The Politics of Public Space:
What Can Political Science Contribute to the Study of Monuments?

Benjamin Forest
Department of Geography
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7
Canada
Benjamin.forest@mcgill.ca

Juliet Johnson
Department of Political Science
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7
Canada
Juliet.johnson@mcgill.ca

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Prepared for the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, Quebec, June 2010. The authors would like to thank Lili Knorr, Chris Ryan, Jeff Tannehaus, and especially Ece Atikcan for invaluable research assistance.
On April 26, 2007, under cover of darkness, Estonia’s new government moved a prominent Soviet WWII monument from central Tallinn to a military cemetery. This symbolic act unleashed a political firestorm, as Russian leaders vehemently denounced the move and ethnic Russians in Tallinn rioted. Prime Minister Andrus Ansip defiantly claimed that his decision represented an Estonian declaration of independence, arguing that “Before April 26, Russia did not take our state seriously . . . the situation has changed radically” (Interfax 2007).

The fall of Communist governments across East Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union brought difficult questions of state building to the fore. As in earlier national movements, cultivating a public sense of the sacred by reframing history and manipulating historical artifacts has been central to asserting the legitimacy of post-communist regimes (Suny 1999-2000; Verdery 1999). During change and crisis, political actors employ monuments and memorials as vehicles to legitimate their claims on power and their visions of society. These symbols, in turn, declare publicly which groups and histories the official sphere recognizes as central to the state’s identity. They reveal and reify the state’s level of inclusiveness – not simply designating who “belongs” to and in the state, but who may legitimately aspire to political power. They also make material claims about a state’s identity in relation to other states, suggesting everything from shared values and past cooperation to ideological conflict and historical enmities. At the same time, state actors do not and cannot act in a vacuum. Various publics, from highly organized NGOs to politically attuned graffiti artists, engage with official forces in shaping monuments and memorials as well.

Understanding collective memory formation as expressed through the material manipulation of myths and symbols has been a central concern of scholars ever since sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1992) introduced the concept in his landmark 1925 study *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire* (e.g., see Bodnar 1992; Gillis 1994; Smith 2000; Tilly 2006; Tarrow 1998). Political scientists, however, have come late to the party. While a few notable political scientists have made important contributions to the study of monuments, memory, and public space, scholars in disciplines such as geography, art and architecture, history, and sociology have dominated the field. In this paper, we hope to demonstrate some of the advantages that a political science lens can bring to this already rich and inherently interdisciplinary area of inquiry. We argue both that an explicit theoretical focus on power relations in “monumental politics” and a methodological approach featuring large-N comparative analysis can provide fresh insight into the process of monument creation, destruction, and alteration.

To support this argument, we first briefly discuss the theoretical and methodological gaps in the existing literature. Then, using a new database that we have developed, we illustrate the potential contribution of our alternative approach by systematically comparing official and private efforts to make “monumental” transformations across different regime types in the post-communist world. In doing so, we find one intuitive and one counter-intuitive pattern, neither of which could have been demonstrated without using our approach. First, the more democratic the state, the more private as opposed to official activity takes place. But second, these differences among regime types are driven almost completely by material action (monument creation and alteration) rather than discursive action (proposals to build monuments or threats to change or remove them). When digging further, we find that much less discourse occurs relative to material action in clearly democratic or authoritarian states than it does in regimes in the murky middle. We
conclude by suggesting some explanations for these patterns and discussing the implications of increased private provision and alteration of monuments.

What Can Political Science Contribute?

We are primarily concerned with the role and power of the state in transforming public space - that is, with public memory. Public memory is the state-sanctioned interpretation of collective memory that emerges from and reflects existing power structures (Gordon 2001). Political actors invoke myths and symbols in an attempt to forge public memories that shape and delimit their societies’ collective identities. This serves to legitimate particular courses of political action and define membership in particular states and nations.

These are widespread and fairly uncontroversial views among political scientists and others interested in nations and nationalism The constructivist school of nationalism holds, for example, that elites actively create nations by constructing shared national identities around important symbolic events and ideas (Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1983). Kaufman (2001), among others, argues that political leaders’ invocation of powerful ethnic myths and symbols can serve to incite or exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict. Other scholars focus on the role of memory and commemoration in confronting societal traumas such as genocide or mass repression, arguing that states cannot overcome damaging historical legacies and build stable democracies without engaging in official symbolic recognition of their traumatic pasts (Langenbacher and Dandelet 2005; DeLue 2006; Barkan 2000; Buruma 1994). Political theorists and philosophers debate the ethical aspects of public memory, asking under what circumstances societies have a responsibility to symbolically acknowledge the past in an official, public manner and whether there are more or less appropriate ways of doing so (Booth 1999, 2001; Margalit 2002; Ricouer 2004).

However, political scientists - with the notable exception of our fellow panelists! - have paid far less attention to the specific role of physical monuments and memorials in the nation-building process.¹ In contrast, following historian Pierre Nora’s (1996) pioneering study of French lieux de mémoire (places of memory), geographers in particular have produced a rich corpus of research on the use of monuments and memorials in shaping and reinforcing public memory (Hoelscher and Alderman 2004; Mitchell 2003). Geographers have written extensively about monuments and the construction of memory in a variety of countries, including Canada (Burk 2003; Gordon and Osborne 2004), the United States (Hoskins 2007; Leib 2002), South Africa (Foster 2004; Grundlingh 2001), the United Kingdom (Edensor 1997; Marshall 2004; Heffernan 1995); and Germany (Till 1999; Till 2005). Since the Soviet collapse, geographers – along with historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and literary theorists – have also discussed monuments, memory, and the transformation of public space in the post-communist world. Although the

¹ More specifically, although political scientists rarely conduct research on the symbolic reframing of post-communist public space, geographers regularly engage this field of inquiry. Political science exceptions include Smith (2002) on Russia and Stan (2006) on Romania, although neither focus specifically on monuments. Other exceptions include our own previous work (Forest and Johnson 2002; Forest, Johnson, and Till 2004; Johnson, Stepaniants, and Forest 2005). As Wendt (1999) notes, as a field political science generally neglects the role of materiality in forging collective identities.
literatures on Russia (Grant 2001; Khazanov 1998; Schleifman 2001; Sidorov 2000; Smith 2002; White 1995) and Hungary (Bodnar 1998; Foote, Toth, and Arvay 2000; James 1999; James 2005) are especially rich, excellent research on monuments in countries as diverse as Uzbekistan (Bell 1999), Slovenia (Jezernik 1998), Romania (Bucur 2002), and the reunited Germany (Cochrane 2006; Till 1999) has appeared as well.

In the 2007 Annual Review of Political Science, Ethington and McDaniel (2007) point out that although political geographers and political scientists have much to learn from each other, to date the two fields have developed in near isolation. We hope to rectify this in part by turning the theoretical and methodological lenses of political science onto this traditionally geographic area of inquiry. First, we do so by focusing on power relations in the transformation of monuments and memorials. Existing studies typically focus on how the transformation of public space reflects changing conceptions of national identity rather than on which groups have the power to manipulate public space and why it might matter politically. We want to ask who is able to alter public space and why. We are concerned with this question both on the micro level and the macro level. On the micro level, we want to know how groups of actors with different power resources interact in specific places and times over specific issues, and with what outcomes. On the macro level, we want to know how broader political factors such as regime type, past colonial relationships, etc., affect the interests and resources of actors who might wish to inscribe their ideas into public space.

In doing so, we treat monuments as both symbolic capital and public goods. The physical transformation of places of memory reflects the struggle among political actors for the symbolic capital embodied in and represented by these sites (Bourdieu 1977, 1990). By co-opting, creating, altering, contesting, ignoring, or removing particular monuments, political actors engage in a symbolic dialogue with each other and with the public in an attempt to gain symbolic capital - that is, prestige, legitimacy, and influence derived from being associated with status-bearing ideas and figures. Through this process, political leaders and interest groups attempt to define the historical figures that become official heroes and establish the historical incidents that frame state identities. Viewed in this way, monuments represent weapons in the political battle for hearts and minds.

Likewise, we focus our attention primarily on those monuments that can be defined as public goods. Public goods are those that are both non-rivalrous and non-excludable. Non-rivalrous means that one person can "consume" the good without reducing its availability for others, and that multiple people can use the good simultaneously. Non-excludable means that no one can effectively be prevented from using that good. The phrase "public good" is economic rather than normative; a public "good" can have problematic or contested normative associations. When political scientists and economists refer to public goods, they usually mean those such as national defense, highways, clean air, and so forth. However, statues, plaques, and memorials in public places share these characteristics as well.² Because everyone can view them free of charge - and, in fact, must view them if they are in the area - manipulating such monuments can be especially politically contentious, reflecting and providing potent sources of symbolic capital.

² So note that this excludes buildings that are often also called "monuments" in the broader literature, including museums, churches, and various historical edifices (whether public or private).
More broadly, one can view public memory itself as represented in monuments and memorials as a public good, and one typically provided by states. Scholars have long held that some set of unifying public ideals, identities, or myths is necessary (or at least useful) for societal cohesion in modern states. As with other public goods such as national defense, government actors are often best placed to provide this good, either in a consultative or an imposed manner.

Second, we take a large-N approach to studying monuments and memorials. While the literature on individual countries and specific monuments has proliferated, researchers rarely undertake systematic, cross-national studies examining patterns of monument construction and destruction. Moreover, to our knowledge, no database on the transformation of monuments or large-N study of the phenomenon exists to date. We are working to fill this gap by developing such a database, described below.

The Post-Communist Monuments Database

The analysis in this paper draws on a portion of our in-progress database on actual and proposed transformations of the monumental landscape in post-communist states. As of May 2010, we have just over 2000 cases catalogued. The database includes alterations, removal, or destruction of existing monuments; threats to alter, remove, or destroy monuments; construction of new monuments; and proposals to construct, alter, remove, or destroy monuments. When we refer to “monuments” we mean the entire set of material artifacts that fit the definition of public goods as discussed above. We do not include acts such as the renaming of streets or squares, although this was also a frequent occurrence after 1989. Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to "monuments" in reference to the database, this also includes threats to and proposals for monuments. Countries in the database include the states of East Europe that had Communist-led governments before 1989, their successor states, the USSR, and the successor states to the USSR.

When complete, the cases in the database will span a 25-year period. Our research efforts begin with Gorbachev’s rise to power in the USSR in 1985 and end in 2010, after the relative consolidation of diverse regimes across the post-communist region and the accession of eight post-communist states to the European Union. This will allow us to examine patterns leading up to, during, and after the key moments of regime transformation in East Europe and the former USSR.

Cases are coded by location (country and city); type (statue, plaque, etc.); year; subject matter; private/official (private or official origin); class (altered, threatened, proposed, or new); and action (details about the precise nature of the change). “Official” actors include state, provincial, and city officials, whether elected politicians or bureaucrats. “Private” actors include NGOs, activist groups, other organized non-governmental entities, and individuals from the private sector. In the case of new or altered monuments, we code a case as private only if the primary impetus and funding (where relevant) for the monument's creation or alteration comes from a

3 The closest on the post-communist world are the edited volumes by Brossat et al (1990) and Walkowitz and Knauer (2004), both of which combine overview chapters with chapters on individual countries written by regional specialists.
The coding scheme immediately allows for the analysis of location, type, year, private/official status, and class, while secondary coding and interpretation will be required for subject matter and action.

To construct the database, we are using primary-source media articles from a wide variety of international and regional news sources, including the extensive Factiva and Eastview electronic databases, the daily Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newswire, the Current Digests of the Soviet Press and Post-Soviet Press, and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service and its successor the World News Connection. We also draw upon relevant scholarly literature, city histories, and guidebooks. We are collecting the reference materials in two separate EndNote libraries, one for primary sources and one for secondary sources. Currently we have nearly 2,500 entries in the primary-source library (most including the full text of the articles in the Abstract section) and over 700 entries in the secondary-source library (most including links to the PDFs of the original articles), with many more to come. The database includes abbreviated reference information for each case, allowing us to find the original source materials used for the case entries and coding in our EndNote libraries relatively quickly.

To date (May 2010), we have drawn exclusively on English-language and translated sources for the database, but are currently compiling data from Russian and Czech regional language sources in separate databases/libraries as well (we hope to add additional languages in the future). Once complete, we will assess the degree of overlap between the English-language/translated sources and regional language sources and compare the patterns to test for bias. The ultimate goal is to develop a reasonably comprehensive database. We realize, of course, that even an exhaustive search of primary and secondary sources in a variety of languages will not identify every monumental transformation in the post-communist world. However, it should succeed in identifying those proposed and actual changes that have political salience and public resonance.

Such systematic data allows for comparisons both across regime type and region, and through time (changes within a single state or region). Analyses can then examine in comparative perspective the changes in each state's symbolic landscape. We will thus be able to examine issues such as the relative balance of co-optation, contestation, and disavowal of Soviet-era monuments; whether and how states memorialize Soviet-era repression; the themes commemorated by new monuments; and the primary decision makers involved in shaping the monumental landscape.

Even its partial state of completion, the database has proven useful both in documenting intuitive patterns and in helping to identify patterns and relationships that otherwise might have remained hidden. To demonstrate the potential power of the database, we use it to first examine the

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4 Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the extent to which government officials consult non-governmental actors in the creation/alteration of official monuments. Although this is an important issue, particularly in the more democratic regimes, it is one that can be best approached through case studies. In focusing on participation, we also want to emphasize that we mean more than whether or not “the public” has a voice in commemoration. Social scientists influenced by Nora (1989) tend to assume a dichotomy between elite/official memory on the one hand and popular/vernacular memory on the other (Agnew 1998). However, local, national, and even international officials, politicians, and other elites may have different agendas for these places and may compete with each other for control over monument sites (Fraser 1990). Likewise, there are many publics, sub-publics, and counter-publics, each possessing distinct political agendas, access to resources, and understandings of place.
relationships between official/private monuments and regime type, and then between regime type and material/discursive actions.

Monumental Action Across Regimes

For this analysis, we use a subset of our database that included only monuments in capital cities, and only between 1996 and 2008, producing a data set with 756 cases in 26 different states. These choices are both pragmatic and theoretical. On a practical level, at this stage the database is more consistent and complete for 1996 and after, with between 35 and 82 cases in capital cities each year (see Table 1). Capital cities are also the most likely to be well covered in English-language and translated media. Theoretically, by 1996 the transition from Communism had been largely superseded by the transition to new national, political, and economic forms in East Europe and the FSU. Struggles over these new forms were likely to be most intense in capital cities, as places of memory in capitals typically reflect the most prominent conceptions of the state and nation and are most vulnerable to change.5

To measure regime openness, we classify the country cases into three groups - democratic, intermediate, and authoritarian - based on Freedom House scores. Freedom House annually ranks countries on a scale of 1 (most free) to 7 (least free) on both political openness and civil liberties protection. We combine the two scores to obtain a composite score from 2 to 14 for each country in each year. In accordance with Freedom House and common scholarly practice, we categorize countries with composite scores of 2-4 as democratic, 5-10 as intermediate, and 11-14 as authoritarian (Tables 2 and 3). Eighteen states (such as Hungary, Ukraine, and Belarus) remained in one category or the other for the entire period, while eight states (such as Romania and Russia) shifted between categories.

As expected, the number of cases varies considerably from state to state. We have only one case from Macedonia, for example, while Russia contributes over 22% of all cases in the data set, over twice the proportion of the next largest contributors, Ukraine (9.3%) and the Czech Republic (9.0%). To ensure that our results are not driven solely by Russia, we perform all analyses both with and without Russia. We find only minor differences (discussed below), which did not substantially influence the outcomes. Consequently, we only report analyses here that include Russia.

The first issue we investigate is the relationship between regime type and the balance of private and official monuments. Intuitively, one would expect that more democratic regimes would have a larger proportion of private monuments because private citizens, NGOs, and civil society in general have greater scope for action in democracies. In contrast, the non-state sphere is more highly constrained in authoritarian countries, so official monuments should predominate there (e.g., see Bell 1999).

Indeed, as shown in Table 4, this is precisely the pattern we find. Private and official monuments constitute approximately equal proportions in democratic states, while over three-quarters of monuments in authoritarian states are official. Intermediate regimes lie between these two

5 For Kazakhstan, which transferred its capital from Almaty to Astana, we include both cities.
extremes with a 30/70 ratio between private and official. A Chi-squared test (p=0.000) confirms that the frequency distribution is non-random.

There is a similar pattern when we examine only cases that involve material changes, that is, cases of new and altered monuments (Table 5). Here again private and official actions are about evenly divided in democratic regimes, but official actions dominate in intermediate and authoritarian states. The ratios are similar to the analysis of all monuments, although the proportion of private action is higher for all categories, and most especially in intermediate states. The results are again confirmed as non-random by a Chi-squared test (p=0.000).

Turning to cases that involve discursive action (threats and proposals), however, we find a more complicated pattern (Table 6). Official action constitutes the majority in all three categories, although the proportion is lower in democratic states (60%) than in the other two categories. Unlike the previous analyses, these proportions do not follow a linear pattern. Rather, they are about 25/75 in both intermediate and authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the proportion of official action is slightly higher in the middle category, although the difference is not large.6

These different results for material and discursive actions call for further analysis. It is not obvious why discursive actions should not follow the same intuitive pattern as material actions. Therefore, we can dig deeper into the puzzle by collapsing the official/private distinction and examining the proportion of all discursive action (threats and proposals) to all material action (alterations and new construction) across the three regime categories.

In doing so, we discover an intriguing pattern that helps to illuminate the relative role of discourse across regime types. As Table 7 reveals, discourse constitutes about one-third of all action in both democratic and authoritarian regimes, but fully half of all action in intermediate ones (p=0.000).7 In sum, we find relatively more “talk” than “action” in states that have neither democratic legitimacy nor an authoritarian leadership. In intermediate states, both private and official actors appear to find it relatively easier and/or more desirable to threaten and propose monuments than to actually build or alter them.

There are two possible explanations for this pattern, not mutually exclusive. The first is that because intermediate regimes are typically weaker than democratic and non-democratic regimes, it is relatively more complicated for either official or private groups to successfully manipulate the symbolic landscape. Democratic regimes perhaps have the legitimacy and stability to act on their own in this regard. Moreover, in democratic regimes it is perhaps more likely that government actors have systematically incorporated key elements civil society into the formal decision-making process on monumental transformations, facilitating material creation and alteration. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes have the coercive power both to act without discussion or consultation and to

6 Although these results are intriguing, we treat them with caution. First, the pattern is only marginally significant (Chi-squared p=0.045), and of all the analyses, this one is most sensitive to the exclusion of Russia. Without Russia, the results are more significant (p=0.025) but the pattern is even more exaggerated, with official action constituting 80% in the intermediate category.

7 This pattern is slightly less pronounced if Russia is removed from the analysis, but intermediate regimes remain significantly distinct from the other two categories.
prevent private groups from expressing their preferences. Authoritarian regimes also arguably have a greater need to use public space to assert their identities and their legitimacy, as they cannot do this through the electoral process. As a result, both democratic and authoritarian regimes would be more likely to exhibit a high proportion of material to discursive action than would those in the middle range.

The second possible explanation is that national identity itself may be more uncertain and contested in intermediate regimes; that is, the relative proliferation of talk as opposed to action may reflect the broader differences in various groups’ conception of the state and nation. This underlying uncertainty would make it harder for political actors both to consolidate a fully democratic or authoritarian regime and to manipulate the symbolic landscape effectively. Qualitative research will be necessary in order to determine the precise causal relationships. In either case, though, the relatively higher proportion of talk to action in intermediate regimes arguably reflects a broader weakness in the state.

Private Actions, Public Goods

The preliminary insights provided through our database and our focus on power relations raise a number of interesting questions, among them the role that privately provided monuments play in building state and national identities across various regime types. Certainly the extensive literature on social capital generally assumes that greater participation reflects and inculcates increasing civic virtue, and thus helps to create and consolidate democracies (e.g., Putnam 1994). But again, through our preliminary investigations based on the cross-national data we have collected so far, it becomes clear that private participation in the transformation of public space does not necessarily promote liberal or unifying visions of the state and nation. Instead, many of the private efforts at monument creation and alteration in the post-communist world either do little to forward a civic vision of the state and nation or, in some cases, actively promote intolerance.

Many new private monuments fit into the general category of inoffensive but relatively trivial in terms of promoting a particular vision of state or national identity. Examples include monuments to Soviet cheese and to a famous stray dog in Moscow. Others, such as a private memorial to organized crime figures killed in a shootout in Moscow (later dismantled by the state) or another to a crime kingpin in Kyrgyzstan, symbolically challenge the rule of law but do not necessarily encourage societal intolerance.

More concerning are the actions of private groups who promote far right, ethnically exclusive, and/or pro-Stalinist political agendas. These activities appear across all regime types. For example, in Budapest far-right, pro-Nazi groups have repeatedly vandalized and demonstrated again the Red Army Memorial (MTI - EcoNews 2006, 2008). In Latvia, ethnic nationalists have repeatedly defaced Soviet war memorials with Nazi swastikas and anti-Russian graffiti (Latvian News Agency 2003, 2005; BBC Monitoring 2006). In Georgia, private groups financed the erection of new and refurbished statues to Stalin, an ethnic Georgian (Barateli 1998; Associated Press 2000a, 2000b). In Minsk, activist groups have regularly threatened and defaced monuments to Jews killed in Belarus during WWII and a monument to victims of Stalinist
repression (Fomin 2003; Reuters 2005). These and other cases represent the public "speaking back" to the state, but not in unifying or desirable ways. More participation does not necessarily mean “better” participation when it comes to monumental transformation in the post-communist world.

Finally, even when private monuments are designed and intended to serve as unifying symbols, they often do so precisely because official monuments are unable to fill that role. In other words, private actions may be substitutes for state actions, and thus (as with high levels of private discourse) can reflect state weakness. Two excellent examples are the Solovetskii stone in Moscow and the Bruce Lee statue in Mostar. Erected by the NGO Memorial in the late Gorbachev era, the Solovetskii stone (taken from the gulag at Solovki) memorializes victims of Soviet repression. Although powerful, Memorial leaders always assumed that this would be a secondary monument, to be overshadowed at some point by a larger, official Moscow monument to the victims. This official monument has yet to appear. Similarly, the Bruce Lee monument, erected in the divided city of Mostar in 2005 by the NGO Urban Movement, honors Bruce Lee as a unifying figure among the ethnic groups of the region - one they all grew up watching and appreciating, and so one who "belongs" simultaneously to all of the groups and none of them. Arguably, given the difficult political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only a private organization could have taken such a step. In cases like these the individual private actions themselves may be laudable, but the very need for them in the first place indicates deeper societal and political problems.

Understanding the meaning of cross-national patterns often requires an interpretive analysis of particular monuments and case studies. As noted in the introduction, a substantial literature of such qualitative studies already exists. We highly value these perspectives (indeed, we have contributed to this literature ourselves). Nonetheless, such analyses can be idiosyncratic and difficult to generalize from, and often neglect formal political contexts. We hope to have demonstrated that a more comparative, quantitative approach – typical of political science – can help to reveal the influence of formal political structures on public memory, and can show how political context may influence not only the subject matter of monuments, but also the agents who can participate in their construction and alteration. In our illustrative examples, this approach not only confirmed the expected pattern of greater private participation in democratic regimes, but also the counter-intuitive finding that discursive action proliferates in intermediate regimes as opposed to democratic and authoritarian ones. As we continue develop the database and the associated primary and secondary-source libraries, we hope that it will serve as a resource for us and for other scholars who wish to delve more deeply into this alternative approach to studying monumental transformation.
### Table 1: Cases by Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>5.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5.42%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>50</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>10.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10.85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>9.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7.28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>65</td>
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<td>2007</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>76</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Cases by Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic FH Combined Score 2-4</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>36.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate FH Combined Score 5-10</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>32.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian FH Combined Score 11-14</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>31.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Countries by Regime Type and Year (1996-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House Combined Score 2-4</td>
<td>Freedom House Combined Score 5-10</td>
<td>Freedom House Combined Score 11-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Kyrgyzstan (1996-99; 2005-08)</td>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia (1996-1997)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yugoslavia (1998-2008)*</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4: Private and Official Monuments by Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private</strong></td>
<td>48.54% (133)</td>
<td>30.49% (75)</td>
<td>25.42% (60)</td>
<td>35.45% (268)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official</strong></td>
<td>51.46% (141)</td>
<td>69.51% (171)</td>
<td>74.58% (176)</td>
<td>64.55% (488)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100% (274)</td>
<td>100% (246)</td>
<td>100% (236)</td>
<td>100% (756)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi Squared = 33.53, Pr = 0.000

### Table 5: New and Altered Monuments by Class and Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Private</strong></td>
<td>53.04% (96)</td>
<td>36.97% (44)</td>
<td>27.14% (38)</td>
<td>40.45% (178)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official</strong></td>
<td>46.96% (85)</td>
<td>63.03% (75)</td>
<td>72.86% (102)</td>
<td>59.55% (262)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>100% (181)</td>
<td>100% (119)</td>
<td>100% (140)</td>
<td>100% (440)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi Squared = 33.53, Pr = 0.000
Table 6: Proposed and Threatened Monuments by Class and Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39.56% (36)</td>
<td>24.39% (30)</td>
<td>26.83% (22)</td>
<td>29.73% (88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official</td>
<td>60.44% (55)</td>
<td>75.61% (93)</td>
<td>73.17% (60)</td>
<td>70.27% (208)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (91)</td>
<td>100% (123)</td>
<td>100% (82)</td>
<td>100% (296)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi Squared = 6.22, Pr = 0.045

Table 7: Material and Discursive Action by Regime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discursive Action (Proposed or Threatened)</th>
<th>Democratic</th>
<th>Intermediate</th>
<th>Authoritarian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discursive Action (Proposed or Threatened)</td>
<td>33.21% (91)</td>
<td>50.00% (123)</td>
<td>34.75% (82)</td>
<td>39.15% (296)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Action (Altered or New)</td>
<td>66.79% (183)</td>
<td>50.00% (123)</td>
<td>65.25% (154)</td>
<td>60.85% (460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100% (274)</td>
<td>100% (246)</td>
<td>100% (236)</td>
<td>100% (756)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson Chi Squared = 18.13, Pr = 0.000
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