“Resistance is futile”? Halifax’s experiences with multi-level governance in four policy fields

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Introduction

Halifax presents an interesting case study of the evolving nature of multi-level governance in Canada. Amalgamation and reshuffling of provincial-municipal financing in the 1990’s accentuated an enduring gulf in communications between this growing urban region and a province dominated by rural politicians. Fiscal restraint, federal off-loading to provinces and a neo-conservative regime in Ottawa affected Halifax, which has pressing fiscal needs in a politically fragmented, have-not province. Cities like Halifax are enmeshed in deepening layers of “multi-level” or “multi-order” governance as they confront complex challenges on infrastructure, immigration, land management and development, economic competition and security. While multi-level systems are often portrayed as equitable partnerships among government and non-governmental sectors (Leuprecht and Lazar, 2007), the Halifax experience reveals that such arrangements, however essential, create problems of coordination and accountability which work against efficient policy, limit public influence and reduce responsiveness.

This essay summarizes data collected for 4 policy areas for the Halifax Regional Municipality as part of the larger project on Public Policy in Municipalities. In each policy area, the focus is on major projects and activities. The study is based on interviews with stakeholders from government, private sector and non-governmental organizations. The interviews focused on core research questions, and were designed to determine what forms of intergovernmental interaction and societal input contributed to policy formulation in the HRM. While variations are evident, there are common patterns in the feedback received across policy fields. The findings suggest inter-governmental communication problems in all policy fields, and biases in the input process unfavourable to social interests. Municipal-provincial tensions, unfunded mandates and slow provision of federal funds were also primary concerns in all policy realms.

From historic community to contemporary metropolis

An historic community facing contemporary challenges, Halifax is a distinctive blend of traditional and contemporary economic, architectural and cultural forms. Founded in 1749 as a British naval outpost to counter the French at Louisburg, Halifax developed around the port and citadel. Though never attacked, it remained an important military outpost and node for wartime transatlantic shipping. Halifax pioneered in Canadian journalism, finance and education before losing status to larger centers. Development centered on governance, administration, military, commerce, education and health services. Based on British Caribbean commerce in the mid 1800s, Halifax experienced diversification into sail-based ship-building, and processing; beautiful commercial and religious structures remain downtown, giving the city a unique flavour despite the spread of homogenizing modern architecture. The era of rail and steel undermined Halifax, and the early 1900s saw corporate consolidation, political marginalization and economic stagnation (Acheson, 1977). World War I brought revival, marred by the Halifax explosion of 1917, a tragedy unparalleled in Canadian history. Consolidation of finance, transport and industry in Central Canada hampered adjustment to demobilization and economic change. Halifax did not recover much during World War II, as federal military and industrial policy favoured other regions even in ship-building. Regional leaders challenged federal policies, designed for electorally-dominant central Canada, which worsened economic weakness. (Forbes, 1979) Post war alterations in federal policy like equalization and regional development, despite imperfections, made Halifax into a regional centre of administration and commerce for the Atlantic Provinces.

Originally covering the core peninsula between the Harbour and the Northwest Arm, Halifax annexed several smaller entities. Suburbs grew across the harbour in Dartmouth after construction of bridges in 1955 and 1970 and later in Bedford and Sackville. The city almost lost a significant portion of its character when urban planners pressed for demolition of derelict waterfront properties
and construction of a harbourside highway. (Fraser 2007, B1) After this decision was thwarted, Halifax blossomed, with restoration, new construction and improved access to dockside drawing citizens and tourists downtown. Recent projects threaten to crowd out some historic districts as demand for office space favours high rises; heritage preservation remains a constant source of controversy. Though based around public institutions and governance, Halifax developed a agglomerative economy. (Macdonald, 2006, 18). The harbour remains crucial: shipping now approaches 6 million metric tones, one-third containerized. (Greater Halifax Partnership 2007).

Halifax’s metropolitan population increased 26% by percent between 1971 to 2001, from 264,421 to 360,000 inhabitants. (HRM Regional Planning Project, 2007). Its economy produces 47 per cent of Nova Scotia’s and 20% of Atlantic Canada's GDP. (Chronicle Herald 12 February 2007, A6). Unemployment rates are below national averages, at 4.5% in 2006-07, with 70% labour force participation, and 25,000 post-secondary students. Populated by the British, Halifax gradually and uncomfortably dealt with diversity. From Cornwallis’ notorious bounty on Mi’kmaq scalps, to Halifax’s role in the expulsion of the Acadians, to the relocation of the black community from Africville in the 1960s (Clairmont and Magill, 1973), Halifax has experienced racial tension. Diversity has increased. Alongside indigenous and African Canadian populations, a Lebanese community emerged from the 1800s. Karma Dzong Buddhists transplanted their headquarters from Colorado in 1985; 800 professionals brought new cultural and business ventures (Jones, 1991, F1). Immigrants are drawn by a healthy economy and Halifax outpaces the rest of the Maritimes in growth and diversity. But it has to adjust social and physical infrastructure to match such change. Yet, like other large cities, Halifax faced federal and provincial deficit reduction, which brought downloading of responsibilities with little sustainable revenue support.

Municipal Amalgamation and Governance

In the 1970s the Graham Royal Commission on Municipal Government proposed “metropolitan counties” for Halifax, with a rational boundary around projected suburban growth (Nova Scotia Royal Commission 2004). It ignored community loyalties in small municipalities which successfully resisted incorporation. By the 1990s, 4 municipalities governed the region: Halifax, Dartmouth, the Town of Bedford, and Halifax county, a sprawling rural area with an urban fringe. Piecemeal incorporation of suburbs left the county unviable. (Hobson et. al, 2005). To rationalize costs, the province experimented with trans-regional entities like Metro Transit. But it soon adopted a “consolidationist” approach, to create a “stronger and more accountable municipal government, greater efficiency in the provision of services and more fairness in allocating costs to residents”. (Sancton, 2002, 35). In 1992, the Conservative government’s Task Force on Local Government called for amalgamation, and predicted cost savings and efficiency gains, reduced duplication, and less administration per capita. Critics argued these predictions were too rosy and worried about accountability and community identity. Extension of services to rural areas with weak tax bases, and standardization of salaries and benefits would drive up costs. (Poel, 2000, 32-33). A critic of the merger as mayor of Dartmouth, Liberal Premier John Savage faced a fiscal shortfall and planned to revamp revenues and responsibilities to streamline provincial-municipal finances. To counter concerns about downloading costs and removal of municipal sales tax exemptions, the province funded social services, justice, and health, while municipalities paid for police and local roads (Department of Municipal Affairs, 1993).

In 1996, the Liberals arranged a forced merger of Metropolitan Halifax, including the entire county, urban and rural. The government predicted savings of $18 million annually, with reduced taxes and increased economic activity. (Canadian Press (Oct. 27, 1994). The unilateral approach resembled mergers elsewhere in Canada, with no plebiscite to gauge support or provide legitimacy (Feldman and Graham, 1997, 167). Efficiencies and cost savings were the stated objectives (Sancton, 2001, 548), but a real goal may have been to eliminate “dysfunctional business park competition” (Poel, 2000, 33). It was a politically expedient decision, which did not follow
Graham’s plan to rationalize urban space. Rebalancing services and revenues would be disastrous for the County while lucrative for the cities, making the shift politically unviable. So the new Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) incorporated vast districts which will not urbanize in the foreseeable future, creating long term challenges of “serving both urban and rural residents simultaneously” (Sancton, 2002, 64).

The HRM merger reflected the shifting character of multi-level government in Canada, in an era of fiscal restraint and federal off-loading of costs to provinces, which had to reorganize municipal finances to compensate. In Vojnovic’s words, “the new surge in the municipal consolidation advocacy is linked with political and fiscal trends common to all the provinces. As the federal government shifts a greater portion of the financial burden on the provinces, the provinces readjust their own finances by placing greater fiscal responsibility for local governance on the municipalities. In this process of fiscal reorganization, the provinces want to promote the rationalization of municipal functions by attempting to improve municipal efficiency, hence the push for consolidation.” (Vojnovic, 2000, 412). The province viewed amalgamation as a solution to crushing debt. (Stewart, 2000, 205). But the “forced” merger bred “resentment” between levels of government. (Vojnovic, 2000, 412).

The HRM covers 5,577 square kilometers, larger than PEI. It includes 200 communities, mostly rural. The government structure reflects expansion of the urban regime. HRM has 23 municipal districts, represented by Regional Councilors. The Mayor is elected-at-large. The municipality is governed by the Council and Chief Administrative Officer (CAO). HRM “assigns all administrative responsibility to the CAO, who reports directly to the elected Council” (HRM Regional Planning, 2007). The mixed responses on HRM’s 10th anniversary indicated persisting disparate interests and loyalties. The conurbation is diverse, with 70% of residents crowded into 5% of the municipality near Halifax harbour; the huge rural areas contain only 3% of the population. (Vojnovic, 2000b, 65). Planners suggest that the “unique blend of urban and rural geography is a defining characteristic. It is our strength, not our weakness”. The blend is “one of interdependence rather than irreconcilable differences.” (HRM, 2005, 6) However, urban rural divisions have created intra-municipal tension, as issues like highway upgrades, taxes and landfills pit rural and suburban councilors against those from the urban core.

Stewart suggests it is difficult to view the merger as anything other than a short-term “failure”. (Stewart, 2000, 205). A few services appear to have improved, with public satisfaction on libraries, recreation and policing. The merger did not save revenues but did reduce competition for economic investment and allowed a rational policy to promote growth. A former city chief administrative officer conceded that reducing political representation did not reduce costs; transition expenses ran to $25-30 million with no provincial compensation; savings in police and fire services were “difficult to quantify in that they occurred in the context of the "service exchange" exercise”. (Mavroyannis, 2002, 1011). Union allowed coordination of business promotion via the Greater Halifax Partnership which brought “more efficient use of resources, greater municipal stakeholder accountability, and responsibility for longer-range planning” Nevertheless, there was much to learn from the merger about how to integrate units with different governance cultures, financial regimes and political structures; “a more successful amalgamation would have resulted in greater cost sharing and a more efficient governance structure to respond to larger regional issues” (Mavroyannis, 2002, 1011).

The merger was hotly contested, but the political scene stabilized when a critic of the merger, Peter Kelly, was elected mayor in 2000. (Sancton, 2003). But council deliberations have been complicated as urban-rural divisions create prolonged debates and problematic decisions. Overall the city is tussling with expansion and modernization while building on its historical, cultural and aesthetic distinctiveness. Battles over downtown projects and complaints about inadequate protections for heritage premises reveal the uncomfortable mix of the old and new. The
city’s regional plan, adopted with much fanfare, pledges to “ensure opportunities for the protection of open space, wilderness, natural beauty and sensitive environmental areas”, giving hope that Halifax will preserve its character as the “city of trees”. (Halifax Regional Planning, 2007).

However, this dictum has not prevented new high density areas or barren suburbs where monster homes crowd together, with removal of tree cover, barren gaps in Halifax’s arboreal green carpet. Upscale uniformity has been brought by developers, who have not hesitated to build their own homes by demolishing a heritage property and constructing a massive concrete block directly on the bucolic Northwest Arm. The regional plan emphasizes greenspace and recreational upgrades, but projects have been concentrated in areas of high-end growth, supporting profitable development not established neighbourhoods. (The Coast, 22 May, 2008).

Similarly the “Halifax by Design” exercise for the downtown core produced detailed and promising guidelines for balancing heritage with new infill and high-rise development; yet developers rushed non-conforming plans into place before its enactment, threatening prime waterfront and heritage districts and secrecy provisions in the bill concern some activists. Halifax is an ecological leader on recycling, composting, and pesticides bans, marked by the green bins and dandelions which dot its streets. But paradoxically, new neighbourhoods include covenants banning clotheslines as unsightly, favouring energy-hogging dryers. Progress has been made in preserving beautiful parks and improving waterfront access; but wilderness and wetland sites have been despoiled by development and highways; roads and parking lots jut into lakes or waterways, leading some to ponder lost opportunities to enhance the city’s unique character.

Many contend that HRM is less responsive to local concerns and the bureaucracy dismissive of popular input. A traffic calming exercise in a wealthy neighbourhood proceeded at great expense despite protests from motorists. A senior traffic official declared that he had authority to proceed with controversial traffic lights and that if “council votes against the short-cutting plan, I would say regardless, the installation will stay in … Council will not be asked whether the traffic signals will be in or out.” (Daily News, 7 November 1999, 3). While this official later backtracked, such responses seem too common despite the commitment to consultation in planning. When council expressed concerns respecting a spate of pedestrian fatalities at crosswalks, and called for more lights at such crossings, another official declared: "Irrespective of what decisions council makes . . . I am not prepared to install them . . . at unnecessary locations," (Pugsley Fraser, April 5, 2007, B1).

Some respondents sense that the democratic deficit in the region is pronounced, and accountability is not a priority for city officials. The use of police force and spate of arrests in the Chebucto road widening project and the tear gassing of anti-globalization protestors suggest a willingness to use coercion to impose measures developed by officials and consultants, with lip-service to popular input. Divided votes on road expansion and high-rise projects give the impression that residents in the urban core have been disenfranchised, outvoted by suburban and rural councilors. In-camera meetings on development and zoning enhance the perception that the city is out of touch, notwithstanding the high-profile consultation process in the regional planning process.

This essay examines four issue areas, selected as part of the larger project on public policy in municipalities in multi-level governance – federal property disposal, infrastructure, image-building and urban aboriginal policy. These four areas will be assessed with a focus on the quality of policy and the state of democracy in the HRM. The cases will be used to reflect on whether the perceived democratic deficit can be attributed to the complexities of multi-level governance, and whether responsiveness can be improved by reconfiguring collaboration among levels of government. The cases reveal a fundamental disconnect between citizen and city and provincial decision makers, in a social setting favouring inputs by some interests over others, compounded by a profound disconnect of urban and rural interests.

Federal Property
The immense public sector in this capital city and regional governance centre makes the disposal of public lands and buildings significant; “[p]ublicly-owned property in the Capital District makes up approximately 50% of the land area. A strategy around the disposal and development of public lands is needed to ensure the region benefits long-term.” (HRM, Capital District Case Study 2003, 3). The cases of federal property disposal and conversion discussed here indicate that an effective strategy has yet to be implemented. Respondents suggested that Halifax has a passive approach, and is not proactive in seeking uses for federal property, particularly for social housing. These cases of federal property dispersion illustrate the halting, uncoordinated nature of the process.

Halifax has been affected by the sell-off of defense properties notably the Shearwater airbase near Dartmouth, which was downsized in the 1990s. Most of this large base was turned over to Canada Lands Corporation. CLC serves “as a real estate agent when it resells some of these properties … as a developer servicing lots for sale to home builders and as serviced industrial sites” or as a service provider “building/owning/managing business and industrial parks”. (Watson, 2003). CLC is mandated to seek commercial value for surplus properties. DND kept one quarter of the site for helicopter operations but transferred fixed-wing aircraft to Greenwood. DND is a major employer, and its bases have been economic mainstays in HRM. An official noted “We have a long history with DND and the closing of Shearwater was a huge hit for us, although any reduction of DND's sizeable and very valuable presence for the municipality is always a concern.” (Watson 2003, 34). To preserve economic activity, base closures must be handled effectively and sustainable uses found for the properties. However, delays in redeveloping Shearwater illustrate how personal and partisan agendas complicate the process.

With well developed runways, Shearwater is directly proximate to rail, highway and port facilities – perfect for an intermodal transport node. Business leaders suggested the base, which also had extensive land for commercial development, could become a post-Panamax container facility, and a site for just-in-time manufacturing, with no peer on the eastern seaboard. (Macdonald, 2000). A private group, Shearwater Development Corporation, received $2.5 million to attract business, including air cargo ventures; but it went out of business in 1999 without success, and was sued by creditors and by the city for unpaid taxes. (Chronicle-Herald 24 August, 1999, A5). The Corporation blamed DND for not ceding valuable waterfront properties or providing links between buildings. DND did not even turn over a full runway (the middle was retained for military use). The province accused Ottawa of overcharging for land, and refused to bail out the Corporation without a right of first refusal, which CLC rules prohibited since federal agencies had first choice. (Daily News 8 February 1999, 5). Subsequent to the collapse of the SDC, DND sold 373.12 hectares to the CLC, though later swapping some hectares to meet changing requirements. DND’s decision to upgrade the helicopter contingent and convert Shearwater to a Heliport (DND Backgrounder, 2007), remove old runways and continue naval use permitted only limited commercial, light industrial and residential development. Hence a lucrative opportunity for inter-modal port development was diverted in part by intergovernmental infighting. But stakeholders agreed that renewed DND investment in the heliport and commitment to its long-term continuance provided the best alternative for the site. (Email from business lobbyist, 2007).

Shannon Park, a downsized base in Dartmouth, with highway and coastal access, brought together all 4 policy areas: federal property, infrastructure, image-building and urban aboriginals. The Commonwealth Games committee sought to use this site. Had this bid been successful, it would have required infrastructure contributions from all levels of government. A successful land clam was made on a portion of the property by a Mi’maq community, devastated by the Halifax explosion and relocated to Millbrook. (The Coast 29 Jan – 4 Feb 2004). The Shannon Park site was mired in bureaucratic uncertainty which delayed redevelopment of boarded-up military housing. The local school provided French immersion and the community sought to ensure its viability. DND gave the school to the school board but held on to the rest of the site. Social groups proposed
making buildings available quickly for affordable housing, which was in short supply. Residents of this high-density district, which had many low-cost apartment complexes, feared that social housing would compound existing social problems. Opposition to affordable housing was lead by the District 9 Citizens’ group and by high profile political figures, who declared: “Shannon Park will not be more social housing while I am alive – “should not, will not and shall not happen while I am alive!” (Interview with retired MLA, 20 July, 2006).

Delays caused a loss of funds from the National Housing Initiative. Social actors suggested that HRM’s lack of interest in affordable housing contributed to this missed opportunity. Compared to similarly-sized cities, Halifax has not maximized potential from the NHI on federal property conversion. A federal politician suggested that the problems with federal property disposal reflected bureaucratic conflicts and politicians’ desire to leave a legacy; social housing’s stigma made conversion contentious, even if federal policy officially promoted this use. (Interview with Federal MP, 2 August, 2006). Plans for social housing at Shannon Park were waylaid by the Commonwealth Games bid. Commonwealth Park, with a new stadium, aquatic centre, and field house, would help attract sporting events and franchises in professional soccer or football and would leave a legacy to the HRM. Environmentally friendly housing at the 6,000 bed athletes’ village would provide a residential component, with “a marina, ferry terminal and walking trails”. (Smulders 2005). The collapse of the games bid again left the Shannon site mired in political uncertainty, though proposals for sports complexes, social housing and ferry connections were touted for future infrastructure funds. (Taylor 2009).

A unique opportunity to use federal property for social housing involved the proposed conversion of the downtown Sir John Thompson Building into a retirement home for performing artists. This campaign was lead by the Performing Artists League (PAL), which coordinated contacts with politicians and agencies such as Public Works and Human Resources and Social Development, as well as CLC. Intervention by provincial officials complicated the matter. While PAL and the YMCA planned to share the building under the Surplus Federal Real Property for Homelessness Initiative, (SFRPHI) provincial funds were also needed. The province wanted to determine the building’s use and proposed sections for homeless people and battered women, as well as artists; one provincial official declared: “It will be my way or the highway.” (Interview with consultant, 16 August, 2006). PAL argued that this would be unworkable given the province’s time-limited support for the homeless and abused. Eventually the property was turned over to CLC for commercial disposal. PAL blamed “a lack of political will” with federal officials hesitant to antagonize a province seeking to minimize costs. (Interview with consultant, 16 August, 2006). The federal approach emphasized commercial value in the sale of buildings, which took precedence over social concerns. (Taylor, 2004).

These cases indicate the uncoordinated multi-level collaboration on federal property. Inter-jurisdictional and inter-agency rivalries limited efforts to implement agreements to ensure best use. Though business goals were sometimes derailed by the inconsistent process, abandoned sites, like the DND storage facility on Gladstone Avenue are often used condo and residential development. Social concerns have been marginalized. Observers cannot recall a single social housing development which followed SFRPHI guidelines; the lure of profit and property taxes link city and developers and limit influence by social forces. Privatization of some federal assets have complicated matters; a former federally owned railway is abandoning lines and seeking high prices for land desired by the city for recreation or transport corridors, and has rushed lands to developers before greenways or trails could be put into place. (Halifax Urban Greenway, 2008). At time of writing, slow municipal approvals threatened offers of federal and municipal support for such valuable recreational conversions. (Email to author from HUG officer, March 2009).

Infrastructure Programs
Infrastructure development, or the provision of “physical overhead capital” is crucial to urban development and subject to intense political debate as an economic motor and a means to promote “class interests”. (Andrew and Morrison, 2002, 237-9). Several federal infrastructure initiatives have been used for HRM projects, including rural and suburban sewer and water upgrades, recreation and sports facilities and community centres. The Municipal Rural Infrastructure Fund has been used to construct rural fire stations and provide well upgrades. The Canada Strategic Infrastructure Fund would have contributed to infrastructure for the now abandoned Commonwealth Games. City officials expressed awareness of constitutional constraints, as dealings with Ottawa must respect provincial priorities; but federal-municipal and tri-level interactions on infrastructure were evident. Despite helpful changes in attitudes, some provincial agencies remain inflexible and “difficult”. (Interview with intergovernmental affairs officials, 11 July 2006). The city has extensive needs and ambitious plans for infrastructure – a high speed ferry, arterial roadways, modernized stormwater and wastewater piping, rural broadband expansion, recreation facilities and suburban services. Yet the key problem is the province and city’s lack of financing, which makes federal contributions essential. (HRM Initiatives, Summer 2006, 1-2, 7-8).

One project dominated multi-level infrastructure debates for years – the much-delayed Halifax harbour cleanup. Although the harbour provides much of the city’s ambience, its waters have been spoiled by the continual dumping of untreated sewage. Ottawa’s assistance was essential for the ambitious Harbour Solutions Project, to channel sewage through water treatment facilities. The need was evident for years, with loss of recreational use and embarrassing odors and beach refuse plaguing citizens and tourists. The city raised charges on municipal water bills for years, with some funds used for sewer upgrades. Amalgamation complicated matters, as some communities treated sewage prior to joining HRM; some disputed whether it was fair for all residents to pay a surcharge. A surplus accumulated from the surcharge and the city committed to the project before confirming federal or provincial funding. On its own, HRM sought bids for construction and operation of the treatment system. (Flinn, 1999, 7). Proposals were debated for 3 decades while sewage volume rose to 100 million liters per day. (Jackson, 2000, A10). This project demonstrates the problems of communication, political and partisan tension and fiscal pressures affecting multi-level governance in HRM. Financing was a major problem; a tri-level agreement collapsed when costs escalated in the 1990s. Councilors feared the city would have to pay the full cost since it started alone. Uncertainty surrounding provincial and federal commitments of funds lead to continuing delay. Critics suggest that wrangling lead to delayed and sub-par policy choices.

City officials proposed a public-private partnership, letting a private consortium run the plants for 30 years. A consultative exercise recommended in favor of a public utility. “The area of greatest concern is that of ensuring that the community’s dependence on a service as important as sewage treatment is reflected in guarantees that the service is driven by public priorities as opposed to private sector priorities. Ultimately, the safeguard is public ownership and control of the facilities”. (Harbour Solutions Advisory Committee, 1998, 26). Some councilors felt the city could run the plants more economically while others feared pressure from a private operator for surcharges to boost profits. (Simpson, 2000, A1). Business leaders and think tanks supported a public-private option. The chamber of commerce declared the P3 option was in the “interests of taxpayers” by blending the “public interest” with the “discipline” and “efficiency” of the market. (Doig, 2000, A2). This approach eventually gained the support of the Mayor and top city officials. While council called for a “shadow bid” to price the costs of going it alone, the private sector preferred a “reference bid” which private bidders could review and match. Officials opted for the latter approach. Critical councilors claimed bureaucrats ignored council and rigged the process to favor private firms. “I shouldn’t use the word sham but this exercise to produce a dummy bid… I’ll bet you the first $100 that comes out of my pocket it comes back and recommends a private-sector approach”. (Maich, 2000, A1). The “reference bid” was supervised by a firm that had already
reported in favour of a public-private system. A local editorial noted, “The call for proposals went out during a two-week council break with the mayor and some councilors out of town at a conference; even as a coincidence the appearances are murky” (Daily News 5 June, 2000, 10).

Officials proceeded with the approach advocated by the Chamber of Commerce. Critics claimed this indicated that business distorted the bid process. A spokesperson for environmental NGOs noted that, when input was sought, most public participants agreed that a private sector approach was the least desirable option, and should be a last resort. Nonetheless, it quickly became dominant, suggesting that public input was ignored. Exclusion of environmental and community groups from policy design and implementation resulted in a policy which was not in the public interest; outside consultants, managers and engineers took precedence over the public. (Interview with official July 23, 2006). Also worrisome were conditions in the tender barring parties from “publicly discussing their proposals or the city’s decision-making process”. Unions expressed concerns about secrecy, hidden costs, lack of input and loss of jobs. A CUPE leader declared, “For it not to be done out in the open in a transparent way with citizens being able to have input is, frankly, an abomination as far as democracy is concerned” (Power and Schneidereit 2000, A10).

While critics pressed for the process to be a core election issue, little changed after Peter Kelly, an opponent of the P3 approach, was elected mayor. In 2002, a private consortium, the Halifax Regional Environmental Partnership, received a 60 year contract (twice the initial proposal), conditional on receipt of funds from other levels of government. (Moar 2003, 3). Critics condemned the share of the costs borne by regressive municipal taxes and noted that a consortium partner had been fined for environmental infractions on European projects. (Mcdonough 2002, B2).

Tension emerged between the city and the province over how to manage relations with Ottawa. Premier John Hamm initially requested Canada Strategic Infrastructure funds only for highways (electorally useful for a rural based government), and assumed that other federal dollars would be provided for the harbour project. Mayor Kelly felt this threatened the project. Some councilors and MLAs criticized the mayor’s “interference” which could do “substantial damage” to provincial-federal relations. (Flinn, 2002, 4). There was a shortfall in funds when Ottawa said it would only match Nova Scotia’s $30 million pledge, threatening to delay or derail the project. Eventually, Ottawa settled on a contribution of $60 million for the cleanup. (Infrastructure Canada 2004). But it expected the city to fund $30 million in other projects as a condition. (Interview with Harbour Solutions project official, 25 July, 2006). The city planned to raise $210 million from water surcharges. The extended bickering revealed significant problems in communication across levels of government and partisan and ideological divisions. And taxpayers faced hikes in pollution control charges which had already doubled; while $71 million had been accumulated since 1974 on the pollution control charges, Council allowed some to be spent on related works. (Interview with Harbour Solutions project official, 25 July, 2006). One commentator summed up public frustration: “taxpayers are the losers in the harbour mess, victims of three levels of government playing politics with an important matter of public policy”. (Rodenhiser 2002; Simpson 2002, A1).

The public-private partnership proved untenable. A report from the Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency complicated matters, suggesting that the primary treatment technology inadequately screened industrial waste from dairies or breweries, and could leave water quality below environmental mandates. In 2003, HRM dissolved its contract with the Halifax Regional Environmental Partnership in a dispute over who would pay fines for inadequate water quality. The city portrayed this as a cost-saving approach which freed it to pursue better options. Environmental interests sought go move to secondary processing, and to implement newer green technologies like solar aquatics. Instead the city turned to a local construction partner to proceed with the primary treatment system. Critics decried the secrecy around these decisions and the impression of ineffectiveness surrounding the city’s handling of the project was high. (Howe 2003, 18). African Canadian leaders took HRM to the Human Rights Commission, when one plant was located in a
poor, predominately black neighborhood in the north end. The commission ruled that choice had not been discriminatory, but the community believed the city had ignored the impact on the neighbourhood. (Daily News 15 September, 2005, 11.) The city held consultations and the Department of Municipal Affairs gave money for a Community Integration Fund to integrate the plants into communities. (Interview with Harbour Solutions official, 25 July, 2006). Despite some technical problems in the rocky terrain, construction of the pipelines and plants proceeded on schedule. In 2008 when two oceanfront beaches were declared safe for swimming after contaminants measured below harmful levels – at least when heavy rains did not flush runoff into the harbour. Mechanical problems after power outages remain to be overcome. (Smith, 2009).

In the implementation period, a working committee representing all three levels of government coordinated regularly and all major changes were discussed prior to public announcements; the province used its control of certain approvals to influence the project and was not content to allow decision-making by Ottawa and the city bilaterally, though its input is perceived as constructive by project managers. The city had difficulty managing its contacts with federal agencies - Fisheries and Oceans, Defence, Environment, Parks Canada etc. - none of which was a lead agency prior to Infrastructure Canada’s involvement. Officials state that technical considerations eventually overrode political ones, and “enhanced” primary treatment was the most cost-effective way of improving water quality. (Interview with Harbour Solutions project official, 25 July, 2006). Environmental activists disagree, suggesting that sustainable, effective options were neglected because of business influence; environmental groups, which had success on pesticides and solid waste diversion, definitely “lost” on sewage. It did not help that provincial and federal contributions were inadequate (possibly because the opposition NDP was dominant locally) forcing HRM to chose a less effective system. (Interview with official from the Halifax Watershed Coalition, July 23, 2006). Local politicians complained that political interference, driven by electoral priorities outside HRM, prevented a constructive provincial role. (Interview with HRM Councilor, 4 August, 2006). The confused consultations and protracted process suggest serious problems of partisanship, jurisdictional jealousy and financial constraint which do not bode well for future major infrastructure commitments.

Many infrastructure projects reflect the urban rural divide, with commuters impatient about improved traffic access irrespective of quality of life in the urban peninsular core. While HRM is committed to promoting transit, suburban councilors have secured contentious road upgrades, like widening an inbound corridor at the expense of landowners on Chebucto Road, budgeted at $2 million while express buses and cycle lanes received little funding. (Muise and Lightstone, 2008). A similar project is now proposed for Bayer’s Road, with potential demolition of homes, to allow more traffic to flow downtown, despite sustainability and heritage goals. (Fraser, 2009, Howe, 2009). Some of these projects keep reappearing on council docket, pushed by the same officials over the years, despite frequent promises to move to more sustainable options like transit and bus lanes. These are poor substitutes for a bridge over the Northwest Arm, blocked since the 1960s by influential south end residents as Council consistently spared wealthy neighbourhoods at the expense of modest-income communities. (Keuper, 1987). Though considered the best zone for traffic alleviation, no projects through the wealthy south end have been approved while most outside that district have been implemented. Most notoriously, the MacKay Bridge was shifted north, requiring demolition of Africville, with little justification in traffic flow at the time (Millward and Keuper, 1988). Mainland south has remained cut off and designated for low growth (Dorey, 2002, A1), which undermines property values. Meanwhile, Mainland North, pushed with infrastructure upgrades and social amenities, has become the most lucrative, high value growth zone, surpassing the south end in assessed property values for the first time. (Massinon, 2008). Development decisions often favor Mainland north and the south end while zones like Spryfield and Timberlea receive minimal infrastructure investment. (MacKinley, 2004).
Such decisions reflect the ongoing divisions between a largely rural province and an urban area which rarely commands a strong place in cabinet. At present the province is threatening to skew infrastructure priorities by pushing for high rise development in a financial excellence centre downtown; port upgrades and accompanying roadway proposals using railway cuts through the city also could deviate from the municipal plan’s emphasis on recreation, green space, heritage preservation and neighbourhood integrity. In addition, city managers complain that though they have produced plans for more sustainable transit, underfunding by the province means such developments are implemented “very slowly” (Landry, 2008). The bias remains to roadways, but funds to do it right are often lacking. Where upgrades occur, there are complaints about poor planning related to mergers and traffic flows. (Massinon 2007). It is difficult to see how this structural division in Nova Scotia politics can be altered and policy coordination improved to the benefit of infrastructure quality in the urban core.

**Image Building and Economic Promotion**

Halifax banks on its image as a modern city with ecological, historical, and cultural amenities. It was recognized by *Village Voice* as “Seattle East” for its bourgeoning alternative music scene; with a plethora of theatre, arts and literary festivals, Halifax was deemed “hip”. (DeMont, 1993, 50-3). Notwithstanding the hype, Halifax has moved away from its sleepy image as a conservative seaport; downtown is vibrant especially in summer. HRM capitalizes on these impressions by presenting Halifax as “Smart City” with its educational, medical, administrative and research venues, lively student life, and cultural diversity. Led by the Greater Halifax Partnership, the approach draws on conceptions of the “learning city” since “urban contexts that support the growth and development of the creative class will be best positioned to reap the full benefits of the knowledge economy” (Plumb et al., 2007, 43). Promotions emphasized the competitive advantages of a city with triple the national level of post-secondary graduates per capita. Critics argue that this coerces citizens to support a corporate competitiveness agenda; “Haligonians are left with the nagging feeling that, if they do not get learning to get on board the knowledge economy, they might end up in serious social, cultural, and economic trouble” (Plumb 2007, 43).

But efforts to change the reputation of Halifax as a staid centre governed by traditional elites have met with success. High profile events like the G-7 summit in 1995 raised the city’s profile. Hosting of national finals in college basketball and world championships in figure skating and hockey instilled confidence that the city could punch above its weight in such visible ventures. DeMont argues that “while everyone’s eyes were elsewhere, Halifax was reinventing itself as a buoyant, forward-looking place to do business” (DeMont, 2005, 35). It is now the largest magnet for immigrants east of Quebec, and boasts an increasingly diverse community with many recent arrivals in business and professional circles. The economy reduced its dependence on government and military activity as new industries like biotechnology, offshore energy and information technology emerged. (DeMont, 2004, 26). Investments in harbour boardwalks, museums, a cruise ship facility and casino attracted tourists; the city emphasized both heritage (like the Titanic connection) and contemporary cultural events and amenities. Halifax remains a major tourist destination, though suffering from border security hassles, fuel prices and the fluctuating dollar.

As the amalgamation process consolidated and economic and cultural change accelerated, the city rethought its image and priorities. A comprehensive regional plan was developed in a process which the city believed provided ample opportunity for popular input. While critical interviewees suggest it reached pre-conceived conclusions based on staff and consultants reports, the report claimed that the:

- public consultation process used in developing this Plan ensured all citizens had an opportunity to participate and to provide input, and emphasized information sharing and collaboration. It involved region-wide, large-scale participatory approaches including public information meetings, open houses, focus groups, surveys,
workbooks, and smaller more informal initiatives such as one-on-one meetings, local community meetings, fairs and events, and meetings with various community groups. A key goal of the consultation process was to target and engage those who might not normally participate in a planning process. Regular newsletters, a website, regional planning displays, televised presentations and other communication initiatives provided information to the public at each step of the process. (HRM, Regional Municipal Planning Strategy, 2006)

The ambitious plan set guidelines for future development and expansion in HRM based on an optimistic vision of the city’s future prospects, as a centre with sufficient agglomerative capacity to face the challenges of changing technology, demography, and global competition. It emphasized sustainable growth, balancing heritage and ecology with economic dynamism. The plan set guidelines for integrated land use and planning which focused on growth in compact zones to permit ecological preservation alongside dynamic economic nodes, efficiently connected by infrastructure. (HRM, Regional Municipal Planning Strategy Halifax, 2006). Intergovernmental collaboration was evident as the provincial government contributed to these initiatives while federal funds would be required to implement them fully.

The most prominent recent image building venture occurred outside this planning process – the still-born bid to bring the 2014 Commonwealth Games to Halifax. After disappointing losses in bids to host the 1994 and 2010 games, Halifax secured the support of Commonwealth Games Canada, and was Canada’s official bid for this prestigious sporting event. As David Black indicates, these bids demonstrate the role of “a persistent ‘booster coalition’ that has doggedly pursued an events-based strategy for enhancing Halifax’s profile, identity, and development on a global stage, with a strong focus on promoting the important tourism industry of the city and region”. (Black, 2004, 474-76). The ambitious proposal had implications for infrastructure and renewal of federal property at Shannon Park, to be renamed Commonwealth Park. The bid committee proposed construction of a stadium which could host professional franchises and amateur sports events; athletes housing which could be used for residential purposes, and a multi-sport facility. A stadium has long been sought by the “booster coalition” to attract a professional football or soccer franchise. The committee suggested that “Commonwealth Park infrastructure was designed with legacy in mind”. The stadium “would have been HRM’s new venue for large, open-air cultural and spectator events. With a permanent seating capacity of 25,000, it would have offered numerous hosting opportunities for the municipality.” (Halifax 2014, “Commonwealth Park”).

The province and city appeared to coordinate well in the bidding process, and stressed the contribution to Halifax’s image. The mayor and premier jointly declared that the Commonwealth Games “represent an opportunity to showcase our people, our history, and our accomplishments to the world. Indeed, if these Games are awarded to Canada - with HRM as host city - the event will leave a legacy that would pay dividends to the municipality, the province, the region and the nation for generations to come”. This legacy was to be built on “the remarkable co-operation” between the city, province, business, sports associations, other Atlantic provinces and cultural communities “that characterized our successful domestic bid”. (Hamm and Kelly, 2006, A7). The bid was supported by a coalition representing business, including media and energy companies and athletes and sports associations who sought upgraded facilities. Supporters accused critics of “resisting progress” and hindering Halifax’s move from “quaintness” to “dynamism”. (“As Halifax Fades from View …”).

Nevertheless, the city’s image suffered when, at an advanced stage in the process, the bid was abandoned after the province and city withdrew funding out of concern over escalating costs. A consultant suggested that the proposed $1.36 billion budget was a “floor” which did not preclude escalating costs. The province decided not to fund the games, and the city joined in announcing the abandonment of the bid. Despite extensive lobbying by the mayor and premier, failure to secure increased federal support beyond $400 million cemented this decision. (Dooley, 2007, 5). Bid
officials argued that they were still trying to reduce the cost when the plug was pulled. There was a $425 million gap between what the city and province believed they could raise and what the games would require, if costs did not escalate. Business sought to keep the plan alive, to keep the economic benefits which consultants allegedly neglected. (Fraser, 2007, A1).

But despite behind the scenes efforts, there was no change in Ottawa’s contribution. Councilors criticized Ottawa’s lack of interest, since its $400 million limit was set before detailed costing was ready. The mix of cash and property and other in-kind federal contributions remained unclear. The bid suffered from a change of federal regime to the new Conservatives under Stephen Harper, who held a different view on municipal federal relations, preferring to defer to provinces. Liberal critics argued their contribution would have been twice as high as the Harper government’s maximum, but costs overruns on the Vancouver Olympics made Ottawa shy of a repeat. Councilors condemned the lack of communication with Ottawa, the lengthy national bid process and the lack of solid, early commitment to Halifax as Canada’s bid.

But some councilors noted the local organizer’s tendency to complete elaborate plans, insist on secrecy and then come to council for ratification and funding, which undermined council’s trust, and eroded public support. A “more transparent, accountable, and forthright” process, with stronger direction by the city over the bid could avoid such an embarrassing fiasco in future. (Interview with HRM Councilor, 10 July, 2007); bid organizers countered that the provincial and municipal levels handled the situation poorly. While in theory the bid committee was directly interacting with government, in practice there was “a disconnect between the committee and the regional council, as well as the provincial cabinet” (Interview with HRM Councilor, 10 July, 2007); but this resulted from council and cabinet reluctance to accept full briefings from the bid committee. The mayor (who had been skeptical of the games bid from the start) made the decision to pull out without consulting council, which was allegedly illegal.

Games supporters suggested that public servants focused on governmental or political responsibilities and did not assess the bid on its merits; with an eye to politicians reputations, they leaked negative reports to influence the public. (Interview with bid committee officials, 6 August, 2007). The province did not consult its own finance officials who determined the city and province could run the games without a deficit, with costs of 1.3-1.7 billion, which could be covered “if every homeowner in HRM were to pay $2 additional property tax per month for 7 years”. The mayor and premier focused on residents on fixed incomes who feared tax hikes. They ignored economic spinoffs, which organizers estimated at $2.3 billion in revenues, 18,000 jobs, and a $1 million increase in GDP. Overall, the “provincial and municipal governments were working at cross-purposes” and chose a “short-sighted” approach based on political survival. Real leaders would try to “inspire people to be a part of something….something that we can do together….something that the working class can cheer for and be a part of” and which would boost the mental and physical well-being required for a well-functioning society and economy”. (Interview with bid committee officials, 6 August, 2007).

Some suggest that the collapse of the bid was beneficial, as experience elsewhere demonstrated the long run legacy of the games would most likely be debt. (Mosher 2007, C4). Opponents raised concerns that this project was too big for a city of Halifax’s size, since larger centres had suffered deficits from similar events. One critic suggested that economic gains, tourism dollars, benefits to health of legacy facilities, and controllable costs were exaggerated or even fabricated. Experience elsewhere showed costs were hard to contain and benefits rarely materialized. Private interests used tax money to fund feasibility studies which were confidential, suggesting that the public estimates were misleading. (Interview with Commonwealth Games Opponent, August 2, 2007). Critics linked the bid to an “old boys network” including those involved in projects such as Metro Centre and World Trade and Convention Centre. One critic alleges that the bid committee’s accounts indicated that this network played conflicting roles in the
process: “the group of business people who were pushing the politicians to go after the Games with public money were in large part the same group of people controlling how the money was spent, and the same group of people who were selling their services to Halifax 2014.” (Bousequet, 2008).

Bid supporters on Council suggested lukewarm support from the mayor, who was shy of large projects, ultimately weakened the city’s position. They accused the city and provincial bureaucracy of “jumping the gun” in withdrawing support; a more deliberative decision would have awaited adjusted figures which reduced the funding gap to $300 million. This botched process “tarnished” the city’s image, and could negatively affect its ability to attract future events. (Interview with HRM Councillor, July 11, 2007). This demonstrated problems of communication between various governments and agencies and difficulties in arranging financial shares among all three levels of government.

The new regional plan called for development approaches to spread growth throughout the region and avoid concentration in the urban core. “The Regional Centre's vibrancy, animation and economic health will be strengthened through the cultivation of a compact, civic inspired and human-scaled urban fabric of streets, blocks and buildings.” (HRM, “Urban Design Vision Statement, 2007). But the city’s commitment to its own image building guidelines was also questioned. Despite reference to participation, the city often turned to expensive consultants and appeared to implement these expert’s views over citizens input. As an example, in the long-running controversy over the future of the Bloomfield community centre, the city granted a contract to consultants who admitted they would rehash much of what those fighting for the centre’s preservation had gathered over 4 years. An activist complained, "The city has paid $66,000 to $70,000 to hire a local consultant, but if they squander what the community has done, that would add to the pile of disrespect and it's a waste of our work and their money."(Benjamin, 2008).

Intergovernmental interaction can also act to undermine the planning guidelines. As this essay is completed, with provincial government support, high-rise projects have been announced as part of an effort to build a concentrated financial services sector downtown. One observer suggests these projects were rushed into place before the HRM By Design guidelines governing downtown building height and location took effect. A project revived from approvals granted 30 years earlier meant a massive office tower would rise on one of the best heritage streetscapes in the city, before the Cogswell district could be reshaped. Conflicts over redevelopment in Historic Properties also emerged just before the new guidelines were enacted. And the province is pushing a paved road through the railway cut from west end to downtown (which has been proposed as an urban “greenway”) to move trucks to the container port (which could have been relocated to a multi-modal post Panamax complex at Shearwater). Such actions suggest the province may work to support business and employment goals over heritage preservation and community consultation. The image of Halifax could be much different in future if implementation of such projects and infrastructure expansion proceeds, lucrative to contractors though destructive of the ambience.

**Urban Aboriginal Policy**

Ottawa’s fiduciary responsibilities towards aboriginal persons give it a role in policies affecting urban aboriginal persons, a growing segment of the population. Yet Ottawa has deferred to provincial governments in most aspects of urban aboriginal policy. (Hanselmann, 2001, 14). As a result policy has focused on urban regions with higher levels of population. But the complexity and diversity of these communities have created unique nationwide problems of multi-order governance in this field. Graham and Peters discuss the “jurisdictional maze that both contributes to and is an outcome of how we have defined the urban Aboriginal problematique. This maze is constructed both through our federal system and through the confounding and conflicting distinctions that past policy and jurisprudence have applied to Aboriginal Peoples and Aboriginal people.” (Graham and Peters, 2002, iii).
Halifax has a limited aboriginal presence. Some one percent of HRM’s population, around 3,525 persons, reported aboriginal background in the 2001 census. This was up from .6% in 1996. The small population has resulted in limited application of federal policies to HRM. A federal website with an Urban Directory of Programs and Services does not provide information for any Atlantic municipality, listing only cities in western Canada. (Aboriginal Canada Portal, 2007). The Urban Aboriginal Strategy (UAS), a national initiative funded by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) is designed to reduce the level of disparity between urban Aboriginal peoples and other Canadians by better tailoring government programs to local needs and priorities. No UAS programs are in place in HRM. The Homelessness Partnership Initiative is also not enacted there. A Nova Scotia Framework Agreement on Aboriginal Treaty Rights/Umbrella Agreement was signed on June 7, 2002 between the Canadian government, province of Nova Scotia and Mi’kmaq people. Nova Scotia has created an Office of Aboriginal Affairs to promote coordination within the provincial government. Its mandate is “representing Nova Scotia’s interests effectively in intergovernmental, bilateral, and trilateral initiatives and negotiations; promoting aboriginal economic development and community capacity building across Nova Scotia; and enhancing the awareness of aboriginal heritage and culture within government.” (Sterling Research, 2000, 2). Such could provide an institutional node for involving the province and the city in urban aboriginal issues, but many respondents reported limited visibility to date.

Despite the community focus of some urban aboriginal initiatives, most have been enacted largely outside HRM. Halifax is home to the Mi’maq Friendship Centre which receives federal funding, and tax breaks and grants from HRM. The Centre provides “structured, social-based programming for Urban Aboriginal Peoples, while serving as a focal point for gathering, community functions and events.” (Interview with official of the Mi’maq Native Friendship Center 10 August, 2007). Local revenues were provided to assess the condition of the current building and to evaluate alternative properties for the Friendship Centre; centre leaders met with municipal officials in an unsuccessful bid to seek space in a vacated HRM building. HRM community grants program have provided project-specific grants to support organizations like “Nations in a Circle”, which organizes first nations’ arts exhibits.

However, the HRM Regional Plan, though referencing cultural diversity, did not refer explicitly to first nations concerns. Cultural programs, heritage protections and the like seem to exclude sites and events of importance to first nations. The first nations’ community lacked visibility, though construction of a new friendship centre in the urban core could increase this profile. But jurisdictional rivalries, political infighting and poor communication limited the scope of effective policy. Notably, the province has not pressed for inclusion in the Urban Aboriginal Strategy. Exclusion of municipal decision makers from policy discussions did not facilitate comprehensive responses to the complex problems faced by urban aboriginal peoples. (Interview with municipal finance official 13 August, 2007).

Given this dearth of activity, not surprisingly most of those interviewed spoke of unmet needs. For instance, one respondent noted a gap in support for off reserve versus on reserve persons in health care. Off reserve aboriginals such as those in cities used the same health care system as other citizens, with limited provision for translation services via the Confederacy of Mainland Mi’maqs. There has been an increase in participation in band affairs by off-reserve persons, permitting feedback to Band Councils about unmet needs. Urban governments confined their activities to cultural events and multi-cultural and race relations policies, not first nation specific initiatives. Formal collaboration with urban governments was practically non-existent, and federal and provincial initiatives focused mostly on reserve-based services, even though one third of aboriginal peoples in the province reside in HRM. Gaps in well-being were greater for on reserve populations, so the dearth of programs in cities was partially justified. But this did leave
unaddressed gaps in cultural awareness, sensitivity, and access to core services like health care and post-secondary education. (Interview with First nations policy group advisor, 18 July 2007).

The federal presence has been evident in the region via the Aboriginal Business Services Network. With support from ACOA and working with Canadian business service centres, the ABSN is a point of contact and information source for aboriginal business interests. It partners with aboriginal 13 aboriginal communities in Nova Scotia and 2 aboriginal organizations. It provides no-fee information on starting a business, growing a business, writing a business plan and marketing strategies. This initiative coordinates the activities of ACOA and other federal departments which support first nations business initiatives. But despite the relevance for first nations enterprise and entrepreneurs in the HRM, there is no local or provincial collaboration; coordination occurs between ACAO, ABSN and first nations leaders. Despite “glaring opportunities” ABSN officials have so little engagement with city government that they are uncertain what role the municipality could constructively play in this field. (Interview with official from Aboriginal Business Support network, Aug 15, 2007). Another initiative, Aboriginal Business Canada, run by Indian and Northern Affairs, collaborates with ACOA only and directs programs to individual first nations’ citizens, rural and urban, and sees no need for involvement by municipal officials. (Interview with official from Aboriginal Business Canada, Sept. 10, 2007).

Leaders of aboriginal organizations in the provinces assert that they had no relationship and few contacts with municipal regimes. The province was beginning to reach out, and some programs were being extended for off-reserve populations in the housing field, for instance, which was considered a first. As more gaps are identified, more consultation with urban communities might develop. (Interview with first nations policy group advisor, 18 July, 2007). Nonetheless, some of the excellent initiatives which have pioneered in Western Canadian cities like Winnipeg have yet to be emulated in the East. Halifax could benefit from adult education initiatives which have integrated native Canadians into the workforce in such cities. (Silver et. al., 2003). Existing consultative mechanisms, such as the tripartite forum, did not include municipal representatives, though it did improve federal and provincial collaborations with first nations groups. One observer suggested the local government did little beyond cultural celebrations, only occasionally attending special events at the Friendship Centre (even though some of its programs, like the needle exchange, served many non-aboriginal clients).

With an increasing urban presence, provision of on-reserve benefits and services will be inadequate; HRMs small aboriginal population may make the problems less visible, but no less real for those aboriginals cut off from necessary support. The unique character of multi-level governance in this area will clearly require distinct arrangements, which may never be fully extended to cities with small first nations’ populations. Respondents appeared pessimistic that much would change in this respect. There is neither the demand from the community nor the will from government to fully extend such arrangements beyond limited measures respecting cultural awareness and sensitivity. There is a significant lack of funding as all those interviewed claimed financial shortfalls hampered their limited abilities to make a difference. Serious efforts to improve services or provide capital funding for new facilities ran into jurisdictional finger-pointing. Thus the truly distinct character of first nations’ policy may only be realized slowly and, in Nova Scotia, only on reserves. None of those talked to in this sector had any perception that meaningful municipal involvement was likely to emerge in the near future, leaving important needs unmet.

Across Canada, there is intensive rethinking of urban aboriginal policy development and implementation. Even in regions where policy is more developed, there are calls for better institutionalization of federal-provincial and municipal involvement in this field to produce genuine collaboration. (Hanselmann, 2003, 8). As Abele suggests it may take time for a new model to emerge incorporating provincial, city and aboriginal governmental and “para-state” organizations in meaningful “partnerships” to overcome “dysfunctional” relationships with the state across Canada.
Whether Nova Scotia’s Office of Aboriginal Affairs can help coordinate such institutionalization of links remains to be seen. HRM’s intergovernmental capacities would need a significant boost before the city could be a viable participant in such collaborations.

**Conclusions:**

Like other large cities, officials in Halifax express anxiety about the pace and direction of change in multi-level governance relationships. Citizens expect more from municipal governments and often don’t understand whether the policy area is actually under the city’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, downloading has resulted in new functions for the municipality without financial compensation from the province or from Ottawa. The cases investigated here suggest that multi-level governance is performing inadequately and the quality, pace and delivery of policy is seriously affected. Respondents reported delays, distorted policy choices and unfilled needs resulting from poor communications, jurisdictional rivalries, inadequate funding and partisan conflict.

City officials claim that public opinion remains paramount, that “the guy down the street really makes a difference in councillor’s opinions”. (Interview with intergovernmental affairs officials, HRM, 11 July 2006). Yet social forces interviewed gave conflicting accounts. Some business groups suggested that “in Nova Scotia, the level of collaboration between the public and private sector is remarkable. I get the sense that, in Nova Scotia, there is probably a better working relationship between the private sector and the provincial, federal, and municipal levels of government than in any other province. … The relatively small size of the province, the strength of the relationships that have been built here, and keeping an eye on the ‘big picture’ have all contributed to the kind of success we’ve seen.” (Interview with official at Greater Halifax Partnership, 20 July 2006). However, some social forces suggested that the city was closed to their views, operated in secret too frequently and left their concerns marginalized. One interviewee noted the importance of connecting with city government but suggested, “if I wanted to work more with the province or the city, I wouldn’t even know who to approach”. Secretive decisions are also decried by critics as major land-use and development decisions are sometimes made out of the public eye, and some critics are concerned recent legislative changes have made matters worse.

In most fields, it is not that institutional structures are underdeveloped and unable to cope. Rather, it is ineffectual consultation and lack of coordination of effort which rankles many in the relevant policy communities. One actor in the urban aboriginal field, for instance, complained that there “is lots of governance, too much governance, but so much competition between levels of government. There is a lack of communication and collaboration, and government tends to be driven by self interests rather than what is easiest for customers [and]… everything gets all tangled up, when the municipality is totally excluded from federal programs. The municipality is not at the table; we need more say in water, housing, service issues. Lack of participation almost makes initiatives fail because [cities] are excluded”. (Interview with municipal finance official on first nation’s issues, August 13, 2007).

It is not the case that this region and its partner governments are incapable of collaborating. In the area of economic development, observers suggest HRM has been innovative with the support of both federal and provincial financial and institutional support. The provincial government changed the mandate of its old industrial commissions when it created the Halifax Regional Development Agency, switching from attraction of investment to development of local entrepreneurs. Hence legislative frameworks and financial support were redirected in sustainable fashion, with arguably positive benefits for the local economy. Public private collaboration between HRM and the Chamber of Commerce via the Greater Halifax Partnership has similarly energized aspects of economic and development policy. Bradford credits it with an updated focus on development, attraction, “city marketing, and networking to meet technology and training needs” as well as the end of destructive competition between communities for development via rival industrial parks. While the democratic implications of the forced merger remain controversial, Bradford
concludes that “the regionalization of the economic development function was a welcome departure contributing to the city’s overall well-being and future prosperity”. (Bradford, 2002, 42). There are close and open ties between city and provincial bureaucrats and business sector actors on major infrastructure and development initiatives. (Halifax Gateway Council Members List).

Nonetheless the frequent concerns expressed by our respondents about poor communications, inter-jurisdictional jealousy, political games, and exclusion of social interests from meaningful policy input indicate long-term challenges for multi-level governance in the Halifax region and the province of Nova Scotia more generally, with implications for the effectiveness and responsiveness of urban public policy. As Sancton concludes re amalgamations elsewhere, failure to clearly separate urban and rural interests will produce imbalances which are unlikely to be offset by community councils or other devices which do not draw enough input to make them meaningful. “What amalgamation does is make the squabbling less visible while limiting our opportunities for democratic decisionmaking”. (Sancton, 2002, 67). However, the problems of accountability reflect not solely the complexity of intergovernmentalism, or the dominance of business, but also a widely perceived elitist culture of top-down decision-making. They reflect traditional biases in decisions and expenditure to wealthier districts, and an aloofness and hubris among officials, consultants and planners which make pursuit of a bureaucratic vision of what a modern city should look like paramount even in the face of popular discontent. Overlaid on this is the disjuncture between urban areas and rural regions, which produces intra-municipal tensions and creates contradictions, like that between traffic inflow and a sustainable urban core. Social constituencies communities like urban aboriginals, African Canadians, environmentalists, conservationists, and the poor in need of social housing find their voices marginalized, with illustrated consequences in these fields.

Many respondents and residents express a sense of disillusion, as high profile municipal decisions often appear to reflect insider, official and consultant priorities above those of citizens. Many respondents agreed with the editorialist who opined “Public consultation is a rigged game, a lie designed to mislead and disenfranchise citizens and give cover for public officials to do what they were going to do anyway”. (Benjamin 2008a). The public visibility of even high profile ventures and consultations remains low and press coverage is often minimal. The closure of a local paper and downsizing of newsrooms in radio and TV leaves more coverage of US college football on the airwaves than local concerns, while TV stations have outsourced programming to other cities, with reduced local news coverage. Notwithstanding controversial issues, most incumbents cruised to victory in the 2008 municipal elections with little visibility in a campaign where voters might be forgiven for thinking their candidates were named “Obama”, “McCain” or “Palin”.

Thus, ironically, as Halifax is celebrated as birthplace of responsible government in Canada on the 250th anniversary, HRM appears to suffer from a lack of accountability and democratic deficits. Frequent complaints about closed door decisions (as on the Cogswell renewal and Bayer’s Road expansions) give the appearance of avoidance of accountability. As opponents of the road widenings argue, councilors often “don't even feel as though they are answerable to citizens”; but even some councilors questioned tactics which they believed violated council guidelines, to serve the “agenda of a very few”. (Benjamin, 2008b). Citizens declared no surprise as these projects proceeded: “it’s not a shock. I knew they wouldn’t listen to us.” (Sheirs, 2008). When the city is disposed to listen, it finds itself often overridden by provincial priorities and interventions, as in recent disputes between mayor and premier on downtown development (Smith, 2008) or provincial proposals for truck roadways threatening to undermine urban greenway initiatives. (Lightstone, 2009). On the 250th anniversary of responsible government at Halifax, it is hardly a ringing endorsement of democratic practices when sole remaining mainstream newspaper feels compelled to comment, “Resistance is futile” (Muise and Lightstone 2008).

Improvements might be obtained by altering the structures of multilevel governance. Greater transparency in the municipal act and tighter reigns of accountability for urban bureaucrats could be
helpful, to ensure council has a meaningful policy role, since the increase in discretion for officials has produced undemocratic practices in pursuit of particular projects. In addition, clearer, more collegial relationships between provincial and municipal actors, with less political and ideological conflicts could be helpful. The inability of municipal leaders to engage consistently with federal agencies appears to constrain potentially beneficial policy making. The province must embrace more constructive engagement with the federal level in municipal affairs, given the need for federal leadership, expertise and funds. The province must become a facilitator and advocate of federal-municipal collaboration, less intrusive and disruptive and not focused on its own political priorities. Such changes will be hard to institutionalize given HRM’s place as a unique metropolis in this politically fragmented, rural province, with competing electoral priorities of the city and province. Changing these relationships also raises constitutional questions around multi-level governance which will be difficult to resolve. Halifax will face continued constraints in multi-level interactions unless pressure from electorally influential metropoles elsewhere produces rationalized tri-level relations nationwide, putting pressure on politicians in Nova Scotia to follow suit.

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