Development @ 50: what prospects for the South by 2020?

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The half-century of ‘development’ policies, agencies & studies has produced very mixed results. It has also been marked by a proliferation of both state & non-state institutions & range of increasingly interdisciplinary as well as transnational issues, especially in the ‘global South’. This paper reflects on such ‘new’ factors & forces, especially emerging economies – BRICs or BRICSAM - & developmental states, small/fragile states like SIDS, political economy of conflict & R2P, ‘global’ civil society including myriad diasporas, Southern multinational companies, climate change & Southern analytic & policy networks, including the Kimberley Process: is the erstwhile South-North begin superseded by South-East axis (Martin 2008)? Does ‘African’ IR pose lessons for the rest of the world? Does ‘Caribbean Dependency Thought’ still retain relevance? ‘Development studies’ is not only the areas of research, teaching & policy which needs to take such ‘inconvenient’ issues into account; amongst others, business & security studies are equally in need of an upgrade. Novel networks amongst heterogeneous actors may advance revisionism to animate alternative visions by the end of the second decade of the new century?

'The illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people & money is booming. Like the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits government against agile, stateless & resourceful networks empowered by globalization.' (Naim 2003: 29)

'Fragile states cannot or will not deliver what citizens need to live decent secure lives. They cannot or will not tackle poverty. As such, they significantly reduce the likelihood of the world meeting the MDGs by 2015...

There are wider reasons why we need to work better in fragile states. They are more likely to become unstable, to destabilise their neighbours, to create refugee flows, to spread disease & to be bases for terrorists.' (DFID 2005a: 5)

'The Secretary-General fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The threats to peace & security in the 21st century include not just international wars...but...organized crime & civil violence. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease & environmental degradation...Collective security today depends on accepting that the threats each region of the world perceives as most urgent are in fact equally so for all.' (UN 2005: 3)

This paper seeks to identify & contrast a set of contemporary ‘global’ issues that have led to a range of novel assumptions & approaches to international relations/projections, especially to a set of global coalitions seeking to ameliorate them: what is ‘development’
@ 50? I assume that these hold relevance to both recent & current analyses/discourses. These span the ‘emerging economies’ (BRICs) - ‘fragile state’ divide, which is itself a central aspect of any new trio of ‘worlds’. In part, I am responding to Bill Martin’s (2008) provocative yet timely suggestion that the central North-South axis is being replaced by one that is South-East! I have also been both encouraged & challenged by a pair of review articles which have appeared towards the start of the present century on ‘African’ international relations which seek to learn about & from the continent in terms of a range of new actors, analyses, issues & policies (Brown 2006, Lemke 2003); ie ‘Africa’ is not marginal in such ‘worlds’ but rather central: hence its heuristic contribution to today’s ‘new’ international relations (Dunn & Shaw 2001).

As indicated in the first quotation above, the highly uneven incidence & impact of 'globalizations' has led to a proliferation of pressing ‘global’ issues: child labor/soldiers, drugs, forced migration, fundamentalisms, global warming, mafias, money-laundering, small arms, terrorism etc (UN 2004). It has also generated a range of international actors & networks, so opening-up space for novel forms of ‘mixed-actor coalitions’ as over landmines & conflict diamonds: salient aspects of foreign policy governance by non-state as well as state & inter-state actors (Conflict, Security & Development 2004, Hubert 2000, Keating & Knight 2004, McRae & Hubert 2001, Ramsbottom, Bah & Calder 2005). Some of these atypical responses include the EU too (see parallel citation re China at end, middle p 13), leading Michael Smith (2003: 340) to suggest that:

the EU (is) a major contributor to global governance, encouraging the building of transnational networks & providing a model of continuous negotiation that is one way of coping with the emergence of a global political economy.

Here I go beyond well-established, relatively successful cases of coalition attention/formation/activism, like the Ottawa & Kimberley Processes, to the more intractable instances like child soldiers or small arms, as well as SIDS & the ICC (on the ICC & Uganda see Allen 2006), in addition to recognizing less high profile issues such as EITI, Commission for Africa & the Commonwealth. These inform my case studies on the relatively established but somewhat lagging SIDS (www.sidsnet.org) & the more recent & efficacious Kimberley Process (www.pacweb.org). The recent BICC Brief on ‘The Business of Private, Public & Civil Actors in Zones of Conflict’ (Boge et al 2006) is instructive as it juxtaposes the emerging & usually isolated genres of ‘corporate social responsibility’ & ‘the political economy of conflict’ with codes of conduct for resource extraction companies in fragile states (cf Therien & Pouliot 2006 on the UN Global Compact).

In turn, then, I seek to begin to abstract a parsimonious set of factors which might begin to explain why some global issues attract notice & generate continuing responses – eg Ottawa & Kimberley Processes - whereas others languish without significant or proportional analytic or political attention – eg child soldiers & small arms (see iii) below). In so doing, I attempt to develop the comparative framework proposed by Don Hubert & cited at the start of section iii) below, though I am less state-centric & more
pro-INGO than him. Whilst he privileges state & inter-state agencies, I would tend to place more attention on contexts, scale & eminent advocates:

a) from bipolar to post-bipolar, pre-9/11 to post-9/11 plus pre-7/7 to post 7/7 along with distinctive crises such as the Iraq & Afghanistan syndromes;
b) whether the issue generates an extensive coalition in terms of numbers & diversity of associates, especially whether the corporate sector is engaged or not; for example, the World Commission on Dams was the first such global commission to bring companies as well as NGOs & governments to the table;
c) given the influence of global media: does the issue attract the attention & support of global icons, such as Princess Diana around landmines or Bono & Geldof re Africa leading to (RED) AmEx cards (www.americanexpress.com) etc (cf Cooper 2007 on global stars & public diplomacy); &
d) ‘sub-prime’ financial crisis at the end of the first decade of the 21st century: US decline & BRIC ascendancy, facilitated or exacerbated by prospects of ‘decoupling’: a conjuncture indeed?

And I weave the case(s?) of Uganda throughout as its division into at least two parts - ‘developmental state’ in the South, especially West, & ‘fragile state’ if not failed state in the North (Shaw 2006c)? – poses challenges to policy-making for governance in the security & development nexus, R2P, ICC (Allen 2006), Commission for Africa, Commonwealth(s) etc as indicated in the following sections….even if as a land-locked state it has some different interests from the SIDS.

A final strand derives from the burgeoning BRICs/emerging economies & more established NICs/developmental state perspectives which now impact Africa both directly as trade & investment (Broadman 2007, Wild & Mepham 2006) & indirectly as policy model (Mbabazi & Taylor 2005, Shaw 2006c, Southall 2006). The former means that some African energy & mineral-exporting economies are booming mid-decade; and the latter suggests that the continent might yet include a minority of developmental rather than fragile states. In short, ‘African’ IR/PE is not only informal and/or illegal; it is also characterized by high rates of growth as well as distinctive conflicts, themselves often ‘wars’ around resources.

The emerging 'global governance' approach to analysis is insightful in regard to 'new multilateralisms' but tends to lag behind public policy around the shift around the BRICs from N-S to S-E etc. The foreign policy agenda in the UK as elsewhere in the EU/OECD in the 21st century is increasingly set by think tanks (eg FPC & IPPR in the UK) & global agencies rather than by national politicians or international scholars. Such a trend reinforces the development of ‘public diplomacy’ by leading foreign offices in the OECD states (Copeland 2005, Potter 2002): the collaborative activities of state & non-state actors in advancing national as well as human security (or brand) (cf controversial historical & conceptual overview by MacFarlane & Khong 2006).

i) Global governance
The contemporary global governance genre has evolved out of the earlier more formal & inter-state international law/organization perspective which also consists of advocacy as well as analysis (Therien & Pouliot 2006); like them, it has its roots in early ‘post-war’ decolonization/ multilateralism etc as captured by UN Intellectual History Project (UNIHP) (Jolly, Emmerij & Weiss 2005) (cf MacFarlane & Khong 2006). Like 'new multilateralisms', rather than the ‘old’ multilateralism of states alone, it embraces a catholic range of heterogeneous actors in addition to a wide variety of 'states', including failing and/or failed (Dunn & Shaw 2001). One of the leading scholars in the field of globalization studies, Anthony McGrew (2005: 25) defines:

'Global Governance: the evolving system of (formal & informal) political coordination - across multiple levels from the local to the global - amongst public authorities (states & IGOs) & private agencies (NGOs & corporate actors) seeking to realize common purposes or resolve collective problems through the making & implementing of global or transnational norms, rules, programmes & policies.'

Another of its leading advocates, albeit with a more international development/ organization orientation, Tom Weiss (2000: 810) similarly characterizes it:

'Global governance implies a wide & seemingly ever-growing range of actors in every domain. Global economic & social affairs have traditionally been viewed as embracing primarily intergovernmental relationships, but increasingly they must be framed in comprehensive enough terms to embrace local & international NGOs, grassroots & citizen's movements, multinational corporations & the global capital market.'

Weiss identifies a spectrum of emphases depending on analytic perspective or institutional connection - from global to good & onto humane governance emphases - his overview taking the Commission on Global Governance (1995) - Our Global Neighborhood - into account but preceding that on Human Security (UN 2003). He includes but does not overly advance UN & World Bank approaches. By contrast, Jean-Philippe Therien (1999: 725) privileges but three perspectives to world poverty, which could also be extended to governance with other focii - traditional North-South approach, Bretton Woods paradigm & UN paradigm - as he suggests himself:

'In explaining the differences between the Bretton Woods paradigm & the UN paradigm, this article seeks to contribute to a better knowledge of the dynamics of multilateralism & global governance...as the struggle against poverty is central to any strategy aiming to promote human security...'.

In reality, of course, all three approaches evolve over time & there may also be distinctions between, say, IMF & IBRD or UNDP & UNICEF emphases within the Bretton Woods & UN paradigms, respectively. We could also, perhaps, identify a further ‘NGO’ or civil society approach, though again it'd be rather heterogeneous given the rather broad spectrum of constituencies, concerns & preferences among myriad international, intermediate & indigenous NGOs & social movements globally.
Finally, Robert O'Brien *et al* (2000: 2-6) focus on the relations between the Bretton Woods institutions & global civil society, suggesting that this encounter has served to transform global economic governance in the direction of greater plurality, what they call 'complex multilateralism'. The 'old' multilateralism was more exclusive, top-down & state-centric. They conclude that:

'...complex multilateralism is...broadening ...the policy agenda to include more social issues. Multilateralism is complicated not just because there are more actors, but become some of these actors are pressing for a new agenda.' (O'Brien *et al* 2000: 210)

This paper assumes that such approaches present implications for global issues & policies, constituting frameworks by which responsive, mixed actor coalitions can be generated which advance such causes internationally but outside established inter-governmental institutions: from Ottawa & Kimberley Processes to ICC & onto small arms etcetera. The new global policy context? Such a promising perspective – co-regulation? - has been recently outlined in an original juxtaposition of the political economy of resource conflict with corporate social responsibility/certification/regulations etc by analysts at the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) (Boge 2006)

**ii) Security & Development**

*The focus of the new security concerns is not the threat of traditional interstate wars but the fear of underdevelopment as a source of conflict, criminalized activity & international instability.*' (Duffield 2001: 7)

In the last decade of the last century, the dominant discourse around 'new wars' had become 'the political economy of conflict' - greed and/or grievance especially around resources like diamonds, gold & oil but also coltan & tropical timber (see iv) below) - as captured in a) the pioneering work of Will Reno (1999), in not only very difficult but also increasingly dangerous environments, & b) the original juxtaposition by Mark Duffield of the analyses/literatures/debates about 'development' on the one had & 'security' on the other; hitherto two distinct 'solitudes'. Certainly the case of Uganda at both national & regional levels is instructive even illuminating (Shaw 2006c, Shaw & Mbabazi 2007).

But, by the start of the new millennium, only momentarily diverted by 9/11, this began to be superceded, at least in the world of donor policy, by the explicit juxtaposition, even integration, of 'conflict/security & development' (DFID 2005b) along the lines anticipated by Duffield *et al* (*Conflict, Security & Development* 2004). From a concern with security sector reform (OECD) this determination to connect these two genres mutated not only into 'fragile states' (DFID 2005a) but also into 'difficult environments' (DFID), 'difficult partnerships' (OECD), 'investing in prevention/stability' (UK 2005), 'low-income countries under stress' (IBRD), Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (UK), 'weak states' (Center for Global Development) etc, with NGO coalitions like BOND (2003) in the UK (over 275 British Overseas NGOs for Development) being very active in helping to formulate acceptable policy in this not uncontroversial area (www.bond.org.uk). And BICC has now proposed ‘co-regulation’ amongst a range of compatible yet
heterogeneous actors particularly corporate & civil society responses to resource conflicts (Boge 2006)

Likewise, the EU, with especial relevance for ESRC & GARNET research project networks, continues to ponder the degree to which its collective 'foreign policy' - the erstwhile & problematic 'Common' Foreign & Security Policy' (CFSP) - should be compatible with a broad or narrow human security orientation (BOND 2003, Kaldor & Glasius 2005, MacFarlane & Khong 2006). Some think tanks certainly advance such an orientation or direction (Biscop 2004, Eide 2004) but there are many established interests, particularly in 'old' rather than 'new' Europe, who so oppose. Hence the intensity of the debate, especially for armies & NGOs, around EU peace-making operations & support to the AU for Darfur through its novel (& not uncontroversial) African Peace Facility (APF) (Ramsbottom, Bah & Calder 2005).

The European debate about 'security' at the policy level reflects a profound discourse at the more abstract, analytic level between 'old' & 'new' security although, of course, these 'levels' are inseparable in reality. The 'new' security perspective is more interdisciplinary & non-state in inclination, recognizing the irreversible character of globalization; ie more compatible with human than national security (UN 2003). Such a post-realist pro-human approach became more feasible with the end of the state-centric bipolar nuclear Cold War (Shaw 2006b). But it took the UNDP (1994) to popularize it before the middle of the last decade of the 20th century (MacLean, Black & Shaw 2006). It was subsequently developed & reinforced through its espousal by inter alia Canada's Foreign Minster, Lloyd Axworthy, especially his advocacy of the anti-landmine treaty, the erstwhile 'Ottawa Process' (Hubert 2000, McRae & Hubert 2001). In turn, the embryonic human security network of the mid-1990s led to ICISS (2001) before the end of the century, even if its report - 'the responsibility to protect' as a generic framework through which to respond to new security challenges? - was overshadowed by 9/11.

The 'responsibility to protect' (ICISS 2001) (R2P) represents an attempt to go beyond state-centrism & orthodox security towards a redefinition of 'humanitarian intervention' in a world where a significant proportion of states cannot really advance their citizens' development or security, as in Darfur, Rwanda & Uganda:

'Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.' (ICISS 2001: xi)

Whilst the horrors of 9/11 then 7/7 & the subsequent 'war on terrorism' diverted attention away from ICISS, its underlying theme of structural violence, arising from uneven globalization, is increasingly salient, as reflected in the UN (2004) High-level Panel on global security. Its suggestions for 'A More Secure World' were followed by the Secretary-General's (UN 2005a: 11)) ready endorsement:
'The threats are from non-State actors as well as States, and to human security as well as State security...

The central challenge for the twenty-first century is to fashion a new & broader understanding …of what collective security means…'

'The Secretary-General fully embraces a broad vision of collective security. The threats to peace & security in the 21" century include not just international wars…but…organized crime & civil violence. They also include poverty, deadly infectious disease & environmental degradation.'

In turn, there is an ongoing, lively, albeit somewhat 'Canadian' (Keating & Knight 2004, MacLean, Black & Shaw 2006), debate over whether human security means the narrower conceptualization of 'freedom from fear' or the broader more cosmopolitan notion of 'freedom from want', embracing cultural, ecological, gender, health & related freedoms & rights (contrast Andrew Mack, Lloyd Axworthy & Don Hubert among the 21 contributions to the compilation by Burgess & Owen (2004)). The long-anticipated Human Security Report (2005) from the Canadian Consortium on Human Security & the Liu Institute for Global Issues at UBC emphasizes the narrower formulation (cf MacLean, Black & Shaw 2006 and Shaw 2006b for overviews of the first decade of ‘human security’).

Finally, an interesting & not insignificant debate is emerging over why some new global issues get attention leading to efficacious global coalitions & negotiations, as in the Ottawa & Kimberley Processes (McRae & Hubert, 2001) treated in the next section iii), by contrast to the stalled efforts over, say, equally (?) compelling child soldiers, explosive remnants of war (ERW) (www.theworkcontinues.org) & small arms nexuses (Hubert 2000)? Such comparative lessons might inform British advocacy around 2005 G8/EU leadership roles of relatively novel issues like ethical trade, transparency etc, to which we turn below before looking at a somewhat broader, yet unilateral, initiative arising from the UK’s mid-decade roles - the year-long Commission for Africa – which has also served to inform the UK’s consultation into ODA policy in 2006 (DFID 2006); ie issues & responses out of Africa?

iii) Ottawa & Kimberley Processes, ICC & EITI

'...while much of the credit for the successful banning of landmines has deservedly gone to the ICBL & to NGO advocates, the success of the campaign can be explained only through an examination of three other sets of actors: the ICRC, the UN, and key government…a model for effective humanitarian advocacy is emerging with three broad dimensions. They are the pursuit of stringent standards with widespread but not necessarily universal support; political coalition building among NGOs, states & international organizations; & negotiating environments that allow for voting rather then consensus decision-making, access for NGOs & the selection of a supportive chairperson.’ (Hubert 2000: xviii)
This part seeks to investigate why the Ottawa & Kimberley Processes rather than ICC let alone small arms & child soldiers campaigns achieved momentum & some degree of attention & resolution as policy directions for global to local state & non-state actors? Similarly, why SIDS seemed to have peaked at the turn of the century, only to be revived by the postponed Mauritius Barbados +10 conference of early-2005, following the terrible South Asian ‘regional’ tsunami of end-2004 (www.sidsnet.org).

As indicated at p 2 above, central amongst contemporary global issues are landmines & conflict diamonds. And the question of corruption through resource revenues from oil & gas etc is also increasingly telling. The first two focii arose from non-state actor coalitions - eg ICBL & PAC, respectively - advocating their resolution (Hubert 2000). By contrast, the last is more a function of the Blair regime in its second term, and its association with UK/EU multinationals, albeit encouraged by a significant NGO lobby plus resource conflict in many sources of such energy & commodities; instances of 'security/conflict & development' analyzed above in ii). En route, we also touch on the mixed results to date arising from the establishment of the ICC & its initial problematic, marginal effects, as indicated in the case of Uganda in Tim Allen’s (2006) new monograph.

Given the legacy of empire, now metamorphosed into distinctive globalization facilitated by the anglophone Commonwealth connection (see v) below), many energy & mining companies have roots in Australia, Canada & South Africa with headquarters in Britain; hence the genesis of EITI. Together this trio of ongoing processes is helping to further define & effect contemporary global governance even though other equally deserving global issues (eg Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) as advanced by the Diana Fund (www.theworkcontinues.org)) have yet to escape such informed let alone authoritative attention.

The Ottawa Process arose, in the post-bipolar period, from a global campaign to outlaw landmines: ICBL of 1 400 NGOs in 90 countries & winner of the 1997 Nobel Peace Prize (www.icbl.org). By contrast, the Kimberley Process was somewhat less global or visible as diamonds are not a mass market product (www.pacweb.org); nevertheless, the blood or conflict diamond campaign forced a multi-stakeholder response in part to avoid an expensive Nestle/Nike/Shell-type PR fiasco (Klein 2001). And the current, parallel Diamond Development Initiative (DDI) is a promising compatible spin-off seeking to augment transnational regulation via the KP through micro-level local artisanal development, thus removing or reducing the need for mafias & militias: a novel mix of MNCs, IFIs, DAC donors, local government ministries & NGOs (DDI 2005).

By contrast, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) (www.publishwhatyoupay.org) was more of a macro-level unilateral UK government initiative, albeit in response to global NGO (eg Global Witness, CAFOD, Oxfam, SCF & Transparency International) & other pressures, given the potential for massive corruption presented by oil & gas & comparable commodities. This is especially so given the rise in prices for commodities & energy at the turn of the century exacerbated by impressive rates of economic growth in China & India.
Launched in the early 21st century, EITI picked up on related ethical/fair trade, accountability/transparency & corporate social responsibility initiatives (NB International Organization for Standardization (ISO) began in early-2005 a three-year (?) process of developing an ISO Standard for social responsibility - ISO 26000 - partly in cooperation with the ILO (www.iso.org/sr) & applied them to the mega-dollar energy sector in particular. This holds popular interest but also has some of the world's biggest corporations as players, which was not so in the other relatively successful, efficacious processes. Moreover, we all need petroleum products, so the character of this sector is unlike those in the earlier Ottawa & Kimberley Processes especially in a period of economic growth & high energy prices, exacerbated by expansion of the Chinese & Indian economies; ie consumer or popular opinion is likely to be less salient as a boycott of oil & gas is not sustainable, even if targeting one or two brands is more so?

Indeed, oil & gas like fresh water are likely to become the focus of conflict in the new century due to scarcities rather than boycotts (Klare 2002). Hence the relevance of the BICC brief (Boge et al 2006) which contrasts a range of codes/certification/regulation formulations (eg EITI; Forestry Stewardship Certification; Kimberley Process; OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises; UN Global Compact (Therien & Pouliot 2006) etc) with the political economy of conflict & of resources literatures: onto ‘co-regulation’ (Boge et al 2006: 26-45)?

The Commission for Africa (2005: 147) endorsed EITI, calling for 'strong political & financial support' from the international community:

'EITI is a multi-stakeholder agreement under which oil, gas & mining companies agree to publicly disclose all payment they make to developing country governments & governments agree to publish what they receive. Published information is audited independently, and there is a clear role for civil society, who participate actively in the design, implementation & overview of the disclosure process.'

Clearly, EITI can be contrasted with ICC in terms of advocacy, animation, organization & impacts. The Coalition for the ICC (www.iccenow.org) celebrated its first decade in 2005: now over 2 000 NGOs, like-minded states & IOs. After five years, it led to an ICC being inaugurated in mid-2000 once 60 states had ratified, encouraged by the horrors of & temporary tribunals enquiring into Yugoslavia & Rwanda. Now a hundred states have so ratified. Despite the de facto veto of the US administration, several US NGOs continue to advance the cause: American NGO Coalitions for the ICC (www.amicc.org, www.unausa.org, www.usaforicc.org). But how efficacious let alone appropriate is the ICC when dealing with Central Europe & now Northern Uganda (Allen 2006)? The Ugandan government referred the Lord’s Resistance Army to the ICC at end-2003 & in May 2005, warrants for the arrest of five senior commanders were issued, including its leader. They were almost captured in eastern Congo by UN peacekeepers but got away. The subsequent formal peace agreement with an amnesty provision has further complicated this case for the ICC.
Before I turn to an overlooked nexus of inter- & non-state actors, with the potential to advance global coalitions as it did on the establishment of Commonwealth Secretariat & Foundation in the mid-1960s (Shaw 2004 & 2005), I treat the short-term Commission for Africa, which tended to downplay conflict on the continent.

iv) Commission for Africa: two Ugandas? Two Africas?

'No one could have predicted in mid-1997 that PM Tony Blair would become more involved in African politics than any British leader since decolonization, authorizing a military intervention in Sierra Leone in 2000 & making Africa an explicit foreign policy priority for his second term.' (Porteous 2005: 281)

'African poverty & stagnation is the greatest tragedy of our time...Recent years have seen improvements in economic growth & in governance. But Africa needs more of both if it is to make serious inroads into poverty. To do that requires a partnership between Africa & the developed world which takes full account of Africa's diversity & particular circumstances.' (Commission for Africa 2005: 13)

'...some of the policies currently pursued by G8 countries are actually damaging Africa.

G8 countries have a clear moral responsibility to end those policies that leave Africa disadvantaged. But it is also in their interests to do so. The consequences of Africa's poverty will not remain confined within Africa's borders.' (Mepham & Lorge 2005: x & xii)

Symptomatic of the possibilities of the new public diplomacy (Copeland 2005) was the 2004-5 Commission for Africa process inaugurated by Tony Blair which brought 17 eminent persons, over half from the continent, to prepare for the mid-2005 G8 talks with Africa's leading reformers, those who articulate & advocate a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) (www.commissionforafrica.org). Their 460-page report, reflective of 500 submissions along with engagement with the African diaspora - Our Common Interest - was launched in mid-March 2005. This consists of 60 pp of Argument (subsequently published as a Penguin pb with the obligatory endorsement from Bob Geldof) followed by almost 400 pp of Analysis, which commences with the history & culture of the continent and proceeds to highlight governance, peace & security, education, economic growth, trade & ODA as imperatives for resurgence.

While Our Common Interest is preoccupied with economic development, especially DFI & ODA, & good governance, it does include a chapter (#5) on peace & security, in which the political economy of resources features:

'Recommendation: to speed up action to control the trade in natural resources that fund wards, the international community should: agree a common definition for "conflict resources", for global endorsement through the UN...to weaken the link between natural resources & violent conflict in Africa, the international community should support recommendations on increased transparency...' (Commission for Africa 2005: 164)
The Commission also advocates more support, better division of labour between UN, AU & regional organizations, & more effective peacebuilding (Mychajliyszyn & Shaw 2005), including support for the proposed UN Peacebuilding Commission. But it tends to overlook the economic causes of conflict as well as the unhelpful impacts of divisions in countries at war such as Uganda (Shaw 2006c).

Amongst the many inputs into the Commission was an IPPR report (NB role of think tanks in global policy development) which emphasized the role of the North rather than reform in Africa, calling on the G8 to advance fairer trade, restrict arms transfers, limit corruption around resource sectors, address climate change & increase aid to the 0.7% level by 2010. Its authors (Mepham & Lorge 2005: ix) lamented that:

'On current trends, there is no prospect of Africa achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)...by 2015.'

Nevertheless, in his second term, the PM was a convert to the cause of the continent. Tom Porteous (2005: 289) argues that:

'By the beginning of Labour's second term in 2001 a discernible UK policy on Africa was emerging from the complex set of influences that were driving the main institutions & personalities involved in decision-making on African issues. The policy was focused on reducing poverty through economic development.'

But Porteous (2005: 290) also cautions that this new direction or discovery also had limitations, including, I would add, inattention to the potential of African diasporas in the UK:

'First, it does not properly answer the question how weak & collapsed states can be fixed & strengthened. Second, it assumes greater leverage & influence than the UK, even with the support of other international actors, actually wields over the leaders of African states to get reform implemented. Third, in implementing its African policy the UK has tended to adopt a statist approach which can serve to reinforce those very elite actors & groups who bear most responsibility for Africa's problems. And fourth, it has proved difficult to resolve some inherent contradictions between the UK's development objectives in Africa & its commercial, strategic & political objectives.'

Onto the classic global governance quandary of more state versus less state interests/nexuses, especially in historically less state-centric Commonwealths: how to define & sustain good governance?

Africa is a substantial & significant part of the Commonwealths & the latter were central during the anti-apartheid struggle towards the end of the last century. Post-bipolarity & apartheid, the Commonwealths have advanced good governance, building on some aspects of the public diplomacy genre given the relative strength of civil society within the Commonwealth nexus.
v) Commonwealth(s)

'The Commonwealth has already made important contributions to supporting both democracy & development...the Commonwealth must make more of its comparative advantage with respect to other regional & global bodies. The Commonwealth is a unique microcosm of global social & ethnic diversity, & of North & South...the state, the market, civil society & the international community each has a vital role to play in delivering development & democracy.' (Commonwealth 2003: ix)

Whilst Britain created the Commonwealth to facilitate post-war decolonization & multilateralization, it was in a minority of one during the Commonwealth's heyday when Mrs Thatcher was PM: the struggle against apartheid. And although the British government remains the largest single funder of both Commonwealth Secretariat & Foundation, both recently marking four decades (Shaw 2005), the ex-empire trails high-priority relationships like those with the US, EU & Asia. Nevertheless, both inter- and non-state Commonwealths constitute invaluable networks for 'low politics' issue areas like development, education, health, islands, law, parliaments etc; ie the MDGs (Commonwealth 2003, Fletcher 2006).

Moreover, in terms of human development/rights/security, the Commonwealths' own emphasis on democratic governance reinforces its espousal by the UK. Thus it has moved to suspend member states with unacceptable records in terms of formal democracy & human rights, most recently Fiji, Pakistan & Zimbabwe. And at the most recent Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Malta in late-2005, civil society groups expressed concern about whether Uganda should be allowed to hold the next one in late-2007 because of its unacceptable record on human rights/security. In turn, post-7/7, both inter- & non-state Commonwealths have moved towards treating increasingly salient issues around diversity & security, respect & understanding, as symbolized by the Secretariat’s 2006-7 Commission on the latter chaired by Nobel Laureate, Amartya Sen, who as co-chair of the early-21st Century UN Commission on HS (UN 2003).

Given some of the unanticipated legacies of empire, like English as the de facto lingua franca of globalization, Commonwealth networks yield gains for the British economy & society, particularly in post-industrial sectors like culture (eg burgeoning world of Commonwealth & post-colonial literatures), higher education (eg Association of Commonwealth Universities, British Council, Commonwealth of Learning & Commonwealth Scholarship Commission), IT, sports (Commonwealth Games) etc: contributions to global governance (Shaw 2004)?

Moreover, whilst migrations can occur without the Commonwealth connection, cultural & linguistic familiarity does facilitate communication even enhanced multi-culturalism/-racialism in countries of immigration like Australia, Canada & South Africa as well as Britain. Indeed, the Commonwealth has been in the middle of controversies about contemporary professional migration, particularly in the education & health sectors, leading to the negotiation of a teachers' protocol to manage the flow. And the dramatic expansion of outsourcing to Indian companies & cities like Bangalore has been facilitated
by the return of skilled Indian diasporas from the UK & US. Symptomatically, the theme for the late-November 2005 CHOGM in Malta was 'Networking for Development' (www.thecommonwealth.org).

The Commonwealth Foundation has widened its purview beyond established professional associations towards civil society, including issues of democracy, accountability & transparency. Its Civil Society Advisory Committee advances such a trend, including ensuring that the biennial Commonwealth People’s Forums are representative of the diversity of non-state Commonwealth networks. And two of us are engaged in a comparative accountability project, animated by Jan Aart Scholte, examining the case of accountability in the Commonwealths’ civil society.

We turn in conclusion to implications for established disciplines/debates/schools…and hence state & non-state policy choices?

vi) Conclusion: global coalitions/governance & the discipline of political science: ex Africa semper aliquid novi

‘The emergence of China & India as powerful actors in global governance arenas & in global politics poses a series of questions for development policy & the future of global governance.’ (Humphrey & Messner 2006: 108)

I conclude by suggesting that foreign policy in an era of global governance involving state & non-state actors alike – public diplomacy (Copeland 2005, Potter 2002, www.publicdiplomacy.org, www.uscpublicdiplomacy.org) - is really networking for human development/rights/security (Shaw 2006b). New multilateralisms of mixed-actor coalitions facilitate the identification of & reaction to new issues (on the variety of such issues & responses see Boge et al 2006). But, as noted at the outset, some global issues – landmines & conflict diamonds – attract more attention & momentum than others – eg child soldiers & small arms (Hubert 2000, McRae & Hubert 2001). And the opening citation to this final section should also provide pause: we may lament the impact today of US unilateralism on, say, the ICC or small arms…but we should already begin to factor in the interests & impacts of emerging economies like China & India into such equations (Cooper et al 2006; Shaw et al 2007) in addition to the EU (see p 2 above).

Such features of globalizations & new regionalisms present profound challenges to orthodox political science, international relations, foreign policy etc (Brown 2006, Lemke 2003), even for interdisciplinary fields like African, development & security studies (Mychajliwszyn & Shaw 2005). To understand/situate let alone respond to myriad global issues, we need to transcend established frameworks & be prepared to recognize & juxtapose novel perspectives along the lines suggested: foreign policy governance? This suggests going beyond government to governance, at all levels: onto more or less state-centric coalitions? In turn, this means contemplating transcending established approaches/ assumptions/debates to novel, interdisciplinary perspectives appropriate for the new century, characterized by +/-200 states & myriad global issues…as informed by Brown (2006) & Lemke (2003) out of Africa.
As the latter’s pair of review articles suggest, ‘African’ IR may be suggestive of broader, global trends towards non-state actors & intra-national or –regional rather than international conflict. In a world of over 200 states, at least a quarter of which are ‘fragile’ (DFID 2005a), ‘Africa’ may be central rather than marginal, with lessons for analysis & practice elsewhere, especially public diplomacy. As Lemke (2003: 117) asserts:

‘…a major distinction between African international relations & those elsewhere is that so many of Africa’s states are states in name only – legal entities that have failed to consolidate political power within the territories over which they are the legally recognized authorities. Instead, political power is exercised by a variety of states & non-state actors in Africa. Because standard international relations research theorizes about & collects data only for official states, much of Africa’s international relations are left out.’ (emphasis added)

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May 2008