Human Security by Proxy: an investigation of Canada’s support to the African Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS)

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Abstract
The protection of human security in Darfur has gained currency in Canadian foreign policy debates in view of the leadership role that Canada played in creating the 1997 Ottawa treaty to ban landmines, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, and the International Criminal Court. Generally the debates on Darfur concentrate on analysing the gaps between the rhetoric and the reality of Canadian foreign policy without analysing specifically how Canada cooperated with the African Union to promote peace in Darfur. This paper attempts to fill this analytical gap by addressing the following question. In what ways did human security inform the policy of the Martin government on the one hand, and the Harper government on the other hand, towards the African Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS)? In order to address this question, the paper traces the origins of the Liberal government’s support to AMIS and how this support has evolved under the Conservative government of Mr. Harper. I argue that both the Liberal and the Conservative governments adopted what I call ‘human security by proxy’ especially through the reliance on the African Union’s leadership to protect human security in Darfur.

Introduction: towards an explanation of human security by proxy

On one hand, the violent conflict that erupted in the Darfur region in the Sudan in February 2003 is a test case of the will and the might of the African Union (AU) to provide leadership to promote peace and security in Africa. On the other hand, Darfur also represents a major test on Canada’s commitment to promote human security, especially, through the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle. The human security challenges in Darfur are diverse but two main characterisations sum up this ongoing human tragedy. United States officials have called the situation ‘genocide’ and the UN refers to it as ‘the worst humanitarian situation in the world’. Although these characterisations connote different political and strategic objectives, they nonetheless capture the gravity of the unfolding human tragedy in Darfur. In accordance with the multilateralist approach to foreign policy, Canada has refrained from giving names to the Darfur situation, but rather appear to have accepted the UN’s characterisation of the conflict as the worst humanitarian situation in the world. In this respect, both the Liberal and the Conservative governments of Prime Minters Martin and Harper respectively, have provided diverse support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) that was initially tasked with the responsibility of providing protection to civilians and help to bring durable peace in Darfur.

In many ways, the Darfur crisis provides an opportunity for the AU to assert its right and leadership to promote human security in Africa through its intervention mandate in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act—“the right of the Union (AU) to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”4. In theory, the AU intervention mandate is consistent with the ‘just cause’ principles of the R2P—the large-scale loss of life (genocide) and ethnic cleansing, which are the threshold for the international community to intervene to protect human security. (ICISS 2001) In fact, the consistency of the AU’s intervention mandate with the just cause principles of the R2P, as well as the actual intervention of AMIS, provided a window of opportunity to the Liberal government of Paul Martin to rely on the AU to protect human
security in Darfur. In strategic terms it could be said that the reliance on the AU to protect human security in Darfur was important to the Liberal government as Canada was the key advocate of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in the G8 that called for African leadership and ownership of Africa issues. In this context, Darfur provides the empirical lenses to gauge Canada’s human security policy in Africa since the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, where Canada claimed leadership to promote the NEPAD initiative that seek to address the security challenges in Africa and transform African economies and placed them individually and collectively on the path of sustainable growth and development. (NEPAD 2001; Black 2005)

As mentioned earlier, the violent conflict in Darfur has attracted widespread international condemnation in view of the humanitarian consequences and has created the urgent need for a robust intervention to resolve the conflict. However, both the Liberal and the Conservative governments have relied on the AU leadership through the AMIS intervention and recently on the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to protect human security in Darfur. This approach to resolve the conflict in Darfur is what I call the protection of human security by proxy. In spite of the rhetoric in support of the R2P, Canadian governments have not intervened directly in Darfur in terms of troop contributions but rather both governments, especially the Liberals under Paul Martin, resorted to the provision of a wide range of material, financial, and technical support to assist the AU to take leadership and deploy troops on the ground to protect civilians.

The idea of human security by proxy as an alternative to Canada’s non-intervention in Darfur originates from the 2005 International Policy Statement: A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. Prime Minister Martin stated that “Canada will work closely with the African Union to improve its ability to restore security and bring stability to the region (Darfur), and we will do more in the areas of training, equipment and logistical support”. Not surprisingly, this statement has shaped the overall practice of Canadian foreign policy in Darfur even under the Harper government. The idea of human security by proxy elucidates and reinforces the AU slogan of “African solutions to Africa’s problems”—Africa’s leadership and ownership of issues that affect the continent.

Nevertheless, in practice, human security by proxy follows the general trend of apathy and indifference of Western countries to intervene in African conflicts especially after the Cold War. For instance, Charles Pentland argues that Africa’s security deficit is large and growing after the Cold War, however, “the list of outside potential (security) suppliers has dwindled”. (2005:923) Perhaps, Western countries including Canada are experiencing peacekeeping-fatigue in Africa as a result of the public outrage that followed the bitter experiences of the United States and the Canadian troops in Somalia in the mid 1990s. (Howe 1995; Carment 1996) Thus, in spite of the rhetoric and the genuine interest to promote the R2P and to protect human security, the actual motivation for direct intervention in African conflicts is low. In this situation, the reliance on the AU leadership through the AMIS intervention was the preferred policy option for the Liberal government and to some extent the Conservative government.

Although a wide range of literature exits on the AMIS capability to protect human security (Nossal 2005; Black and Shaw 2007; Williams 2006; Zwanenburg 2006; De Waal 2007; Udombana 2007), what is missing is a holistic assessment of the Canadian government
contributions to AMIS capability and the consequences of AMIS operation in Darfur. In the arguments that follow, I attempt to fill this important gap in the literature. I will begin by providing a brief but detailed sketch of the genesis of the AMIS intervention in Darfur. I will then turn to focus on outlining the Canadian government’s response to the conflict and follow-up with a comparative assessment of the Liberal and the Conservative government’s response to the conflict.

**Background to Canada’s Contribution to AMIS**

The main parties in the Darfur conflict are the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/ Movement (SPLA/M). However, in the course of the violence, other groups have emerged such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the “Janjaweed” militia—a ‘private’ militant group that is supported by the Sudanese government, who deliberately target civilians. Initially, the AU adopted a mediation approach to find a political settlement to the Darfur conflict in the form of inter-Sudanese meetings through a Chadian Mediation Team (CMT) led by President, Idriss Deby. The mediation efforts by the AU and the CMT culminated in the signing on April 8, 2004, of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement in which the Government of the Sudan, SPLA/M, and JEM agreed to “…cease hostilities and proclaim a ceasefire for a period of 45 days which was automatically renewable unless opposed by one of the parties; establish a Joint Commission and a Ceasefire Commission with the participation of the international community; free all prisoners of war and all other persons detained because of the armed conflict in Darfur; and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the creation of conditions conducive to the delivery of emergency relief to the displaced persons and other civilians victims of the war”.

To ensure the effective monitoring and implementation of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, the AU initiated the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks. As well, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) chaired by the AU with the international community (which was represented by the EU through France) as the deputy chair. The PSC also authorised the establishment of the AU Monitoring Mission (AMIS) as the operational arm of the CFC. Subsequently, a small AU observer mission of 162 persons made up both military and civilians with 24 support staff was deployed to Darfur on a $26 million budget with the bulk of the funding coming from the EU, USA, UK, Germany, and Canada. Thus from the onset, the AU appears to have taken the leadership role to resolve the conflict in Darfur. As some observers have argued, it has now become accepted in Africa and in the international community that the AU can and should deploy in advance of the UN in situations of violent conflict in Africa.(Cilliers 2008:7)

Nevertheless, the small AU observer mission that was made up of the Sudanese parties to the conflict, the CMT, AU member states, and representatives of the international community including Canada had no enforcement mandate to ensure the strict adherence to the humanitarian ceasefire agreement. International humanitarian law and human rights were violated in Darfur especially by the Janjaweed militias who were supported by the Sudanese government. The breach of the humanitarian ceasefire caused massive refugee flows into neighbouring countries such as Chad, and several thousands of Darfurians became internally displaced persons (IDPs). In several reports, the AU Commissioner, Alpha Oumar Konare
described the humanitarian situation in Darfur as precarious, grave, and as a matter of very serious concern. Indeed conservative estimates assert that several thousands of people have died and about 2.3 million of the 6 million inhabitants of the Darfur region are IDPs who are supported by an equally vulnerable population of conflict-affected residents of about 390,000 people. The gravity of the Darfur crisis is reflected in a recent report by two high-ranking UN officials including the Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Darfur, Rodolphe Adada, who suggested that the death toll of the five-year conflict has risen to about 300,000.

Consequently, in 2004, the AU through the assistance from its partners including Canada enhanced the capacity of AMIS with a protection force of about 7700 personnel comprising of 6171 troops and 1560 police officers. The mandate of AMIS was also expanded to: protect civilians under imminent threat it being understood that this is primarily the responsibility of the Sudanese government; monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population; monitor and verify efforts of the Sudanese government to disarm government controlled militia; protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity; provide visible military presence by patrolling and by establishing temporary outpost in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population; establish and maintain contact with the Sudanese police authorities; and investigate and report all matters of police non-compliance with the humanitarian ceasefire agreement. Obviously, this mandate fell short of using force to protect civilians as would have been the case if the deployment was done based on R2P principles.

At the diplomatic level, the AU complemented the AMIS intervention with the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks and other peace negotiations involving AU partners including Canada. These negotiations culminated in the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by the government of the Sudan and the SPLA/M on May 5, 2006. The DPA set the modalities for achieving lasting peace in Darfur. Through the partnership arrangement with the UN, and in spite of the resistance of the Sudanese government against non-African troops in Darfur, AMIS was transformed into a Joint AU-UN hybrid operation, UNAMID, in January 2008 with authorised force of 26,000. The partnership agreement between the AU and the UN reflected the demands of the Sudanese government to the effect that UNAMID should have an African character and as far as possible the troops should be sourced from African countries. As a result all the key personnel of UNAMID are drawn from Africa including the Joint AU-UN Special Representative, Rodolphe Adada (Republic of Congo), the Deputy Joint AU-UN Special Representative, Henry Anyidoho (Ghana), the Deputy Joint Special Representative for Operations and Management, Hocine Medili (Algeria), the Force Commander, Gen. Martin Luther Agwai (Nigeria), and the Police Commissioner, Michael J. Fryer (South Africa).

The content of the mandate of UNAMID is not different from the expanded mandate of AMIS nevertheless, it makes important additions such as the provision of support for the early implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA); preventing the disruption of the DPA implementation and armed attacks; and the protection of civilians without prejudice to the responsibility of the government of the Sudan. Operationally, UNAMID is faced with similar
obstacles that confronted the AMIS. Although it is widely acknowledged that the UN was better resourced to resuscitate the failing AMIS intervention, only 15,351 out of the 26000 Security Council’s authorised troops are deployed on the ground as at 31 March 2009—that is more than one year after the creation of UNAMID. Many Western officials have accused the Sudanese government for the non-compliance with the 2007 Security Council Resolution 1769 that establish UNAMID and as well blamed the government for the deteriorating humanitarian situation. Although the Sudanese government have denied these charges, what cannot be denied is that the security situation in Darfur has not improved. In spite of its successes, it could be said that just like the AMIS, the UNAMID as of now has not been able to guarantee the protection of civilians caught-up in the conflict in Darfur.

**The Canadian Contribution in Darfur: Diplomacy, Development, Security**

Generally speaking, Canada’s commitment to Darfur portrays a mixture of heavy emphasis on rhetoric and less substantial contribution of resources to resolve the violent conflict that has claimed several thousands of lives and displaced millions across the African continent. Consistent with the idea of protecting human security by proxy, the Liberal government of Paul Martin relied heavily on the AU leadership and adopted a three-pronged approach in the areas of diplomacy, development, and security, to respond to the Darfur crisis. The three-pronged approach—diplomacy, development, and security—originated from the 2005 *International Policy Statement: A role of Pride and Influence in the World*, in which the Liberal government proposed to breath a new life into Canada’s global responsibilities with regards to the military, international assistance and diplomatic presence that has suffered as a result of the budget cuts in the 1990s. It is noteworthy that the Harper government has not drifted away from the three-pronged approach although there are notable differences in terms of the resource contribution and the general commitment to protect human security in Darfur.

With the notable exception of development assistance, the Liberal government’s efforts in the areas of diplomacy and security were channelled through the AU. On diplomacy, the Liberal government was an active participant in the Darfur peace process and used both bilateral and multilateral channels including statements in the UN, to put pressure on the Sudanese government to end the human rights abuses and the violence in Darfur. Although multilateralism played a key role at the diplomatic front, emphasis was placed on bilateral relations with the AU. Canada was among the few countries that were invited by the AU to participate in the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks which was a major AU diplomatic effort to find a peaceful settlement to the Darfur crisis. The Liberal government provided financial support and expert advice through the Canadian diplomats in Abuja to the AU in the course of the Abuja Peace Talks. For instance, as at October 2007, Canadian funding to the Abuja Peace Talks totalled $229, 143.68. Of course this contribution could be seen as limited and symbolic, yet it kept the government engaged in the peace process in Darfur.

Prime Minister Paul Martin appointed a Special Advisory Team in May 2005 led by his Personal Representative for Africa, Robert Fowler, and including Senators Mobina Jaffer and Romeo Dallaire to strengthen Canada’s diplomatic engagement in support of the AU leadership on Darfur. The expertise of the advisory team cannot be overemphasised. Among his experience on Africa, Ambassador Robert Fowler served as Prime Minister Chrétien Special
Representative on Africa and the Sherpa of the G8 Summit in Kananaskis in 2002, when Canada assumed a leadership role in promoting the NEPAD initiative. Senator Mobina Jaffer is the first Muslim and the first African born to sit in the Canadian Senate. Thus as an African and a Muslim she brought an important experience to engage the Muslim dominated Sudanese government. On his part, Senator Romeo Dallaire had in-depth experience in African conflicts as the commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in the early 1990s. In short, the knowledge of the advisory team on Africa added some importance to the Liberal government’s commitment to Darfur as it showed an attempt to bridge the gap between rhetoric and practice. Apart from participating in the Abuja Peace Talks, the Special Advisory Team had the mandate to oversee all aspects of Canada’s initiatives in Darfur including the files of the Darfur Task Force that was set up in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT). In putting words into action, the Liberal government requested that the AU Commission Chairperson, Alpha Oumar Konare, make time to meet Ambassador Robert Fowler in Brussels on May 16, 2005 to discuss the Canadian support to the Darfur peace process.25 Thus at the diplomatic level, the Liberal government showed its commitment to working with the AU and therefore appears to have embraced the AU slogan of “African solutions to Africa’s problems”.

The Martin government’s diplomatic engagement on Darfur was also focused on using forums such as the G8, and the UN where Canada played an active role in the Human Rights Council to ensure the Council’s involvement in monitoring the human rights situation in Darfur. The multilateral diplomacy in the UN culminated in Canada’s co-chairmanship with the United States of the “Friends of UNAMID” which aims at ensuring the swift and full deployment of UNAMID troops in Darfur. In addition, the Liberal government was the first to make a voluntary contribution of $500,000 to assist the International Criminal Court (ICC) in its investigations in Darfur when the Security Council in its resolution 1593 passed on March 31, 2005 decided to refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC.26 As a result on March 4, 2009 the prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, issued arrest warrants for key Sudanese government officials including the President, Umar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Darfur.27

In the area of development assistance, the Liberal government policy did not depend on AU leadership although it complimented the overall peace efforts led by the AU. Canadian aid was sent directly to Sudan especially through CIDA. Nonetheless, the Liberal government contributed $500,000 to the AU for humanitarian issues out the $4million that was allocated in the 2002 Canada fund for Africa in support of strengthening the peace and security capacity of the AU.28 Concerning the actual assistance to Darfur, Canadian aid efforts under the Liberals and the Conservatives, concentrated on bilateral and multilateral aid through CIDA and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund at the World Bank. Since 2005, Canada has pledged over $135 million of aid to Sudan including $85 million for humanitarian assistance and $50million for reconstruction.29 CIDA’s bilateral aid is mainly focused on humanitarian assistance in three priority areas which are the reintegration of IDPs; mine action; and governance.30 The Canadian funding in the World Bank’s Multi-Donor Trust Fund is focused on post-conflict reconstruction projects. Related to this, the DFAIT’s Stabilisation and Reconstruction Task Force (START) is assisting in areas such as the implementation of Sudan’s peace agreements, the rule of law, the
reduction of small arms, and community security in Darfur.31 By initiating these projects it can be said that the Liberal government appeared committed not only to the political settlement of the Darfur conflict but as well, the rebuilding of Darfur to protect human security.

On security, the Liberal government’s contribution to ensure “boots on the ground” is the most elaborate of all the support towards the Darfur peace process and portrays more clearly what I call the protection of human security by proxy—the extensive reliance on the AU leadership through the AMIS intervention. In the AU, Canada found a means to avoid the direct deployment of Canadian troops as part of the international efforts to end the violence in Darfur. Indeed some have argued that the unwillingness of the Canadian government to deploy Canadian Peacekeepers on the ground signifies a retreat from the promotion of the R2P doctrine. (Nossal 2005; Black and Shaw 2007) One can agree with this view, but without UN authorisation, the idea of protecting human security by proxy provided an alternative route for the Canadian government to deploy troops in Darfur through the AMIS intervention and recently through the UNAMID by the Harper government. Although there are differences in policies of the governments, such as the Conservatives preference for the UNAMID intervention, yet both the Liberal and the Conservative governments worked bilaterally with the AU and also multilaterally especially through NATO to provide airlift capability and the training of AMIS staff.32

Under Martin, the support to AMIS was conceived as part of the long term process of strengthening the capacity of the AU to enable it to undertake its peace and security mandate in Africa as enshrined in Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act—intervention in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.33 The Liberal government placed emphasis on Canada’s willingness to provide support to the military and the police personnel of AMIS based on AU’s request and depending on Canada’s capacity.34 In this context, the Martin government supported AMIS with expert advice, logistics and equipment, and financial contributions. The government provided experts to the AU to establish an Information Analysis Cell (IAC) which was part of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) that was among other things charged with strategic planning, procurement and logistics, liaising with AU partners, and management support. The Martin government provided equipment and bore the cost of related personnel of the Canadian information support team that provided training to the AMIS personnel.35

Related to the IAC, Canadian technical contribution is notable in other areas such as the establishments of the joint logistics operation center, map production, and assisting in the intelligence capability of AMIS.36 Through Operation AUGURAL and operation SATURN,37 the Canadian military lent 105 Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) or Armoured Vehicles General Purpose (AVGPs) made up of 100 Grizzlies and 5 Husky to AMIS operation in Darfur. In addition, the Canadian military provided more than $1.4 million worth of basic army equipments including 2000 fragmentation vests and 1900 protective helmets to AMIS.38 The Liberal government also provided aviation assistance through contracted helicopters to AMIS. It is noteworthy that since the transformation of AMIS to UNAMID in January 2008, the Harper government has committed $40million to purchase equipment and to provide training to African countries that are deploying military and civilian police to UNAMID. Even though the Harper government has retreated from Africa and is concentrating on Afghanistan and the
Americas since it came to power, Canada is the second largest voluntary contributor to UNAMID.39

Finally, apart from the technical support and the provision of equipments, the Canadian government’s cash contributions to AMIS stood at $26, 708,340 at the end of October 2007. Most of this funding was spent on aviation fuel as well as AMIS and civilian police Accommodations.40 Related to Darfur, Canada provided support to the UN Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS) which was mandated to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that was signed by the government of Sudan and the SPLA/M on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. The CPA brought an end to the civil war between Northern and Southern Sudan. Apparently, the overarching purpose of Canada’s contributions to the Darfur peace process was to support the African military and the police personnel to protect civilians in Darfur as well as to bring peace to that region. In doing this, the Canadian governments (both Liberals and Conservatives) found it more convenient to provide financial and material support without putting Canadian forces in harm’s way in Darfur.

Assessing the Canadian Contribution to Darfur

Canada’s support to AMIS especially under the Liberals acknowledged the authority and the leadership of the AU to intervene in the Darfur conflict. The Conservative government also see AU leadership as important when it argued that “regional organisations are often best placed to make the most efficient contributions to peace operations. They are closer to the situation and are able to respond quickly. They understand local sensitivities. And their involvement builds regional stability.”41 It is important to add that the Liberal government’s previous experience with the AU served as a motivating factor for the reliance on AMIS to protect human security in Darfur. To be sure, Darfur is not the first time that Canada has provided assistance to the AU or other Pan-African organisations to undertake peace support operations in Africa. For instance in the 1990s the Liberal government provided financial support to the OAU missions in states such as Burundi and Rwanda and during Ethiopia-Eritrea war.42 (Mathews 2005; Powell 2005) Nonetheless, a senior AU official opined that the Liberal government’s support to the AMIS operation in Darfur “is the watershed” of Canada’s bilateral peace and security relations with the AU.43

Canada’s ‘faith’ in the AMIS especially by the Martin government is well acknowledged by AU officials. According to AU officials the Martin government was flexible and attached no conditions to Canadian assistance to AMIS unlike other states such as the United States, the EU and the UK. For instance at the Brussels Donor conference on Darfur, the United States support to AMIS was tied as it asked the AU to send 2 battalion instead of 6 battalion to Darfur. As well, the United States asked African states that contributed troops to AMIS to sign agreements because some of the parts of the Canadian grizzlies that were leased to the AMIS by the Liberal government were made in the USA.44 But as a sign of its flexibility, the Liberal government allowed the AU to use an amount of $750,000 from the Canada fund for Africa for the strengthening the AU peace and security capacity to support the Abuja Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks.45 The Special Advisory Team that was appointed by Prime Minister Paul Martin, as well as other financial and logistical assistance to the AMIS contributed to the successful negotiations and the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5, 2006. The Abuja Peace Talks
produced four important protocols on humanitarian, security, political questions, and economic and social issues, as well as the declaration of principles that is to guide the future deliberations of the Sudanese parties, and also constituted the basis for the just, comprehensive and durable settlement of the violent conflict in Darfur.46

The Liberal government could have done more to match its rhetoric with resources, nevertheless, its contributions helped to strengthen the operational capacity of AMIS in Darfur thereby improving Canada’s image in Africa and reinforcing its ‘moral leadership’ as a non-colonising power in Africa. A senior AU official who had extensive participation in the negotiation for the Canadian government’s assistance to AMIS opined that the Liberal government did not interfere in AU politics because it did not want to incur “the wrath” or displeasure of the 53 African states which make up the AU. As a result, the Liberal government maintained a friendly and independent approach to the AU-led intervention in Darfur.47 The government’s non-interference in the AU politics is not to suggest that Canada was passive to AU leadership in the promotion of human security in Darfur. Rather, this attitude reinforced the believe among AU officials that Canada does not project a belligerent posture in Africa as the Liberal government showed sincerity to help the AMIS to be operationally effective in Darfur. The AU officials saw the Liberal government as a more committed and reliable partner.48

Even though the Martin government’s assistance to AMIS was limited and at times symbolic, the Harper government has retreated substantially from supporting AMIS by shifting its policy in favour of the deployment of UNAMID—Harper’s choice of proxy to protect human security in Darfur. Perhaps the shift in policy was due to the fact that AMIS could not bring peace to Darfur. The rampant human rights abuses including rape by the government-sponsored Janjaweed militia and the continuation of the violence has claimed over 300000 lives and displaced several millions as IDPs and refugees. (Williams 2006; Zwanenburg 2006; De Waal 2007; Udombana 2007) Even though the Martin government was a staunch supporter and a leading contributor to AMIS, officials of the AU opined that what Canada provided became ‘Canadian owned and Canadian controlled’. For instance, one of the key factors responsible for the inability of AMIS to carry out its mandate efficiently was that the Information Analysis Cell (IAC) which was set up by the Canadian government as part of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) was managed and controlled by Canadian officers and was not successfully integrated into AMIS.49 In the end, the IAC could not provide timely briefings to the mission commander on the ground in Darfur. Furthermore, in terms of the material support to AMIS field operations, the AU officials argued that the APCs that were supplied by the Canadian military were old and difficult to operate. According to some key AU officials some of the APCs could not even move from the airport to the frontlines where civilian lives were at risk. Similarly, the aircraft were old and the flight hours was not enough as it was tied to the amount of fuel supplied. The net result of these operational difficulties was that it contributed to a situation whereby much time was spent on repairs and training instead of deploying and equipping AMIS personnel at the frontlines to protect civilians.50 The resource challenges deprived AMIS of the capacity to create the secured environment necessary for the delivery of humanitarian aid.

The critical views of the AU officials paralleled those that were expressed from within Canada in the context of the Martin government’s commitment to promote human security based on the principles of the R2P. One insightful Canadian observer who was involved
extensively in the process leading to the creation of the Landmines Treaty, the R2P and the ICC, opined that “Canada’s response to issues in Africa is generally unplanned and done spontaneously”. He goes on to argue that Canada does not have vested interest in Africa and that “Canada’s support to Africa is because there is just some money available to spend.” Similarly, a Canadian official who was posted as part of the technical team that supported AMIS argued that “Canada joined in Darfur by accident as the Canadian military’s involvement was not planned. The 105 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) which were leased to AMIS were surplus equipment and outdated”. It stands to reason that although Canada has a positive image as a committed and reliable partner of the AU its support to AMIS in Darfur appears not to meet the expectation of even some Canadian officials. The above shows the apathy in Canadian foreign policy in Darfur and not surprising some critics such as Mathews (2005) have concluded that Canada’s efforts towards the peacebuilding process in Darfur lacks in generosity. In short, the Canadian contribution suggests not only a policy of human security by proxy but also human security on the cheap.

In comparing the efforts of the Liberal and the Conservative governments, however, it is fair to say that the Liberal government showed much interest and commitment to support AMIS and the protection of human security in Darfur. The Conservative government has reduced both the rhetoric and the resource contribution to Darfur, except perhaps through its support to UNAMID and recently naming Sudan as one of CIDA’s countries of focus. It is quite ironic and surprising that even though the Harper government does not show keen interest in the Martin government’s approach to Darfur, it is riding on ‘the past glory’ in respect of the policies that were initiated by the Martin government. In fact the human security concept and the R2P doctrine are scarcely mentioned by the Harper government in respect to Darfur. One notable occasion when Harper himself referred to the R2P was through the 2008 Canada-EU Summit Statement that proposed to “deepen...the dialogue on issues related to the responsibility to protect with the objective of providing greater operational scope for this concept”.

Generally speaking, Canadian foreign policy under the Harper government has shifted towards the traditional focus on protecting Canadian national security. (McRae 2007) According to some insiders, the Conservative government does not want to be associated with anything concerning the promotion of human security that was initiated by the Liberal government. The Special Advisory Team that was appointed by Paul Martin was dissolved immediately Harper came to power. The Harper government is not open to public dialogue with groups such as the Sudan Inter-Agency Reference Group that met with the DAFIT’s Sudan Taskforce set up by the Liberal government. In fact the Sudan Taskforce has been scrapped as the officials were transferred to work on other security issues concerning Afghanistan. At the parliamentary level, the House of Commons have scarcely carried out any serious debate on promoting human security in Darfur since October 2006. The deterioration security situation in Darfur and the Harper government’s inaction led Senator Hugh Segal to argue in the Senate that “the situation in Darfur is a classic example of how our collective inaction may destroy even the idea of the Responsibility to Protect”. He went on to suggest that “… what is needed immediately... not only in Canada...is how far we are prepared to go exactly with the obligation for the Responsibility to Protect”.

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Darfur does not feature on the priorities of the Harper government. At a meeting with African diplomats in Ottawa on January 20, 2009, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lawrence Cannon, stated the geographic priorities of the Harper government as lying in Afghanistan, Americas and the emerging markets. He goes on to argue that “it may be difficult to see many of your (African) countries reflected in our geographic priorities, but you may recall that Canada’s foreign policy is also anchored in our respect for the values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law”. In relation to this, in 2006, Peter Mackay who was Harper’s foreign minister in a speech at the UN on Darfur argued that “the responsibility to protect must now move from abstract words to clear action”. While these statements gives some assurance of the Harper government’s commitment to promote human rights and to end the human tragedy in Darfur, the government’s rhetoric does not match the reality. At the financial level, Canada has spent $7.5 billion in Afghanistan since 2001 which is far more than the $477 million that has been spent in Darfur since 2006. And although Canadian troops are deployed to Afghanistan, the Harper government has made it clear that Canada will not contribute troops to UNAMID in Darfur. Perhaps the Harper government’s policy for not contributing troops is a response to the Sudanese government’s objection to non-African troops especially from Western countries. Nonetheless, the decision not to send troops to Darfur and the overall apathy towards the humanitarian crises there tarnishes Canada’s reputation and commitment to peacekeeping. (Dorn 2005; Bratt 2007) Perhaps in order to cut Canadian support to AMIS, the Harper government quickly joined the call to transfer AMIS to the UNAMID in January 2008, as Canada’s policy on Darfur shifted from the AU to the UN.

To a large extent, both the Martin and the Harper governments’ policy towards Darfur validates the claim by some critics (Hampson and Oliver 2001; Stairs 2003; Nossal 2005) that Canada increasingly fails to punch above its weight as government policy is infused with self-serving rhetoric that is not equally matched with reality. Human security in Darfur cannot be protected ‘on the cheap’. There is the need to back the rhetoric with real resources to achieve the protection of people in Darfur if indeed Canadian foreign policy is anchored in the respect for freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Conclusion

The Canadian contribution to end the atrocity in Darfur will continue to attract debates among students of Canadian foreign policy. Yet in the midst of the diversity of opinions students can agree that there is a gap between the rhetoric and the reality of Canadian policy in Darfur. On the one hand, by working through the AU, the Liberal government appeared to have taken the right steps to protect human security in Darfur to demonstrate its commitment to bridge the gap between rhetoric and reality. Although the AMIS intervention could not deliver on its promise and was subsequently transformed to the UNAMID, the Liberal government remained actively engaged at least at the rhetorical level to stop the senseless killings in Darfur. On the contrary, perhaps students can agree that the protection of human security is impossible when both rhetoric and material resources are lacking especially as seen in the Conservative government’s policy in Darfur. The Harper government has made it clear not to send troops to Darfur and the government’s material support to the international effort has declined substantially.
To be sure, the Canadian contribution in Darfur was constrained not only by the inability of the Security Council to authorise intervention based on the R2P, but as well, the Sudanese government has objected to non-African troops in Darfur. As Ambassador Robert Fowler rightly pointed out, “civilians can only be protected within the limits of the possible”. This means that it is very difficult if not impossible to adequately protect human security in Darfur when there is a fierce resistance from the Sudanese government to non-African troops. In fact this has been the contention, but the contention has generated into an excuse of some Western governments including Canada for not contributing substantial and appropriate support to UNAMID. In these circumstances, one could therefore understand why the Liberals especially, and the Conservatives to some extent, relied on the AU leadership in Darfur. Thus, without international consensus in the UN to intervene in Darfur based on R2P principles, the Liberal government and Conservative governments found the idea of human security by proxy through the AMIS and UNAMID interventions a viable policy alternative to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.

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NOTES

1 I am grateful to the Canadian Consortium on Human Security (CCHS) that supported my fieldwork in Ottawa and Addis Ababa with a human security fellowship. I also thank University of Alberta’s Faculty of Graduate Studies (FGSR) that supported my travel to the CPSA conference. The Ideas expressed in this paper are entirely mine and in no way represent the views of the CCHS or the FGSR. This paper is a draft paper please do not cite.

2 Although the Darfur region over the past two decades has experienced intermittent low intensity conflicts, the current crises began when the Sudan Liberation Army launched an attack and captured Gulu, one of the Cities in Darfur in February 2003.


4 See, Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the African Union, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia


6 See Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis in Darfur), 5th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, 13 April 2004. CONF/PLG 3(1) pp.1-7

7 Ibid.
8 For details see “Communiqué on Darfur of the Solemn Launching of the 10th Meeting of the PSC”, Addis Ababa 25 May 2005. See also “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur (the Sudan) presented at the 12th Meeting of the PSC”, Addis Ababa 4 July 2004

9 For instance see the “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in the Sudan (Crisis in Darfur), 5th Meeting of the PSC”, Addis Ababa, 13 April 2004. CONF/PLG 3(1)

10 See the “Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur (the Sudan) presented at the 23rd Meeting of the PSC”, Libreville, Gabon 10 January 2005


12 See AU “Communiqué of the 17th Meeting of the PSC”, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 20 October 2004

13 ibid

14 As indicated, the Peace Agreement was signed between the government of the Sudan and the largest rebel group, the SPLA/M. The other party to the conflict, JEM has not signed the agreement.

15 The Sudanese government has on several occasions maintained that only African forces are welcomed in Darfur. The Sudanese government made it clear to the chief of defence staff, Rick Hiller, that non-African troops were not welcome in Darfur. Nossal (2005)


24 This information came from the AU Department of Finance during my field research in Ethiopia


30 Ibid

31 The overall Canadian aid programme in Darfur is provided within the context of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed between the government of the Sudan and the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi, Kenya. For full details see (http://www.unmis.org/English/documents/cpa-en.pdf) Also see (http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pic/sudan/library/humanitarianassistance-en.asp)


33 Interview with CIDA and DFAIT officials in Ottawa January 16, 2008

34 Letter Dated May 13, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission

35 Canadian Functions Under the MOU Concerning the Contribution of a Canadian Information Support Team to the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) 2006.

36 Letter Dated May 13, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission

37 Operation AUGURAL was set up by the Canadian Military to support AMIS. This has been transformed to Operation SATURN to support UNAMID. See “Canadian Forces Launches Contribution to UN-African Union Mission in Darfur” CEFCOM/COMFEC NR 08.008- February 4, 2008 (http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=2567) Accessed on September 27, 2008


AU Department of Finance


Interview with AU official in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 22, 2008

Interview with anonymous official at AU Addis Ababa, Ethiopia April 23, 2008

Letter Dated September 12, 2005 from the Canadian Embassy in Addis Ababa to the AU Commission

Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Darfur (the Sudan) presented at the 28th Meeting of the PSC, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 28 April 2005

Interview with an AU official

A summary of interview with AU officials in Addis Ababa

Ibid

Ibid.

Interview with anonymous former official of DFAIT in Ottawa on January 17, 2008

Interview with a Canadian forces personnel who was posted to Darfur as part of the technical support to AMIS


See Government of Canada, “Canada-EU Summit Statement” Quebec City, October 17, 2008

For Instance see the Conservative Government’s defence policy document, “Canada first Defence Strategy”

This view was expressed by an official of a prominent think tank based in Ottawa January 17, 2008

According to available records, the last time the House of Commons Debated the Darfur Crisis was October 3, 2006. In the Senate available records show the last debate was on March 27, 2007 See Debates of the Senate (Hansard) 1st Session, 39th Parliament Vol. 143 Issue 8 March, 27, 2007. Also See 39th Parliament, 1st Session edited Hansard no. 058 October, 3 2006

59 See, DFAIT, “Notes for an address by honourable Lawrence Cannon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to Heads of African Missions to Canada” Ottawa January 20, 2009


61 The Canadian government has spent $7.5 billion of Canadian in Afghanistan since 2001 as compared to the $500 million Canada fund for Africa of which $4 million and $15 million are allocated for the strengthening of the capacity for peace and security of the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States respectively. For more information see


63 Interview with Ambassador Robert Fowler Prime Ministers Chrétien/Martin Special Representative for Africa Ottawa January 24, 2008

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