The Politics of Police Image in Chile

*Draft*

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The Carabineros de Chile is one of the most respected police forces in Latin America. Since the 1990s, the Carabineros have been consistently ranked by Chileans as the most respected institution in their country, at times ranking higher than the Catholic Church. The Carabineros are also well respected by other police throughout Latin America. For example, many countries in Central America send their police to Chile to be trained by the Carabineros. This level of support is striking in a country that has only relatively recently emerged from a long and brutal military authoritarian regime, a regime in which the Carabineros played an active role in not only repression but also leadership. Few developing democracies have been able to restore such respect for their police as quickly as has Chile.

Many authors and practitioners note the respect Chileans have for their police. Some authors follow-up with further measures of this respect (Fruhling 2007) or analyses of institutional police reform (e.g. Frühling 2003, 2001; Dammert 2006). A few studies have raised questions about the potential consequences of this respect (Dammert 2009; Fuentes 2005). This article will explore the politics of Chileans’ respect for the Carabineros. That is, it explores the power dynamics and institutional interests that have played a role in the public’s respect for the Carabineros. The article asks the question: why do Chileans respect the Carabineros? I argue, that while the Carabineros are certainly less corrupt and more disciplined than other police in Latin America, the positive image of the Carabineros has more to do with the politics of communications than police reform.

In many developing democracies, scholars have noted the importance of establishing citizens’ respect for the police (Beck & Robertson, 2009: 67; Moon & Morash 2009: 116; Davis 2009: 190; Asiwaju & Marenin 2009: 282 & 300-301; Uildriks 2009: 6-8). The term ‘respect’ is often used interchangeably with ‘trust’ and ‘legitimacy’. When police have been involved in gross human rights violations during periods of civil war or authoritarian rule and have been (and may still be) corrupt, building public respect for the police is a formidable task. Yet, it is also very important. If police are to function democratically they need citizens to feel confident enough to report crimes to them, to provide evidence, and act as witnesses. Little research has been done on how to establish or re-establish this respect. However, key in most analyses is that when police reform leads to democratic policing, citizens will respect the police. In this sense, citizen respect for police is used as an implicit litmus test of successful democratic police reform. It is perhaps for this reason that high citizen respect for the police is often given as a key piece of evidence of a successfully democratized police force.

Of course, this line of reasoning is circular. Citizens respect successfully democratized police and successfully democratized police can be measured in part through citizens’ respect for them. Indeed Chileans often quote polls referring to the respect Chileans have for the police as sufficient evidence that the police in Chile are democratic. Thus it is important before dissecting Chileans’ respect for the police to clearly define democratic policing.

Drawing on my previous work, I define democratic policing as when “the police, acting as public servants, use a minimal level of coercion, bounded by a respect for human rights, with
the purpose of upholding a broad definition of democracy (i.e. beyond electoral democracy).\(^1\) Thus it involves such characteristics as: subordination to a civilian government (without personalistic control); transparency; accountability to civilian courts; minimal corruption etc. This article will show that while the Carabineros have made some important changes that have contributed to their democratization there remain some equally important limitations. The politically controlled image of the police has assisted police resistance to some areas of democratization.

The article is based in over forty interviews with key Chileans whose work involves the police in some manner: journalists, members of civil society organizations, academics, government administrators, political party members and the police themselves (Carabineros and the Investigative Police\(^2\)). The interviews were conducted in June and July 2009. I either asked the interviewee why people respect the police in Chile or the issue was brought up by the interviewee him or herself. Almost all interviewees emphasized how well respected the Carabineros are in Chile, often citing polls. The interviews were semi-structured. Relative to a survey, my sample size is small. However, the format of semi-structured interviews with knowledgeable interviewees allowed me to explore the reasons for Chileans’ respect for the police in a much more broad and in-depth manner than a survey. Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewee to determine the answer and provide the possibility for the interviewer to ask follow-up questions and ask for reactions from interviewees to previous responses. The latter allows answers to be cross checked for validity if concrete information is provided.

From these interviews I found four key explanatory reasons why the Chilean police are so well respected. First, they are not corrupt. Second, the distinction between respect and fear is not clear. Third, the Carabineros have implemented a successful communications strategy that has shaped the public’s image of them. Fourth, political elite and the media have favoured a positive view of the police in order to support their fight against crime.

**Carabineros are Not Corrupt**

The most common, and often first, explanation given as to why Chileans respect the police is that the Carabineros are not corrupt. Sometimes this is qualified with statements such as “they have very low levels of corruption, of course we could find some cases, but the cases we see on TV are a minority.”\(^3\) Or, “as in other parts of the world there are some who fall out of line, but here they have the status that they are not corrupt, they are a correct police.”\(^4\) Often the low level of corruption in the Carabineros is compared immediately to the rest of Latin America. For

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2 There are two centralized police forces in Chile, the Carabineros and the Investigative Police (PDI). The Carabineros are a uniformed and militarized police force with representation throughout the country. Their primary responsibilities are crime prevention and maintaining public order (traffic and crowd control). The Investigative Police is a smaller civilian police force that is not as widely dispersed throughout the country. They investigate particularly large crimes such as drug trafficking and organized crime. Both police forces are housed within the Ministry of Defense. The Carabineros were more tightly integrated into the military regime than were the Investigative Police.
3 Personal interview with Communications Officer, Interior Ministry, Santiago, Chile, June 18, 2009.
4 Personal interview with Víctor Salas, photojournalist for EFE, Santiago, Chile, July 2, 2009.
example, “the level of corruption in the Investigative Police and Carabineros in this country compared to other countries in Latin America and with Argentina, is nothing.” In other cases, people compared the Chilean police with the past as well “I believe our country is very distinct from other nearby places, from other neighbouring countries, very different from what happened here twenty-five years ago when police were a lot more repressive and thought differently.”

One interviewee explained how low levels of corruption have translated into respect for the Carabineros, “when one meets with a police officer and can’t give money, this generates the impression that police apply laws and that there is no possibility of negotiating with the police, so this intransigence creates a sensation that one is within what is normal and the police officer will be fair with them.”

Indeed, according to transparency international, levels of police corruption are low in Chile. In 2008 94% of Chileans responded ‘no’ to the question “In the past 12 months have you or anyone living with you paid a bribe in any form to the police” (TI 3.1.4), the highest negative response among the Latin American countries surveyed (Transparency International 2009). Comparing Chile to its neighbours, as many of my interviewees did, 86% of Argentines responded ‘no’, 57% of Peruvians and 38% of Bolivians. One of the most common reasons given for why the police in Chile are not corrupt is that corruption is low in Chile in general, it is culturally not something that is acceptable. This would fit the hypothesis of many authors that particularly politicians act as models; if corruption is high in other state institutions there is no reason for the police to be different (Hinton & Newburn 2009: 19). In the same Transparency International survey, 81% of Chileans responded ‘no’ to the question, “In the last 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?” (TI 5) – only 9% said ‘yes’, 10% responded ‘don’t know’ (Transparency International 2009). It would appear that while corruption is low over all, it is actually slightly lower within the Chilean police compared to elsewhere in Chilean society.

Of course, corruption is not limited to the acceptance of bribes. Corruption is most commonly defined as the abuse of public power for personal gain. Thus police involvement in criminal activity is a form of corruption. Certainly, knowledge of police involvement in criminal activity in Chile appears to be much lower than in its neighbouring countries. However, one article published by a well-known on-line investigative journalism website, CIPER Chile (www.ciperchile.cl), found that the number of known cases of Carabineros (active or retired) involved in criminal activity rose between 2001 and 2007. There were an average of five per year from 2001-2001, 14 cases in 2006 and nine in the first six months of 2007 (Ramírez 2007: 2). The journalist who wrote the article, Pedro Ramírez, explained to me that what was most shocking was the seriousness of the crimes found. For example, two Carabineros held up a liquor store. Another two Carabineros were members of a band that stole trucks on the highway (Ramírez 2007: 1). He asks one Carabinero serving time about the internal controls to detect such criminal activity. The now ex-Carabinero explained:

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5 Personal interview with member of the Centre for Studies on Development (CED), Santiago, Chile, June 18, 2009. These are the views of the interviewee not necessarily those of the organization.
6 Personal interview with Communications Officer, Interior Ministry, Santiago, Chile, June 18, 2009.
7 Personal interview with Mayra Feddersen, Diego Portales Human Rights Centre, Santiago, Chile, June 22, 2009.
8 Personal interview with Pedro Ramírez, journalist at CIPER Chile, Santiago, Chile, July 14, 2009.
If one has a car, for example, and it doesn’t match with your salary, they will investigate you. But if it is an official [senior officer], no. […] I knew a major, that is now retired, who travelled all over Europe with his wife because he worked in the Carabineros’ casinos and received money from the suppliers, for things that were paid for but never arrived. He told me this himself, directly, when I was a Carabinero. (Ramírez 2007: 11)

Ramírez said that the article was based on an access to information request he submitted to the Carabineros. He said it was difficult to obtain the information and it required a great deal of persistence. Ultimately, what he received was not everything he asked for but it was better than what he would have received in the past. Ramírez benefited from new access to information laws that have facilitated journalists’ ability to acquire such information.9

Of course few other news providers conduct such in-depth analyses and are so free to criticize the Carabineros as is CIPER Chile (an issue I will discuss more in the last section). However, more than lack of information, a journalist from El Mostrador (another well-known on-line Chilean news source) explained “these days it [Carabineros] is an institution that, yes has members that are involved in acts of corruption, it’s true, but these days I believe people have very clearly separated the institution of the Carabineros from the bad elements.”10 That is, the Carabineros are not corrupt and when individual members are found to be corrupt they are punished, it is not an institutional problem.

Inadequate information and framing corruption as an issue of bad apples helps maintain a positive image for the institution of the Carabineros. Police corruption may be truly an issue of bad apples but without full information it is difficult to know for certain. Yet, insufficient information combined with the “bad apples” frame reduces the possibility of political leaders making institutional changes that could further limit the opportunity for corruption, leaving such changes to the discretion of the Carabineros themselves. The Carabineros are the only institution with adequate information to make such changes.

Finally, while low levels of corruption are an important feature of democratic policing they are not the only feature. As a member of Amnesty International’s Chilean Section put it, “the forces can be well trained, can be not very corrupt, but this does not guarantee that the work, as has been show, is quality police work.”11 Indeed police abuse and police corruption, while sometimes interconnected, are separate issues.

**Respect or Fear?**

From the many surveys conducted in Chile regarding respect for the Carabineros it would seem that immediately after the dictatorship all the human rights abuses of the Carabineros were forgotten and the police force was embraced by the Chilean public. It appears as if the Carabineros immediately supported democracy and the public’s respect for them is an important indicator of this change. Yet in my interviews a number of people told me, in the words of one

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9 Personal interview with Pedro Ramírez, journalist at CIPER Chile, Santiago, Chile, July 14, 2009.
10 Personal interview with journalist at El Mostrador, Santiago, Chile, July 3, 2009.
11 Personal interview with member of Amnesty International – Chilean Section, Santiago, Chile, June 16, 2009.
interviewee, “The perception that people have of the Carabineros isn’t respect, it’s fear.” There were also many interviewees who told me not to use their name because they did not want to be associated with criticism of the Carabineros. Some journalists simply refused to meet with me, leaving my research assistant with the impression that they were afraid to talk to me. One journalist I interviewed, who works closely with the Carabineros, was visibly nervous when we started the interview and indicated that he was concerned I would ask questions that would trick him into criticising the police. He was quite noticeably more relaxed and happy by the end of the interview when he saw my questions were aimed more at understanding his relationship with the police from his perspective and did not lead him to question the Carabineros. Those willing to speak about Chileans’ fear of the Carabineros identified two key issues that explain its existence, the first concerns the past, the second military justice.

The nuance between respect and fear is not one that can be easily detected in surveys, especially since most surveys do not ask questions about the past or its legacy today. Indeed, relative to Argentina, Chileans generally do not talk as openly and publicly about the past. Yet a number of interviewees, mostly civil society actors, were willing to talk about the past and its lingering presence today. One interviewee explains,

I believe that still the Carabinero is a man that has authority over you, for me at least, I believe a lot of people, you see a Carabinero and you are afraid, for a generation of us this will happen. If a Carabinero stops you and asks for your car documents, still you jump. We still have a strong feeling of authority in this country.

Another interviewee provided a story to illustrate the point:

Look, in the dictatorshop, we, who repressed us? Who arrested us? It was the Carabineros. Who beat us? It was the Carabineros. After, in democracy, the people are sill afraid of them. Look, in a public space I saw the following. A women was with her baby, with her daughter, she was three years old, crying, the girl was crying ‘look if you do not be quiet, I’ll pass you to the Carabineros.’ There were people around and the Carabinero nearby went red, and he told the woman ‘please don’t say that to the girl’. But it shows you that this is the boogeyman. That is, if you don’t eat your food, the Carabineros will come get you, this shows you what the Carabineros are for the people.”

Indeed the Carabineros were not passive tools of the military regime in Chile. Between September and December 1973, the Carabineros were the primary perpetrators of disappearances. They were responsible for the disappearance 248 people in these months (Policzer 2009: 90). Even when DINA took over primary responsibility for disappearances, the

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12 Personal interview with member of the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of People (CODEPU), Santiago, Chile, June 10, 2009.
13 Personal interview with a journalist at Megavision (TV), Santiago, Chile, June 12, 2009.
14 Personal interview with a member of the Centre for Studies on Development (CED), Santiago, Chile, June 18, 2009. These are the views of the interviewee not necessarily those of the organization.
15 Personal interview with a member of the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of People (CODEPU), Santiago, Chile, June 10, 2009.
Carabineros were the perpetrators in 45 more cases from 1974-1989 (Ibid). They also went through significant militarization. In 1974 they were moved from their traditional home in the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Defense. The justification for the move was that this would make the police less tied to politics and more able to focus on the technical issues of policing (Frühling 2007: 120-121). With this move, the Carabineros also acquired greater autonomy in part due to the Ministry of Defense not being involved in the preservation of public order and in part due to Carabineros adopting institutional regulations that guaranteed the institution greater autonomy from the ministries of state (Frühling 2007: 120-121). Essentially, during the dictatorship the Carabineros were the fourth branch of the Armed Forces. This was laid out clearly in the 1980 Constitution when, like the other branches of the Armed Forces the head of the Carabineros was given membership on the National Security Council and a member of the Carabineros was to be appointed to the Senate (Frühling 2001: 18). The Carabineros only began to become more distanced from junta decision-making after a horrific incident in 1985 know as the “Degollados” (Slit-Throat) case (Dammert 2009: 156). In this case, Carabineros were found to be responsible for the death of three human rights activists who were members of the Communist Party; the activists’ bodies were found on the side of the road with their throats slit. This incident shook public confidence in the Carabineros.

Many aspects of the autonomy gained by the Carabineros during the dictatorship have not been reversed. In particular, cases of a Carabinero involved in wrongdoing against a civilian or a civilian against a Carabinero are still tried in military court. The continued use of the military court in this manner was raised as a reason for citizens’ fear of the Carabineros in a number of my interviews. Interestingly, in an interview with José Mora Quevedo from the Communications Department of the Carabineros, Mora accidently slurred the distinction between fear and respect by referring to the military courts. He then tried to backtrack. Here is what he explained about Chileans’ respect for the Carabineros:

In Chile there still exists a lot of respect for Carabineros. In the Alameda, the principle artery of the country, if the smallest Carabinero raises his hand and stops traffic, nobody would ask why, if he is there it must be for a reason. I lived in Argentina and to be able to stop traffic they would need to cross two vehicles in the street, here no. Here a female traffic Carabinera can stop a truck driver in a ten tonne truck and ask for documentation, and no one will dispute it, and if he did dispute it, if it’s a lot then it goes to military justice. [this was said emphatically, followed by a pause and then he began to justify and reframe what he said] We have legal tools that the state has given us and that has given power to police work and that have, for many years, achieved the people’s respect for the Carabineros [pause] not that they fear him, that they respect him [pause] we don’t look for fear, we look for respect [pause] fear is different, fear comes from aggression, respect is won.16 [italics identify speaker’s emphasis]

A member of a civil society organization explained that the use of military justice does inspire fear among some Chileans. She explains: “because the Carabineros are not tried in normal courts, they are still tried in military courts. So this issue makes people respect them, but

16 Personal interview with José Mora Quevedo, Communications Department, Carabineros de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 19, 2009.
also be afraid of them, because they can do many things.”17 While there have been positive changes to the civilian criminal justice system and some cases from the dictatorship were transferred from military to civilian courts in the 1990s, cases involving Carabineros (as victims or protagonists) continue to go to military courts. The judges in military courts are members of the Armed Forces who do not necessarily have any legal training and who are subject to the military chain of command.

According to the Chilean civil society network involved in the campaign “Alto Ahí! Basta de Violencia Policía” (Stop There! Enough Police Violence), as well as many of my interviewees, the vast majority (close to zero) of cases of Carabineros involved in mistreatment or excessive force have not led to convictions (Observatorio Ciudadana 2008: 20; Fuentes 2005: 59). Despite this low success rate, between March 1990 and December 2000, 3,877 legal complaints were filed by citizens in military courts against police (Fuentes 2005: 58). At least 160 cases of torture have been filed in military courts from 1995-2001 (Fuentes 2005: 59). Of course, these statistics only represent cases that were brought to military courts. Given the odds of success, one can assume that most cases of police violence are not brought to the courts. Statistics on police violence in Chile are very hard to find. While most targets of police violence are young males from lower socio-economic backgrounds, students or indigenous people (Mapuche and Ayamara), the lack of civilian legal oversight of the work of the Carabineros may lead many Chileans to respect the police for fear of what they have the impunity to do.

In discussing explanations for Chileans’ respect for the Carabineros I have interspersed some discussion of the police force’s poor human rights record both during the dictatorship and afterwards. This then brings us back to the question: why do Chileans hold the Carabineros in such high regard considering this history? It is not an accident, nor is it due solely to low levels of corruption. Rather, I argue that a clear political communications strategy has played an important role in the positive image of the Carabineros. I will begin now with the Communications strategy of the Carabineros and then move on to the broader communications strategy of citizen security.

**Carabineros’ Communication Strategy**

When speaking about Chileans’ respect for the Carabineros it was very common for my interviewees to place the credit for the positive image with the Carabineros themselves. What the interviewees commended them for was not important efforts made by Carabineros to win public support through democratic or community policing. Indeed, while the Carabineros’ Plan Cuadrante, a form of community policing that has been one of the police force’s most significant structural changes, was mentioned from time to time, the most common response was that the Carabineros have succeeded in an impressive communicational campaign that has played a central role in changing their image.

For example, “they [the Carabineros] have done an interesting job at improving their public image since, what we could call, their democratic integration, Carabineros did an

17 Personal interview communications officer, Colegio de Profesores (Teachers’ Union), Santiago, Chile, July 15, 2009.
important job in this regard, and today Carabineros are a much valued institution, very respected by society. [...] this is very relevant because despite this, Carabineros’ work continues to be repressive in the area of non-authorized protests and all that, yet they maintain their prestige.”

My interviewee from the national prosecutors office (Fiscalía Nacional) also emphasized the amount of money the Carabineros have had to pursue this communicational campaign compared to the prosecutors’ office and the Investigative Police (PDI). He showed me the magazines produced by all three; the magazine of the Carabineros’ was clearly of much better physical quality. My interviewee at the PDI confirmed that they had few resources for communications, “we have few resources to put into ‘lobbying’ or ‘marketing’. These two terms I often see connected with the capacity of the Carabineros that we don’t have.”

I spoke with a couple of people from the Communications Department of the Carabineros to better understand their communications strategy and how it has evolved over the years. I crossed checked their information and sought additional information from my other interviewees. According to José Mora Quevedo, a journalist and Carabinero in the Carabineros’ Communications Department, their new communication strategy began during the dictatorship in the aftermath of the ‘Degollados’ case, in 1985 (see above). The General Director of the Carabineros and junta member at the time, General César Mendoza, was asked to resign along with four other of his most senior officers (Policzer 2009: 120). The ‘Degollados’ case led to profound public mistrust of the Carabineros and a crisis of legitimacy for the institution (Dammert 2009: 156).

The newly appointed General Director of the Carabineros, Rodolfo Stange, began to take communications seriously. For example, for the first time the head of the Communications Department was a Carabinero (oficial) with a degree in journalism, Major Luis Retamar Martínez. General Director Stange brought in civilian experts in communications as advisors, people who had been directors of media communications, and asked them to evaluate the institutions’ communications and how the public viewed them. “He [Stange] arrived at the conclusion that all Carabineros needed to communicate. That the Carabinero that is in the street with citizens is the first communicator.” They began to provide training for media spokespeople within the Carabineros from 1985-1990. Each level of command was trained on what they could and could not talk about with the media and how to talk to the media. Since the Carabineros are a very disciplined police force this chain of command is followed in a manner that might not occur in other countries with less police discipline.

According to Mora, it was after 1985 that the department began to become more open to journalists. He said they were the first [of the military government institutions I assume] to open their doors to journalists from newspapers that opposed the military regime such as Fortín.

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18 Personal interview with national prosecutors’ office (Fiscalía Nacional), Santiago, Chile, July 15, 2009.
19 Personal interview with Patricio Tudela of the Investigative Police (Policía de Investigaciones), Victoria, BC, Canada, via telephone to Santiago, Chile, July 21, 2009.
20 It is interesting to note that after eleven years as Director General of the Carabineros Stange was asked to resign in 1997 due to his involvement in the ‘Degallados’ case (personal interview with José Mora Quebedo, Department of Communications, Carabineros de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 19, 2009).
21 Personal interview with José Mora Quevedo, Communications Department, Carabineros de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 19, 2009.
Mapucho and La Época. The goal was to have the population understand the work of the Carabineros and re-insert the Carabineros back into the community. In 1986-87 they began a campaign with the slogan “Un amigo en su camino” (A friend on your road), which was mostly focused on traffic accident prevention. This was a very successful campaign that many of my interviewees made reference to. One interviewee described it as a “popular icon because it was a cartoon character, and it stuck as a phrase.” Mora explained that the character’s name was Pepe Grillo, and he was like Mickey Mouse. Pepe Grillo would talk with a Carabinero about traffic safety.

According to Mora, in 1990 the polls revealed that the Carabineros were now for the first time at the top of institutions in which citizens had the most respect and they have maintained this position ever since. If this is true (I have not been able to find the polls but it is consistent with what many other interviewees told me) this is an astounding achievement only five years after the ‘Degollados’ case and the year of the end of the dictatorship. However, the communicational efforts of the Carabineros did not end in 1990.

In 1997 they established their own radio station that plays Chilean music aimed at youth and provides crime prevention advice based on the season e.g. how to stay safe on summer vacation, how to prepare students for back to school etc. They also began to provide seminars for journalists so journalists could learn about the work of the Carabineros. Many of the communicational campaigns that followed were aimed at encouraging citizens to work with Carabineros to fight crime: for example, “Con usted, juntos podemos” (“With you, together we can”). They no longer have communications advisors as, Mora explained, everyone in the Communications Department has a degree, many in journalism but some in other areas such as economics and engineering. However, they maintain a very good relationship with the heads of all the major media in Chile.

Rather than simply react, the Carabineros’ Communications Department continually tries to communicate through their own media, and through the mainstream media, their version of events. The department runs 24 hours a day. They have a very professional website. The website began in the 1990s and now receives 7000 visits a day. They also run a facebook page and regularly post videos on youtube. On their website it is possible to watch “Carabineros TV” in which news on Carabineros’ activities is presented by a Carabinero in a TV news format. This is in addition to their magazine that has existed almost since the Carabineros began but has more recently developed into a more sophisticated glossy cover publication. Mora explained the proactive communications strategy of the Carabineros: “So that we can control and intervene in what comes out in the media, we have an office for the website, a graphic design office, an audiovisual office, because we know that communications are very important.” Approximately thirty people work in the Carabineros’ Department of Communications. Sometimes the General Director of the Carabineros has played an important role in improving media relations. This was the case with Cienfuegos and more recently the very charismatic Bernales. Yet Mora stressed

22 Personal interview with Claudia Lagos, Professor of Journalism, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 26, 2009.
23 Personal interview with José Mora Quevedo, Communications Department, Carabineros de Chile, Santiago, Chile, June 19, 2009.
that the communications strategy of the Carabineros continues regardless of the General Director.

There is no question that the politics of communication has been a priority for the Carabineros that has paid off very well in terms of public support. Their communications strategy has been facilitated by internal discipline and relatively low levels of known corruption. However, its success cannot be attributed solely to changes made by the police. A number of my interviewees also emphasized the role of a sympathetic media and right-wing politicians whose mutual support for citizen security is an important factor in the receptiveness of the mainstream media to the communications efforts of the Carabineros.

Carabineros and Citizen Security (Public Order)

Among the reasons given by interviewees as to why Chileans respect the Carabineros is that Chileans are afraid of crime and they perceive the Carabineros as able to provide them security. Indeed, beginning in 1988 (prior to the end of the military regime) public opinion polls began to show that Chileans were increasingly concerned about crime (Frühling 2001: 20). A member of Amnesty International-Chilean section explains that “people respect armed authority because it ensures a society with less crime. Of course this is false, because a society is safer when everyone has rights.”

Another human rights activist dissects the distinction between security, human rights and respect for the Carabineros slightly differently. He states:

Carabineros participated massively in the dictatorship, but what has happened is that the concept of citizen security has been installed in our country and has stayed. Here there is an individualism focused on having and protecting private property. It comes from capitalism, from neoliberalism that you know well from the United States, and this has stayed in Chile. So the Carabineros fulfill the role of protector against delinquents, people who commit crimes, and they fulfill this role well. Carabineros fulfill this role well, but obviously people vote for them, or have a positive vision of the Carabineros only in this as protectors, but it doesn’t include the excesses they have committed. And, I believe that the same people who vote for this institution will reproach or rethink the actions of the Carabineros when they exceed their limits.

This particular activist works with poor male youth who have been victims of police excesses. His last statement uses the future tense because he knows that most Chileans don’t know about the types of abuses he sees because, in part, it is very difficult to have these issues covered in the mainstream media. He is also alluding to the fact that few surveys ask people about police excesses; the vast majority of surveys are framed in terms of how well the Carabineros combat crime (Frühling 2007; Gobierno de Chile 2009; emol.com 2009; cooperativa.cl 2009). Another human rights activist emphasized the role of the media in making crime such a central issue.

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24 Personal interview with a member of Amnesty International-Chilean Section, Santiago, Chile, June 16, 2009.
25 Personal interview with a member of the Foundation of Social Help of the Christian Churches (FASIC), Santiago, Chile, June 9, 2009.
arguing that while levels of crime are low “crime is an important issue, a daily issue and is in all
the media everyday, so it’s pure media manipulation, and it very effective.”

More conservative groups, that work on issues of crime, not police excesses, argue that Chileans’ respect for the police includes their fulfillment of security in a very broad sense. For example,

What happens is that the institution of the Carabineros, you see them working in a whole
array of situations that goes from the issues of security, to helping out in the face of
natural disasters, floods, earthquakes. […] the image of the Carabineros is of a valued
institution that provides us security, which goes into the poblaciones [poor
neighbourhoods] and works with the people.

From this perspective, the critique of the Carabineros identified by interviewees as common
among Chileans is that the Carabineros do not do enough to provide people security. In this
regard, the response the interviewees provide is that people need to lower their expectations of
what the Carabineros can do for them. For example, “there is of course also the critique that puts
the blame on the Carabineros, because when you speak of delays in police response it’s because
Carabineros don’t have enough resources for all the population that they attend to, or because
there are sectors that have a high population density for which there are not enough
Carabineros.” Others, in defense of perceived critiques of Carabineros’ ability to fight crime
note that crime might not be as high as people’s fear of crime (a point made by many of the
interviewees). For example, “Many times the questioning of insecurity in many parts is unjust
because, for example, there are sectors that effectively have never suffered a crime but the
people say they feel very insecure that there have been crimes, but there is not a single report
denuncia] from any neighbour, or person.”

There are two perspectives in these quotes that I will discuss here. The first, is that
respect for the Carabineros comes from their perceived ability to provide security and where they
fail is in simply needing to provide more security. The second, is the distinction that Chileans
may be making between respect for the Carabineros’ ability to provide security and their human
rights abuses.

As Hugo Frühling, points out, it is curious how Chileans hold their police in such high
regard while at the same time crimes rates in the country have increased steadily since 1990 and
there is a high level of fear of crime and victimization among the population (2007: 115). In part
this discrepancy could be explained by the fact that the types of crimes that have been increasing
are crimes against property (particularly automobile theft) and not homicide; Chile has a very
low homicide rate of approximately two per 100,000 inhabitants (Dammert 2009: 160). Another

26 Personal interview with a member of the Corporation for the Promotion and Defense of the Rights of People
(CODEPU), Santiago, Chile, June 10, 2009.
27 Personal interview with a member of the Centre for Studies on Development (CED), Santiago, Chile, June 18,
2009. These are the views of the interviewee not necessarily those of the organization.
28 Ibid.
29 Personal interview with a member of the National Renovation Party (RN). Santiago, Chile, July 7, 2009.
possible reason is that the mainstream media in Chile are dominated by two major media monopolies, the El Mercurio media group and COPESA, who advocate for “citizen security”.

That is, both media groups emphasize the issue of crime and the need and ability of the Carabineros to provide what they called “citizen security” to Chileans. El Mercurio is widely considered the agenda-setting newspaper in Chile and recently La Tercera (Copesa’s national newspaper) has been emerging as a significant competitor. Most mainstream radio and TV news shows repeat or even read the cover stories in these newspapers each day. Kiosks in the street will display the newspapers of these two media groups; other newspapers and magazines will be displayed depending on the preferences of the person running the kiosk. Thus for Chilean politicians, to exist is to be covered in El Mercurio (Léon-Dermota 2003: 138). The issue of media coverage of citizen security is a very large topic issue, which I will expand on in future research, but for this article I will provide a very brief overview.

The owner of the El Mercurio media group, Augustín Edwards, has actively lobbied on the issue of crime and “citizen security” since 1991 when his son, Cristián, was kidnapped. To assist in this lobbying effort Edwards established a well-funded foundation, Paz Ciudadana (Citizen Peace), in 1992. Paz Ciudadana is one of the few civil society organizations provided regular coverage in the El Mercurio group media. For example, most crime statistics printed in El Mercurio come from Paz Ciudadana and not the government (Léon-Dermota 2003: 157). According to Ken Léon-Dermota, Edwards has an agreement with COPESA that Paz Ciudadana’s findings will also be published in their publications (2003: 157). Journalists at El Mercurio know the owner’s position on citizen security and select cases that fit this perspective, that is, issues of crime (particularly property crime in wealthy neighbourhoods) and the positive work of the Carabineros. Politicians who implement proposals for fighting crime proposed by Paz Ciudadana are rewarded with positive coverage in El Mercurio. For example, President Lagos received a front page colour photograph of himself after agreeing to toughen the criminal code at the request of Paz Ciudadana (Léon-Dermota 2003: 161).

While in the 1990s there were significant legal limitations to what journalists could say about the police (HRW 1998), these legal restrictions no longer exist. However, media self-censorship (on the part of journalists or editors) or self-selection persists. Only one journalist stated that he experienced censorship by his editors. He explained that,

the Concertación governments still maintain a very strong reverential fear of the uniform, this persists in Chile even twenty years after the end of the dictatorship. The media prefer not to address these issues indepth, for this reason you won’t find names [of police or military officers], except when a judicial case is opened, or when the police sanction their members themselves. But it is tremendously difficult for journalists to published

30 A number of my interviewees explained that the term ‘citizen security’ is a term used by those on the political right. Under the Concertación government, the Division responsible for the issue of crime was named the Division of Public Security to distinguish itself from the right-wing term. There appears to be little difference between the substance of the two terms. Both terms refer to a fight to reduce crime; the method of how to achieve this varies between and within those supporting the use of each term.

31 Personal interview with an ex-journalist for El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, July 6, 2009.
investigative reporting. It costs, costs a lot. […] I tell you this because I have suffered a large amount of censorship for my articles.\textsuperscript{32}

Many other journalists claimed the self-censorship was more professionally strategic. Most media rely on crime as an important part of their news. They have journalists who specialize in the police, most often the Carabineros in particular, who provide them their regular articles on crime. While the Carabineros claim that they allow all journalists access to the information they need, many journalist told me that not writing positive stories about the Carabineros or following their advise on wording, could potentially lead to not being given exclusives on big crime stories or not being invited to press conferences. Thus for journalists whose jobs rely on providing their newspaper (or other media) crime stories, it is important how they present the work of the Carabineros. Smaller media such as community radio, or newspapers such as \textit{El Ciudadano}, \textit{The Clinic} or \textit{El Siglo}, that do not rely on crime news are better able to write critical reports on the police.

To summarize, this line of argument follows that the priority placed on citizen security by the mainstream news media and politicians (the latter in the hope of gaining coverage in the mainstream news media) increases the importance of media coverage of crime and a positive image for the police and the Carabineros in particular. While media critiques of the police exist, they are far outweighed by the daily dominance of the citizen security discourse.

The second, and interconnected issue, raised in the quotes at the beginning of this section is the relationship between security and human rights when Chileans evaluate their respect for the Carabineros. While police abuse occurs during the arrest of particularly poor youth, statistics on this abuse are extremely hard to find, rarely in the media, and, thus, known mostly to those affected and those people (lawyers, human rights organizations) working with them. However, excessive police violence during protests (particularly, but not exclusively, protests led by students and indigenous groups) are regularly covered in the media (e.g. Bonner forthcoming).

For example, on May 21, 2008 in Valparaíso, a photojournalist for the news agency EFE, Víctor Salas, was hit by a Carabinero with a baton which left him paralyzed for six days and he almost lost an eye. Salas explained to me that he was watching a group of protesters, who had peacefully left the protest and were sitting in a park, being beaten with batons by a group of Carabineros on horseback. He stressed that the victims included women and children. Salas began taking pictures and this is when a Carabinero on horseback came at him and hit him in the face with his baton.\textsuperscript{33} While there are many other incidents of police violence at protests (as serious as death) affecting protesters and journalists alike (see Observatorio Ciudadano 2008), I highlight this incident because of the extensive media coverage it received both nationally and internationally. Salas explains that the government, in coordination with the Carabineros, responded to the incident with a very well controlled communications strategy. He said that while he was in the clinic recuperating, unsure if he would lose his eye or not, the government and Carabineros held a press conference at which they spoke of “the unfortunate accident suffered by the reporter” (quoted by Salas in my interview with him). In July 2009, more than a

\textsuperscript{32} Personal interview with a journalist at La Nación, Santiago, Chile, June 15, 2009.
\textsuperscript{33} Personal interview with Víctor Salas, photojournalist for EFE, Santiago, Chile, July 2, 2009.
year later, El Mercurio had just begun to speak of the incident as one in which Salas was *hit* by a Carabinero, rather than an *accident*.\(^{34}\)

Coverage of police excesses against protesters are often covered in this manner by the mainstream media in Chile. The protesters are portrayed as the wrongdoers and the Carabineros are presented as playing a positive role in maintaining public order, or sometimes as victims of protesters’ violence. My interviewees revealed two positions on police repression of protest. The first position is consistent with the image put forth in the media that Chileans do not approve of protest, especially by students or indigenous groups.\(^{35}\) According to a 2004 Latinobarómetro suvery, 45% of Chileans prefer to live in an orderly society even if it means less freedoms (Frühling 2007: 116). I asked almost all my interviewees to define public order for me and they all responded that it involves the use of public space in such a way that does not inhibit someone from moving freely from one place to another, in particular not to be inhibited from movement by protests. Some spoke of the fear protests evoke in people who remember the chaos of protests under President Salvador Allende. Others spoke of how protests today are different than during the dictatorship. Interviewees explained that now protests “always” attract infiltrators who throw Molotov cocktails and engage in the damage of private and public property. In this context, the work of the Carabineros is valued and their response is proportionate to the challenge they face.

The second position is that Chileans separate the work of the Special Forces, a unit within the Carabineros responsible for the control of protest, from the Carabineros they see regularly on the street. The Special Forces wear different clothing, with helmets, shields and batons. They are not the friendly officer on the corner. Thus even one student group I met with, that is regularly met with police abuse when they hold protests, distinguished that Chileans’ respect for the Carabineros is for the regular police, the Special Forces are different and are not what people are thinking about when they say they respect the police.\(^{36}\)

Thus the Carabineros have not succeeded in turning their image around through their own, substantial, work in the politics of communications alone. Their communications strategy has had a very receptive audience within the mainstream media and the Concertación government. The policy of citizen security places a priority on the issue of crime and respect for the important role of that the Carabineros play in this goal. While Carabineros may be criticized for not doing enough to fight crime or needing more resources, critiques that tarnish the positive image of the Carabineros as an institution are avoided in order to support the fight for citizen security. There is no reason why this will not continue with the right-wing government of President Sebastián Piñera. Piñera strongly supports the prioritization of citizen security.

**Conclusion**

The cultivation of public respect for the police in a post-authoritarian context is a formidable task which the Chilean police have achieved with enviable ease. Few post-authoritarian or post-civil war countries have been able to achieve the level of respect achieved

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\(^{34}\) Personal interview with Víctor Salas, photojournalist for EFE, Santiago, Chile, July 2, 2009.

\(^{35}\) The 2006 student protest is an exception to this for very particular reasons (see Bonner forthcoming).

\(^{36}\) Personal interview with the president of the Federation of Chilean Students (FECH) Santiago, Chile, June 17, 2009.
so quickly by the Carabineros. However, high levels of respect for the police should not be conflated with the attainment of democratic policing. Politics, not only police reform, can influence the public’s respect for the police. Not unpacking citizens’ respect for the police opens up the possibility of glossing over important issues for democratization. By way of conclusion, I will highlight three possible consequences that merit further research.

First, a strong public image can be used by the police to defend their autonomy and resist reforms. This is an issue that is touched on by Hugo Frühling (2007). He explained that while the negative image of the police elsewhere in Latin America has forced them to “undertake processes of structural reform to increase their efficiency and to respond to negative perceptions on the part of the public at large, Chilean police have had to undertake only gradual changes during the democratization period.” (Frühling 2007: 116). My interviewee in the Division of Public Security in the Ministry of the Interior also emphasized how the strong image of the Carabineros allows them to assert themselves as autonomous of the government. She explained how in a campaign for missing children she organized with the Public Ministry, the Carabineros, the Investigative Police and the Ministry of Justice, they were trying to establish what logos to put on the posters. She said that in most campaigns like this “the Carabineros always try to position themselves strongly”. In this case “since they have such a strong image” they resisted working with the other institutions. When each institution wanted to put their own logo on the poster, my interviewee suggested that, to simplify, it would be better to put the logo of the Chilean government. In response, “the Carabineros declared that they are not a part of the Chilean government, something that was obviously very complicated. We’re speaking of high ranked leaders, not that high, but leaders.” She told me she was telling me this story so I understood the power and autonomy of the Carabineros. This example is rather innocuous compared to the possibility that the Carabineros could use their positive image and effective communications to similarly defend their autonomy in other circumstances such as remaining the Ministry of Defense, remaining under the jurisdiction of military courts, not reforming in response to critiques of police violence etc.

Second, democratic policing involves transparency and accountability. While access to information laws have helped to increase the transparency of the police in Chile (to a certain extent), issues of accountability remain significant. Horizontal accountability, through civilian courts, is absent in cases involving Carabineros as protagonists or victims of crimes. Vertical or social accountability, which involves oversight by the media and civil society, is also weak. Democratic policing is not an end point, but rather a process that involves and requires that the media and civil society keep a critical eye on the work of the police. Thus political projects such as “citizen security” that necessitate a lack, or minimal, critique of the police in order to maintain a positive image of the police to in turn ensure success in the area of fighting crime (the achievement of which is unclear) are problematic for democratic policing.

Finally, by equating public respect for the police with the existence of democratic policing the opportunity to improve policing in problematic areas is obstructed. For example, while the percentage of Chileans polled who respect the police is high, this level of respect is

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37 Personal interview with employee of the Division of Public Security, Interior Ministry, Santiago, Chile, June 17, 2009.
consistently lower among those from lower socio-economic backgrounds (Frühling 2007: 116; Dammert 2009: 159). This was confirmed in my interviews with groups from poor neighbours and those that work with people from those neighbourhoods. Yet, this is not a figure that is widely discussed in the media. Indeed, in a number of my interviews with more conservative upper middle class Chileans the interviewees told me how people in poor neighbourhoods respect the Carabineros. Whether the lower level of respect for the police in poorer neighbourhoods results from the poor police record at combating crime in these areas or whether it is linked to higher levels of police violence in these neighbourhoods has not be adequately studied.

The same issue can be raised in regard to protests. While most Chileans might support the actions of the Carabineros to control protests, this most certainly is not the case for those protesters who are in direct contact with this police response. The consequences for those affected are serious, even if those affected are a minority and even if the police perpetrators are simply bad apples. Research in this area is needed but neglected when police reform is framed within the rubric of “citizen security” (crime control) and with the objective of maintaining the public’s positive image of the police.

To be sure, the successes of the Carabineros should not be dismissed. Known cases of corruption are much lower than elsewhere in the region. It is possible that the Carabineros’ discipline has assisted in this accomplishment. Thus Chileans’ respect for the Carabineros is not unfounded in aspects of democratic policing. However, what this chapter has highlighted is that public respect for the police is not necessarily an outcome of democratic policing but rather can also be the outcome of effective political communication strategies. This is not an issue that has been well studied. More research is needed on the politics of communications in the area of policing.

**Bibliography**


