The Little Black Box that Could:
Third Level Variables and Canada’s Evolving Foreign Policy

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Abstract
An evaluation of Canadian foreign policy must begin with an appreciation of the evolution taking place within the international arena. Because systemic rather than domestic forces are the primary variables shaping states’ foreign policies, looking outward rather than inward provides the proper lens with which to best explain why Canada acts the way it does. To this end, the paper describes the emergence of a novel international environment and explains how systemic variables impact Canadian foreign policy concerning the United Nations, global warfare, and the Middle East in new ways.

The Little Black Box that Could: Look Out or Look In?

Understanding state behaviour is the veritable Rosetta Stone of International Relations (IR). Explaining why states act the way they do, in times of peace and in times of war, is a crucial step for better appreciating international complexities and managing conflict puzzles.

It was with great interest, then, that I read the International Studies Association (ISA) – Canada’s Call for Papers for this year’s Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) Conference. The principal question ISA-Canada organizers asked was this:

"With the recent change in government, what is Canadian Foreign Policy? How is it manifested in practice?"

Elementally, the phrasing of the question betrays a curious aspect related to thinking and writing about Canadian (or any other state’s) foreign policy and foreign relations: foreign policy – and the external behaviour that stems from it – is thought to be influenced most forcefully by endogenous, domestic, individualistic, and bureaucratic forces rather than exogenous, international, and systemic forces.

Notice, for instance, that the conference question asks participants to investigate how the “change in government” (i.e. the replacement of Paul Martin’s Liberal Party of Canada by Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party of Canada in the country’s 39th General Election) has influenced Canada’s foreign policy. I admit that a focus on domestic variable inputs might have resulted from a conscious decision by ISA-Canada to ensure that its section of the greater CPSA Conference retained a Canadian-centric rather than IR-centric edge, but I suspect more sinister forces at hand!

Behind this Call for Papers rests a perception, increasingly prevalent in academic and political circles, the popular press, and the Gen-Y blogosphere, that an exuberant number of domestic variables – from the media, lobby groups, partisan ideologues, bureaucracies, political parties, big business, oil tycoons, and so on and so forth – play a necessary and sufficient role in shaping state interest, foreign policy, and state behaviour. The argument
assumes, then, that a shift in Canada’s domestic environment – a ‘right-wing’ takeover of a ‘left-wing’ political landscape, as some pundits would have us believe – should result in significant foreign policy re-structuring. The 2006 election is especially monumental given that the incumbent Liberal Party had been in power for almost 15 years.

There is, however, another half to the equation; one that offers impressive (and robust) suggestions as to the forces influencing foreign policy making in Canada and elsewhere. In this alternative case, the question asked is this:

“What external, international, or systemic variables have come to influence Canadian foreign policy and behaviour over the past several months?”

Answers begin by investigating the environment existing outside the black box of the state, assessing the relevance of novel security dilemmas, and measuring their impact on state interest and international policy.

This essay does just that. It investigates the externally-driven foreign policy process of the Canadian Government. The basic argument assumes that external factors trump internal ones as the principal guiding mechanisms of foreign policy. It also assumes that significant changes at the international level have unleashed novel demands on the Canadian foreign policy establishment.

This is not to say that Harper’s ‘new’ government does not control the levers of its own foreign policy engine – it does and surely must. Rather, the argument holds that a valuable investigation of Canada’s present – and future – foreign policy must take into account the structural forces impacting the state. Looking upwards and outwards produces the proper information with which to decipher the complexities of Canada’s post-Cold War and post-9/11 foreign policy.

The argument is presented in three sections. Part one presents some of the pertinent literature pitting external theories of foreign policy making – the Aussenpolitik School – against internal theories of foreign policy making – the Innenpolitik School. Part two then presents four evolutionary developments taking place at the international security environment that are impacting state behaviour. Part three concludes by showing how Canadian foreign policy shifts attributed to the Conservative government – the anti-UN, pro-war, and pro-Israeli positions – are likely a consequence of external security demands rather than a result of conservative preferences.

Why States act the Way they do: External versus Internal Variables

Elementally, the debate on foreign policy pits two contrasting approaches against one another. The first grouping, “actor general” theories, assume the state is a unitary actor, its behaviour a result of systemic, relational, and power-based variables stemming from
the state’s interactions at the global level. The second, opposing grouping, “actor-specific” theories, assume the state is an assortment of semi-autonomous human collectives, its foreign behaviour a result of internal, ideational, bureaucratic, normative, and other endogenous forces “pulling and hauling” against one another. The debate, as Fareed Zakaria sees it, pits theories of Aussenpolitik – “the primacy of foreign policy” – against theories of Innenpolitik – the primacy of internal policy. One might also argue


that the division is really a recreation of the prevalent debates within IR as a field; realism against liberalism, constructivism, (neo)-Marxism, and facets of post-structuralism.

Elementally, *Aussenpolitik*, Zakaria explains, relates to foreign policy and state behaviour in two ways.

First, *Aussenpolitik* assumes that systemic variables (like the structure of the system itself, the composition of the unit actors that make up the system, the nature of power and warfare prevalent to that system, etcetera) influence how states (or other political units) arrange themselves domestically. That is, external forces shape internal structures.

Evidence of this phenomenon is longstanding. Napoleon’s nationally-structured military went on to near global domination until competing political units within the system arranged their own forces on national footings. Nazi Germany’s mechanized Blitzkrieg overran Europe’s Maginot system until the surviving political units incorporated similar tactics in their counter-attacks. And today, the network structure of modern, trans-national terrorism is forcing Western militaries to respond with less-hierarchically based force structures.⁴

Charles Tilly’s assertion that “war made the state, and the state made war” is pertinent to each case.⁵ Kingdoms beget kingdoms, and states, states, because newly evolved and ultimately more efficient political structures won wars, destroyed weaker organizations, gobbled-up territory, and forced the rest to either imitate a winning strategy or risk eventual annihilation. The forces of Darwinian evolution are alive in the relations between political units straining under the pressures of anarchy.

Christopher Layne – borrowing from Kenneth Waltz – calls the phenomenon of internationally-induced political imitation, the “sameness effect”. “If other [actors] do well in developing effective instruments of competition,” Layne writes, other units in the system “must emulate [them] or face the consequence of falling behind.”⁶ Fear of territorial predation and political survival in a self-help international system creates both the incentive for winners to retain their competitive edge and for losers to shrink the distance separating them from potential aggressors.

The second aspect of *Aussenpolitik* is the assumption that states conduct their foreign policies for “strategic” reasons, “as a consequence,” writes Zakaria, “of international

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pulls and pushes” rather than as a result of domestic forces. Kenneth Waltz’s work on structural realism is perhaps the most well known expression of this *Aussenpolitik* assumption. In *Man, the State and War* (1954) Waltz postulates that of the three approaches to explaining conflict (the “three images” of the individual, state, and international) the latter level suffices in trumping the others in providing the “permissive causes” of state behaviour and warfare. Years later, in *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz proposes that the realm of inter-state relations – the affairs of the international level – is distinct and separate from that of domestic politics. Accordingly, foreign policy is a result of the systemic pressures a state faces – survival, competition, warfare, and so on – that trump the normative or ideational preferences of individual statesmen and the bureaucratic inklings inherent to particular domestic environments. Waltz concludes that an,

> International-political theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy any more than a market theory implies or requires a theory of the firm. Such theories tell us about the forces to which the units are subjected. From them, we can draw some inferences about the expected behavior and fate of the units: namely, how they will have to compete with and adjust to one another if they are to survive and flourish.”

Why do states act they way they do? In order to survive as independent and sovereign political units in the Coliseum of world politics.

Robert Gilpin, in *War and change in World Politics* (1981), argues similarly that competing states – differentiated by uneven growth rates – place pressure on the status quo system as they pursue greater security, influence, and economic prosperity. As a result, the global system is in constant flux. Rivals challenge each other over the controls of global order, each in pursuit of a system most attuned to its own self-interest. With evolving balances of power, new status quo systems topple older ones, benefiting some while disenfranchising others. Because one state’s interest might differ from the next, the outcome of this global game weighs heavily on all. The result, John Mearsheimer explains, is an international system where “every state would like to be the most formidable military power in the system because this is the best way to guarantee survival

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7 Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics”, 179.
8 Waltz, *Man, the State, and War*, Chapters 2, 4, 6.
in a world that can be very dangerous...The aim is to acquire more military power at the expense of potential rivals.”

In sum, *Aussenpolitik* holds the international system as the dictator of state behaviour. While individual and domestic interests exist, when push comes to shove, as is often the case under international anarchy, international security constraints often trump domestic/individual variables at the table of global politics.

Critics of *Aussenpolitik* turn its logic inside-out and upside-down. The *Innenpolitik* School argues that internal pressures deriving from within the confines of the black box are the pertinent levers of external behaviour. “Dismissing the strategic rationale” professed by statesmen when conducting state affairs, *Innenpolitik* locates the roots of foreign policy in the “social and economic structures of states” rather than on the forces of international dictate. Global politics is the stuff of human, rather than state, interaction. The end of the Cold War and IR’s perceived inability to predict or explain it, empowered *Innenpolitik* thinkers.

John Lewis Gaddis, for instance, questions realism’s reliance on external factors as drivers of state behaviour. He argues, that “the simple persistence of values in politics ought to be another clue that one is dealing here with objects more complicated than billiard balls.” New IR approaches that incorporated first and second level variables into policy equations were required. Various theorists took to the task, many of them self-professed realist scholars.

Jack Snyder found Great Power “overexpansion” and militaristic foreign policies a result of insular domestic interest groups steering policy towards personal ends. Adventurist policies were legitimized and strategically rationalized by relying on the “myths of empire” – economic advancement, security enhancement, and normative obligation.

While international variables are included in Snyder’s theory – power vis-à-vis other states, for instance – his general argument rests on the notion that internal levers construct foreign policies. Stephen van Evera, too, found that some conflict behaviour was a result of misperceptions of state power. The “false optimism” of warfare, van Evera explains, is domestically constructed by self-serving elites, domestic penchants for militarism, and nationalist sentiments. When present at the domestic level, these forces tilt foreign policy towards aggression rather than cooperation.

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15 Zakaria, “Realism and Domestic Politics”, 180.
Similar conclusions are drawn by William Wohlforth in his investigation of the Cold War era. The global war remained generally cold, its dénouement non-violent, Wohlforth explains, because state behaviour is dictated by changes in the “perceptions of power” and not on exogenous calculations of material power. Perceptions of power, he explains, are endogenously constructed by decision-makers, relying on measures of “non-material capabilities” vis-à-vis other political units. Non-material measurements include perceived declines in domestic welfare, deteriorated ideological fervour, unfeasible global/regional aspirations, and weakened national morale. Thus, the USSR’s foreign policy reversals during the 1980s resulted from the Soviet calculation that their county’s power vis-à-vis the US had declined in sustenance rather than substance. Wohlforth surmises that “any realist discussion of international change” – and foreign policy more specifically – “must combine the domestic and international levels of analysis.”\(^\text{19}\)

There are myriad other domestic theories of foreign policy. A few of the more pertinent ones include: Democratic Peace Theory;\(^\text{20}\) Expected Utility and Domestic Uncertainty;\(^\text{21}\) bounded rationality, misperception, and Prospect Theory;\(^\text{22}\) and bureaucratic-politics.\(^\text{23}\)

One final thought. In interpreting state behaviour, it is useful to emphasize that all state policy (domestic and foreign) is fundamentally based on the decisions taken by human beings: decision-makers decide on a policy; state institutions follow it through; the state behaves in a particular manner. Nonetheless, the state still exists. No amount of conceptual restructuring will dissolve it.\(^\text{24}\) As J. P. Nettle argued nearly 40 years ago, some degree of “stateness” – the institutional centrality of the state – will always exist, requiring theoretical work that takes the state as an actor of social behaviour, separate and

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independent from those existing at other social levels.\textsuperscript{25} Consider further, Gilpin’s candid assertion:

Of course, we “realists” know that the state does not really exist...only individuals really exist...Only individuals act, even though they may act on behalf of [any number of] collective social entities, the most important one being the group. But...we do write as if some particular social or political entity really does exist and acts. It is a matter of convenience and economy to do so. \textsuperscript{26}

Gilpin reiterates that although realists speak of the state in personified terms, risking the “fallacy of reification” – “The United States did this”, “Canada did that”, “China reacted accordingly”– the debate behind the meaning of the word is one of semantics. The state is a unit actor that acts rationally in the pursuit of its interests because the decisions taken by the individuals who lead and represent the state are themselves taken on behalf and in the name of the state. Richard Snyder and colleagues note that

It is one of our basic methodological choices to define the state as [the] official decision-makers – those whose authoritative acts are, to all intents and purposes, the acts of the state. State action is action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers. State X as \textit{actor} is translated into its decision-makers as \textit{actors}.\textsuperscript{27}

The interests decision-makers prescribe to their state are those dictated by the nature of global politics – anarchy, insecurity, competition, and survival – which are embodied in a state’s interest, reflected in its external behaviour.

Both the \textit{Aussenpolitik} and \textit{Innenpolitik} camps produce robust arguments that support their underlining principles. Suffice to say, neither camp is at risk of being wholly eclipsed by the other in the arena of paradigmatic debate.

That being the case, the following two sections of the paper illustrate how Canada’s foreign policy in recent years has undergone some redefinition as a consequence of external factors rather than as a result of an episodic changing of the political guards on Parliament Hill. The following section presents four emerging characteristics of the global environment that are impacting Canadian foreign policy in novel ways.

\textit{The Evolving International Environment}

\textit{The Globalization of Informal Violence}

Canadians of all political stripes believe that their country’s foreign policy has changed with the election of the Conservative government. A 2006 Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI) report found that 76 percent of Canadians agreed that

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  \item \textsuperscript{25} J. P. Nettle, “The State as a Conceptual Variable”, \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 20 (4), (July 1968), 559-569.
\end{itemize}
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“there [had] been a change in the direction of Canadian foreign policy” in the (mere!) eight months following the Tories’ electoral victory. Not only that, but the report suggests that most Canadians considered it “a change for the worse.” An interesting caveat, however, is the fact that respondents who are “very attentive” to foreign affairs and defence and security policy – the very people reading this paper! – are more supportive of the “changes” in foreign policy than those who pay little attention.  

In any event, “change” is a slippery, contextually-driven term. From the literature on foreign policy, “change” includes two different things: foreign policy “restructuring” and foreign policy “shifts”. The former involves “comprehensive…and multidimensional change” in policy orientation over a “brief period of time”, manifested in “major behavioral changes encompassing a broad range of activities” in the state’s interaction with others. Think of Joseph Stalin’s 1939 Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany, of Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem, of Mikahail Gorbachev’s Glasnost in the late 1980s, of Ariel Sharon’s 2005 Disengagement from Gaza. These were sudden and monumental policy developments. In some cases, they were bona fide policy reversals.

Foreign policy shifts, on the other hand, are less significant in scope. They are “incremental in nature, occurring over several years,” and remain limited to a few aspects of policy.

Taking a more nuanced approach to Canadian foreign policy change, it is clear that what Canadians perceive is a shift rather than a restructuring. If Canada were to suddenly pull out of the World Trade Organization (WTO), or establish a strategic alliance with China, or preemptively attack Great Britain and annex the Turks and Caicos Islands, then we could safely say that Canada was restructuring its foreign policy. Instead, Canada is going through a period of foreign policy adjustment, reflective of the greater changes enveloping much the world.

Of the many shifts that are believed to be tied to the Conservative government, three over-arching perceptions have littered the public sphere over the past year and half. Canada under the Conservative Party is said to be anti-UN, pro-War, and pro-Israeli.

Each perceived policy position is, generally speaking, interrelated with the other. To evaluate how each is associated with Aussenpolitik rather Innenpolitik variables, an assessment of Canada’s strategic, international environment is required. If Canada is tweaking its foreign policy in response to exogenous forces, understanding how the international environment has shifted over the past decade is a necessary first step.

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30 Ibid., 617.
The evolving security environment is marked by four inter-related developments.\textsuperscript{31} While no single development is independently novel to the global arena \textit{per se}, their combined impact on the nature of global conflict, power, security, military force, and so on, is. As a result, changes to the international arena go a long way in explaining Canada’s shifting foreign policy.

First, globalization – that nebulous force that binds independent international actors more closely to one another – is continuing, unabated. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in their seminal book, \textit{Power and Interdependence}, define globalization as a “state of the world involving networks and interdependence at multi-continental distances, linked through flows of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances.”\textsuperscript{32} To this list, one might add the prevalence of conflict linkages as well. In practice, globalization increases the mobility of goods, services, and information, across time and space.\textsuperscript{33} While increased globalization may make the rest of ‘them’ look and act a lot more like ‘us’ (normatively, democratically, even culturally speaking), globalization has other less benign consequences. Two stand out.

First, globalization has given life to non-traditional forms of violence. As Keohane explains, “global informal violence” takes advantage of “modern technologies of communication, transportation, explosives…capitaliz[ing] on secrecy and surprise to inflict great harm with small material capabilities.” Violence is globalized, Keohane continues, when “networks of nonstate actors operate on an intercontinental basis, so that acts of force in one society can be initiated and controlled from very distant points of the globe.”\textsuperscript{34} Conflict has become informal in that those who control it rest beyond the grasp of the state – the political unit once thought to have a ‘monopoly’ over power. While 9/11 did not create globalized informal violence, the attack did highlight its destructive potential. IR and strategic theorists will be grappling with the meaning of 9/11, in terms of its significance on sovereignty, power, geographical space, warfare, ethics, and so on, for years and decades to come.

Second, globalization increases the vulnerability of hi-tech, industrialized societies to small, well-timed, and well-positioned disruptive ‘bubbles’ to the functionality of integrated systems. A system implies the existence of boundaries (separating inside and outside environments), along with a differentiation between internal units, their functions,

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\item The basis for this section is partially based on research I conducted for the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies (AIMS -- \url{http://www.aims.ca/}). See, Alex Wilner, “The Best Defence is a Terrific Offence: Four Approaches to Countering Terrorism”, Atlantic Institute for Market Studies, \textit{Commentary}, (Forthcoming, Summer 2007).
\end{enumerate}
A disruption of one unit, then, has the potential of gravely influencing the functions of other units in the system. The tighter – or more highly interdependent the system – the greater the risk a pinpoint and limited disruption will reverberate deleteriously to interconnected areas. Thus, as globalization increases the degree of interdependence between – and to a certain degree, within – states, the potential for massive disruptions by well-positioned attacks becomes evident. At some point, disproportionate consequences at both the domestic and international levels will result from limited interruptions.

Think of the impact 9/11 – a devastating though narrowly focused attack – has had on a number of interdependent global activities.

Militarily, 9/11 created new global alliances. Pakistan, for instance, has become the United State’s “most important non-NATO ally”, a veritable quantum leap from the years it spent chastised as a global pariah. Uzbekistan, the Philippines, Kenya, and various others, have also been championed as important Western allies in the War on Terror. NATO, on the other hand, nearly disintegrated in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Old rogue states – Cuba and Libya – have been replaced by new ones – Syria and Iran. Both Iraq and Afghanistan were invaded and democratically restructured, with varying degrees of success. Foreign intelligence sharing has reached new heights, while defensive military techniques – encapsulated in the multilateral and inter-agency Top Official (TOPOFF) exercises – have been honed. Targeted killing has been resurrected as a robust and effective tactic of war (e.g. Muhammad Atef, killed in a Kabul air-strike in 2001; Abu Ali al-Harithi, killed by a remote-controlled CIA drone in Yemen in 2002; Hamza Rabia, killed by a guided missile in Pakistan in 2005; Abu Musab Zarqawi, killed by a US strike on his al Qaeda safe house in Iraq, 2006; Abu Taha al Sudani, Fazul Mohammed, and others likely killed by US strike in Somalia, 2007), and “preemptive war” has replaced “preventive war” as a legitimate military doctrine.

9/11 also had widespread repercussions on various North American and European domestic institutions. The “world’s longest undefended border” between the United States and Canada has been replaced with the world’s first “virtual fence”. The Secure Border Initiative Net (SBINet) is expected to comprise a chain of nearly 2000 towers – each 80 meters high – equipped with motion, sound, and infrared detectors, cameras, and radiation sensors able to track would-be border crossing terrorists.

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38 Jeffrey Record, “The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq”, _Parameters_, (Spring 2003), 4-21.
societal monitoring and intelligence gathering, employing advancements in hi-tech telecommunications, have also been constructed. Consider the United Kingdom, where 5 million closed circuit televisions (CCTVs) – some with the ability to “speak” to anti-social misfits and loiters – monitor a person’s movement hundreds of times a day. Departments of ‘homeland defence’ have been constructed in most Western states; airport and seaport security has been augmented; and advances in personal identification – biometric authentication, for instance – have been sought. Xenophobia, too, has begun to rear its ugly head. In Europe, changes to refugee and immigration policies have begun, while in Canada, a debate on “reasonable accommodation” has flourished in recent months.

Economically, the story is much the same. If 9/11 devastated the global airline and tourist industries, think of the damage Bonjika II (the foiled 2006 plot to destroy up to a dozen airplanes in mid-flight over the Atlantic Ocean with ‘liquid bombs’) would have caused. Al Qaeda’s deputy leader, Ayman al-Zawahri, reiterated the role of economic terrorism in a 2006 audio tape, urging Muslims to “inflict losses on the crusader West, especially to its economic infrastructure with strikes that would make it bleed for years.” In the meantime, oil refineries have been targeted in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and elsewhere and tourist hotspots have been hit in the Sinai Peninsula, Jordan, Kenya, and Indonesia. As a result, economic actors are augmenting their security infrastructures in order to mitigate the economic consequences of renewed terrorist attack.

The thesis that globalization carries with it risky interdependence is well encapsulated in Thomas Homer-Dixon’s 2002 theory of “complex terrorism”. In it, he argues that modern terrorism “operates like jujitsu – redirect[ing] the energies of our intricate societies against us.” In one sense, then, terrorism itself isn’t the new variable – our vulnerability to it is. The coming decade will likely be fraught with devastating attacks that prey upon and impact our interconnected way of life.


A second feature of the evolving global security environment is rapid scientific and technological innovation. Think of the advances that await us in information technology, robotics, nano- and bio-technologies. Think also, however, to the darker sides of technological development – every breakthrough has a potentially malicious use. One man’s airplane is another’s guided missile.

In the civilian sector, various examples exist. Internet banking, for instance, revolutionizes the way we pay our bills, but it helps a non-state actor launder electronic money. The same could be said of Chlorine gas. While it is a necessary chemical ingredient to any functioning hospital, when coupled with high explosives it makes a deadly dirty bomb, as terrorist have begun proving on the streets of Najaf, Ramadi, and Baghdad. Cell phones are today a necessity of any functioning economy – let alone dating service – but hooking a phone’s ringer to a detonator, as terrorists did in the Hebrew University Blast of 2002, in the Madrid and Bali bombings, and elsewhere, and you’ve got ready made lethality. In each case, benign technological developments were employed by cunning individuals to kill and maim civilians in new and unexpected ways. This trend will continue in kind with future technological developments.

In the military sector, similar trends are evident. “The arms available to terrorists,” writes Paul Johnson, and “the skills with which they use them…are improving at…a rate much faster than the countermeasures available to civilized society.” Consider the historical trend in the terrorist’s choice of weaponry. At the turn of the century, the dagger and pistol were commonly used. These light arms were eventually replaced with explosives after the Second World War and by automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-held anti-aircraft weapons during the Cold War. The suicide car- and truck-bomb, introduced in 1980s, not to mention today’s IED onslaught in Iraq and Afghanistan, seem to continue this explosive trend. In each case, the step-wise development of weaponry was adopted by non-state groups, elevating the degree of carnage available to them. While the attacks of 9/11 (and those that followed) could be considered conventional in nature – none has yet to involve the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological substances, though the use of Chlorine Bombs in Iraq might change this

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assessment – the threat of WMD terrorism represents a likely threat escalation.\textsuperscript{52} Walter Laqueur, a noted terrorism expert, argues that “yesterday’s nuisance has become one of the gravest dangers facing mankind. For the first time in history, weapons of enormous destructive power are both readily acquired and harder to track.”\textsuperscript{53} Even the United Nations, never an organization all too readily willing to define or condemn terrorism, highlights the threat posed by WMD terrorism.\textsuperscript{54}

A third feature of the emerging security environment will be the increasing prevalence of failing, failed, and collapsed states. Due to myriad of causes, political weakness in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Northern Africa, and elsewhere will become increasingly commonplace in the coming decade. In an international system developed on the principle of state sovereignty, a failed state is one that cannot control the inner-workings of its territorial entity. They are marked with a partial or substantial loss of governmental control over the territorial borders of a given political area, plagued, as it is, by a “collapse of authority of the central government.”\textsuperscript{55} As a result, political disenfranchisement and marginalization occurs, and the “social contract” between the citizen and his government vanishes.\textsuperscript{56} Without law and order, competing armed groups champion their own selective forms of political and social organization. Eventually, individuals transfer their political and social allegiances from the state to sub-collectives (ethnic, linguistic, familial, and even commercial identities), further weakening the legitimacy and power of the government.\textsuperscript{57} Robert Jackson notes too that though failed states retain a “legal existence” – that is, the state of Somalia, for instance, exists as a legally understood entity – they do not have a “political existence” – the ability to function as a single political unit. He concludes that failed states are “hollow juridical shells that shroud an anarchical condition domestically.”\textsuperscript{58} In general, then, failed political environments share a number of characteristics: a dangerous and tense social structure; a rise in criminal activity and political violence; ineffective political and judicial infrastructures; porous borders; a declining economic base; warlordism; sectarian tension; civil war; politicide; a potential for genocide; and various other social, political, and economic ills.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 356
\textsuperscript{56} Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror”.
Besides the basic humanitarian issue associated with failed environments – think of Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti in the 1990s – ungovernable geographies of the future will represent strategic threats to Canada and her allies as potential hiding places for terrorist organizations. It took a failed Afghanistan only five years in the 1990s to metastasize from a humanitarian and human rights disaster into a clear and present terrorist threat as al Qaeda’s base of operations. The same could be said today of Somalia and the Islamic Courts Union, of Southern Lebanon and Hezbollah, of Gaza and HAMAS, and so on and so forth. Tomorrow’s political power vacuum will be the fuel feeding well-funded, opportunistic, and predatory terror organizations. Under burgeoning demographic pressures and continued resource degradation, many of today’s stable governments of the developing world could very well become tomorrow’s failed political environment.

Finally, as has become obvious, non-state actors will continue to grow in significance over the coming decade, impacting the global security environment in new and uncertain ways. Political realists might scoff at the role played by non-state organizations, but today, groups ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan to al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb are playing a more significant role in the world of organized violence than a majority of states. The nineteen individuals who transformed passenger planes into missile on 9/11 wore no discernible military uniforms, acted not as a military organization, represented no sanctioned government, carried no military hardware, made no distinction between civilian and military targets, and offered no warning of their attack and yet, in a successful act of coordinated violence killed more people, and arguably caused more economic, social, and political damage, than did the Japanese fleet at Pearl Harbor. While large scale attacks like 9/11 will continue to be rare, the rise of smaller-scale terror attacks – like those in Bali, Madrid, Jerusalem, Istanbul, Moscow, Mombassa, Casablanca, Beslan, Jakarta, Tab, Sharm el-Sheikh, Beirut, London, Aman, Dahab, Mumbai, Algiers, and so on and so forth – will continue.


Consider Steven David’s remark: “Terrorism is essentially an offensive action, making counter-offensive actions…especially effective response. In terms of defense, there are literally tens of thousands of targets. Power stations, government bureaus, bus depots, airports, skyscrapers, open-air markets and sport stadiums—the list is endless. It is impossible to defend them all, especially against a determined adversary that can choose the time and place of attack.” Steven R. David, “Fatal Choices: Israel’s Policy of Targeted Killing”, Mideast Security and Policy Studies, No. 51, (2002).

terrorism will prove a different adversary from the terrorism of the Cold War. Today’s version is stretched internationally, afflicting all states in one form or another. Unlike past decades where domestic terror groups with specific local grievances demanded a “national counter-response”, international terrorism, as Paul Rich asserts, is “entering for the first time the arena of global strategy.” Strategically, 9/11 shifted the “centre of gravity of terrorism” from the national to the global level.

All in all, interdependence, technological innovation, political weakness, and non-state empowerment have coalesced in creating a global environment starkly different from that which existed during the Cold War era.

Is it any wonder, then, that states have responded with evolving foreign policies?

**Canada’s Shifting Foreign Policy:**

*Plus ça change…*

With a clearer picture of the evolving international security environment, an *Aussenpolitik* evaluation of Canada’s recent foreign policy shift can be made. As mentioned briefly, Canada’s foreign policy over the past several months is thought to have shifted towards anti-UN, pro-War, and pro-Israeli positions. While each of these might be considered an individual ‘policy folder’, in reality, the demarcation is fuzzy. Evidence of one shift occurs in the other’s folder, so that the three policy shifts are better understood as a single, over-arching theme rather than distinct case studies.

With this in mind, the following section illustrates two things: First, it shows how the anti-UN, pro-war, and pro-Israeli shift is a response to external stimuli. Second, it demonstrates that the shift is not particularity Conservative- or Harper-induced, having begun in substance during the Liberal era. As a result, Canada’s evolving foreign policy

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67 Ibid. 41

68 Obviously, other blanket generalizations have also been levied against the Conservative Government. Harper is thought to be pro-American, or simply, pro-Bush, (on supporting sanctions against North Korea and Iran, on constructing a missile defence system, and on border security); anti-China (in challenging Beijing’s Human Rights record, supporting the Dalai Lama, and tacitly sponsoring Taiwan’s sovereignty); pro-Military (in augmenting the Canadian Forces, militarizing Canada’s Northern Border (see Operation LANCASTER), asserting sovereignty over Hans Island, and defending the Afghan mission), and so on and so forth.
is neither a Liberal/Martin nor Conservative/Harper position, but rather an interest-based response taken by the state in response to changes taking place internationally.

As one of the 51 founding states of the United Nation in 1945, Canada has a long tradition of supporting the organization. Canada-UN relations are known to most. The sort of multilateralism that is the hallmark of the UN is shared by Canadian decision-makers and laymen alike. The UN’s guiding principles, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are near-identical to those enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada’s most famous global diplomat, Lester B. Pearson, was instrumental in establishing UN-mandated peacekeeping forces, a policy that is today a hallmark of the UN’s role in international conflict mediation. Canada has contributed tens of thousands of its own military and diplomatic personnel on dozens of UN mandated missions in over 20 countries over the past 50 years. Canada has also poured money into the organization. In 2006, it ranked 7th as the largest contributor to the UN’s regular budget (totalling roughly US$50 million – nearly 3 percent of the UN’s day-to-day budget), ranked as a top 10 donor to the UN system of funds, programs and agencies – UN Development Program, UNICEF, World Health Organization, and so on – providing US$600 in 2006 alone, and sponsored UN peacekeeping operations to the tune of US$135 million.

Nonetheless, Canada-UN relations over the past half-decade have soured.

First, Canada has become far less willing to lend its military, police, and diplomatic personnel to the UN for peacekeeping and humanitarian-based operations. While Canada was once a leading peacekeeping nation, today, it ranks 55th of the 108 soldier-contributing countries. As of August 2006, Canada had 126 personnel working on UN missions. When one considers that developing states like Bangladesh, Pakistan, and India, rank at the top – with each contributing roughly 10,000 troops to UN missions – Canada’s shifting support for UN peacekeeping seems rather sombre. When you consider further that as of June 2006, over 90,000 personnel (three quarters of them military) were serving on 18 UN peacekeeping operations, Canada’s handful is outright pitiful. But the fact is, peacekeeping has all-but vanished as a Canadian venture.

The deepening Darfur Crisis serves as a good case in point. In the weeks following the Darfur Peace Agreement of May 2006, Harper announced that “Canada will act…[with] a two-pronged approach, splitting…efforts between the provision of humanitarian aid and

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peace support assistance.”  

“Cash, vehicles, and moral support, but no Canadian boots on the ground’ the message rang. A similar response was given by Harper in his rejection of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), re-constituted in 2006 to mediate the Israeli-Hezbollah ceasefire. “I think, ultimately, a solution lies in the region,” Harper commented, adding that “Canada’s first choice is not to have Canadians or foreign troops enforcing” the shaky ceasefire.

Canada’s shifting position on peacekeeping and humanitarianism is a reflection of the shifting patterns of global conflict.

The nature of the strategic threats Canada faces negates the rationality of a foreign policy based on humanitarian intervention that rests on starry-eyed notions of morality and justice. As was the case during the Cold War, real and pertinent threats have emerged that require a realpolitik, toothy, and yes, even self-interested response to failed environments and peripheral conflicts. That humanitarian disasters, like Darfur, are despicable and touch us all on a normative basis should be a given. The assumption that such disasters are therefore innately tied to a country’s national and security interest is, however, dubious at best.

Canadian resources are limited; their use should be used to secure the country’s most pressing needs. As Rob Huebert adds:

Canadian foreign and defence policy has a legacy of wanting to do the “right thing”. Since the Pearson era, Canadian peacekeeping is the best known example of this, and the subsequent development of anti-landmines treaties and other associated elements of the human security agenda illustrate the importance that Canadians place on normative elements of their foreign and defence policy. Although commendable, such action as a core element of defence policy leads to dangerous problems.

Under the current and emerging international environment, Canadians can no longer afford policy miscellany. The heyday of post-Cold War idealism has evaporated in the bluster of catastrophic global terrorism. Accordingly, failed states are no longer the sad, humanitarian crisis of yesteryears, but potential facilitator of terrorism.

Nonetheless, failed states are not created equal. In an international environment plagued by the threat of terrorism, some failed environments have the potential of becoming more dangerous than others. In that respect, while all failed states may represent threats to the people living within their borders, only a few threaten the security of those living outside their borders. It is absurd Justin Preble and Christopher Logan suggest “to claim that the

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ongoing state failure in Haiti poses a national security threat of the same order as would state failure in Indonesia, with its population of 240 million, or in nuclear-armed Pakistan.” The same argument can very well be made for almost all of the current states at risk of failing. Some cases are dangerous; others are simply not. For that reason, Canadians are stationed in Afghanistan and not in Sudan.

Harper’s pro-War position on Afghanistan is a direct result of this distinction. As al Qaeda’s facilitating state, Afghanistan posed a clear and present danger to Canadians and her allies. In his address to the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan in March 2006, Harper states his government’s position on the matter: “Under the Taliban regime, Afghanistan often served as an incubator for al Qaeda…This reality hit home with brutal force on 9-11, when two dozen Canadians lost their lives suddenly and senselessly in the destruction of the World Trade Centre. Since that time, al Qaeda has singled Canada as one of the countries targeted for terror.” Canada’s humanitarian work in Afghanistan, though important, is as an aside to the security principle underlining the country’s interventionist policy.

That Harper’s government embodies the evolving nature of failed states is clear. Less so, however, is the fact that the Martin government before it held the exact same position.

A glance at the Liberal Government’s 2005 Defence Policy Statement – one document of four (Diplomacy, Defence, Development, and Commerce) that together encompass the most updated and comprehensive policy document – reveals to the same policy shift currently being attributed to Harper’s government. The reason, of course, is that Martin’s Canada faced the same challenges then as Harper’s Canada does now.

Let’s not forget either, that it was the Liberal Party, under Jean Chrétien who signalled Canada’s new offensive counter-terrorism policy. Chrétien told Canadians, in his televised speech five weeks after 9/11, that Canada was “part of an unprecedented coalition of nations that [had] come together to fight the threat of terrorism. A coalition that [would] act on a broad front that includ[ed] military, humanitarian, diplomatic, financial, legislative, and domestic security initiatives.” A few days later, then Defence Minister Art Eggleton – remember Art!?! – noted that Canada was sending warships, planes, special forces, and other military personnel to Afghanistan, in a “campaign…unlike any campaign [Canada had] engaged in before.” “Every role,” he continued “in this campaign is significant. Every country determined to halt terror can

76 Justin Preble and Christopher Logan, “Are Failed States a Threat to America? The Bush Administration’s nation-building efforts are a big mistake”, Reason, (July 2006), 3.


make an important difference.”81 If this isn’t considered a pro-war policy, I’m not sure what would be.

With 9/11, both the Liberals and the Conservatives understood that Afghanistan was both a humanitarian (and human rights) disaster and a threat to Canada. Afghanistan, in one sense, was the harbinger of the future conflict environment. Up until 9/11 the general historic norm had been that humanitarian and strategic concerns under conditions of state failure rarely, if ever, overlapped. As Robert Rotberg suggests, “in less interconnected eras, state weakness could be isolated and kept distant. Failure had fewer implications for peace and security.”82 Failure was something that happened ‘over there’, not a dangerous and pressing matter ‘over here’. Global terrorism changed that calculation dramatically. Some failed states not only threaten the wellbeing of the individuals living within and around their borders, but by terrorist proxy, threaten the security of others living around the globe.83 Canada responded in kind with a shift in the necessary policies that would best safeguard its security needs in an increasingly complex environment. Part of that calculation was a rejection of humanitarianism as business as usual, replacing it with a new pro-war, security-oriented, and hard power foreign policy.

Besides a shift on humanitarianism and war, Canada has also become more critical of the UN as a global institution. Muscular language has been voiced by Canada’s top decision makers. Harper himself has called for more transparency and accountability from the organization. In his first UN address (the 61st Opening Session of the General Assembly in September 2006), the Prime Minister offered this rather stinging assessment:

Earlier this year, Canada’s New Government was given a mandate to make our national government more accountable, to ensure taxpayers get full value for their money, and to pursue a clear, focused agenda that produces tangible results. The United Nations should accept nothing less. This organization must become more accountable and more effective. The taxpayers of member nations, Canadians among them, make significant financial contributions to this organization. They have the right to expect stronger, more independent oversight mechanisms, more robust accountability for how funds are spent, and human resource practices that are based on merit.84

Such bravado by a Canadian PM in the halls of the UN is unusual. Harper didn’t stop there, however. Amazingly, he argued that the UN risked becoming the ineffective diplomatic shell the League of Nations had. “Will the new Human Rights Council become a forum where human rights are genuinely put above political manoeuvring?” Harper asked, “Or will it emulate the fate of its failed predecessor organization?”

82 Rotberg, “Failed States in a World of Terror”.
Answering, Harper lands one final punch: “I must tell you, the early signals suggest that
too little has changed, that the page has not yet been turned.”

Besides accountability, the Harper government has also been critical of the General
Assembly’s overt bias against Israel. Terry Cormier, Deputy Permanent Representative
of Canada to the UN, challenged one of the many UN Resolutions condemning Israel
during last summer’s Lebanon crisis with these harsh words: “In [Canada’s] view it is not
acceptable for the UN to be used as grounds for continued one-sided criticism of Israel.
For these resolutions to be relevant and useful, it is imperative that they reflect the
commensurate role and responsibilities of all parties.”

On another anti-Israel Resolution, Canada disparaged the “addition of inappropriate paragraphs” that
undermined “the neutrality” of UN peacekeeping operations by targeting “one party for
criticism and non-compliance.” Canada’s UN voting behaviour on UN Resolutions
castigating Israel has, in general, also shifted. During the 61st Session of the General
Assembly (2006/7), of the 22 Resolutions levied against Israel, Canada overwhelmingly
sided with Israel, voted against and abstaining from 14 Resolutions.

Besides Canada’s efforts at the UN, Harper’s government is perceived to have tilted the
country’s general policy in favour of Israel. Ottawa’s policy came to a front during the
Israel-Hezbollah conflict last summer. First, Harper called Israel’s retaliation against
Hezbollah (following the terrorist group’s incursion into Northern Israel and killing and
abduction of Israeli soldiers), as a “measured response”. While at the G8’s 2006 Summit
in St. Petersburg, Harper was instrumental in formulating the group’s decidedly pro-
Israeli statement on the conflict. It read: “The immediate crisis results from the efforts of
extremist forces to destabilize the region,” placing blame for the conflict squarely on
Hamas and Hezbollah. At the Francophonie Summit in September, Harper singularly
vetoed that organization’s statement on the Middle East conflict because it acknowledged
Lebanon’s suffering while ignoring Israel’s. Harper explained that “Yes, we can deplore
the war and we can recognize the victims, but la Francophonie can’t recognize victims
according to their nationality.” The Canadian rejection stood, with eventual support
from France and Switzerland, and a more balanced resolution was issued by Summit’s

85 Ibid.,
86 Government of Canada, “Explanation of Vote on Economic and Social Repercussions of Israeli
87 Government of Canada, “Explanation of Vote on the financing of UNIFIL”, (December 12, 2006),
88 UN Watch, “Anti-Israel Resolutions at the 61st General Assembly”, (2007),
<http://www.unwatch.org/site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.2264593/k.14EE/AntiIsrael_Resolutions_at_61st_GA.html#Vote_on_Illegal_Israeli_Actions>, Accessed May 18, 2007.
89 For an interesting editorial on the matter, see Andrew Coyne, “Harper Knows the Game has Changed”,
National Post, (July 19, 2006).
90 Government of Canada, “G8 Summit 2006: Saint-Petersburg – Middle East”, (July 16, 2006),
Finally, in his speech to B’nai Brith’s Award of Merit Dinner in October 2006, Harper solidified Canada’s position towards Israel.

The state of Israel…was attacked by Hezbollah…a terrorist organization listed - illegal - in this country. We are fighting terrorists in Afghanistan. We have arrested alleged terrorists here in Toronto. Thus, when it comes to dealing with a war between Israel and a terrorist organization, this country…cannot and will not be neutral. It is why Canada’s New Government has reacted with speed and spoken with clarity on the recent events in the Middle East – just as we have against terrorists in Afghanistan. Why we were the first nation outside of Israel to cut off funding to the Hamas government…and why we defended Israel’s right to vigorous and effective self-defence against Hezbollah.  

Israel’s war against Hamas and Hezbollah, Harper’s argument suggests, is the same as Canada’s war against al Qaeda.

However, neither Canada’s critique of the UN nor its new-found support for Israel is singularly a Conservative (or Liberal) initiative. Canada’s policy of vociferously calling for UN reform, accountability, and neutrality, is a reaction to the UN’s continued deterioration, inefficiencies, and politicization that contradict Canadian interests. Canada’s support for Israel’s war on terrorism is a recognition that Canada is at the forefront of a similar war in Afghanistan, and even, at home.

The Liberal government was doing the same thing and voicing the same concerns in the years preceding Harper.

In his speech to the General Assembly in 2005, for instance, Prime Minister Martin had this to say about the UN: the “Commission on Human Rights has a serious credibility problem. Its membership, its increasing politicization and its overall lack of effectiveness at tackling human rights violations around the world have overwhelmed its commensurate with the importance of human rights.” Elsewhere, Martin argued that Canada needed to help rid the UN of “old thinking…[and] out-of-date decision-making mechanisms.” Concerning Israel, Canada’s UN representative, Allan Rock, announced in 2004, that UN “resolutions [against Israel] are often divisive and lack balance…references to Israeli security needs are often overlooked…[while] repeatedly emphasizing Israel’s responsibility under international law obscures equally important


responsibilities of other parties to the conflict.” Martin himself slammed the UN’s “annual ritual of politicized anti-Israel resolutions.” And finally, the Liberal government began a full review of Canada’s voting on Middle East resolutions in 2004/5, implementing a more balanced voting strategy during the 60th Session of the General Assembly – just as the Conservatives had done during the 61st Session – rejecting over one-third of all UN Resolutions censuring Israel. Outside the UN, the Liberal policy on Israel shared much in common with that of the Conservatives. Martin argued at one point, that “Israel’s values are Canada’s values…democracy, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights.” Denouncing Iranian nuclear threats against Israel, Martin suggested that “Canada will not tolerate Iran’s reprehensible posturing.” Let’s not forget either, that it was the Liberal Party, under Prime Minister Jean Chrétien that added, in 2002, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, along with the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade and the Palestine Liberation Front in 2003 to Canada’ international terrorist list.

In each of the above cases, the prevalent Innenpolitik assumption that Canada’s new Conservative government has implemented a shift in the manner with which Canada conducts its foreign policy is rebutted. Not only were Liberal policies in the years preceding the Conservative Government carried out in a near identical anti-UN, pro-war, and pro-Israeli fashion, but an Aussenpolitik evaluation seems to indicate that Canadian foreign policy shifts are a response to the evolving nature of international relations and global violence.

It would seem, then, that the little black box is a fine paradigmatic engine for driving the study of Canadian foreign policy.

99 Ibid.