

Ethnic Diversification and Attitudes of Tolerance in Canada

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Over the past 30 years, increased ethnic diversity due to shifting immigration patterns has been a common experience for many Western countries. Recently, considerable research has explored potential effects of increased ethnic diversification on a variety of political phenomena. Two questions have yet to be sufficiently addressed in the literature. First, research has tended to focus on diversity's impact on the political behaviour of the majority group (usually white, native-born individuals). As a result, little is known about the behaviour of individuals central to ethnic diversification – that is, immigrants and visible minorities. Is the behaviour of these minority individuals similar to majority individuals? Are there important differences that hinge on being a minority? Second, changes in immigration have shown to influence public preferences for social policy and levels of social trust. But how do changes in ethnic diversification affect other aspects of individual attitudes? In particular, how do immigration changes affect opinions on issues related to multicultural societies, such as minority rights, immigrant integration, and the recognition of difference?

This paper addresses these questions with a focus on Canada. Descriptive statistics and OLS regression using Canadian Election Studies (1988-2004) reveal that, on measures of ethnic tolerance, majority and minority opinion does significantly differ according to ethnic identity and country of birth. Moreover, changes in immigration – specifically visible minority immigration – have a negative effect on attitudes of tolerance.

Before reviewing past research, it should be noted that conceptualizing and measuring ethnic diversity presents a challenge. It has been observed that the literature uses a variety of definitions and measurements to tap the complex concept of ethnic diversity. Banting and Kymlicka (2006) note that there is no single term that adequately denotes the ethnic, linguistic, and racial diversity that is often under scrutiny. Moreover, Putnam (2007) rightly posits that diversity is not synonymous with immigration – that is, not all immigrants are visible minorities just as not all visible minorities are immigrants. The various measurements employed (for example, percentage of foreign born or usage of non-official languages) also indicate ambiguous conceptualization. As such, past research has yet to untangle the effects of different minority groups; it is not always clear if visible minorities or immigrants (or visible minority immigrants) are the drivers of observed variance in political behaviour. Since the literature is somewhat vague on these concepts, I approach it on its own terms. Any attempt to untangle ethnic identification from immigrant status, as well as the effects of different types of immigrant intake, is reserved for empirical analysis.

Diversifying Societies and Political Behaviour

A host of research suggests that ethnically diversifying populations have an effect on individual attitudes and behaviour. The direction of this effect, however, is debated. ‘Contact theory’ assumes that increased ethnic diversity exposes the majority group to different minority ethnicities, resulting in decreased ignorance and increased tolerance (Allport 1954; McLaren 2003; Oliver and Wong 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2006; Sigelman and Welch 1993). In contrast, ‘conflict theory’ argues that increased ethnic diversity increases perceived cultural and/or economic competition, resulting in increased ethnic intolerance (Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Brewer and Brown 1998; Taylor 1998).

As Putnam (2007) notes, empirical evidence seems to favour conflict theory. For instance, past work has found a positive relationship between ethnic diversity and

majority prejudice against minority groups (Hood and Morris 1998; Quillian 1995; Pettigrew 1998; Taylor 1998). Evidence also suggests that this prejudice, as well as perceived economic threat, drives negative attitudes towards generous social and immigration policy (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Poterba 1997; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Soroka et al. 2007).¹ Ethnic diversity appears to be associated with less social trust at both the local and national levels, as well (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Delhey and Newton 2005; Rice and Feldman 1997; Soroka et al 2007).

While the evidence suggests that individuals from majority groups tend to be negatively affected by diversity, it is not clear how individuals from minority groups are affected. Indeed, there are good theoretical reasons why minority behaviour may be considerably distinct from majority behaviour (Berry 1991). For instance, Sniderman et al. (1989) assert that politically disadvantaged groups should have a stronger incentive to support the rights claims of an advantaged group compared to the advantaged group's incentives to support the disadvantaged group. Seminal group-position theories of prejudice in sociology have made similar arguments about the desired societal position of one's in-group to other out-groups, resulting in incentives to support or deny the out-group (e.g., Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999).

Several studies in political science have considered attitudinal and opinion gaps on issues central to the ethnic diversity debate. However, their findings are mixed. Citrin et al. (2001) find evidence that whites in Los Angeles are more likely than Hispanics and Asians to think that immigrants push too hard for rights (which evidences theories of differing incentives cited above). Also, Oliver and Wong (2003) find that racially diverse areas in the US, compared to more homogenous areas, decreases racial hostility for whites, blacks, and Hispanics – but not Asians. Other studies of national and local areas, however, have found little evidence of a race or ‘country of birth’ effect for various political attitudes and preferences, regardless of group identity (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Mulder and Krahn 2005). It is possible that the treatment of minority groups as homogenous might be obscuring patterns – for instance, Moghaddam and Taylor (1987) find a gender gap within Canada’s Indian community on the retention of heritage languages. As such, considering possible variation within minority groups is important to consider and will be pursued to a limited extent here.

Several recent comparative studies have addressed the second question in this paper— that is, the effect of immigration changes on political behaviour (e.g., Banting 2005; Soroka et al 2006). These studies do not consider variation of behaviour across different groups; moreover, the analysis is focused on the effect of immigration on welfare policy preferences. Still, their findings offer a critical improvement over past studies. Namely, while past studies have tended to focus on *levels* of immigration as negatively influencing preferences (with mixed success), this recent slate of studies convincingly demonstrates that it is *changes* in immigration that influence preferences. The underlying assumption is that individuals notice changes more than they notice particularly high or low (yet static) phenomena. Translated to the national level, these multicultural welfare studies find that relatively heterogeneous countries are no more challenged in maintaining their welfare regimes than relatively homogeneous countries.

¹ The relationship between prejudice and perceived threat is somewhat vague. Sniderman et al. (2004) suggest an interactive effect – that is, prejudice can increase perceptions of threat, but perceptions of threat can also trigger prejudices.

The challenge comes from larger increases in immigration, regardless of initial diversity. Taking direction from these recent studies, I consider the effect of immigration changes rather than levels on political attitudes.

Data and Analysis

I explore questions of diversifying societies and political behaviour with data from Canada. Canada is a fruitful context for studying ethnic diversity and political behaviour. It has one of the most ethnically diverse populations in the world and has one of the largest immigration intakes. Moreover, Canada has had a multiculturalism policy since the early 1970s; this policy has since expanded into a strong multicultural policy regime (Banting 2005; Banting and Kymlicka 2006). Thus, to examine the relationship between diversifying societies and majority and minority political behaviour, Canada should provide a suitable test.

I use pooled data from the Canadian Election Studies (CES) from 1988-2004. The dataset includes five surveys conducted during Canada's national elections (1988, 1993, 1997, 2000, and 2004). While pooling these data results in approximately 22 400 cases, in reality, my working dataset is much smaller. I depend on the smaller mail back surveys for my dependent variable (discussed next); accounting for the smaller sample, as well as for missing data, the number of cases drops to 4709. Still, this amount is sufficient for empirical analysis.

My dependent variable is an index measuring ethnic tolerance. Attitudes of ethnic tolerance are at the heart of the multiculturalism and diversity debate. Tolerance, or lack thereof, is thought to fundamentally drive the changing policy preferences or social trust observed in other research. For the *Ethnic Tolerance* index, each indicator was selected as a partial measure of the core concept of 'tolerance' towards minorities. By tolerance, I simply mean acceptance of a particular group, and not finding the group objectionable (Sullivan et al. 1981). While it is not clear how minority groups might think about other minorities (that is, do minorities think of themselves or other minorities when being asked about, say, the struggle for minority rights), the index purposely narrows the analytic focus to tolerance of minorities and not simply tolerance in general.

[Table 1 about here]

Ideally, indices built from various data sources have the same indicators for each source. However, only three of the CES surveys (1997, 2000, 2004) have four identical tolerance indicators. Fortunately, the other two surveys have either part of this main battery or plausible surrogates. Table 1 contains the survey items included in the index for each year. I included a variety of indicators to mitigate any possible effects of question word priming. For example, it was important to have questions that specifically mentioned 'immigrants' or 'minorities', as well as questions that did not. Moreover, both positive and negative toned questions were included. I recoded the indicators so that high scores represented high tolerance. These scores were summed and then divided by the number of indicators in the index. Thus, *Ethnic Tolerance* ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating high ethnic tolerance.²

² The index was correlated with similar data from Environics for the same period to see if observed variance was simply due to changes in index indicators. The Environics data indicator is "How important are the following to Canadian identity: very important, somewhat important, not very important or not at all important? Multiculturalism." For the period in question, the index and the Environics indicator sufficiently correlated at $r=.65$. Environics Focus Canada (1985-2003) data was supplied by the Canadian

My independent variables measure ethnic and immigrant sub-groups, as well as changes in immigration. For the former, I combined the standard CES measures of ethnic identity and country of birth. I employ both measures to untangle the potentially independent effects of ethnicity and immigrant status – something previous studies have tended not to do. The ethnic identity question (which asks respondents to which ethnic group they belong³) is transformed into a dichotomous variable. Thus, 1 represents respondents who identified with non-visible ('white') ethnicities and 0 represents respondents who identified with visible ethnicities. The country of birth variable was also recoded as a dichotomous for respondents born in Canada (1) and respondents born elsewhere (0). After creating the dichotomies, I combined them to make four distinct ethnic variables. In other words, I generated variables for *White Canadian-Born* (n=5875), *Visible Minority Canadian-Born* (n=125), *White Foreign-Born* (n=629), and *Visible Minority Foreign-Born* (n=139).

In terms of analytic expectations, it is unclear whether visible minorities (native- or foreign-born) are more or less tolerant than their white counterparts. As mentioned, Sniderman et al.'s (1989) work suggests that the former should be more tolerant than the latter. However, it might be true that, since visible minority immigrants tend to come from less democratic (and presumably less tolerant) societies, they may be less tolerant regardless of the incentives created by their weaker societal position in the host country (as Sniderman et al. would predict).⁴

The second question I address is the effect of changes in immigration on ethnic tolerance. While previous studies that test changes in immigration tend to focus on immigration in general, my measure is slightly different. It narrows the focus to changes in visible minority immigration, rather than total immigration. The categorization of visible and non-visible source countries certainly does not perfectly capture the concept (e.g. not all immigrants from the UK are 'white'), but the measure uses the data as it is. Thus, as immigrants from, say, China or Iran increase as a percentage of Canada's total population, the measure increases. An important goal of the measure is to separate the effects of visible minority immigration from immigration in general – again, something that past research tends not to do. This separation is important since racially intolerant individuals may react differently to visible minority immigrants as compared to white immigrants.

Opinion Research Archive. I also ran the regression analysis without the 1988 data – the most problematic year. The results were similar, suggesting again that the differing index indicators are not influencing the analysis.

³ In some surveys, the respondent is prodded with another identity question if she answers "Canadian" to the first. Importantly, this question might identify more visible minority respondents. However, it is not in all surveys. To see if the prompt is important, I created two ethnic identity dichotomies with the 2004 CES data; one included the prompt and one did not. Including the prompt increased visible minorities from 6.7% to 7.6% of the total sample – or less than 1%. Moreover, the dichotomies produced similar results in regression analysis. Thus, while there are good measurement reasons to include the follow-up indicator generally, I choose to exclude it to enhance the comparability of the different surveys.

⁴ This is assuming that if non-white countries, on average, are less tolerant than their white counter parts, then immigrants from those countries are representative of this average, which may not be the case. This issue, while interesting, is not pursued here.

I obtained national immigration data from Citizenship and Immigration Canada Annual Reports.⁵ For the immigration change measure, I summed the number of immigrants from non-white countries and divided the result by the total population. Changing this measure of immigrant *levels* to *changes* simply meant subtracting the percentage of the previous year from the current year. Finally, the measures were averaged for the inter-election period, including the election year, resulting in one value per survey year.

[Figure 1 and 2 about here]

I begin the analysis with some descriptives to give a sense of the data. Figure 1 plots the mean of the dependent variable over the period. The high point of the series is in 1988 with the mean score of *Ethnic Tolerance* being .59. The series dips in the 1990s and then recovers somewhat in 2000. The gap between the highest and lowest index score is only .13; however, a general U-shaped pattern of ethnic tolerance responses is clear. More revealing is Figure 2, which disaggregates the *Ethnic Tolerance* series into different ethnic and immigrant groups. The figure suggests that native-born whites native-born visible minorities, foreign-born whites, and foreign-born visible minorities have different attitudes towards minorities. The differences in each of the four series reflect Sniderman et al.'s predictions about differing incentives – visible minority respondents tend to be more tolerant than white respondents; the same is true for foreign-born respondents when compared to native-born respondents. Note, as well, the spatial ordering. Ethnicity appears to have more of an effect than immigrant status – in other words, visible minority Canadians tend to be more tolerant than white immigrants. Surprisingly, the four series tend to move together closely over time. A Cronbach's alpha measure of .71 for the four series indicates how tight this movement is (1 is perfect correlation). Also, the series are positively correlated (ranging from .2 for visible minority Canadians and visible minority immigrants to .86 for white Canadians and white immigrants). The close movement indicates that the groups may be reacting to pressures in a similar manner. If the pressure is, in fact, ethnic diversification, then the similar movement is surprising. It is not intuitive that minorities and majorities would similarly respond to pressures if ethnic or immigrant group differences characterize that particular pressure.

[Figure 3 about here]

Figure 3 overlays the series measuring changes in the percentage of visible minority immigrants compared to the national population (using the secondary y-axis). This new series correlates both positively and negatively with the ethnic and immigrant combination variables (e.g., changes in visible minority immigration correlates with the visible minority foreign series at .82; it correlates with the white foreign series at -.34). The alpha also drops to .23. Thus, while Figure 2 reveals relatively clear (though not

⁵ Future analysis should consider local levels of immigration data. For instance, past work has shown that neighborhood level diversity has an impact on attitudes and preferences (e.g. Alesina et al. 1999; Soroka et al. 2007). Moreover, knowledge of changing immigration patterns may be different at the local, as opposed to national, level (e.g., knowledge of local diversity may be more experiential whereas national require more sophisticated attentiveness). Unfortunately, local data were not available here. I tested provincial level data and found little difference with the national data. I also interacted political knowledge with the immigration variables to see if the influence of immigration changes was being driven by knowledge and not ethnic identity or country origin. The interactions had no effect. As such, I use national immigration data as a suitable, if not ideal, measure.

causal) relationships between the variables, Figure 3 is much more vague; it is difficult to identify particular patterns between changes in visible minority immigration and ethnic tolerance scores of the various survey groups.

Regression analysis should illuminate any potential relationship between changes in visible minority immigration, belonging to ethnic or immigrant groups, and ethnic tolerance. I employ OLS regression of the individual-level data to test the effect of 1) a respondent's ethnicity and country of birth on their ethnic tolerance scores, and 2) changes in visible minority immigration patterns on tolerance scores. Along with these primary independent variables, I add standard socio-demographic and political control variables shown to influence political behaviour. Specifically, I add sex, region, income, prospective vote, Catholic religion, English-speaker, age, education, and political knowledge. The knowledge variable is an index of the knowledge indicators included in the various CES surveys. While the CES does not have a standard battery of knowledge indicators, previous studies using multiple CES surveys have used both general knowledge questions and interviewer assessment for a reasonable, cross-survey measure (e.g., Bittner 2007; Matthews 2005; see appendix for index construction).

I also add a few controls that are particular to the question at hand. First, I add a measure of changes in total immigration, rather than just visible minority immigration. The variable controls for the possibility that measures of tolerance are directed towards immigrants in general, whether visible minority or not. I also add two measures of personal income perception (retrospective and prospective) and two measures of national economic perception (again, retrospective and prospective); high scores indicate negative perception.⁶ These measures control for the possibility that ethnic intolerance is driven by economic insecurity rather than something specific to ethnic group identification. As mentioned, perception of economic threat is thought influence intolerance; thus, these controls are important.⁷ I also add a measure of attitudes towards women to assess if tolerance towards one minority group is associated with tolerance towards another minority group.⁸ In other words, controlling attitudes towards women will test if values on the dependent variable are simply being driven by a broader attitude of tolerance.

[Table 2 about here]

The first model in Table 2 shows the OLS regression results without interactions, clustered by election year (which adjusts the standard errors to reflect contemporaneous correlation in the error term). The ethnic group variables, compared to white Canadians, have a positive and statistically significant effect on ethnic tolerance index scores. In other words, as Figure 2 indicated, Canadian-born visible minorities, foreign-born visible minorities, and foreign-born whites tend to score higher on the ethnic tolerance index

⁶ The questions are 1) Financially, are you better off, worse off, or about the same as a year ago? 2) Do you think that a year from now you will be better off financially, worse off, or about the same as now? 3) Over the past year, has Canada's economy gotten better, gotten worse, or stayed about the same? 4) What about the next 12 months? Will Canada's economy get better, get worse, or stay about the same? Each question has been recoded into three categories and so they run from better (low) to worse (high).

⁷ Theories of economic threats and intolerance argue that *perception*, and not necessarily *reality*, of threat drives the effect; thus, including objective economic indicators (such as changes in unemployment rates) are not necessary.

⁸ The question is "How much do you think should be done for women? Much more, somewhat more, about the same as now, somewhat less, or much less?" I recoded responses into three ordinal categories with the highest score indicating "more".

than white Canadians, all else equal (.11, .17 and .06, respectively). For instance, if a white Canadian scored .5 on the index, a visible minority born outside of Canada might be expected to score around .67. The order of the ethnic groups reflects the spatial ordering already observed in Figures 2 and 3: foreign-born visible minorities tend to be the most tolerant of other ethnic and immigrant groups, with Canadian-born visible minorities and foreign-born whites scoring in descending order.

Importantly, the effect of changes in visible minority immigration is significant and in the expected direction. Namely, a unit increase in visible minority immigrant intake results in a .49 decrease in ethnic tolerance. To note, it is unrealistic to think about whole percentage point shifts in visible minority immigration – Figure 3 reveals that the largest shift is around .29. In fact, substantive interpretation of this variable only makes sense with the second model that includes interactions. Still, we can note the direction of the effect in the first model. The negative sign reflects the literature that evidences a negative effect of immigration changes on preferences for redistribution or social trust. Interestingly, total changes of immigration appear to *positively* influence ethnic tolerance scores (.44). The contrast of this coefficient with the negative effect of visible minority immigration changes certainly deserves further study.

Notably, the two income and two economic variables do not appear to have an effect on ethnic tolerance. As such, a common source of ethnic intolerance – perceived economic threat – is eliminated for the current context. The rest of the socio-demographic and political controls affirm expectations. For instance, more politically knowledgeable and educated respondents tend to be more tolerant. This relationship is also true for respondents who believe that more should be done for women, suggesting that tolerance towards one “minority” is linked with tolerance to other minorities. Women in general have higher ethnic tolerance scores than men, and the older the respondent, the less tolerant (though the effect is small). Being Catholic or not does not seem to have an effect on tolerance scores. Intended vote choice is compared to Liberal voters. The effects are generally as expected – as compared to Liberal voters, right-wing voters tend to be less tolerant and left-wing voters tend to be more tolerant (though it is unclear why Bloc voters tend to be less tolerant). Finally, the region variables, compared to Ontario, are positively associated with the dependent variable (though the Prairies variable is not significant).

As a final test, I add interactions to the model to see if changes in visible minority immigration affect the ethnic groups differently. It might be the case that visible minority respondents react to changes in visible minority immigration differently than white respondents. It is also possible that immigrant respondents (visible minority or white) will react differently to immigration changes than native-born respondents. The third column in Table 2 suggests that the influence of changes in visible minority immigration only affects foreign-born visible minorities differently than the other groups (.47). I employ Stata’s lincom function to get a sense of the effect of plausible immigration changes on this particular survey group. For instance, a .1 percentage point increase in visible minority immigrants (a more realistic number than the whole percentage point represented in model 1) tends to result in a .13 decrease in ethnic tolerance for foreign-born visible minorities, all else equal (SE=.075). Compare this result to the .19 point drop for white Canadians (SE=.08). A .2 point *decrease* in visible minority immigrants is associated with a .26 increase in tolerance for visible minority

immigrant respondents ($SE=.15$) and a .38 increase for white Canadians ($SE=.16$). Thus, it does appear that, for at least these two groups, changes in visible minority immigration not only influences tolerance, but influences tolerance differently.

Discussion

This analysis is an attempt to understand the implications of ethnically diversifying societies. Clearly, the results presented are only a small piece in a complex puzzle. Still, they provide some answers to questions at the heart of the immigration and multicultural debate. First, how might individuals outside the majority ethnic group think about immigration and identity issues? My analysis indicates that not only do these minority groups have different attitudes towards immigrants, minority rights, etc., but that they tend to be more tolerant than the majority group (at least in Canada). However, given that the attitudinal gap is small, and that respondents tended to be tolerant in general, there is room for optimism.

The analysis also indicates that, similar to findings elsewhere, changes in immigration tends to have a negative impact on ethnic tolerance. Importantly, my findings suggest that it is a subset of immigration intake – immigrants from non-white countries – that seems to drive this negative effect. Moreover, certain respondents from particular ethnic and country of origin groupings (i.e., visible minority immigrants) appear to react differently to these changes. These two observations indicate that future work should heed potential variation in the effects of immigration changes and in the response of individuals to these changes.

There are still unanswered questions. A pressing one is the lack of a causal mechanism. That is, what is it precisely about belonging to a particular ethnic and/or immigrant group that influences ethnic tolerance? Are higher tolerance scores for visible minority respondents due to a stronger empathy towards other minorities as compared to white respondents? Or, instead of empathy, are visible minorities simply using their own in-group as a reference point when answering questions about issues such as minority rights and integration? Is the same true for immigrants and non-immigrants? Also, exactly how do changes in visible minority immigration affect tolerance? Levels of knowledge have already been ruled out as a possible mediator. So, how are individuals getting information about immigration changes? Would local statistics reveal a different story? These are all questions for future research. The analysis presented here has hopefully answered a few questions about the impact of diversifying societies on individual attitudes of both majority and minority groups.

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Appendix: Knowledge Index Indicators

1997, 2000, and 2004: Index built by summing correct responses and divided by number of indicators per survey.

1993: Respondent provided a score based on the interviewer assessment.

1988: Respondent provided a score based on reported interest in the federal election campaign.

2004

Do you happen to recall the name of the Premier of your Province?

Do you happen to recall the name of the Minister of Finance of Canada?

Do you happen to recall the name of the British Prime Minister?

Do you happen to recall the name of the female cabinet minister who ran against Paul Martin for the leadership of the Liberal Party?

2000

Do you happen to recall the name of the Premier of your Province?

Do you happen to recall the name of the Minister of Finance of Canada?

Do you happen to recall the name of the Prime Minister of Canada at the time of the Free Trade Agreement with the United States?

And do you happen to know the capital of the United States?

1997

Do you happen to recall the name of the Premier of your Province?

Do you happen to recall the name of the Minister of Finance of Canada?

Do you recall the name of the first woman to be Prime Minister of Canada?

Do you happen to recall the name of the President of the United States?

1993

Knowledge level assigned by interviewer at time of interview on a scale from 1-5 (high being high knowledge).

1988

Would you say that you are very interested, fairly interested, not very interested, or not at all interested in the campaign?

Table 1: Ethnic Minority Tolerance Index Indicators

Survey Year	Indicator
2004	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. Minority groups need special rights. Immigration makes an important contribution to this country. Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society.
2000	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. Minority groups need special rights. Immigration makes an important contribution to this country. Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society.
1997	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. Minority groups need special rights. Immigration makes an important contribution to this country. Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society.
1993	We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. Ethnic minority influence: more or less than now. ⁹ Feel about immigrants. Too many recent immigrants just don't want to fit into Canadian society.
1988	Feel about ethnic minorities. New immigrants make Canada a better place. Canada should encourage immigration that is like us.

⁹ I combined two indicators for this question. The original indicators ask respondents to place on a 1 to 10 scale: 1) how much influence ethnic minorities have, and 2) how much influence ethnic minorities *should* have. I then subtracted these scores, producing a measure of whether the respondent thought ethnic minorities should have more, the same, or less influence.

Figure 1: Mean Aggregate Score of Ethnic Minority Tolerance Index




Figure 2: Mean Score of Ethnic Minority Tolerance Index by Ethnicity and Place of Birth




Figure 3: Mean Score of Ethnic Minority Tolerance Index by Ethnicity and Place of Birth with Changes in Visible Minority Immigrant Intake




Table 2: The Influence of Ethnicity, Place of Birth, and Changes in Immigration Intake on Ethnic Minority Tolerance

	Dependent Variable: Ethnic Minority Tolerance Index	
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)
Visible Minority Canadian-born	0.112 (0.020)***	0.110 (0.022)***
Visible Minority Foreign-born	0.166 (0.043)**	0.155 (0.033)***
White Foreign-born	0.059 (0.008)***	0.061 (0.008)***
Visible Minority Immigration Changes	-0.485 (0.068)***	-0.489 (0.071)***
Visible Minority Canadian*Immigration		0.064 (0.070)
Visible Minority Foreign*Immigration		0.468 (0.142)**
White Foreign*Immigration		-0.032 (0.043)
Total Immigration Changes	0.443 (0.079)***	0.442 (0.080)***
Retrospective Income	-0.014 (0.014)	-0.014 (0.014)
Prospective Income	-0.002 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.005)
Retrospective Economy	-0.027 (0.015)	-0.027 (0.014)
Prospective Economy	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)
Knowledge	0.118 (0.022)***	0.119 (0.021)***
Done for Women	0.077 (0.016)***	0.077 (0.016)***
Education	0.093 (0.009)***	0.093 (0.009)***
Catholic	-0.022 (0.011)	-0.022 (0.011)
Income	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Women	0.024 (0.004)***	0.024 (0.004)***
Age	-0.001 (0.000)*	-0.001 (0.000)
English	0.023 (0.014)	0.023 (0.014)
Conservative	-0.053 (0.011)***	-0.053 (0.011)***
NDP	0.041 (0.023)	0.041 (0.022)
Reform/Alliance	-0.168 (0.015)***	-0.168 (0.015)***
BQ	-0.043 (0.018)*	-0.043 (0.018)*
Other Party	0.003 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)
Undecided	-0.030 (0.021)	-0.030 (0.021)
Maritimes	0.051 (0.021)*	0.051 (0.020)*
Quebec	0.048	0.049

Prairies	(0.019)*	(0.019)*
	0.015	0.015
	(0.014)	(0.014)
BC	0.039	0.039
	(0.018)*	(0.017)*
Constant	0.147	0.147
	(0.072)	(0.071)
Observations	4709	4709
R-squared	0.16	0.16

Cells contain OLS regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses

* p < .1 ** p <.05 *** p <.001