The Impact of 9-11 on Human Security in Canada’s Foreign Policy

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Abstract: This paper presents an analysis of Canadian foreign policy and its changes in the post-September 11th (9/11) world focusing of the emergence and sidelining of the ‘human security’ (HS) agenda. The paper argues that the securitization of the HS agenda has reduced its normative power substantially, and that domestic politics have reshaped the HS agenda into a US-led security dialogue in which the Canadian state has lost its impetus as a prime mover or the normative weight acquired in the 1990s by the advancement and attainment of key HS agenda items such as the Ottawa Convention and Treaty.
I. Introduction
Throughout the second half of the 1990s, the concept of ‘human security’ became closely associated with Canadian foreign policy. The then foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy was clearly seen as a norm entrepreneur within various international organizations popularizing a ‘new’ approach in international politics which emphasizes the importance of protecting individuals and communities from any form of political violence in contrast to national security (albeit mutually reinforcing) which, in turn, focuses on the defense of the state from external attack. Although human security declined conceptually as soon as Lloyd Axworthy had left Ottawa in 2000, its agenda did not entirely lose momentum – as this paper will show. As a normative concept it has contributed to inform a number of Canadian foreign policy domains, soften domestic policies vis-à-vis (international) terrorism and still seems to be rather well-entrenched in the foreign affairs bureaucracy. In the aftermath of 9-11, Ken Roach suggested that Canadian foreign policy should insist that “terrorist threats be integrated into a broader human security agenda and separated from American geo-political interests.” Thus, how much of human security survived in Canadian post 9-11 (foreign) policy, or, alternatively, was human security nothing more than an ‘Axworthy doctrine’ destined to disappear once the prominent close to Nobel prize-winning foreign minister had left office?
Without downplaying the terrorism-related areas on which Canada has stood firm and opposed US action, I argue that, at the level of domestic politics, Canada took many post 9-11 actions in direct response to US concerns or in an effort to align Canadian efforts with those of the United States. In contrast, however, Canada pursued a more liberal, multilateral and comprehensive approach – ultimately spurred by human security – similar to other civilian powers such as Japan or Germany. Thus, while it is right to assume that a “continental divide” emerged between Canada and the United States internationally (albeit somewhat remedied by the new Conservative government coming into power in March 2006), domestically pragmatic cooperation (in the shadow of US domination) between both partners prevailed.
This paper proceeds in a threefold way: first, it situates the concept against the backdrop of Canadian foreign policy demonstrating that human security, in principle, subscribes to the multilateral tradition of an “activist state” or middle power. Second, it analyzes human security as well as its development as a theoretical and practical tool of Canadian foreign policy starting in the late 1990. Third, it provides an analytical assessment of Canada’s major anti-terrorist measures introduced in the aftermath of 9-11. In the context of this analysis, it evaluates the role human security played in Canada’s efforts to counter terrorist threats.

II. The pillars of Canadian foreign policy
Since the end of World War II, Canadian foreign policy unfolds in a (virtual) dynamic triangle defined by the interplay of three basic factors. The first one is set by the fact that Canada is a North American country sharing the largest land border of the world with the United States in the South and North West (Alaska), the “big elephant” to use an image by Pierre Trudeau. Since the late 1980s, there have been increasing efforts of regional (economic) integration on the North American continent. The Canada-US free trade agreement in force since 1989 was eventually superseded by the creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) including Mexico in 1994. In March 2005, the
Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) was launched as a trilateral effort to compliment economic cooperation with greater cooperation and information sharing in the field of security. Canadian foreign and defense policy is strongly influenced by the overall climate of the US-Canada relationship, as are virtually all sectors of Canadian society. The infrastructures of both countries are greatly interlinked, such as for instance the energy power grids, making Canada – given its size and resources – the more vulnerable partner in the bilateral relationship. Moreover, any terrorist threat targeting US domestic infrastructure in terms of water supply, energy and transportation is also likely to translates into an immediate threat to Canada.

It is estimated that more than one third of Canada’s GDP is generated through trade with the US, and roughly 80 per cent of Canada’s trade in goods and services is with the US. For many manufacturers in Canada, the US market is more important than the domestic one. Jennifer Welsh elucidates, “[t]he value of trade in goods and services that crosses the 49th parallel every day is now CDN $1.9 billion. Each day, more than half a million people and 45,000 trucks cross our common border.” Against this backdrop, it becomes crystal clear why issues related to border security such as the US-proposed Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) are of paramount importance to Canada.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Canadian-US trade relationship was increasingly penetrated by security concerns articulated by Canada’s southern neighbor. In contrast, south of the border, only 19 per cent of US exports are destined for Canada. Still, for 39 US states the Canadian market is the most important one for their exports. From a US perspective, Canada is most significant as a reliable supplier of energy and raw materials.

Furthermore, the predominance of the US in the bilateral relationship became deeply entrenched in defense matters. Sharing a land border with the US, Canada’s territorial defense is more closely integrated with the US than with any other NATO member. Canada assumes commitments in various bilateral defense agreements established to secure the territorial integrity of the North American continent, such as NORAD and the Arctic Distant Early Warning defense system. The cooperative proximity between Canada and the US in matters of defense sees the Canadian Department of National Defense (DND) tend to lean much more towards NATO – and implicitly the United States –, whereas the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAIT) tends to be more UN-leaning. While human security was certainly more influential with DFAIT, it also resounded in DND: “…while for diplomats and humanitarian or development workers human security has created a paradigm within which it is now possible to act with the support of international institutions and against the previously sanctioned rights of a state, this is of little practical consequence to the Canadian military…DND does human security already; it just does not speak human security.”

It is very difficult for Canadians to escape the shadow of power projected by their southern neighbor; at the same time, it is also clear that Canadians want to distance themselves in many respects from the policies of the US, in particular with regards to social policy, environmental issues and international law. Hence, the permanent quest for differentiation has been a catalyst if not the engine of “Canadian identity”. Although these contentious issues have been on the US-Canadian policy agenda for a while, the rift has grown since the George W. Bush administration came into power; a rift including a wide range of norms and policy issues – ranging from softwood lumber trade, the role of
international trade courts in NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
discernible. A few public opinion polls have revealed
that this rift also translates into an increasing “feeling of distinctiveness” between US-
Canadians. Less Canadians today think of US as Canada’s “closest
friend” (now 53 per cent, formerly 60 per cent).\textsuperscript{13}

The second factor is defined by the fact that Canada, in many regards of its socio-
political life, is both a ‘European’ and multicultural country in terms of values and
norms.\textsuperscript{14} While it has always been an immigrant country, Canada has integrated a
substantial inflow of immigrants from China, India and African states into its society over
the past two decades. Moreover, the Canadian immigration experience is widely – within
the country and outside – considered to be successful.\textsuperscript{15} The existence of many different
communities has been made possible by the presence of values such as societal openness,
transparency and inclusiveness in Canadian political life. As a member of the
Commonwealth, numerous historical affinities with Europe in general and the United
Kingdom in particular still prevail. These affinities are also deeply entrenched in
Canada’s constitutional, social and political life. Canada’s second founding nation,
Québec maintains very close relations with Europe in general and France in particular. In
many regards, the system of governance and the federal structures of Canada and the
European Union share quite a few commonalities. Furthermore, both Europeans and
Canadians hold similar views on a number of domestic (e.g. social policy) as well as
international issues (e.g. Kyoto, ICC, UN). Still, the growing convergence in these policy
areas has not translated to a deeper economic relationship. As trade has been stagnating
over the past few years, both Canada and the EU now focus on improving the conditions
for mutual investments and services.

The third factor is defined by Canada’s global vocation which has roots in a
legacy of Commonwealth membership and the obligation to co-opt into Britain’s global
role until the decline of the Empire. Today, however, it is mostly motivated by Canada’s
self-description as a middle power, albeit with some limits to action at the global level.
Former foreign minister Lloyd Axworthy once called upon Canada to make use its ‘soft
power’ resources in order to pursue a liberal internationalist agenda focused on human
rights and the rule of law (‘pulpit diplomacy’).\textsuperscript{16} In general, there seems to be a
significant public interest in foreign affairs; an attitude which may also be spurred by the
fact that Canada is an immigrant country which is intrinsically linked with the ‘outside’.
Canadian foreign policy is strongly supportive of the United Nations as a clearing house
of international politics. Furthermore, Canada traditionally backs the role of international
law and regime formation to deal with specific international policy issues.

These factors provide the structural background for the emergence of a number of
key principles in Canadian foreign policy. In general, three fundamental principles have
become paramount since the end of the Second World War: multilateralism, international
engagement or ‘internationalism’ and functionalism. Multilateralism provides a means
for a medium power state (hence the middle power debate in Canada, a term coined after
WW II) to exert influence in global politics; international engagement is seen as a vital
part of national interest, albeit balanced by a selective approach to avoid overstretch. And
lastly, functionalism is the organizing principle behind successive governments’
approaches to representation in international organizations.
Canadian policies abroad contain strong elements of moral values and normative commitments. Canadian foreign policy tends to be embraced as policy by ‘do-gooders’; Dean Acheson once described Canada as the “stern daughter of the voice of God.” Even today, Jennifer Welch’s notion of Canada as a ‘Model Citizen’ is rather normative: “Canada can model in two senses: first, it must strive to show others what a liberal democracy looks like in the post-September 11 era; second, it must work side by side with others in less stable parts of the world, demonstrating how they might create the foundations of healthier societies […].” In general, Canada’s commitment to international law and as a role model in international relations is widely accepted. This also holds true vis-à-vis Canada’s reputation as a strong, credible counter-terrorism player: Canada is seen as a leader in promoting new international standards in such areas as transportation security at the IMO, ICAO and G-8. Furthermore, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in particular is acknowledged as a highly competent intelligence organization – and one that is punching above its weight on many fronts. Ultimately, as will be demonstrated in the next section, human security is very much entrenched in the path of Canadian foreign policy.

III. Canadian Foreign Policy and Human Security

Clearly, terrorism was not a preoccupation or priority at the time that Lloyd Axworthy articulated his human security agenda. Still, an emphasis on this concept has the potential “to integrate terrorism into the broader context of other threats to human security.” While it is true that individual programs sponsored under the umbrella of human security had widespread support, such as in particular the anti-land mines campaign, it is questionable whether the human security concept as such was as well-articulated and well-understood by Canadians.

The concept of human security provided the intellectual focus for bridging the world of academia and policy-making legacy, and adapting multilateral capabilities in international politics to the needs of the post-Cold War era – as well as to severe budgetary cut-backs to Canadian foreign affairs and defense portfolios. Its implementation in Canadian foreign policy would have been hardly conceivable without an academic turned politician at the head of the Department of Foreign Affairs. In principle, Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy aimed at restarting something similar to the ‘golden age’ of Canadian diplomacy (1948-57) when Lester B. Pearson, who later won the Nobel Prize, invented the concept of UN peace keeping as opposed to the observational missions deployed prior to 1956. Before he assumed office, Axworthy had masterminded the ‘Liberal Handbook for Foreign Policy in 1993’. There, he argued that the Conservatives do not do enough to consult with the citizenry about foreign policy issues, proposing no less than the ‘democratization of foreign policy’. In the 1980s, Lloyd Axworthy had fostered links to NGO’s which supported his anti-free trade stance in the 1988 run-up to the federal elections. At this intersection, he recognized the important role NGOs can assume in both domestic and international politics.

Clearly, human security should not be seen only in the light of party politics. According to the core document ‘Human Security: Safety for People’ (1999) the ‘concept traces its intellectual origins back over one hundred years’. Don Hubert, the mastermind of the concept in Foreign Affairs Canada, suggested that Jean Henri Dunant’s Red Cross may be conceived as the forerunner of the human security approach. Officially, the 1994
The UNDP (United Nations Development Program) Report defined ‘human security’ as 1) a universal concern, 2) its components are interdependent, 3) easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention and 4) people-centered, from territorial to people’s security, from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development. The Report was authored by the late Pakistani development economist Mahub ul-Haq. Thus, the term does not only bridge academia and the world of ‘practitioners’, but also the development community and security studies.

Lloyd Axworthy took up the idea “in [a] search for a common thread to tie together conceptually a string of single issues, including landmines and the protection of civilians in conflict” which should become a comprehensive intellectual platform for Canadian foreign policy and development initiatives. Its conceptual consolidation occurred in late 1998, when Axworthy’s collaborator Paul Heinbecker was entrusted with connecting ‘human security’ with the NATO intervention in Kosovo, “foremost an example of human security in action.” Most importantly, Lloyd Axworthy put NGOs back on the foreign policy agenda, a relationship which dates back almost forty years. In 1968, the Canadian Council on International Cooperation was founded with a view of establishing an umbrella organization for NGOs. Subsequently, bureaucrats and policymakers recognized the utility of consulting with NGOs on various issues such as for instance acid rain. Similarly, NGOs played a “fundamental role in influencing Foreign Affairs’ human security agenda.”

When Axworthy gave his first speech to the UN General Assembly in 1996, he tried to identify new themes and major threats in international security. He made ample reference to the notion of ‘soft power’, which he perceived as a superior mode of power projection than ‘hard power’ primarily based on military assets. Joseph Nye, who originally coined the term, voiced concerns that ‘soft power’ had to be seen as a supplement to rather than a replacement of ‘hard power’. From then onwards, human security provided a focal point for Canadian foreign policy to achieve some remarkable successes on the international stage. First and foremost, there was the so-called ‘Ottawa process’ which led to the ban on anti-personnel landmines. In early 1996, Canada offered to host a meeting among NGOs, international organizations and pro-ban states. After several months of negotiations in which Canadian government played a crucial role, the Ottawa Convention, prohibiting manufacturing, stock-piling, trade and use of anti-personnel landmines, was signed in December 1997. It entered into force in March 1999. Since 1997, Foreign Affairs contributed actively to efforts to prevent the spread of ‘Small Arms and Light Weapons’ (SALW), supporting initiatives worldwide, such as an August 1998 NGO meeting at which the International Actions Network on Small Arms (IANSA) was founded. Support of these initiatives resulted from an increased awareness for the need to protect civilians in conflicts that involve intra-state rather than inter-state groups. Following an initiative by Canada, the UN appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts in September 1997. Four years later, in October 2001, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Paul Heinbecker, would suggest the appointment of a High Commissioner or a Special Representative of the Secretary General for terrorism, a proposal that ultimately did not materialize.

Beside the inclusion of non-state actors into various steps of foreign policymaking, these initiatives implicitly reflect Canada’s ambition to foster international norms and law. Hence the support of the creation of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and the sponsoring of ‘the responsibility to protect’ (R2P) agenda appear the final logical step in a foreign policy process aiming at fostering Canada’s role in the world.²⁸ Canadian foreign policy was not always necessarily at the origin of these initiatives, but it understood well to integrate the ambitions of others, in particular NGOs. With regards to the International Criminal Court, van Rooy observes: “As in the case of the Landmines Convention, Canada joined what had begun as a United Nations (UN) and NGO campaign, chairing the like-minded group, urging members to identify shared cornerstone positions and to co-ordinate strategy.”²⁹ Yet, normative ‘policy entrepreneurs’ such as Axworthy and his team were instrumental in providing a bigger arena to address these concerns.

More than in the US, the federal government of Canada has recognized that it was no longer possible to ‘do’ national security as was the case during the Cold War. Canada needs and seeks the collaboration of all levels of government as well as NGOs and the private sector. The latter plays a particularly important role with respect to protecting Canada’s critical infrastructure – as about 85 per cent of it is owned and operated by non-government entities.

IV. Canada’s Response to International Terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’

The Canadian response to 9-11 was multi-faceted, taking into account the four main avenues for combating terrorism: intelligence, law enforcement, military action, diplomatic/development activities; these activities can be distinguished between domestic and international actions, between defensive and offensive actions. Without down-playing the terrorism-related areas on which Canada has stood firm and opposed US action (Arar on US black list, Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, US demand for passenger manifests for Canadian flights over the US, etc.), Canada took many post 9-11 actions in direct response to US concerns or in an effort to align Canadian efforts with those of the US at the domestic level. At the same time, the Canadian government worked hard to counter false information, such as for instance that some of the 9-11 hijackers arrived in the US from Canada. In contrast, however, Canada pursued a far more liberal approach internationally emphasizing the human security agenda. This section will demonstrate that there is convergence in terms of domestic anti-terrorist policies, but divergence still prevails in the overall realm of Canadian foreign policy – most likely because of a considerable level of public discontent with seeing Canada too closely aligned with the US in foreign policy.

Canada’s immediate response to 9-11 was to help passengers stranded in Canadian airports, when their flights were diverted in the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C, on the morning of September 11, 2001. Thousands of Canadians embraced those air passengers who had been stranded far away from their destinations in the United States and elsewhere.³⁰ Moreover, on September 14, 100 000 people rallied in Ottawa in order to express their sympathy with the United States and those people who have lost their lives following in the terrorist attacks of September 11. In contrast, the Canadian government seemed to response far more coolly and unwilling to support any immediate military action.³¹

*Canada’s international response*
Canada became actively involved in the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan where it assumes one of the most prominent roles of all intervening parties. However, similar to France and Germany, Canada did not give carte blanche for further use in the US attempts to contain terrorism and rogue states such as Iraq. Hence, despite mixed signals sent throughout the run-up to the war, the Liberal government of Jean Chrétien did not join the US-led coalition of the willing which invaded Iraq in March 2003. Although Canadian intelligence analysts had agreed with their British and American counterparts that Iraq had, and was working on weapons of mass destruction, they disagreed that Iraq posed an imminent threat. Instead, Canadian policy-makers, such as the Canadian Ambassador to the UN at the time, Paul Heinbecker, insisted that the United Nations must remain the primary venue for dealing with the Saddam Hussein regime.\(^{32}\) Canada supported efforts to send in UN weapons inspectors, and in January 2003, Defense Minister John McCallum stated that if the inspection found Iraq to be violating UN resolutions, Canada would join the coalition.\(^{33}\) Ultimately, the war began without Canadian involvement after Canada had launched yet another initiative in March 2003 to secure a new UN resolution that would delay the war. Stephen Harper, at that time the leader of the conservative ‘Alliance’ was the only party leader to favor the intervention, stating that “in reading only the polls, indulging a juvenile and insecure anti-Americanism, this government has for the first time in our history left us outside our British and American allies in their time of need.”\(^{34}\)

The Liberal Government of Paul Martin released the ‘International Policy Statement’ in April 2005. It highlighted that Foreign Affairs makes a unique contribution within the broader context of Canada’s overall counterterrorism strategy. The declaration stresses that the “promotion of accountable, democratic governments that respect human rights, allow for peaceful dissent, take action to fulfill the aspirations of their people, and respect diversity”\(^{35}\) is the first line of defense in countering terrorist recruitment. In the path of Canada’s tutelage of human security at the international level, the promotion of human rights and democracy remains a core responsibility for the Department of Foreign Affairs.

From a Canadian perspective, countering terrorism requires effective international coordination and cooperation. Hence, Canada works in various international organizations and fora such as the United Nations, G-7/8, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Organization of American States (OAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO) to improve and develop legal instruments, best practices and international standards to combat terrorism.\(^{36}\) In the light of potential terrorist threats, Canada perceives its national security to be inextricably linked to that of other states: “When other states lack the resources or expertise to prevent and respond to terrorist activity, the security of Canadians and Canadian interests, at home and abroad, is at risk. Counter-terrorism capacity building (CTCB) assistance is the provision of training, funding, equipment, as well as technical and legal assistance to other states to enable them to prevent and respond to terrorist activity in a manner consistent with international counter-terrorism and human rights norms, standards and obligations.”\(^{37}\)
Clearly, the primary venue for Canada’s international efforts is the United Nations: As early as October 2001, Paul Heinbecker asked a set of questions hoping that these would provide guidance for future action: “To advance that cooperation we should also innovate to strengthen our present anti-terrorism instruments. Why not consider new bodies with strong and specific counter-terrorism mandates and adequate resources to lead and coordinate our efforts?”

The second most important arena was provided by the G-8 format, uniting those ‘Western’ states that were likely to be the primary targets for international terrorism. In particular, Canada used its presidency in 2002 to address various terrorism-related issues in G8-bodies. On February 9, 2002, the G-7 finance ministers and central bank governors, meeting in Ottawa, set measures to strengthen international coordination to freeze terrorist assets. Following the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendations, the G-7 set up Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) to share information on money laundering, terrorist financing and tracking terrorist assets. On April 20, 2002, a meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors announced the first G-7 joint designation of terrorist entities and associated freezing of assets. A spin-off of Canada’s ambitions can also be seen in the establishment of a Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG) at the G-8 summit of Evian. Following the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005, the G-8 summit of Glaneagles declared: “As terrorists operate flexibly and internationally, so must we. Government, police and intelligence responses must be more effectively coordinated – both within and between States. Co-operation between external and internal intelligence and security agencies must be further improved. Law enforcers, intelligence collectors and analysts, policy makers and practitioners must co-operate and share information.”

**Canada’s domestic response**

Some of the domestic initiatives directed at countering terrorist acts predate 9-11 – especially border issues. It is needless to say that at the time of adoption and implementation of these measures, the primary focus was not anti-terrorist, but rooted in security concerns resulting from a large-scale ‘securitization’ of border issues (such as organized crime). As it was said earlier, both countries share the longest border worldwide – almost 9,000 kilometers. In general, it is possible to discern a shift of emphasis from ‘border security’ to ‘national security’.

**Securing the border**

Border security has long been an issue of concern for the United States. This issue has gained increased prominence in recent years; in 1997 a US proposal for a Cross Border Crime Forum was agreed to and created by Prime Minister Chrétien and President Clinton. The forum serves as a vehicle for coordination of Canadian and US law enforcement agencies and has become central to US-Canada efforts to ensure that the border remains ‘open for business but closed to terrorists and criminals.’

On December 12, 2001, Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and Tom Ridge, Director of U.S. Homeland Security, signed the ‘Smart Border Declaration’ outlining a 30-point Action Plan upon which both Canada and the United States continue to work on. Its main objective was to secure the flow of people and trade, the infrastructure, as well as the co-ordination and sharing of information in the enforcement of these objectives.
Furthermore, on December 3, 2001, the governments of Canada and the United States signed a ‘Joint Statement of Cooperation on Border Security and Regional Migration Issues’. Canadian and American efforts henceforth have focused on deterrence, detection and prosecution of security threats, the disruption of illegal migration and the efficient management of legitimate travel through the border, but have become less important because of a shift to ‘national security’.

**Securing the society**

The attempt to reconcile an open society with the need to address security issues raised by international terrorism gave rise to Canada’s new ‘National Security Policy’.

Released in April 2004, ‘Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy’ sets out three key Canadian national security interests: protecting Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad; ensuring that Canada is not a base for threats to our allies; and contributing to international security. The document comprehensively addresses threats to security from a broader perspective. Most interestingly, it proposes the establishment of a ‘Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security, comprising members of ethno-cultural and religious communities from across Canada; its aim is to “engage in a long-term dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests.”

The Cross Cultural Roundtable has been described as “a resounding success, as have the efforts of CSIS and the RCMP to reach out to cultural communities.”

The Strategy also refers to the ‘Anti-terrorism Act’ whose making was the most immediate legislative response to terrorism post-9-11. The bill was tabled in October 2001 and subscribes to four objectives: 1) to stop terrorists from getting into Canada and protect Canadians from terrorist acts; 2) to bring forward tools to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists; 3) to prevent the Canada-US border from being held hostage by terrorists and impacting on the Canadian economy; and 4) to work with the international community to bring terrorists to justice and address the root causes of such hatred.

In a nutshell, the ‘Anti-Terrorism Act’, subject to a five-year-review, included measures to identify, prosecute, convict and punish terrorists. Most importantly, it provides for ratification of two UN anti-terrorism conventions, the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism’ and the ‘International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings’, as well as the ‘Safety of the United Nations and Associated Personnel Convention’. Furthermore, the bill gave law enforcement and national security agencies new investigative tools to gather intelligence about and prosecute terrorists and terrorist groups, as well as protect Canadians from terrorist acts: The ‘Anti-Terrorism Act’ facilitates the use electronic surveillance against terrorist groups, creates new offences targeting unlawful disclosure of certain information of national interest and adjusts existing legal documents – such as the ‘Canada Evidence Act’ and the ‘National Defence Act’ – to clarify the mandate of the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to collect foreign communications. At the same time, it introduces rigorous checks and balances in order to uphold the rights and freedoms of Canadians, such as a regular Parliamentary review procedure within a period of three years.
Immigration

In June 2002, a new ‘Immigration and Refugee Protection Act’ (IRPA) came into effect. It aimed at modernizing Canada’s immigration and refugee programs and also ensuring that Canada will not be a ‘safe haven’ for persons who endanger national security. The new law provides for removing persons who may pose a threat to security; introduces harsh new penalties (up to life in prison and fines of up to a million dollars) for delinquents convicted of human trafficking and smuggling or for using or selling fraudulent documents; it denies access to Canada through the refugee system to persons who may pose a security threat; it offers new tools for front-line officers at Canada’s borders and suspends refugee claims for persons charged with serious criminal offences and reduces delays in removing serious criminals from the country; last but not least, it legalizes punishing refugee claimants for misrepresentation of material facts in trying to gain entry to or remain in Canada. In principle, the law subscribes to long-standing efforts by Canadian authorities to counter the country’s ‘bad image’ in the US vis-à-vis alleged weak security standards in immigration. Prior to 9-11, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) had already warned Canada was becoming a home for Organized Crime, stating that “Canada is […] quickly becoming one of the most important bases for the globalization of organized crime in recent years, and criminals are increasingly attracted to the weak laws governing their activity and the lower risk of detection than is found in the United States or Europe.” As in many other countries, we observe processes of securitization affecting immigrants in Canada.

Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

On December 12, 2003, the government established the ‘Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness’ (PSEP) department, which mirrors to some extent the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The portfolio was put under the direction of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The Department and its various agencies provide policy leadership, coordination, and deliver programs and services in the areas of national security and emergency management, intelligence, policing, law enforcement and borders, corrections and crime prevention. Besides fostering coordination, the department brings a stronger national security focus to the operations of key agencies, which include the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), Canada Firearms Centre (CFC), Correctional Service of Canada (CSC), and National Parole Board (NPB). Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness takes the lead for regularly organizing national and international counter-terrorism exercises involving multiple departments and agencies. These exercises focus on intergovernmental coordination and cooperation and address both crisis and consequence management.

Through adjustments to the provisions of the Criminal Code of Canada, the United Nations Afghanistan Regulations (UNAR) and the United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations (UNSTR), Canada has put in place strict measures to identify terrorist entities and to freeze their assets in Canada. In support of UN Security Council Resolution 1373, Canadian financial institutions have frozen $344 000 associated with the 100 individuals and groups designated under the United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations. Furthermore, since September 11, 2001, the government has
invested $63 million in the Financial Transaction Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) in order to expand its capacity to stop possible funding of terrorists. The transportation sector is yet another area where Canada has aimed at improving its standards and initiatives, in particular with a view of aviation, land and marine transportation security.

The overall domestic response took into account various concerns expressed by the US government, in particular with regards to security standards at the border and in immigration. Furthermore, we observed a great deal of emulation of US anti-terrorist policies and institutions (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness). Looking at the discourse surrounding various initiatives, it is possible to discern a shift of emphasis when it comes to human security. The concept seems to have been considerably ‘securitized’ meaning that it is not only about human being involved in various conflicts outside Canada. It seems to become a tool of providing security to Canadians within their own borders by tightening up immigration and asylum standards.

V. Conclusion
Canada’s response to 9-11 and its thrust to counter terrorism have been threefold. First, the government strongly emphasized border security to make sure that Canadian infrastructure can be sealed off from terrorist threats as effectively as possible. As shown, this approach had quite a few serious repercussions in terms of Canadian immigration law, policies and practices. Second, Canadian policymakers aimed at emulating some of the institutional structures established in the US in order to synchronize bilateral efforts in combating terrorism. The main objective here is to secure the health of the Canadian economy which is strongly dependent on the smooth functioning of cross-border trade. Thus, the increase of the ‘bilateral factor’ in the US-Canadian relationship has significantly limited both domestic and international options which the country may have enjoyed. Third, Canada aims at balancing its approach at the international level, which is quite in line with its historical legacy as a multilateral player. Thus, Canada is at the forefront of supporting various measures to improve intergovernmental cooperation in combating terrorism, notably at organizations (UN, G-7/8) where it has relatively heavier political weight.

Although Canada’s human security discourse has virtually disappeared from the international scene, it still supports various efforts in line with this new approach (for instance, by supporting R2P through the 2005 UN World Summit), engaging the private sector and universities (at least until the end of the Liberal government in 2006). Although the Canadian government – in particular the Liberals until early 2006 – was well-placed to acknowledge the benefits of potentially putting human security first in the combat of terrorism, it did not prevail in light of the etatist approach chosen by the Bush government. Still, it is interesting to see that, for instance, the Security Agenda of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America does not single out terrorism, but integrates it rather comprehensively into a list of other threats to North America.49

When it comes to countering terrorism, Western states – including Canada – have been fairly reluctant in providing public-private partnership a mandate. At best, one may argue that these partnerships are being maintained at the level of development policy, which is also an important aspect of human security. These efforts are still far from the more comprehensive and universal approach human security had been designed for. If we
want to push the argument further, one could say the alliance between the importance of ‘development’ and ‘security’ within the concept has been broken in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

From a Canadian perspective, this has to do, in part, with its asymmetrical power relationship with the US. Yet, it also flows from the fact that Canadian foreign policy did not entirely internalize the implications of this concept. It seems that public-private partnerships are also maintained with a view to maintaining some public control over the management of what has formerly been described as public goods. Furthermore, Lloyd Axworthy admitted that Canada ultimately just joined the NGO bandwagon. Hence, it is does not come as a surprise that the human security agenda has not yet been entirely dismissed, but significantly downgraded in the aftermath of September 1, 2001.
Endnotes
1 See Human Security Centre at http://www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/24/59/ (28.05.07)
3 The line between domestic and foreign policy seems to have become blurred in the light of perceived terrorist threats.
4 In a nutshell, human security can be viewed as a part of what makes a civilian power. According to Maull and others, the foreign policy identity of a civilian power is characterized by six elements (Cf. Hanns W. Maull (2001), “Germany’s Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a Civilian Power?” in Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns W. Maull (eds), 2001: Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic, Manchester: Manchester University Press: 124-126., 124-126): 1. efforts to constrain the use of force through cooperative and collective security arrangements; 2. efforts to strengthen the rule of law through multilateral cooperation, integration, and partial transfers of sovereignty; 3. promotion of democracy and human rights, both within and between states; 4. promotion of non-violent forms of conflict management and conflict resolution; 5. promotion of social equity and sustainable development; 6. promotion of interdependence and division of labor.
5 (Stern 2004)
6 The fact that 80 per cent of the Canadian population lives within 100 kilometers of the Canada-US border speaks to this geographical proximity.
7 [reference]
8 Jennifer Welsh (2004), At Home in the World: Canada’s Global Vision for the 21st Century. Toronto: Harper Collins: 32. The quote, however, is technically false, as most of the trade crosses in Ontario and Quebec (and most of the Canadians live below this parallel) – i.e. well south of the 49th parallel. I am grateful to David Haglund for drawing my attention to this.
9 Currently, Canadians do not require a passport or visa to enter the US directly from Canada by land. They can still enter the US by providing proof of citizenship, such as a birth certificate and government-issued photo identification (e.g. driver’s license). As of January 8, 2007, though, the United States’ Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) will require all travelers – including citizens of Canada, the United States, Bermuda, the Caribbean and Central and South American – to present a passport or other appropriate secure document when entering or re-entering the United States by air or sea.
10 See, for instance, the Trade and Security Partnership Map, available at the Washington-based Canadian Embassy. According to the Embassy website, “CanadianAlly.com is an electronic newsletter maintained by the Canadian Embassy in Washington, DC, designed specifically for an American audience. The goal of this e-publication is to bring together pertinent defense and security information from a variety of government departments, agencies, military commands and bi-national organizations. The intent is to give American citizens a better sense of the scope of Canada’s role in North American and Global Security and the War on Terror”, <http://www.canadianally.com/ca/news-en.asp>.
11 See Jennifer Welsh, op. cit, ibid.
13 (Eagles 2006)
15 (quote)
19 Quote
21 (the so-called ‘Red book’)
24 Kai M. Kenkel, op. cit, 204.
25 Quote
27 Pro-ban states are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and Switzerland.
30 See backgrounder on ‘Canada’s Action against Terrorism since September 11’, <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/canadaactions-en.asp> (accessed on July 20, 2006): “Within forty-five minutes of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., Canada began accepting 224 diverted planes and more than 33 000 passengers and aircrew in airports across the country. In small communities like Gander, Newfoundland and Labrador, 12 000 people were accommodated, although the local population is only 10 000.”
33 See Parliament of Canada, 37th Parliament, 2nd Session, ed. Hansard, no. 48, January 29, 2003: “In my judgment Canada will eventually join with the allied coalition if war on Iraq comes to pass. The government will join, notwithstanding its failure to prepare, its neglect in co-operating with its allies, or its inability to contribute. In the end it will join out of the necessity created by a pattern of uncertainty and indecision. It will not join as a leader but unnoticed at the back of the parade.”
35 Quote
36 These include the thirteen UN-sponsored terrorism-related international conventions and protocols which address specific terrorist acts such as hostage taking, hijacking, terrorist bombings, and terrorist financing.
43 Quote M. Purdy.
46 Citing the centre-right newspaper ‘National Post’, Leo Panitch rightfully observed that processes of securitization also extend to other groups. “Like terrorists, the anti-globalization movement is disdainful of democratic institutions […]”, see Leo Panitch (2002), ‘Violence as a Tool of Order and Change: The War on Terrorism and the Anti-Globalization Movement’, in Options Politiques (Septembre): 40-44 (here 40).
Cf. David Charters, “‘Defence Against Help’: Canadian-American Cooperation in the War on Terrorism”. 45th Annual ISA Convention – Montreal 17-20 March 2004: 2. Margaret Purdy argues differently: “PSEPC is not the equivalent to DHS. It is different in many ways. The RCMP and CSIS are part of PSEPC, while the FBI and the CIA operate outside DHS. Transportation security is part of DHS, but not PSEPC. PSEPC focuses on all threats to Canada – from natural disasters to pandemics to cyber attacks to terrorism and organized crime. PSEPC is much more closely linked to the provinces than DHS is to the states” (interview with author, February 28, 2007).

In order to strengthen capabilities within the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Integrated National Security Assessment Centre was established.

Literature


Van Rooy: 255 [check]
Government of Canada (2004), Securing an Open Society. Canada’s National Security Policy, Ottawa See


