PUBLIC SPHERES AND LEGITIMACY:
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT WITHIN SECURITY COMMUNITIES

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ABSTRACT

The paper develops a theoretical framework for understanding the impact political crises have on security communities. To this end, it argues that the main source of conflict within security communities stems from periodical challenges to their external identity that is, to the role the community is supposed to play on the world stage with respect to international order, the use of force, and international organizations. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, the paper further argues that security communities enter a legitimacy crisis when the opening of their public sphere is not followed by a proper closing process that is, when the impulses and potentials released by new political circumstances remain unattached and in disequilibrium from an intersubjective point of view. The United States intervention in Iraq in 2003 serves as a case study for testing empirically the validity of this argument.
I. Introduction

The stability and endurance of security communities has been generally attributed to the strength of the institutional structure and the “thickness” of the collective identity shared by their members. Strong commitment to multilateral rules of conduct and democratic values are assumed, for instance, to bear a direct influence on members entertaining dependable expectations of peaceful change (Adler and Barnett 1998; Williams 2001). Internal crises may still occur but they are peacefully resolved by diplomatic means ranging from negotiations informed by a logic of appropriateness (Neumann and Williams 2000) to showdons based on representational force (Mattern 2004). In other words, institutions and identities restrict the options available to the members of the security community to resolving disputes. This view has been partially challenged by the recent evolution of the relationship between the United States on one hand, and Canada and Europe on the other hand. The foreign policy direction pursued by the United States (US) under the leadership of President George W. Bush since taking office in 2001 and especially the US military intervention in Iraq in 2003 appear to have strained the relationship between the United States and its allies to the point that some IR scholars have even started to call into question the very idea of transatlantic security community (Cox 2005).

This perception has been largely prompted by the sharp deterioration of the political discourse among the members of the transatlantic community. At the height of the Iraq crisis, the US Secretary of Defense disparaged France and Germany as “Old Europe”, and thus presumably politically irrelevant (CNN 2003b). On the orders of the Defense Secretary, Pentagon officials even discussed a plan to punish Germany’s “treachery and ineptitude” over Iraq, by harming its trade and economy (Beaumont et al. 2003). German officials responded by comparing Bush with an emperor, a dictator, and even with Adolph Hitler. The French government felt also compelled to go public and accuse the United States of orchestrating a "disinformation campaign aimed at sullying France's image and misleading the public" including allegations that France and Germany had in 1998 supplied Iraq with switches used in detonating nuclear weapons (BBC 2003e). On the Canadian side, cabinet minister Herb Dhaliwal slammed President Bush as a failed statesman (CBC 2003), while a top aide to the prime minister called President George W. Bush "a moron" (CBC 2002).

The relationship between the United States and its traditional allies has also deteriorated at the policy level, although not as drastically as the rhetorical acrimony between the two sides might suggest. For example, most of the EU members have withdrawn their troops from Iraq or are in the process of doing that, including Britain, thus leaving the United States to bear largely alone the military and financial costs entailed by the pacification of Iraq (Partlow 2007). Transatlantic relations within NATO have also come to a standstill leaving the Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer even wondering as to whether “some deliberately want to keep NATO and the EU at a distance from one another” (EUObserver 2007). At the level of the public opinion, the situation has been equally disconcerting. Three years after the war, the majority of Europeans and Canadians expressed the view that the US policies in Iraq constituted the main threat to international stability, and considered President Bush to be more dangerous to world peace than Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah (Harper 2006; Pew Research Center

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1 Ludwig Stiegler, the leader of the Social Democratic caucus in the Bundestag quoted in (Andresen 2002: 114).
2 Walter Kolbow, state secretary in the German Defence Ministry, quoted in (Die Welt 2003).
3 Hertha Däubler-Gmelin, the German justice minister, quoted in (Gruber and Schönstein 2002: 212-4)
Rhetorical bitterness and policy differences aside, it remains nevertheless unclear the extent to which the viability of the transatlantic security community has suffered as a result of the Iraq crisis. Some scholars have suggested the damage to have been rather profound (Cox 2005; Keen 2006), while others went a step further by arguing that political clashes over Iraq actually constituted telling symptoms of a growing cultural divide between the United States and its allies (Lipset 1990; Kagan 2003). More optimistic voices have insisted that calls for a demise of the transatlantic community are definitely premature since the threat of *jihadic* terrorism would likely push the West closer together (Singh 2006: 26), and that a new transatlantic bargain based on the complementarity between American military might and European civilian power would not only save the transatlantic relationship but would even transform it for the better (Moravcsik 2004). Nevertheless, what is strikingly lacking from these arguments is a clear framework for assessing the strength of the transatlantic security community (TSC).

The relevant literature makes reference to two broad approaches to addressing this issue. The first one emphasizes the role that institutions have in maintaining and reproducing the legitimacy of the security community. Close military coordination, multilateral decision-making procedures, high density of transnational interactions, or diffuse norms of reciprocity are generally viewed, for instance, as key ingredients of a mature security community (1998: 56). In other words, as long as the main institutional blocks are in place, the long-term survival of the community is firmly secured. However, as pointed out above, with the exception of the issue of borders, all other institutional mechanisms have been challenged in the aftermath of the Iraq war, albeit to different degrees. Had not been for the NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan (NATO 2008), the level of political and military cooperation among the members of the TCA would have the lowest since the onset of the Cold War. This seems to lend credibility to the argument that the transatlantic security community is actually devolving from a consolidated to a more diffuse form, but the depth and implications of this process of institutional deterioration are rather difficult to capture theoretically.

A second approach argues that collective identity provides a stronger anchor to TSC than formal institutions. What keeps the community together is a particular type of identity that constitutively binds member states through the logic of appropriateness. More specifically, this identity construction tells them what the appropriate action is in a given situation based on the context of the social structure within which actors are located and on the judgment of others (Neumann and Williams 2000: 363). When conflict arises, a “narrative gun” might be deployed in order to bring non-confirming actors back into the fold by forcing “we-ness” upon them through constructed representations of shared values, trust, and common-security fate (Bially Mattern 2004: 98-100). It is largely for this reason that some authors look optimistically ahead to the future of TSC. While acknowledging the fact that the institutional dimension of the transatlantic community has been damaged by the Iraqi crisis, they nevertheless insist the other important constitutive element of TSC, collective identity, has actually remained intact (Risse 2004). It remains though unclear the level of damage the collective identity of the community can sustain without that undermining its effectiveness. The German reaction to the Iraqi crisis illustrate well the limits that even a “narrative gun” can have on keeping the members of TSC in fold (Bjola and Kornprobst 2007).

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4 Post 9/11 reinforcements of border controls between the United States and Canada might actually dispute this point as well (CBC 2006).
The main objective of this paper is therefore to develop an analytical framework for understanding the ways in which political tensions within the transatlantic security community affect its strength and effectiveness. The question asked thus refers not to how conflict is settled within security communities, but to how to evaluate the strength of the community after a major crisis. More specifically, how do political crises influence the internal dynamic and constitution of the TSC and what implications does that have on its security policies? To this end, I argue that the main source of conflict within the TSC stems from periodical challenges to their external identity that is, to the role the community is supposed to play on the world stage. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, I further argue that the TSC enters a legitimacy crisis when the opening of their public sphere to external conditions is not followed by a proper closing process, that is, when the impulses and potentials released by new circumstances remain unattached and in disequilibrium from an intersubjective point of view. The paper will be divided in two main parts. The first section will review Habermas’ concept of the public sphere, examine its analytical relevance for understanding the process of legitimization of security communities, and provide a new typology of security communities. The second part will apply this framework for understanding the impact the 2003 Iraq crisis has had on the internal dynamic of the transatlantic security community.
II. The Public sphere and security communities

2.1 The concept of the public sphere

The concept of public sphere owes much of its theoretical significance to Jürgen Habermas, who introduced it to social theory via his landmark study on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962. Habermas originally defined the public sphere as the “the sphere of private people come together as a public […] to engage [public authorities] in a debate governing relations in the basically privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social labor” (Habermas 1989: 27). The emergence of the public sphere in the modern period was associated by Habermas to the efforts undertaken by the bourgeoisie to justify its rightness to political ascendancy by insisting on the universal character of the normative principles it appealed to, such as rationality as the sole arbiter in debate, openness to criticism, and accessibility to deliberation (Johnson 2006: 24-5). These principles turned the public sphere into a critical institution and a norm-giving source of power in which reasoned argumentation became the ultimate authority for settling political differences rather than the appeal to tradition or political status. In short, the public sphere constituted the driving force behind the constitution of the modern liberal state as well as the social mechanism by which individuals transformed themselves from subjects into citizens.

One the negative side, the public sphere became the victim of its own success. The constitution of the modern capitalist state led, among other things, to the colonization of the modern lifeworld by market-driven relations. The idea of self-regulating market efficiency thus began to erode confidence in the function of the public sphere as a platform for rational deliberation about the common good. Not only public debate broke down under the pressure of contending groups fighting for economic and political compensation from the political system, but the reading public was transformed into a minority of specialists interested less in a free and open debate as in presenting their message for mass consumption and the entertainment of an uncritical audience (Eriksen and Weigård 2003: 182-3). Habermas called this transformation the “re-feudalization of the public sphere” as citizens basically turned back into subjects not because they were deprived of their political or civil rights but primarily because they gradually lost the deliberative capacities necessary for exercising these rights effectively. In his later work, Habermas expressed hope in the possibility of rescuing the emancipatory potential of the public sphere. The integrative functions of the public sphere, such as shaping identities, generating social solidarity, and legitimating power relations, are too important for the modern society to be ignored (Habermas 1996: 360-366).

For Habermas, the restoration of the public sphere depends on securing the proper conditions for the well functioning of a “two-track” deliberative process of will- and opinion-formation. The former is supposed to take place in a core public sphere defined by formally organized political institutions, while opinion-formation emerges in a peripheral public sphere, involving deliberations outside the political system (Eriksen and Weigård 2003: 185). The role of the peripheral public sphere is not only to act as a “sounding board for problems” but also to “influentially thematize” them that is, to furnish them with possible solutions and to dramatize them in such a way that they are taken up and

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5 Habermas refers by that to the situation in which the public sphere takes on feudal features, which “imitates the kind of aura proper to personal prestige and supernatural authority” that once dominated feudal courts. Rational-critical discussions of public affairs are thus replaced with a mood of conformity to public figures, while consensus is manufactured by “sophisticated opinion-molding services under the aegis of a sham public interest” (Habermas 1989: 195).
dealt with by the core arena of the public sphere (Johnson 2006: 91). At the same time, the latter filters out and set priorities among various claims after testing them from the standpoint of the generalizability of interests (Habermas 1996: 371). Furthermore, neither tier of the public sphere is supposed to encroach on the other’s area of jurisdiction. Each besieges the other but without conquering it (Eriksen and Weigård 2003: 189). Otherwise, the critical function each is supposed to bring on the other would be distorted, thus opening the door to various social pathologies. If opinion-formation is usurped by power relations, then political manipulation of the public agenda becomes inevitable. On the other hand, if opinion-formation becomes too dominant then governance effectiveness is undermined.

The social relevance of the public sphere thus stems from its capacity to ensure legitimacy that is, social compliance in absence of coercion or self-interest, to a particular political order. By creating a “network of communicating information and points of view” (Habermas 1996: 360), the public sphere creates the necessary conditions for the articulation and adjudication of political claims by means short of violence. The mechanism that primarily contributes to this outcome is publicity that is, public engagement between two debating parties, the speaker and the addressee, in front of a third party, the audience. Since the latter cannot be normally coerced to accept the standpoint of either the speaker or the addressee, its support can be only won by presenting arguments that appeal to general interests and deny references to one’s political, social or economic power status. The legitimating function of the public sphere nevertheless collapses when the triadic relationship between the speaker, addressee and the audience fails to properly answer the social demand for opinion and will-formation. In sum, when actors’ opinions fails to gain political attention and traction, then the associated political arrangement may enter into a legitimacy crisis (Habermas 1975). It is exactly this last aspect that makes the concept of the public sphere particularly relevant for the study of security communities.

2.2 Legitimating security communities

Habermas’ concept of the public sphere is relevant not only for domestic politics but also for understanding the functioning of security communities. Granted, TCS does not yet have a fully developed public sphere, at least of the same scope and depth as that available to member states at the national level. According to Schlesinger, a full developed public sphere above the nation state must have three essential properties: the dissemination of a transnational news agenda, that such an agenda would become an important part of everyday media consumption, and that the audiences living within the member states begin to think of their citizenship to a certain extent as transcending the level of nation-states (Schlesinger 1999: 277-8). While these conditions are not probably met on a regular basis, they are clearly manifest in time of crises, when the key constitutive elements of the

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6 For a comprehensive examination of the role of ethical argumentation in world politics, see (Crawford 2002).

7 The idea of “argumentative entrapment” (Risse 1999) is particularly important for understanding why third parties could play an important role in stimulating deliberative behavior. As arguing always involves reference to a mutually accepted authority to validate empirical and normative claims, third parties provide by their very existence a powerful incentive to the arguing parties for avoiding contradictory statements or self-defeating behavior (e.g., repeating fallacious arguments over and over again) in order to make their case. This provides further evidence to the fact that it is mainly the institutional context rather than actors’ motivations which determine whether argumentative reasoning has influence on social interactions (Risse 2005 174-6). For recent studies examining scope conditions and contributions of third parties in settling international disputes, see (Deitelhoff and Müller 2005; Merrills 2005; Allee and Huth 2006; Fukunaga 2006; Haftel and Thompson 2006).
community, institutions and the collective identity, are put to test. For example, during the Kosovo crisis in 1999, there was a clear synchronization in the focus of mass media and the public opinion regarding the proper political and military solutions for handling the crisis (Grundmann et al. 2000). That was also accompanied by a critical reflection of what a military intervention conducted for humanitarian purposes could mean for the identity of the actors involved (Habermas 2000; Apel 2001).

More reliable evidence concerning the existence and effectiveness of TSC’s public sphere results, though, from the way it upholds confidence of its members in the legitimacy of the community as a political project. The two functions of will and opinion-formation are particularly critical for achieving this objective. The first refers to the process of decision-making involving matters of common interest, especially in the security area. This core area of the community’s public sphere is inhabited by political leaders and elites from the member states, who make decisions largely based on the logic of appropriateness informed by shared practices and values. The second function of the public sphere has the key role in building legitimacy for TSC by providing a venue of political responsiveness and accountability to decisions taken by political elites (Koopmans 2007: 184). This area is inhabited by mass media, public intellectuals and expert groups. The legitimacy of the TSC is thus secured as long as the two tiers of its public sphere synchronize with each other without unduly encroaching on each other’s area of jurisdiction.

Challenges to the well functioning of the public sphere could arise both from within or outside the security community, but most of the time they do not dispute its legitimacy. The most significant challenge to the viability of TSC’s public sphere comes, though, from the way in which member states define the external identity of the community that is, the set of collective images and expectations that actors held regarding the role and responsibilities of the community in world politics. The external identity defines the boundaries within which TSC is expected to conduct its relations with the other members of the international society and encompasses three main role-conceptions: the vision of international order, conditions for legitimate use of force, and the importance attached to international law and institutions. The first element demarcates the type of positions (e.g., regional hegemon, human rights defender, diplomatic powerhouse etc.) actors are expected to take up within the international system. Conditions for legitimate use of force indicate the limits actors are assumed to observe in their relations with others (e.g., self-defense, pre-emptive action, humanitarian intervention). Importance attached to international law and institutions refers to systemic expectations about how actors should tackle collective problems and settle disputes.

Redefining the external identity of the security community thus poses the most serious challenge to its legitimacy. First, it is the external identity that generally spurs the momentum for the security

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8 As the security community lacks agency and institutional means of enforcement of its rules, what keeps its members together is exactly the belief that the community as whole has an inherently positive moral value. Self-interest can encourage voluntary compliance with the community’s norms but only in short-term. Only the development by member states of an internal sense of moral obligation (i.e., legitimacy) can ensure the survival of the security community in long-term. For more on the effectiveness of self-interest vs. legitimacy as means of social control, see (Hurd 1999).

9 In fact, regular public debates about the role and performance of the community serve to strengthen rather than to weaken it. For example, debates regarding the enlargement of the European Union are seen not as a deterrent but rather as a motor of integration (Friis 2003).

10 The concept of external identity draws on the seminal work on national roles conceptions of Holsti (1970) and Walker (1987), but it moves beyond them by offering a more concrete breakdown of the constitutive elements and by applying it to non-state actors as well.
community to form in the first place. Therefore, the redesign of such a foundational element would certainly have profound consequences for both the institutional framework and the collective identity of the community. Second, re-configurations of the community’s rules of conduct with respect to the use of force or international organizations could easily undermine the will-formation function of the public sphere through decision-making paralysis or ineffectiveness. This is particularly problematic, especially as a long term factor, because it could dissolve actors’ trust in the institutional framework of the community. Third, protracted and divisive debates on the issue of the external identity of the community would likely undermine the opinion-formation function of the public sphere by stimulating nationalistic ambitions. Once awaken, nationalistic domestic pressures, often disguised as inevitable responses to overriding national interests, could call into question the very future of the community. In sum, ineffectual responses to challenges to the external identity of the security community are most likely to foster its termination as a political project.

2.3 Crisis management and the public sphere

The central argument put forth in this paper is that the impact of political crises on the legitimacy of security communities in general, and on the TSC in particular, can be best explained through the concept of the public sphere. More specifically, successful management of political crises depends on how the security community opens and closes its public sphere to accommodate new understandings, expectations and practices, especially when that involves redefinitions of the community’s external identity. Whereas the opening process may unleash serious challenges to the stability of the security community, it does not necessarily need to undermine its legitimacy. According to Habermas, a legitimacy crisis may actually emerge when the opening process is not followed by a proper closure that is, when impulses and potentials released by new political circumstances remain unattached and in disequilibrium from an intersubjective point of view (Habermas and Pensky 2001: 82-83). In other words, by failing to intersubjectively capture and absorb the new meanings, the public sphere creates a deliberative deficit of will and opinion-formation that puts the legitimacy of the security community at risk.

Three different scenarios may develop as a result of how the process of opening-closing of the public sphere takes place, and each of them has different implications for the constitution and functioning of the security community. A first scenario unfolds when the opening of the public sphere is followed by a closing process that allows for will and opinion-formation to take place in a rational-critical manner. The speaker and the addressee generally refrain from engaging each other through rhetorical action and they actually try to shape their relationship through argumentative reasoning. Occasional deviations from this practice may occur, but they are generally denounced and censored by the audience. Accordingly, the peripheral tier of the public sphere does not simply reflect the debate taking place in the core arena but it actively engages with it. The result of this

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11 The legacy of the War World II (WWII) and the Soviet threat were, for instance, the key factors that drove the Americans, Canadians and Europeans to come together to establish a relatively horizontal model of international order based on restrained use of force and support for international organizations.

12 As the military arm of TSC, NATO is currently facing this problem as the post 9/11 unilateralist drive in the US foreign policy has exposed the alliance to potential political irrelevance (Cottee 2004).

13 Reactions in the United States to Europe’s reluctance to embrace the Bush Administration’s conceptions of power and use of force in international politics provides a good illustration to this point (Kagan 2004).
process is a deliberative form of security community defined by a vibrant public sphere, strong legitimacy, and a successful record of overcoming political crises. A clear indicator of that is the set of deliberative prohibitions the members of the community develop with respect to what is not accepted as legitimate arguments in the community’s public sphere.\textsuperscript{14}

At the opposite pole, an antagonistic security community is the result of a failed attempt to close the public sphere through a rational-critical process. The political dynamic within the security community remains peaceful to the extent that no member seriously contemplates the possibility of settling differences with the other members by force or the threat of using force. At the same time, the public sphere largely fails to carry out it will- and opinion-formation functions. In fact, the process of will-formation inside the security community practically ceases to exist, while the peripheral arena of the community is consequently dissolved into a constellation of peripheral private spheres, each controlled by the respective members of the community. As a result, no significant effort is undertaken to intersubjectively filter and prioritize claims raised in the peripheral public sphere and to take decisions based on that. The speaker and the addressee continue to engage each other, but mainly strategically, with no consistent intention to genuinely listen and respond to each other’s arguments. The legitimacy of the antagonistic security community thus rests only on a fragile agreement not to invoke the threat of using force for settling disputes, but no other tacit deliberative prohibitions exist to regulate the debate among members.

The feudalized model of security community strikes a middle ground between the deliberative and antagonistic versions. The process of closing of the public sphere partially follows a critical rational path to the extent that will- and opinion-formation are both guided by considerations of responding to challenges to the legitimacy of the security community on an intersubjective basis. At the same time, the critical functions of will- and opinion-formation of the public sphere are both distorted to the point that discussions regarding the constitutive norms of the security community take place in a context gradually divested of rational criteria of validity. The audience generally defers to the speaker and the addressee because it lacks its own rational criteria of validity. The latter are usually manufactured by the speaker and the addressee not through a process of mutual enlightenment but through staged monologues, emotionally-laden symbols, and rhetorical actions. In short, the public sphere is forced to close but in a deformed way marked by declining trust, accountability and responsiveness, thus prompting a gradual process of de-legitimization of the TSC. Increased contestation of deliberative prohibitions regarding common objectives and of the relationships among its members represents a clear sign of the declining effectiveness of the security community.

The distinction between the three models of security community has important theoretical implications for the study of conflict and cooperation in international politics in general, and of the functioning of the TSC in particular. First, it highlights the decisive role the public sphere plays in maintaining the stability of the security community. By assisting the process of will and opinion formation, the public sphere thus provides an indispensable platform for building and upholding the

\textsuperscript{14} As security communities do not posses agency of their own as their member states do, tacit deliberative prohibitions are very important, because they allow the process of will- and opinion-formation to take place in a manner that avoids trust-eroding debates over the intentions of the members towards each other (i.e., the security dilemma) or ontological insecurities regarding the norms and principles that are supposed to bind together the members of the security community in global politics. Absence in the public discourse of positive references to the realpolitik European powers used to practice before 1945 illustrates, for instance, how deliberative prohibitions have been internalized by European political leaders because they do not want to allow such a past to become again Europe’s future (Waever 1996: 122).
community’s legitimacy. Second, it also specifies the scope conditions under which the de-legitimization of security communities may occur. Not every dispute can lead to this outcome, but only those that critically undermine the capacity of the community’s public sphere to intersubjectively capture and absorb challenges to its institutional structure and collective identity. Third, it provides an insightful analytical framework for understanding how political crises affect the effectiveness of security communities. The level of policy coordination among the members of the security community thus depends on the extent to which deliberations inside the public sphere follow a rational-critical rather than a rhetorical-strategic path.

Last but not least, how can we recognize the three models of security community when we “see” them? The deliberative and antagonistic models are clearly the easiest to identify. The first is shaped by frequent communicative engagements among decision-makers, mutual positive references to the members’ policies, an optimistic vision of the future of the community, a flexible but active political agenda, and prompt public rebukes of occasional deviations from discursive prohibitions regarding the relationship among members or the external role of the community. By contrast, antagonistic security communities encompass rare and formal interactions among policy-makers, negative attitudes of some members towards the others, skepticism regarding the fate of the community steered by constant disputes over the external role of the community, and a weak level of cooperation. On the other hand, the feudalized model of security community is characterized by a relatively minimalist agenda of cooperation, positive but declining confidence in the future of the community, an atmosphere of distrust among decision-makers, and an increasingly trivialized and polarized public debate.
III. Quo vadis the transatlantic security community?

An analytical framework informed by the concept of public sphere can answer two important questions regarding the dynamic and evolution of the transatlantic security community: first, how does the community deal with challenges to its external identity and second, what impact does that have on its strength and effectiveness? The United States (US) military action against Iraq in 2003 represents a highly relevant case for addressing these questions because it directly challenged the post Cold War external identity of the TSC, and in so doing, it provoked one of its most serious crises since its establishment. The severity of the challenge was threefold. From a legal point of view, it forced the members of the community to take a position that arguably conflicted with the UN Charter provisions regarding the use of force. From a military perspective, it urged the actors involved to abandon their long-standing practice of restrain against the use of force and instead embark on a military action without direct provocation. Finally, from a strategic perspective, it questioned its commitment to a horizontal international order by raising prospects of Western military hegemony in the Middle East. The debate surrounding the reactions of the TSC members to the Iraq crisis thus represents the perfect case for empirically testing the validity of the argument regarding the mutual constitutive relationship between the public sphere and the legitimacy of security communities.

The Iraq war deeply divided the transatlantic community with United States, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Denmark, and the Central European countries on one hand, supporting the intervention, while France, Germany, Belgium, Canada and to a lesser extent Austria, Greece, Finland, Sweden and Luxembourg opposing it. The intervention in Iraq was presented by President Bush as “an urgent duty to prevent the worst” since “failure to act would embolden other tyrants, allow terrorists access to new weapons and new resources, and make blackmail a permanent feature of world events” (Bush 2002). The main points of accusation referred to Iraq’s possession and production of WMD, including nuclear weapons, as well as to its connections to terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda (Bush 2002). The crisis thus confronted the transatlantic security community with the prospect of re-shaping it external identity from a military passive into a militant international actor, responsible for protecting international order by taking pre-emptive actions, if necessarily, against terrorist-supporting countries. This attempt ultimately failed, largely because of the deformation of the community’s public sphere under the impact of an abrasive and strategically driven process of will-formation and of a deficient input of opinion-formation.

The process of will-formation that is, of political leaders debating and deciding the proper course of

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15 President Bush centered his argument for war on the implied but never explicitly stated connection between Iraq, Al-Qaeda and 9/11: “We know that Iraq and the al-Qaeda terrorist network share a common enemy - the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al-Qaeda have had high-level contacts that go back a decade. Some al-Qaeda leaders who fled Afghanistan went to Iraq […] We've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaeda members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases. And we know that after 11 September, Saddam Hussein's regime gleefully celebrated the terrorist attacks on America” (Bush 2002). The British Prime-Minister, Tony Blair, avoided the 9/11 reference but he otherwise concurred with Bush's assessment of the threat posed by Iraq to international order: “What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme. I also believe that, as stated in the document, Saddam will now do his utmost to try to conceal his weapons from UN inspectors. […] Intelligence reports make clear that he sees the building up of his WMD capability, and the belief overseas that he would use these weapons, as vital to his strategic interests, and in particular his goal of regional domination. And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them” (United Kingdom Government 2002: 3-4).
action under the given circumstances, was particularly problematic. For reasons pertaining to its long-standing resentment of American unilateralism as well as to its legitimate concerns for the stability of the region, France took the lead of the anti-war camp. While deploring the lack of solid evidence on Iraq’s WMD programs, President Chirac agreed that the UN should “impose the return of inspectors in Iraq without restrictions or preconditions”. He stopped short, though, from endorsing the American idea of “regime change” and advocated instead a more limited objective that is, the prevention of Iraq from developing WMD. To this purpose, Chirac outlined a two-stage approach to solving the crisis: first, to strengthen the UN weapons inspection regime and second, to ask the UN Security Council to authorize the use of force in case of Iraq non-compliance (Chirac 2002). Germany, as a new non-permanent member of the Security Council forcefully joined the anti-war camp, refused to endorse any initiatives that would strengthen the “logic of war” (BBC 2003d), and directly challenged the United States over the justifications for military action against Iraq (BBC 2003a). The principle that the “force of law” must always prevail over the “law of force” also determined Canada to refuse to commit troops to the “coalition of the willing”.16

Despite this, the two sides managed, in a first phase, to reach a compromise under the form of UN Resolution 1441. The most vocal opponent to the intervention, France, eventually agreed to support the resolution after the United States accepted language in the final document that basically removed the threat of automatic use of force against Iraq (Woodward 2004: 220-227). However, as the UN inspectors failed to reveal evidence of Iraqi WMD,17 the position of the United States turned increasingly belligerent. The Americans, seconded by the British, expressed the view that diplomacy had run its full course and consequently, the elimination of Iraq’s WMD could not be achieved unless Saddam was removed from power by force. As a result, the gap between the two sides drastically widened, to the extent that by February 2003 the positions of the two parties became basically irreconcilable. The final showdown occurred when France, Germany and Russia joined forces and proposed a plan for strengthening the UN inspection regime (UN Security Council 2003a), while the US, UK and Spain drafted a resolution asking the Security Council exactly the opposite, that is to authorize the use of force against Iraq (UN Security Council 2003b). The US surveillance operation of the members of the Security Council (Bright et al. 2003) only confirmed the total failure of argumentative reasoning.

More disturbingly, the United State began to engage in a harsh policy of arm-twisting, which intensified in the months preceding the intervention. On orders from Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Pentagon officials discussed, for instance, a plan to punish Germany’s “treachery and ineptitude” over Iraq, by harming its trade and economy (Beaumont et al. 2003). The French government felt even compelled to go public and accuse the United States of orchestrating a "disinformation campaign aimed at sullying France's image and misleading the public" including allegations that France and Germany had in 1998 supplied Iraq with switches used in detonating nuclear weapons (BBC 2003e). In an effort to diplomatically isolate France and Germany, the United States also managed to secure two important joint statements of support for its stance on Iraq

16 According to Jean Chretien, the Canadian Prime-Minister: “If they (the Americans) want to go there all alone, they can go there all alone, but we say they must go with the authorization of the United Nations. If they don’t, the international system of peace and security will probably be more destabilized than it need be” (Ljunggren 2003).

17 The inspectors grew particularly frustrated with the quality of the leads provided the by US intelligence community (CBS 2003), to the extent that some US Senators began to accuse the CIA of deliberately sabotaging the inspection process by refusing to fully co-operate with the UN and withholding crucial information about Saddam’s arsenal (Buncombe 2003).
from four members of the “Old Europe” (BBC 2003b) and ten of the “New Europe” (Fox News 2003). Nevertheless, the US efforts to marginalize France and Germany badly backfired as both countries blocked NATO from dispatching military hardware to Turkey in preparation for the Iraq invasion (CNN 2003a).

The process of will-formation thus failed to engage the members of the TSC to develop an intersubjective understanding of the conditions for solving the crisis. The most significant aspect of this outcome was not actors’ failure to reach consensus, but the reasons for which they were not able to do that. More specifically, the crisis exposed the divergent views the various members of the TSC held regarding the external identity of the community with respect to the preferred vision of international order, conditions for the use of force, and relationship with the United Nations and international law. The representational force deployed by United States against its opponents, especially France and Germany, failed to deliver largely because by submitting to it, the target actors would have had to abandon an important aspect of their identity (Bjola and Kornprobst 2007). In fact, the abrasive use of representational force was the key factor responsible for the deformation of the community’s public sphere. While certain differences are sometimes inevitable and even irreconcilable among the members of the security community, a healthy public sphere helps protect the legitimacy of the community in the eyes of its members. Nevertheless, once that certain deliberative prohibitions have been discarded, as it happened during the Iraqi crisis, the ability the public sphere to deliver becomes clearly more difficult if not impossible.

Deficiencies in the core arena of the public sphere can be generally corrected by actions taken in the peripheral arena. Unfortunately, the process of opinion-formation was little conducive to ensuring responsiveness and accountability to the course of action pursued by political leaders. From an American perspective, the process of opinion-formation was largely feudalized to the extent that the major US news organizations were basically absent from the public debate on the war. The validity criteria for assessing the merits of the case for war were manufactured by the White House through a series of public relations techniques and served to the media for consumption. The post 9/11 national political climate was undoubtedly the key factor that assisted the feudalization of the American media. Many readers were intolerant of articles critical of President Bush. For example, whenever The Washington Post ran such pieces, readers sent hate mail and threats, calling reporters’ patriotism into question. At the same time, media outlets and reporters that were ideologically close to the President such as Fox News, Rush Limbaugh, and The Weekly Standard all stood ready to pounce on journalists who strayed, branding them liberals or traitors, labels that could permanently damage a career. As a result, journalists gradually began to censor and muzzle themselves (Massing

18 The second letter especially triggered an angry reaction from the French President, Jacques Chirac, who accused the countries backing the US position of irresponsible behavior: "It is not well-brought-up behavior. They missed a good opportunity to keep quiet" (BBC 2003c). Needless to say, Chirac’s reaction did not contribute either to creating an inclusive and open deliberative framework.

19 For a comprehensive and non-partisan analysis of the resourcefulness and effectiveness of the communication strategy of the Bush Administration, see (Fritz et al. 2004).

20 Nothing probably illustrates this better than the fact that at the last press conference held by President Bush before the war, only one reporter out of ninety-four present challenged, albeit in a mild form, the premises of the Administration’s push for war (i.e., the imminence of the Iraqi threat). The reporter asked why were the European allies reluctant to think the Iraqi threat was so real and imminent as the Bush Administration believed, despite all governments having access to the same up-to-date intelligence information. The rest of the questions accepted the war inevitability argument and referred rather to marginal issues, including Bush’s personal relationship to God. For full details, see (Bush 2003).
By contrast, the European and Canadian media were significantly more critical of the arguments presented by governmental officials. That allowed them to reflect positions both in favor and against the war, with a slight emphasis on the latter. For example, the German press included views that repeatedly accused the United States of imperialism (Follath and Spörl 2003), but also opinions that routinely criticized the antiwar stand of the Chancellor Schroeder government, which some believed would lead Germany into foreign-policy isolation (Lehman 2005: 359). European and Canadian media was also more balanced than its American counterpart regarding the selection of its sources, military and non-military, and consistently discussed the war from a broader perspective, including its consequences and implications for global peace and justice (Boaz 2005: 353-4). Equally important, while the American news media uncritically followed the Bush administration’s lead in marginalizing and trivializing the United Nations in the public discourse, the European and Canadian media took great care to interrogate the UN for its decisions and processes, but without undermining the organization’s legitimacy or its right to exist (Barker-Plumer 2005).

The intellectual debate during the Iraq crisis focused on the strategic and legal aspects of the intervention, especially on the pre-emptive component of the Bush doctrine (White House 2002). Prominent IR scholars publicly challenged, for instance, the Administration’s strategic rationale for talking pre-emptive action against Iraq (*** 2002). Legal experts took also issue with the legality of the pre-emption concept (Gardner 2003; Slaughter 2004), although others supported it (Taft 2002; Wedgwood 2003). From a historical perspective, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida argued that European visions of world order are, partly due to past experiences, different from the ones predominant in the United States (Habermas and Derrida 2003). This position was echoed by Robert Kagan’s famous remark that “on major strategic and international questions American are from Mars and Europeans from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less” (Kagan 2003: 3). Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, also openly accused United States and Britain of deliberately undermining his efforts before the war (Usborne 2003). Blix later recalled that the Bush Administration put pressure on his inspectors to produce more damning language in their reports and he also accused "some elements" of the Pentagon of being behind a smear campaign against him (Smith 2003).

In sum, the process of opinion-formation failed to provide a constructive counterpoint to deficiencies created by the abrasive use of representational force in the core arena of the public sphere. Neither mass media nor civil society managed to properly sensitize political leaders to alternative courses of action or to hold them accountable for the way in which they reacted to each other. Actually, very few accounts, mostly European, took the position to approach the crisis from the perspective of the TSC as a whole, rather than of the specific member states, a fact that raises some unruly questions regarding the strength of the community’s collective identity. While some of

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21 This conclusion was also shared by CNN reporter Christiane Amanpour who stated: “I think the press was muzzled and I think the press self-muzzled. I’m sorry to say but certainly television and, perhaps, to a certain extent, my station was intimidated by the administration and its foot soldiers at Fox News. And it did, in fact, put a climate of fear and self-censorship, in my view, in terms of the kind of broadcast work we did” (quoted in Domke 2004: 168). Amanpour’s suspicions were later confirmed by the mea culpa issued by New York Times (Editors 2004) and Washington Post, (Kurtz 2004), both expressing regret for not challenging more vigorously the assertions made by the Bush Administration in the run-up to war. For more details regarding the tactics used by the Bush Administration and its media allies to silent or discredit public criticism, see (Massing 2005).
the factors responsible for that were idiosyncratic and hence, less likely to re-occur in the future, other had deeper roots and therefore, they posed a more serious challenge to the well-functioning of the TCS’ public sphere. The post 9/11 political climate in the US was largely responsible, for instance, for media’s complacency with the position taken the Bush Administration. While the US media seems to have drawn some lessons from that, the relative easiness by which political elites managed to "feudalize" the public discourse indicate the presence of a more structural problem involving a questionable relationship between media, business and politics.

To conclude, the reaction to the challenge leveled by the Iraqi crisis to the external identity of the transatlantic security community has caused a serious deformation of the community’s public sphere, especially at the level of will-formation. In so doing, the crisis has placed the legitimacy of the community under serious strains, bringing the community close to a feudalized stage. The subsequent low level of political cooperation among the members of the community, the still positive but cautious confidence in the future of the community, and the continuing atmosphere of distrust among decision-makers tend to confirm the crisis has had a long-term rather than short-term effect on TSC. Fortunately, the prospects of further degradation of the community into an antagonist form are not in sight, unless the ongoing tensions between the United States and Iran would lead to another war. The restoration of the community to its deliberative form requires by necessity a thorough restructuring of its public sphere. In short term, that would involve the development of new deliberative prohibitions concerning the manner in which actors relate to each other. In long-term, the members of the community have to develop a reliable intersubjective definition of the external identity of the TSC.

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22 New York Times and Washington Post both expressed regret for not challenging more vigorously the assertions made by the Bush Administration in the run-up to war; see New York Times (Editors 2004) and Washington Post, (Kurtz 2004).

23 For an insightful view regarding this relationship seen from the perspective of a preeminent political insider, see (Gore 2007).
IV. Conclusions

The argument presented in this paper addressed the issue of the impact of political crises on security communities in general and on the transatlantic community in particular. To this end, the paper proposed an analytical framework based on Jürgen Habermas’ concept of the public sphere. It has been thus argued the legitimacy of security communities is intimately connected to the performance of two critical functions of the public sphere, will- and opinion-formation. The first refers to how political elites take decisions, especially in the security area, while the second function acts as a check on the former by providing a platform for producing political responsiveness and accountability. Deficient functioning of these two components of the public sphere could undermine the legitimacy of the security community by raising doubts regarding its institutional framework and collective identity. The main source of conflict within security communities stems from periodical challenges to their external identity that is, to the role the community is supposed to play in world politics with respect to international order, the use of force, and international organizations. Accordingly, a security community is likely to experience a legitimacy crisis when the opening of its public sphere is not followed by a proper closing process that is, when impulses and potentials released by new political circumstances remain unattached and in disequilibrium from an intersubjective point of view.

The US intervention of Iraq in 2003 served as a case study for testing empirically the validity of this argument. The crisis challenged the transatlantic community to redefine its external identity along a more military assertive role, responsible for protecting international order by taking pre-emptive actions, if necessarily, against terrorist-supporting countries. This attempt ultimately failed, largely because of the deformation of the community’s public sphere under the impact of an abrasive and strategically driven process of will-formation and of a deficient input of opinion-formation. The case study also revealed the precarious situation of the legitimacy of the transatlantic security community in the aftermath of the Iraq war. While the members of the community continue to share dependable expectations of peaceful change, the deformation of the public sphere generated by the crisis has brought TSC close to a feudalized stage characterized by a relatively minimalist agenda of cooperation, positive but reserved confidence in the future of the community, and an atmosphere of distrust among decision-makers. While the possibility of reversing this trend still exists, rising tensions between the United States and Iran could further drive the security community towards an antagonistic form.
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