Theorizations on Exclusionary Citizenship:  
Gender, Race, and Multiculturalism in Canada

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Introduction

Richard Day distinguishes among three prevalent usages of multiculturalism in his text *Multiculturalism and the History of Canadian Diversity* (2000). They are: “to *describe* (construct) a sociological *fact* of Canadian diversity; to *prescribe* a social ideal; and to *describe and prescribe* a government policy or *act* as a response to the fact and an implementation of the political ideal (Angus 1997: 139; Kallen 1982:51)” (Day, 2000, p.6). In addition, he includes a fourth category of multiculturalism as an *already achieved ideal*. This conference paper draws upon Day’s third definition of *description and prescription* through an analysis of Canadian state policy.

Throughout the essay, attention will be drawn to some of the most obvious historical examples of marginalization in order to address the challenges of exclusionary citizenship as it pertains to gender, race, and ethnicity in Canada. While initial forms of exclusion were directed towards the Black Africville community, Acadians, Aboriginal peoples, the Québécois, and “Other” immigrants, the hierarchy of state oppression has seen a transformation from its initial forms. Today, visible minorities who constitute the majority of recent immigrants to Canada experience a complex new web of domination based on the intersection of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and labour status. This paper extends Charles Mills’ theory of the “racial contract” in order to provide a gendered and racialized critique of multiculturalism in the distinctively Canadian context. By doing so, it overtly problematizes the role of the Canadian state in creating a new hierarchy of “exclusionary citizenship.”

This essay employs a five-fold approach in its examination of multicultural state policy as a project oriented towards the management and control of (as opposed to inclusion) of various national or ethnic subject positions in Canada who do not fit the Anglo-Canadian social, political, and economic model in terms of language, religion, customs, and institutions. The first section of this paper outlines the premises of Charles Mills’ *The Racial Contract* (1997) and other critiques of social contract theory. Section two contextualizes historical Canadian regulation of the “Other.” The third and fourth sections examine multicultural policy implementation and delineate contemporary theories regarding multiculturalism. Finally, section five addresses the major critiques of these liberal theorizations. The paper concludes that instead of improving the conditions of marginalized people in Canada, a more attenuated form of racism (Mills, 1997) has evolved which remains obscured by the guise of multicultural inclusion.

1 The author expands on this final category by explaining, “inasmuch as the fact of multiculturalism is conflated with the act, the problem of Canadian diversity is thought to contain its own solution, to be in the process of solving itself, of achieving its own *ideal*” (Day, 2000, p. 44).

2 While drawing attention to the commonalities of oppression, this paper in no way attempts to essentialize these identities and social locations. I acknowledge that there are many subject positions facing discrimination in Canada that cannot be addressed within the confines of this paper. The overall attempt is simply to draw attention to some of the most obvious historical examples of marginalization in order to address the challenges of exclusionary citizenship as it pertains to gender, race, and ethnicity in Canada.

3 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller define citizenship as “equality of rights of all citizens within a political community, as well as a corresponding set of institutions guaranteeing these rights” (Castles and Miller, 2003, p.4).

The notion of social contract (today integral to Western political tradition) is based on the premise that men in a hypothetical state of nature made a rational choice to transcend their original state of freedom for the purposes of receiving protection in civil society. Contemporary feminists and political philosophers, have, nonetheless, problematized contract theory and universal concepts of citizenship. Historically, the concept of citizenship has been predicated on liberal, male norms, and other exclusions based on race, class, education, and skills. Feminist theorist Carole Pateman emphasizes that Hobbes’ notion of the protection of civil freedom through society was not at all universal, but was instead, exclusionary for women. She explains that in the initial construction of the social contract, a public/private binary was created in which the public constituted the realm of male citizenship rights and women were relegated to the private. The author argues that the original contract constituted both male freedom (based on masculine attributes and patriarchal right) and women’s subjection. She insists that, “[i]n the natural state all women become servants, and all women are excluded from the original pact. That is to say, all women are also excluded from becoming civil individuals. No woman is a free subject. All are ‘servants’ of a peculiar kind in civil society, namely ‘wives’” (Pateman, 1988, p.50). Contract was the medium through which patriarchal right was initially created and, Pateman contends, the marriage contract and the sexual contract continue to perpetuate women’s exclusion in society today. Free relations, she asserts, are impossible “within the patriarchal opposition between contract and status, masculinity and femininity” (p.187-188).

Pateman is joined by Charles Mills in challenging the legitimacy of liberal social contract theory. Unlike Pateman who focuses on gender as a social construction, Mills focuses on race, and contends that racial inequality is inherent in the structures of liberalism itself (Mills, 1997).

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4 Thomas Hobbes is considered to be the first great modern contract theorist, followed by John Locke, and Jean Jacques Rousseau. In his publication *Leviathan*, Hobbes proposed that a hypothetical “state of nature” would exist if there were no common legal power or sovereign able to restrain individuals. As such, the only way for men to avoid death and to protect their individual property involved placing power in the hands of one sovereign and reinforcing such authority through legal principles. If such restraints were removed, Hobbes asserts that a hypothetical state of “war” would erupt in which there would be, “no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short” (Hobbes, 1985, p.186). In other words, the establishment and maintenance of all that is considered to be “civil” in Western society, whether it be business, trade, culture or knowledge, requires reinforcement through contract. Hobbes’ liberal theory of a form of rights and laws reinforced by the sovereign and designed to protect society, became the lynchpin of contemporary Western political thought.

5 For the purposes of this paper, I will use the definitions provided by Floya Anthias, Nira Yuval-Davis and Harriet Cain for gender, race, ethnicity, and class. The authors define gender as a social construction related to, “the social organization of sexual difference of biological reproduction” but also involving social constructions and representations of these which cannot be reduced to biology alone (Anthias, Yuval-Davis, and Cain, 1992, p.18). It also refers to “the social processes through which cultural meanings come to be associated with sexual difference and the ways in which sexual difference forms the basis for social
restrict “‘egalitarianism to equality among equals,’ and blacks and others are ontologically excluded by race from the promise of “the liberal project of modernity”’ (Lucius Outlaw, 1996, as qtd. in Mills, 1997, p.56). In a more recent piece of writing, Mills elaborates on three main arguments regarding “the actual polity of the racial contract.” First, it is “characterized by the political domination of whites over non-whites, who are at best second-class citizens. The state [...] has historically functioned as a racial state, enforcing laws that have not been neutral but instead biased in favor of the white citizenry” (Mills, 2001, p.76). Second, it “is governed by an exclusionary “Herrenvolk” ethics,” in which white persons are seen as more valuable than nonwhite subpersons. (p.76). Third, it is situated in a space that is racialized through and through, reflecting the differentiated civic and moral status of the bifurcated populations that are inhabitants. (p.76). “In sum,” the author emphasizes, “in contrast to officially colorless contractarianism, the racial contract makes explicit that the actual body politic is that of the white body, and political relations of racial domination are made incarnate in its extended flesh” (p.76).  

Critiques of liberal social contract theory by Pateman, Mills, and others become useful in an analysis of “officially colourless” multicultural theory and policy in the context of Canada. After all, multiculturalism is imbued with issues of political power (Mills, 1997). As Mills suggests, “the classic apparatus of social contract theory, which conceptualizes the polity as inclusive, founded on the consent of undifferentiated atomic individuals, and equally concerned about the welfare and rights of all its diverse members” (Mills, 2001, p.74) does not match the ongoing reality of class, gender, race, and ethnocultural domination. For this reason, “[l]iberal models of the polity such as classic social contract theory need to be reconceptualized so as to register the history and ongoing reality of racial domination” (Ibid).

exclusions and inclusions and constitutes inequalities in power, authority, rights and privileges” (Fudge and Vosko, 2003, p.185). Race is defined as the social significance attached to certain biological human features, physiognomic difference, or collective heredity of traits. Ethnicity, broadly defined, entails, “belonging to a particular group and sharing its conditions of existence” (Anthias, Yuval-Davis, and Cain, 1992, p.8), while class relates to the sphere of production processes, but factors which cannot be solely reduced to the economy. The authors contend that racism cannot be understood without considering its intersection with other social constructions such as gender, ethnicity, and class.

Pateman and Mills are also joined by contemporary political theorist Giorgio Agamben in challenging the legitimacy of liberal social contract theory. In his 1998 text Homo Sacer, Agamben, too, challenges the inclusions and exclusions of modern political theory and links it to both ancient sovereign states and modern nation-states in his attempt to disrupt classic liberal justifications. Through historical analysis Agamben asserts that, “[i]n Western politics, bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that whose exclusion founds the city of men” (Agamben, 1998, p.7). It is precisely this exception which Agamben problematizes. His skepticism is revealed in the statement, “[w]e must [...] ask why Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life. What is the relation between politics and life, if life presents itself as what is included by means of an exclusion?” (Ibid). The roots of the contemporary biopolitical nomos of the planet, he suggests, are directly linked to social contract theory. He elaborates, “The understanding of the Hobbesian mythologeme in terms of contract instead of ban condemned democracy to impotence every time it had to confront the problem of sovereign power and has also rendered modern democracy constitutionally incapable of truly thinking a politics freed from the form of the State” (p.109). Because of this, Agamben believes that the time has come, “to reread from the beginning the myth of the foundation of the modern city from Hobbes to Rousseau” (Ibid).
II. Regulating the “Other”: A Historical Analysis of the Canadian Context

Canada’s colonial legacy must be closely scrutinized in any examination of multicultural policy. As Day proclaims, there has been “a long history of attempts at governmental management of ethnocultural identities within the territory now claimed by the Canadian state” (Day, 2000, p.5). A thorough analysis of the historic factors leading up to the decision to implement multicultural policy in Canada reveals oppression of Black Canadians and Acadians in Nova Scotia, atrocities committed against Aboriginal peoples in the name of European (British and French) expansion, and strained French Quebec-English relations from the onset. Indeed, an examination of the Canadian context reveals multiple exploitations of “Others.” Joyce Green writes that historically, colonization, initiated by imperialism, formed the foundation of Project Canada. Colonization is not only about the physical occupation of someone else’s land but also about the appropriation of others’ political authority, cultural self-determination, economic capacity, and strategic location. That is, colonialism is a profoundly exploitative relationship to the benefit of one at the expense of the Other (Green 1995; but also see Flanagan, 2000). (Green, 2003, p.52)

Colonialism took on many forms as Europeans brought time-tested methods of constructing and managing human difference to the Canadian context (Day, 2000).

The Africville Community

The history of Canada’s largest historical Black settlement provides a good starting point for a critical analysis of the racial contract in the Canadian context. Jennifer Nelson suggests that,

the means by which Black residents of the province [of Nova Scotia] came to form the community of Africville must be regarded in the context of the history of the displacement and enslavement of Black people by whites in North America, of hostile reception upon settlement in Nova Scotia, complete with a worldview that demanded their containment and denial, and of a young nation struggling to form its identity through the predominantly British colonial enterprise. (Nelson, 2002, p.214)

An often-overlooked fact is that while the practice of slavery was not instituted by law, it was indeed, common in the region. Descendents of these slaves, Black Loyalists who fought for the British during the American Revolutionary War, and those who arrived after the War of 1812, began to settle the region of Northern Halifax known as Bedford Basin in the mid-nineteenth century (McCurdy, 2001; Nelson, 2002).

“The behavior exhibited by the larger dominant society towards Africville’s people,” writes Howard McCurdy, “was established upon two very potent factors:

7 Day suggests that Canadian discourse was informed by the idealization of the Old World, its people, ideas, and practices. “[A]ncient philosophers and statesmen, medieval theologians and missionaries, and renaissance travellers and Conquerors,” he states, “all contributed to the construction and maintenance of a highly adaptable system, a sort of tool kit, ideally suited to the task of Self/ Other differentiation and management” (Day, 2000, p.70).
8 Nova Scotia was the only province to be involved in the slave circuit to any extent because, as H. Clare Pentland explains, the overhead costs of maintaining slaves for activities limited by climate to about six months of the year curtailed the economic benefits of maintaining slavery in Canada (Pentland, 1981). Nonetheless, African and First Nations slaves were used as domestic servants in Ontario and Quebec for nearly two hundred years.
disenfranchisement of blacks and industrial development or greed, in that order” (McCurdy, 2001, p.101). American Jim Crow-like practices and racial segregation in this region excluded Black people from white schools, churches, communities, and even cemeteries. Such factors posed major obstacles to the social advancement of this population; in addition, economic development encroached on Africville land and the region and its people faced extensive environmental assaults in the form of deteriorating houses, industrial toxic emissions, and contamination.9

The people of Africville were finally relocated after the conditions of the area drew national attention in the 1960s. Ironically, city officials who failed to take action earlier described living conditions at the time as “intolerable and unsanitary,” in other words, “as justification of the inevitable dismantling of the community and eviction of its four hundred residents” (Nelson, 2002, p.216).10 This segregated black slum remains not only a blot on Canadian race relations, but emblematic of British Canada’s historical treatment of “subject races.”

The Expulsion of the Acadians

The expulsion of more than 24,000 Acadian people from Nova Scotia in the years 1755-1763 is another little-known historical blot on Canadian history.11 “Contrary to what is still common wisdom,” Day suggests, “the British and French colonizers did attempt, like the much-vilified Spanish Conquistadores, to exterminate entire peoples, and in some cases they achieved their goals” (Day, 2000, p.101). In addition to the perceived military threat despite their explicitly pacifist stance, the Acadians’ claim to full humanity was forfeited by their “Otherness:” their (French) culture, their profession of the wrong (Roman Catholic) religion, and their use of the wrong (French) language (Faragher, 2005; Day, 2000).

The means of physically transporting people on ships may have appeared, Day suggests, “as a ‘soft’ or ‘humane’ means of physical elimination,” (Day, 2000, p.103) but led to destruction of life, family and community ties, as well as disease and death in many cases.12 Day assesses the handling of the problem of Acadian diversity as starkly

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9 The construction of three railroad lines, factories, plants, coal-handling facilities, and slaughter-houses initially formed an environmental blight upon the landscape to be later dominated by a refinery and large hydro tower. Disposal pits, a prison, and disease hospitals spilt raw sewage and led to the contamination of wells, while building permits to improve homes, garbage collection, law enforcement, fire protection, and paved roads were denied to the area in spite of repeated request to the Halifax city council (McCurdy, 2001; Nelson 2002).

10 It should be noted that instead of providing public services and structural assistance for the area, relocation was chosen as a solution without consultation of the relocatees. High levels of dissatisfaction were reported by residents regarding their low compensation and inability to buy new homes, in some cases because of difficulties proving legal title to their land (McCurdy, 2001; Nelson, 2002). For further discussion of British colonial practices regarding Black Canadian communities in Nova Scotia, see Clairmont and Magill (1971; 1999) and Saunders (1992).

11 The Acadians were rounded up by British soldiers and loaded en-masse into ships at port. In the confusion, husbands, wives, and children became separated. Many were taken by disease during their journey or enslaved upon their arrival in North American destinations extending from the Gulf of the St. Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico: South Carolina, Virginia, Georgia, and Louisiana, as well as international locations.

12 Some accounts suggest that an estimated 10,000 exiles and refugees lost their lives as a direct result of the British campaign of expulsion (Faragher, 2005). As well, violence was committed against those who
demonstrating “the futility of rational- bureaucratic management of problematic human Others, as it cycled through military conquest, failed assimilation, and failed tolerance, to [finally] revert to physical elimination and extermination via transportation” (p.106).  

Both cases of the Africville community and the Acadian expulsion provide fertile ground for evaluating the regulation of the “Other” in the British colonial context. They indicate that early on in the history of Canada, there were overtly public state attempts to promote management of the internalized ethnocultural identities. This “whirl of rational-bureaucratic” (Day, 2000, p.5) activity took on an even larger form in the management of Indigenous peoples.

**First Nations Peoples**  
Some of the most egregious acts of colonial dislocation and dispossession become visible in an investigation into the First Nations peoples of Canada. In their creation of a binary form with a Self-Other distinction, Day argues that the figure of the savage “provided the crucial negative pole to the New World European identities” (Day, 2000, p.7-8). European colonization resulted in the appropriation of common land and the destruction of Aboriginal ways of life.

Beginning in the 17th century, French Europeans in Canada used conversion to Roman Catholicism along with extermination as a means of controlling the First Nations Huron and Iroquois tribes (Day, 2000). French colonial policy, however, soon took the form of mercantilism. The fur trade benefited from Aboriginal alliance and interracial marriage became a promoted practice in New France (Stevenson, 1999). British- First Nations relations followed a similar politico-economic trajectory of “colonial capitalist rational-legal domination” (Day, 2000, p.97). Similar to the French, English colonialists first waged war on Aboriginal communities and then realized the economic benefits that Aboriginal allies and female labour power could bring to the fur trade economy. Early
in the formation of Canada, the position of Indigenous peoples in relation to Europeans became one of exploitation through unequal exchange. After the exhaustion of fur, the move from common and open access resources to private property ownership and wage labour had an extremely dislocating effect on First Nations peoples (Spry, 1983; Harris, 2002). Simply put, Aboriginal peoples were left out of changing technologies, markets, and prices during the Canadian transition to capitalism.\(^{17}\)

Colonial governance played a large role in attempting to legislate Indigenous peoples out of existence. It first extinguished Indian title to land through the Royal Proclamation of 1763. \(^{18}\) A century later in 1876, the Indian Act was implemented to regulate Indian life and land. Kiera Ladner contends that, “the Canadian government committed an act of genocide- political and otherwise” by means of this act which forcibly replaced Indigenous sovereignty and systems of governance with colonial structures and governance (Ladner, 2003, p.48). While the Indian Act was debilitating to the community as a whole, Aboriginal women in Canada bore the brunt of its detrimental impacts. In paternalistically defining who was and was not “Indian,” the government usurped the birthrights of First Nations women and their children (Stevenson, 1999).\(^{19}\) Winona Stevenson writes, “The result was a major disruption of traditional kinship systems, matrilineal descent patterns, and matrilocal, post-marital residency patterns. Furthermore, it embodied and imposed the principle that Indian women and their children, like European women and their children, would be subject to their fathers and husbands” (p.68).\(^{20}\)

interpreters, diplomats and peacemakers (Van Kirk, 1991, p.357). The fur trade “depended on women’s work not only to ensure subsistence but also […] to make possible the surplus production that formed the basis of economic development” (Fox, 1991, p.337).

The social and economic consequences of the fur trade economy, however, severely recast Aboriginal women’s social and economic positions (Bourgeault, 1988). The eventual arrival of British women in Western Canada replaced Native women’s position in the fur-trading society with prejudice and class distinctions (Van Kirk, 1991). Thus, Native women lost their status in both Aboriginal and European Canadian society.\(^{17}\)

Iain Wallace explains how Aboriginal people remain dislocated from the modern political economy because of their lack of control over reserve land and the fact that they have no jurisdiction over resources in Northern Canada. Evidence of the debilitating effect this has on Aboriginal communities is reflected in the fact that Nunavit is Canada’s poorest jurisdiction and 30 percent poorer than the poorest province (Globe and Mail, 5 June 1998 as cited in Wallace, 2002).

Ward Churchill, on the other hand, takes a more critical look at the struggles of the Lubicon Lake Cree Band in Northern Alberta to preserve their landbase, their way of life, and identity as a people amidst corporate oil and lumber resource extraction. He concludes that this is equivalent to “genocide and ecocide in the Canadian North” (Churchill, 2002).

\(^{18}\) For more information on treaty land titles, see Boisvert and Turnbull (1985). European colonizers adhered to the concept of \textit{terra nullius}, right of discovery and ownership of title regarding land that was considered to be "empty," "uninhibited" or "not in the possession of civilized peoples or put to civilized use."

\(^{19}\) Such birthrights included living on reserve, voting in band elections, and the loss of treaty benefits, among others (King, 2004)

\(^{20}\) In 1985, Bill C-31 allowed for the reinstatement of women and their children who lost status and band membership by marriage. This, in itself, was controversial in that some bands challenged the loss of control over their own membership. Thomas King states, “Since the act was amended in 1985, some hundred thousand Native people who were non-status because of the discriminatory provisions of the Indian Act have been able to regain their status” (King, 2004, p.141). However, if a status Indian marries out of status, their children and children’s children are at risk because of the “two-generation cut-off clause.” Because
Thus, starting with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, state policy evolved and eventually culminated in the near-total destruction of Indigenous peoples, their political systems, their ability to exercise sovereignty, and to even exist within their own territory (Ladner, 2003). As Day clearly demonstrates, this form of “paternalistic rational-legal domination—through integration and administration” came to define the “Canadian Way” of dealing with non-French, non-British ethnic groups (Day, 2000, p.113).

In the years to come, state regulation in the form of reserve land would be used alongside residential school and child welfare policies to separate children from their Aboriginal parents and communities, thus destroying “the [existing] fabric of social, familial, gender, and sexual relations” (Dua, 1999, p. 244). Day suggests that by doing so, Canadian policy on aboriginal people shifted from past colonial “methods of ignorance and physical elimination by extermination to softer forms of physical elimination involving orderly, legal displacement” (Day, 2000, p.113). He states, “[w]hen the limits of displacement were reached, the Indian was then acknowledged to be ‘inside,’ placed on reservations and subjected to various forms of rational-bureaucratic management designed to eliminate signs of difference via assimilation” (p. 113). Despite the attention Canada receives for its “so-called progressive stance” towards diversity, it is on par with the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and other old settler colonies, which, Mills notes, “all maintained ‘white’ immigration policies until a few decades ago, and native peoples in all three countries suffer high poverty, infant mortality, and suicide rates” (Mills, 1997, p.29). Against these odds, Day suggests that Aboriginal people’s resilience can solely be credited with preventing their utter destruction (Day, 2000).

Quebec-English Relations

The situation of French Quebec contrasts with that of Black Canadians in Africville, the Acadians, and Aboriginal peoples across Canada. French Europeans, as was noted in the previous section, were initially colonizers, but become colonized with the British conquest of New France. As such, they became internal “Others” to the British and were also subjected to a series of failed attempts at elimination, assimilation, and ultimately integration (Day, 2000). The efforts to manage a French speaking “Other” through the concept of “dualism” began to be laid out in the 1700s, long before official multicultural policies were put into place.

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21 Fifty percent of status Indians are marrying non-status people this will, in effect, significantly eliminate Indian status over a few generations (Ibid).

22 The Trudeau government at one point attempted to eliminate the Indian Act. Jean Chrétien’s 1969 Federal White Paper on Indian Policy promoted assimilation, or “termination” as King calls it (King, 2004). Ladner proclaims, “By eliminating the Indian and the Indian Act band – thereby destroying all vestiges of nationhood and assimilating Indians as individuals into the Canadian state- the federal government was attempting to make political genocide a final reality” (Ladner, 2003, p.50). Incidentally and somewhat ironically, this formed the catalyst for a powerful Aboriginal nationalist movement. This reflects Day’s observation that instead of achieving their purpose, state sponsored attempts to design a unified nation paradoxically lead “to an increase in both the number of minority identities and the amount of effort required to ‘manage’ them” (Day, 2000, p.3).

22 First Nations people were excluded from the BNA Act, the 1981 Constitutional negotiations, and the proposed Charlottetown Accord. The proposed Charlottetown Accord contained the largest package of proposals for reform on Aboriginal issues in Canadian history, but still fostered considerable opposition by Indigenous groups. For further discussion, see Turpel (1993).
In Quebec, attempts at assimilation through such means as religious tolerance, liberal political institutions, and policy failed to achieve their goals and the British were forced to concede with the Quebec Act of 1774. This Act, suggests Kenneth McRoberts “laid the basis for Canadian dualism” (McRoberts, 1997, p.4). Through it, the Church’s legal privileges were restored, the seigneurial system was re-established, and civil law was adopted. Day describes these combined measures as constituting “the first attempt at officially integrating a problematic ‘Canadian’ population that could not be eliminated or assimilated, and set a precedent that would be followed, over the next two centuries, by each new group in an expanding ethnocultural economy” (Day, 2000, p.107).

The passing of the Constitution Act in 1791 cemented the notion of the two founding “races.” When Canada was divided “into two large pieces, with one (Upper) space for those who identified with Britishness, and one (Lower) for those who preferred Frenchness” this duality, suggests Day, became lodged “in official Canadian political discourse” (Day, 2000, 108; 107). The principle of dualism was not to be long-lasting, however. The fact that the British North America Act of 1867 explicitly promoted the “interests of the British Empire” with only minor mention of the use of English and French languages in Parliament (Department of Justice, 2007, p.1) to accommodate Lower Canada reveals that the leaders of the movement for Confederation had no real intentions of applying the principle of dualism or guaranteeing French interests (McRoberts, 1997). To remedy this exclusion, Henri Bourassa, the leading French-Canadian nationalist, presented the notion of a “double compact” in 1902 in which an inter-provincial agreement would be coupled with a national compact between two founding peoples. This concept became firmly entrenched in Quebec and would play a central role in future French-English relations (McRoberts, 1997). As we will see in the next sections, the eventual implementation of multicultural policy in Canada was, in large part, an intended “antidote” to historic French-English tensions.

“Other” Immigrants

The final category to be examined involves the Canadian state’s attempts to manage an “explosion of racial subject positions” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries as the Dominion of Canada pursued “a self-conscious quest to rise from the status of ‘colony’ to that of ‘nation’ with colonies of its own (Day, 2000, p. 122; p.8). This desire required Westward expansion and settlement.

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23 Colonial relations become complicated in an examination of Quebec-English relations in Canada. While Québécois authors such as Pierre Vallières (White Niggers of America, 1968) utilize a strongly postcolonial framework to delineate the relationship between French Quebec and English Canada, closer analysis reveals a hierarchy of domination. The Quebec reaction to the 1990 Oka crisis in which the Canadian Army was deployed in a seventy-eight day standoff against the Mohawk people illustrates the ways in which one oppressed and marginalized group (the Québécois) exerted exclusion or subordination against another (First Nations People) (Stasiulus, 1995, p.195). As well, Reg Whitaker notes the irony that, “[t]he sovereignists have refused, flatly, bluntly and apparently irremediably, to contemplate the notion that national self-determination is a right of first nations resident on Quebec territory in any way comparable to Quebec’s right to national self-determination” (Whitaker,1999, p.81.) Thus, a province like Quebec which is postcolonial “from one perspective can be simultaneously (neo)-colonial in its relationship to other groups” (Moore-Gilbert, 1997, p. 10).

24 John A. McDonald’s 1879 National Policy emphasized a role for the state in economic development and expansion. In addition to tariffs and protectionist policies, focus was on immigration and the development
Day asserts that the expansion into the Western Red River region (originally part of Rupert’s land and present-day Manitoba) involved, violent displacement of the existing population, seductive integration through the offer of provincial status, followed by assimilation through massive inward movement of people who occupied higher positions on what had become a Great Chain of Race (White, Yellow, Black, Red). The acquisition- through immigration- of these apparently more ‘desirable’ person-types [...] led to a proliferation of problematic identities within the category of White itself. (Day, 2000, p.8)

The author notes that filling the Northwest with the Anglo-Saxon race was not as easy a task as clearing out the existing inhabitants for the ambitious new nation. The Western provinces attracted a large number of Europeans such as Germans, Ukrainians, Danes, Dutch, Finns, French, Icelanders, Norwegians, Poles, and Swedes.25 The new subject position became “the Immigrant, the non-British, non-French, non-Indian internal Other” (p.123). While these new immigrants were not Anglo-Saxon, they were European and considered second best. They were not considered to be Canadian, however.26

Drawing on Toni Morrison, who contends that “Americanness definitionally means whiteness” (Morrison as cited in Mills, 1997, p.58), in the Canadian context Canadianness has historically meant whiteness as well. Nonetheless, this theory of whiteness needs to be complicated in much the same way as Mills examines intra-European varieties of racism, or “white people with a question mark- the Irish, Slavs, Mediterraneans and above all, of course, Jews” (p.78-79). In the Canadian context, not all white immigrants were equal. An examination of the new immigrant categories in the 19th and early 20th centuries reveals explicit state management of a hierarchy of races.

Based on the new race complexities, the state began a series of attempts at physical elimination of immigrant bodies such as rejection based on racial criteria and exclusion via selective immigration policies. Day describes this period as being dominated by “a design theory of identity that required strict conformity to an Anglo-Canadian model” (Day, 2000, p.144).27 Of particular threat to the British Canadian identity were those immigrants who were not European. A Chinese head tax was levied following the Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 and public support for exclusion of the Oriental “Other” was signaled in the 1902 Royal Commission on Chinese and Japanese Immigration. Conveniently following completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act severely restricted the immigration of “Undesirables” (Day, 2000; Dyzenhaus, 2005). Moreover, within two decades, the Second World War of the railway. For further information on this topic, see Albo & Jenson (1997), Conway (1983), Brodie (1997), Mackintosh (1991), Naylor (1981), Pentland (1981), Phillips (1979; 1990), and Schedvin (1990).25 Evidence of this “Otherness” is revealed by ship statistics on immigration. In the 1870s, ships recorded only four categories of nationality: English, Scotch, Irish and Foreigners (Day, 2000, emphasis added).26 For further analysis of the discrimination that ethnic enclaves experienced on the prairies, see Lipset (1971).

27 Day also presents two other predominant theories of Canadian policy in this discussion: the “free emergence theory which assumed that a ‘proper’ and ‘desirable’ Canadian identity would evolve on its own, out of an unconstrained mixing of ‘racial qualities’” and the constrained emergence theory which combines “elements of both design and free emergence.” Day asserts that the constrained emergence theory “was the ancestor of multiculturalism as state policy after 1971” (p. 146). For him, it is one more strategy by which the Canadian state attempted to manage the “Other”. 
“presented an opportunity to ascribe the mark of ‘enemy alien’ upon Japanese nationals and ‘disloyalty’ upon Canadian citizens of Japanese origin” (Oikawa, 2002, p.77). The historic 1914 War Measures Act and various Orders-in-Council were employed as authorization for the dispossession, incarceration, forced displacement, and deportation of 22,000 Japanese Canadians living on the Canadian West coast.28

Canada, explains Ian McKay, for much of the early twentieth century, was “essentially a liberal empire, not a nation, and not a democratic state” (McKay, 2000, p.9). This is revealed through its exclusions of those who were not considered “persons” (women and people of colour), high property qualifications for the Senate, and the disenfranchisement of women, non-propertied males, Aboriginal, Chinese, and Japanese individuals (Ladner, 2003; McKay, 2000). As has been demonstrated, non-English speaking immigrants from Europe who settled much of Western Canada formed an underclass along with even more marginalized groups (Chinese and Japanese immigrants, for example). Women, moreover, were excluded from the liberal project of nation-building. Thus, in the Canadian context not all bodies or even all white bodies were equal. Instead, a hierarchy of racism evolved “informed by Old World influence of dividing individuals into groupable types, arranging these types hierarchically, distinguishing some types as problematic, and attempting to provide solutions to the constructed problem (Day, 2000). The eventual implementation of Canadian multicultural policies must be examined in light of these historic ethnic and racial tensions.

**Setting the Stage: The Historical Context of Multicultural Policy Implementation**

Beginning in the 1950s, a new Department of Citizenship and Immigration was established. It issued its first report in 1951 and by 1956 had issued a statement on “The Integration of Immigrants in Canada” which involved a shift from the previous focus on racial assimilation to ethnic and cultural integration of Immigrant “Others” (Day, 2000). “Buried within the text,” Day states, “and occurring only once, was a reference to ‘the multicultural structure of the Canadian population’” (p.176). This, he suggests, provided the conditions for the emergence of multiculturalism as state policy.

Certainly there were other factors influencing the inception of multicultural state policies at the time. They are considered to have their origins in the 1960s when Liberal Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the 1963 Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (the B&B Commission). McRoberts explains how the competing nationalisms of Ottawa as “national government” and Quebec as the national government of French Canada following World War II, threatened “to divide English Canadians and French Canadians more profoundly than ever before” (McRoberts, 1997, p. 25-27; 30).

Largely as a response to this newly invigorated Quebec nationalism, the B&B Commission promoted an asymmetrical view of Canadian federalism with equal

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28 Mona Oikawa employs a Foucauldian analysis of “carceral” spaces (the spaces where people are punished, disciplined, and monitored) to examine how the forced movement of 22,000 Japanese people reproduced the hegemonic racial, gendered, and social order of a white nation-state. Despite their Canadian-born citizenship, they were considered a dangerous immigrant “Other” to be monitored and controlled. Communal and familial relations were destroyed and depending on their location (age, class, gender, physical ability, family responsibilities, language, and citizenship status), Japanese Canadians faced different sites of violence, whether it be work or Prisoner-of-War camps, “self-support” sites, agricultural work, domestic work, or exile (Oikawa, 2002).
partnership for the two founding “races” (French Quebec and English Canada: Aboriginals and “Other” immigrants excluded). Opposition to this position quickly mounted, however, from many second and third-generation Canadians of non-French and non-British origin. Some of the greatest opposition came from Ukrainian Canadians originating in the Western prairie provinces. Paul Yuzyk’s 1964 criticism of the B&B Commission, for example, brought attention to the concerns of the third (non-Aboriginal, non-French) immigrant category. He argued that Canada was a multicultural, not a bicultural country and that this element needed greater representation in federal and provincial governments. Such strained relations laid the groundwork for later controversy surrounding multicultural policy implementation.

III. Multicultural Policy Implementation

In 1971, seven years after the establishment of the initial B&B Commission, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau quelled the spirit of French-English dualism and accommodation of Quebec by making a public statement in the House of Commons, the goal of which was to detail a policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual (French-English framework). While the B&B Commission recognized the concept of Canadian dualism and recommended biculturalism as a partnership between political and economic equals, Trudeau substituted “multiculturalism for biculturalism as the basis of government policy” (McRoberts, 1997, 120). In his analysis of the Trudeau policies, Day proclaims that “a new means of differentiating the population was found […] The state could now claim that multiculturalism was about ‘equality’ since the same category was used to describe all Canadians” (Day, 2000, p. 184-185).

Official bilingualism in federal government institutions became, “[t]he centre-piece of Pierre Trudeau’s strategy for integrating Quebec francophones into a new Canadian identity” (McRoberts, 1997, p. 78). McRoberts emphasizes the contradiction in linking multiculturalism with bilingualism: only English and French were to be supported, yet the government claimed to support all cultures without also promoting their languages. By dissociating language and culture, Day argues, the Canadian state was able to uphold English and French as the two official Canadian languages, while not having to grant a superior position to the cultures associated with them.

By attempting to reduce dualism to language alone, McRoberts concludes that Trudeau’s multicultural policies were an affront to the francophone conception of dualism. He condemns Trudeau for dismissing the B&B Commission’s concessions to territoriality in his pursuit of the unattainable goal of reinforcing a French presence throughout Canada. Moreover, he argues that the promotion of official bilingualism at

29 See Paul Yuzyk’s 1964 Senate of Canada speech on multiculturalism in which he states, “Present-day Canada is a country of minorities, and this fact should not be ignored” (Yuzyk, 1964, p.52). The minorities at that time mainly consisted of immigrants originating from Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Scandinavia, and Ukraine, although Yuzyk also includes Jewish immigrants and Aboriginal Canadians in his data. This speech indicates that many of the criticisms made forty years ago are still relevant in multicultural discussions today.

30 This, suggests McRoberts, was a direct “reaction against […] the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism” (McRoberts, 1997, p.117).

31 Trudeau’s official bilingualism project, McRoberts observes, greatly enhanced the role of Quebec francophones but failed to make the public service effectively bilingual because aside from two provinces, Quebec and New Brunswick, the assimilation of francophones continued (McRoberts, 1997).
the provincial and federal level contradicted Quebec’s primary concerns over the French language. The result, McRoberts argues, “was to make the federal order seem hostile to the primary linguistic concerns of Quebec francophones. To that extent, the Trudeau strategy of language reform became a source of conflict and division rather than the instrument of reconciliation it was intended to be” (McRoberts, 1997, p.111). McRoberts concludes that Trudeau’s insistence on multiculturalism impeded all chances for national unity because it undermined the status of French as an official language and worked to intensify the constitutional conflict between Quebec and the rest of Canada.

The apex of Trudeau’s influence came with Constitution Act of 1982, however, which, according to McRoberts, was the outcome of “Trudeau’s long-standing priorities and views” (McRoberts, 1997, p.161). He explains that because it reduced the powers of Quebec and was patriated without the approval of the Quebec government or National Assembly, the Constitution Act was certain to divide French and English Canada. He notes, moreover, that in violating the dualistic compact principles, Trudeau managed to alienate even his federalist supporters in Quebec.

Beginning with the inception of the Trudeau statement in 1971, official government responses were to have lasting effects on the Canadian political sphere. Early policy documents relating to multiculturalism beginning with the 1963-1967 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism were followed by Multiculturalism: Building the Canadian Mosaic (MCBCM) in 1987 and the Canadian Multicultural Act passed by Brian Mulroney’s Conservative government in 1988. The Act was also followed by the creation of a separate federal department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1989. Multicultural policies implemented from the Trudeau era onward reflected earlier strategies by which the Canadian state attempted to manage internal “Others.” As Day suggests, this public state management of

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32 McRoberts blames the Trudeau legacy along with his public interference in the Meech Lake Accord and Charlottetown Accord efforts for Canada’s unresolved constitutional problems. Because English Canadians had become attached to the principle of equality as a legacy of the Trudeau era, McRoberts argues, they rejected the “distinct society” clause in the Meech Lake Accord of 1987. The Charlottetown Accord of 1992, furthermore, was overwhelmingly rejected by Quebec federalists. McRoberts cites the 1993 election results as reflecting the divisions the Trudeau strategy had created in Canada: the election of a Liberal government dependent on English Canadian support, an Official Opposition (the Bloc Québécois) committed to sovereignty, and a strong Reform Party built on direct opposition to accommodating Quebec in the Accords. In his final analysis of the 1995 Quebec referendum, McRoberts contends that the Trudeau vision required primary attachment to Canada and that the only option left for those who identified primarily with Quebec was sovereignty. The close referendum results, he argues, were “the ultimate proof that the Trudeau national unity strategy had failed” (McRoberts, 1997, p. 244).

33 The MCBCM, suggests Day, was a product of the new policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. It clearly defined the goals and approaches of official multiculturalism for legislators and lobbyists and provided the basis for the 1988 Multiculturalism Act (Day, 2000). The 1988 Multiculturalism Act replaced the original statement by Trudeau in 1971.

There is considerable evidence to suggest that multiculturalism has mainly been a symbolic policy, however. It has always received much less funding than English and French bilingualism and recently has been particularly disabled by neoliberal spending cuts. In the 1990s, funding for multiculturalism was around $27 million yearly, but by 1996 had dropped to less than $19 million (Abu-Laban, 1999). The Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship was dismantled in 1996 and now falls under the portfolio of Canadian Heritage. These factors indicate that multiculturalism by itself (and not viewed as a political or economic project as will be demonstrated in the final section of this paper) is not a priority for any federal government.
ethnocultural and racial identities demanded a whirlwind of rational-bureaucratic activity at the federal level. Thus, in the Foucauldian sense, ethnocultural subjects in Canada become subject to management, discipline, and uniformity and become part an intricate web of social regulation in the form of multicultural policy.34

IV. Contemporary Theories of Multiculturalism: Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka

Canadian immigration began to see a decline of immigrants from European origins in the 1970s and an increase in “visible” migrants from the Caribbean, Central and South America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (Stasiulus and Abu-Laban, 2004). Yasmeen Abu-Laban notes that, “while other advanced capitalist countries have also experienced immigration from the Third World, the proportion of immigrants in the Canadian population is about double that of many other countries commonly seen to be affected by immigration” (Abu-Laban, 1999, p.469). The 2001 Census reveals that there were 5.4 million immigrants to Canada and that 18 percent of Canadians were born outside of Canada (Statistics Canada, 2001). This new Canadian immigrant population needed to be fit neatly into existing agendas of multiculturalism and theories of containment.

In his landmark essay, “The Politics of Recognition” (1994) Charles Taylor outlines the importance of the demand for recognition by various minority or “subaltern” collectives (women’s groups, ethnic groups, national movements, environmental movements, religious organizations, gender politics, and so on). Taylor’s premise is that an important link exists between recognition and identity. He explains,

[…]

our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced mode of being. (Taylor, 1994, p.25)

Taylor identifies recognition as part of a social dialogue, as a vital human need for people and central to the discourse of multiculturalism.

There is an inherent contradiction, Taylor argues, between the principle of equal citizenship which has now come to be universally accepted and the principle of the politics of difference. According to Taylor, the two modes of politics (universalism and difference) come into conflict because, “[f]or one, the principle of equal respect requires that we treat people in a difference-blind fashion […] For the other, we have to recognize

34 Theorizations on the abject by Judith Butler (1993; 1999), Julia Kristeva (1982), and Anne Mcclintock (1995) also help delineate the ways in which ethnocultural subjects in Canada are constructed through the forces of exclusion and abjection. Agamben, moreover, theorizes the exception. Liberal rights, suggests Agamben, make the modern individual both a subject and object of state authority and in practice, do little to protect individuals. In the discourse of liberalism, universalism, and equal rights, ethnocultural minority Canadians form the exception that Agamben elucidates. Himani Bannerji confirms the pervasive presence of the state over the lives of non-white and Third World legal and illegal immigrants and new Canadians. The state, she contends, “steadily rules our lives with ‘regulations’” (Bannerji, 2000, p.89).
and even foster particularity” (Taylor, 1994, p.43). Taylor illustrates how these two clashing philosophies of liberal society have become materialized in the Canadian-Quebec constitutional debates. Taylor’s contribution to the discussion consists of his assertion that group recognition such as the Quebec right to self-government can be compatible with individual rights under liberalism. In other words, Quebec (which he assumes is a self-contained, homogenous unit) can gain recognition without sacrifice of such recognition on the part of English Canada outside Quebec or “Other” ethnocultural immigrant groups. His reasoning behind the protection of Quebec group rights is that it is necessary for cultural survival.35

This reveals an aberration from Taylor’s general “hands-off” approach by the state for legislating group rights and what he outlines as procedural forms of liberal democracy. In his discussion of other multicultural demands such as those promoting Afrocentric curricula and enlarging educational curriculum to include women and people of “non-European races and cultures,” for example, Taylor advocates openness and respect for the possible value of or equal dignity of other cultures, rather than publicly endorsed recognition of difference (Taylor, 1994, p.65).36

Charles Taylor and Will Kymlicka on the Aboriginal “Issue:”
Inclusion as a Means of Containment

The reaction to the assimilation proposals contained in Jean Chrétien’s 1969 Federal White Paper on Indian Policy was the catalyst for a powerful Aboriginal nationalist movement. Despite this early attempt to dissolve special treatment for Indigenous peoples through the elimination of treaties and historical Native claims, Aboriginal Canadians continue to hold certain rights and privileges which other “minority groups” in Canada do not have legitimacy to. They have not, however, been able to achieve the collective rights of self-government and self-determination that they aspire to.

In discussions of multiculturalism, both Taylor and Will Kymlicka promote special status for Aboriginal Canadians in combination with special status for Quebec. Taylor calls for “deep” diversity in which Aboriginal or Québécois Canadians would have priority of acknowledgement and acceptance over “Other” cultural (immigrant) groups (Taylor, 1993). Will Kymlicka takes a similar position in rethinking the English-French-Aboriginal partnership and also prioritizes these groups through a form of “asymmetrical multinational federalism” which would grant greater powers to minority nations than to the provinces in which English-speaking Canadians are currently the

35 In this manner, Taylor advocates a return to the B&B Commission’s recommendations “of a strong association between language and culture,” but like Will Kymlicka (as will be explained in the next section), “only for certain groups” (Day, 2000, p.212).
36 What Taylor means by recognition (without political action, redistribution, etc.) remains ambiguous. State recognition of most multicultural groups would not extend to public policy in his view, leaving very little reassurance for members. This position is highly deficient in the fact that it pays only superficial attention to women’s social and political issues. It may be argued that women are not a minority of the population in any sense and require redistributive measures along with recognition. In addition, it is unclear how Taylor would respond to other group demands such as those put forward by environmentalists and which require very concrete action rather than the type of ambiguous recognition that he proposes. Taylor’s “Politics of Recognition,” therefore, is limited by a number of weaknesses.
majority. By breaking the link between nation and state and by challenging the assumption that an independent state is the best form, Kymlicka argues that self-government for both Quebec and Aboriginal people could be achieved to “help secure access to a societal culture” (Kymlicka, 1995, p.101).

Taylor and Kymlicka are, without doubt, the most internationally renowned theorists on Canadian multiculturalism. Nonetheless, their theories are firmly based in the liberal (or in the case of Taylor, the liberal-communitarian) tradition and confused by liberal assumptions regarding equality and universalism. Kymlicka and Taylor are united in their attempts to prioritize two groups of marginalized Canadians, French Quebeckers and Aboriginal peoples (groups who incidentally, they consider to be self-contained, homogenous formations) at the expense of a third, and also highly marginalized segment of the population (“Other” visible minority immigrants). This provides a clear signal that these theorists consider the main virtue of multiculturalism to be its ability to solve the ongoing constitutional crisis. Such limited analysis reveals that little has changed since Trudeau’s initial implementation of the federal strategies decades earlier.

V. Critiques of Liberal Theorizations on Multiculturalism

*Construction and Containment of the Immigrant “Other”*

Day suggests that contemporary multiculturalism does not represent a break with the colonial remainder in the history of Canadian diversity, but reifies the status quo and practices of marginalization (Day, 2000). Many authors agree with this claim. Himani Bannerji, for one, provides an opposing perspective to Taylor and Kymlicka as an antiracist, Marxist feminist rooted in historical materialism. She criticizes Taylor and Kymlicka for ignoring issues of history, social relations, and political power in their limited frameworks of cultural analysis. The author’s objective is to create a critical space of multicultural discussions beyond the most common paradigms of liberal, quasi-liberal, and conservative communitarianism.

Bannerji asserts that Taylor has only a superficial understanding of difference as a cultural category, separated from social relations and inscribed with issues of power such as gender, race, class, capital, ideology, and imperialism. She writes, at the same moment that difference is ideologically evoked it is also neutralized, as though the issues of difference were the same as that of diversity of cultures and identities, rather than that of racism and colonial ethnocentrism- as though our different [immigrant] cultures were on par or could negotiate with the two dominant [English and French] ones! (Bannerji, 2000, p.96).

Bannerji has clear political goals which cannot be addressed through Taylor’s notion of recognition. “It”, Bannerji explains, “is not a plea for recognition that ‘they’ put forward, but rather a struggle to end exploitation and injustice” (p.147). By wishing to “to retain an older European cultural identity in the face of what he considers to be a mass culture

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37 Bannerji’s critique of Taylor’s theorizations on multiculturalism originate in his location within the realms of bourgeois, organic intellectualism and by which she suggests that he portrays an example of “non-official elite multiculturalism” (Bannerji, 2000, p.125).
and exaggerated egalitarianism” (p.128), she suggests that Taylor exacerbates existing inequalities and reifies the dominant position of Anglo-European elite hegemony.  

Daiva Stasiulus also critiques Taylor’s notion of “deep diversity” and its corresponding exclusions. She argues that it relegates the “Others” (non-aboriginal, non-French) to “the status of second-class citizens just as it relegates questions of the representation of ethnic/ racial minorities to a much lower rank of importance than representation of ‘charter groups’” (Stasiulus 1995, p.212). The author puts the harsh reality of the multicultural dynamic into perspective by providing concrete examples of the many forms of social, cultural, and economic exclusion that minorities in Canada face. By doing so, she addresses the weaknesses that Taylor and Kymlicka display in their emphasis on theorization rather than multiculturalism in practice. In this absence, they seem to be missing the causal factors driving minority groups to push for differential treatment. Stasiulus draws attention to the systemic discrimination that ethnic minorities in Canada face. State institutions, she argues, play a central role in drawing the external boundaries of ethnic groups. The author identifies immigration, multiculturalism, employment equity, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as the key federal government policies at the centre of debates over the support and containment of ethnic and racial diversity. As will be demonstrated in the following section, the existing institutions claiming to endorse a multicultural vision provide only a superficial level of ethnic and racial equality in practice.

Boosting the National Project: The Recent Commodification of Multiculturalism

State capital projects have historically played a large role in the national project of multiculturalism. Immigration selection, Abu-Laban and Christina Gabriel argue, has always been strongly influenced by “the perceived needs of the Canadian economy” (Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002, p.167) along with racial objectives. Like Stasiulus, the authors pinpoint immigration policies, multiculturalism, and employment equity as primary sources of exclusion for immigrants to Canada. Individuals who possess human capital (those who are highly skilled, well-educated, and self-sufficient) are welcomed at the expense of those deemed less desirable. Most recently the discourse of globalization has, the authors claim, been informed by neoliberalism. As such, there has been a direct response by,

Canadian policy-makers to the perceived exigencies of globalization- namely, capturing global markets and enhancing Canada’s competitiveness. This interpretation of, and strategy of response to, globalization has resulted in a

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38 Day’s analysis of Kymlicka complements Bannerji’s critique of Taylor. He argues that those who do not consider themselves to be English-Canadian will find that, “despite being ‘recognized,’ they are once again” placed by Kymlicka “in an inferior position in a hierarchy of human types differentiated by what is presumed to be their ‘origin,’ and the place assigned to them in a Eurocentric history of colonization and the play of power” (Day, 2000, p. 216). The offer of Taylor and Kymlicka’s “differentiated citizenship rights,” he suggests, “bestows these rights as a monological gift and places limits on them precisely where they threaten to achieve what multiculturalism is supposed to be about- that is, equal reciprocal recognition between all of the peoples whom a history of violent conquest has cast within the purview of the Canadian state” (Day, 2000, p.210).

39 Until the 1960s, the government had an explicit objective to create a “White Canada” through immigration policies which restricted the entry and permanent settlement of racialized immigrants. Racial minorities were segregated and confined to either service or unskilled labour (Abu-Laban, 2000).
serving of diversity, whereby the skills, talents, and ethnic backgrounds of men and women are commodified, marketed, and billed as trade-enhancing. (p.12)

The authors conclude that the new multiculturalism in Canada is not just about inclusiveness, but about national and global competitiveness. This profoundly narrow vision of diversity, they stress, is “basically a selling-out of an agenda based on pursuing substantive equality for those marginalized by race/ethnicity, gender, and class” (p.173). Multiculturalism, therefore, recreates itself into slightly different form, but continues to reinforce and reproduce unequal power relations today.

Theorizations on Exclusionary Citizenship: Gender, Race, and Employment

Visible minority workers (Aboriginal people or visible immigrant “Others”) share certain commonalities. The location of these categories of workers results in various dimensions of economic and social exclusion within Canada. The 2001 Census reveals that the average income of First Nations people was 64 percent of that of other Canadians and that the low income or poverty rate was 2.4 times the national average, meaning one in three Aboriginal families lives in poverty. Andrew Jackson surmises that Indigenous people are at a disadvantage in the job market because many live on reserves or in rural areas far from job opportunities, because average education levels are low, and because they confront discrimination in the workplace. He states, “To a large degree, the job issues facing Aboriginal people are inseparable from the wider economic and social problems facing Aboriginal communities” (Jackson, 2005, p.117).

In an analysis of employment patterns, it is important to note, however, that the bulk of the growth of the Canadian labour force is neither constituted by First Nations people nor Canadian-born residents. Instead, it now comes from immigration. Visible minority workers, nonetheless, are lower paid, have much less job security than other workers despite higher-than-average levels of education, and risk greater levels of unemployment. Both new immigrants and Canadian-born visible minority workers earned only 85.5 percent of the average for all earners according to the 2001 Census (Jackson, 2005).

The breadth and scope of this paper limit thorough analysis of the impacts of neoliberal economic restructuring in Canada over recent decades. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the Canadian labour market has become increasingly polarized, with vulnerable populations such as youth, women, and immigrants over-represented in contingent work and more likely to experience the full impact of labour market deregulation (Fudge and Vosko, 2003). Neoliberal economic restructuring results in

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40 Wallace substantiates these claims stating, “Unemployment among Aboriginal peoples remains much higher than among non-Aboriginal Canadians, and the problem is more difficult to solve because of the higher growth rate of the Aboriginal working-age population. This demographic characteristic of Aboriginal communities and the lack of economic opportunities keep unemployment rates high on reserves and contribute to urban Aboriginal unemployment rates that are often three times higher than the overall average (Globe and Mail, 24 June 1999). High unemployment rates also reflect social pathologies (such as children born with fetal alcohol syndrome) that are themselves rooted in cultural dislocation” (Wallace, 2002, p.238).

41 The 2001 Census also revealed that the low income or poverty rate was 27.2 percent for visible minority people, or 2.5 times the national average (Jackson, 2005).

42 Along with shifts in the standard employment relationship (limited benefits, temporary work, and so on), deregulation involves substantial challenges to collective bargaining and labour market policies such as unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, and public pensions. In Canada, both implicit and
differential outcomes for various groups in society and the particular structural position that women of colour occupy in the labour market makes them more vulnerable to adverse effects (Gabriel, 2001).

Examination of the employment patterns of recent visible minority immigrants to Canada, and women in particular, confirms Abu-Laban’s and Gabriel’s claims of new manifestations of exclusion based on the intersection of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and labour status. The 2002 United Nations International Migration Report ranked Canada seventh out of twenty countries having the largest migrant populations. In 2004, there were 9,101 females between the ages of 18 to 64 years recorded as “net temporary emigrants” to Canada (Statistics Canada, 2005). Unfortunately, upon their arrival, these women workers face limited employment options and are clearly constrained by gender, racial, ethnic, and class inequalities. In the Canadian context, women of colour are highly concentrated in the domestic sector (employed for purposes of childcare, eldercare, and housework), garment homework, cleaning, service industries, and factory work. These are considered to be forms of precarious employment as they involve “atypical employment contracts, limited social benefits and statutory entitlements, job insecurity, low job tenure, low earnings, poor working conditions and high risks of ill health” (Cranford, Vosko, and Zukewich, 2003, p. 455). The particular location of women workers in the employment hierarchy both limits and controls their opportunities for social and labour protections as well as their potential citizenship status. This results in the contradictory nature of inclusion/exclusion of immigrant women workers. As well, notes Janine Brodie, privatization and the erosion of the welfare state have the effect of “forcing health, child, and elderly care back onto the family and the unpaid work of women” or, alternatively onto the market, as in the case of domestic work (Brodie, 1995, p.53-54). Thus, women have been disproportionately assigned to the low-wage, contingent workforce and to a greater burden of unpaid care and domestic work.

Essentially, jobs in Canada are becoming polarized, with differences being reinforced on the basis of gender and race (McKeen and Porter, 2003).

While certainly issues of the polarization of labour are part of a complex web of national and international forces, multiculturalism does little to improve the employment situations of visible minority workers in practice. An examination of gender, race, and employment reveals that multicultural constructions become problematic as they do not guarantee social and citizenship rights for racial and ethnic minorities in reality (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Racism in the Canadian labour market clearly restricts many visible

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43 In Canada, 5,826,000 people or 18.9 percent of the population are migrants (United Nations, 2002).
44 Stasiulus demonstrates that state policies of cultural diversity and racial equality are deficient on many levels. The author reveals that the enforcement of the 1986 Employment Equity Act (an attempt to integrate female, Aboriginal, visible minorities, and people with disabilities into federally regulated spheres and the public service) for example, has been inefficient due to its lack of specific goals and timetables, poor monitoring mechanisms, and ineffective sanctions. She notes that the Act and the Charter only protect individuals from the actions of government while not covering the majority of discriminatory practices by
minority men and women in their choices of employment, a fact that multicultural theories and policies are unable to transcend. Inclusion, therefore, remains elusive for the majority of people of colour and, instead, differential citizenship rights are bestowed upon workers in the context of the Canadian state.

VI. Conclusion

Theories and policies of multiculturalism must be considered in light of Canada’s long colonial legacy and continuous attempts at governmental management of ethnocultural minorities. While initial forms of exclusion were directed towards the Black Africville community, Acadians, Aboriginal peoples, the Québécois, and “Other” immigrants, the hierarchy of state oppression has seen a transformation from its initial forms. Since the late 1960s, Canadian state policies have had one thing in common: containment of the “Other,” whether it be the “Other” from Quebec (which was the catalyst for Trudeau’s 1971 statement on multiculturalism), the “Other,” who is Aboriginal (the force behind the rejected 1969 White Paper on Indian Policy), or the “Other,” visible minority immigrants to Canada (the impetus behind the 1988 Multiculturalism Act, the formation of the federal department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship, and so on). Today, visible minorities who constitute the majority of recent immigrants to Canada experience a complex new web of domination based on the intersection of gender, race, ethnicity, class, and labour status.

Unfortunately, Canadian theories of multiculturalism have not reduced hierarchical privileging of the dominant, white, English-speaking Euro-Canadian identity over “Other” marginalized segments of the population. Instead, different groups can still be seen to possess specific locations on a three-tier level of oppression. According to multicultural theorists Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, the first tier includes francophone Quebeckers, the second Aboriginal Canadians, and the third “Other” and visible minority immigrants to Canada.

An investigation of multiculturalism in this context substantiates Charles Mills’ assertions in The Racial Contract. As the author makes clear, “Whiteness is not really a color at all, but a set of power relations” that puts “the fact of domination front and center” (Mills, 2001, p.127; p.76). It is difficult to rectify domination and hierarchies of racism because racial and gender inequality is inherent in the structures of liberalism, and therefore, liberal theories and policies of multiculturalism itself. In the Canadian context, racial exclusion becomes part and parcel of mainstream political practice, and, as such, becomes a more attenuated form of racism. Instead of improving the conditions of marginalized groups, critics conclude that inequality among gender, ethnic, racial, and
class lines have merely become *depoliticized*.\textsuperscript{47} For this reason, attention needs to be drawn to the deficiencies of multiculturalism and the practices of exclusionary citizenship. Only by highlighting the problems and weaknesses inherent in the existing framework can alternative visions and transformative social justice projects emerge. Multiculturalism in Canada needs to be *repoliticized* in order to break down barriers of discrimination and reconstruct citizenship among more pluralistic lines.

\textsuperscript{47} Day concludes that any forms of local autonomy and identity which currently do exist in Canada, “have survived, not by virtue of a history of multiculturalist tolerance, but through determined *resistance* to a statist dream of a perfectly striated space of social order” (Day, 2000, p.3).
References


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