
Junichiro Koji
Ph.D. Candidate
School of Political Studies
University of Ottawa
Email: junichiro.koji@gmail.com

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Comments and suggestions are welcome.
Introduction

Since the mid-sixties, the Quebec government has been actively engaged in immigrant integration. After seeing that a majority of newcomers were integrating into the Anglophone community, the leaders of the sole predominantly French-speaking province in Canada expressed the intention of designing policies to become a host society in order to maintain the “French fact” (French-language predominance) in Quebec. Since first setting up a provincial immigration department in 1968, Quebec’s government has worked to ensure the harmonious integration of immigrants into the French-speaking community. In other words, Quebec has engaged in building a multicultural (though they use the word intercultural as official terms), multiethnic, and multiracial society whose common language is French. In order to attain this objective, the province has developed various sets of policies over the last forty years.

This paper focuses on Quebec’s first two major policy statements. The first is Quebecers, Each and Everyone (QEE), published in 1981, which was the first comprehensive policy statement on the integration of immigrants and ethnocultural minority members (Québec. MÉDC, 1981). The second is Let’s Build Quebec Together (LBQT), published in 1990, which still serves as the cornerstone of current provincial integration policy (Québec. MCCI, 1990). The two policy statements form a notable contrast in three areas. First, the conceptual framework of immigrant integration shifted from “convergence of cultures” in the first to “moral contract” in the later one. Secondly, the priority targets of government funding changed from monoethnic groups to multiethnic ones. Finally, the two policy statements outlined different implementation mechanisms. While the QEE provided for a system run by ethnocultural minority members, the LBQT designed one run by provincial officials.

This paper attempts to explain why and how the policy changed. Paying special attention to the influence of ideas and policy networks, it argues that the policy change resulted from the transformation of policy ideas among the various government actors who have been dominant in Quebec’s integration policy network throughout the period.

This paper is divided into three parts. The first part will discuss in detail the two policy statements in terms of the three areas of difference. The second part will provide an analytical framework. Following the insights of Colin Hay (1998) and Ben Kisby (2007), this paper adopts an idea-centred approach to policy network analysis. The two scholars stress the impact of cognitive and normative ideas when explaining policy change and policy network evolution. The third part will analyze Quebec’s integration policy as part of the larger process of policy change through the evolution of policy networks and policy ideas.

1. From Quebecers, Each and Everyone to Let’s Build Quebec Together

Quebecers, Each and Everyone
On March 3, 1981, right before calling a provincial election, the Parti Québécois (PQ) government published the QEE. Its overall objective was to “define a new balance, a new harmony, between the majority and the minority” (Québec. MÉDC, 1981). Toward this end, the policy statement proposed “convergence of cultures” as the optimum provincial integration policy framework. Looking to strike a fine balance between the protection of French-Canadian culture and the recognition of cultural pluralism, the QEE suggested a dynamic intercultural vision for Quebec’s cultural development. The provincial government distinguished its integration policy framework both from American assimilationism (which it defined as seeking a monolithic culture) and Canadian official multiculturalism, resulting in a juxtaposition of different cultures. In this cultural convergence, French-Canadian culture remained at the core of Quebec culture. Taking a tree as an analogy, a vigorous French-Canadian culture (trunk) was considered necessary for vibrant minority cultures (branches). The QEE thus placed its ontological base on culture. In other words, immigrants and ethnocultural minority members were defined first and foremost by their identity as members of an ethnocultural group.

The emphasis on vibrant minority cultures pushed the government to reinforce its efforts to institutionalize the lives and community structures of ethnocultural minorities. The QEE thus announced the enhancement of existing minority language teaching programs and government funding for ethnocultural associations and activities. The Quebec government had first undertaken such measures in the late sixties in order to “respect and, in certain cases, even reinforce the rights and the means of blooming of non French-speaking cultural communities” (Québec. MÉDC, 1981: 27).

Another important characteristic of the QEE was its implementation mechanism. The policy statement provided for the establishment of a provisional committee composed of five ethnocultural minority members. The Committee of Implementation of the Action Plan for Cultural Communities (CIAPCC) had a three-year mandate (renewable up to six years). It was responsible for implementation process management and evaluation as well as interdepartmental coordination. The establishment of the CIPACC meant that the government delegated policy implementation powers to ethnocultural minorities themselves.

Let’s Build Quebec Together

Nine years later, the Liberal government published Let’s Build Quebec Together (LBQT). This new policy statement, made public on December 4, 1990, explicitly associated the success of immigration policy with the progress of integration. The provincial government treated integration policy as an instrument to respond to four challenges: demographic, economic, and linguistic challenges, as well as the challenge of enacting Quebec’s opening to the world. Faced with a rapidly aging population and the spectre of future population decline, the LBQT expressed Quebec’s intention to increase the number of immigrants, especially economic immigrants with knowledge of French language.
The LBQT proposed the “moral contract” as its new conceptual framework for applying provincial integration policy. As the word “contract” implies, this integration concept was characterized by the notion of reciprocity: “Integration supposes in fact double consent: the one made by an immigrant to fully participate in the community, and the other made by the host society to open up itself to his/her participation and support it” (Québec. MCCI, 1990: 45). Mutual efforts to further immigrant participation in French-speaking society were the central goals. French acquisition and intercultural contacts were perceived as preconditions allowing full participation by newcomers and ethnocultural minority members. At the same time, non-French-speaking immigrants were expected to make efforts to learn French, while the province pledged to support them by offering French courses. As for intercultural contact, immigrants were expected to respect the laws and values of Quebec society and to develop their sense of belonging within Quebec. In exchange, the host society had the mission to open itself up and clearly appreciate contributions made by immigrants and ethnocultural minority members. In contrast to the QEE, the LBQT placed its ontological base on the individual and put the priority on governmental intervention to eliminate all barriers to equality of opportunity and individual rights. In this conception, immigrants and ethnocultural minority members were considered as bearers of individual rights, independent of their ethnocultural origins.

The new integration policy concept also altered the nature of government funding for ethnocultural minorities. The provincial government stated its preference for funding multiethnic organizations in order to encourage intercultural contacts and eliminate racial and ethnocultural prejudice and discrimination. The LBQT regarded existing funding programs as a factor leading to the isolation of ethnocultural minority members. Instead, the LBQT favoured the mingling of diverse cultures in order to pursue “a dynamic vision of Quebec culture, open to multiple contributions and intercommunity exchange” (Québec. MCCI, 1990: 80).

Finally, the LBQT proposed an implementation mechanism based on control by a group of provincial officials from all departments and agencies. Moreover, the provincial government stressed the interdepartmental coordination capacity of the Department of Cultural Communities and Immigration (DCCI) in its implementation process. Ethnocultural minority groups were relegated to a consultative role, like that of other societal actors. How can we understand and explain this policy change? Let us now turn to our analytical framework.

2. An Idea-centred Approach to Policy Network Analysis

In order to explain the policy change mentioned above, this paper adopts an idea-centred approach to policy network analysis, following the insights of Colin Hay (1998) and Ben Kisby (2007). These two British scholars focus attention on the role of ideas in explaining policy network evolution and policy change. Their common goal is to overcome theoretical weaknesses of policy network analysis through incorporating ideational elements.
Policy network analysis has been an important theoretical approach in policy studies over the last few decades. Developed as a critical tool for the macroscopic understanding of state-society relations amid pluralism and corporatism, policy network analysis has sought to reveal more complex state-society relations by disaggregating both the State and civil society into particular governmental agencies and interest groups. This analysis follows their interactions in different policy sectors (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). We can thus define a policy network as more or less structured set of relationships between state and societal actors in a policy sector. This meso-level analysis led to the development of various typologies classifying different types of state-society relations (Rhodes, 1986: Ch.2; Coleman and Skogstad, 1990; Van Waarden, 1992; Howlett and Ramesh, 1995: 129-131). The authors use different criteria, such as the degree of resource interdependency and the number of actors involved in policy-making. The use of assorted typologies reinforces the heuristic power of policy network analysis.

Policy network analysis also demonstrates a significant theoretical power. Focusing on structured relationships between state and societal actors, policy network analysts argue that public policies can be explained as a function of network types. However, this theoretical claim received severe criticism in the 1990s. One of the strongest challenges came from Keith Dowding (1995) who described the approach as merely a “system of classification” (144). Pointing out that policy network analysis explains policy outcomes as a function of the properties of actors rather than networks, he has proposed instead an actor-centred rational choice approach.

In the wake of this criticism, different approaches taking into account structure-agency relations have been proposed in order to increase the theoretical power of policy network analysis, such as rational choice institutionalism (Blom-Hansen, 1997; Konig and Bäuminger, 1998) and dialectical model (Marsh and Smith, 2000, 2001). These are all theoretical endeavours to incorporate macro-level and micro-level variables into meso-level policy network analysis (Daugbjerg and Marsh, 1998).

An idea-centred approach forms part of these synthetic theoretical efforts. It takes actors’ ideas seriously as independent variables to explain policy network evolution and public policies. Hay (1998) proposes a relational strategic approach. Seeking ontological and epistemological bases in critical realism, his approach sees structure-agency relations as dialectical interactions between a structure defining agents’ courses of action and partially autonomous agents with critical views toward the structure (McAnulla, 2002: 280-281). In other words, policy networks have constraining effects in limiting and defining actors’ courses of action, but actors can still modify networks through critical evaluation of their surrounding reality. The relational strategic approach considers a policy network as a collation of actors sharing a common strategic agenda. It then focuses primary attention on actors’ strategic perceptions when accounting for policy network evolution. That is to say, a policy network transforms the ways on which actors interpret new realities, reconstruct their strategies and interests, and renegotiate network configuration with other actors who share common strategic agendas. In this process, Hay suggests paying attention to power relations within a policy network because it usually
reflects strategies and interests of a dominant network actor, or what he names “network hegemon” (Hay, 1998: 47).

On the other hand, Ben Kisby (2007) suggests an ideational approach based on the dialectical model of Marsh and Smith (2000). Interested in explaining the reasons behind the recent introduction of citizenship education in British secondary schools, Kisby (2006: 157-158) criticizes the model of Marsh and Smith for failing to explain why a new policy is introduced due to the lack of appreciation toward ideational elements in policy-making process. Then, borrowing “programmatic belief” concept proposed by Sheri Berman (1998), he incorporates ideational elements into their dialectical model. A programmatic belief is “the ideational framework within which programs of action are formulated” (Berman, 1998: 21, cited in Kisby, 2006: 157). Kisby’s another theoretical insight is his explicit treatment of policy networks as intermediate variables determining the entry of new policy ideas and the speed of policy change (Kisby, 2007: 83).

My paper combines these two critical realist approaches in order to take advantage of their complementary insights. First, this combination allows us to analyze both policy change and policy network change in Quebec’s integration policy sector. Secondly, we can also appreciate the influence of both normative and cognitive elements in policy-making process. By putting emphasis on the cognitive elements in actors’ strategy formulation, Hay’s approach does not sufficiently take into account the impact of normative ideas. In contrast, Kisby’s approach stresses the more normative aspects of policy ideas. This paper suggests instead that we take into account both normative and cognitive elements in analyzing policy-making process because actors often have some policy beliefs or ideals when participating in policy-making process, yet these beliefs often are strongly informed by actors’ understanding and diagnosis of the larger reality. Moreover, this understanding of reality inspires actors to define their strategies and interests so as to accord with their policy beliefs and ideals. Finally, we can take policy networks as intermediate variables rather than independent variables in explaining policy outcomes. In other words, policy networks determine actors’ capacity to translate their programmatic beliefs into policies. Let us use this double approach, then, as we move on to our analysis on the evolution of Quebec’s integration policy from 1976 to 1991.


This study covers the period starting with the arrival of the Parti Québécois government in 1976 and ending with the publication of a LBQT-based triennial action plan in 1991. Our analysis is based on information collected from government documents, parliamentary debates, accessible archival documents, newspaper articles (La Presse, Le Devoir, Le Soleil, and The Gazette), and other media coverage gathered in daily and weekly press reviews of the DCCI. The author also conducted fourteen confidential interviews in 2004 and 2005 with Quebec government officials (former and active at the time of interviews) and societal actors who were involved in policy-making or keen observers at the time.
In order to facilitate our understanding, we divide this period into three phases corresponding to three policy network configurations. The first phase ranges from the inauguration of the PQ government in 1976 to the publication of the QEE in 1981. It is a policy-making stage of the QEE, operating under a policy network dominated by the Minister of State for Cultural Development (MSCD). The second phase starts after the QEE and continues until the end of the PQ government in 1985. It represents the implementation stage of the QEE under a policy network characterized by the growing dominance of the DCCI. The third phase opens with the inauguration of the Liberal government and continues until the publication of the triennial action plan based on the LBQT in 1991. The policy change phase leading to the LBQT takes place under an enlarged policy network with further dominance of the DCCI.

Quebec’s integration policy network during the period covered in this study was dominated by state actors. Two reasons can be mentioned for this. First, state actors succeeded in retaining network hegemony. This allowed them to be autonomous vis-à-vis societal actors. Secondly, societal actors remained numerous and dispersed. Ethnocultural minority groups failed to unite under a few umbrella organizations which could represent them and speak in a unified voice to the provincial government. In addition, network expansion in the mid eighties further increased the number of societal actors within the network and helped provincial actors to reinforce their autonomy.

As for ideational elements, two pairs of programmatic beliefs can be identified. The first pair concerns the best way to realize the integration of immigrants and ethnocultural minority members. For the Quebec government, integration meant that newcomers and ethnocultural minority members would take part in different aspects of collective life in Quebec through adopting French as common language. Within that, there existed two contrasting programmatic beliefs – a group-based approach and an individual-based approach. The group-based approach regards immigrants and ethnocultural minority members as an ethnocultural entity. According to its advocates, it is thus essential that newcomers and ethnocultural minority members keep their strong ethnocultural identity in order to feel at ease in Quebec society. This approach presumes that they can more easily engage in intercultural dialogues with the French-Canadian culture and integrate into their host society once they feel comfortable and confident with their ethnocultural baggage. Here, intercultural contacts are encouraged to enrich the French-Canadian culture. Therefore, in policy terms the group-based approach stresses measures facilitating the preservation and development of communities of ethnocultural minorities. The individual-based approach, on the other hand, takes immigrants and ethnocultural minority members as individuals with special needs. Its champions argue that the provincial government should take measures which respond to their individual needs and eliminate all barriers in order to facilitate their participation into Quebec society. According to this approach, intercultural contacts are encouraged rather as measures to eliminate ethnocultural prejudices and fortify individual rights and equality.

As mentioned, beyond the approach taken to integration, a major difference between the two policy statements is the leading actor of policy implementation. Two programmatic beliefs in this regard are a minority-led approach and a bureaucrat-led
approach. The former affirms that ethnocultural minorities should lead integration policy in order to assure representation and take advantage of their expertise. In contrast, the latter argues that a government policy should be implemented by government officials. In addition to programmatic beliefs on integration, the conflict between these two beliefs on implementation style also played an important role in policy change process, as we will see now.

Phase I: 1976-1981

This first phase was a policy-making stage of the QEE, which made “convergence of cultures” the conceptual framework of Quebec’s integration policy; prioritized monoethnic groups as funding targets; and proposed an implementation mechanism run by ethnocultural minority members. These policy outcomes came from both the strategic understanding of the political environment and programmatic beliefs of the MSCD, who assumed a leading role within the network.

Since the creation of the Department of Immigration in 1968, Quebec’s integration policy network was filled with tensions among Immigration, Cultural Affairs, and Communications departments on provincial integration policies, especially governmental intervention towards ethnocultural minority organizations (Helly, 1996: 33). However, once the MSCD was created under the PQ government, it rapidly became a leading actor in the provincial integration policy network and led the QEE formulation process. Four factors can explain its ascension to the hegemonic position. First, the collective governing style of the PQ government gave significant institutional power to the MSCD. In order to build strong political leadership and rationalize the governing process, the Lévesque government established four standing committees within the cabinet which were charged with sectorial coordination (Bourgault et al, 1993: 232). Each committee was chaired by a minister of state who was responsible for interdepartmental coordination. The minister of state was also a member of the Priorities Committee, the inner cabinet chaired by the premier. The MSCD was one of super-ministers who enjoyed strong institutional powers. Secondly, the minister’s leadership and charisma also allowed him to impose upon other actors. Camille Laurin was an important figure within the Lévesque government. Thirdly, policy context was also in favour of the MSCD. Since the late sixties, Quebec’s integration policy had revolved around French acquisition by immigrants and ethnocultural minority members. Being responsible for language policy, Camille Laurin took leadership in the formulation of the French Language Charter (Bill 101) and increased his political influence in Quebec’s integration policy network during the period of QEE formulation. Finally, the MSCD did not face strong opposition or competition from societal actors. In spite of some initiatives, ethnocultural minority organizations failed to establish a few strong umbrella organizations which would represent their united voice vis-à-vis the provincial government. The dispersed nature of societal actors allowed the MSCD to keep its autonomy and to pick spokespeople whose views corresponded to the governmental orientation.
The MSCD advanced a group-based approach as the ideational base of Quebec’s integration policy. The root of this programmatic belief is revealed in *A cultural development policy for Quebec*, a white paper prepared by the MSCD in 1978 (Québec. MÉDC, 1978). This policy statement allowed the MSCD to frame the question of integration within the scope of Quebec’s cultural development. The document then set forth two general principles: 1) appreciation of minority cultures as sources of Quebec’s cultural development; and 2) reinforcement of government intervention in the development of minority cultures and their interaction with the French-Canadian culture. Therefore, according to the policy statement, successful integration meant that immigrants and ethnocultural minority members could bring their cultural expertise to the French-Canadian majority members and facilitate mutual understanding. This shows that the MSCD considered immigrants and ethnocultural minority members first and foremost as ethnocultural entities. Moreover, in order to allow them to bring their cultural expertise, the MSCD affirmed the importance of keeping minority cultures vibrant within Quebec society.

The development of this programmatic belief was not isolated from the particular political environment of the period. The election of the first “independentist” government generated serious apprehension among ethnocultural minorities. They launched different political organizations in order to request their representation in policy process as well as to defend minority rights (Stevenson, 1999: 136-144; Le Devoir, 1978). Moreover, the federal government attempted to discredit the PQ government as insensitive to minority rights (Bissonnette, 1977). Facing these pressures, the PQ government needed to show its sensitivity to minority group rights and assure their representation in policy process in order to obtain their trust. For instance, Premier Lévesque said, in an interview by an English-speaking radio station that his government would create a mechanism for representation of English-speaking and other ethnocultural minorities (Le Devoir, 1976). Meanwhile, the Immigration minister, Jacques Couture, restored the suspended Consultative Committee on Immigration and appointed nine ethnocultural minority members. The government’s concerns about the representation of ethnocultural minorities were eventually translated into a minority-led approach of the QEE implementation. An archival document implies that this approximation of the PQ government towards ethnocultural minorities could be a strategy to disengage non Anglophone ethnocultural minorities from Anglophone community (ANQ. E5, 1977). In order to lower the tension between the government and ethnocultural minorities, the Lévesque government organized a series of conferences in six regions in 1979 for the purpose of formulating the QEE.

Seventy-five minority communities participated in the conferences and played an advocacy role by telling their daily life stories and speaking of the difficulties they faced in Quebec society as well as asking for government action to redress them. Most of them agreed with the programmatic belief advanced by the Quebec government and asked for more governmental actions. Their demands included: the distribution of government services and information to minorities; the improvement of French language programs for immigrants; the reinforcement of governmental subsidies for ethnic media and ethnocultural groups as intermediaries between the government and new immigrants; the
increase of governmental financial and logistical aid aimed at helping ethnic and local community groups organize cultural and intercultural activities; and more ethnocultural representation in public and semi-public organizations. Consistent with the government’s programmatic belief, these requests were interpolated into the QEE. The creation of the CIAPCC was also included in order to assure ethnocultural representation.

Phase II: 1981-1985

This second phase was the implementation stage of the QEE. We can observe that the group-based approach was featured in Quebec’s integration policies, especially in the areas of provincial subsidies to ethnocultural minorities. Monoethnic groups were prioritized as the best way to preserve and develop minority cultures. This group-based approach was strongly supported by a new network hegemon, the DCCI. In contrast, the minority-led approach rapidly shrank as a dominant programmatic belief within the DCCI and resulted in the abolition of the CIPACC.

A new network configuration appeared after the publication of the QEE. The new configuration featured a new network hegemon – the DCCI – and the entry of the CIAPCC. Replacing the Department of Immigration, this new department became responsible for both immigration and integration of ethnocultural minorities. This change was driven by two factors. First, the provincial government needed an administrative apparatus in order to implement the QEE. The MSCD’s office, as a policy planner and coordinator, was too small to execute provincial integration policy in the field. Second, the government needed to deliver on an electoral promise – the establishment of a new department responsible for ethnocultural minorities – in order to demonstrate its clear commitment to promoting the interests of ethnocultural minorities (Le Devoir, 1980). After a defeat of the first referendum, their support was crucial to the continuation of its political project to make Quebec an independent country.

The DCCI’s hegemony depended on legislative, financial, and political resources. First, its founding law granted the department explicit responsibility for policies regarding the development of ethnocultural minorities and their integration into Quebec society. Secondly, the departmental budget grew by 27% during the period ($22 million to $28 million). Finally, Gérald Godin took strong leadership as minister, and Premier René Lévesque decided to give over all responsibilities over ethnocultural minorities to the DCCI (ANQ. E47, 1981b).

Still, the network hegemony of the DCCI was not as strong as that formerly held by the MSCD due to its status as a sectorial department. At the outset, the DCCI sought to regroup all provincial programs regarding ethnocultural minorities under its area of responsibility. However, other departments were opposed, arguing that ethnocultural minorities should not be the DCCI’s exclusive clients and that it should behave as a regular sectorial department. Nonetheless, the DCCI succeeded in taking over programs from the Department of Cultural Affairs (DCA), the Department of Tourism, Industry and Commerce, and the Department of Communications (DC). At the same time, in order
to avoid further problems, the DCCI adopted a joint committee approach with other departments (ANQ. E47, 1981b: 3).

As for the CIAPCC, it was supposed to become central to the implementation mechanism. However, this first initiative to allow minority members to hold the reins of provincial integration policy did not bear fruit. The CIPACC failed to become a network hegemon or a dominant actor due to the following three reasons. First, the committee was too weak in institutional and political terms. It was originally established under the MSCD as a body attached to the Department of Executive Council (premier’s department) in order to assure smooth implementation. Nonetheless, the CIAPCC was later transferred to the DCCI because of premier’s intention to regroup all organizations relating to ethnocultural minorities under the department. Making the CIAPCC a sectorial body jeopardized its institutional power. Secondly, the committee was not appreciated by the DCCI officials. They simply did not buy the minority-led approach. In contrast, the one public official within the CIAPCC, who was supposed to facilitate communication with the provincial bureaucracy, instead played a Trojan horse role and continued to minimize the committee’s role in the implementation of policy (ANQ. E47, 1981c). Thirdly, the committee was not given sufficient resources. Despite its broad mandate for intervention, it was composed of only nine people (five members and four administrative staff), and its average annual budget was around $300 000. These factors demonstrate that the minority-led approach shrank within the policy-implementation process. The CIAPCC was gradually marginalized and was finally abolished in 1984, in spite of opposition from ethnocultural minorities.

In addition to these two bodies, different departments and agencies worked in collaboration with the DCCI to implement measures that fell under their jurisdictions. These include: the DCA, the DC, the Department of Education, the Department of Social Affairs, the Department of Public Administration, the Treasury Board, the French Language Office, and so on.

As for societal actors, ethnocultural minority groups continued to be principal actors within the network. In principle they remained dispersed, in spite of some regrouping initiatives led by English-speaking groups such as the Supervisors of Action Plan Implementation and Alliance Quebec. Their influence thus varied according to their resources. For instance, Alliance Quebec became a strong English-speaking advocacy group thanks to subsidies from the federal government.

In this network configuration, the group-based approach became a dominant programmatic belief. This dominance depended on the DCCI’s capacity to translate theory into policy. DCCI minister Gérald Godin was a strong champion of this approach and played a key role in its consolidation. When the department was created, he enunciated two principles: 1) preserve and disseminate the specific qualities of each ethnocultural minority; and 2) institutionalize government funding of cultural centres for ethnocultural minorities (ANQ. E47, 1981). He developed his programmatic belief through personal contacts with members of the Greek community in his riding. Acknowledging the difficulties of integrating adult immigrants completely into French-
Canadian culture, Godin appreciated to a certain extent the Canadian style of official multiculturalism and took the image of the United Nations a model for Quebec society. Ethnocultural minorities found strategic advantages in this approach and supported it in spite of slight differences among them. Some groups placed more emphasis on the preservation of minority cultures while others stressed more the interaction with majority French-Canadian culture. For example, a young Greek group leader said, “We sincerely believe that all cultural communities should preserve their identities within Quebec and Canadian societies. Each community has to assimilate its original culture as prerequisite for understanding of others’ culture” (cited in Beauchamp, 1983). In contrast, the president of the Ethnic Groups Federation of Quebec advanced a strategy marked by more intercultural rapprochement in order to promote mutual understanding between the majority and ethnocultural minorities (Kuitenbrouwer, 1984).

The most tangible group-based intervention was the reinforcement of government funding programs for ethnocultural minorities. This departmental initiative was also based on a strategy that made the DCCI “a privileged interlocutor” for ethnocultural minorities and was meant to increase its network hegemony (TELBEC, 1982). Taking into account requests from ethnocultural minorities, the DCCI launched six programs supporting institutionalization of ethnocultural minorities in the province. They included: 1) A financial support program for the operation of ethnocultural minority associations; 2) two programs to assure facilities (offices and equipment) for their activities; 3) two financial support programs for their activities; and 4) a financial aid program for ethnocultural media. The DCCI’s total spending on immigrants and ethnocultural minorities more than doubled from $1.6 million (1981-1982) to $3.4 million (1985-1986) (calculated from Québec. MCCI, 1982, 1986). As far as its spending on the operations and activities of ethnocultural minority associations is concerned, the amount almost tripled from $794 000 (1981-1982) to $2.2 million (1985-1986) (calculated from Québec. MCCI, 1982, 1986). As we have seen, this phase was the consolidation of group-based approach. At the same time, the failure of the CIAPCC ensured that minority-led approach shrank rapidly within the DCCI.

**Phase III: 1985-1991**

The third phase represents a policy change stage leading to the propounding of LBQT. Under the new Liberal government, the DCCI continued to serve as a network hegemon and enjoyed increased capacity thanks to the government’s expansionist immigration policy. At the same time, the DCCI started to change its programmatic belief to an individual-based approach, based on their interpretation of the state of integration. Moreover, the network configuration also expanded to include new societal actors such as chambers of commerce, employer’s associations, labour unions, school boards, and nationalist associations. A window of opportunity opened for these actors when the government introduced public consultations on immigration quotas as a way to raise public interest in immigration and make it a matter of interest to the whole of Quebec society (ANQ, E47, 1986a). Although ethnocultural minority groups themselves
continued to play an important role, their relative weight in the network was reduced due to the participation of these new actors. At the same time, the network expansion contributed to increase the DCCI’s hegemony. The evolution of constitutional politics around the Meech Lake Accord accelerated the change of programmatic approach.

The reinforcement of the DCCI’s network hegemony resulted from an expansionist immigration policy pursued by the Liberal government. Premier Robert Bourassa, deeply concerned with the province’s demolinguistic future as a French-speaking society, instituted a significant increase in the volume of immigration. In the process, the number of immigrants admitted to the province soared from 14,884 in 1985 to 51,707 in 1991. This expansionist immigration policy boosted departmental budgets from $29.8 million for 1985-1986 to $60 million for 1990-1991.

Constitutional negotiations also contributed to reinforcing the DCCI’s network hegemony, for the Meech Lake Accord included a clause on Quebec’s powers over immigration and integration policy. When its ratification by the federal Parliament and all provincial legislatures grew elusive, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and Premier Robert Bourassa agreed to save at least the immigration clause as a separate administrative agreement. In this context, the Quebec government started to elaborate the LBQT allowing the clarification of provincial orientation in this domain. For this reason, Robert Bourassa then reinforced the institutional capacity of the DCCI, especially in policy analysis and planning as well as in terms of interdepartmental coordination. The DCCI’s reform started with the change of top leaders. Premier Bourassa entrusted the department to Monique Gagnon-Tremblay, who was considered as sharing his overall political orientation.

Moreover, Bourassa recruited Norman Riddell as new deputy minister. Before taking this position, he had served as deputy minister in the Saskatchewan government. The premier chose him as someone who would be well versed in English Canadian politics, in order to reinforce Quebec’s capacity to negotiate an administrative agreement with the federal government. Under the leadership of the new deputy minister, the DCCI set up the Policy and Programs Branch in 1989 (Québec. MCCI, 1990: 84). This branch played a key role in the formulation of LBQT. The DCCI also announced the creation of a network of contact persons from all government departments and agencies in order to reinforce its interdepartmental coordination in the policy making and implementation process (Québec. MCCI, 1990: 84). This network was used during the formulation of LBQT for the purpose of intragovernmental consultation.

With the arrival of the Liberal government, the individual-based approach became dominant within the policy network. This approach was strongly supported by the DCCI. During the 1985 election campaign, the Quebec Liberal Party published an electoral platform including discussion of the place of ethnocultural minorities within Quebec society (ANQ. P717, 1985). Seeking to infuse new energy into the provincial integration policy, the platform stressed the full participation of newcomers and ethnocultural minority members in Quebec society, not only from a standpoint of social justice but also from an instrumentalist perspective. The latter aspect was explicitly defended by the claim that Quebec had not fully taken advantage of its immigrants in its development. Consumed with demographic concerns, the Liberal government put its priorities on
eliminating all structural barriers against their participation, both in access to labour markets and government services as well as those caused by racial discrimination and xenophobia.

The individual-based programmatic belief translated into a shift in the nature of government subsidies to ethnocultural minorities. The DCCI modified its funding orientation and placed a new emphasis on multiethnic groups and intercultural rapprochement activities. In 1987, the department created an “intercultural rapprochement” section containing two new funding programs for organizations and activities that promoted intercultural rapprochement. The restructuring of funding programs was driven by the programmatic beliefs of the Liberal government and the DCCI officials. A departmental working document which offered a comprehensive review of all funding programs recommended simplifying the funding program structure and putting more money into programs in support of intercultural rapprochement activities and multiethnic groups (ANQ. E47, 1986b). The document observed that departmental programs had not respected the principle of “multiethnicity” and had placed too much emphasis on monoethnic groups. The document suggested that the DCCI put multiethnic groups at the centre of funding targets because they could develop more general expertise and reach more diverse clienteles than monoethnic groups who should instead play a complementary role. Acknowledging that this deviation resulted not only from the demands of ethnocultural minorities but also from the programmatic beliefs of the DCCI leaders at the time, the document affirmed that it was the time to reinforce intercultural rapprochement in order to cope with growing racial discrimination against visible minorities within the province.

Constitutional politics around the Meech Lake Accord, which recognized Quebec as a distinct society in Canada, also facilitated the ideational shift toward the individual-based approach. The recognition of Quebec as distinct society in the Meech Lake Accord promoted the crystallization of Quebec’s own idea on immigrant integration. For instance, the Cultural Communities and Services to Immigrants Branch of the DCCI proposed in February 1989 an approach that presented intercultural rapprochement as a strategic alternative to the federal approach of official multiculturalism (Québec. MCCI, 1989). After the Meech Lake Accord failed, the rise of Quebec nationalism reinforced the dominance of an individual-based approach, which was presented as Quebec’s distinct method of immigrant integration. The DCCI minister underlined the province’s specificity as a special reason to push intercultural rapprochement as well as the developing a sense of belonging to Quebec among immigrants and ethnocultural minority members (Québec. AN, 1991a: 770; 1991b: 819; 1991c: 978).

The participation of societal actors in the LBQT formulation was limited to some informal consultations made by the DCCI before its publication. However, societal actors had opportunities to express their views during public consultations on the LBQT that were planned to enrich a triennial government action plan. Sixty-six organizations, including some governmental actors, went before a parliamentary commission to advance their views. In fact, there was no serious challenge to the LBQT by the societal actors present. Most expressed their support for the LBQT, especially its individual-based
approach characterized by intercultural rapprochement, individual equality, and the sense of belonging to Quebec. One might note the impact of constitutional politics in shaping social actors’ programmatic beliefs on integration policy. Quebec’s specificity within Canada was mentioned by several as a justification for pursuing intercultural rapprochement rather than multiculturalism. In addition, the sense of belonging to Quebec and respect for Quebec laws and values were stressed by many societal actors as important preconditions for successful integration.

As for implementation, a bureaucrat-led approach remained dominant among DCCI officials. Remembering the failure of the CIAPCC, they did not want to repeat the same error. In addition, there were perceptions that the MCCI had been unduly swayed by political pressure from ethnocultural groups. An interviewee said that the Quebec government seemed not to have any say in integration policy and that it seemed important for the government to regain control over integration policy. Still, some actors called for the formation of a special committee, similar to the CIAPCC, to implement the action plan during public consultations on the LBQT, but the DCCI defeated these requests without difficulty.

Conclusion

In this paper, I have attempted to explain Quebec’s integration policy change in the years between two major policy statements – *Quebecers, Each and Everyone* and *Let’s Build Quebec Together*. The two policy statements contrast in three aspects: 1) conceptual framework of integration policy; 2) priority funding targets; and 3) policy implementation mechanisms. Adopting an idea-centred approach to policy network analysis, I have argued that the policy change resulted from the transformation of programmatic beliefs among governmental actors dominant in Quebec’s integration policy network. My analysis has showed that programmatic beliefs shifted from a group-based approach to an individual-based approach as the best way to achieve the integration of immigrants and ethnocultural minority members; and from a minority-led approach to a bureaucrat-led approach in terms of implementation.

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIAPCC</td>
<td>Committee of Implementation of the Action Plan for Cultural Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Department of Communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCA</td>
<td>Department of Cultural Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCCI</td>
<td>Department of Cultural Communities and Immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBQT</td>
<td>Let’s Build Quebec Together</td>
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References


1 All quotes from French documents in this paper are author’s translation.
2 The Quebec government has used the term “cultural communities” as official designation of ethnocultural minorities within the province. Its definition has changed over time and sometimes caused confusion when designing provincial integration policies. At the outset, it included all non French-Canadian descendants. The definition has evolved during the 1980s. According to the LBQT, the term means all Quebec residents except French, British, and Aboriginal descendants. In this paper, we use the terms “ethnocultural minorities” or “ethnocultural minority members” except when citing governmental documents. Our terms include all non French-Canadian descendants.
3 A personal interview with a former deputy minister of the DCCI, October 13, 2005.
4 He was also a ethnocultural minority member.
5 A personal interview with a political assistant of the minister, August 24, 2005.
6 A personal interview with a former DCCI high-ranking official, October 22, 2004.
7 A personal interview with a former DCCI high-ranking official, October 22, 2004.
8 A personal interview with a former DCCI high-ranking official, October 22, 2004.
10 A personal interview with a former DCCI high-ranking official, October 22, 2004.