Realignment in Manitoba:

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Introduction

Until Edward Schreyer and the New Democratic Party (NDP) surprised most political observers with their narrow victory in the provincial election of 1969, governing parties in Manitoba, be they Conservatives (renamed “Progressive Conservative” (PC) in the 1940s), Liberals, or Liberal-Progressives (which formed by the merging of the Liberal Party with the Progressives in 1932),² achieved power by combining support from rural voters located in the province’s southern farm belt and an urban professional and business elite based chiefly in South Winnipeg (Peterson, 1972; Adams, 2008a). The NDP’s narrow victory in 1969 was based on its unprecedented ability to capture a majority of seats in Winnipeg, including those containing lower and middle class neighbourhoods, along with support from comparatively less prosperous northern farm regions and the northern hinterland. In two ways the provincial election of 1969 fits the mould of what can be described as a “critical election” in that it signaled a new formula for winning power, and triggered a major shift in party preferences, especially away from the Liberals, towards the NDP in both Winnipeg and the North.

In the 1950s, V.O. Key introduced to the political science community the concept of “critical elections” in his analysis of how American voters began shifting towards the Democrats in the late 1920s which ultimately led to the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in the 1932 Presidential Election. Fusing support from the industrial northeast and southern “Dixiecrats”, the Democrats were able to occupy the Whitehouse for two decades until Eisenhower’s Republican victory in 1952. A critical election is therefore an

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¹ I wish to thank my colleague Scott MacKay for providing comments on an earlier draft of this paper. All errors or omissions remain mine.
² The Conservatives and Progressive Conservatives are the same party. It underwent a name change following the renaming of the federal Conservative Party in 1942, with candidates running as “Progressive Conservatives” in the 1945 provincial election (Adams, 2007a). The Liberal-Progressives, however, were not simply renamed Liberals. The party was born out of a fusion of the Liberal Party and Progressive Party in 1932. The party dropped the word “Progressive” from its name following the 1958 provincial election and ran as “Liberals” candidates in 1959 (Adams, 2007b).
electoral event in which there occurs “a realignment, both sharp and durable.” In this sense, therefore, it is only after watching a series of electoral outcomes following a change in government that one is able to label the triggering event as a “realigning” election, and not simply a reflection of temporary shifts in partisan support.

Similar to the long-time presence of Democrats in the White House subsequent to the 1932 election, 1969 signaled the NDP’s ascendancy and a long term pattern for Manitoba’s party system. Based on support from Winnipeg voters, the less prosperous farm regions of the province, and, for the first time, ridings across the North, the NDP went on to replace the Liberals as one of the province’s two major parties and, by 2008, was able to hold government power in 24 out of 39 years. During this time, the NDP was out of power for only two periods. The first one was short lived, lasting from 1977 to 1981 when Sterling Lyon’s PCs were elected based in part on a neo-conservative agenda. The PCs lost after a single term to the NDP led by Howard Pawley. The second period was significantly longer, commencing in 1988 when the PCs under Gary Filmon won a minority victory which was followed by two PC majorities in 1990 and 1995.

A multitude of elements helped generate the NDP’s 1969 breakthrough. This included a shift to the ideological right by both the PCs and Liberals which moved the two parties closer to the political inclinations of rural voters, the NDP’s ability to harness the power of television (especially during a highly publicized leadership race which was triggered when the provincial election was unexpectedly called), and Schreyer’s appeal as a moderately pragmatic leader with a multi-ethnic background. Not the least of the various factors at play was that in 1968, electoral redistribution increased the number of seats for the Winnipeg region, while decreasing the power of the southern farm vote. Urban voters for the first time were electing almost half of Manitoba’s MLAs (McAllister, 1984: 116).

Compared to 1977, the 1988 election appeared to have more serious consequences for the NDP, with Liberal candidates taking much of Winnipeg from both the NDP and PCs, leaving the NDP in third place and reliant on the northern edge of Winnipeg’s

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downtown, West Brandon, and the North. For many, including Ed Schreyer who had been watching the election coverage that evening, it was believed to be the end of the NDP as one of the two major provincial parties (Schreyer interview with author, 2006).

Aside from gains made by the Liberals, the PCs made the most from the 1988 election by refashioning itself as a pragmatic and moderately conservative party rather than the neo-conservative entity it had been under Sterling Lyon (Lambert, 1988: 256-259). For a number of reasons, including the handling of federal government pressures over the socially divisive Meech Lake Accord, and discussed at length by this author and others elsewhere (Adams, 2008, Lambert, 1995, Lambert 1998), Filmon and the PCs went on to win two successive majority victories. The PCs’ hold on provincial government power came to what was for many a surprising end in 1999, with what will be described in this paper as the second of the Manitoba NDP’s critical elections.

**Manitoba’s Political Alignments**

It has long been understood that Manitoba’s party system is tied to territorial patterns that are marked by two distinct class cleavages. These cleavages are similar to those discerned by others in many emerging European party systems during the 1800s. This includes 1) a land-industry (rural-urban) cleavage and 2) an ownership-worker (class) divide (Lipsett and Rokkan, 1967). In the case of Manitoba, similar divisions appear when mapped out according to election results. Leaving aside Winnipeg and its own internal peculiarities for the moment, electoral outcomes for the major parties can be divided along a diagonal line that coincides with the southern edge of the Canadian Shield. This runs from the northwest, where the Swan River Valley is located, to the Lake of the Woods in the southeast (Peterson, 1972; see also Lambert, 2004; Serfaty, 1996). This line roughly separates the generally prosperous southern farming areas (which were mostly settled by farmers of British origin who arrived in the province via Ontario during the 1880s and 1890s) and more northerly marginal farmlands which tended to be settled by those of non-British origin, as well as the less developed (and sparsely populated) northern hinterland (Wiseman, 1981).

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4 The map based on the 1988 results is taken from Wikipedia.
The outcome of this class-based geographic pattern is that in the past forty years southern farmers and those in nearby communities have generally elected PC candidates, while the NDP has drawn support from working class neighbourhoods, marginal farming communities, northern labourers, and Aboriginal communities. Furthermore, Winnipeg itself has its own territorial class-related dynamic with its North End consisting of working class voters with its history of electing socialist and labour-based candidates, and the South End where the city’s business and professional community is concentrated and where PC candidates have often drawn high levels of support. As this paper will show, since the critical election of 1999, the NDP has expanded its base in Winnipeg where a majority of the province's seats are now located. And whereas the city’s electorate roughly divided itself between its northern (NDP) and southern (PC) halves, the NDP has now pushed the PCs out of most of South Winnipeg and into the southwestern corner of the city.

**Emerging Realignments: Using V.O. Key**

To help examine the dynamics of Manitoba’s shifting electorate, used here will be a simple yet visually useful tool used by V.O. Key in his *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*. In it he examines shifts in popular support using four case studies, the elections of 1900 and 1904 in Indiana and California, and the 1904 and 1908 elections in New York and Ohio. He does this by charting, on a county by county basis, changes in percent in Republican Party support from the first election (using the X-axis) to the second (on the Y-axis) (Key, 1964, 528). Figure 2 provides here a simplified demonstration. A county where no change in support occurred from one election to the next (marked by Dot A) is plotted on the line marking a 45° angle, a county where support increased, such as from 20% to 25% (Dot B) appears above the line, while a

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Some might object that the Liberals have been left out of this discussion. With the exception of T.C. Norris’ Liberal victory in 1915 which was based on support from across the city, prior to the 1970s the Liberals (and their predecessors, the Liberal-Progressives) also tended to follow the S+S formula by drawing support from farmers and South Winnipeg businesses. However, since the early 1970s the Liberals have operated as an ideologically centric urban-based party with occasional successes in Winnipeg. In 1988, Sharon Carstairs and her Liberal Party won twenty seats, yet with the exception of one seat in Selkirk, all of these seats were in Winnipeg. In part this reflected a momentary collapse of the NDP, rather than long term realignment. For an account of the Liberal Party’s decline in Manitoba see John Wilson’s “The Decline of the Liberal Party in Manitoba” (1975) and Adams (2007b).
county where a party’s support dropped, such as from 33% to 30%, appears below the line (shown here as County C).

![Diagram of party support changes]

**Figure 2: Example of Shifting Party Support**

### The 1999 Critical Election

Just as various elements came together to produce the 1969 victory for Schreyer’s NDP, so too did a multitude of factors produce another breakthrough in 1999. Prior to this, in the 1995 provincial election Gary Doer and the NDP went down to their third defeat in a row. With only a third of the electorate (33%, up from 29% in 1990) and 23 seats going to the NDP, compared to the PCs who were able to take 43% of the vote and 31 seats, the NDP remained far from power. However, an important element was the fate of the Liberals. Already discussed in part was how the Liberals in 1988 election decimated the NDP in Winnipeg and for the first time since the 1960s were able to form the Official Opposition. However, the Liberals were unable to consolidate its hold on its second place position and, in 1990, support for the party declined to 28% garnering seven seats. Figure 3 shows that the Liberals continued their decline in 1995, and were reduced to three seats based on 24% of the vote. This was followed by a series of problems...
relating to divisions in the party leadership and the necessity to hold two leadership conventions prior to 1999 (Adams, 2008).

With the Liberals largely sidelined by internal problems, the factors that influenced the 1999 outcome included issues, leadership and platforms. Concerning the campaign issues, there were two that dogged Premier Filmon and his party leading up to the vote. The first issue involved widespread concern regarding shortages in healthcare care funding and what was termed by the media as “hallway medicine” (i.e. patients being left in the hallways). The problem was rooted in cuts in federal government transfers made by Prime Minister Jean Chretien and Finance Minister Paul Martin (Maslove, 2005) exacerbated by Filmon’s commitment to balance budgets without increasing taxes. The second issue revolved around the role played by high level PC strategists in an illegal vote-splitting scheme concocted during the previous 1995 election. While accepting Filmon’s testimony that he was not involved in the illegal activity,\(^6\) many others who were involved in the activities and a subsequent cover-up were labeled as “liars” by retired Chief Justice Alfred Monnin who headed the inquiry into the matter (Monnin, 1999; Smith, 2003).

While the PCs took a public image hit on issues pertaining to healthcare services and government integrity, NDP leader Doer was able to present both himself and his party as a moderate and fiscally prudent alternative to the PCs. An unusual yet effective step in this regard was to have his opposition caucus vote in favour of the PC government’s 1999 budget, including its controversial balanced budget provisions, prior to the 1999 election.\(^7\) NDP election platform contained five simple commitments: resolve access problems within the healthcare system, lower post-secondary education costs, make communities safer, maintain balanced budgets, and “create a new partnership with business and labour.” At the same time, the PCs countered with their “50/50 Plan”, dubbed by others as the “Billion Dollar Plan”, which promised $500m in spending on

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\(^6\) Many Manitobans were less willing than the retired judge to believe Premier Filmon’s testimony. A survey of 600 Winnipeg residents in March, 1999, revealed that 56% did not believe his testimony and thought that the premier had been aware of the vote-splitting activities. Probe Research, “Credibility and the Vote-Splitting Issue,” Press Release, March 16, 1999.

\(^7\) The vote was 51 to 1 in passing the PCs’ provincial budget. The single opposing vote came from the lone Liberal in the Legislature, Kevin Lamoureux. *Hansard*, May 10, 1999.
health, education, and other issue areas while, over the same time period, providing $500m in tax relief (*Maclean’s*, October 4, 1999).

Polling data collected during the election revealed that NDP support could be found among three significant groups: middle class voters (as measured roughly by household income), middle aged voters, and women. This is shown in Table 2. Among those residing in middle income households ($30k to $59k), the NDP were almost tied with the PCs with only two percentage points separating the two parties (while maintaining its expected lead among lower income households). Among middle-aged voters (those aged 35-54), and women, NDP support was a full ten percentage points higher than the PCs.

### Table 2: 1999 Party Support – Pre-Election Poll

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender Age</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Household Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Totals (1010) %</td>
<td>Men (494) %</td>
<td>Women (516) %</td>
<td>18-34 (339) %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


The 1999 election produced a majority victory with 32 seats based on 44% of the popular vote for the NDP compared to the PCs’ 24 seats and 41% of the popular vote. At the same time the Liberals mustered only 13% of the popular vote which was a drop from 24% in 1995. The long-term effects of this election are significant. Since then, the NDP increased its majority in the Legislature by winning 35 seats in 2003 based on 49% of the vote to the PCs’ 20 seats with 36% of the vote. In 2007, the NDP took 36 seats based on

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8 The interviews were conducted by Probe Research between September 9th and September 15th among 1,010 Manitobans. The question was as follows: “Which party’s candidate are you most likely to support in this provincial election?”
48% of the vote to the PCs’ 19 seats with 38% of the vote. Using here V.O. Key’s model, and as discussed previously as it applies to the study of shifts occurring among American voters, the extent to the 1999 election was “critical” and an event which signaled a long-term realignment within in the provincial electorate, especially in Winnipeg. This shift, both across the province and in Winnipeg, will now be discussed further.

The Shifting Electorate

Did the 1999 breakthrough signal an across-the-board provincial shift towards the NDP? Or was this shift restricted to specific ridings or particular regions of the province? Using Key’s approach for charting electoral realignments, provided here is a picture of what occurred in 1995 and 1999, with percentage support in each riding (calculated from the number of NDP votes cast out of the total votes in each of the ridings) in 1995 for the NDP plotted on the X-Axis, and then plotted on the Y-Axis for the 1999 election. Figure 4 shows that with the exception of only four ridings, the NDP experienced growth across the entire province. This includes virtually all ridings where support was less than 50% in 1995, even those where support was less than 20%. In other words, the 1999 election was more than a breakthrough victory in the number of seats won; it was an event which signaled widespread provincial growth for the NDP. Furthermore, with only a 3-point difference between the two frontrunners in 1999 (44% vs 41%), the NDP’s victory rested on an ability to translate more efficiently popular support into seats compared to the PCs. The NDP took all of the northern portions of Winnipeg, the mid-North and northern ridings, including the Interlake and Dauphin-Roblin. It also made inroads into parts of Winnipeg South. It is to the urban electorate that this discussion now turns.

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9 The reader should note that only those ridings that existed in both elections are included in this. The same rule applies for other charts provided in this paper. No adjustments are made for boundary changes that might have occurred between elections when displaying changing riding-based voter support.
Figure 4: NDP Popular Support 1995 - 1999
Urban Realignment - 1999

The 1999 electoral map for Winnipeg (Figure 5) shows that longstanding political divisions continued to exist between the city’s north side and south side. That is, with the exception of swing seats close to the city’s centre (two of which were newly created from other ridings and two previously held by the PCs), voters in most southern Winnipeg ridings elected PC candidates while northern Winnipeg ridings elected New Democrats. However, when each of the Winnipeg ridings is studied in a longitudinal fashion, a more dynamic trend emerges. Figure 6 shows that except for the safe North End ridings of Burrows and Point Douglas where support dropped for the NDP candidates while still being elected by customary wide margins, the party increased its support across the entire city, including ridings held by the PCs (with the one dot on the line representing the Liberal riding of River Heights, where NDP support increased by 1%).

Figure 6: NDP Support in Winnipeg Ridings, 1995-1999

These were St. Vital, Lord Roberts, Riel, and Fort Rouge.
The 2003 Election

The reader will recall that a critical election signals not only a change in support for one party over another, it also signals a shift that has long term consequences. In the case of Manitoba, shifts towards the NDP in 1999, including within the City of Winnipeg, continued into the 2003 election with the party taking 35 seats to the PCs’ 20 and the Liberals’ 2. This majority victory was based on 49% of the popular vote going to the NDP, a figure not seen by any party since 1977. The NDP’s post-1999 success can be attributed to four main factors: 1) a growing provincial economy which helped the government produce surplus budgets while also delivering on its previous promises including those relating to healthcare and post-secondary education, 2) a leader who proved to be both a charismatic and capable administrator, 3) an opposition in disarray with the PCs’ leader showing less charisma than Doer and prone to strategic blunders, and 4) the continuing inability of the Liberals to broaden its base of support (Adams, 2008).

The PCs under leader Stuart Murray in 2003 appeared out of step with the times by campaigning on cuts in government spending and taxes. Among their promises was the removal of post-secondary tuition freezes, an unpopular platform especially among those middle class voters funding their children’s education. The party was hampered also by new provincial party financing laws introduced in 2001 which prohibited corporate and union contributions while reducing annual individual contributions to $3,000. The impact was particularly felt by the PCs who saw their revenues drop from $1.28 million in 2000 to just under $400k ($393,674) in 2001 (Winnipeg Free Press, April 10, 2006; see also Wesley and Stewart, 2006). As a result, the party was unable to launch an effective advertising campaign and faced shortages in other areas of the election campaign (Stuart Murray, interview with author, 2007).

Figure 7 shows that, at least in most ridings, support for the NDP was continuing to grow when 1999 and 2003 riding results are examined. Furthermore, many of these ridings were in the critically important 30% to 50% support range in 1999. Overall, the PCs’ popular vote was reduced from 41% to 36%, producing only twenty seats. It was the party’s worst showing in a provincial election since 1953. An examination of the
outcome in Winnipeg revealed other bad news. The extent to which this urban electorate was undergoing realignment is examined in the following section.

Figure 7: NDP Popular Support, 1999 – 2003
Winnipeg in 2003

Outside Winnipeg, the provincial electoral map again remained static in 2003, with the rural south painted rural blue and NDP orange in more northerly ridings. In Winnipeg, however, the urban North-South line of cleavage had clearly deteriorated (Figure 8). Holding onto the ridings it took in the previous 1999 election, the NDP also took the southern Winnipeg ridings of Fort Garry, St. Norbert, and Seine River, all of which were previously held by the PCs. Figure 9 shows that not only did support increase in a number of these swing ridings, but it occurred throughout most of the city.

[Figure 9: NDP Support in Winnipeg Ridings, 1999 - 2003]

Continuing the Trend: The 2007 Election

At least on the surface, the 2007 NDP victory was a repeat of the 2003 election, with the NDP winning 48% of the vote (down 1%) and 36 seats (an increase of one). Manitoba voters had not produced a third successive majority victory for any party since Duff Roblin’s PCs were re-elected in 1966. Early in 2007, it appeared that the upcoming election would be close. The governing NDP were now facing a reinvigorated PC party with an energized new leader in the form of Hugh McFadyen. The PCs put forward a redesigned and more urban-oriented platform with similarities to that of the NDP. This
included a promise to fight crime (a top issue in publicly released polls), keep college and university tuition fees frozen (a reversal of the 2003 platform), reduce provincial sales tax, promote downtown development and capital investments, and keep young people in the province. Along with this, the new leader and his party now had the financial resources to get their message out to voters, having raised over a $1 million in 2006 (Winnipeg Free Press, August 20, 2007).

In spite of its preparedness for the 2007 election, the PC campaign stumbled badly when senior strategists unexpectedly launched a mid-campaign promise to bring the Winnipeg Jets NHL team back to the city. The idea was to make Winnipeggers “think big”,\textsuperscript{11} and on the day of the announcement both the NDP and Liberals appeared flat-footed with “us too responses” made to the press. Yet the PC strategy soon turned into fiasco, with many swing voters wondering if they would have to experience a re-run of the failed “Keep the Jets” $13.5m fundraising campaign of the mid-1990s which occurred under the watch of the Filmon government (Trenaman, 2007).

The other two parties quickly distanced themselves from the PCs on the Jets issue and when the votes were counted a few weeks later the PCs proved neither able to overcome NDP Premier Doer’s widespread popularity nor to make significant inroads among women and urban middle class voters. The NDP’s hold on two important groups was demonstrated by a pre-election poll which revealed that 46\% of those in middle income households ($30k to $59k) supported the NDP compared to 38\% for the PCs. Furthermore, 48\% of women reported a preference for the NDP compared to only 34\% for the PCs (Probe Research, May, 2007). In the end, the NDP took 36 seats, based on 48\% of the vote to the PCs’ 19 seats with 38\% of the vote, while the Liberals held onto their two seats.

An examination of ridings in 2007, compared to 2003 results, shows that the realignment towards the NDP commencing in the 1990s had crested for the province as a whole. Based on shifts from 2003 to 2007, and compared to 1999 and 2003, Figure 11 shows that most ridings were straddling the line of “no change”. Yet did the realigning stall? Was 2007 what can be termed a “maintaining election”? That is, one in which

\textsuperscript{11} Worth noting is that political insiders have remarked that this is the second time that “thinking big” has backfired on Hugh McFadyen, who was widely regarded as the chief architect of the “Billion dollar plan” in the 1999 election.
current electoral patterns are reinforced in a stable manner? An examination of the provincial electoral map shows a continuance of the traditional North-South cleavage in non-urban Manitoba, with the NDP holding ridings in the North half of the province and the PCs holding the South half (excluding Brandon where the PCs took one of the two seats).

Figure 10: 2007 Provincial Election (Wikipedia)
The PCs were punished seriously in Winnipeg where they took only 29% of the urban vote and four seats: one on the city’s northern fringe and three seats in the southwest corner (Figure 10). The NDP was not only holding a majority of Winnipeg’s ridings, it also now held a majority of ridings on the south half of the city. The PCs failed to retake those Winnipeg ridings it lost to the NDP in 2003, and they lost what were thought to be two “safe” seats in Southdale and the eastern suburban riding of Kirkfield Park. With regard to realignment in Winnipeg, Figure 12 shows that NDP support growth continued into the 2007 election in those ridings where support had been under 60% in 2003 (as plotted on the X-axis). In other words, the only significant declines in Winnipeg for the NDP occurred in the “safe” and therefore less competitive ridings.
NDP Support: A Generational Shift

The focus of this paper has been on shifts occurring within the electorate at the constituency level. However, opinion data show an emerging shift occurring beneath this surface which might detrimentally affect the NDP’s future. Table 2 shows that in 1999 the party was more generally supported by younger and middle aged voters, with only 32% of those aged 55 or over supporting the NDP. It now appears that young people are becoming more drawn to the PCs while the NDP attracts older voters. In 2007, over half (51%) of those aged 55 or over supported the NDP while only 37% of those under the age of 35 supported the party, down from 44% in 1999. At the same time, the PCs have moved away from older voters while increasing their support from 35% to 41% among those under 35.

Table 2: 1999 & 2007 Polling Data & Age Cohort: Manitoba

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>18 – 34</th>
<th>35 – 54</th>
<th>55 or plus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>4%</td>
<td>1%</td>
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</table>
Conclusion

The critical election of 1999 triggered a long-term shift towards the NDP across the province but especially in Winnipeg. Now in their third term of government, there are many who expect that Premier Doer will retire before the next election (although at the 2008 NDP annual meeting, Doer mused about staying on to lead the party into another election). Regardless of whether or not a new leader is in place for the next election, whoever eventually replaces Gary Doer will be only the fourth leader to lead the party since the choice of Ed Schreyer in 1969. Echoes arising from both the provincial elections of 1969 and 1999 should be discernible for years to come.

Appendix: Manitoba Elections 1962-2007

Manitoba Elections 1962 - 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Progressive Conservative</th>
<th>NDP</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% Votes</td>
<td>Seats</td>
<td>% Votes</td>
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</tr>
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<td>45%</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<td>40%</td>
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<td>19</td>
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*Includes 1 Independent and 1 Social Credit

Figures compiled by the author based on riding results provided by Elections Manitoba, “Historical Summaries”
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