“Canada’s Identity in Afghanistan: Masculine Warrior or Protector of the Peace”?  

Canada and International Peacekeeping  

Canada’s international identity has long been characterized by its involvement in peacekeeping missions, with the belief that Canada’s capacity for promoting its interests and values has affected positive change in the world. The participation of Canadian forces in UN-sanctioned missions has been touted as one of the country’s greatest international contributions, referred to as our “golden age” in foreign policy and a “source of great pride”. More recently, peacekeeping has been envisioned as a post-Cold War alternative to militaristic violence seen in the two World Wars; it has been described as a duty of middle powers and an important tenet of multilateralism on the international stage. The support for peacekeeping among Canadians has traditionally been strong, with support garnered because of the connections to multilateral efforts and UN support. Canada as a “soft power” or middle power has been part of its international performative role for over half a century. It is performative in the sense that it is not an objective condition, rather a performance that reproduces a self-image of Canada as a “fixer” or “mediator” that “simultaneously imbues its [Canada’s] voice with considerable moral authority on matters of international peace and security”. Part of the image of middlepowerhood is a distance from unilateralism and assertive military objectives of a global hegemon. Therefore, accompanying the middle power self-image is a moral authority that is achieved through multilateral efforts that address international problems. Since peacekeeping missions have historically been the international engagement of choice for middle powers like Canada, there has also been an almost automatic association of peacekeeping as an alternative to the unilateral or heavily militaristic foreign policies chosen by more powerful nations. 

Peacekeeping is an activity that is full of contradiction. The “warrior-prince-of-peace” as described by Sandra Whitworth has been an image of a benign, altruistic, and neutral blue bereted soldier, one that is capable of conflict resolution in any cultural setting. The contradiction of this image is that many of the messages a soldier receives about appropriate soldierly behavior are fundamentally at odds with their expected duties in peace operations. Whitworth examines incidents such as the murder of a Somali teenager, hazing practices that involve homoerotic and racist embarrassment tactics that explain how the socially reproduced image of peacekeepers has often been at odds with the environment that peacekeeping occurs within. Such analysis reminds citizens that peace operations are not as simple (or benign) as serving in soup kitchens and escorting children to school (although these are important and crucial components).

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4 Beier, 434.
5 Whitworth (2004), 12.
6 Whitworth (2004), 16.
Peacekeeping in the post-9/11 era has become increasingly multifaceted, and in Afghanistan specifically, peace operations are not the alternative to military violence that many might believe. For UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), the traditional term has expanded to include “second generation” concepts such as peacemaking, peace building, and peace enforcement operations that include military, political, social, and humanitarian aspects, yet the terminology and definition of such delineations is still unclear. What appears to be a contradiction in these second-generation missions, is that there is much military action, violence, and conflict in missions that continue to be conducted with the label “peace”.

This paper is a response to Sandra Whitworth’s analysis of UN peacekeeping missions and deals with a similar concern for the masculinism and militarism that are present in the current peace enforcement operation in Afghanistan. Although it has been made clear that the mission in Afghanistan is not, and has not been, a traditional/classical peacekeeping mission, it is still a UN Chapter VII sanctioned endeavor that has been referred to as a peace-making or peace enforcement mission. Ironically, the primary objective of this mission is not defined as “peace”, but rather as “security”. Therefore, like Whitworth, this paper is interested in contradictions, such as the term “peace enforcement mission” that is used instead of “security enforcement mission”.

A second concern is with the Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force mission, of which Canada is a participant, and the gendered implications this peace operation has for Canada’s foreign policy. It will be argued that the ISAF mission demonstrates a trend or shift towards more militaristic foreign policy tactics, which necessarily have racial and gendered consequences (discussed in this paper, but are only a portion of the complexities involved in such a transition). I envision part of this shift to be a (re)production of Canada’s performative international role. I have articulated this role shift as one from a “protector” to a “warrior”. It would be inadequate to say that these labels could conclusively describe Canada’s imagined international role, as such an identity is always in flux. What I am aiming to articulate is not what Canada’s role definitively is, but rather how it can possibly be shaped by, and how it can shape, our foreign policy platforms.

Lastly, this paper deals with feminist concerns about militarism and hegemonic masculinities. Feminists have long articulated the connections between militarism and a hegemonic form of masculinity. These connections have unique and often negative consequences, and as always my aims are to foster a “feminist curiosity” for such correlations.

To begin, the ideas of militarized masculinity will be summarized. It is important to understand the associations between militarism and masculinity, as well as understanding that these are not natural. This is work that has been theorized by other feminists, but is important for understanding my arguments for Canada and peace enforcement.

Following is a discussion of Whitworth’s “confusion of soldiery conduct”—the identity

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8 As described by Cynthia Enloe in *The Curious Feminist*. (Berekeley, University of California Press, 2004). It is a concept that I like to think about when analyzing international affairs. It is to not take for granted ideas that appear “common sense”, because for an idea to become common sense, there are flows of power that help to re-produce the “naturalness” of such concepts. Often these power flows privilege certain genders, races, classes.
and expectations of troops trained in combat techniques, which are at odds with their responsibilities as peacekeepers. Whitworth’s argument is also important, as my analysis builds from this discussion and hopes to offer new insights. Both concepts are important in understanding how the recent mission and policy initiatives by the Canadian government suggest a shift to a re-masculinization of Canadian foreign policy, as indicated by Prime Minister Paul Martin’s 2008 announcement on the future of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan: “In today’s dangerous world, Canada must have a credible military to be a credible leader. You understand that countries that cannot or will not make real contributions to global security are not regarded as serious players.” PKOs, whether peacekeeping or peace enforcing missions, still have at their root, the belief that security cannot be achieved without militarized policies. The push towards a more militarized foreign policy should have feminists not only curious, but on high alert. The mission in Afghanistan, especially since 2006 has caused a new crisis of identity as Canada shifts in role from the traditional “peaceful protector” to a contemporary “just warrior”. This paper argues how this shift in identity may resolve Whitworth’s confusion of soldiery conduct, yet poses renewed challenges to Canada’s glorified role as an international protector.

**Militarized Masculinities**

To begin, one must understand the correlations between ideas of masculinity and militarization. Cynthia Enloe notes that when tracing militarization, we must understand what it means to be “manly” and what it means to be “feminine” in particular historical settings. Many feminists have contended that ideas of masculinity have traditionally been bound up within ideas of militarism. Hegemonic forms of masculinity have historically been caricatured by macho, tough, or aggressive figures, represented by warrior figures such as Rambo. The term hegemonic masculinity refers to a dominant image of masculinity. There are numerous other forms of masculinity, which may contain aspects of passivity, emotion, or weakness, but the connections between militarism and masculinity have usually occurred with the imagining of hegemonic masculinity. For international relations, the important connection between militarism and hegemonic masculinity is the notion of security. Although in academic circles, the notion of security is an “essentially contested concept”^{11}, it is fair to say that security requires protection by someone for someone. Feminists are clear that the protector is recognized as a masculine role, one that often accompanies recognizable militarized symbols such as the soldier in battle: “The valorization of war through its identification with a heroic kind of masculinity depends on a feminized, devalued notion of peace seen as unattainable and unrealistic.”^{12} The image of the militarized, masculine protector also requires a feminine subject to be protected. It is here we see the links between masculinity and militarism. Hegemonic forms of masculinity have historically been associated with qualities such as aggressiveness, rationality, and war-like behavior: imagined in these ways because of war

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11 Barry Buzan is noted for this oft-repeated phrase. For more, see Whitworth (2004), 14.

narratives that we (re)produce. Overly simplistic portrayals of men as perpetrators and women as victims in war have reified the divisions between what is considered masculine, and created an unnatural opposition in what is constructed as feminine.

The importance of why masculinity and militarism should be examined is two-fold: those with the authority to protect (often those believed to best represent a hegemonic masculinity) are those that hold power in society and are allowed to participate in the secret circles that coordinate “national security”. This authority also grants these individuals the power to dictate what is “dangerous”. Therefore, those who claim to offer security also set the agenda for what is security. Feminist concern with the intertwining of masculinity and militarism is that women are often left out of these decision-making processes, and things associated with femininity are necessarily devalued. This concern with militarization is therefore a concern with the privileging of masculinity. Cynthia Enloe describes militarization as a “tricky process”—one that occurs when any part of a society becomes controlled by or dependent on the military or on military values. Anything can be militarized if it is dependent on militaristic ideas, concept of values for its social legitimacy. When individuals (both men and women) feel they must participate in militaristic endeavors to prove themselves as legitimate citizens, there should be concern that citizenship is so strongly connected to masculinized militarism that necessarily excludes femininity and alternatives. Such an example is Prime Minister Harper’s comments that Canada must be more militarily active if we are to participate as a “serious” player in the global arena. This is a clear example of militarism (militarized masculinity), and one that strikes serious feminist concern. This will be discussed in detail later.

Peacekeeping and Confusion of Soldierly Purpose

Peace enforcement missions are part of Chapter VII and not the same as traditional peacekeeping missions that fall under Chapter VI of the UN Security Council Charter. Chapter VII missions differ from traditional missions in that they often do not have the consent of warring factions, force may be used outside of self-defense, and soldiers do not wear the blue helmets of the UN. It is interesting that semantically both types of missions contain the word “peace”. Enloe comments that, “peacekeeping inspires optimism because it seems to perform military duties without being militaristic.” However, feminist discussion of Canadian foreign policy has shown that regardless of Chapter VI or VII rules of engagement (ROE), neither type of mission is without militarism and violence. It strikes me as curious then, that the word “peace” is used at all. It is arguable that the word “peace” is used to inspire optimism and provide legitimacy. As PKOs have been considered acceptable and to some degree popular uses for the Canadian military, it reasonably appears the word “peace” is used strategically for these missions. The use of “peace” for a mission title leads into the discussion about other contradictions in PKOs.

15 Enloe (1993), 100.
16 Enloe (2007), 145.
18 Enloe (1993), 33.
Gendered analysis such as Whitworth’s has shown the contradiction of training soldiers to kill, and then deploying them in missions dubbed “peace operations”. This produces what she calls “confusion of soldierly/warrior purpose” as well as a “crisis of masculinity”. As militaries require a particular “ideology of manliness” in order to function properly, soldiers are created in ways that promote masculine values: encouragement of violence, aggression, and individual conformity to military discipline, as well as an emphasis on homophobia and heterosexism.\textsuperscript{19} Canadian Major R.W.J. Wenek notes that, “The defining role of any military force is the management of violence by violence, so that individual aggressiveness is, or should be, a fundamental characteristic of occupational fitness in combat units.”\textsuperscript{20} These qualities are often at odds with responsibilities and conduct expected in peace missions, such as restraint, cultural openness, and compassion. Traditional (Chapter VI) peacekeeping missions that permit force only in self-defense result in a contradiction between the combative skills taught to a soldier, and his/her expectations on the ground.

The public image of the benign, altruistic peacekeeper also faces contradiction when images surface of Canadian soldiers torturing a Somali teen, military rituals that involve homoerotic, misogynist, and racist hazing practices, and even death tolls of citizens under the “protection” of peace forces. These contradictory images call into question the traditional narrative (peacekeeping as a benign, altruistic and noble practice) of these operations.

Gendered analyses identify problems associated with the feminization of peacekeeping. Believed to be an (feminized) alternative to traditional military activities, soldiers have expressed that upon returning home from peace operations, they feel they have failed to live up to the military ideal and are not truly part of the military family.\textsuperscript{21} Often ridiculed and demeaned within traditional military culture, the result of such experiences creates what Whitworth calls a “crisis of masculinity”. This “crisis” is the (social) emasculation a soldier feels because his or her role in a peacekeeping mission does not/did not involve direct combative activities. The crisis of masculinity not only occurs on the individual level of the soldier/peacekeeper, but also for the military as an institution. Some Canadians have called for rebuilding and replenishing our military and not being satisfied with the “mediocrity” of our current (read: feminized) foreign policy.\textsuperscript{22} Peacekeeping is particularly interesting for the examination of militarized masculinity because, “on the one hand, peacekeeping resolved what had become a crisis of legitimation for many post-Cold War militaries—it was one of the few military activities that remained in persistent demand. On the other hand, peacekeeping resolved that crisis in a way that is not fully, or properly, militaristic [and therefore masculine]”.\textsuperscript{23} The institutional concerns with the feminized nature of peacekeeping will be discussed in further detail later, with the current concerns with Canada’s foreign policy direction.

\textsuperscript{19} Whitworth (2004), 16.
\textsuperscript{21} Whitworth (2004), 14.
\textsuperscript{22} Cohen, 200.
\textsuperscript{23} Whitworth(2004), 16.
The more contemporary (Chapter VII) peace enforcement missions do not suffer the same challenges that Whitworth outlines for peacekeeping. Similar to the Canadian Airborne Regiment’s Chapter VII mission to Somalia in 1993, there is a belief amongst troops that these missions are more exciting, more challenging, involve more responsibility and action—that they are more “real” than traditional peacekeeping.\textsuperscript{24} The crisis of masculinity or the confusion of soldierly conduct do not have the same effects in this situations, as soldiers trained to kill are serving exactly that purpose: providing security, training local forces, and participating in increased combative engagement of the infantry and artillery regiments. Yet, they are still considered a form of “peace mission”, and still fall under the rubric and authorization of UN peacekeeping. It can be argued that the crises discussed by Whitworth have in many ways been resolved through this new form of international military engagement: there has been a return to more traditional uses of masculinized militarism. A re/new(ed) cause for feminist concern is that these engagements are still relying on the notion of peace enforcement to legitimize such activity.

The assertion that, “Peacekeeping is a part of the contemporary colonial encounter, establishing knowledge claims about both “us” and “them” that legitimize the missions themselves”\textsuperscript{25} should have feminists even more concerned with the narratives that are produced in peace enforcement missions. Use of violence in areas deemed especially dangerous is (allegedly) acceptable on such missions. Terms such as “extremist”, “terrorist”, “infidels”, “war lords”, and “drug lords” are used to describe the enemy whose “principle mission is to disrupt and prohibit Afghan men, women, and children from going about their daily lives…[and] who are not interested in peace”\textsuperscript{26}. This narrative of others as irrational and evil both encourages and (allegedly) justifies aggressive and militaristic engagement. Post-colonial scholars are aware of the undertones of such story-telling, as “confrontation of good and evil is a racialized narrative: citizens of nations who join the alliance against evil come to know themselves as members of a more advanced race whose values of democracy and peace are not shared by others.”\textsuperscript{27} The construction of “us” and “them” becomes a story where an out-of-control Third World needs the firm hand of the First World heroes: a narrative that secures an international arena where some states have the right to intervene and discipline others. These narratives are simplistic and neglect the colonial histories or contemporary Western dominance that have led to the current situation (such as in Afghanistan). Sherene Razack explains this situation as one where the “rational”, usually white, powerful West teaches the “irrational” East lessons about democracy, ironically a lesson that is taught with guns.\textsuperscript{28}

The reoccurring racist and gendered dilemmas with peacekeeping are still of concern in peace-making missions, such as the Canadian (ISAF) mission presently in Afghanistan. Rather than concern for a confusion of soldierly conduct, or concern for a crisis of masculinity, feminists should be concerned with the clear militarized masculinity

\textsuperscript{24} Whitworth (2004), 100.
\textsuperscript{25} Whitworth (2004), 15.
\textsuperscript{26} Department of National Defence, “Canadian Forces Operations in Afghanistan” (August 14, 2007). Available <http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=1703>
\textsuperscript{28} Razack, 49.
that has emerged from peace enforcement missions. A brief description of the ISAF mission will be described, before explaining why this appears to be a re-masculinization of Canadian foreign policy and its possible implications for Canadian’s image as a peacekeeper.

**Afghanistan: Peace Enforcement**

Currently, there are about 2500 Canadian Forces (CF) members that are serving on a Joint Task Force in Afghanistan (JTF AFG). This NATO-led International Security Task Force (ISAF) mission’s goal is to improve the security situation in Afghanistan that creates “conditions for stabilization and reconstruction…concentrating on defense reform, defense institution-building and the military aspects of security sector reform.” The primary goal of the ISAF forces is security. The main security tasks include: security operations, support to the Afghan National Army, helping disarm “Illegally Armed Groups”, and support to the Afghan National Police. Canada, as of 2005, has also assumed responsibility for the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT), whose goals are police reform, army training, and demining in the Southern region. The primary role of Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is a militarized focus on protection, combative training, and policing. There is much humanitarian and reconstruction efforts that are occurring through NGOs and UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), however this are not where CF members are primarily serving. In a press release titled “Why Are We There?” released by the Canadian government in 2007, the Canadian Forces were clear that their responsibility was to aid the security situation and that NGOs and the United Nations were primarily responsible for humanitarian concerns.

Unlike former peacekeeping missions, this peace-enforcement mission sanctioned by UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1386 does not require its troops to restrain from violence and hold a peace line. Chapter VII missions generally do not have the consent from all warring factions, and are therefore considered more dangerous than conventional Chapter VI missions. Scholars have commented that these types of missions have been increasingly common in the post-Cold War era, and peacekeeping as a concept may be moving away from its classical form in the more multifaceted and engaged Chapter VII missions. For Canada, this has implications for our foreign policy: possibilities that should strike a feminist curiosity as these missions are increasingly militarized.

**Re-masculinization of our Middle Power Stance?**

True to the self-reproduced image of Canada as a helpful middle power, the ISAF mission is a multilateral effort. There are over 40 countries involved in some capacity, and it is a UN-sanctioned mission, which arguably also contributes legitimacy to the neoliberal, soft power- image Canada has performed. It is, however, a departure from the

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33 Wood and Soresnson, 3.
Pearsonian “golden age” of Canadian foreign policy, where Canada participated in blue helmet missions that were considered more humanitarian in nature. It has been suggested that the reasons for the shift to peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping was because traditional peacekeeping could not effectively deal with crisis situations. Horrifying testimonies and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that resulted from missions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia (Srebrenica), left the Canadian Forces and the Canadian public with mixed feelings on the proper role for peacekeepers. It became questionable if Canadian troops should be put into potentially dangerous situations if they were restricted to firing only in self-defense. Consequentially, there has been increasingly governmental support for missions that are more militarily engaged.

Feminist curiosity should stop to analyze this seemingly simplistic shift in peacekeeping tactics. Part of the testimonies and PTSD include the admittance that soldiers felt “impotent” or “feminized” in their roles as peacekeepers, often feeling a fear of losing control in a warlike situation, where they were trained for combat but charged with providing humanitarian services. A shift to militarized activities where soldiers can perform the hypermasculinity they were trained with suggests that this shift also has gendered motivations and consequences.

The most obvious example of a desire to re-masculinize and re-militarize the Canadian Forces comes from a 2008 speech by Prime Minister Stephen Harper:

“Many yearn for a return—indeed in some cases to a virtually exclusive focus—on classical international peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is a wonderful concept. A Canadian invention and frequent necessity. But it covers only a limited portion of the security challenges we face in today’s international environment…if Canada wants to contribute to global security, we will have to participate in UN peace enforcement missions, not just traditional peacekeeping…and that means we will need a strong modern, multifaceted military backed by the political will to deploy.”

It is clear that Prime Minister Harper feels that peace enforcement is preferred to the classical peacekeeping that Canada’s self-image is inspired by. But my feminist concern has more to do with his secondary comments:

“Our government is close to finalizing a long-term plan to thoroughly reverse the so-called ‘rusting-out’ of the Canadian forces…we need to build a first class military and keep it that way. Ladies and Gentlemen, I believe Canada should be a leader in the world, not a follower. And in today’s dangerous world, Canada must have a credible military to be a credible leader. You understand that countries that cannot or will not make real contributions to global security are not regarded as serious players. They may be liked by everybody; they may be pleasantly

34 Razack, 25.
acknowledged by everybody. But when the hard decisions get made, they will be ignored by everybody.”

This statement shows a clear shift to privileging the militaristic and uncompromising attitudes of a “great power” rather than the benign “mediator” middle power role that Canada has historically re-produced. This should alert feminist concern that Canada is moving towards a more masculine and militarized foreign policy, one that will not go without gendered consequences. When militarized masculinity is privileged, the concerns outlined earlier (secrecy, exclusion, and the creation of “danger”) are likely to manifest themselves so that national security trumps alternative (daily/personal) securities, combat missions trump peacekeeping missions, and questions of unequal power relations get brushed aside for “Big Picture” questions and problems of “high security”.

I have serious concern for the extensive emphasis on military enhancement for security. The military, “which is fundamentally predicated first on the fundamental need of an enemy “other” in order to legitimize its very existence, and second on the construction of soldiers as masculinized instruments of violence, cannot be one of the institutions through which we can work towards a less violent world.” Peace enforcement missions in general, and the ISAF mission in Afghanistan specifically, should strike the curiosity of all observers as it is clear this is a departure from our past foreign policy initiatives. It opens many questions about the ideas of peace and security, but also closes many doors and options outside of military initiatives to conflict. We should be wary of the shift towards more masculine and militarized foreign policy initiatives, even if they are dubbed “peace missions”, because the consequences of these policies do not always effectively result in peace.

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38 Cristina Masters, “Gendered Defenses, Gendered Offences: What is at stake in the politics of missile defense?” in Canadian Foreign Policy 12/1. 115.
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