

**Contemporary Immigration
and the Future of Regional Political Cultures in Canada**

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the potential impact of contemporary immigration to transform regional political cultures in Canada. We rely on 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 *Canadian Election Studies* to explore whether immigrants integrate into regional political norms in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia and develop political orientations (feeling toward Canada, perception of province treatment by the federal government, and vote for the Liberal Party of Canada) that resemble those of their native-born provincial counterparts. A special attention is devoted to assessing the different dynamics of integration between immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries. Findings indicate that, if at first sight contemporary immigration demonstrates the potential to transform regional political cultures, overall immigration tends to reproduce Canadian regional political cleavages. The noteworthy exception is Quebec where the transmission to immigrants of provincial grievances and norms appears less successful than in other provinces.

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Introduction

Regionalism, or the existence of regional political cultures and cleavages, is a central feature of Canadian politics. In the past decades, scholars of Canadian politics have debated whether regional political cultures and cleavages were initially a consequence of different settlement patterns (Elkins & Simeon 1980; Schwartz 1974; Wiseman 1996), fundamental regional economic differences (Brodie 1990; Brym 1986; Wilson 1974) or Canada's federal political institutions (Simeon & Elkins 1974, 1980).¹ If great attention has been devoted to understanding the origins of regional political cultures and cleavages, only very little efforts have been devoted to foreseeing the future of regionalism in Canada. This paper aims at initiating this discussion by connecting two central features of Canada's political dynamics, namely regionalism and immigration.

There are reasons to believe that contemporary immigration could significantly transform regional political cultures and cleavages throughout Canada in the years to come. First, the latest Canadian Census data indicate that the rapid transformation of Canada's population is not only continuing but also accelerating. Canada's foreign-born population reached 19.8 percent 2006 and between 2001 and 2006 the immigrant population grew four times faster than the native-born population, and immigration was responsible for more than two thirds of Canada's population growth over that five year period (Chui et al. 2007). Moreover, the settlement patterns of immigrants to Canada have changed considerably in recent years. For decades, the overwhelming majority of immigrants have typically settled in Ontario. Although Ontario remains the province of choice for most immigrants, Quebec, British Columbia and Alberta have witnessed rapid growth in their foreign born populations.

Second, in addition to the increase in the number of immigrants, there has also been a change in the composition of immigration in Canada. As demonstrated by the Census data, there have been dramatic shifts in the patterns of immigration over the past 30 years. While the founding waves of immigrants came from traditional source countries in Europe and the United States, the vast majority of contemporary immigrants now come from Asia, the Middle East and Africa (Chui et al. 2007), from non-traditional source countries. Given the sharp cultural differences between immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries, one expectation is that newcomers from non-traditional source countries might have the potential to re-shape regional political cultures in significant ways over the long haul.

¹ A secondary, and related, area of contention is boundaries of regions. For some, provinces are useful boundaries because they are "analytically distinct political systems" (Simeon and Elkins 1974, p .400; see also Schwartz 1974; Wilson 1974), while for others (MacDermid 1990; Henderson 2004) sociodemographic boundaries are more appropriate because they are the "constituent units of culture" (Henderson 2004, 602).

The conventional wisdom is that successive waves of European immigrants who settled in each region of the country have had a significant impact on the founding political cultures of different regions (Blake 1972; Simeon and Elkins 1974: 433; Elkins and Simeon 1980). Unlike the first waves of newcomers, contemporary immigrants settle into regional environments where some political norms, attitudes and grievances are already established. From that vantage point the expectation is that contemporary immigrants would have no impact whatsoever on the character of regional political cultures; they would simply conform to prevailing regional political norms and contribute to reproduce regional political cleavages. It is also possible, however, that rather than conforming to prevailing regional political norms, these contemporary immigrants could bring new cultural influences resistant to conformity and also identify more strongly with pan-Canadian political figures rather than with regional ones, thus altering or attenuating regional political cultures.

Regionalism and immigration are two central features of Canada's political system, but empirical analyses of the connection between the two are rare. One exception, Elkins' (1980) investigation of whether immigrants develop attitudes similar to those of the people already living in the host-province, found that immigrants generally conform to provincial political norms. But Elkins also concluded that provincial patterns were less pronounced among immigrants; he noted that "regional and provincial variations have, if anything, been muted by the vast numbers of immigrants to Canada" (Ibid, 122). Even though very insightful and pioneering, Elkins' work tells little about how more contemporary waves of immigrants might alter or reproduce current regional political cultures and regional cleavages across Canada. Elkins' analyses relied on data collected in the 1960s and 1970s with a focus on immigrants who settled in Canada in the 1940s and 1950s.

This paper reassesses the relationship between immigration and regional political cultures and cleavages by investigating the impact of contemporary immigration. We propose two new sets of investigations, one focusing on immigrants from traditional source countries that possess similar cultural background to those coming at the time when Elkins' study was conducted, and the other focusing on immigrants from non-traditional source countries representing the new trend in immigration. By doing so, our analyses shed a "fresh" look at the relationship between immigration and regional political cultures.

The reproduction of regionalism rests in no small part on the capacity of each region to transmit the regional norms, values and political grievances not only to successive generations of citizens raised within that region but also to recent citizens who are new to the region. On the one hand, if immigrants internalize dominant regional attitudes, the implication is that contemporary waves of immigrants are likely to reproduce current regional cleavages. On the other hand, if new

waves of immigrants hold attitudes rooted in their pre-migration experiences or that are more pan-Canadian than regional in character, then contemporary immigration may have the potential to transform regional political cultures and possibly attenuate regional cleavages, at least among those provinces that receive substantial flows of immigrants.

The Impact of Contemporary Immigration:

Reproduction or Transformation of Regional Political Cultures?

Does contemporary immigration in Canada transform or reproduce regional political cultures and cleavages? Our exploration of that question is informed by two opposing theoretical perspectives on what happens to individuals when they move from one cultural context to another.

From one vantage point, immigrants quickly adapt to their new environment through a process of *acculturation* (Berry 1980, 1997, 2001). Through acculturation immigrants experience both “culture shedding” and “culture learning” (Berry 1997), whereby they “unlearn” some orientations acquired in their previous cultural context, and adopt new attitudes and orientations that are appropriate for their new cultural context. Indeed, there is evidence from Canada (Black 1982, 1987; Black et al. 1987; White et al. 2008) and elsewhere (Finifter & Finifter 1989) that immigrants adjust their political orientations relatively quickly upon arrival in their new host country.

The difficulty in the Canadian context is that acculturation could imply the development of two distinct sets of new political orientations. One prospect is that cultural learning occurs in relation to regional level political norms. A large body of recent empirical research re-emphasizes the importance of local interpersonal communication networks to the formation of political attitudes. The prevailing findings are that people tend to develop political attitudes that are consistent with the local majority opinion (Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, Levine, & Morgan 1998); and people still favour interpersonal communication over other means of acquiring political information (Beck, Dalton, Greene, & Huckfeldt 2002). Moreover, empirical research on contextual change among internal migrants in the United States indicates that, when it comes to racial attitudes and partisanship, people who move to new environments (states or neighbourhood) tend to develop attitudes that resemble those of the local population (Glaser & Gilens 1997; McBurnett 1991; MacKuen & Brown 1987; Brown 1981, 1988; Markus 1979). Although the precise elements of these dynamics remain somewhat unclear, one possibility is that immigrants take on the norms and attitudes that prevail in their new environments to lower the costs of “fitting in” to their new contexts (MacKuen & Brown 1987; Huckfeldt & Sprague 1987,

1991; Burbank 1995; Huckfeldt, Beck, Dalton, & Levine 1995). The implication of this line of reasoning is that immigrants will not have a significant impact on existing regional political cultures. Rather, regional political cultures will change immigrants. Under this first scenario of acculturation, we would expect immigrants to internalize political grievances and norms that are specific to their host province and region.

The second prospect is that immigrants acculturate by taking up not the regional or provincial set of political grievances and norms but rather by developing a new set of political orientations that is more pan-Canadian in character. In short, cultural learning would occur in relation to pan-Canadian institutions and figures. A possible explanation is that the general “vision” of Canada as a multicultural society as promoted by the federal government over the last few decades could significantly encourage immigrants to adopt political norms and values that are distinctly ‘pan-Canadian’ in character. Some observers argue that Canada’s multiculturalism policy offers immigrants an alternative pathway to social and political integration by encouraging immigrants to retain aspects of their pre-migration cultural identity (Kymlicka 1998) and also, we speculate, to identify more strongly with pan-Canadian political figures rather than regional ones. If that is the case, then the pressures on new immigrants to adapt to prevailing local norms may be less forceful than they once were, and the expectation is that immigrants do not share the regional grievances of their locally born counterparts. In effect, immigrants would not come to hold the same type of traditional grievances that Canada’s regions have held against the federal government and would resist the appeal of regional based political parties that have been quite successful in Canada since the 1990s.

From another vantage point, immigrants can often experience *acculturative stress*, and consequently adjust to their new environment very slowly and perhaps never fully internalize the dominant orientations of their new environment either regional or pan-Canadian in character (Berry et al. 1987; Berry 1997). A possible explanation, offered by classic theories of political socialization, contends that individuals’ political orientations develop early in life, and that those orientations structure how individuals acquire and integrate subsequent political information (Greenstein 1965; Hess & Torney 1967; Easton & Dennis 1969). People learn about politics in ways that usually conform to these deep orientations and core political outlooks are robust in the face of significant environmental change (Jennings 1987; Green & Palmquist 1990; Sears & Valentino 1997; Valentino & Sears 1998; Sears & Funk 1999; Jennings 2002).

If the shift from one political environment to another is indeed difficult, then some groups of immigrants may well be less likely than others to exhibit the same regional patterns of political norms as native-born Canadians. Two specific expectations emerge from this perspective. The first possibility is that immigrants from systems that are vastly different from Canada may well

exhibit regional patterns of political norms that are substantially weaker than the regional differences among immigrants from systems that are more similar to Canada. The greater the environmental discontinuities between an immigrant's country of origin and the new host country, the more difficulty that immigrant will have in picking up the political norms of the region. The second possibility is that immigrants who have lived in Canada for a shorter period exhibit regional patterns of political norms that are substantially weaker than the regional differences among immigrants who have lived in Canada for a longer period. The reasoning behind this expectation is equally straightforward: if regional political orientations are difficult for immigrants to acquire, then the learning process might take a long time.

Research Design and Data

This paper uses three methodological approaches to assess whether contemporary immigrants absorb regional political norms and thus help reproduce regional political cultures and cleavages in Canada. First, we examine whether immigrants in different provinces differ from their respective native-born counterparts. This is the easiest and most intuitive way to proceed. If immigrants' political outlooks are essentially indistinguishable from their native-born provincial counterparts, then there is strong empirical support for the claim that immigrants adopt regional political norms and help reproduce regional cultures and cleavages within Canada. If, on the other hand, immigrants' outlooks are systematically different from those of native-born Canadians regardless of region, then it may be the case that immigrants adopt pan-Canadian political orientations or experience acculturative stress.

But it is also possible that immigrants' political orientations vary along the same regional lines as native-born Canadians even if they differ from their native-born counterparts within their respective provinces. Therefore, as a second perspective, we examine whether immigrants in one province differ from immigrants in other provinces in the same way that the native-born populations of these provinces differ from each other. The purpose of this second perspective is to determine whether by comparing immigrants from various provinces we can identify the same regional cleavages that we observe when comparing native-born populations across the same provinces. Finally, our third approach is to examine whether immigrants' length of exposure to Canadian politics systematically influence the extent to which they absorb regional political norms. In essence, we first assess whether the political orientations of immigrants vary along the same regional lines as those of native-born Canadians, and we subsequently examine whether immigrants' political orientations converge with those of their respective native-born populations

the longer they reside in the region.² Our analyses use these three approaches to examine how two distinct groups of immigrants, namely from traditional and non-traditional source countries, integrate into regional political cultures and cleavages. For a detailed classification of immigrants' country of origin, please refer to Appendix A.

To explore these hypotheses we rely on a pooled data set of the 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 *Canadian Election Studies (CES)*. For reasons of sample size and population distribution, we limit the analyses to the immigrant rich provinces of Ontario, Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia. Table 1 presents the sample composition for each group of respondents for each of the four provinces.

INSERT TABLE 1 HERE

Three political dimensions of regionalism are examined. The first two concern respondents' relationship to Canada and the federal government. Western Canadian citizens' alienation from Canada's center and Quebec citizens' alienation from the federal government are well documented (Clarke et al. 1979; Gibbins 1982; Henry 2002). Specifically, we investigate whether immigrant respondents reflect the same kinds of "alienation" from the federal government and possibly weaker attachment to Canada as those found among their respective native-born provincial counterparts. The indicators used are a feeling thermometer for Canada (0-100) as well as respondents' perceptions of whether their province is treated better, worse or about the same as other provinces by the federal government. Finally, because recent elections have shown major regional variations in terms of partisan preferences (Gidengil et al. 1999; Blais et al. 2002; Nevitte et al. 2000), we also examine the distribution of partisan preferences. Ideally, given our focus on regional political cultures, we would examine support for regional political parties such as the Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois. However, because the Bloc Québécois is found only in Québec and because the Reform Party was replaced subsequently by the Canadian Alliance and the Conservative Party of Canada, it is difficult to examine support for these parties using a pooled data set from 1993 to 2006 and to look at the structure of regional cleavages. Consequently, we focus solely on support for Liberal Party of Canada, the party most widely represented in every region of Canada and most stable in party organization and support during the period covered by our analyses.

In order to ensure that the potential differences between immigrants and the native-born provincial population or between populations of difference provinces are genuine reflection of different understanding of Canadian politics dynamics and are not caused by difference of socio-

² We actually investigate for converge with length of residence in Canada; there is no way to determine how many years immigrants have lived in the province specifically.

economic status, the analyses that follow control for sociodemographic variables such as sex, age, education, income, and employment. In addition, because it is possible that evaluations of Canada, perception of the province treatment by the federal government and propensity of voting for the Liberal Party of Canada have varied across elections between 1993 and 2006, our analyses control for the election year for which respondents were interviewed.

Do Immigrants Resemble their Native-Born Provincial Counterparts?

The first step of our investigation is to determine whether immigrants exhibit political orientations similar to or different from those of the native-born population in the province where they live. Each province is analyzed separately in a multivariate setup, with a pair of dummies for immigrant type (traditional and non-traditional) entered as independent variables. A summary of the findings based on the multivariate analyses are presented in the figures that follow and the full set of findings are duly reported in tables in Appendix B. The data presented in Figures 1 through 3 illustrate the differences in political outlooks in each province between immigrants from traditional and non-traditional source countries, and native-born citizens. Two basic findings emerge from this initial step of the analysis. First, the data indicate that there are substantial differences between immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional source countries and their native-born provincial counterparts. Second, the within-province differences between immigrant and native-born populations are not of a piece: the magnitude and direction of the disparity in outlooks between immigrant and native-born populations vary from province to province.

The data reported in Figure 1 show differences in feelings towards Canada between immigrant and native-born populations in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia. In Quebec, immigrants from both traditional and non-traditional source countries exhibit significantly more positive orientations towards Canada than their native-born counterparts: traditional immigrants score approximately six points higher on average than native-born residents of Quebec on the 0 to 100 scale, and non-traditional immigrants score about nine points higher on average than the native-born Quebec population. That pattern, however, does not emerge in other provinces. For example, there is no discernable difference between traditional immigrants and the native-born populations in Ontario and British Columbia, and non-traditional immigrants in both provinces exhibit slightly more negative orientations than their native-born counterparts towards Canada ($B = -2$ and -4 in Ontario and British Columbia, respectively). That trend is reversed in Alberta, where traditional immigrants express the most positive feelings for

Canada, (4.7 points higher than their native-born provincial counterparts), but non-traditional immigrants are not significantly different from the native-born population.

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

There are more striking differences between immigrant and native-born provincial populations when it comes to perceptions of how the provinces are treated by the federal government (Figure 2). New waves of immigrants in Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia give considerably more favourable evaluations than native-born Canadians of the role played by the federal government. Yet again there are marked variations between provinces. Traditional and non-traditional immigrants in Quebec are equally more likely than their native-born provincial counterparts to indicate that the federal government treats their province better than other provinces, whereas the outlooks of traditional immigrants in Alberta and British Columbia are essentially the same on average as the native-born populations in the two provinces. In further contrast, no discernable differences emerge between the native-born population and either of the two immigrant groups in Ontario.

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

A similar pattern of differences between immigrant and native-born populations in each of the provinces emerges with respect to partisan support (Figure 3). Across all four provinces, immigrants from non-traditional countries are more likely than people born in Canada to express support for the Liberal Party. But once more, the disparity between immigrant and native-born groups in Quebec stands out from that of other provinces. Traditional immigrants are nearly as likely as their non-traditional immigrant counterparts to express support for the Liberal Party in Quebec, but not in the other three provinces. In fact, traditional immigrants in Alberta are significantly less likely than their non-traditional and native-born provincial counterparts to support the Liberal Party.

INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE

These initial findings indicate that immigrant Canadians, and more particularly newer waves of immigrants from countries with social and political systems that are vastly different from Canada's, exhibit systematically different political outlooks from native-born populations in their respective provinces. The political outlooks of newer waves of immigrants also appear to be distinctly pan-Canadian: non-traditional immigrants, regardless of province of residence, are more likely than others to support the same federal political party, the Liberal Party (and consequently to reject regional parties), and they are also more likely than others to believe the federal government treats their province better than other provinces. They do not seem to share as much as their native-born provincial counterpart the regional grievances against the federal

government. Furthermore, the patterns of differences vary across provinces; the disparities between immigrant and native-born populations are more pronounced in Quebec and generally less pronounced in Ontario than elsewhere. In the case of Quebec, it is striking how both groups of immigrants substantially differ from the native-born provincial population while in the other provinces it is mostly only the group immigrants from non-traditional source countries that differs from the native-born population. These results suggest that immigrant populations have the potential to attenuate or alter regional political cleavages in Canada because of their distinct pan-Canadian outlooks. Nevertheless, there is also the possibility that immigrants reproduce regional cleavages despite their systematic differences from the native-born population. The analysis now turns to exploring that possibility.

Do Immigrants Reproduce the Regional Structure of Political Cleavages?

The first stage of the analysis compared the political orientations of native-born and immigrant populations within each province. That approach tells us whether immigrants within regions share the same outlooks as their native-born counterparts, but it does not provide a full picture of the regional dynamics of political orientations. The next stage of the analysis explicitly compares inter-provincial differences in the political orientations of traditional and non-traditional immigrants with those of native-born residents. At this stage, each subgroup of citizens (native-born, traditional immigrants, and non-traditional immigrants) is analyzed separately in a multivariate setup, with provincial dummies entered as independent variables. For instance, we compare immigrants from non-traditional source countries in Quebec, Alberta and British Columbia to those from Ontario, and we repeat the same comparative exercise for immigrants from traditional source countries and the native-born populations.

The core evidence from these analyses, presented in Figures 4 through 6, suggests that regional cleavages are reproduced among immigrants, notwithstanding the differences between immigrant and native-born populations within provinces. Looking first at the data concerning inter-provincial differences in orientations towards Canada (Figure 4), it is clear that the major regional cleavage lies between residents of Quebec and the rest of Canada, and that the basic structure of that cleavage is broadly similar among immigrant and native-born populations. The orientations of native-born populations in Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia are essentially the same, and no significant variations emerge in the outlooks of immigrants across those three provinces; but immigrant and native-born Quebec populations alike express considerably more negative feelings towards Canada than do their counterparts in other provinces. At the same time, there are also unmistakable differences in Quebec between native-born and traditional and

non-traditional immigrant populations with respect to the size of the regional cleavage. Native-born residents in Quebec score approximately 19 points lower than their Ontario counterparts on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, whereas the corresponding gaps among traditional and non-traditional immigrant subgroups are 11 and six points, respectively. The implication is that although immigrants' political outlooks reflect the same regional cleavage found within the native-born population, immigrants do not absorb this particular local political norm to the same extent as their native-born counterparts.

INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE

The evidence that regional cleavages in the native-born population are reproduced among immigrants is even clearer when it comes to perceptions of provincial treatment by the federal government and partisan support (Figures 5 and 6, respectively). Three significant findings emerge from these data. First, it turns out that the structure of those cleavages is quite different from the inter-provincial disparities in feelings towards Canada. The evidence indicates that the major regional cleavage with respect to both political orientations is between Ontarians and residents of the three other provinces. By and large, residents of Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia are more likely than Ontarians to indicate their respective provinces are treated worse than other provinces by the federal government, and they are less likely than Ontarians to support the Liberal Party.

INSERT FIGURES 5 AND 6 HERE

The second significant finding is that differences in political outlooks between immigrants in Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario reflect those of the native-born population. Along the same regional lines as native-born Canadians, traditional and non-traditional immigrants in both Alberta and British Columbia are significantly less likely than their Ontario counterparts to give favourable evaluations of the federal government's treatment of their respective provinces. By the same token, both immigrant groups in the two Western provinces are significantly less likely than their Ontario counterparts to support the Liberal Party. Furthermore, the regional differences once again are more pronounced among immigrants from traditional source countries than among those from non-traditional source countries.

The third core finding that emerges from the data presented in Figures 5 and 6 is that regional political orientations are transmitted least successfully from the native-born population to both traditional and non-traditional immigrants in Quebec. Native-born residents of Quebec are much less likely than their Ontario counterparts to view the federal government's treatment of their province favourably, or to support the Liberal Party. In contrast, traditional immigrants in Quebec and Ontario express essentially the same views with respect to how their provinces are

treated by the federal government, and there is no statistically significant difference in their levels of support for the Liberal Party. The evidence concerning differences between non-traditional immigrants in Quebec and Ontario is equally modest.

Do Immigrants Learn Regional Political Norms in the Long Run?

The evidence from the first stage of the analysis showed that newer waves of immigrants from non-traditional source countries in particular tend to hold political outlooks that are distinct from those of their native-born provincial counterparts. In the second stage of the analysis, we observed that even though immigrants generally adjust to regional political norms, the regional differences in the political outlooks of non-traditional immigrants are muted when compared to native-born and traditional immigrant populations. That raises the possibility that discontinuities between old and new political environments make it more difficult for immigrants from non-traditional source countries than for those from traditional source countries to take up regional political norms. The final stage of the analysis further probes that possibility by exploring the impact of immigrants' length of residence in Canada on the political orientations of immigrants from non-traditional source countries. Because our previous analyses indicate that immigrants from traditional source countries tend to resemble the native-born population and to reproduce regional cleavages the following analysis on length of residence focuses solely on immigrants from non-traditional source countries.

If the differences between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and other Canadians are a consequence of acculturative stress, then we should find evidence that with length of residence immigrants from non-traditional source countries adjust to the political norms of their respective provinces. We test that prospect by first dividing non-traditional immigrants into three groups (recent immigrants, who have lived in Canada for 10 years or less, immigrants who have lived in Canada for 11 to 20 years, and established immigrants, who have lived in Canada for more than 20 years), and then comparing their political outlooks to the native-born population in their respective provinces. Even with pooled CES data, the resulting samples of non-traditional immigrants are too small to conduct reliable multivariate analyses with sociodemographic controls; therefore we limit our analyses to bivariate comparisons presented in Figures 7, 8 and 9. The central finding is that differences in political outlooks between the native-born and non-traditional immigrant populations within each province on for each of our three dimensions examined diminish the longer immigrants have lived in Canada.

INSERT FIGURES 7, 8, AND 9 HERE

With regards to feelings toward Canada, the evidence is less clear-cut but nevertheless still somewhat supportive of the hypothesis. With length of residence, the gap between non-traditional immigrants and the native-born population in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia somewhat decreases (from -6.5 to 0.3 in Ontario, from -8 to -0.5 in Alberta and from -9.3 to -6.3 in BC). The decline in Quebec is more modest and a substantial difference endures with a drop from 14.5 to 12.6.

It is in terms of perception with regards to the way the respondents' province is treated by the federal government that we observed the most obvious evidence of change in non-traditional immigrants' political orientation. In all four provinces the gap between immigrants from non-traditional source countries and the native-born population shrinks dramatically the longer immigrants reside in the province; by about the half in Quebec and Alberta; it practically disappears in British Columbia; and it even reverses direction in Ontario. Interestingly enough, it is again in Quebec that the largest gap persists after immigrants have lived more than 20 years in the host province.

Finally, there is also evidence of a diminishing gap in immigrants' political orientation in terms of support for the Liberal Party in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia although the change is more modest than what we observed for the perception of province treatment by the federal government. Furthermore, the gap actually increases in Alberta rather than decreases. As we observed for the other two dimensions, it is again for Quebec that the largest gap endures after immigrants have lived in the province for more than 20 years, with a remaining 31 percentage point difference with the native-born population.

Two central findings emerge out of this last part of our analyses. First, for each of the three dimensions examined the differences in political outlooks between the native-born and non-traditional immigrant populations within each province diminish the longer immigrants have lived in Canada. Second, the evidence from Quebec is consistent with that interpretation, but it is also a noteworthy exception. The evidence of convergence over time in the outlooks of non-traditional immigrants and their native-born counterparts in Quebec is overshadowed by the sheer size of the differences in outlooks between immigrant and native-born populations in that province both among recent and established immigrants. Newly arrived immigrants in Quebec differ more from the native-born population in that province than newly arrived immigrants do in any other province. Furthermore, even though the gaps diminish over the years, this reality endures and after 20 years in Quebec, immigrants in this province still differ more than any established immigrants in other provinces. It seems the political integration of immigrants and transmission of regional political norms and grievances in Quebec follow dynamics quite distinct from those of other Canadian provinces.

Conclusion

As the birthrate in Canada continues to decline immigration becomes an increasingly important source of population replacement, as well as a potential source of change in Canada's regional political cultures. This paper examined empirically whether contemporary immigration has the potential to transform regional political cultures, or whether regional cultures are simply reproduced within the diverse subpopulation of new arrivals.

We began by outlining three possibilities to explore. The first possibility was that immigrants rapidly adjust their political outlooks to fit with those of the population in the region where they reside (cultural learning in relation to local level politics); in consequence, the potential for immigration to transform regional political cultures would be quite limited. The second prospect was that immigrants develop distinctive political outlooks that are more pan-Canadian than regional in character (culture learning in relation to national level politics), in which case immigration could potentially attenuate regional differences in political norms over the long haul. The final possibility was that immigrants adjust slowly and only partially to regional political norms; and under that scenario, immigration could substantially transform regional political cultures in the future.

As it turns out, immigrants do in fact develop distinctive political outlooks that cut across regional cleavages and that are more pan-Canadian in character. Our results indicate that immigrants, especially newer waves of immigrants from non-traditional source countries, share political outlooks that are significantly different from those of the native-born populations in their respective provinces. Immigrant Canadians are generally more likely to vote for the Liberal Party of Canada (and therefore to reject regional parties) Canada, and less regionally alienated, than their native-born counterparts.

The central finding of this investigation, however, is that the distinctive political outlooks of Canada's immigrants are unlikely to attenuate regional differences in political cultures. With some exceptions, the basic cleavage structure observed between local populations of Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia is also observed between the immigrant populations of these three provinces. Moreover, the evidence from the Canadian Election Studies indicates that in the long run even immigrants from political and social systems that are vastly different from Canada's become fully acculturated to regional political norms.

A third core finding concerns the transmission of regional political norms to immigrants in Quebec. Our evidence from Quebec differs from other provinces in at least two important ways. The basic differences in two of the three political outlooks between the native-born population in Quebec and the rest of Canada are not reproduced among immigrants, suggesting

that local political norms are not transmitted to immigrants in Quebec as effectively as they are passed on to newcomers in other provinces. That interpretation is reinforced by further evidence that even after more than two decades in Canada, non-traditional immigrants living in Quebec still hold considerably different political outlooks from the native-born population of that province.

Our results are less ambiguous about the impact of immigration on regional political cultures than those reported by Elkins (1980). The main implication of these findings, taken together, is that immigration will likely not transform regional political cultures, except maybe in Quebec. Nor will it attenuate or accentuate regional cleavages. If flows of immigrants to Canada do not have a sustained impact on regional political cultures, then what other factors might transform regional differences in political outlooks? At least two possibilities we have not examined in this paper seem to merit attention. First, some researchers note that rising interregional mobility might also attenuate regional differences in Canadian political orientations (Schwartz 1974; Elkins 1980). The evidence presented here, however, suggests that this scenario may be somewhat unlikely. If migrants from other countries with very different political environments can adapt to regional norms, then why would migrants from within the Canadian political system behave any differently? A more promising prospect, perhaps, is that a shift from geographically concentrated to more geographically dispersed networks of social communication could attenuate regional cleavages. Baybeck & Huckfeldt, for example, contend that "lower density social networks created through spatially dispersed ties of association give rise to higher levels of political integration within the larger community" (2002, p. 217). The most significant finding of this exploration is that the movement of new people into old spaces has a minimal impact on regionalism: the arrival of new populations with diverse backgrounds does not diminish regional differences. It could be that, by making space less relevant, communication networks have the potential to powerfully transform regional political cultures. This is a possibility that requires some empirical investigation.

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
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Table 1. Sample distribution and size by province

	Quebec	Ontario	Alberta	British Columbia
Native-Born Population	4403	4004	1731	1850
Traditional Immigrants	161	468	127	290
Non-Traditional Immigrants	242	580	104	219

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies

**Figure 1. Feelings Towards Canada:
Difference Between Immigrants and Native-born Population**




Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2006. Results report unstandardized B coefficients measuring the gap between immigrants and the native-born population after controlling for gender, education, age, income, employment status and year of interview.

Question wording: "How do you feel about Canada on a 0 to 100 scale where 0 = really dislike and 100 = really like".

* P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01

**Figure 2. Perception of Province Treatment by the Federal Government:
Difference Between Immigrants and Native-born Population**




Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006. Results report unstandardized B coefficients measuring the gap between immigrants and the native-born population after controlling for gender, education, age, income, employment status and year of interview.

Question wording: "In general, does the federal government treat your province: better (+1); worse (-1); or about the same (0) as other provinces?"

* P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01


**Figure 3. Proportion of Liberal Voting:
Difference Between Immigrants and Native-born Population**



Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006. Results report gap in probability of voting Liberal between immigrants and the native-born population; based on predicted probabilities obtained from logistic regressions after controlling for gender, education, age, income, employment status and year of interview.

* P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01


Figure 4. Feeling Towards Canada Among Immigrants and Native-Born Populations in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia (Difference between province's subgroup and Ontario's subgroup)



Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2006. Results report unstandardized B coefficients measuring the gap between each province (Quebec, Alberta and BC) and Ontario after controlling for gender, education, age, income, employment status and year of interview. Question wording: "How do you feel about Canada on a 0 to 100 scale where 0 = really dislike and 100 = really like".


* P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01

Figure 5. Perception of Province Treatment by the Federal Government among Immigrants and Native-Born Populations in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia (Difference between province's subgroup and Ontario's subgroup)




Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006. Results report unstandardized B coefficients measuring the gap between each province (Quebec, Alberta and BC) and Ontario after controlling for gender, education, age, income, employment status and year of interview. Question wording: "In general, does the federal government treat your province: better (+1); worse (-1); or about the same (0) as other provinces?" * P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01

Figure 6. Probability of Voting for the Liberal Party of Canada among Immigrants and Native-Born Populations in Quebec, Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia (Difference between province's subgroup and Ontario's subgroup)




Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006. Results report gap in probability of voting Liberal between each province (Quebec, Alberta and BC) and Ontario; based on predicted probabilities obtained from logistic regressions controlling for gender, education, age, income, employment status and year of interview. * P<0.10; ** P<0.05; *** P<0.01

**Figure 7. Change in Feelings Towards Canada
among Immigrants from Non-Traditional Source Countries
(Difference between Immigrants and Native-born Population)**




Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2006.

Figure 8. Change in Perception of Province Treatment by Federal Government among Immigrants from Non-Traditional Source Countries (Difference between Immigrants and Native-born Population)



Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006.

**Figure 9. Change in Liberal Voting
among Immigrants from Non-Traditional Source Countries
(Difference between Immigrants and Native-born Population)**



Source: CES 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006.

Appendix A Construction of Variables

1993-2006 Canadian Election Studies

Thermometer for Canada 0-100 scale where 1 means respondents feel quite positively toward Canada and 0 means they feel quite negatively.

Regional Alienation -1 to +1 scale where 1 means that respondents believe that their province is treated better than other provinces by the federal government. 0 means that their province is treated the same as other provinces, and -1 means that respondents believe that their province is treated worse than other provinces by the federal government.

Liberal Vote Dichotomous variable where 1 means respondents report having voted Liberal and 0 means they voted for another party.

Education Highest degree attained.

Age Age in years.

Female 1 = female, 0 = male.

Income Household income in quintiles

Employed 1 = full time or part time employed, 0 = all others.

Traditional Immigrants Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA, Ukraine,

Non-traditional Immigrants Albania, Argentina, Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Central/South America, Chile, China, Columbia, Costa Rica, CroatiaCzech, Dominica, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St-kits/Nevis, St-Vincent de Grenadine, Taiwan, Trinidad, Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zimbabwe, Other African Country, Other Asian Country, Other European country, Other Middle Eastern Country, and Other South American Country.

Appendix B

Table B1: Difference between Immigrants and Native-born Populations (Feeling Toward Canada)

	Feeling Toward Canada (0-100)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	6.26	2.46b	-.11	.97	4.70	1.52c	.64	1.40
Non-Traditional Immigrants	9.41	2.02c	-2.05	.96b	-1.16	1.72	-3.97	1.51c
Female	1.59	.89a	2.13	.58c	3.04	.70c	1.91	.88b
Education	2.65	.81c	.41	.55	.84	.65	-.28	.85
Income	.47	.36	.10	.22	.26	.27	.06	.34
Age	.22	.04c	.12	.02c	.08	.03c	.09	.03c
Employed	1.26	1.19	2.36	.78c	1.86	.96b	.37	1.19
Election 1993	-2.42	1.49	.35	.85	.91	.99	-1.61	1.28
Election 1997	-5.49	1.22c	-.95	.78	-.87	.93	-2.78	1.16b
Election 2000	-6.53	1.17c	-1.30	.76a	-2.90	1.02c	-3.93	1.22c
Constant	54.00	3.30c	79.92	2.20c	78.41	2.55c	85.47	3.28c
Adjusted R-square	5.00		1.70		2.20		2.70	
N	2580		2614		2100		1185	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. See Appendix A for variable construction.
a: P<0.10; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.01. Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

Table B2: Difference between Immigrants and Native-born Population (Province Treatment by Fed. Govt.)

	Province Treatment by Federal Government (-1 to +1)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	.24	.06c	-.03	.04	-.03	.05	.02	.04
Non-Traditional Immigrants	.23	.05c	-.03	.03	.23	.05c	.18	0.05c
Female	-.02	.02	.13	.02c	.01	.02	.03	.03
Education	.01	.02	.06	.02c	-.06	.02c	-.01	.03
Income	.01	.01	-.02	.01a	-.03	.01c	-.04	.01c
Age	.0	.001	-.01	.001c	-.003	.001c	-.01	.001c
Employed	.01	.03	.01	.03	-.01	.03	-.06	.04
Election 1993	.33	.04c	-.28	.04c	-.03	.04	-.12	.05b
Election 1997	.07	.03b	-.07	0.03b	.16	.03c	.06	.04
Election 2000	-.05	.03	.11	.03c	.04	.04	-.10	.04b
Election 2004	.02	.03	.08	.03c	-.03	.03	-.19	.04c
Constant	-.35	.07c	.23	.08c	-.08	.08	.08	.10
Adjusted R-square	3.60		6.40		3.40		6.60	
N	3895		3905		2944		1838	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. See Appendix A for variable construction.

a: P<0.10; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.01

Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients.

Table B3: Difference between Immigrants and Native-born population (Liberal Vote)

	Liberal Vote (0-1)							
	Quebec		Ontario		Alberta		British Columbia	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Traditional Immigrants	1.08	.21c	.05	.13	-.65	.26b	-.10	.20
Non-Traditional Immigrants	1.37	.22c	.76	.14c	.60	.24b	.71	.21c
Female	.18	.09a	.14	.08a	.02	.11	.20	.13
Education	-.04	.08	-.15	.08b	.14	.10	.13	.13
Income	-.05	.04	.04	.03	.01	.04	.02	.05
Age	.02	.004c	.01	.003a	.01	.004	-.001	.005
Employed	-.005	.12	.17	.11	-.04	.15	.27	.17
Election 1993	1.0	.17c	.91	.13c	1.03	.17c	.32	.21
Election 1997	1.0	.15c	.64	.12c	.57	.17c	.18	.19
Election 2000	.99	.14c	.57	.12c	0.48	.19c	.40	.20b
Election 2004	.76	.15c	.32	.11c	.43	.17b	.02	.18
Constant	-2.55	.37c	-.86	.32c	-2.26	.44c	-1.80	.50c
Pseudo R-square	6.39		2.53		2.36		2.06	
N	2433		2779		2075		1306	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. See Appendix A for variable construction. a P<0.10; b P<0.05; c P<0.01
 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficient.

Table B4: Reproduction of Regional Cleavages among Immigrants in Canada

	Feeling Toward Canada (0-100)						Province Treatment by Federal Government (-1 to +1)						Liberal Vote (0-1)					
	Native		Trad		Non-Trad		Native		Trad		Non-Trad		Native		Trad		Non-Trad	
	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE	B	SE
Quebec (vs. Ontario)	-18.53	.54c	-10.92	1.88c	-6.19	1.95c	-.35	.02c	.02	.07	-.14	.06b	-.70	.06c	.32	.24	-.12	.25
BC (vs. Ontario)	-.58	.69	-.52	1.62	-2.97	2.03	-.63	.02c	-.55	.06c	-.43	.06c	-.77	.08c	-1.02	.23c	-.71	.23c
ALB (vs. Ontario)	-1.58	.56c	2.11	1.71	-.82	2.24	-.54	.02c	-.46	.06c	-.30	.06c	-.98	.07c	-1.72	.28c	-1.20	.28c
Female	2.45	.42c	.34	1.26	.08	1.52	.04	.01c	-.002	.05	.01	.04	.17	.05c	-.07	.18	.05	.19
Education	.96	.39b	1.55	1.12	3.04	1.57a	.02	.01	-.07	.04a	-.01	.04	-.02	.05	-.22	.15	-.32	.20
Income	.33	.17b	-.31	.51	.07	.58	-.01	.01b	-.02	.02	-.04	.02b	.03	.02	-.08	.07	-.07	0.07
Age	.12	.02c	.19	.05c	.17	.06c	-.003	.00c	-.01	.002b	-.01	.002c	.01	.002c	.004	.01	.01	.01b
Employed	1.46	.57b	1.75	1.68	2.01	2.04	-.01	.02	.04	.06	.04	.06	.02	.07	.25	.24	.52	.24b
Election 1993	-1.14	.64a	3.52	1.80a	2.14	2.28	-.02	.02	-.15	.08a	-.13	.08a	.94	.09c	.58	.30b	.46	.29
Election 1997	-3.01	.57c	.85	1.64	.48	2.24	.04	.02b	.04	.07	.09	.07	.64	.08c	.65	.27b	.70	.31b
Election 2000	-3.52	.57c	-1.54	1.82	-7.64	1.94c	-.001	.02	.04	.08	.02	.06	.68	.08c	.79	.29c	.20	.26
Election 2004							.01	.02	-.09	.07	-.004	.06	.44	.08c	.21	.25	.02	.27
Constant	79.29	1.61c	74.47	5.24c	70.79	5.94c	.24	.05c	.48	.19b	.46	.17c	-1.26	.21c	-.05	.76	.33	.77
Adjusted/ Pseudo R-square	20.70		9.80		7.50		13.00		15.20		8.50		4.23		9.54		5.10	
N	7312		587		581		10800		851		932		7385		658		550	

Source: 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006 Canadian Election Studies. See Appendix A for variable construction. a: P<0.10; b: P<0.05; c: P<0.01
 Entries report OLS unstandardized coefficients for “Feeling toward Canada” and for “Regional Alienation”, and Logit estimates for “Liberal vote”.