UN PEACE OPERATIONS: IDENTIFYING SOURCES OF HUMAN INSECURITY

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The post-Cold War multidimensional peace operations have been designed to bring something more than negative peace. They not only aim to establish order, but also to provide a level of welfare that would contribute to the sustainability of peace. Recognizing this new direction necessitates the investigation of a new set of interrelated questions. Why UN peace operations are now aiming for something more than negative peace? How should we redefine ‘operation success’ in order to account for this new direction? How successful the multidimensional operations have been? And are there potential contradictions of pursuing order and welfare simultaneously?

1. **INTRODUCTION:**

Human security brought a paradigm shift to security studies. This new conception of security urged us to move beyond the mainstream scholarly fixation for state security and to direct our efforts into protecting and enhancing the security of civilians. The United Nations (UN) (specifically the UNDP) being an organization founded to promote global peace and human rights, not only contributed to the formulation and definition of human security, but also rapidly incorporated it into its agenda. A visible impact of this shift can be observed directly through the UN’s peace operations. Since the late 1980s, with the favorable conditions emerging from the end of the Cold War, peace operations have significantly expanded both in scope and number and, I argue that human security has served as the principal discourse to justify these changes. The increased willingness to acknowledge and act upon human insecurity led to the progressive development of more intrusive strategies ranging from preventive diplomacy to peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, peace enforcement, to humanitarian intervention and even to nation-building efforts.

This new conceptualization of security clearly clashes with the Westphalian state order and its sovereignty norms especially the well-established principle of noninterference in states’ domestic affairs. Consequently, it has increasingly justified UN’s entitlement to intervene in intrastate conflicts, especially where the state is very weak or simply not existent. Since 1948, the UN has dispatched a total of 61 peace operations. Although the Cold War (1948-1989) lasted for 40 years, only 15 of the 61 peace operations occurred during this time and among them 8 were deployed in response to intrastate conflicts. Highlighting the proliferation of UN peacekeeping after the Cold War, 46 peacekeeping missions have been dispatched since 1989. The vast majority of the recent peacekeeping activities, 43 of 46 operations, was responding to intrastate conflicts or collapsed states.
The broader question I am addressing is how successful the UN has been in expanding the focus of its operations from the traditional peacekeeping purpose of merely stopping war to the more ambitious and intrusive aim of shaping the political development of previously war-torn societies. More specifically, why some of these new peace operations have been more successful in improving human security than others? I propose that operations are more likely to be successful when the sources of human insecurity specific to the conflict can be discerned and strategies to mitigate them can be designed. However, it would be argued that in order to do so, first order should be established.

In order to account for the new direction adopted by the UN peace operations, it is necessary to establish what constitute a successful operation. I argue that while the existing literature acknowledges and studies extensively the new direction taken by the UN peace operations, the commonly used definitions of success fail to reflect the extensive changes that have taken place in the last two decades. Although there are slight variations in how it is defined, negative peace (absence of war) seems to be the benchmark for success (Bratt, 1996; Fortna, 2004; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2006; Heldt, 2001; Regan, 1996). Recently, this trend has been challenged by some, who defined success around different conceptualization of positive peace (M. W. Doyle, Sambanis, N., 2006; Hampson, 2002; Peou, 2002; Usegi, 2004; Zuercher, 2006). Agreeing with this approach, I argue that the new strategies implemented by the UN operations are designed to achieve more than negative peace. In fact, if the justification to intervene and to be more intrusive is a concern for human security, it would be more accurate to judge their effectiveness with changes in human security conditions. There are few studies (and no large-n studies) evaluating the effectiveness of these operations in terms of human security considerations (Hampson, 2002; Peou, 2002; Usegi, 2004). Therefore, I will investigate the content of these new peacekeeping operations and statistically analyze their impact on human

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1 Graph taken from UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations Website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/timeline/pages/timeline.html
security. It is argued that for an operation to be successful it needs to provide sustainable peace, which is defined as order plus some degree of human security. Below, I will further elaborate on my definition.

In order to assess why some peace operations have been more successful in bringing sustainable peace than others, I argue that the human security literature in general and the strategies developed by the UN to enhance human security in particular need to be investigated. While the definition of human security is elusive and widely debated among scholars, the strategies required to provide or improve human security are even more so. Therefore, after establishing how human security is defined in this study, I categorize the different strategies used by the UN. I argue that even though they are designed to enhance human security, when implemented together, some of the strategies actually undermine or contradict each other. In order to demonstrate this tension, I categorize UN’s strategies under two broad goals; order and welfare. I hypothesize that the strategies implemented by the UN to bring welfare often undermine the efforts to restore order, which, in turn, negates human security in general. In essence, I argue that without order and effective authority, the supply of humanitarian aid, the holding of elections, the liberalization of the economy and the extension of political and civil rights by the peacekeepers will actually result in decay and instability. Moreover, I argue that the resources, expertise and personnel needed in the phase of establishing order differ from the ones necessary in the phase of dealing with the various sources of human insecurity. Therefore, I propose that the missions dealing simultaneously with establishing order and providing welfare are more likely to fail in providing human security and sustainable peace.

In the following sections, I will briefly trace the evolution of UN peacekeeping and explain how its traditional aim of preventing and stopping conflict expanded towards providing human security. Second, I survey the different definitions of success used in the literature and posit my own definition. Third, I evaluate different studies assessing the success of UN peace operations and the conditions they argue are necessary for success. Then, with reference to the debates surrounding human security, I will develop my argument. The methodology I intend to follow in order to test my propositions will follow and finally, I conclude that in order to achieve a level of human security that will sustain peace, peacekeepers should first devote their resources and intelligence to secure a stable order, after which a significant lapse of time is recommended for the institutions established to gain legitimacy and durability. Only then, sources of insecurity destabilizing the sustainability of peace can be seriously addressed and their eradication successful.

2. UN PEACE OPERATIONS:

2.1. The Evolution of Peacekeeping:

Before the end of the Cold War, peacekeeping was less ambitious. It was based on deployment of a small military force and required the consent of all parties. The peacekeeping mandates were to observe, collect information, shame hostilities and atrocities in order to appease the situation. The troops could only use force as a last resort in case of self-defense, but for the most part their protection was though their vulnerability and their impartial and neutral presence (Prins, 2002, p. 60). The goal was to secure the state from conflict and bring order, regardless of the systematic direct or indirect violence individuals living in that state may

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2 Below I elaborate what is meant by some degree. The data will determine the relative degree of human security.
experience in that process. Peacekeeping was exercised within the confines of the Westphalian order, where intervention into state’s domestic or foreign affairs without its consent was unacceptable. The interference that was actually practiced was equally limited to non-intrusive observers.

By the end of the Cold War, the UN peace operations experienced significant changes, which can be mainly explained by its redefinition of ‘security’. The incorporation of human security considerations into the UN Peacekeeping agenda started in 1992, when Boutros Boutros-Ghali, presented his *Agenda for Peace*. It urged that the Security Council and the General Assembly have “a special and indispensable role to play in an integrated approach to human security” (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). Human security came to fill a significant gap present in the traditional conception of security, while paradoxically contradicting it simultaneously. Under the Westphalian system, where state security is the primary preoccupation, the security of citizens is the responsibility and jurisdiction of that state. This arrangement has long protected states from undesired outside interference and manipulation. However, by the 1970s, it became apparent that securing the state does not guarantee the safety of its citizens. Initially, this realization led to the investigation of sources of threats that are non-military in nature, such as economics or environment. While the concern for state security remained predominant, attention shifted toward the relationship between sustainable development and security. Many discovered the intimate relationship between underdevelopment – in forms of deprivation, inequity, instability, lack of hygiene, pollution and famine – and conflict. As Hampson argues, “[t]hose calls for a redefinition of the meaning of security, however, failed to come up with a new, shared definition of security.” (Hampson, 2002, p. 28) The concept of human security emerging in the early 1990s, however, successfully managed to connect the dual agendas of development and security into one coherent approach. By reframing security concerns away from the state and instead around individuals, the human security perspective allows for the identification of different sources of insecurity, including economic, environmental and even political threats (the state itself).

In order to eradicate human insecurity, the scope and strategies of UN peace operations had to expand. In fact, the *Agenda for Peace* calls for the “strategy for peace [to] become more intrusive: it ranges from preventive diplomacy to peacemaking to peacekeeping to peacebuilding to humanitarian intervention – all which aim to build human security.” (Peou, 2002, p. 54). The post-Cold War multi-dimensional peace operations not only evolved towards efforts at nation-building but also towards peace enforcement. Military force came to be authorized in order to compel the belligerents into compliance with Security Council resolutions. This necessitates that “[t]he core elements of traditional peacekeeping missions been abandoned in the context of peace enforcement: the peacekeepers’ neutral role in the conflict, non-use of force, and consent of the belligerent parties to outside involvement.” (Schnabel, Thakur, 2001, p. 241)

It is clear that with these alterations and additions, the UN embarked on a new direction, where the goal is no longer simply mediation and observation of an already existing peace. Today the UN aims to not only restore a non-existent order to provide security to individuals but also to provide them a certain level of welfare. I argue that since UN peace operations have embarked into these new ambitious missions, our definition of what constitute a successful operation should be accordingly updated.
2.2. Updating the Definition of Success:

The literature on peace operations can be divided in two camps in terms of how they define a successful operation; those who prefer qualitative criteria and those who use quantitative measures. The former group is interested in an interpretive approach to the contribution of peacekeeping to larger values such as world peace, justice and the reduction of human suffering (Druckman et al., 1997; Johansen, 1994). More relevant to this study is the latter group, which uses various quantitative criteria to measure success. These definitions can be placed on a continuum ranging from the minimal requirement of fulfillment of the mission mandate (Bratt, 1996) and negative peace (Fortna, 2004; Gilligan & Sergenti, 2006; Heldt, 2001; Regan, 1996) towards different conceptions of positive peace. Diehl (1993) explains that defining success as the fulfillment of the mandate is problematic as the mandates are often vague, leaving lots of room for interpretation. Moreover, he argues that since each mandate is specific to the conflict, it renders making generalization impossible. Those using negative peace as their measure of success argue that it is unrealistic to conceive the role of peacekeepers as something more than the cessation of conflict. In response, many argue that negative peace does not reflect what is needed for peace to be self-sustaining (M. W. Doyle & Sambanis, 2000, 2006).

Accordingly, many different conception of positive peace have proliferated. For Diehl (1993), an operation is successful if it deters and prevents violent conflict and if it facilitates the resolution of the disagreements underlying the conflict (See also: Cousens, Kumar, & Wermester, 2001; Druckman et al., 1997; Hillen, 2000). Others also include criteria such as limitation of casualties and suffering (Bratt, 1996; Pushkina, 2006), the reestablishment of a full monopoly over the means of violence and economic and political development (Zuercher, 2006). Alternatively, Doyle and Sambanis (2006) developed two measures of success; sovereign peace and participatory peace. While the former is defines as termination of war, no residual violence and undivided sovereignty, the latter includes all three conditions plus a minimum standard of political openness.

These various definitions of success essentially represent a disagreement on what peace operations are expected to provide. In fact, generating expectations of goals other than the ones stated in the mandate necessarily implies the normative formulation of preferences about what peace operations ought to deliver. It also fails to address the appropriateness and effectiveness of the mandate. In other words, if certain goals, not stated in the mandate, are expected to be accomplished, what does this tell us about the effectiveness of the mandate itself? Alternatively, if an operation fulfills all the goals stated in its mandate but there is still severe human suffering in the areas where it was deployed, can we still qualify it as a success? In order to resolve these predicaments, I assume that UN’s broader goal in establishing peace operations is to contribute to sustainable peace. However, I argue that what constitute sustainable peace cannot be normatively assigned or uniformly the same across cases. For example, for peace to be sustainable, one mission might need to reestablish the monopoly over violence, while in another some political openness might be required to ease tensions. Below, I explain that human security, as a conceptual tool, enables the formulation of a measure of success (sustainable peace) that will address these concerns.

Many scholars have been dissatisfied with the elusive and broad definition of human security (See: Bellamy & McDoanld, 2002; G. King & Murray, 2001; Roland Paris, 2001). However, recent studies have attempted to formulate a clear definition that will enable its operationalization as a measure. In fact, twenty-one scholars participated in a colloquium in the
2004 issue of Security Dialogue to discuss the plausibility and desirability of this endeavor. Owen, author of the concluding remarks, explains that while the UNDP Human Development Report identified seven components of human security\(^3\), those categories are not threats themselves. Instead, they constitute a conceptual grouping of possible sources of threat (Owen, 2004b). Therefore, Owen proposes a threshold-based conceptualization, rooted in the original UNDP definition. He suggests “that limiting threat inclusion by severity, rather than by cause, bridges the divide between the broad and narrow proponents” (ibid, p.373). Instead of being pre-chosen, Owen argues that threats should be included according to their actual severity. He clarifies:

“The list of all possible threats to human security in the world is vast, the list of relevant harms for a particular region or country, however, is considerably more refined. Using regional relevance as the criteria for threat selection means that no serious harm will be excluded, staying true to the broad conception of human security, but also improves the chances of acquiring relevant data” (Owen, 2004a, p. 21)

I borrow Owen’s definition of human security, which is “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive economic, environmental, health, food, political and personal threats.” (Owen, 2004b, p. 382) Using his threshold-based conceptualization, I establish the conditions for sustainable peace, which I define as order plus some level of welfare. In other word, the level of order and welfare necessary for peace to be sustained is determined by the eradication of the specific insecurities that are pervasive in and relevant to the case examined. By doing so, it will be possible to first evaluate if the mandates are appropriately designed to address the specific insecurities and, second, if the mission on the ground was able to eradicate them to provide grounds for sustainable peace. Having established our definition of successful operation, the following section will elaborate on the conditions necessary for an operation to be successful.

2.3. Conditions for Operation Success:

The bulk of the peacekeeping literature explores two interrelated but different questions. Some are interested in whether there is a relationship between UN peace operations and peace. They theoretically or/and empirically investigate the positive and negative impacts of these missions on peace (however they define it). Others are exploring under what conditions peace operations are successful.

Studies focusing on the relationship between UN peace operations and peace seem to agree that the missions have more or less a positive impact. Bratt (1996) examines 39 peacekeeping missions between 1945 and 1996 and evaluate their success in four different ways: mandate performance, facilitation of conflict resolution, conflict containment and limitation of casualties. Combining all his findings, he concludes that 50% of UN missions are successful. While Bratt’s findings are interesting, it fails to fully answer the question since it does not compare cases where UN intervenes with cases where intervention did not happen. Without accounting for the outcome of those cases, it is impossible to discern whether the UN has a positive or negative role in general. Other studies have remedied this problem by looking at all the conflicts and comparing them with the ones that the UN intervened. Fortna (2004), only examining civil conflicts and controlling as much as possible for factors that might influence the

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\(^3\) Seven elements that comprise human security: 1) economic security, 2) food security, 3) health security, 4) environmental security, 5) personal security, 6) community security and 7) political security (UNDP, 1994).
degree of difficulty of a particular case, found that intervention helps maintain (negative) peace. Similarly, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild (2001) look at third party involvement, and suggest that peacekeeping in particular has increased the duration of peace (Hartzell, Hoddie M., & D., 2001). Greig and Diehl (2005) found that while peacekeeping might be successful at monitoring a cease-fire, it is not an effective facilitator to the conflict resolution process. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) have used two measures of success; “sovereign peace” is based on the absence of large-scale violence and the reestablishment of the legitimate monopoly of violence, and “participatory peace” encompasses sovereign peace plus a minimal degree of political assent and participation. Their findings indicate that while the UN is effective at fostering peace through multidimensional peacekeeping (also referred as second generation), it has been very ineffective as a peace enforcer or war-maker (also referred as third generation).

Studies dealing with the second question – under what conditions are the UN peace operations successful? – are more policy-oriented. They take these operations as given and treat them as technical exercises in conflict management. “Many contributions to [this] literature ask the same few questions of the same few cases: Why are some peace missions more successful than others? Why do some peace agreements last while others fail? How can we improve the techniques employed in future operations?” (R. Paris, 2000, p. 32) Attempts to answer these questions produced a significantly large body of policy-relevant research, which has successfully brought scholars and practitioners together. Nevertheless, an investigation of this literature reveals that there are no agreed-upon conditions for success. Diehl (1994) and Johansen (1994) argue that intervening only in intrastate conflict while remaining neutral, acquiring consent, being lightly armed and using weapons only in self-defense are increasing the likelihood of success. While Durch does not make a distinction between intra and interstate conflicts, he adds sufficient great power support to the list above (Durch, 1993). Pushkina (2006, p.140), however, finds that there is no substantial association between great powers taking a leading role and the success of the operation. Testing his propositions on 17 missions from 1945 and 1998, he finds that UN commitment, absence of external support for the belligerents, successful diplomatic efforts and low degree of mutual antagonism are the conditions necessary for success. Others have emphasized feasibility of the mandate, adequate resources and training of the personnel (see: Gray, 2001; Schnabel, 2001; Urquhart, 1987).

This brief survey of the literature reveals that while it seems that some UN operations have a positive effect on peace (however defined), the conditions that lead to this success are not well established. I aim to remedy this lack of clarity by emphasizing the reality that each conflict differs on the sources of insecurity destabilizing the sustainability of peace. Therefore, some conditions for success will be more pertinent in some cases, but less in others. I am not suggesting that no generalization is possible; in the following section I develop the argument that UN operations will be more successful in mitigating the sources of insecurity threatening the sustainability of peace, if they first devote all their resources and efforts to provide order. Only then, they will be able to effectively discern and tackle the obstacles to sustainable peace.

3. THE ARGUMENT:

The post-Cold War UN multi-dimensional peace operations, as explained above, are assuming roles ranging from peacekeeping, peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement to nation building. Indeed, the old traditional peacekeeping mandates would not be sufficient to bring peace to conflicts where the UN intervenes nowadays. However, I argue that these
operations are assuming the impossible, if not paradoxical, tasks of restoring order and security, while simultaneously attempting to increase the overall welfare level of the country in conflict. As elaborated below, experience seems to show that without a minimum degree of order, even the modest aim of providing food to civilians can become problematic and sometimes counterproductive. Consider, for instance, the ambitious mission in Somalia; UNOSOM II. Aiming to initiate a process of grassroots political development, it implemented the formation of district and regional councils, which proved to be unsustainable institutional solutions in an environment of factional distrust, violence and hostility (Jan, 2001). Indeed, it is argued that it decreased the factions’ willingness to disarm, which facilitated the relapse to fighting. In essence, the step of creating effective order is undermined by programs implemented to bring political, social and economic welfare to all citizens.

This resonates with the well-known debate about the relationship between order and liberty/justice. As Huntington argues “the primary problem is not liberty but the creation of a legitimate public order. Men may, of course, have order without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order” (Huntington, 1968, p.7-8). Similarly Bull wrote “… not only is order in world politics valuable, there is also a sense in which it is prior to other goals, such as that of justice” (Bull, 1977, p.97). There seems to be a consensus among some scholars, that without order and viable authority, the extension of rights, participation and mobilization result in decay and instability. Moreover, it is also well established that institutionalizing and legitimizing authority is not a short-term project. However, UN peace operations, constrained by the lack of resources, ventures into the ambitious, if not impossible, missions of expanding liberties, rights and participation, while the institutions supposed to support and absorb these new activities have yet to be established. This problem become even more acute if the conflict is ongoing and hostilities are still very alive.

It is evident that the consensus necessary for the efficient functioning of institutions and government is significantly weaker in conflict-ridden societies. For instance, even though United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) managed to bring together the four warring factions to sign the Paris Agreement in 1991 and subsequently fulfilled its mandate to hold elections and to establish a liberal democratic constitution in 1993, the persistent and un-addressed lack of trust and consensus among the Khmer Rouge, CPP and Funcinpec reverted Cambodia to civil conflict in 1994-5. The Kymer Rouge, failing to reconcile with the others parties, reacted by setting up a competitive provisional government in 1994, protected by their strong military capability (Berdalm, Leifer, 1996). The rapid introduction of participatory and competitive politics, in fact, may do more damage to the establishment of a consensus. The unpredictability of election results and the lack of trust among factions, again make disarmament difficult, and may enable losers to become spoilers.

The UN seems to be influenced by the UNDP conceptualization of human security; operations became multi-dimensional, reflecting an all-encompassing approach, where every issues threatening human security are dealt with simultaneously. I argue that order should be prioritized and restored first, which would enable the identification of the relevant sources of insecurity specific to the conflict. Moreover, I suggest that humanitarian assistance, political and/or economic liberalization and judicial reforms should be implemented only if the situation is amenable and ripe enough to support these actions and reforms. It is also necessary to recognize that the resources, type of personnel and expertise required to establish order differ

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4 Cambodian People’s Party
5 United National Front for an Independent, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia
from what is needed to cure the various sources of human insecurities. Essentially, every mission established following the restoration of law and order constitute second-tier operations, which require different training, resources and personnel.

Understanding the financial side of the story is essential for sound examination of operation success. With the cooperation developing among the five permanent members of the Security Council in the late 1980s and the subsequent successes of the peacekeeping operations, the UN acquired a degree of notoriety around the world. This led to the flow of funding and increased willingness by states to contribute troops to peacekeeping missions. However, this enthusiasm proved to be short-lived and not sustainable. As the UN’s operations around the world increased steadily, the commitment of troops and funding has become scarcer. As the Peace Operation 2010 Report circulated in 2005 declared: “Simply put, we [the UN] are overstretched” (DKPO, 2005). The UN, in general, but especially its peace operations have increasingly faced financial problems. “Since the 1960s, UN peacekeeping has been plagued by financial difficulties. … This situation reached unprecedented levels in the early 1990s, even as the Security Council launched the largest and most complex peacekeeping missions in UN history.”

As explained above, along with strategies to restore order, the ambitious UN operations aspire to increase the overall welfare by assuming administrative, governance and enforcement responsibilities. Often, due to the lack of financial support and low troop commitment, these tasks need to be implemented simultaneously and in a short time span. However, as many UN reports acknowledged, without sufficient resources, troops and skills, the operations are bound to fail. Moreover, I argue that the resources necessary in the first phase of establishing order are significantly different than what is required in the second phase. Therefore, any analysis of the conditions necessary for the success of an operations, should take the financial side of the story into consideration.

My propositions regarding the conditions for UN peace operations’ success are: (see figure 1 for model)

**P1: If the UN peacekeepers intervene to establish order first, they are less likely to fail in establishing sustainable peace.**

**P2: If the UN peacekeepers intervene to simultaneously establish order and improve welfare, they will more likely fail in establishing sustainable peace no matter the level of resources and commitment.**

**P1a: If the UN peacekeepers intervene to establish order first and they are endowed with adequate resources, they are more likely to succeed in establishing sustainable peace.**

**P1b: If the UN peacekeepers intervene to establish order first and they are not endowed with adequate resources, they are less likely to succeed in establishing sustainable peace.**

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6 For instance: UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) monitoring and verifying the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the monitoring of compliance with the cease-fore between Iran and Iraq by the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) and others


The hypotheses can also be presented formally as follows:\footnote{Sustainable Peace, $t = A + B_1 \left( \text{Order}_{t-k} \ast \text{Resources}^O_{t-k} \right) \left[ \ast \text{or} \plus \right] B_2 \left( \text{Welfare}_{t-q} \ast \text{Resources}^W_{t-q} \right)$}

\[
\text{SP}_t = A + B_1 \left( \text{Order}_{t-k} \ast \text{Resources}^O_{t-k} \right) \left[ \ast \text{or} \plus \right] B_2 \left( \text{Welfare}_{t-q} \ast \text{Resources}^W_{t-q} \right)
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Where SP stands for Sustainable peace, O for order, R for resources. k represents the point in time where the strategies to bring order are implemented and q is the point in time where the strategies for welfare are implemented.

If $k \leq q$, then $B_1 < 0$ and $B_2 < 0$

If the strategies designed to bring welfare are implemented before or at the same time as the strategies implemented for order ($k \leq q$), then neither order can be established nor welfare be improved.

If $B_1 > 0$ & $k > q$, then $B_2 > 0$

If order is established first ($k > q$), then strategies to improve welfare are more likely to be successful.

3. **METHODOLOGY:**

The proposed hypotheses will be tested using event history analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997; Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, & Zorn, 2003) which will be followed by some selected illustrative qualitative cases that will enrich our understanding of the model developed above. In order to accurately capture the impact of the UN operations, it will be necessary to compare the cases where the UN intervened with the occurrences that it did not intervene. This will enable an assessment of the efficiency of the implemented treatment - namely UN peacekeeping. This study will use all the armed conflicts after 1946 as its universe of cases. The Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (version 4-2006), which “is a conflict-year dataset with information on armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state in the time period 1946-2005”, will be used (Gleditsch, 2002- Version 4-2006, Codebook). Although the focus of this paper is the new wider peacekeeping operations that emerged in the 1990s, the operations occurring before the expansion of the mandates are of interest. Traditional peacekeeping was solely interested in tasks relating to the establishment of order, thus comparing their impact on sustainable peace with the newer missions geared towards human security improvement can be fruitful.

4.1. **Dependent Variable:**

The dependent variable of this study is sustainable peace, defined as order plus some level of human security. Therefore, two measures will be used. The first one is the absence of armed conflict, which will be the indicator of order. The Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset defines armed conflict as “a contested incompatibility that concerns governments and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.” The second measure of success is the change in the level of human security. As it is acknowledged above, human security is a broad and fluid
concept. However, I argue that Owen’s conceptualization will enable me to systematically code changes in the sources of human insecurity.

Recently, there have been some attempts to develop a measure for human security. However, an investigation of the available data reveals that they are not suitable to the goals of this study. The Uppsala/Human Security Centre dataset has proposed a human security indicator. However, only two years (2002-2003) have been coded to date. The data accounts for the following: the number of occurrences of political violence, the number of countries experiencing political violence, the number of reported deaths per 100,000 population. This reflects a ‘narrow’ conceptualization of human security. However, as Owen points out, including certain types of threat because they fall under a particular category, essentially omits competing threats that might be more severe in reality.

Alternatively, the Human Development Index (HDI) constitutes another approach to measure human security. It measures the average achievements of a country in three basic dimensions of human development: a long/healthy life, knowledge/education, and a decent standard of living. While this does not encapsulate all the issues of human security, scholars have contemplated and attempted to create a similar index for all aspects of human security (King, Murray, 2001-2002). However, some have questioned the desirability of a human security index. “Composite indices can conceal more information than they convey. Presenting the data from individual human security datasets separately, rather than aggregating them into a single index, conveys more information – and conveys it more clearly.”

In fact, for the purpose of this study, aggregating human security indicators do not seem fruitful. As explained earlier, different types of missions may increase certain aspects of human security, but may not affect or actually decrease other sources of insecurities. Therefore, it would be more effective to consider each aspect individually. This study will follow Owen’s approach to measure and operationalize human security. Therefore, first proxies for each of the categories identified by UNDP are found, and then their severity in relevance with the regional standing will be assessed.

4.2. Independent and Control Variables:

The main independent variable, the strategies employed by the UN operation, will be categorical. To assess the existence of possible trade-offs among the different goals, it seems necessary to create a taxonomy of all components undertaken by UN peace operations. While there are some attempts in the literature to create classifications of peacekeeping missions, it is also clear that this task is not straightforward, as each attempt resulted in markedly different representations. In fact, this is not only true among scholars, but also among the various actors – member states or UN branches/officials - involved in peacekeeping. As Connaughton argues, “[c]ollaborated and agreed definitions of the new peace-oriented terminology are difficult to find.” (Connaughton, 2001, p.45)

The first step is to create an all-encompassing list of missions drawn from the literature, which will enable the identification of redundancies caused by different terminologies used for similar missions. Table 1 (see Appendix A) represents a selection of different categorizations

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12 Human Security Report 2005, p.91
13 For the definitions of twenty-four governmental and intergovernmental bodies see: (Barnett, et.al., 2007)
since the 1992 Agenda for Peace, when the proliferation of new missions commenced. Each row corresponds to a distinct category (mission) and the columns represent the different terminology used for that mission. It is observed that the number of categories is increasing.

The next step is to categorize the missions according to the goal they intend to fulfill. For the purpose of this study, they are categorized under two goals: order and welfare, see Table 2 (appendix B). The main independent variable of this study will be coded according to the categorization developed above. Operations only geared towards the establishment of order will be coded as 1, operations geared to simultaneously establish order and increase welfare will be coded as 2.

The literature on peacekeeping has incorporated numerous control variables to account for differences among cases. For the purpose of this study, the numerous factors affecting the success of peacekeeping operations, drawn from the existing literature, are categorized as exogenous or endogenous factors. All the aspects that the UN and its members have the agency to ameliorate or modify are categorized as endogenous variables: financial and logistical support (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006), commitment of troops and personnel (Connaughton, 2001), clear and feasible mandate (Boutros-Ghali, 1992), quality and appropriateness of training (Thakur, Schnabel, 2001), timing of deployment (Grieg, Diehl, 2005), deadline for troop withdrawal (Evans, 1993), and type of missions (essentially their mandates) (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006). The endogenous factors\(^\text{14}\) can be said to relate to the overall quality of the operation. These factors will also be considered as independent variables for this study. Some authors may have treated aspects such as troop commitments and funding as exogenous (and as control variables) since they depend on state’s willingness. However, I will argue the UN has the agency to examine the state of its resources and capabilities, before deciding whether it is viable and/or desirable to dispatch a peacekeeping operation.

Exogenous variables are more related to the specificities of the conflict itself, and constitutes what we refer to as ’control variables’\(^\text{15}\): type of conflict (intrastate or interstate), presence of ongoing militarized disputes, existence of cease-fire, type of issue under dispute (tangible or intangible) (Brams, Taylor, 1996), level of polarization (Lacina, 2004) or ethnic fragmentation (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006; Horowitz, 1985), severity of previous conflict, duration of conflict (Heldt, 2001), number of previous mediation (Grieg, Diehl, 2005), severity of previous conflict, ripeness of the conflict (Zartman, 2000), level of economic development (Doyle, Sambanis, 2006), level of democracy (non-linear relationship, where semi-democracies are most prone to civil war) (Wallensteen, Heldt, 2003), polity change, and natural resources (Lacina, 2004).

**Conclusion and Possible Policy Recommendations:**

It is argued that influenced by the UNDP’s approach to human security and also constrained by the lack of resources, the UN peace operations are employing an all-encompassing view of human security. This conception of security does not prioritize any type of threats and aim at dealing with them simultaneously and comprehensively. I argue the dual goal of establishing order and improving welfare at once is problematic. Not only discerning the different sources of insecurity is difficult in a situation where basic order does not exist, but also the strategies implemented for improving welfare ultimately undermine the restoration of order. Consequently, the lack of order and stability renders efforts to increase human security futile. In

\(^{14}\) This does not constitute an exhaustive list

\(^{15}\) This does not constitute an exhaustive list.
order to avoid a lose-lose situation, operations should first devote all their resources and intelligence to secure a stable order. Only then, can the sources of human insecurity be seriously addressed and sustainable peace be acquired.

This study contributes to the peacekeeping literature in two ways. First, using a more flexible definition of operation success, which is determined by the mitigation of the sources of insecurities that are pervasive in the case examined, I am able to evaluate not only if the mission on the ground was a success, but also if the mandate in the first place was appropriately designed. Secondly, rather than treating each operation deployed in a specific conflict as independent, I recognize that they are interconnected. The existing literature has judged the success of each operation separately, without recognizing that operations that are deployed back to back can be seen as a whole. I believe that acknowledging this continuity contributes to a better understanding of the strategies needed to address the pervasive insecurities.
## APPENDIX A:

### Table 1: Taxonomies of UN Peacekeeping missions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>measures to build confidence</td>
<td>traditional peacekeeping</td>
<td>supervision</td>
<td>traditional peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fact-finding, demilitarised zones</td>
<td>conventional observer mission</td>
<td>observation and verification of cease-fire, buffer zones, troop withdrawal</td>
<td>Observation, fact-finding</td>
<td>observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Enforcement units</td>
<td>enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>collective enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>preventive deployment</td>
<td>preventive peacekeeping</td>
<td>preventive deployment</td>
<td></td>
<td>preventive deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sanctions</td>
<td>sanctions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>sanctions enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>protecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>establishment of secure conditions for the delivery of humanitarian supplies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>protective services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>supervising a cease-fore between irregular forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assisting in the maintenance of law and order</td>
<td>electoral support</td>
<td>election/referendum monitoring</td>
<td>election supervision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>separation of forces, demobilization, collection, custody and destruction of arms</td>
<td></td>
<td>pacification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mine clearance and training and awareness programs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>disarming paramilitary forces, privates and irregular units</td>
<td>disarmament/demobilization</td>
<td>arms control verification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Human rights monitoring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


APPENDIX B:

Table 2: UN Peacekeeping Missions According their Goals:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UN Peacekeeping Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Missions for Order</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffer-zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assisting in the maintenance of law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance (legislation, executive, judiciary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Gleditsch. (2002- Version 4-2006). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Publication., from UCDP/PRIO


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