

Don't You Know That Tears are Not Enough? Transnational Campaigns, Canadian Foreign Aid and the Politics of Shame

**Elizabeth Smythe, Political Science,
Concordia University College of Alberta,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
elizabeth.smythe@concordia.ab.ca**

Paper presented at the Annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, May 30, 2007, Saskatoon.

*We can bridge the distance
Only we can make the difference
Don't you know that tears are not enough*

*If we can pull together
We can change the world forever
Heaven knows that tears are not enough*
(Adams, Foster and Vallance, 1985)

So sang a group of 50 Canadian singers in February 1985 as part of an international response of recording artists to the famine in Ethiopia. As part of a British-initiated campaign led by Bob Geldof the Canadian effort, including the sales of singles, a music video and concerts, along with a major national fund-raising campaign, ultimately raised 32 million dollars over 5 years. While a successful charitable endeavour, these efforts did not “change the world forever” partly because, as critics noted, the campaign did little to promote a broader understanding of the sources of the famine beyond the weather, and particularly ignored issues such as colonialism, the superpower rivalry in the Horn of Africa and the origins of the civil war in Ethiopia. While fund-raising for good causes by recording artists has not disappeared even celebrity-driven campaigns have moved away from a charitable model to one that seeks to directly address global justice in policy terms and advocate for change. The past two decades have also seen the development and proliferation of transnational networks of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other actors that have challenged corporate globalization and its neo-liberal ideas. This paper examines the effectiveness of these trans-national advocacy campaigns in influencing Canadian aid policy. It also looks at broad, often celebrity-based, mass mobilization campaigns and their effectiveness through a case study of the global campaign against poverty launched in 2005 and its Canadian version Make Poverty History (MPH). The paper thus is imbedded in two areas of study, the role of transnational social movements (TSMs) and networks in international relations and Canadian foreign policy. While the issues of trans-national movements and networks have been subjects of great interest in international relations they have been largely dismissed or relegated to the margins of the study of Canadian foreign policy. Mainstream Canadian foreign policy, as evidenced by the major textbooks and journals, remains firmly rooted in a state-centric approach, heavily oriented around security and economic prosperity questions (Smith, 2005) with the latter defined largely in terms of access to the US market. What attention there has been to these transnational movements and networks has come more from critical scholars, many of them examining the increasing involvement of Canadian movements and NGOs in these broad coalitions (Macdonald, Ayres) where, in some cases, they have played important roles. Why groups seek to be part of these broader coalitions in order to influence Canadian foreign policy, and how effective they are, has rarely been a subject of inquiry –something this paper seeks to change.

The paper is divided into four sections. The first section reviews the literature on transnational networks and social movements particularly as it relates to the Global Social Justice Movement. The second section looks at the origins of the global campaign seeking to address poverty, its organization, demands and targets. It also

examines some of the controversies and issues that arose from the celebrity-based nature of the campaign, especially its high profile British version, and the activities and concerts, known as Live8, which specifically targeted the G8. The celebrity based campaign in the run up to the 2005 G8 raised troubling questions for many anti-poverty and global justice activists and highlights the tensions inherent in broad trans-national coalitions and campaigns. This section also looks at the changing focus of the G-CAP campaign after the G8 and the efforts to move to a more grassroots and southern centered campaign which, while it allows more space and diverse voices has over all garnered less public and media attention.

The third section of the paper examines the national form of the campaign in Canada, also called Make Poverty History outlining the organization, demands and actions of the campaign, focussing in particular on the issue of foreign aid and the campaign's targeting of the minority Liberal and then Conservative governments.

The conclusion provides a brief assessment of the impact of such campaigns at the global and at a national level in Canada and highlights some of the challenges and dilemmas the campaign has faced. It discusses the potential, as well as its limits, as a tool of change for social justice within a context of corporate globalization.

Transnational Advocacy

Scholars in international relations and students of social movements (primarily in sociology) have noted the increasing presence of transnational networks in recent decades. Their proliferation and impact have become the subjects of much study and debate. For international relations scholars much of the analysis has sought to explain why these movements emerge and under what conditions they are effective (Keck and Sikkink). Attention has been focused, in particular, on their impact in terms of changing international norms, creating and framing issues and setting agendas. Strategies used to influence procedures and policies of states or international organizations have also been a subject of scrutiny. Strategies have included the deliberate recruitment of external, third party actors (often states or other intergovernmental organizations) to pressure a state (the so-called boomerang), to hold it accountable when not living up to its own claims. (Keck and Sikkink, 23). In the case of those analyzing social movements the focus has been on the emerging organizational forms of loose networks of activists, and why local groups seek to resort to, or integrate with, a global network. Other analysts have focused on how transnational identities are formed, the repertoire of actions groups draw on, the resources that movements can mobilize, and the role of political opportunities in shaping strategy and success.

Scholars have identified several common trends in these movements and networks. One is that communication technologies have both facilitated and shaped the kind of networks which have emerged and the way in which they tailor or develop campaigns to maximize local and global media attention. In terms of structure they have noted that these networks are very loose, decentralized, inclusive and flat, ie leaderless (Clark). In the case of the global social justice networks that have emerged around globalization and neo-liberalism, those involved have included a variety of actors ranging from the traditional, moderate, reformist non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the more direct action, radical or transformative groups. Consequently tension over goals and tactics is very much a part of these networks (Bennett) and their repertoire of actions include both traditional type interest- group lobbying activities, at both the local and

global level, and the more contentious forms of activity such as protests and direct action. In addition groups operate on multiple levels and networks ranging from the global to the local and move among these levels strategically, called scaling. In the case of the global social justice movement the targets of these campaigns have been private actors, such as corporations (and the World Economic Forum) and states, as well as international governmental organizations (IGOs) and institutions that have a role in global economic governance, including the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the G8. One of the key debates among scholars, particularly those on the left, is how effective these networks have been in countering or checking the powerful forces of neo-liberalism.

Beyond their opposition to various aspects of corporate globalization and neo-liberalism these networks have also begun to create public spaces where they can articulate and develop alternative models of globalization. This has been seen most notably in the development of the World Social Forum (WSF) since 2001 and its now myriad regional and local manifestations.

The Transnational Campaign Against Poverty

The emergence of the transnational campaign on global poverty must be seen within the context of two factors. One was the increased attention to questions of global poverty and inequality. While these issues had been given voice in the UN Millennium Summit of September 2000 they quickly become eclipsed in the aftermath of 9/11, but re-emerged as the result of growing criticism both on the part of civil society, developing-country members of organizations like the WTO, and tragedies such as the HIV/Aids pandemic in Africa. The second impetus for the campaign was the confluence of a number of events and political agendas related to global economic governance that came together in the summer and fall of 2005, including the G8 meeting in Scotland, the UN Millennium Summit which would include a stocktaking on development, and the WTO Ministerial Meeting in December 2005. These events and the growing attention to questions of poverty provided an opportunity to raise the issue and provide a focal point for more a concerted effort to push for faster progress on the Millennium Development Goals (appendix). The British branch of Oxfam was especially keen on a campaign and in September 2004, Oxfam initiated a meeting in Johannesburg South Africa to begin planning. According to the notes from the meeting posted on the Global Call to Action Against Poverty (G-CAP) website the organizations which participated indicated:

We do not endeavour to reach absolute agreement on a detailed global policy platform, but we do want to pressure governments to eradicate poverty and to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. We want

- Trade justice
- Debt cancellation
- A major increase in the quantity and quality of aid
- National efforts to eliminate poverty and achieve the Millennium goals that are sustainable and developed and implemented in a way that is democratic, transparent, and accountable to citizens”

Membership and organization were outlined as follows:

Any non-profit organization willing to support the core message and joint action is invited to become involved. The main level of co-ordination will be national platforms, layered under regional networks. National activities will be home grown, will include national priorities and national demands and will build on existing initiatives. Mass mobilization and people-centred advocacy will be key to the campaign. (www.whiteband.org)

The network was to be loosely organized around a plenary of groups, the Global Action Forum, and an International Facilitation Group, a smaller committee to undertake most of the tasks of coordination and communication. The latter was composed of representatives from various geographic regions eg Latin America and the Caribbean,¹ and a group of organizations which were to represent “international networks, trade unions, religious groups and other civil society actors” and which seems to be largely development and other NGOs and labour organizations, primarily based in the North. The meeting identified three key events in 2005 that would be focal points of the campaign for coordinated action on specific dates, July 1 to coincide with the G8 meeting in Scotland, September 10 during the UN Millennium Summit+5 in New York and December 10 during the WTO ministerial meeting in Hong Kong. An activist from South Africa, Kumi Naidoo head of Civicus was chosen as chairperson.

The international launch of the G-CAP was to take place at the fifth World Social Forum (WSF) in Porto Alegre Brazil in January 2005. The launch was somewhat controversial in the way in which it was done. The rally was held on the opening day of the WSF, January 26 in Porto Alegre Brazil in Gigantinho Stadium (technically not on the grounds of the WSF venue but adjacent to it) where Brazilian president Lula was clearly the centrepiece. Since, under its charter of principles, elected political leaders are not welcome in their official capacity at the WSF this was clearly a violation of the spirit, if not the letter, of the charter. For some sceptics the launch was troubling both in Lula’s efforts to use it for his own purposes and in the way in which they saw the WSF becoming part of a largely reformist project. As two observers wrote:

Lula’s intervention in Porto Alegre was part of this project to rebuild support for social-liberal governments by repackaging neo-liberalism as the way to help the world’s poor....Maybe the domestic political pressures on the Brazilian organizers of the WSF were simply too great for them to resist the demand that the Forum itself should be a venue for the attempt of Third Way politicians to appropriate the agenda of the altermondialiste movement. (Callinicos and Nineham)

It foreshadowed a debate around both the rationale of the campaign and its close link to political agendas, a debate which was to plague the campaign in Britain in particular.

The organizers followed a model of a fairly loose, but coordinated series of actions which were to be civil-society based, open, inclusive and participatory involving grassroots organizations and remaining “flexible and light” in its structure. There was a conscious effort however, to identify and brand key symbols and actions featuring the colour white, the white bands and “strategic partnerships with media specialists.” While it is not possible to document the events and activities over one year in over 80 countries the activities included traditional lobbying, rallies, open letters to, for example, the G8

1 The other regions include North America, Arab Region, Europe, North Africa/Middle East, Asia.

finance ministers, as well as marches, and the symbolic wrapping of various emblematic public spaces, such as the Sydney Harbour Bridge and London's St. Paul's cathedral in white banners. The latter was clearly reminiscent of the Jubilee 2000 campaigns encircling the G8 venue in Birmingham in 1998 where 70,000 people linked up to form the chain of debt. The campaign however, also had a very heavy focus on the use of celebrities and what we might call "moral icons" (for example, Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu) to draw attention to their message. Most well known were the "click ads" in North America and Europe and the "snap ads" as they were known in Africa. In these television ads, celebrities, often actors or recording artists wearing white T-shirts (and of course, white bands), looking serious and keeping silent, would snap their fingers every 3 seconds to symbolize the unnecessary death of a child due to extreme poverty as the voiceover indicated. The reliance on movie and music celebrities to get the message out was not new, Oxfam, one of the architects of this campaign, had enlisted celebrities in its Make Trade Fair Campaign (the Big Noise) two years earlier. The celebrity aspect was again to reach its zenith in the UK campaign and in the Live8 concerts and the activities of U2's Bono and Bob Geldof of LiveAid fame.

Make Poverty History-the British version

The British campaign, using the slogan Make Poverty History, is discussed here because it illustrates so well the many tensions and challenges of the campaign. Three issues emerged which threatened to split the campaign and led to much scepticism and concern among global justice activists. The first was the closeness of many key people in the UK campaign to the Blair government and the Chancellor Gordon Brown. Many blamed this on Oxfam UK and the revolving door between its staff and the government. Magazines like the *New Statesman* and *Red Pepper* and even mainstream newspapers reported on the link. It raised questions about the extent to which the campaign was being co-opted to suit a political agenda which Blair and Brown had defined through the Commission on Africa and Blair's plans for the G8. Cynics saw his effort to focus on poverty and Africa as designed to deflect from or politically atone for Blair's role in attacking Iraq.

A second issue was the role of corporations and powerful media people in the campaign including major advertising firms, film directors and a Scottish clothing chain-store tycoon. This led to the scandal of the white bands which had been stamped with advertising logos of major clothing brands, some of which were known to be sourced from sweatshops (Hogkinson, 2005b). The third issue which troubled many was the attempt to create a mass mobilization around a watered down, slick and superficial set of ideas and actions - a sort of activism lite where millions of people could feel they had taken action by wearing a white band, text messaging the G8 from their cell-phones, or watching a rock concert and snapping their fingers.

Some of the worst fears of sceptics were realized in the hype around the Live8 concerts, the efforts to stifle and marginalize those criticizing the British government especially in regards to the Iraq war, and the egregious and self-congratulatory role of Bono, and even worse, Bob Geldof in crowing about the success of the G8₂ (Monbiot) .

2 Geldof graded the G8 results as scoring 10 out of 10 on aid and 8 out of 10 on debt, which Monbiot and others have strongly criticized.

Make Poverty History: The Canadian Version

Why did Canadian activists and organizations become part of the trans-national network and how did they see it fitting with their goals? Part of the answer lies in the links and contacts activists in Canada have with other groups. The organizations involved in development work under the umbrellas of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) in English Canada and Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale (AQOCI) have links with various international networks as a result of past campaigns on global justice issues. Key players in the CCIC such as Oxfam and World Vision had close ties with Oxfam UK and Debt, Aids, Trade, Africa (DATA, Bono's NGO) and were aware of the Oxfam initiative. The goals of the global campaign also fit with the desire of the Canadians to raise the profile of the issue in Canada and the growing concerns groups had about the Martin government in the spring of 2005, especially after the release in April of the government's widely anticipated International Policy Statement. The statement, titled *A Role of Pride and Influence in the World* was very heavy on empty rhetoric and light on any serious development commitments especially to the goal of raising Canada's commitment of official development assistance (ODA) to the level of .7 of Gross National Income (GNI). A level that former prime minister Lester Pearson had identified in a World Bank sponsored global commission in 1969 as necessary to achieve development. The UN had adopted the target in 1997 and reiterated the need to reach this level to eliminate poverty by 2015 as set out in the Millennium Development Goals.

The domestic political context offered some opportunities in the view of activists to push for greater aid levels especially in the context of the minority government situation, the growing federal budget surplus and values, especially the over all public support for an active international role in development assistance. Canadian values and their reflection in our international commitments have been the subject of much comment, especially in terms of the gap between the government rhetoric and the reality of our commitments abroad and the failure to realize many of the values we champion abroad at home (Howell). However, the manipulation of appeals to these values on the part of the Canadian government also provided some leverage for groups critical of Canada's minimal efforts and weak commitments to further global justice. Part of the strategy then was to use international institutions and external actors to help name and shame the Canadian government on the gap between the espoused values and its actual commitments. Moral leverage and "the mobilization of shame" is a strategy often used by local groups in working with transnational networks and is based on the assumption that "governments value the good opinion of others" (Keck and Sikkink), clearly the case with the Martin government which had aspirations to global leadership.

The Canadian campaign was organized based on a steering committee composed of representatives from 19 organizations (see appendix) including the Assembly of First Nations, various development NGOs (Oxfam, WUSC, CUSO), labour (the Canadian Labour Congress) and national anti-poverty organizations. The co-chairs were Gerry Barr of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation and Maria Luisa Monreal of the Association québécoise des organismes de coopération internationale (AQOCI).

The Canadian campaign followed the model of the G-CAP and outlined the three goals of more and better aid, trade justice and debt cancellation but added the fourth of putting an end to child poverty in Canada. This was something the House of Commons

had committed to back in 1989 to be achieved by the year 2000. But in 2005 there were still, according to the MPH campaign, over one million children living in poverty. The Canadian campaign also followed the model of using celebrities and moral icons (Stephen Lewis) to raise the profile. The click ads featured well-known singers like Bryan Adams, Sarah McLachlan and Gordon Lightfoot. Over 500 groups and organizations signed on to the campaign, from labour unions, development NGOs to local service and advocacy groups, ranging from Egale to the Burnaby Public Library! Each group simply had to endorse the platform and provide some contact information. Hundreds of local and national events were organized around the three key dates.

A focal point for the Canadian campaign was the website, clearly oriented toward youth. It was designed to be a space where groups and citizens could find information, download resources, register their activities and ideas and click to instantly send a message to the government. It also provided an educative element in the ability of those on the website to drill down on topics for more in depth information. In addition the technology allowed for quick communication with those active in the campaign during election times and afforded the possibility to coordinate actions and input to policymakers.

Activities organized at the local level around key dates ran the gamut from marches to educational events and traditional lobbying alongside the “click TV ads and newspaper ads. In addition as a result of links to music promoter and Toronto resident Michael Cohl “Sir Bob” blessed Canada as well with a Live8 concert. Given the desire to send a message to government the concert most appropriately should have been held on Parliament Hill but given the lack of cooperation of authorities there, and the lack of an available venue in Toronto, it took place on July 2 in Barrie Ontario (Deibel) featuring many of Canada’s most well-known rock groups and popular singers. Unlike the British campaign, however, the Canadian one was free from scandal regarding white bands, all of which were union made and sold either through the chain of stores Ten Thousand Villages or via the local organizations that were part of the network.

Nor were the Canadian organizers of MPH seen to be in bed with the government-far from it. Despite their distance from the government there were some reasons for optimism however, that the campaign might resonate with the government. These related to the fact that the Martin government was in a minority situation, that the government was running one of the largest budget surpluses of any G8 member and that the Prime Minister had already committed to increasing foreign aid. Moreover, Martin in his international dealings, sought to distance himself somewhat from the United States which was resistant to making such a commitment on increasing aid.

In terms of foreign aid the demands of the MPH campaign were fairly clear:
Reach the UN target of 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) by 2015 by committing to a timetable to increase aid by 12% in each of the next 3 years and by 15% thereafter.

Enact legislation to make "ending poverty" the exclusive goal of Canadian foreign aid in a way consistent with our human rights' obligations.

There were also some advantages to Canadian activists in being part of a broader transnational network. Blair’s ambitions for the G8 summit and his presidency of the

EU meant that the UK would press hard for the European Union (EU) to move on increased aid. This did indeed prove to be the case when EU foreign and development ministers meeting May 24, 2005 approved a timetable to meet a pledge of 0.7 percent of gross national income (GNI) in official development aid (ODA) by 2015. With the EU G8 members onside it left only the United States, Japan and Canada as key members who had not put forward a timetable to reach the .7 goal. Being part of the broader international campaign, in this case, meant that the high profile campaigners and other G8 governments would be able to name and shame the G8 holdouts, including Canada.

Canadian Aid: a long way to go

Canada had in fact been long underperforming, despite the rhetoric of governments, in its support for development. Since 1960 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has been monitoring aid performance of its member countries through the work of its development assistance committee (DAC). The DAC's mandate is to expand the resources available for development assistance and improve the effectiveness of aid. The primary mechanism for doing this, as is the case with many OECD activities, is through member cooperation and consultation, peer review and the publication of standardized and comparable statistics on aid flows. Thus Canada's ranking within the OECD DAC figures is both an indication of Canada's performance and a reflection of its reputation among its aid-giving peers. As the following chart indicates Canadian aid, in comparison to other OECD members, had a long way to go to even match the average country effort of the OECD donor countries never mind achieving .7 per cent of GNI. In fact the high point of Canadian aid efforts was reached in 1988 when Canada came close to matching the OECD average. The column on the right indicates the size of the gap Canada would have to make up in order to even reach the OECD average country effort.

Chart 1 Closing the Gap? Canada and OECD Official development assistance as % of GNI 1984-2005

Year	Canada	OECD Ave country effort³	CAN's GAP
1988	0.5	0.52	-.2


³ Average country effort refers to the unweighted average of each country's aid as a per cent of GNI. This is a more directly comparable measure across OECD countries, large and small, in terms of the proportion of their economic wealth they contribute as aid.

1989	0.44	0.45	
1990	0.44	0.46	
1991	0.45	0.49	
1992	0.46	0.5	
1993	0.45	0.46	
1994	0.43	0.45	
1995	0.38	0.42	-4
1996	0.32	0.4	-8
1997	0.34	0.4	
1998	0.3	0.4	
1999	0.28	0.4	-12
2000	0.25	0.39	-14
2001	0.22	0.39	-17
2002	0.28	0.4	-12
2003	0.24	0.41	-17
2004	0.27	0.42	-15
2005	0.34	0.47	-13

By 2001 the gap had widened enormously despite the Canadian success of wrestling the government's deficit to the ground. Despite the appearance of large budget surpluses in the millennium government had done little to bridge the gap

In contrast a number of small northern European countries had already well surpassed both the OECD average and the target of .7. While Canadian aid had increased slightly over the previous year (2004) the ratio of ODA to Gross National Income (GNI) at .27 in 2005 still put it in twelfth place among the 22 members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee, lagging well behind most of Europe as it has for much of the past decade. Not something a country espousing internationalism, soft power and multilateral commitments could view with any sort of pride. Perhaps the obsessive need to compare Canada to the US, which normally ranks at the bottom of the DAC list, accounts for the lack of concern about Canada's reputation as an aid donor, despite the tendency for foreign policy analysts and official to talk about the 3D's of foreign policy, defence, development and diplomacy. As other have noted (Smith) the only D that has seen significant amounts of funding has been defence. Defence spending in 2005 had held at 1.2 per cent of GNI, well over 13 billion dollars. Though down from its high point of 1.9 per cent of GNI in the later post-war period current policies seem to be increasingly re-balanced in favour of the military. This has gone so far, as noted below, to include trying to re-classify a part of security, military –related expenditures as Canadian foreign aid.

Chart 2 Canadian ODA



Source: OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 2006.

Despite Canada’s dismal aid record politicians seeking to push their own political agendas in the context of a minority government were willing to take up the issue as reflected in MPs in the House of Commons endorsing the goal of .7 in the spring of 2005. The government’s long-awaited *International Policy Statement* released in April had however, been disappointingly weak on international development. In June 2005, an all-party report by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, studying the Liberal government’s *International Policy Statement*, called on the government:

to act upon the near-unanimous recommendations of Committee witnesses from 2003 to date to honour the Millennium Development Goals and to commit immediately, through a plan, to increase Canada’s aid budget by 12 to 15% annually to achieve an aid level of 0.5% of Canada’s Gross National Product by 2010 and 0.7% of Canada’s GNP by 2015.....and to provide a legislative mandate for Canadian ODA exclusively focused on poverty reduction in the context of Canada’s human rights obligations” and “to improve our aid effectiveness by strengthening the partnership with civil society, both in Canada and overseas. (House of Commons, 2005)

The Liberal government had committed to increasing the international assistance budget envelope by 8 per cent per year, but as a result of a two-year budget deal with the New Democrats had added a further \$500 million. However, it is also clear in the amount of funds going to Afghanistan and Iraq (including debt forgiveness) that security rather than poverty concerns continued to drive the policy agenda. Still there seemed to be some signs that the government would be vulnerable to pressure, both domestic and international.

Tears clearly are not enough! Shame might help

In terms of the goal of increasing foreign aid the key events for the Canadian MPH campaign were clearly the G8 meeting in Gleneagles Scotland in July 2005 and the September UN Millennium Assembly. The MPH campaign went into high gear on several levels in the spring of 2005. There was a clear effort to name and shame the Prime Minister using the celebrities and moral icons of various sorts. On June 7 an open letter signed by international celebrities including Bono, Geldof and Desmond Tutu, along with Margaret Atwood, Sara McLachland, and Steven Lewis was sent to Finance Minister Ralph Goodale as one of the G8 finance ministers. It called on Canada to commit to .7 by 2015 and target aid to the poorest countries. This was followed by Geldof weighing in with a newspaper and on line op ed piece which told the Prime Minister, "Hey, Paul Martin: The ball's in your court to make poverty a thing of the past".

An historic deal is now in sight. Paul Martin can be the man who pushes the deal through. He has a unique opportunity to make poverty history. It is his for the taking. If Canada commits to the 0.7-per-cent target, the U.S. and Japan will face intense pressure to deliver. We can accept no half-measures or small-time initiatives. An entire country, and increasingly the global media, and a generation of Africans, are looking now to you, Canada. The spotlight is on your next move. (*Globe and Mail* June 15, 2005).

Geldof's pressure on the Canadian prime minister was aided abetted by the Canadian members of MPH, especially World Vision Canada which via a memo had supplied Geldof with the necessary information about Canadian aid levels and the fact that the progenitor of the .7 goal was in fact the Nobel prize winning Canadian prime minister Lester Pearson (Diebel). A few days after the op ed piece Geldof opined publicly: "there's no use your prime minister coming to Scotland," for the G-8 summit in July 2005 unless he plans to make that commitment there. "If he's not prepared, stay at home." Critics went on to claim that by resisting increasing commitments on aid Martin was in fact providing cover for the US. These efforts seemed to have a limited effect. In fact by the time of the G8 meetings Blair had conceded that a commitment to .7 was off the agenda although he was able to point to the commitment to double aid to Africa. Martin though clearly on the defensive was unapologetic about refusing to commit to the timetable of 2015.

Look, the fact is that we each have a job to do. My job is to make sure that we achieve the 0.7 and I'm going to do that, and his (*Bono's*) job is to push me to do it as quickly as we possibly can, and do it more quickly than I would have set out. He's doing his job and I'm doing mine.

We have said we are going to double our aid to Africa. There are no conditions on that. There are no monies that have to be raised. It is budgeted and it is part of our ongoing cash projections.

And then, having achieved that, we're going to go beyond that. And, in fact, it is our intention to do what we have done with other targets, and that is to beat our targets and to build on them. (CBC, July 7, 2005).

Despite the budget surplus and their willingness to make a ten-year health care funding commitment to the provinces both Martin and Goodale claimed that the cost to reach .7 was formidable and that those leaders who had already committed to the target were disingenuous. Martin argued the other leaders were simply committing to something that would not have to be delivered until they were out of office:

Instead of dealing with the problems the way that people ought to deal with the problems, what in fact they're doing is they're giving in to short-term political pressure, (to) get their pictures in the paper, make an announcement, go home to favourable headlines and then forget about it.... Well, I'm not going to do that.

The MPH campaign fared little better with the Prime Minister on aid in September 2005 at the UN Millennium Summit. The press reported that "PM Martin chastised international economic development, calling the global record 'far from brilliant' but then left out two paragraphs from his prepared text that stated donor countries must do more." Even the popstars gave the UN Assembly a failing grade on poverty. Gerry Barr, the MPH co-chair of the MPH campaign, said Martin's speech was "all attitudinal and so empty of action. It was all just pretty, nicely crafted notions."

After the government fell in November, 2005, with an election coming in late January the MPH campaign weighed in on the federal election. Steven Lewis, who had been outspoken in attacking the G8 results as "flim-flam" called upon Canadians in a statement for MPH:

"We are clearly heading into an election campaign. There is every reason in the world for every one of us, including our political leaders, to embrace the targets of the Make Poverty History campaign. This issue needs to be raised at every all-candidates' meeting, in every riding, and in every possible fashion, to get Canada to embrace a schedule by which the 0.7% target will be reached. I call on all parties to explicitly state in their party platforms their commitment to reach 0.7% in the immediate future, preferably by 2010. Canadians want this. Our leaders should act."
- Stephen Lewis speaking at Carleton University, Ottawa, November 22, 2005
(CCIC press release, November 24, 2005).

The website of the MPH campaign provided a kit for voters which included the platforms of the main parties. Clearly all the main parties felt the need to address the issue. Even the Conservatives had pledged to increase aid more than the Liberals, although again they did not commit to reach .7 by 2015 despite their earlier support for that goal in the House of Commons. Rather they sought to at least attain the DAC, OECD average country effort of .42. Hardly and inspiring goal for Canada.

With the election of a minority Conservative government on January 23 2006, the stage was set for some improvement in aid levels and the MPH campaign continued to lobby for this. However, the budget was a further disappointment. Despite promises made in the election and during the MPH campaign the Conservatives did not even mention foreign aid in the May 2 budget merely continuing the Liberal policy of increasing aid by 8 per cent per year. (CCIC, May 2, 2006) Bono weighed in on behalf of MPH, "With this budget Flaherty and Harper seem to be breaking an election pledge to increase Canadian aid by more than the previous government."

The impact of the campaign in Canada

What was the impact of the campaign in Canada? Here we need to reflect on the challenges of measuring the effectiveness or success of such campaigns. One way to examine effectiveness is purely in terms of its impact on government policy. Did it change behaviour? Did the Canadian government increase its aid commitment? A second set of criteria relate to whether the campaign successfully raised awareness, educated and then mobilized people and increased the resources (people and money) available to the social justice movement. A third set of criteria relate to the extent to which the campaign created an issue around poverty, altered the broader public agenda and/or shaped norms and public discourse around the question of poverty. Did the campaign re-frame the issue from one of charity perhaps to one of justice? We will attempt to briefly address these questions in turn .

Impact on Canadian Aid Policy

In terms of government aid commitments the picture is rather mixed. Clearly the campaign to get either the Liberal or Conservative governments to commit to achieving .7 by 2015 did not fully succeed. However, both governments have committed to increasing foreign aid and more recently a private member's bill on aid passed third reading in the House of Commons (March 29, 2007). Sponsored by Liberal MP John McKay the bill C-293 would provide a legislative mandate for Canadian ODA with a focus on poverty reduction. (Kuruvila) The bill also provides criteria for aid and ensures that government direct resources to those in poverty while respecting human rights. It also requires government to take the perspectives of the poor into account, and consult with international agencies and Canadian civil society. A recent Senate committee had also called for a legislative mandate for aid, something the UK has had since 2002. Campaign organizers also feel that governments have bought into the need to increase our aid effort and move toward the goal and that no matter which party is elected retreat from that commitment would be difficult.

Why was the campaign not more successful in changing policy. Once answer lies in the nature of the policy process and the issue of foreign aid. Of the four goals of the MPH both aid and debt relief have no direct domestic interests who benefit from policy. In the case of trade economic interests, such as farmers have a direct material interest in the outcome of trade negotiations. As a result there is a domestic constituency attentive to and actively seeking to impact trade policy. Governments may face consequences if they do not satisfy these constituencies. In the case of aid, especially better quality aid which would not be tied to domestic procurement of Canadian goods and service has no domestic constituency that would benefit from an increase. Thus the argument in favour of increased aid rests on either moral arguments or ones that ties aid to increased influence abroad. While polls indicate a general level of public support for aid, there is some evidence that such support in many countries has little or no impact on aid policy. (Otter). While public opinion might provide support to increase aid it provides little in the way of a push to do so. Efforts to mobilize Canadians during the election and make aid an issue which the MPH campaigns feels had some success, as reflected in party platforms also provides limited leverage because elections are fought on a variety of issues, rarely a single one, and there were no consequences likely if politicians failed to deliver on commitments.

Mobilization: People and Resources

Another criteria for measuring effectiveness or success is the extent to which the campaign mobilized people and resources for the global social justice movement. Technology has facilitated the development of networks and mobilization as most analysts have noted. In the case of MPH the numbers are impressive. In Canada over 300,000 postcards along with e-mails were sent to the government during the campaign. The website led to contacts with over 250,000. The campaign sold over 500,000 white bands. The web of contacts also meant that the input to policy makers could be very focussed and coordinated. After an e-mail alert the MPH network was able to organize the input to the website for the House of Common's committee review of the International Policy Statement in 2005 (Goody et al) ensuring that of the over 4000 on line submissions 61 per cent of the responses to four key question reflected the MPH critique of the government's efforts on aid and poverty reduction. More recently the network was able to bombard the minister of international development with 10,000 e-mails in support of the private member's bill. The campaign also allowed for education on the issues and many MPH resources were incorporated into school curricula and activity during the campaign. A basis, they would argue for further mobilization.

The broader global campaign especially the Live8 concerts clearly garnered huge audiences. Over 35, 000 attended the Canadian event and many more tuned in to coverage around the globe. The Live8 website claims over 3 billion viewers and 31 million messages (mostly e-mail and text messages) went to the G8 leaders. However, it also needs to be noted that sponsors, especially communication, media (CTV in Canada) and phone companies clearly profited handsomely from this form of "activism" –all those e-mails and text messages! The bigger question, however, is whether the concerts and the limited engagement involved constitute mobilization?

Despite the heavy media focus on the concerts the MPH campaign in Canada and around the world involved thousands of smaller local activities including educational events, marches, rallies and demonstrations. In Canada these included wrapping various buildings and in the case of the Department of Finance forming a human wrapper to draw attention to debt issues. In Africa many of the activities were grassroots oriented. Thousands of activists also went to Edinburgh and the G8 in July 2005 engaging in a march of over 250,000 and many smaller actions and demonstrations, some of which resulted in confrontations with the police and arrests. As in all G8 or other meetings in recent years a G8 Alternative Summit was held featuring many of the major figures and thinkers in the social justice movements.

Norms, Discourse, Framing

We can also examine the impact of the MPH campaign in terms of how it shaped or re-shaped a broader understanding of the sources and solutions to poverty issues, both in Canada and globally. This is a huge task and what follows are just a few initial comments on the question. For many critics the message of the MPH campaign was overly simplified. The click ads and their focus on the death of children clearly reinforces the image, as some activists from the South have pointed out, of Africans as victims in need of the "help" of the viewer and the G8 governments. It does not promote a deeper

understanding of the real sources of poverty but appeals to emotions and personal morality. However, supporters might argue that it begins to raise awareness and by using celebrities gets the attention of youth. A dense and complicated issue must, at least initially in their view, be presented in an engaging way. A similar case was made for the Live8 concerts. As one of the Canadian participants in the concert pointed out he became more informed about the issues as a teen-ager when his favourite band at the time, U2, drew his attention to them.

Although not systematically studied to date impressions suggest that press coverage of the issues did increase as a result of the campaign. There were more stories about poverty issues in the run up to the G8. Much of the coverage related to Live8 concerts. In Canadian media however, much of this was from a popular culture perspective, often ending up in entertainment or culture sections of broadcast programs and newspapers. The attention to the G8 was quickly overtaken by the London bombings on July 7, 2005. The recent manifestations of the campaign including the fall 2006 Stand Up Against Poverty, while mobilizing millions globally received very little media attention in Canada and elsewhere. The dilemma faced by the Global Social Justice movement is that spectacle and image drive much commercial media coverage, especially those involving violence and celebrity.

Another way we can examine the impact in terms of ideas is through the effect of the campaign on public attitudes. There are few consistent studies of public opinion regarding global poverty or even foreign aid that can be used for comparisons before and after the campaign. What evidence there is shows a mixed picture of support for the broader goal of more aid but a fixation, which the government clearly promoted, on the cost and the timeline. One poll reported on July 2, 2005 that 59 per cent of those polled were optimistic that the concerts (Live8) would help African poverty relief, at the same time, the poll claimed the same number felt Canada could not afford the extra funds required to reach .7 by 2015. A Decima poll taken the third week of June reported on July 2, 2005 that 75 per cent of respondents supported the Martin government's refusal to commit to the 2015 deadline to reach .7 per cent goal. although they supported the goal in general. (CTV, July 2, 2005)

A case could also be made that the nature of the campaign, its focus on celebrities and rock stars, provided potential to inform and mobilize youth. A much more detailed survey on youth attitudes was conducted by Decima research for the NGO War Child. The survey of 1274 Canadians from ages 15-24 was conducted July 5-27, 2005 in the midst of and just after the G8 meetings. When asked whether the government should spend more on foreign aid (having been informed about how much is actually spent) 52 per cent of the youth surveyed thought that the federal government should be spending a little (23%) or a lot more (29%). Yet when asked about where Canada should be taking a leadership role most identified peacekeeping, rather than development aid, and supported the need for a larger military to undertake that task.

In terms of altering the broader discourse around global poverty or re-framing the issues the short term picture is one of a campaign that, at least as it was reflected back in the mainstream media became centered around the .7 number and the date of 2015. Broader questions about the "better aid" aspect of the campaign received less attention, especially serious issues related to the increasingly commercial emphasis of Canadian aid policy and its increasing orientation towards security and defence. We should remember

however, that the campaign also addressed questions of debt and trade and saw aid as only one aspect of the changes needed to address global poverty. Canada's trade policy and the position we have taken within the WTO and their impact on developing countries in fact, received very little serious scrutiny from the press, with the exception of issues related to agricultural subsidies.

Conclusion: The limits of the campaign.

The global campaign, G-CAP, and its British version have come in for very strong, and in some cases dismissive and derisive criticisms. In terms of the commitments governments were to have undertaken even Chancellor Gordon Brown, admitted they were limited and constituted a beginning and not an end. For many critics the bigger problem lay in engaging with institutions such as the G8, which they regard as illegitimate, or the UN, which others see as having been captured by the powerful forces of neo-liberalism. Patrick Bond, for example, has been critical of the global G-CAP campaign for in the first instance, making the MDG goals themselves the focal point of reference. The UN's Millennium Summit he argues "demonstrated how very little can be expected at the scale of global governance these days, in view of the prevailing balance of forces" and reflect the way in which the UN has been incorporated into neo-liberal power. Moreover he claims the G-CAP message built around the MDG's and a simple set of demands risks demobilisation and "a set of lowest-common-denominator analyses and demands" (Bond, 349) Better, he argues to work with the more effective sectoral movements addressing issues like water, land (Via Campesina) or debt (Jubilee South). Yet many of the organizations he sites approvingly in the South have signed on to the G-CAP campaign. Clearly they do not see their sectoral or grass-roots work in conflict with the broader global campaign and tried to use the latter in a strategic way to advance their goals.

Others have argued that the campaign, especially in Britain, reflected a fatal flaw of trading access to the powerful for silence (Hughes) or even worse allowed governments and powerful corporate interests to hijack the campaign and its symbols and slogans to enhance their own legitimacy. The latter was reflected in EU trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, chief negotiator for the EU at the WTO, sporting a white band. Given that many in the campaign regard the EU as responsible for many trade injustices it should not be surprising that the G-CAP coordinator demanded that he take it off! Clearly the somewhat simplistic messages of the campaign and the singular focus on governments and their policies risked ignoring the broader questions around the role of corporations. As one commentator observed "talking about development without mentioning transnational corporations is like talking about malaria without mentioning mosquitos." (Burgis)

There is an argument, on the other hand, that we should be cautious about being too dismissive of the campaign. We need to keep in mind that the global justice network is a vast, diverse set of actors, at both the global and the national level, many of whom have made strategic alliances and engaged in a wide array of activities beyond those of the celebrities and slick TV ads. The relationship to neo-liberalism and its powerful networks can also be seen as one of interaction and organizations like the UN as sites of that interaction and struggle, just as states can be. Given the global environment in which they operate it should not be surprising either that transnational campaigns seek to find allies and have their voice heard in various ways. The reality is, for example, that

even though new and alternative media exist their impact is still limited. The youth survey discussed above for example, does indicate many Canadian youth still get most of their information from television news and even those who are turning to the Internet most frequently access mainstream media websites. In the absence of popstars and flashy ads we can pose the question of whether there would have been less or more media attention to poverty issues?

Tensions between reformist and more radical activists within these broad networks and between insiders and outsiders are also nothing new. The bigger question for global justice activists has to be whether their efforts have advanced the goals of global justice. Have they increased the transparency and accountability of governments, international organizations and corporations for what they do in the world and finally, have they empowered citizens? In the Canadian case the profile of the issues of aid and more broadly development was elevated publicly and while the results were disappointing in terms of policy outcomes there was some public debate. Many of the actions at the local level provided an opportunity for Canadians to become personally involved and informed.

There are some signs that the broader global justice movement has had an impact. Efforts to co-opt and hijack the movement by governments and corporate interests are a reflection of that, as some observers point out.

The fact that even an imperialist warmonger like Blair feels obliged to express a concern for the plight of the global South is a tribute to the impact of our movement, whose origins lie in part in the campaign against Third World debt that gathered pace during the 1990s” (Callinicos and Chris Ninehan)

Others have noted that at its heart the movement has been able to raise questions about the legitimacy of global inequality (Bunting). In Canada organizers feel the profile of the whole issue of global poverty has been raised. Even the fact that conservative forces have now begun to engage on the issue, trying to re-define aid to include either military assistance, remittances of the Canadian diaspora (Carment) to their impoverished relatives or engaging in critiques of the effectiveness of Canadian aid especially in Africa, (Senate committee) though somewhat sinister could also be seen to reflect the emergence of at least some public debate.

If we look back at the 1985 Canadian song quoted at the outset which while noting that “tears were not enough” implied that personal charity was enough, we have come a long way.

Appendix I

MPH Steering Committee

Darrel McLeod	Assembly of First Nations
Maria Luisa Monreal	Association québécoisedes organismes de coopération internationale (AQOCI)
John Anderson	Campaign 2000
Gerry Barr	Canadian Council for International Co-operation
Karen Takacs	Canadian Crossroads International
Angela Regnier	Canadian Federation of Students
Anna Nitoslawska	Canadian Labour Congress
Suzanne Michaud	Canadian Nurses Association
Carole Trepanier	CUSO
George Roter	Engineers Without Borders
John Mihevc	Kairos
Janet Epp-Buckingham	Micah Challenge Canada
Dennis Howlett	National Anti Poverty Organization
Mark Fried	Oxfam Canada
Lina Holguin	Oxfam Quebec
Christine Laliberté	Oxfam Quebec
Blaise Salmon	Results Canada
Doug Blackburn	World Vision
Paul Davidson	WUSC

Appendix II

The Millennium Development Goals

All 191 United Nations member states have pledged to meet these goals by 2015.

1. Eradicate extreme poverty & hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development

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