that were interviewed indicated that once investors had chosen Ontario, and more specifically their riding to invest in, their office was important in the facilitation of the project. Beginning construction of a complex and expensive manufacturing facility is a complicated process; they require municipal services, they must meet federal, provincial and municipal regulations, establish relationships with local businesses, just to name a few of the activities investors engage in as they begin and complete their projects. The MPPs that were interviewed indicated that they played an important role in facilitating and liaising with the appropriate government ministries and departments. They often helped to expedite the application process both for meeting regulations and government programs. Moreover, they often helped to connect the international investors with the correct departments and people within the appropriate ministries.

Another way in which local MPPs can help facilitate international investment in their riding is by helping foreign investors understand the different cultures in Ontario and the different ways that they conduct business. This sort of activity is especially important when foreign investors engage in negotiations with Ontario’s first nations’ peoples. In Northern Ontario, often mining and resource extraction takes place on first nations’ lands and these foreign investors need to negotiate with these groups in order to gain the rights to operate on their land. Foreign investors are most often unaware of the culture, practices and ways of life of the first nations’ peoples of this province and this can often lead to complications in the negotiations. One example of a member helping to facilitate the negotiations between an international investor and Ontario’s first nations peoples took place as DeBeers began the process of constructing a diamond mine on the land of the Mshkegawuk first nations’. Although representatives of DeBeers were well intentioned and eager to negotiate, they were simply unaware of the culture of the people they were negotiating with.

Although there are many examples of foreign investors who utilize the office of the local MPP during negotiations with the municipalities, local business and the provincial government, in certain instances this is not the case. One of the members who holds a border riding indicated that American companies locating in Ontario often do not
contact the local members. One possible explanation is that American companies are already familiar with the business and political culture of Ontario and are less inclined to need the functions performed by the local members. Also, many American companies that operate in Ontario have a long history of investment in the province and have already established their own relationships. It is not necessary for these investors to use the office of the MPP to find the appropriate people to contact because they have already established these relationships through their long history of business in the province.

International Negotiations

One of the most publicized and debated negotiations that has taken place within Canada and Ontario in the last few years has been the softwood lumber dispute between Canada and the United States. Currently, the forestry industry in Ontario is experiencing a serious crisis; saw mills are closing, the pulp and paper industry is leaving and jobs in northern Ontario have been leaving the region in droves. This crisis is debilitating to the economy of many Northern Ontario communities as they rely heavily on the forestry industry for direct and indirect employment. Moreover, this dispute has caused some, although not irreparable, damage to Canada/US relations. Resolving this dispute has been paramount for both the federal and the Ontario government.

With both fanfare and criticism, a deal was reached late in April between the federal Canadian and American governments; however despite the agreement, many Canadian provinces were quite upset with the terms of the deal. The deal was initially leaked to the provinces and the softwood lumber industry on Wednesday April 26, and many of the affected provinces were not pleased with the terms. The deal would cap Canadian softwood exports to the US at 34 percent of the US market, while Ontario would initially receive an estimated eight to nine percent of the US market, substantially less than its traditional share. The deal also stipulated that a sliding tariff would be placed on the exported lumber depending on the market price, starting as the price per 1000 board feet falls below 355 dollars. In addition to that tariff, a region would be charged a surcharge if its export rises above 110 per cent of its negotiated quota. In exchange, the US would return four of the five billion dollars that it collected in punitive duties charged to Canadian exporters.\(^8\)

Ontario’s major criticism of the deal was its lower share of the market. The next day in Ontario’s Legislature, David Ramsey, the Minister of Natural Resources publicly criticised the leaked deal in an attempt to alter it in Ontario’s favour;

[i]t looks to be particularly disadvantageous to Ontario, despite Ontario's stressing to the Canadian ambassador that the volume of the quota that will come needs to be based on our historical trading patterns with the United States, which would bring us anywhere from 10% to 12%. It looks like it's something below 10%. This will have a negative impact on our northern communities.\(^9\)

\(^9\) These remarks were made by Minister Ramsey in the Ontario Legislature on, Wednesday April 26, 2006.
By the time the final deal was reached it appeared as if Ontario had had its concerns met. Instead of the eight to nine percent of the market share in the originally leaked deal, the final deal would see Ontario receive 10.3 percent of the US softwood lumber market. The new deal appears to indicate the kind of influence that Ontario can have in affecting the outcome of international negotiations – in this case a bi-national negotiation between Canada and the US. Minister Ramsey and the Ontario government through their negotiations with the federal government and through the public statements made in the Legislature, were able to influence the foreign policy decisions negotiated by the federal government.

Although all the members interviewed in this study indicated that the Ontario government does have a substantial role with respect to international trade negotiations, they tended to differ as to the extent to which they believed that the current government effected these specific negotiations. For the most part, politics was not a major issue concerning Ontario’s foreign policy; however, the extent to which MPPs felt that the Ontario government secured a better deal during the softwood lumber negotiations was divided by party lines. Not surprisingly, Liberal members indicated that it was the public comments of Minister Ramsey that finally increased Ontario’s share by over two percent – millions in additional revenue for the province and softwood exporters. However, members of the opposing parties tended to downplay the role that the Ontario government had in altering the deal. Opposition members that are well connected to the forestry industry indicated that the deal did not change all that substantially from the leaked deal to the final deal. Despite the reports which indicated that Ontario would only receive eight to nine percent of the US softwood market in the leaked deal, their industry contacts indicated that Ontario was to receive closer to ten per cent initially – much closer to their traditional share.

Certainly any issue that has been as public as the softwood lumber dispute, stands to be highly politicised, especially an issue so important to Northern Ontario. It is not surprising that Liberal members would choose to interpret the actions of Minister Ramsey in the most favourable light considering the disfavourable image of the provincial Liberals in Ontario’s North. This is an issue that they feel they have won for Northern Ontario and Northern Ontario based industries and hope that it will move towards restoring the government’s tarnished image in the North. Furthermore, the declining image of the Ontario Liberals in the north of the province is an issue which the opposition feels it can use to weaken the government by highlighting the exodus of jobs from the north and the decline in the forestry and pulp and paper industries. It is not surprising that they would look to neutralize the actions of the Ontario government on this issue and downplay the impact that Minister Ramsey’s public statements had in influencing this deal in Ontario’s favour.

Despite the natural and expected partisan divide on this issue, those who were interviewed indicated the importance of the provinces in negotiations such as this. At the very outset, many of the provinces affected by any Canada/US softwood settlement were quite unhappy with the initial leaked deal, specifically Ontario and British Columbia. It would have been impossible for the federal government to continue to negotiate and sign a deal which would not be supported and accepted by the provinces. However, over the course of the week, each province in turn declared their support for the agreement. One can speculate about the reasons for this; certainly for Ontario a greater share of the
market was a significant factor as to why it ultimately decided to support the agreement, but just as the provinces have the power to affect international negotiations that the federal government is involved in, the federal government also has many tools and much clout that it can use to persuade provinces to support its efforts. One can only speculate as to the extent to which Ottawa used its muscle to bring the provinces into line concerning the softwood lumber negotiations.

Conclusion

The widely held assumption that the only important actor in international relations is the state has been eroding for a past thirty years. Scholarly evidence from a wide array of sources indicates that the international community is comprised of a numerous array of different types and classifications of actors. Many of the important international actors are sub-state actors of which the province of Ontario is one. Federations are comprised of different sub-national governments which to a greater or lesser degree are able act either autonomously or semi-autonomously in the field of foreign policy. Over the course of its history, Ontario has been able to formulate a particularly active and extensive foreign policy. Ontario’s foreign policy has often not been at odds with that of Ottawa; Ontario has opened a wide array of foreign offices throughout the globe while Ontario has a history of sending its public officials across the globe and trade and diplomatic missions. Much of Ontario’s activity is aimed primarily at attracting business and investment to the province to ensure the long-term economic prosperity of the province. No group of individuals are more acutely aware of this than Ontario MPPs; they know the importance of attracting and keeping investment in their ridings. Although this essay has conducted an exhaustive study of the entire Legislature, it does however indicate that MPPs will go to great lengths to assist those business and investors who have chosen to locate in their ridings. In addition to facilitating investment in the province, the government of Ontario and Ontario officials can attempt to apply pressure to the federal government so that through its own foreign policy the interests of Ontario are satisfied.
Bibliography


