Liat Radcliffe Ross

The Participation of Canadian Muslim Pressure Groups in the Canadian Foreign Policymaking Process


Abstract:

Research on the participation of Muslim minorities in the foreign policymaking processes of Western democracies, especially Muslim pressure groups in the West, is only just beginning. While this interest in part responds to a now familiar prediction of conflict between Islam and the West, it is also a reaction to the growing political activism of Muslim minorities in the West, set within a globalized world with its rapid and inexpensive communications and transportation. This research therefore lies at the nexus of international relations, domestic integration and transnational flows.

In the last two decades, Muslim minorities in pluralist democracies, including Canada, have organized politically as Muslims (as opposed to ethnic or national identities) and have endeavoured to influence foreign policy. This study compares the foreign policy lobbying activities of the two most prominent Canadian Muslim pressure groups, and analyzes these strategies and tactics within Canadian foreign policymaking theory. Do relatively young pressure groups, representing a diverse but growing minority in Canada, try to influence foreign policymakers as insiders or outsiders? That is, do they seek to access foreign policymakers directly or try to influence the national foreign policy debate and thus affect foreign policymakers indirectly? Furthermore, to what extent have these groups been able to influence foreign policy?

By examining documents issued by the Canadian Islamic Congress and the Canadian Council of American-Islamic Relations between 2000 and 2005, and speaking with the leaders of these groups, this study provides an empirical understanding of the participation of Muslim actors in the Canadian foreign policymaking process.
Research on the participation of Muslim minorities in the foreign policymaking processes of Western democracies, especially Muslim pressure groups in the West, is only just beginning. While this interest in part responds to a now familiar prediction of conflict between Islam and the West, it is also a reaction to the growing political activism of Muslim minorities in the West, set within a globalized world with its rapid and inexpensive communications and transportation. This research therefore lies at the nexus of international relations, domestic integration and transnational flows.

In the last two decades, Muslim minorities in pluralist democracies, including Canada, have organized politically as Muslims (as opposed to ethnic or national identities) and have endeavoured to influence foreign policy. This study compares the foreign policy lobbying activities of the two most prominent Canadian Muslim pressure groups, the Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and the Council of American-Islamic Relations Canada (CAIR-CAN), between 2000 and 2005, and analyzes these strategies and tactics with respect to Canadian foreign policymaking theory. Do relatively young pressure groups, representing a diverse but growing minority in Canada, try to influence foreign policymakers as insiders or outsiders? That is, do they seek to access foreign policymakers directly or try to influence the national foreign policy debate and thus affect foreign policymakers indirectly? Furthermore, to what extent have these groups been able to influence foreign policy? Analysis of the actions and influence of CIC and CAIR-CAN relied on three sources: first, documents issued by the two groups, primarily press releases and publications directed towards members and/or the Muslim community, that focused on international affairs; second, interviews with the leaders of these groups; and third, media sources.

The findings of this research suggest that the two groups adopted a mix of insider and outsider strategies and tactics with respect to influencing Canadian foreign policy. CIC employed both direct and indirect action; CIC leaders met with senior foreign policymakers but also encouraged its members to demonstrate in the streets. By contrast, CAIR-CAN used mostly outsider strategies, although on a few occasions, the group was invited to engage with policymakers directly. The groups’ own assessments of the success of their efforts were modest, but nonetheless point to particular pathways of influence in the Canadian foreign policymaking process.

2 While the representativeness of these groups of the diverse Canadian Muslim community has been questioned, they were nevertheless welcomed by federal politicians and focused on by the Canadian media. This study does therefore not seek to impute the actions of all Canadian Muslim groups (or other Muslim pressure groups in the West) from its study of CIC and CAIR-CAN, but rather to understand the strategies and tactics of the most important groups seeking to affect Canadian foreign policy.
3 These documents were largely available on the groups’ websites: www.canadianislamiccongress.com and www.caircan.ca.
4 For an analysis of the foreign policy interests put forward by the two Muslim groups, see Radcliffe Ross, "Canadian Muslims and Foreign Policy."
Direct Action

Whereas CIC pursued an insider strategy to influence Canadian foreign policy, the limited direct action undertaken by CAIR-CAN was largely uninitiated by the group. CIC was relatively active in its direct lobbying of federal politicians and foreign government representatives on international affairs. More than one quarter of CIC’s foreign policy documents mentioned some kind of direct contact with policymakers and diplomats, from letters to meetings. CIC’s President Mohamed Elmasry suggested the organization met with “a very important person from the Prime Minister to a Senator” – of which maybe half were Ministers – about once every two weeks, although this enumeration likely included meetings on both domestic and foreign policy. Moreover, Elmasry suggested that this frequency was increasing as CIC focused more on “this aspect of lobbying.”

Describing a gradual increase in the regularity of these contacts over the years – a trajectory said to have been unaffected by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – Elmasry stated:

All the governments now recognize that… Canadian Muslims… are right now more organized, more articulate in their positions, that they have political muscle compared to say other faith minorities like Sikhs and Jews. And the fact [is] that they should really listen to them because you give them another perspective. And our efforts also to do an outreach to them [contributed to this recognition].

The executive branch was a key target for CIC, as would be expected given its dominance in Canadian foreign policymaking. During the period under examination in this study, CIC claimed to have met with both Prime Ministers as well as each of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. CIC’s documentation announced a couple of these meetings, including in 2001 with Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley and his successor Bill Graham in 2004. CIC also noted or reproduced several letters sent to Cabinet ministers, including one congratulating the Prime Minister on his approach to the Syrian presence in Lebanon. Elmasry also suggested CIC had met with parliamentary secretaries and civil servants, especially those “officers responsible for the Middle East desk or the South Asian desk.” CIC’s President explained that not all meetings were noted on CIC’s website because results were not “tangible.”

Parliamentarians were also the target of CIC lobbying, despite their relative weakness in Canadian foreign policymaking. Elmasry said CIC met with MPs “often,” either invited as an “expert witness” or in response to CIC’s request to meet. CIC documents recorded one testimony given on foreign policy in relation to a review of “Canadian Relations with the Muslim World” conducted by the House of Commons

---

5 All references to Elmasry, unless otherwise noted, can be attributed to Mohamed Elmasry, Interview, 30 August 2006.
7 Again, it is likely that Elmasry was referring to meetings about both domestic and foreign affairs.
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2003. Additionally, Elmasry said that press statements and op-eds were distributed to parliamentarians (both federal and provincial) and senators, as well as unsuccessful federal candidates.

According to Elmasry, CIC met with foreign representatives of Muslim majority countries or countries with large Muslim minorities like Russia and France about once or twice a year. For instance, CIC met the Russian ambassador to Canada in 2004, and discussed the war in Chechnya as well as the potential to establish links between CIC and Russian Islamic organizations. Elmasry argued that direct action with foreign representatives only occurred as current events warranted them; “it was not a continuous foreign government lobbying on issues.” Nevertheless, there were a couple of regular forums at which CIC interacted with foreign government representatives. First, CIC held annual dinners in Ottawa, attended by both federal politicians, including Cabinet ministers, and foreign government representatives. Second, CIC began conducting “annual consultation[s]” with ambassadors from Muslim countries from 2003. Foreign representatives in Ottawa were also recipients of CIC’s press releases. Additionally, Elmasry met foreign politicians while travelling abroad, including the Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Finally, a CIC member from Montreal travelled to Iraq in December 2005 to persuade the hostage takers of four Christian Peacemaker Teams workers, including two Canadians, to release their captives – an ultimately unsuccessful mission. Although most obviously the purpose of this trip was to influence the behaviour of foreign individuals directly, it might also be interpreted as an indirect strategy to boost CIC’s influence in Canada – that is, its prestige and value as intermediary between the Muslim world and Canada in a moment of crisis.

In contrast to CIC, CAIR-CAN did not engage much in direct action on foreign policy matters. CAIR-CAN’s Chair admitted this strategy was not a priority for her organization: “we don’t go out and say let’s go have lunch or can we chat with you because our focus has always been domestic.” Documentary analysis likewise showed very little reference to direct action towards the Canadian government, particularly the executive branch. CAIR-CAN’s meeting with Prime Minister Paul Martin in the summer

---

8 CIC also requested to speak before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs on Iraqi sanctions but was turned down. Instead, the organization submitted a written report and attended the hearing as an “observer”. CIC, CIC Contributes to Growing Call for Sanction Reforms in Iraq, in Friday Bulletin (21 April, 2000 [cited 8 May, 2006]); available from www.canadianislamiccongress.com/fb/friday_bulletin.php?fbdate=2000-04-21.


11 Elmasry, Interview.


13 All references to Khan, unless otherwise noted, can be attributed to Sheema Khan, Interview, 7 September 2006.
of 2005 was the most prominent exception. The organization facilitated a highly publicized meeting between the Prime Minister and Canadian imams (or prayer leaders) to discuss extremism and to condemn terrorism in the wake of the London bombings.\footnote{Press reports suggested that while the discussion largely focused on Canada, foreign policy was raised. Khan was not present at the meeting and therefore said she did not know what was discussed.} Although CAIR-CAN had “low-level and high-level engagements” with policymakers on domestic issues, Khan said the organization did not have direct contact with any of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, their advisors, nor any senior bureaucrats within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) during this period of study.

Aside from the meeting with the Prime Minister, CAIR-CAN’s most prominent direct action was to participate in inquiries and parliamentary hearings. Most notably, CAIR-CAN was one of the official intervenors at the Arar inquiry, testifying twice. The organization was also interviewed by the “fact-finder” and submitted several reports to the inquiry, both to the “Factual Inquiry” into details of the rendition and torture of Maher Arar in Syria, and to the “Policy Review,” which considered the creation of an oversight body for the Canadian security services.\footnote{CAIR-CAN, \emph{Arar Commissioner Thanks CAIR-CAN for Participation in Inquiry} (18 November, 2005 [cited 27 December, 2007]); available from \url{www.caircan.ca/print_aa_more.php?id=A2140_0_3_0_M}.}

CAIR-CAN’s Chair also testified before two Standing Committees with respect to international affairs in this period of study. First, Khan argued against Bill C-16, the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act before the Standing Committee on Finance in 2001. Second, like CIC, she offered testimony on Canadian relations with the Muslim World before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs.

In several instances, CAIR-CAN’s interaction with foreign policymakers was initiated by the government.\footnote{This paragraph is based on Khan, Interview.} For instance, the meeting with the Prime Minister was initiated by the Prime Minister’s Office, which called CAIR-CAN wanting “to organize what was essentially a photo-op.” Similarly, CAIR-CAN was approached to testify before the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs; as Khan recalled:

\ldots you know, to be honest, we didn’t even know it [the review] existed. We didn’t apply for… standing or anything. I wrote a column in the \emph{Globe and Mail} about… ‘is democracy possible in the Muslim world.’ It was based on a Pew Research poll. And the column appeared and the next day, I got a call from the clerk, saying can you please testify. So, we didn’t ask to be there, it just so happened that they asked. And so we did our research, whatever we could, and we testified.

Likewise, when word of a Pakistani woman who was gang-raped for her brother’s transgression of class hierarchy made international headlines, a civil servant from DFAIT noticed a newspaper article Khan wrote about the topic and approached her to “do something” about it:
And I said yeah, let’s do something - I don’t know what. So she said well I’m going to send a note to our counsellor/officer in Islamabad and I’ll ‘cc’ you on it. And she did and I also wrote a letter saying, I don’t know if you are aware of it but can we do something? I get a reply back saying that the ambassador is away but we are working on a comprehensive package. And then the next thing I knew… they sent us the press release after. 17

Finally, CAIR-CAN’s documents did not record any contact made with foreign countries, organizations or individuals. Khan recalled only one meeting she attended at the British consulate in the wake of the London bombings in 2005.

Indirect Action

Both Canadian Muslim groups employed indirect strategies, although quantitative and qualitative differences were evident. Quantitatively, CIC pursued a more intensive indirect strategy by issuing approximately fifty percent more documents about foreign affairs than CAIR-CAN. Qualitatively, the most significant difference between CIC and CAIR-CAN’s indirect strategies lay in their approach to grassroots action.

Media

The two groups employed largely similar media strategies. Press releases were the primary means for both organizations to influence foreign policy through the media. CIC issued fifty percent more press releases than CAIR-CAN, suggesting a more active media strategy in this respect. CIC began to offer a French-language media contact in early 2004, and CAIR-CAN did the same in 2005.

Leaders of both groups also published opinion pieces in local and national newspapers. In particular, CAIR-CAN’s Chair had a regular column in the national newspaper the Globe and Mail. However, the relationship of Khan’s opinion pieces to CAIR-CAN’s work was ambiguous. On the one hand, CAIR-CAN publicized its Chair’s articles on its website, in its electronic mailings and in its annual reports. On the other hand, Khan suggested that her op-eds did not represent the organization’s line, and rather offered a different “facet” to the organization’s work:

… they were meant essentially to engage the wider Canadian audience…. So the op-eds that I wrote… sort of spoke to issues that the organization could not engage in. Like I wrote a lot of times about foreign policy. I wrote a lot of times about women’s issues, because those are very dear to me. As an organization, could the organization engage in those things directly? No way, they don’t have the resources. So they provided another arm or another… facet to what the

17 According to Khan, Canada donated money to the woman’s school and village.
organization does. [Executive Director] Riad [Saloojee]’s op-eds were more from an organization perspective. They actually spoke to work that the organization did.

Press conferences, letters to the editor and media advertisements were other tactics employed less frequently by one or both groups. Both organizations occasionally hosted press conferences about foreign issues; for instance, CIC held a news conference with regards to Bill C-16 and CAIR-CAN joined other intervenors in the Arar inquiry to offer information to the press about additional cases similar to Maher Arar’s. CIC wrote numerous letters to the editor, which were reproduced in its weekly electronic newsletter, The Friday Bulletin. In addition, on one occasion, CIC paid for a half-page advertisement – as part of a coalition – in a few Canadian papers condemning Israeli human rights abuses in the Palestinian territories at the onset of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.

Finally, the media also initiated contact with the two organizations, seeking comments and interviews for the written press and broadcast media on international affairs. Most notably, Elmasry’s comments as a panel speaker on a televised talk show on the definition of terrorism in 2004 generated nation-wide controversy.

Grassroots

Both organizations distributed regular electronic mailings to their members and subscribers with similar components, including calls for grassroots action, press clippings, opinion pieces written the groups leaders, and announcements of community events. Nevertheless, the two groups placed different emphases on and advocating different kinds of grassroots action. Quantitatively, CIC issued more grassroots documents than CAIR-CAN. However, the latter group was more persistent in its call to

---


20 Elmasry seemed to suggest that all Israeli adults were valid targets since all (compulsorily) served in the Israeli military. Elmasry and CIC denied this was his intended meaning, issuing a statement which read: “Dr. Elmasry, did not, does not, and will not condone the widely-held Palestinian view that any form of armed resistance against civilians that includes suicide bombing constitutes a legitimate military operation against the Israeli occupation, and not a terrorist activity.” Elmasry offered his resignation over the incident, but CIC’s Board of Directors refused to accept it, consenting to an apology alone. CIC, *Islamic Congress Board of Directors Accepts President's Apology, Declines Resignation* (27 October, 2004 [cited 24 March, 2006]); available from www.canadianislamiccongress.com/mc/media_communique.php?id=546; CIC, *Islamic Congress Says President's Remarks "Regrettable"* (23 October, 2004 [cited 24 March, 2006]); available from www.canadianislamiccongress.com/mc/media_communique.php?id=545.
subscribers to act, doing so in nearly half of its foreign affairs documents, whereas CIC did so in just over a quarter.

This consistency reflects the purpose of CAIR-CAN’s Action Alerts which, according to Khan, were primarily means to “empower” Canadian Muslims rather than to influence policy per se:

The Action Alerts are ways to empower the Muslim community. To also educate the Muslim community about political or media engagement. This is something new, relatively new for members of our community and it’s a way for them to feel that they can do something.

Referring to CAIR-CAN’s calls for grassroots action to oppose the Iraq war, Khan explained:

…the various Muslim communities, they felt very strongly about this, many people did. And we just wanted to guide them in a way that they could... do something. So whether that is to march, to write a letter, to call your MP and this is what I mean integration, engagement. I just feel that’s our most important role, you know?

Do we influence? I mean I’m sure every single call, every single letter does something. But is it a tipping point, I don’t know, I don’t think so.

Adopting a more traditionally American strategy of grassroots mobilization, CAIR-CAN frequently asked its grassroots to contact the federal government, foreign governments and the media about international issues, much more so than CIC. For instance, at the end of the first week of the Afghan campaign in October 2001, CAIR-CAN encouraged members and subscribers to contact their MPs ahead of a parliamentary debate “to encourage a resolution to the crises [sic] that addresses the mounting humanitarian suffering.” By contrast, CIC recommended no similar grassroots action during this period.

Nevertheless, both groups targeted the same Canadian policymakers when such grassroots mobilization was requested: first, the constituent’s local MP, followed by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This emphasis on parliamentarians seems surprising given their relative impotence in Canadian foreign policymaking, although perhaps these politicians were targeted because they were more receptive to individual lobbying than those in the executive branch.

---

22 CAIR-CAN, Contact Your MP for Upcoming Parliamentary Debate (12 October, 2001 [cited 17 March, 2006]); available from www.caircan.ca/print_aa_more.php?id=A157_0_3_0_M.
The two groups also requested their members to contact foreign governments, albeit only infrequently. For instance, CIC asked its members to write to the US Secretary of State and the President of the European Union, in addition to the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, to press for an end to sanctions against Iraq.23 Likewise, constituents were also asked to directly engage with the media on occasion. For example, with the onset of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, CAIR-CAN asked “Canadian Muslims” to “[w]rite letters to local newspapers and participate in call-in shows to let the Canadian public know about Muslim sentiments.”24

CIC leaders often spoke at conferences and in mosques to heighten awareness of certain issues.25 For example, Elmasry used the pulpit to encourage charity in the wake of the Asian tsunami and to condemn the London bombings, the latter of which was televised. In reference to these speaking engagements, Elmasry suggested:

In this we actually articulate our strategy to make our community informed, committed, multi-issue voters… So that’s why we try to engage them… And it’s not enough to address one issue. Even in foreign policy. You have to [be] encompassing. Because I think this is better for Canada.

… we communicate that we are living in a liberal democracy and that dissenting voices are acceptable and you have voting power, you can exercise it when the election’s called next time. So we try to communicate information, and to provide knowledge.

CIC’s documents also offered its members advice, such as to avoid travel to the United States for fear of discriminatory treatment by security officials.

CIC’s Friday Bulletin often advertized other groups’ events about international affairs, especially lectures and protest marches. CIC placed a substantial emphasis on public demonstrations, advertising them and/or encouraging members to participate in such protests (the majority of them in support of the Palestinians) in nearly a quarter of its Friday Bulletins with foreign policy content. CIC hosted at least one of these demonstrations – in coalition with other “Canadian NGOs” – outside the Parliament Buildings in Ottawa in May 2002, demanding an “[e]nd [to] Israeli occupation now.”26

By comparison, Khan suggested that while CAIR-CAN might bring demonstrations to the attention of its members, it was rarely actively involved and only

24 CAIR-CAN, Support the Victims of Israeli Aggression (7 October, 2000 [cited 17 March, 2006]); available from www.caircan.ca/print_aa_more.php?id=A106_0_3_0_M.
25 CAIR-CAN advertized its speaking engagements in its Media Watch mailing. This type of document was not archived on their website and therefore CAIR-CAN’s activity in this regard cannot be compared with CIC’s.
occasionally spoke at them. CAIR-CAN was hesitant to participate in public protests because “sometimes they [demonstrations] get so out of control… Sometimes people get very emotional… Sometimes people say things. Sometimes people carry signs that just are objectionable.” In other words, CAIR-CAN sought to protect the organization from the risk of bad publicity. Nevertheless, CAIR-CAN’s Executive Director did speak at protests against the Iraq war in his official capacity because he “felt quite passionately about it.”

Finally, Elmasry suggested that CIC was also active in petitions. However, only one of CIC’s foreign affairs documents advertised a petition, supporting the Palestinian right of return. CAIR-CAN’s documents similarly forwarded a few petitions to its members and subscribers, including one that urged the federal government to conduct a public inquiry into the Arar case.

Coalitions

Both CIC and CAIR-CAN entered into coalitions on various foreign issues to amplify their voices in foreign policy debates. However, CAIR-CAN appeared to act in concert with other groups more often than CIC, with coalitions mentioned in more than a quarter of its international documents as compared to less than ten percent of CIC’s.

According to these documents, CIC and CAIR-CAN entered into a coalition with each other twice on an international issue, both occurring in the aftermath of September 11. First, the two groups were among 113 Muslim organizations to sign a statement condemning the attacks of September 11. Second, they sponsored, along with other Muslim groups, a conference for Canadian Muslims in Toronto called “Healing the Wounds: Uniting in the Aftermath of Sept. 11th.” However, CAIR-CAN’s Chair suggested that the relationship between the two organizations had “not been good.”

CIC’s coalitions included some that were “permanent,” such as the Canadian Peace Alliance, as well as others that were ad hoc. By contrast, CAIR-CAN’s coalitions were largely “issue by issue” partnerships. Khan explained the value of coalitions to CAIR-CAN lay partly in its own lack of resources: “because our resources were so strained, [we] felt that the best way perhaps to speak to foreign policy issues was not by ourselves but in partnership.”

Both groups cooperated with other Muslim organizations, such as the Islamic Society of North America for CIC and the Canadian Muslim Civil Liberties Association.

---

27 This paragraph is based on Khan, Interview.
29 CAIR-CAN, Statement of Canadian Muslims Condemning Terrorist Attacks and Expressing Alarm at Growing Number of Anti-Muslim Incidents (14 September, 2001 [cited 17 March, 2006]); available from www.caircan.ca/print_itn_more.php?id=A59_0_2_0_M.
31 Elmasry, Interview.
32 Khan, Interview.
for CAIR-CAN. Additionally, CIC used its ties with mosques to encourage charitable giving for such natural disasters as the earthquake in Bam, Iran in 2003. CAIR-CAN similarly cooperated with Canadian ulama (or religious scholars) to promote the separation of Islam from acts of violence, most notably issuing an anti-terror fatwa or legal ruling in the aftermath of the London bombings in 2005.

Speaking quite frankly, however, Khan noted the difficulties of cooperation within the Canadian Muslim community:

Building coalitions within the community is not easy. No, it’s not easy. I don’t know why. We just haven’t matured... One of my friends who’s in the [United] States, she remarked how balkanized Canadian Muslims [are]... Oh, and she’s right. We are where the American groups were 15 years ago.

According to Khan, cooperation on foreign affairs with its American parent, the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), did not happen often because “foreign policy issues in the US are so different from here.” Nevertheless, she noted that with regards to the detention and deportation of Arar, CAIR-CAN consulted with CAIR “because we knew that they were in touch with various Arab governments.”

Coalitions were undertaken by both organizations with ethnic associations, in particular Arab groups. For instance, CIC joined dozens of other organizations, including the Canadian Arab Federation and other groups representing Palestinian, Lebanese and Syrian Canadians to press the government to prohibit the Canadian visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in 2005. Both groups also cooperated with secular organizations; in particular, CAIR-CAN had a sustained coalition with Amnesty International Canada and others during the Arar Inquiry. Khan suggested that these coalitions had the added benefit of providing learning experiences; for instance, Amnesty International showed CAIR-CAN how to “frame issues” in the media. Notably, only CIC’s documents highlighted interfaith cooperation, such as an interfaith gathering in Ottawa in 2000 to pray for peace in Israel/the Palestinian territories.

Influence

Both CIC and CAIR-CAN were modest about their degree of influence on Canadian foreign policymaking. While they are clearly offering only one side of the

---

33 While Khan described CAIR-CAN’s relationship with CAIR at its inception in 2000 as “very close,” in 2006, she considered the organization “independent” (including financially) to the extent that “we’re even contemplating a name change.”


story, and the impressions of foreign policymakers should also be ascertained in future research, there seems to be no reason for these Muslim pressure groups to understate their success. As such, it seems that the experience of the two Muslim pressure groups is consistent with the view of those scholars who suggest that (ethnic) pressure groups play a role in foreign policymaking but are not decisive.  

Similarly, some suggest that ethnic pressure groups operate within the confines of existing foreign policy objectives and principles, as opposed to setting the boundaries for policy.  

Commenting on the extent of the community’s influence to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2003, both organizations suggested that Canadian Muslims had very little influence on foreign policy. Theoretical literature on ethnic foreign policy pressure groups suggests that various factors contribute to their ability to influence policy, but, in particular, the size, unity and socio-economic attributes of the community the ethnic group claims to represent are key variables. Accordingly, Canadian Muslims have several obstacles preventing their ability to influence foreign policy.

First, Canadian Muslims comprise only two percent of the Canadian population, and thus pressure groups can claim to represent only a small fraction of the voting public. Second, as CIC argued in its submission to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, the diversity of the community hinders political influence. Indeed, academic research

---


40 Population by Religion, by Provinces and Territories (2001 Census) (Statistics Canada [cited 21 March, 2006]); available from www40.statcan.ca/l01/cst01/demo30b.htm. Although a more recent census was taken in 2006, Statistics Canada has not yet released data on the religious composition of the population.

41 See also Aoun, "Muslim Communities," 117.
on ethnic pressure groups suggests that ethnic communities need both a unity of focus on a particular issue (or limited number of issues) as well as a unity of purpose with respect to that issue in order to lobby effectively. As Milton Esman argues, these divisions of focus and of purpose affect the pressure group’s appreciation of the issues, definition and prioritization of interests and appropriate choices of strategies and tactics. Divisions will also diminish the credibility of the pressure group to ‘deliver’ the community in terms of votes.

Third, the literature suggests that the more effective ethnic foreign policy pressure groups represent communities that are well-integrated into society, while retaining a distinctive identity and strong sense of community. Canadian Muslims are relatively well-integrated into Canadian society. However, CIC argued in its submission that Canadian Muslim political engagement is hindered by a lack of knowledge about or of conviction that they can influence the political process.

Perhaps partly reflecting the above obstacles to influence, CIC also suggested that the community’s influence was limited by the absence of a government initiative to promote understanding about the “Islamic World” and to engage with Canadian Muslims. Likewise, Sami Aoun suggests that Canada’s low prioritization of trade and strategic relations with Muslim-majority countries weakens Canadian Muslim pressure groups. Additionally, the theoretical literature offers further potential constraints for ethnic pressure group influence, in particular: a) competition among pressure groups for members and for influence; b) public opinion; and c) domestic politics, such as the ideology of the political party in office or inter-departmental competition.

However, two factors, in particular, help to explain the participation of ethnic pressure groups in the foreign policymaking process (as well as their organization in the first place). First, ethnic communities are heavily concentrated in a handful of urban areas of Canada, lending them greater political clout than sheer numbers warrant. Indeed,

43 Milton J. Esman, "Diasporas and International Relations," in Modern Diasporas in International Politics, ed. Gabriel Sheffer (London; Sydney: Croom Helm, 1986), 344. Unfortunately, Esman does not elaborate on this point.
45 In terms of socio-economic indicators, they are well educated. For instance, significantly more Canadian Muslims have post-secondary education than the national average. Nonetheless, Canadian Muslims suffer higher levels of unemployment and lower incomes than the average Canadian. Selected Communities of Islamic Cultures in Canada: Statistical Profiles, (Toronto: Diaspora, Islam and Gender Project, York University, 2005), www.atkinson.yorku.ca/~diaspora/MASTER_REPORT_final_June_7.doc (accessed 12 Jan. 2006), 3-6.
46 Subsequent to this review, the Muslim Communities Working Group was established within DFAIT, first as an informal grouping, and later as a distinct unit. David Mulroney, Administrative Notices: Creation of Muslim Communities Working Group Operational Unit (FMCG) (7 April, 2006 [cited 20 April, 2009]); available from www.danielpipes.org/rr/blog_582.php.
47 Aoun, "Muslim Communities," 111.
48 Organizational attributes, such as available resources, are also important variables explaining individual group action and influence, but do not account for the community’s action and influence, per se.
CAIR-CAN noted this strength in its submission to the Standing Committee: “there are specific locales in Canada where the Muslim population is large enough and established enough to have an effect on political life.” Second, the Canadian government has been very active in the promotion of multicultural policies that encourage ethnic, religious and linguistic identity-based organizations. Public support for multiculturalism\(^{50}\) likely similarly bolsters the credibility of these groups and their actions.

In their foreign affairs documents, CIC and CAIR-CAN noted a few minor victories. These successes were consistent with several theoretical propositions as to the kind of policy most conducive to pressure group influence. First, and most notably, low policy, or uncontroversial and technical issues, is suggested to be the bread and butter of pressure group activity, whereas high policy, or fundamental decisions such as war and peace, is considered to be nearly free of pressure group participation.\(^{51}\) Second, pressure groups that try to modify policies are often more successful than those that try to change its direction entirely.\(^{52}\) Third, but less certainly, congruence between an ethnic group’s interests with government objectives will enhance the pressure group’s influence whereas discrepancies in policy views will lead to the ethnic group being shunted from the corridors of power.\(^{53}\)

CIC claimed credit for a couple of victories in its foreign affairs documents. The organization said that the government adopted one of its recommendations on Bill C-16.\(^ {54}\) More generally, it also claimed that “political analysts” had credited CIC’s endorsement as a “significant factor” in the victory of the Liberal party in federal elections.\(^ {55}\)

More significantly, Elmasry argued that CIC contributed to Canada’s decision not to join the war against Iraq, as part of the Canadian peace movement. Elmasry also contended that meetings CIC held with politicians, who in turn met with the Prime Minister, influenced Canada’s decision to not participate in the war. Elmasry explained: “I mean our job is actually to convince people we meet who… can convince others. And


\(^{51}\) However, scholars also note that even high policies are implemented through smaller decisionmaking processes, allowing for pressure groups to influence at a more technical, and less public point in time. Moreover, sectoralization, or the narrow defining of a sector or set of issues by the government in response to the high complexity of many issues, pushes policies to the lower end of the policy-type scale. J.J. Richardson argues that this sectoralization both facilitates and confines pressure group activity as it allows for pressure groups to shape smaller decisions more readily but limits the scope of their influence. A. G. Jordan and J. J. Richardson, *Government and Pressure Groups in Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 161; J. J. Richardson, "Government and Groups in Britain: Changing Styles," in *First World Interest Groups: A Comparative Perspective*, ed. Clive S. Thomas (Westport, CT; London: Greenwood, 1993), 56.


\(^{53}\) However, in terms of scientific inquiry, this causal relationship seems an unsatisfactory condition for determining pressure group effectiveness as it is difficult to know which came first in the policymaking process – pressure group demands or government agreement. Nevertheless, the difficulty of measurement does not in itself suggest that this proposition is incorrect.

\(^{54}\) CIC, *Bill C-16*.

I think we were successful in doing that. So if the Prime Minister gets the same message from so many Liberals\textsuperscript{56} at the time, you know, I think this means we did a good job.”

In general, Elmasry believed that CIC had contributed to the awareness of politicians and political parties of international issues, such that they now commented on issues that they would have ignored a decade earlier.\textsuperscript{57} Similarly, Elmasry argued that CIC’s grassroots action had led to greater awareness among Canadian Muslims about “political issues” such that they were empowered to lobby their local politicians directly: “So when they meet their politicians in their ridings, they will be able to lobby for a specific issue and they can, instead of reinventing the wheel, they have already the homework done for them. And this is indirect influence.”

CAIR-CAN’s foreign affairs documents noted a few instances of influence, all with regards to the Arar case. Most directly, CAIR-CAN claimed to have induced an apology by an MP in reaction to a disrespectful comment made by one of his staff about the then-ongoing imprisonment of Arar, through its request for grassroots action.\textsuperscript{58} More substantively, CAIR-CAN implied if not influence at least congruence between its advocacy and the government’s decision to hold a public inquiry into the case.\textsuperscript{59} Recommendations put forward by CAIR-CAN in coalition with other intervenors at this inquiry were adopted, such as the inclusion of details of the imprisonment and torture of other Canadian Muslims in Syria, although surprisingly no document was issued to point out this success.\textsuperscript{60} Nevertheless, CAIR-CAN reproduced comments made by the inquiry’s Commissioner thanking the organization for its participation.\textsuperscript{61}

Additionally, Khan identified CAIR-CAN’s success in influencing the final report produced by the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, which she suggested included “quite a bit” from her testimony. Indeed, Khan was quoted eight times over the course of the report, largely from her testimony but also from her column in the \textit{Globe and Mail}.

\textbf{Conclusion}

In sum, the two Canadian Muslim pressure groups adopted both insider and outsider strategies concurrently with respect to influencing foreign policy between 2000 and 2005. Nevertheless, the two groups took very different views of the necessity and/or practicability of direct action on foreign policy. CIC regularly engaged in traditional

\textsuperscript{56} That is, the Prime Minister’s Liberal party.
\textsuperscript{57} The example offered by Elmasry was an event that lies outside the scope of this study: the Israeli-Hezbollah war in the summer of 2006.
\textsuperscript{58} CAIR-CAN, \textit{Alliance MP Offers ‘Unreserved Apologies’ for Remarks by Assistant} (17 December, 2002 [cited 28 December, 2007]); available from www.caircan.ca/print_itn_more.php?id=A100_0_2_0_M.
\textsuperscript{59} CAIR-CAN, \textit{Muslim Group Welcomes Public Inquiry in Arar Torture Case} (29 January, 2004 [cited 28 December, 2007]); available from www.caircan.ca/itn_more.php?id=A805_0_2_0_M.
\textsuperscript{60} Commissioner Dennis O’connor to Appoint a Fact Finder to Look into Maher Arar’s Treatment in Jordan and Syria (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 10 May, 2005 [cited 28 February, 2008]); available from www.ararcommission.ca/eng/ReleaseFinal_may10.pdf; CAIR-CAN, \textit{Was Maher Arar Detained and Interrogated in Syria as Part of a Canadian-Style Rendition Program?} (3 May, 2005 [cited 28 December, 2007]); available from www.caircan.ca/print_itn_more.php?id=A1614_0_2_0_M.
\textsuperscript{61} CAIR-CAN, \textit{Arar Commissioner Thanks}.
lobbying, whereas CAIR-CAN’s insider strategy was limited with respect to foreign
affairs.

Moreover, contrary to theoretical expectations, the structure of the policymaking
process did not seem to be a decisive factor in determining access points for lobbying. Although the Canadian Parliament is almost irrelevant in foreign policymaking, both CIC and CAIR-CAN had direct contact with MPs about international affairs, whereas only CIC actively lobbied the Executive on foreign policy.

The Canadian government seemed to welcome or at least allow traditional
lobbying by CIC while at the same time occasionally seeking the participation of groups such as CAIR-CAN. Notably, CAIR-CAN’s direct interaction with policymakers was enhanced by Khan’s regular newspaper columns – or indirect action via the media. This intermittent inclusion of CAIR-CAN can be interpreted in several different ways. First, the government may have been seeking more information, that is, a range of views from the Muslim community in order to increase its understanding of the issues at hand and/or provide the government with forewarning of potential dissent on certain policy choices. Second, the government may have been attempting to offset the views or strength of active lobbies such as CIC by introducing competition. Third, the government may have been seeking to include or co-opt Muslim pressure groups in order to bolster the legitimacy of its consultation efforts within the Muslim community and/or to cultivate groups that could champion its policies within the community or abroad.

Contact with foreign government representatives and transnational ties similarly
varied by organization. While CIC recorded more direct action towards the Canadian
government as compared to foreigners, the noted number of interactions was relatively
similar. By contrast, CAIR-CAN’s documents recorded significantly more contact with
domestic as opposed to foreign actors on international affairs.

Both Muslim pressure groups employed outsider tactics to convey their interests
in foreign affairs, in particular through media and grassroots action. Quantitatively, CIC
seemed to be more active than CAIR-CAN. While the two organizations’ media tactics
were largely similar, their focus on grassroots action differed. In particular, CIC seemed
to emphasize participation in public demonstrations, whereas CAIR-CAN adopted a more
traditionally American style of grassroots mobilization, including letter-writing
campaigns.

CIC and CAIR-CAN entered into coalitions with Muslim and non-Muslim groups
to amplify their voice on the foreign policy stage. However, interfaith cooperation was
pursued only by CIC. Moreover, the two groups rarely cooperated with each other.

62 For more on the interdependence between pressure groups and government in Canada, see A. Paul Pross,
Group Politics and Public Policy, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1992), 71-73; A. Paul Pross,
"The Mirror of the State: Canada's Interest Group System," in First World Interest Groups: A Comparative

63 See Tim Draimin and Betty Plewes, "Civil Society and the Democratization of Foreign Policy," in
Canada among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign Policy, eds. Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen
Appel Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995), 76; Kim Richard Nossal, "The Democratization of
Canadian Foreign Policy: The Elusive Ideal," in Canada among Nations 1995: Democracy and Foreign
Policy, eds. Maxwell A. Cameron and Maureen Appel Molot (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995),
38.

64 For instance, the British government has sent delegations of British Muslim leaders to Muslim-majority
countries to boost trade and political ties with the UK. Radcliffe, "A Muslim Lobby [2004]," 377-378.
Although coalition-building was not a consistently used strategy by either group, some of the two groups’ noted successes occurred when coalitions were established.

Aoun argues that the attacks of September 11 created a “stumbling block” for the development of a more powerful Canadian Muslim lobby because of increased public suspicion of Muslim and Arab communities.65 The findings of this study, however, largely suggest the opposite; that is, the events of September 11 enhanced the participation of Muslim pressure groups in the foreign policymaking process, or had no independent impact. Most notably, CIC argued that the organization’s direct action with government increased throughout this period and was unaffected by the terrorist attacks in the US. Similarly, the 2003 House of Commons review of Canadian foreign policy towards the Muslim world consulted both CIC and CAIR-CAN. With regards to indirect strategy, CIC’s first press releases of this study period were issued in response to these terrorist attacks. Similarly, these events kick-started CAIR-CAN’s media strategy on international affairs.

Both Muslim organizations were modest about their ability to influence foreign policy. Each group noted only a few minor successes in their documents, conforming to the scholarly consensus that that low policy was easier to affect than high policy. Nevertheless, the President of CIC claimed some credit for contributing to Canada’s stance against the Iraq war. Elmasry also argued that CIC had succeeded in affecting the agenda of the national foreign policy debate.

The two leaders also suggested a link between their political activity and domestic integration; specifically, that their actions encouraged participation in the political process. CIC’s President suggested that the organization succeeded in educating Canadian Muslims such that they were empowered to lobby their representatives directly. By comparison, CAIR-CAN’s Chair argued that their requests for grassroots action were designed more so as a tool for political participation than for influencing policy. Yossi Shain has similarly suggested with respect to American ethnic groups that foreign policy lobbying acts as “an important vehicle” for political and social integration.66 However, he also argues, in line with others like Mohammed Ahrari, that gaining “a voice on the foreign policy stage” is a measure of the ethnic groups’ acceptance within the larger society.67 The complex interconnections between domestic integration, foreign policy lobbying and transnational ties remains a topic for further research.

---

65 He also argues that these terrorist attacks have become a “shackle that [the community] brandishes to justify its failures or its unease in the face of internal problems and its incapacity to formulate real recommendations for Canadian foreign-policy decision-makers.” Aoun, “Muslim Communities,” 116.
66 Shain, Marketing the American Creed, x.
67 Ahrari, “Introduction,” xvi; Shain, Marketing the American Creed, x.
Works Cited

Coalition against Israel's War Crimes. ca.geocities.com/mouammar@rogers.com/index.html. (accessed 20 March, 2006).


CIC. 6 November, 2005. Islamic Congress Joins Canadian Ngos Asking That Sharon Be Banned from Canada.  
(accessed 20 March, 2006).

CIC. 20 April, 2005. Islamic Congress Meets with Ambassadors of OIC Countries.  
(accessed 20 March, 2006).

CIC. 23 October, 2004. Islamic Congress Says President's Remarks "Regrettable".  
(accessed 24 March, 2006).

(accessed 20 March, 2006).

CIC. 19 April, 2004. Russian Federation Ambassador Meets with CIC to Forge New Relations with Russian Muslim Ngos [Sic].  
(accessed 24 March, 2006).


Elmasry, Mohamed. 9 January, 2004. Democracy, Or. Hypocrisy?  
(accessed 17 May, 2006).

Elmasry, Mohamed. Interview, 30 August 2006.


Khan, Sheema. Interview, 7 September 2006.

Khan, Sheema, and Wael Haddara. "Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada and the Muslim World: Submission for the Committee's Study on 'Canada's' [Sic]

Kymlicka, Will. "Marketing Canadian Pluralism in the International Arena." 


