Abstract

The question of the weaponization of space is a creature of the Cold War, born out of superpower rivalry and the "space race". However, this question and its attendant consequences did not fall with the Berlin Wall and have, on the contrary, become more salient in the post-Cold War and post-9-11 world. In particular, this renewed interest in the question has been catalyzed by the U.S. administration's intent to withdraw unilaterally from the ABM treaty and to pursue a national ballistic missile defense system (BMD). Since January 2004, with a letter of intent for cooperation between the Canadian and US governments on BMD, there has been a heightened interest in the whole issue of the weaponization of space in Canada via a lively debate that spanned from Parliament, to the media, to academe and civil society. It is this widespread discussion and public debate in Canada over the issue that makes the Canadian case particularly interesting in that it can serve to understand the place of the weaponization of space discourse in the way in which we represent the present and future of world order and our role in it. There are few security issues today that bring into play these questions in such a comprehensive fashion both temporally and spatially. In this paper, I would like to address the way in which the weaponization of space discourse has been used by both proponents and opponents to BMD in order to pursue their interests. In this way, I am interested in the symbolic power of the weaponization of space discourse in politicizing the issue of ballistic missile defense in the Canadian debate over BMD. In doing so, I will provide a framework for the discursive examination of foreign policy issues by addressing how the weaponization of space discourse serves purposes for a variety of actors in the political debate and how these positions feed into broader "imaginaries" about international order, the state, the political, and the role of technology.
The big, red line we all have is the weaponization of outer space, which would be immoral, illegal, and a bad mistake.¹

Bill Graham, Canadian foreign affairs minister, 2002

[W]e know from history that every medium - air, land and sea - has seen conflict. Reality indicates that space will be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against hostile acts in and from space.²


In 1994, Lt Col Michael E. Baum wrote a short fictional article entitled “Defiling the Altar: The Weaponization of Space” published in the *Airpower Journal* that envisaged a scenario in which China, on December 7th, 2001, delivers a space Pearl Harbor. In what is described in a fictitious *New York Times* headline introducing the article, the “worst policy failure in 70 years,” China launches a surprise attack on a variety of American space assets and thereby take away from the U.S. “the ultimate high ground - space” in their plan to reoccupy the disputed Spratly islands. As the fictitious chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff explains in his testimony to a joint committee of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence after the attack it was this high ground that had enabled the “dramatic victory in the Gulf” and that the U.S. had unfortunately taken the wrong lesson from this conflict by assuming that “we would always own the high ground of space and be able to depend upon our assets in space.” The chairman laments the fact that, in the 1990s, the U.S. chose to pursue a policy which “worshiped at the altar of the peaceful use of space”, instead of following the “visionaries” in the late 80s and 1990s who would have admitted the eventual weaponization of space and proceeded accordingly to pursue offensive and defensive weapons technology “R&D programs to be able to do these things when we saw other countries developing these technologies.”³

Jump forward to January 2001 to the Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization - better known as the Rumsfeld Commission - and its dire warnings that the U.S. is “an attractive candidate for a Space Pearl Harbor”⁴ This attractiveness is, according to the report, based upon the vulnerability of national security space systems and the ambiguity and uncertainty that an attack on such systems could

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bring about. For the Commission, the improbability of such an attack should not deter the U.S. Government to take action. On the contrary, based upon the “reality” of the eventual conflict in space that is highlighted in the introductory quote above, the U.S. Government should follow the advice of the commission, as those fictitious “visionaries” in Baum’s piece, to pursue the necessary technology. If not, it would have to be a bolt out of the blue, “as in the past, a disabling attack against the country and its people - a “Space Pearl Harbor” - [that] will be the only event able to galvanize the nation and cause the U.S. Government to act.”

Ironically, the real “bolt out of the blue” came only months after the release of the report of the Rumsfeld commission and did not involve sophisticated weaponry or the vulnerability of American space assets. On the contrary, the use of box cutters and the use of civilian aircraft as, what James Der Derian called, “highly explosive kinetic weapons,” provided the context in which Pearl Harbor would be brought up again and again in the days, weeks, months and years since the event took place. An event that allegedly provoked George W. Bush to inscribe in his diary on September 11th, 2001 “The Pearl Harbor of the 21st century took place today”. If anything, however, the event of September 11th, galvanized support for ballistic missile defense as well as for the issue of the vulnerability of space assets. Although 9-11 could have been interpreted in terms of the impossibility of absolute security and the possibility of attacks for which any of the envisaged high-tech weapon systems would be completely ineffective, it was the question of vulnerability in any way, shape, or form, that carried the day. As Dennis Gormley has pointed out in relation to missile defense advocates - but could be brought up in terms of those that support anything from increased border protection to the weaponization of space - “the 11 September reinforces the notion that a determined adversary would stop at nothing to threaten the United States.”

Is Pearl Harbor the best frame of reference that can be used to address the weaponization of space? Or should we, for example, following Robert MacDougall and Philip J. Baines, use the Cuban Missile crisis as the proper frame of reference in understanding the weaponization of space as a deployment of weapons that would create “new and unexpected vulnerabilities”, instead of mitigating them. What we have in these two analogies are the kernels of two

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5 Ibid., p.xv.
diametrically opposed positions on the weaponization of space. On the one hand, there is an extension of arms race logic beyond the stratosphere where the primary concern is the vulnerability of space assets, while, on the other hand, space is seen as a threshold that should not be crossed for a variety of reasons elucidated later and that is reflected in the opening quote to this paper by Bill Graham. In relation to the concept of security, “space security” can mean two completely antithetical situations from each of these standpoints. Space security can mean the security of assets in space against attack or, on the contrary, to “secure” space from its weaponization - i.e. to make space a sanctuary or weapons-free zone. It is primarily this latter understanding of the “weaponization of space” that was deployed in the Canadian debate on BMD.

This paper is an exploration into the way in which the discourse surrounding the weaponization of space has been employed in the Canadian debate on Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). This investigation is, therefore, not about the relative merits of the strategic arguments regarding participation but an examination of the way in which the discourse regarding the weaponization of space has been used in the political debate regarding participation in the U.S. missile defense shield. In this way, I am interested in the symbolic power of the “weaponization of space” discourse in politicizing the issue of ballistic missile defense in the Canadian debate over BMD. This paper addresses both the way in which narratives that see the inevitability of space based weapons are enabled as well as how sites of resistance to this narrative can be articulated. This is done through an examination of the possibilities of political mobilization that a counter-discourse may afford to those who want to prevent the deployment of weapons in space.

In providing a novel reading of Canadian foreign policy-making, I will argue that the discourse on the weaponization of space serves purposes for a variety of actors in the political debate. For the state, in terms of its interests defined in terms of power and state survival, weaponizing space is perceived as a necessary step in reducing vulnerabilities. In the Canadian case, this position is inextricably linked to having a say on the security of the continent. For the politicians involved in the debate, the “weaponization of space” discourse enabled the maintenance of a “wait and see” attitude making the government seem like they were taking the moral high ground and distancing themselves from unpopular US policy while, concurrently, increasing its ties to the U.S. program via “consultation” and maintaining the options open to participation in BMD. For the organizations and citizens involved in opposing BMD, linking Ballistic Missile Defense explicitly with the “weaponization of space” enabled a certain amount of consensus building and mobilization by simplifying the issue and also introducing an ethical dimension to something that is primarily represented as a technical issue. In conclusion, I would like to illustrate the way in which the “weaponization of space” may serve as a significant marker for social mobilization against Ballistic Missile Defense in the future by briefly marshaling arguments in relation to two relatively successful instances of political mobilization as concerns traditional security issues: the nuclear freeze movement and the international campaign to ban landmines (ICBL).
This paper will be divided into two parts. In the first instance, I will discuss the issue of politicization and depoliticization in relation to security issues in view of understanding how and why a security issue can be brought into the realm of public contestation. In the second instance, I will move on to examine the debate itself and the use of the “weaponization of space” discourse within the debate on BMD in Canada and, in guise of conclusion, of its potential for political mobilization.

The depoliticization and politicization of security issues

You look fabulous

In a 1984 issue of Diacritics centered around the “nuclear criticism” approach to nuclear strategy and nuclear war, Jacques Derrida argues that the essential feature of the phenomenon of nuclear war is that it is “fabulously textual through and through” in that it is, more than any other form of weapon and warfare, dependent upon “structures of information and communication, structures of language, including non-vocalizable language, structures of codes and graphic decoding” and, since a nuclear war has not taken place, “one can only talk and write about it”. This is something that can also be said about war in space and the “Pearl Harbor in space” scenario outlined above not only because such a war has not taken place, but also because the greater part of the technology for such weapons systems has yet to be imagined let alone be developed and made operational. Col. Baum’s fable of a Chinese attack is no different than the scenarios that we find in the Rumsfeld report warning of a “Pearl Harbor in space.” Ironically, what makes one more of a “fable” is the factual data in Baum’s piece in the use of specific dates and events set in the future. However, the message is identical: ignore the threat at your own peril. In the succinct words of the Rumsfeld report: “We are on notice, but we have not noticed.”

Beyond the issue of only talking and writing about nuclear war, Derrida insists that the question of nuclear strategy and nuclear war is also fabulous in that “the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology.” In other words, textually, the sophistication of these technologies and their attendant strategies are always already connected to “the power and essence of rhetoric,” and, I would thus argue, of the cultural markers which inform the way through which we make sense of such weapon systems and their strategies - e.g. “a space pearl

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13 Ibid.
harbor” and its concomitant imaginaries. As Rebecca Bjork has expressed in relation to the Strategic Defense Initiative:

Viewing a weapons system like SDI as text allows the critic to explain the relationship between the weapon and the symbolic milieu from which it emerges and which it in turn helps to shape. Examining the discourse that justifies SDI allows the critic to explore the way in which advocates call upon the symbolic artifacts of the culture to perpetuate the program, and shape the symbolic environment itself.\(^\text{14}\)

This is clearly the case if one examines the symbolic power of a “Space Pearl Harbor” and what this symbol enables for the proponents of attending to the perceived vulnerabilities by providing measures to protect space assets and counter-measures to potentially attack the assets of a yet-to-be-determined adversary. However, one can also examine the discourse of the opponents to such a project, those attempting to provide alternative symbolic artifacts, alternative sense-making imaginaries such as a “Cuban Missile Crisis” in space highlighted above. Furthermore, as will be elaborated in detail later, the “weaponization of space” does, in itself, pack a rhetorical punch due to what it evokes and enables at the symbolic level.\(^\text{15}\) It is precisely the role of this expression in the debate over Ballistic Missile Defense in Canada that is of interest in this paper.

**Securitization, desecuritization and the political**

It should be clear from the above that the approach to reading foreign policy taken here eschews an “essentialist” reading of security issues. In other words, what is posited is that meaning and identity can never be fixed since there is, as Laclau and Mouffe suggest, no “underlying principle [or essence] fixing - and hence - constituting the whole field of differences.”\(^\text{16}\) In this sense, since meaning and identity are not intrinsic and are always relational, never self-present or self-engendered, they are unstable and in constant need of reiteration. What this enables, is an understanding of meaning and of the contestation over meaning(s) - such as that related to the weaponization of space discourse - that is intimately political.

Within the context of security studies, and informed by the above, this approach is also intimately associated with an understanding of security as a *speech act* as developed by Ole Weaver and the Copenhagen School.\(^\text{17}\) In short, and in relation to the above discussion on

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15 As will be addressed in detail later, its use has primarily negative connotations and is thus very rarely used by proponents of such weapon systems. Col. Baum mentioned above can be seen being one of those rarities although, even in his case, its use is polemical as it is presented in terms of a critique of those who would worship “at the altar of the peaceful use of space.” For such a polemical use see also Baker Spring, “Slipping the Surly Bonds of the Real World: The Unworkable Effort to Prevent the Weaponization of Space”, *Heritage Lectures*, no.877, April 14, 2005. It is interesting to note, in relation to this argument, that the Rumsfeld report does not mention the word weaponization once.


17 On the development of relative consensus in the Copenhagen School around this understanding of
essence, treating security as a speech act means, as Ole Weaver explains, that you do not understand it as “a sign that refers to something more real, the utterance itself is the act.”\(^{18}\) In other words, what makes a security issue a security issue is not the fact that the threat is itself intrinsically a security threat, but it is framed as such by calling it one. However, this does not simply mean that making an issue a security issue occurs solely in the ideational realm. On the contrary, by making an issue a security issue certain practices and technologies associated with security are deployed in order to neutralize what has been deemed a “security threat.” Understanding something as a security issue is thus never a neutral enterprise. Furthermore, through this understanding of security, more security is not always a good thing. Understanding security in this way has thus led to calls to either desecuritize certain issues or to not make an issue a security issue in the first place - e.g. immigration\(^{19}\) or the environment.\(^{20}\)

In understanding security as a speech act, one understands the deployment of a security discourse as a way to bring a certain issue under the realm of state decision and control. As Weaver suggests, “[i]n naming a certain development a security problem the “state” can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites.”\(^{21}\) In securitizing an issue, therefore, one fundamentally shifts it into a specific realm. For Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde, this process is one of politicization, in that it becomes part of public policy and government decision or, at its extreme, it is deemed an existential threat which would require emergency measures. As the authors note:

“Security” is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.\(^{22}\)

However, this is premised upon an understanding of the political as having to do with state policy - i.e. an issue becomes political once government decision and resource allocation is involved. If, however, we understand the political, as adumbrated above, in relation to a contestation over meaning, and, moreover, a social contestation over meaning, then making an issue a security issue is a depoliticizing move in that one removes this issue from social contestation. In this, my position on the relationship between securitization and the political is

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\(^{19}\) See, for example, Jef Huysmans, “Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues”, in Miles, Robert and Thranhardt, Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, London: Pinter (1995).


closer to that of Jenny Edkins who understands securitization in the following terms:

When issues are “securitized” they are even more firmly constrained within the already accepted criteria of a specific social form.[...]. Issues of “security” are more removed from public debate and decision than issues of “politics”; in most cases these issues are secret, and even the existence of such matters are concealed. Decisions about them are taken in technical terms, following the advice of experts in military affairs or defense. Securitization is technologization par excellence.23

The issue of securitization has been primarily addressed in terms of the broadening of security - i.e. of expanding the agenda of security beyond military security to include economic, environmental, and/or societal “threats.” From this standpoint, this type of broadening should be always treated with suspicion since securitizing such issues can lead to their depoliticization and their treatment through exceptional measures. In turn, taken as a whole, this can lead to securitizing and depoliticizing wider and deeper spheres of social and political space. However, how does this relate to the present issue? How can the insights of (de)securitization and (de)politicization be brought to bear in the case of the weaponization of space discourse in its relation to the Canadian debate on Ballistic Missile Defense? After all, this is not really a question of broadening the security agenda in the sense of securitizing issues from outside the traditional understanding of security understood in military terms. On the contrary, BMD can precisely be seen as being part and parcel of this traditional military understanding of security that was born at the end of the Second World War, and monopolized the political imagination for most of the Cold War.

The way in which this discussion is pertinent is in the possibility of bringing traditional security issues into the realm of social contestation. This is, of course, nothing new. One could say that the nuclear freeze movement was precisely this type of shift. As Rebecca Bjork has argued, certain themes of the freeze movement such as the rhetoric around “faith in common sense”; the “fear about nuclear war”; the “concern about nuclear overkill”, the “sense of urgency”, and the “impatience with traditional arms control”24, led to the possibility of successful political mobilization around a relatively simple and approachable articulation of the meaning of the nuclear arms race. Ironically, the Reagan civil defense proposal may have also helped to fuel the mobilization, in a structural sense, by bringing the debate to local governments. As Bjork suggests, “[a]s city councils studied and considered these plans, public information about the destructive effects of nuclear weapons proliferated. This knowledge was to become a major factor contributing to public support for the nuclear freeze campaign.”25 More recently, the international campaign to ban landmines (ICBL) can be seen as another example of bringing a traditional security issue into the realm of social contestation. I have argued elsewhere, with Claire Turenne Sjolander, that landmines went from being understood as a legitimate weapon to

23 Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism & International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In, Boulder: Lynne Rienner (1999), p.11.


secure the existence of the sovereign state to being perceived as a humanitarian scourge through the creation of a counter-discourse that enabled a successful political mobilization. Instead of a securitization, therefore, what we can see with the contestation of meaning of landmines is a humanitarianization of the issue. As we argue:

Within the state security discourse, landmines ‘protect national borders, military and economic assets, and fighting forces themselves.’ While Axworthy suggests that the issue of landmines has been incorporated into a broadened notion of security (human security) in which the conditions of daily life are security issues, the contrary process to securitization is observable here; landmines are being humanitarianized. From a non-essentialist perspective, landmines migrate from being off-limits in terms of the state security discourse to being constructed as a legitimate concern of civil society - a humanitarian issue.

Within the context of the present paper, what is at issue is precisely an examination of the weaponization of space discourse and how it is deployed in relation to the Canadian debate on Ballistic Missile Defense. What is addressed is how the different actors in the debate give meaning to, and make sense of, the “weaponization of space” and its relationship to BMD.

In having to address the way different actors deploy the weaponization of space discourse, however, one last issue should be addressed regarding securitization and desecuritization. One final adaptation from the academic debate around securitization needs to be made around those who initiate the security speech act. This is what I would like to address as the “situatedness” of the security speech act.

The situatedness of the security speech act

As alluded to above, Weaver’s original formulation of the security speech act addressed the way in which it is successfully articulated by the “state and its elites” and, thus, these actors can claim a special right to a certain issue. However, this view has come under certain amount of criticism as being too state centric, as a constructivist extension of realist tenets. As Jef Huysmans explains, “Ole Weaver theorizes this question from a classical realist perspective. The modern state, represented by statesmen, possess the principal capacity of securitizing issues. Statesmen, incarnating the state and expressing security in its name, are the privileged instruments of the process of securitization.” I do not want to dispute here the importance of statesmen in the enunciation of a security discourse, in particular when one addresses security issues in the realm of its traditional military understanding. However, I believe that one must add complexity to this approach by examining the types of contestations over meaning that occur within the state and across state borders in relation to the interests of the different actors.


27 Ibid., pp.373-374.

involved. After all, successful political mobilization around traditional security issues such as the nuclear freeze campaign or the international campaign to ban landmines must occur somehow if one adheres to a speech act approach. In doing so, I will loosely take my cue from the work of Didier Bigo who presents a more sociological perspective on the speech act. In his work on the securitization of immigration, Bigo addresses how both the symbolic order of the sovereign state as well as different actors such as politicians and security professionals - what he calls “professional managers of unease” - and the dissemination of their techniques, have performatively contributed in different ways to the articulation of immigration as a security issue through a specific form of governmentality. As Bigo explains,

Securitization of the immigrant as a risk is based on our conception of the state as a body or a container for the polity. It is anchored in the fears of politicians about losing their symbolic control over the territorial boundaries. It is structured by the *habitus* of the security professionals and their new interest not only in the foreigner but in the “immigrant.” [...] It is based, finally, on the “unease” that some citizens who feel discarded suffer because they cannot cope with the uncertainty of everyday life.²⁹

Of course, within the present context, we are dealing with a rather different phenomenon, one of a contestation over meaning related to what can be understood as a “traditional” security issue. However, what I would like to retain from Bigo’s analysis is precisely the “situatedness” of the security speech act, the way in which different actors confer meaning upon the “weaponization of space,” or avoid the term altogether, in relation to the symbolic order of the sovereign state in the Canadian debate on BMD. What I will address through Bigo is a way of “seeing” in relation to the state, the politicians, and the social movement mobilized against Canadian participation in Ballistic Missile Defense.

**The “weaponization of space” in the Canadian debate on BMD**

*Seeing like a state*

To understand what it means to “see like a state” is not only to understand the world in terms of *realpolitik* and the traditional realist tenet of interests defined in terms of power, but to comprehend the power of the symbolic order that this form of social order deploys. In other words the symbolic order around state sovereignty constrains our ability to conceive of alternative configurations of political space in modernity since, as Rob Walker explains, “states have managed to more or less monopolize our understanding of what political life is and where it occurs.”³⁰ In terms of security, this monopolization manifests itself, as Walker suggests, in that “the security of states dominates our understanding of what security can be and who it can be for.”³¹ What this standpoint effectively forecloses is the capacity of civil society to contest or to question the weapons of war that secure the existence of the state and its territorial integrity. As Bigo suggests, “even if all these concepts were arms in symbolic and political struggles between

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³¹ Ibid.
different groups, the concepts of sovereignty, security and borders always structure our thought as if there existed a “body” - an “envelope,” or “container” - differentiating one polity from another."\(^\text{32}\)

It is precisely this type of understanding that is deployed in understanding the vulnerabilities to space-based assets, and the need to defend those assets, in terms of a “Space Pearl Harbor” as outlined above. Although understanding space-based assets and their defense in terms of the state-as-container metaphor is difficult, “Pearl Harbor” serves to deploy such an understanding as an extension of the U.S. national interests. After all, being on Oahu, Hawaii, before its admission as the 50\(^{th}\) state of the union, “Pearl Harbor” is not an attack on the territorial integrity of the U.S. mainland, yet it is, for all intents and purposes, an attack not only on U.S. interests, but on the extremities of the forward defenses of the state - i.e. an extension of the state as such. It is through this imaginary - the one that sees space as “an ultimate high ground” - that one can understand space as a continuum, as a transfer of the same logic into just another “medium” beyond “air, land and sea” as described in the Rumsfeld Commission quote at the outset of this paper. From this standpoint, there is no real room for the “weaponization of space” to be a frame of reference, since space does not constitute a definite threshold. Furthermore, the line is even more blurred if one considers the use of space-based systems to target precision weapons on the ground. Are the targeting systems themselves part of the “weapon” or not? In examining the ethical and moral issues around the debate between the militarization and weaponization of space and addressing the common held view that space has been militarized but not weaponized, Col. John Hyten and Robert Uy argue:

The Taliban and Republican Guard forces who were on the receiving end of global positioning system (GPS)-guided weapons, likely have a different impression. Many of the targets attacked by today’s Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines are targeted using overhead space systems commanded through the use of space connectivity and guided by precision, spaced-based navigation systems. Space systems are an essential element of our current intelligence, command and control, and weapon systems inventory. This fundamental nature of modern warfare is a critical element driving the moral and ethical decisions regarding “space weapons.”\(^\text{33}\)

In this gray area between what is “space” and what is “not space”, what is a “weapon” and what is “not a weapon,” one can understand the vulnerability of space-based assets as a crucial issue in maintaining the “ultimate high ground” to achieve “full spectrum dominance.” As alluded to before, from the standpoint of the state, in articulating its interests in terms of power and, consequently, in terms of its vulnerabilities concerning state survival, the rational course of action is understood as having all the possible weapons at its disposal to maintain its integrity.

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Weapon systems of all types and anywhere can thus be seen as artifacts of the state security discourse framed around an essentialized notion of state sovereignty.

In relation to the Canadian case, this discourse manifests itself differently. As Tariq Rauf explains, Canada, in contradistinction to some of the arguments presented above, “does not feel as vulnerable. It does not suffer from the Pearl Harbor syndrome or the over-riding fear of “a bolt out of the blue” as does the U.S., or for that matter for a defining need for an external threat to maintain a national security state.”34 Furthermore, Canada has also consistently taken independent foreign policy positions in relation to U.S. policies, including deciding not to participate in the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative in 1986 and, more recently, declining to participate in the U.S. led war in Iraq in 2003. However, Canada is perceived as being dependent on the United States for its territorial integrity and is inextricably intertwined with U.S. territorial defense policy through a myriad of cooperation mechanisms including more than 80 treaty-level agreements, more than 250 memoranda of understanding between defense departments, and approximately 145 bilateral fora on defense.35 The way in which Canada “sees like a state” is therefore, not primarily through direct vulnerability - although the geographical proximity and the possibility of threats to the U.S. having an impact on Canadian territory are factors taken into consideration - but through the fear of not participating directly in continental defense and, more precisely, of the repercussions that not participating in a National Ballistic Missile (NMD) defense program may have on Canada- U.S. defense agreements. This position has been most firmly voiced through the Canadian Department of National Defense that had been pushing for a role in the American national missile defense system since 1997.36 This vulnerability is brought to the fore by Andrew Richler in his overview of Canada’s response to NMD in relation to an unofficial offer made by the U.S. for Canada to participate by the spring of 2000:

[A]s the months passed and no official announcement on Canadian participation was forthcoming, concern began to grow within the military that Canada might decline the US offer, and that the effect on NORAD could prove disastrous. Lt. General George Macdonald, NORAD’s Deputy Commander (and Canada’s highest ranking NORAD officer), warned that if Canada refused to participate in NMD, NORAD could face gradual erosion and possible extinction. As he cautioned, ‘you have to ask if [Canada] is not part [of NMD], how can we be part of NORAD?... There would be a serious risk that the closeness of our very successful partnership would be compromised.37

Although these fears have been assuaged through the rejuvenation of NORAD after September 11th through the perceived increased vulnerability to external threats and the addition of domestic


airspace, other fears about the Canada-U.S. security relationship have come to take its place. As James Ferguson points out, Canada’s “input into the NAMD intercept strategy, the future status of NORAD within a restructured U.S. command hierarchy, the relationship of NORAD to Space Command, Canadian industrial involvement, and most importantly Canada’s military (and to a lesser extent civilian) space strategy”\(^{38}\) are still open questions.

From this standpoint, the question of the “weaponization of space” is occluded and so is the issue of social contestation over the decision to participate in NMD. The issue is not framed around a political decision in terms of deciding what course Canada should take, but it is framed in technical terms - i.e. in terms of maintaining a say in the defense of the continent and in securing the territorial integrity and survival of the state.

*Seeing like a politician*

Canada has been a firm supporter of multilateral agreements regarding the peaceful use of outer space and has also been active in pushing for an expansion of the 1967 Outer Space treaty to ban all types of space weapons through the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD). Beyond the passage of the annual Prevention of an Arms Race in Space (PAROS) resolution, Canada has, since 1998, initiated proposals for the negotiation in the CD of a legally binding instrument to prevent an arms race in outer space. At the same time, however, since the 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada has also made a commitment to gain “a better understanding of missile defense through research and in consultation with like-minded nations.”\(^{39}\) This was reinforced in a 1999 special feature on Canada’s Department of National Defence (DND) website declaring that Canada “will continue efforts to to develop a better understanding of the U.S. ballistic missile defence program” through “ongoing consultations.”\(^{40}\) This was again reiterated in a DND background document in May 2003 that states that “ballistic missile defence consultations between Canada and the US took place in Ottawa in July 2002, and, more recently, in Washington on January 28, 2003.”\(^{41}\)

The rhetoric of “consultation” is akin to the way in which SDI, defined primarily as a research program, became immune to criticism and developed its own inertia. As Rebecca Bjork states:

> Given that SDI was justified primarily as a research program designed to explore the feasibility of emerging technologies, it was difficult for opponents to formulate compelling arguments against it. Arguments challenging the design of the system, and its probable cost and effectiveness, were dismissed with calls for further research, and, since

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these uncertainties could only be resolved with more research, SDI became self-perpetuating.\footnote{Rebecca S. Bjork, \textit{The Strategic Defense Initiative: Symbolic Containment of the Nuclear Threat}, New York: State University of New York Press (1992), p.66.}

“Consultation” plays the same role here in the sense of keeping the door perpetually open to cooperation while being relatively immune to criticism. This was also, of course, maintained by how long the U.S. kept the system in its planning stages. As the program moves from its research and development stage to testing and deployment, this position becomes increasingly untenable. However, although some, like Jack Granatstein, believed in back in 2002 that “Canada must choose between high morality and great practicality,”\footnote{Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, \textit{Partners in North America: Advancing Canada’s Relations with the United States and Mexico}, December 2002, p.110.} the dynamic between a firm position on the “weaponization of space” and perpetual “consultation” enabled Canada to maintain an ambiguous position on its participation in the U.S. National Missile Defense program until Prime Minister Martin’s announcement on February 24\textsuperscript{th}, 2005 to not participate in the program.

The quote by Bill Graham that introduced this paper most clearly exemplifies what the “weaponization of space” enables in relation to Missile Defense. By making Canada’s position regarding the weaponization of space one that sees the latter as “immoral, illegal, and a bad mistake” - as a threshold that \textit{must} not be crossed - Canada puts itself on the terrain of the ethical. As NMD feeds into the broader American imaginaries of a historic sense of mission or destiny as well as the role of progress and technology in American culture,\footnote{On this, see Rebecca S. Bjork, \textit{The Strategic Defense Initiative: Symbolic Containment of the Nuclear Threat}, New York: State University of New York Press (1992), pp.65-90 and William Chaloupka, \textit{Knowing Nukes: The Politics and Culture of the Atom}, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (1992), pp.68-85.} the “weaponization of space” feeds into Canada’s sense of place in the world. What the weaponization of space discourse - or, rather, the “non-weaponization of space” as a position - affords to the Canadian imaginary is its fit with the perceived understanding of Canada as a champion of multilateralism and a leader in arms control. It also fits into the broader imaginary of “peace”, of Canada as a “peace-keeper”, as a “peaceful” country. In this imaginary, “weapons” are seen as antithetical and, furthermore, the weaponization of space is not seen as “progress,” but as a de-generation, as a step back on the path of disarmament. Furthermore, non-weaponizing space fits in to an imaginary of conservation, of preservation and, in some ways, of a desire for a return to a simpler time. It must also be added that this understanding of the Canadian imaginary is relational in the sense that this identity is often articulated in contradistinction to our neighbors to the south.

The dynamics of the weaponization of space discourse are interesting if one examines its deployment in relation to changes in the implementation of the program in the United States. What is intriguing to note is that the Canadian government increasingly became more vociferous on this issue as the United States increasingly committed itself to its National Missile Defense program. Steps that have been taken by the U.S. towards making NMD a reality have been countered by comments by a Canadian government representative regarding Canada’s commitment to oppose the weaponization of space. For example, Graham’s comments above were made in December 2002 after President Bush ordered the U.S. military to have the first
pieces of the national missile shield combat-ready by 2004.

Furthermore, when “consultation” comes to the fore in concrete, detailed, form highlighting the possibility of Canadian participation a comment on Canada’s stand on the weaponization of space is sure to follow. For example, to a question by the Right Hon. Joe Clarke in the House of Commons on the 27th of February 2002 regarding discussions with the Americans regarding space weapons and missile defense systems both Minister of National Defense Art Eggleton and Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham reiterated Canada’s position on the weaponization of space as a firm and absolute position. Even in relation to a possible affirmative position on participation the message has been the same as long as the “weaponization of space” can be kept rhetorically separate from “Ballistic Missile Defense.” For example, as Andrew Richter has noted, after some indications from the Canadian government of a openness to consider participation in 2002, in May 2003 Bill Graham “suggested that Canada was prepared to participate in the missile defense program, its goal in doing so would be to prevent the weaponization of space.” In other words, Canadian participation would keep a Canadian presence in the process to make sure that the U.S. was kept “honest” about its intentions. How Canada would be able to do this remains an unanswered question.

The “weaponization of space” has thus served to deliver an unambiguous message. It is relatively simple and straightforward and, in this sense, can give the Canadian public the perception that it is taking a stand on the issue. However, what this means in terms of Canadian participation in NMD is very ambiguous. What the weaponization of space discourse affords the Canadian government is to slowly move forward at a technical level with ongoing consultation and research while appearing to stand firm on its principles and its perceived world reputation. By rhetorically separating cooperation on U.S. National Missile Defense from the “weaponization of space,” the Canadian government has been able to maintain what James Ferguson calls a “wait and see” policy which enabled Canada not to make a choice between “its vital cost-effective continental defense relationship with the U.S. and its long-standing commitment to the ABM treaty and arms control.” Paul Martin could therefore go in front of the United Nations on September 22nd, 2004 and unabashedly proclaim “what a tragedy it would be if space became one big weapon arsenal and the scene of a new arms race” and that “the time has come to extend this ban to all weapons,” while still having not made a formal decision


47 That the separation is rhetorical is further evidenced by the fact that, as Richter notes, “[i]n January 2004 it was reported that DND had concluded that “a significant risk associated with BMD...is its reinforcement of trends towards the weaponization of outer space”, Ibid., p.169, Note 120.


49 _Address by Prime Minister Paul Martin at the United Nations_, September 22, 2004, New York, New
regarding Canadian participation on NMD.

However, although the weaponization of space discourse presents an opportunity for the Canadian government to appear to stand firm and to present Canadian values, it also presents a danger to its position in that it brings the issue of Ballistic Missile Defense into the realm of social contestation in that it can be re-deployed by social movements against Ballistic Missile Defense. It is to this issue that I now turn.

Seeing like a social movement

If the Canadian government has attempted to keep the issues of the “weaponization of space” and “Ballistic Missile Defense” separate, those involved in creating a campaign against Canadian participation in BMD have attempted to explicitly link the two. The “weaponization of space” serves a similar purpose for social movements against ballistic missile defense: it has negative connotations, it is relatively simple and straightforward, and it is an absolute position - i.e. it creates a threshold which does not leave room for compromise. In this way, it not only has mass appeal but it is socially engaging. What it enables, is to shift the discussion from the technical to that of social contestation, into the realm of the political. Linking the weaponization of space discourse to BMD therefore enables the possibility of bringing the issue of BMD into the realm of social contestation without having to marshal the finer points of deterrence theory and how ballistic missile defense can be profoundly destabilizing or a catalyst for increased proliferation. It is also, in my opinion, more effective than alternative conceptions such as “space sanctuary” because of both its relative passivity and its possible exposure to counter-arguments around the fact that space is already militarized, or “space security” which, as alluded to before, is ambiguous since both sides of the issue can claim to be “securitizing” space. For this reason it has been more explicitly, and increasingly, deployed by those organizations and citizens opposed to ballistic missile defense. For example, an examination of Project Ploughshare Briefings by Ernie Regehr shows how “the weaponization of space” has increasingly become the central theme around which to develop arguments against BMD.

Opponents of BMD can thus highlight the particularities of how “consultation” has avoided the use of the term “weaponization of space.” For example, Regehr demonstrates how a letter by Canadian defense minister Pratt to U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, although explicit about certain issues regarding Canadian negotiations on BMD that are to be included, does not address anything that is to be excluded. What is important here, according to Regehr, is precisely

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For the use of the former see, for example, Lt Col Bruce Deblois “Space Sanctuary: A Viable National Strategy”, *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1998, pp.41-57, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj98/win98/deblois.html. For the use of the latter see, for example, *Achieving Space Security: A Preliminary Action Inquiry for a Canadian Campaign to Prevent the Weaponization of Space*, Polaris Institute, February 2005 or the work of the Space Security Working Group including its latest annual report *Space Security 2006*, http://www.spacesecurity.org/SSI2006.pdf. I would like to make clear that my argument is in no way disparaging of the work that individuals and organizations deploying space “sanctuary” or “security” as monikers to mark their position in the debate. The point I am making is that discursively the “weaponization of space” may provide a better quilting point for political mobilization for the reasons explained herein.

the lack of mention of “weaponization of space.” As the author notes: “This omission of any reference to space weaponization has been widely remarked upon and is especially relevant because it commits Canada to the ‘current’ US BMD program which includes research on placing weapons in space.”52 Here Regehr tries to explicitly link “weaponization of space” and “consultation” and shows that while the former is clear and unequivocal, the latter is amorphous and incremental. As Regehr notes: “The letter adopts the Pentagon’s vague language of an overall system that is to evolve over time including into space if that is where technology takes it. And Minister Pratt’s letter explicitly says that Canada’s cooperation “should also evolve.” 53

This brings up the notion of the threshold with regards to the weaponization of space discourse. By making the distinction between space being “militarized” but not “weaponized” it is possible to circumscribe a clear threshold that should not be crossed.54 The notion of a threshold serves precisely to enable the development of “thin edge of the wedge” arguments. For example, Nobel Prize winner John Polanyi has warned that the thin, more restrictive, missile defense system proposed by the U.S. can quickly lead to a much more complex and “thick” layer of missile defense. As the Globe and Mail reported: “As far as Polanyi is concerned, the addition of space-based weapons is to be anticipated if the US goes ahead with NMD as, ‘...once the door is open to a minimal anti-ballistic missile, it will also be open to a less than minimal one.’55

Conclusion: the “weaponization of space” and the mobilization of civil society

The weaponization of space discourse has therefore enabled organizations and citizens opposed to Ballistic Missile Defense to bring into the realm of social contestation such an ethereal and technologically complex issue. Although Canada has formally declined to participate in the U.S. project for NMD, there is a new conservative government in Ottawa that appears more amenable to U.S. security designs and the issue is far from resolved. Furthermore, considering the increased engagement of the U.S. government on the issue of NMD and a continued reiteration of space-asset vulnerabilities from the Bush administration, the issue is certainly not going away soon. On the contrary, with the issue of proliferation around Iran and North Korea becoming increasingly salient news items, it is on its way to becoming more pointed in the future. One can therefore ask, is there a place for social movements to effect pressure on this issue? and, more germane to the present analysis, can the “weaponization of space” serve as

52 Ibid., p.2.
53 Ibid.
54 See, for example, Sarah Estabrooks, “Preventing the weaponization of space: options for moving forward”, Project Ploughshare Briefing, #03/3, March 2003. Interestingly, this point has also recently become a site of contention for those arguing for the deployment of a spaced based missile defense system from groups outside the current US administration. For example, in arguing for the deployment of such a system, Baker Spring argues that space “is already heavily weaponized and has been since the dawn of the space age”, arguing that ballistic missiles, due to their spending “a majority of their flight time in space” in themselves have already weaponized space. He also makes the argument adumbrated above regarding the extension of the definition of “weapon” to weapon system. Baker Spring, “Slipping the Surly Bonds of the Real World: The Unworkable Effort to Prevent the Weaponization of Space”, Heritage Lectures, no.877, April 14, 2005.
a marker of social contestation that can be effective in mobilizing populations?

What this paper has attempted to reveal is that the weaponization of space discourse has indeed served certain interests if examined in relation to certain specific subject positions - i.e. ways of “seeing” in relation to the state, politicians, and the social movement mobilized against Canadian participation in Ballistic Missile Defense. In this way, it provides a way of reading foreign policy that takes into account multiple actors in its articulation. For the state, as concerns the U.S. administration’s discursive economy around the issue, there is no space for the “weaponization of space” discourse inasmuch as a ballistic missile system is perceived as yet another step in a continuum to reduce potential vulnerabilities. The rational course of action is therefore understood in terms of having all the possible weapons at its disposal to maintain its territorial integrity in an increasingly disordered and dangerous world. In the Canadian case, this argument articulates itself around the repercussions that not participating in a National Ballistic Missile (NMD) defense program may have on Canada in their participation in the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the continent.

In terms of its explicit use, the “weaponization of space” discourse enabled the maintenance of a “wait and see” attitude for the Liberal government in power. By rhetorically separating cooperation on U.S. National Missile Defense from the “weaponization of space” the government was able to appeal to certain markers of Canadian identity in contradistinction to those of the United States, appearing to be taking the moral high ground in relation to U.S. policy while, simultaneously increasing its ties to the U.S. program via “consultation” and maintaining the options open to participation.

For the organizations and citizens involved in opposing BMD, linking Ballistic Missile Defense explicitly with the “weaponization of space” enabled a certain amount of consensus building and mobilization by simplifying the issue and also introducing an ethical dimension to something that is primarily represented as a technical issue. In bringing Ballistic Missile Defense into the realm of social contestation, the “weaponization of space” discourse has presented a relatively unambiguous ethical position on the issue around the notion of a clearly circumscribed threshold that should not be crossed. In this sense, the weaponization of space reveals certain similarities with the international campaign to ban landmines (ICBL). Although in this case it was the elimination of a weapons system instead of its creation that was at issue, both can be seen as being similarly articulated around the unambiguous figure of a ban. In both cases, furthermore, it is a question of bringing an issue that has been part of the traditional security discourse of the state and its attendant logics of survival into the realm of social contestation. Finally, in both cases, it is the relatively impersonal issue weapons systems that are at stake.

However, with landmines, because of the relatively simple technology, their mass production, and their autonomous functioning once they have been placed, the weapon itself could be distanced from the user and made into a “humanitarian scourge.”\(^{56}\) This type of distancing is much more difficult to achieve when it is precisely the level of technology and the promise of eternal vigilance that is supposed to provide the assurances. In this case, the state must be viewed as being firmly in control of the technology and cannot absolve itself from its

role in producing the weapons system as can be the case with landmine production and “bury and forget” deployment. Finally, and intimately related to the above as well as to the earlier discussion regarding the fabulous nature of nuclear war, one of the key features of the ICBL was the possibility of showing the victims and also empowering them to be spokespersons for the movement. Vignettes of landmine victims as well as poignant symbols such as pyramids of shoes or the manufacture, purchase and fitting of prosthetic limbs were central to the political mobilization. As with the nuclear freeze movement before it, the movement to prevent the weaponization of space does not have such victims to provide an existential example of the impact of the weapon systems. Its existential impact can only be understood in terms of the potential impact of the technologies. In this, perhaps the movement to prevent the weaponization of space could take a cue from the nuclear freeze movement and emphasize the issues of proliferation, destabilization and the potential creation of new vulnerabilities that crossing the weaponization of space threshold may entail. In developing a frame of reference for the crossing of such a threshold, therefore, the sense producing analogy of a “Cuban Missile Crisis” as a counter-frame to that of a “Space Pearl Harbor” may be a prescient one indeed.

57 Ibid., pp.375-377.