The Transformation of Japanese Conservatism and Koizumi Revolution

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In 2006, Prime Minister Jun-ichiro Koizumi resigned after five years in his office. His government started with high popularities among Japanese and ended still so. Koizumi’s five years as PM is a rare case in recent Japanese politics because most of cabinets were so unstable; their terms were usually less than two years; Hosokawa, Murayama, Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori. In 1980’s, PM Yasuhiro Nakasone stayed his position for almost five years also. PM Nakasone insisted “The end of the post-war politics and let’s create a new politics”. It might be possible to point out that there are some similarities between Nakasone and Koizumi because the latter also proclaimed “the end of l’Ancien Régime LDP”. Also what they achieved might be similar. Both of them tried to privatize national public companies. At Nakasone regime, he carried out privatization of the Japan National Railway Corporation, the Japan National Telecommunication Company and the Japan Tobacco Corporation.

It is said that with his popularity, Koizumi and his cabinet successfully managed the Japanese politics and produced significant policy outcomes like the privatization of the Japan Post and the Japan Highway Corporation, which had been dominantly controlled the Japanese national highway system for over fifty years.

This paper and my presentation at the CPSA conference at first overview Koizumi’s achievements, then examine the transformation of the Habatsu-function dynamics and figure out the philosophical and ideological basis within the LDP which made those achievements possible from a descriptive perspective. Also I am going to refer to the difference between Koizumi and Shinzo Abe. It is often said that those two PM are similar in their political goals but this paper thinks that they are definitely different from each other.

In my view, in Koizumi era Habatsu dynamics within LDP dramatically declined. And also Koizumi regime had its basis in the newly invoked conservatism not only within LDP but also within newly emerged pressure groups. Traditionally, Japanese LDP PMs had their bases on the clientelistic function system. LDP PMs were usually on the sophisticated balance among the competitive functions; Habatsu and the decision makings of LDP governments had depended on mainly bottom–up way rather than top-down decisions making. This bottom-up decision making system had consisted of
“official” institutions of LDP and “unofficial” influence of Habatsu-functions. This means that for the successive LDP PMs, it had not been easy to show their own policies based on their political philosophies. LDP PMs were traditionally strongly to be moderators and brokers, like the Canadian traditional “brokerage political system”. Although Canadian broker politicians did their brokerage politics among regions, provinces, ethnic and economic sectors, Japanese LDP brokers did mainly among functions within LDP. Koizumi almost perfectly ignored that official and un-official bottom up decision making systems within LDP. Not only he ignored the intentions of function leaders but also the rule of the official LDP decision making institutions. Here what I tried to say in terms of “official” is as follows: official decision makings within LDP consist of several sophisticated intra-party decision-making structure, like the general council and the policy council. The rule which Koizumi broke was strict unanimous rule at those two councils.

Also this paper will analyze the transformation of Japanese current conservatism. The newly developed conservatism in Koizumi era is a combination of neo-liberal economic policy conservatism and the historical revisionist conservatism. The latter conservatism remained potential in Koizumi era because Koizumi himself was basically indifferent to those philosophical matters. Habatsu-dynamics and political philosophy of LDP had been closely connected each other. Competitions among Habatsu-functions among LDP made the political philosophy of LDP not to be extreme right or left. It means that Habatsu-functions had worked something like the break. But under the Koizumi regime, Habatsu-function weakened. Koizumi reform and his break down of Habatsu-dynamics made some space for this new revisionist conservatism. This transformation of the philosophical conservatism is still continuing at the Abe administration and the aspect of the historical revisionist conservatism more clear in the Abe era as at the end of this paper analyzed.

Until Koizumi, the LDP governments which were mainly represented by Keisei-kai: Hashimoto-function, old Tanaka-ha, which had been the LDP mainstream function, did not strongly insist the small government and neo-liberal economic policies even when they were in the governments. Since Kakuei Tanaka era, this function produced PM or supported PM from other functions and had made Japan more welfare-leaned and crientelistic state. Traditionally the support for the LDP governments under the 1955 regime had been from rural areas, mainly farmers and rural small businesses like construction companies which deeply depended on the public enterprise like road constructions. To get support from them, LDP had to do strong distribution politics and it made LDP a government party of Japan. The distribution policy and the
In the late 1990’s Hashimoto government tried to make bureaucratic ministry reform and economic reform but those attempts were protested even by his own function. Hashimoto already experienced finance minister and he did recognize himself as an expert of the Japanese fiscal crisis. Though he was in the mainstream old LDP and function, he had to move his government toward a fiscally balanced austerity budget and a small government. But the result of the Hashimoto reform finally became moderate and a halfway job, listening to the mainstream LDP conservatism. Finally Hashimoto lost his popularity among Japanese and lost the Upper House election in 1998, which forced him to resign. It might be possible to say that Hashimoto recognized the importance of those reforms but could not resist to those protestors within LDP. Hashimoto’s successor, PM Obuchi changed Hashimoto’s fiscal policy and returned to the budget which heavily relied on the deficit-covering national bond.

Contrary to Hashimoto administration, at least superficially it looks like Koizumi succeeded in his reform as he wished against the LDP functions protest and pressure groups strongly connected with the LDP and LDP functions. This paper insists that this contrast depends on their political personalities. Hashimoto was a mainstream LDP-MP, who could not neglect the power of the functions but Koizumi, though he had been a member of Seiwa-kai, Mori function, which is also a traditional function in LDP, was looked as an outsider of LDP function system and even he pretended so.

Takenaka (2006) describes that from 1993 to 2001, when Koizumi was elected to PM, those ten years were the transient period for the Japanese politics. It is also same for the Habatsu-dynamics. Habatsu-dynamics started its transformation at that time. But at least superficially, until Koizumi era, Habatsu-dynamics looked like in the similar powerful organization as before. Hashimoto, Obuchi and Mori, those 3 LDP PMs were elected by the balance of the Habatsu-dynamics as same as the selection of usual LDP PMs. Especially Mori, the Predecessor PM of Koizumi was a kind of a symbol of the old style LDP function politics. He was elected among four leaders of Habatsu-functions after the sudden death of PM Obuchi and also he loved the high-class Japanese-style restaurants, which easily connected to the image of the old style LDP politics. Those three LDP PMs were surely traditional LDP PMs, who acted as a moderator or a broker, although their political environments started changing under the new electoral system.

Contrary to those three PMs, Koizumi pursed his own political goals like the privatization of Japan Post and Japan Highway without taking care of other political leaders intentions within LDP and surely he succeeded in those. The institutional reason
and the background of those “success” of Koizumi reforms are mainly as follows:

1. Deterioration of LDP functions under the new electoral system

2. Reinforcement of the function and the power of PM under the Hashimoto administration reform
   In Hashimoto reform,
   a. Reinforcement of the PMO
      Usually the role of PMO had been a coordinator between ministries. But in this reform, Hashimoto tried to put a powerful decision making power to PM and the PMO.
   b. Re-organization of ministries

3. The establishment of the Council of Economics and Finance at Mori administration.
   In fact, this organization was tried to be established under the Hashimoto administration in vain. This was because the protest from the ministries, especially the ministry of finance. The establishment of this council aimed mainly at excluding the substantial decision-making power of the ministry of finance, which was called “the real ministry of ministries” and also this establishment was related to the reinforcement of PM and PMO power.

Under those conditions after several institutional reforms, when Koizumi became PM, he could achieve his political goals. Those conditions made Koizumi easier to pursue his top-down decision making. From the perspective of the neo-institutional point of view, there are already excellent researches, for example, Takenaka (2006), Ito (2006), Hiwatari and Miura (2004) etc.

But also it might be possible to say that as least the successive LDP PMs, like Obuchi and Mori, were in the same condition of Koizumi administration except the establishment of the Council of Economics and finance but especially Mori looked like following the traditional LDP politics. Mori administration produced the council of economics and finance but he did not rely on this institution. Why did this contrast occur?

In this point, this paper strongly agrees with the discussion of Otake (2006). He pointed out Koizumi’s specific character as a politician, like a populist or a Machiavellist. The “success” of Koizumi reform should be explained by a combination
of the institutional transformation of the power within the Japanese Polity and Koizumi’s character. Based on several institutional reforms, Koizumi could do what he wanted to his heart’s content with his character.

**Koizumi in LDP**

When he ran for the leadership at 2001, he promised the privatization of the Japan Post – “Yusei-Kaikaku” but nobody believed it real even among his supporters.

Koizumi has been constantly not in the mainstream of the LDP in many meanings but surely he was in the line of the LDP tradition. This point is often forgotten. His father and grandfather were famous politicians of LDP. But at odd, he preferred to be heretic and has acted so always. This is the raison d’être for him. He ran for the LDP leadership selection three times but he did not get support from the mainstream LDP function. Even when he was elected as the leader of LDP in 2001, it was a time when he shouted “I am going to break down LDP!”, the mainstream LDP function, Hashimoto-Ha, did not support Koizumi and they had their own candidate, ex-PM Ryutaro Hashimoto\(^5\). Mainstream LDP functions were afraid of the emergence of Koizumi and losing their substantial power within the LDP. Hashimoto-ha was afraid of Koizumi mainly because they could not figure out what Koizumi would do actually\(^6\) and also, more importantly, they were afraid of the losing dominant power to influence over the actual decision making process and substantial power not only within LDP but also over the sophisticated overall system which they carefully had made up within the Japanese political system since 1955, that is a broadly penetrated influence among Japanese elite bureaucrats and Japanese mega companies.

**The achievements of Koizumi and his cabinet**

Here I want to check what Koizumi did in his term as a PM. His policy and political achievements were often called in the name of “Kaikaku” –reform. The term Kaikaku-reform, was a key miracle word for these decades in Japanese politics. Since Hosokawa era especially, the successive PMs often called their political goals “Kaikaku”, for example,

- “Zaisei Kaikaku (fiscal reform)” (Most of PMs promise)
- “IT-Kakumei (internet revolution policy)” (Mori) and
- “Gyosei kaikaku (ministries and bureaucratic reform)” (Hashimoto)
Among those Kaikaku, What Koizumi did were obviously kaikaku or revolution. He clearly divided LDP MPs between the enemies and the friends and without mercy he discarded those enemies. What he mainly did were as follows:

1, Yusei-Kaikaku.
   the Japan Post reform : to private Japan Post

2, Tokusyu-Hojin Kaikaku.
   Government owned public corporations reforms. Some of those are to be privatized (Japan Highway Co.) and others are to be reformed in their styles and systems.

3, Regional-level fiscal reforms
   Koizumi government tired to abandon two subsidies from the central government to regional governments. And also tried to transfer the tax resource itself to regions, like prefectures and municipal levels. This reform was called “sanmi-ittai no Kaikaku”, which meant three fiscal resource reform simultaneously.

Other than those three main Kaikaku, there are several reforms like the pension plan reform but those reforms could not be achieved. For example, Pension Plan reform was also important but in Koizumi era, but this problem became just the problem of the institution, the problem of the ministry of insurance and national pension.

The reforms of Koizumi were mainly made from the perspective of the neo-liberal economic policies. To do those reforms, Koizumi used newly created decision making system, The Council on Economic and Finance. With this system, Koizumi tried to bypass the intra-party decision making system and bureaucratic protest.

It is often criticized that the Koizumi’s ideological stand point leaned to the historical revisionist right-wing view. This view is exaggerated by his platform like Yasukuni issue but when we saw his achievement while he was a PM, we have to pay attention to the fact that what he did were mainly in the economic fields.

Koizumi-style decision makings

As Otake (2006) pointed out, Koizumi seemed not to understand the exact details
of his own reform policies\textsuperscript{7}, even his main reform policy of the privatization of the Japan Post. Koizumi appointed Heizo Takenaka, a professor of economics at Keio University, to the minister responsible for the reform of the Japan Post and mostly depended on him about the technical details of the privatization. Under the leadership of minister Takenaka, the form of the privatization of Japan Post transformed some parts to be a product of compromise with LDP function leaders. This compromise was different from Koizumi’s first image but Koizumi was proud of this achievement.

This Koizumi’s attitude was often called “maru-nage”, putting business under the charge of minister Takenaka. The specific character of Koizumi’s decision makings was that Koizumi made a big decision as a whole, but the details depended on those ministers or academics, like Heizo Takenaka and Masa-aki Hon-ma, usually called Japanese supply-side economists school who were used to be at Osaka University, department of economics\textsuperscript{8}. The mentor of those two academics is Kan Kato, a professor emeritus at Keio University and ex-chairman of the council of tax system at the government.

Koizumi politics is characterized by the key words like “Koizumi theatre”, “one phrase politics”, “TV show politics” or simple adjective words. Those characters might be frivolous but some points are to the purpose. His political style and his characters are simple and easy to understand as a whole for the people. He intentionally used those one phrases effectively at the important point.

Koizumi heavily relied on Takenaka, and the members of the Council of Economy and Finance who elected from private sectors. The number of the member of this council is 10. 4 of 10 members were from private sector. They were Jiro Ushio, Masa-aki Hon-ma, Hiroshi Okuta and Hiroshi Yoshikawa. Yoshikawa, Hon-ma were from academic and the rest members from private sector are from Ushio electronic Co, and Toyota respectively. Minister Takenaka was also member as a representative of the Cabinet and the government. Those five members, led by Minister Takenaka, produced important economic policies without negotiating with representatives of government ministries. They were protested by traditional LDP MPs and ministries but they realized they were strongly supported by PM Koizumi.

This is perfectly different from the Council of Economics and Finance at the Mori administration. PM Mori created the Council of Economics and Finance at the end of his term but he did not respect this organization. Mori totally depended about economic policies on Shizuka Kamei, then the chairman of the policy council within LDP. This contrast and transformation of the economic decision making style, from LDP policy council to the Council of economics and finance, was a symbolic of Koizumi’s decision
making style.

Traditional policy decision making system (-2001)

[Diagram showing the traditional policy decision making system with nodes labeled PMO, Ministries, LDP, Sectional committees, Policy Council, General Council, #unanimous approve principle, and Official Cabinet decision, with arrows indicating flow and coordination.]
New decision making structure under Koizumi

Traditionally, representatives of each ministry tried to influence on the decision making of LDP. They send unofficially their bureaucrats to the LDP sub-policy committees and sectional committees. This unofficial dependence between LDP and government ministries continues still but the ministries could not influence on the decision makings at the Council of Economics and Finance at the Koizumi era. This is because four members from private sectors carefully avoided any contact from the ministries, which tried to contact with those members and persuade them.
The Downfall of Habatsu-system of LDP functions

As Kitaoka (1995) says, Habatsu-function system started in 1956 soon after the merge of the Liberal Party and the Democratic Party at 1955°. Since then, Habatsu-dynamics within LDP was a dominant force. Often Habatsu has a negative image among people. Some academics and opposition parties criticized this Habatsu- dynamics, for example, saying that Habatsu-system is a symbol of the developing countries politics and so on. But it was also true that the Japanese specific medium constituency electoral systems, which selected more than two MPs, competition among LDP MPs was un-avoidable. The institution of the electoral system until 1993 produced Habatsu-dynamics. In that sense, Habatsu was surely almost a party within a party.

Once Takeo Fukuda and Yohei Kono, both of them were the Chancellor of LDP at that time, declared the abolishment of Habatsu at 1970s and late 1990s respectively. For Fukuda, although he was a leader of a function, he did not like the Habatsu-system naturally. This is an interesting coincidence because when Koizumi became a MP, he belonged to Fukuda-function. Koizumi’s attitude toward Habatsu is also antinomic as I described in this paper. His attitude might be from his mentor, Takeo Fukuda. Also for Kono, when he proclaimed the abolishment of the functions within LDP, it was a time when LDP was a opposition party. As a chancellor of LDP, Kono needed more attractive aspects of LDP to get support from people.

After the official “abolishment” of Habatsu, those functions changed their faces like “policy group”. But their real faces are archaic traditional Habatsu-functions. As MP Taro Kono, a son of Yohei Kono, aptly stated, new functions as a “policy group” did not exist. He said, Habatsu is not the policy group but a lunch club.

In the Koizumi era, the influence of functions, Habatsu within LDP dramatically declined. This rapid transformation of the declining of the power of Habatsu has two reasons. One is because of the newly adopted election system at Hosokawa administration. This reason is considered to be an institutional one. And also, there is a non-institutional reason. It is Koizumi’s political character. He pretended to be a reformer and positioned himself as a freshman who was acting against traditional LDP system, mainly Habatsu system. Koizumi deliberately ignored the Habatsu-function system for his cabinet ministers selection. Traditionally, when PM appointed the cabinet ministers, at first function leaders recommended the candidates for the ministers and PM accepted. At the selection of ministers within the functions, the most important thing was how many times he or she was successfully elected as MP more than their
policies or characters. But Koizumi perfectly ignored this system and the intensions of function leaders, even ex-PM Yoshiro Mori, who was a leader of a function where Koizumi belonged.

LDP politics meant competition among the Habatsu-functions. But under the Koizumi administration, Habatsu-dynamics dramatically weakened. Especially the mainstream functions, represented by Hashimoto-ha, seemed to be weakened. But it does not mean that other functions, like Mori-ha, made their influence larger. Habatsu-dynamics is as a whole weakened.

Habatsu-dynamics is deeply related to the LDP political ideology as a whole. Competition among Habatsu-function had controlled the direction of not only the economic policy but also of the political ideology. This competition have prevented LDP from it’s moving toward an extreme direction. With this competition, LDP kept their direction in the moderate ways. The weakening of Habatsu-dynamics meant the weakening of the diversity of the LDP ideologies.

From the ideological perspective, in Koizumi era, a new type of social movements (NSM) from the right side is activated. Those NSM are for example, the Japanese Society of History Textbook Reform (Atarasii Rekishi Kyoukasyo wo Tsukuru kai), National Association for the Rescue of Japanese Kidnapped by North Korea and Japan Conference (Nihon Kaigi). Those NSM are deeply connected with the mainly LDP MPs union and made their influence larger among LDP. In Koizumi era, Koizumi himself was basically indifferent to the revisionist conservatism but those NSM and new conservatism spread. Habatsu system was a vertical organization. The members of each Habatsu are basically subject to the leaders intention. This organization was something like a military or Yakuza-Gang organization. But especially in Koizumi era, unity of Habatsu weakened and even the back-bencher MP did not listen to the Habatsu leaders. Those new type of LDP MPs are so active to unite with other MPs from other Habatsu-functions for their political purpose like the abduction problem or Yasukuni matters. It means instead of the vertical organization, in recent Japanese Politics, some horizontal unities among MPs are so active. With close relationship with NSM, those new type of unities of MPs started insisting their own political view, which looked like an extreme view 10 or 20 years ago.

After Koizumi

As this paper pointed out before, what Koizumi did in the name of the reform was mainly neo-economic style reform. The political outputs of Koizumi administration are:
1. Post office reform
2. Government-owned public company reform like Japan Highway Co.
3. Pension Plan reform
4. Regional fiscal system reform

Those are surely in the economic policy area. Koizumi is often said that he is a TAKA-ha, non-liberal revisionist conservatives, but that character is not appeared in his political achievements. Koizumi himself promised to visit Yasukuni shrine every year in August as PM and in his term, and he had to confront the abduction issue by North Korea. He pretended as belligerent negotiator but this style seemed to depend on Shinzo Abe, at the time the deputy chief cabinet secretary, who strongly against the elite diplomat Hitoshi Tanaka, who had sought a compromise with North Korea for years.

Especially Yasukuni issue made a diplomatic keen problem among Asian nations like China and South Korea and this conflict might give Koizumi an image of the revisionist conservative. But what we have to think is that before Koizumi became PM, he rarely been to the Yasukuni-shrine and did not involved in the MP league of Yasukuni-supporters, which mainly consists of revisionistic conservative MPs. It is possible to say that in fact fundamentally he is indifferent to those revisionistic ideological matters. He promised Yasukuni-issue to get the support from Japan Survivors Union, which is a strong pressure group of LDP. Otake (2006) describes Koizumi as a realistic machiavellist and also Otake said Koizumi was not Taka-ha. I also agree with this description. He was very flexible in the political ideology. In the Koizumi government, the politician who covered the revisionist conservative ideology was Shinzo Abe.

Abe’s platform is clear in his book, “Toward a beautiful country” In this book, although Abe refers to the declining birth rate in Japan (Ch.6) but he mainly discusses about the Nationalism (Ch.3), abductions by North Korea (Ch.2) and Japan-US relations (Ch.4). He also discusses about the education reform (Ch.7).

It is often said that the policies of Koizumi and Abe are similar but this paper insists that they are definitely different from each other. At the end of this paper, I would like to compare their political stand point by analyzing their first policy speech at the National Diet and their conference speeches. In sum, Koizumi leaned to the fiscal and economic reforms. Contrary to Koizumi, Abe tends to lean more revisionistic conservative view. This contrast is clear by analyzing their speeches at Diet.
In his first policy speech at 7th, May, 2001, Koizumi mainly spoke about the economic reform. His main topics were as follows;

1. regeneration of Japanese economy
2. structural economic and finance reform:
   “without those reforms, it is totally impossible the resuscitation of Japanese economy!”
3. structural reform of the national administration and ministries
4. the establishment of the social safety net
5. foreign policy

It is obvious that his main political goals were mainly in the economic field and revival of the Japanese economy. In this speech, he also talked about his foreign policy but it was abstract rather than concrete idea. His all speeches are still available at the PMO website 1 4. When we check his speeches, it is obvious that he rarely talked about the constitutional reform which now Shinzo Abe tries to promote.

Now let’s check what Abe said at his first policy speech at 29th, September, 2006 1 5. In this speech, his topics were as follows:

1. Constructing an Open Economy Full of Vitality
2. Resolute implementation of Fiscal Consolidation and Administrative Reform
3. Realizing a Healthy and Safe Society
4. Rebuilding Education
5. Shift to Proactive Diplomacy

Basically he follows his precursor’s economic policies, he tries to indicate his own policy in the field of the education and the diplomacy though. His policies are apparent in his next policy speech at the Diet on 26th, January, 2007 1 6. Main topics are as follows:

1. Economic policy
   He seems to modify Koizumi’s neo-liberal economic platform. He insists that “Creating a Society Full of Opportunities That Guarantees a Chance to Challenge Again and Again” policy 1 7. Abe describes that recent Japanese society is divided between “winner” and “loser”. His government makes a chance for those economic losers” he says.
2. Creating Attractive Regions  
3. Advancing Administrative and Financial Reform of Central and Local Governments  
4. Realizing a Healthy and Safe Society  
5. Educational reform: rebuilding education  
6. Proactive Diplomacy

In this speech, other than economic policy, he insisted on educational reform and diplomacy. Those policies are also found in his book, “Toward a beautiful country”. Chapter 4 of his book is about Japan and US union, but in this chapter, in fact he insisted on the contradiction of the current constitution and the necessity of the constitutional reform. He describes the current Japanese constitution as being pinned by the United States, winners of WW2. More important part of his discussion is that the preamble of current constitution is, he says, a letter of apology to US. This image of the Japanese constitution is often found in the LDP revisionist right wings. His view of the constitution also reflects in his speech about the provocative diplomacy.

Also he talked about the educational reform. Referring to the educational reform of the Thatcher administration in UK, he insisted that the current Japanese education system too masochistic. The pride of our country and self-respect as a nation are keywords for Abe’s manifesto not only in the educational reform but also in the diplomacy. For Abe, Japanese current education seems to be dominated by the teacher’s union, Nikkyo-so. It was necessary for him to change the Fundamental Educational Law of Japan, which had admitted the governance at the each school district levels. For Abe and his supporter, this Japanese educational fundamental law was made by GHQ intention to be “too democratic”. Under the new education system which Abe plots, the patriotism and the love for our nation would be cultivated.

Related to the educational reform, he insists on the importance of the family and the family virtue. He says that recent frequent atrocious crimes by young generation are the result of the luck of the moral and virtue. It is somehow suggestive that Abe refers to the American famous drama, “Little House on the Prairie”. We need to pay attention to those Abe’s words like “virtue” and “moral”. It is possible to say that Abe is social conservative politician, while Koizumi was a fiscal and economic conservative. For Abe, it seems that the matters in hand are the educational reform and the constitutional renewal, rather than economy. Abe administration already succeeded in the approval of the amendment of the educational fundamental law last year. With this renewal, the central government can easily intervene in the school district board decisions. Abe’s
amendment of the educational law, which was often called the “constitution of education”, makes the power of the teacher’s union weak. Also, Abe administration succeeded in the approval of the National Referendum Law. This law clearly aims at the amendment of the current Japanese constitution. The current legal system lacks this referendum law, which is necessary for the amendment of the constitution.

His social conservative views are clearer when we look at his achievement since he was sworn to be PM. We should take care of the obvious deference between Koizumi and Abe and we need to look at Abe’s future achievement carefully.

1 For the information of the institutions of LDP, the homepage of LDP, http://www.jimin.jp/jimin/english/outline/e-orgchart.html, is useful.

2 Ikeda, Sato and Nakasone were exceptionally powerful PMs because they were on the powerful coalition of LDP functions. Especially Nakasone was this case. He made a strong coalition with ex-PM Kakuei Tanaka function and based on that coalition, he succeeded in promoting his original policies. Contrary to them, Takeo Fukuda and Masayoshi O'hira in 1970s bitterly competed and could not succeed in making of the stable government. Those are clearly described in Masaya Ito, Jimin-to sengoku shi, Asahi Shin-bun Sha, 1982. etc.

3 Yomiuri Shin-bun, Political Division ed, The man broke up LDP: 1500 days of Koizumi administration, Shincho-sha, Tokyo. Koizumi made an alliance with Taku Yamazaki and Koichi Kato, which was called YKK group. But Koizumi this time did not listen to Yamazaki’s request.


6 LDP mainstream MPs were skeptical about the Koizumi’s platform, which insisted the privatization of the Japan Post. They believed that even accidentally Koizumi was elected, they could be stop it’s realization. Harukata Takenaka, ibid, pp139-.

7 Otake, pp80-81. Otake also says that Kozumi lacked logical way to think and depended on and trusted to intuition especially in the field of diplomacy. I think that this analysis also applied to other political fields.


9 Shin-ichi Kitaoka, Jimin-to. Yomiuri-Shinbun. 1995. pp73-.


11 The theory of NSM of sociology is mainly for analysis of the new left like green party or environment groups. But this theory is also useful for the new right wing analysis. Some researches from this perspective are Chris Mackenzie, Pro-Family Politics and Fringe Parties in Canada, University of British Columbia Press, 2005 and Koji Ono, Tenkanki no Seiji Hen-yo, Nihon Hyoron sya. 1999.

12 Otake, pp3.

14 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/index.html
15 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/abespeech/index.html
16 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html
17 http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/abespeech/2007/01/26speech_e.html
18 Shinzo Abe, ibid, pp122.
19 Shinzo Abe, ibid, pp202.
20 Shinzo Abe, ibid, pp214.