

Terrorists or National Heroes? Politics of the OUN and the UPA in Ukraine¹

Ivan Katchanovski, Ph.D.

Visiting Scholar
Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
Tel. (617) 495-9722
ikatchan@fas.harvard.edu

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Abstract

This study analyzes policies and public attitudes concerning the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) after the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The issue of the political rehabilitation of these nationalist organizations, which relied on terrorism and were involved in Nazi genocide and ethnic cleansing of Poles during World War Two, became one of central political issues in this post-Soviet state. The question is which factors determine attitudes towards the OUN and the UPA in contemporary Ukraine. The hypothesis is that regional factors are the main determinants of the public opinion concerning these organizations. This paper uses analysis of historical studies and archival data to examine policies and controversies concerning the OUN and the UPA. It employs comparative and regression analyses of the 2009 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey to determine effects of regional factors, compared to other factors, such as ethnicity, language, and age, on attitudes towards the Stepan Bandera faction of the OUN and the UPA. The paper shows that that regional factors and perceptions of the involvement of the Bandera faction of the OUN and the UPA in mass murder are strongest predictors of views concerning these nationalist organizations.

Research Question and Hypothesis

The question of the political rehabilitation of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) became one of the central political issues in post-Soviet Ukraine, especially after the “Orange Revolution.” (See Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, “Anti-Soviet Partisans,” “Stepan Bandera;” *Orhanizatsia*; Shevel). President Viktor Yushchenko, his bloc “Our Ukraine,” other nationalist parties, and many mass media outlets pursued the complete political rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA. They portrayed these organizations as a national liberation movement, which fought against both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union for Ukrainian independence, and presented leaders of the OUN and the UPA as national heroes. For example, President Yushchenko awarded, posthumously, the ‘Hero of Ukraine’ titles to Roman Shukhevych, the Supreme Commander of the UPA, in October 2007, and to Stepan Bandera, the leader of the main faction of the OUN, in January 2010.¹

This study analyzes political attitudes concerning the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army after the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine. The question is which factors determine attitudes concerning the OUN and the UPA in modern Ukraine. This first section of the paper examines contemporary controversies regarding these organizations and reviews previous studies. It provides a theoretical and historical framework for analysis of public attitudes towards the Bandera faction of the OUN (OUN-B) and the UPA in the second section. The study focuses on the OUN-B because it was historically more influential than the Andrii Melnyk faction (OUN-M), in particular, by organizing the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, and because the policies of the heroization of the OUN in “Orange” Ukraine concerned primarily the Bandera faction.

This paper uses data from a national survey that was commissioned by the author and conducted in Ukraine by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in June 2009. This survey includes questions concerning general attitudes towards the OUN-B, the UPA, and involvement of the OUN and UPA in mass murder of the Polish, Jewish, and Ukrainian populations. The paper also uses analysis of previous studies of the OUN and the UPA and archival documents from the Roosevelt Presidential Archive in the United States and the Volyn State Regional Archive in Ukraine.

This study employs comparative and multiple regression analysis of the survey data to determine effects of regional factors, compared to other factors, such as ethnicity, language, education, age, gender, and place of residence, in public attitudes towards the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. It tests a hypothesis that regional factors are major determinants of views concerning these organizations. Since the OUN and the UPA were regional organizations based primarily in Galicia in the 1930s and the 1940s, public support for these organizations is likely to be strongest in this region.

Support for the OUN and the UPA is also likely to be much higher in other regions of Western Ukraine than in the regions of historically Eastern Ukraine. Previous studies show that pro-nationalist political culture became dominant in Western Ukrainian regions, which experienced Polish, Czechoslovak, and Romanian rule between World War I and World War II. Western Ukraine came under Soviet rule as result of World War II, in contrast to historically Eastern Ukraine which experienced much longer periods of Russian and Soviet rule. Western regions, with the exception of Volhynia, were ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire before World War I. Because of differences in historical experience, nationalist values are stronger in Galicia compared to historical Western Ukrainian regions of Volhynia, Bukovyna, and

Transcarpathia. However, previous studies show that differences among Western Ukrainian regions in terms of support for pro-nationalist parties and presidential candidates are generally lower than differences between these regions and regions of historically Eastern Ukraine. (See Birch; Katchanovski, *Cleft Countries*).

OUN and UPA Controversies

The OUN-UPA issue exposed significant political divisions concerning policies, attitudes, definitions, and commemoration of these organizations in a country which is already divided in terms of support for main presidential candidates, political parties, and key foreign policy issues. Viktor Yanukovich, his Party of Regions, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and many other pro-Russian and pro-Communist parties and politicians opposed Yushchenko's policies of the political rehabilitation and heroization of the OUN and the UPA. For example, after he was elected President of Ukraine in February 2010, Yanukovich stated that he would consider annulling Yushchenko's decrees that awarded the 'Hero of Ukraine' titles to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych.²

The issue of the politics of the OUN and the UPA is relevant not only to Ukraine, but also to other countries. The governments of Russia and Poland have opposed the political and historical revisionism concerning these organizations. For example, in his open letter to President Yushchenko, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev cited his opposition to the policies concerning the OUN and the UPA as one of the major factors of the deterioration of relations between Russia and Ukraine.³ The Polish Senate declared anti-Polish actions of the UPA and the OUN during World War II as ethnic cleansing with "elements of genocide."⁴ The leaders of Russia and Poland and many other politicians in these countries publicly condemned the Yushchenko's award of the title of 'Hero of Ukraine' to Stepan Bandera by pointing out OUN's collaboration with Nazi Germany and OUN's involvement in mass murder.

The European Parliament in its resolution of February 25, 2010 concerning the situation in Ukraine stated that it "deeply deplores the decision by the outgoing President of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, posthumously to award Stepan Bandera, a leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) which collaborated with Nazi Germany, the title of 'National Hero of Ukraine'; hopes, in this regard, that the new Ukrainian leadership will reconsider such decisions and will maintain its commitment to European values."⁵ The Simon Wiesenthal Center, a leading US-based Jewish organization, expressed its "deepest revulsion at the recent honor awarded to Stepan Bandera, who collaborated with the Nazis in the early stages of World War II, and whose followers were linked to the murders of thousands of Jews and others."⁶

A number of other post-communist countries, such as Croatia, Slovakia, Poland, Russia, Romania, the Baltic States, and Serbia, faced similar issues coming in terms with nationalist movements during World War II. For example, there were attempts in independent Croatia to cast *Ustashi* as a national liberation movement, while ignoring or minimizing their collaboration with Nazi Germany and their involvement in the mass murder of Serbs.

There is a growing number of academic studies of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army not only in Ukraine, but also in the West, Poland and Russia. Studies of the OUN and the UPA often embrace differing views of these organizations. Many issues still remain debated or not sufficiently researched. (See, for example, Himka; Hunczak; Kentii, *Ukrainska povstanska armiia, Zbroinyi chyn*; Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, "Anti-Soviet Partisans," "Stepan Bandera," Motyka; *Orhanizatsia; Politychnyi*; Rudling, "The Shukhevych Cult," "Theory and Practice").

Research on the OUN and the UPA in the Soviet Union was restricted, censored, and often driven by the communist ideology which depicted these organizations as “bourgeois nationalists” and close allies of Nazi Germany. However, for similar reasons, the issue of the OUN-UPA involvement in the genocide of Jews and the ethnic cleansing of Poles was largely ignored in the Soviet Union.

In contrast, publications produced by former leaders and members of the OUN and the UPA and their followers in the West, generally, presented these organizations as a movement for independence of Ukraine while omitting or minimizing their participation in the mass murder of Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians (See, for example, *Litopys Ukrainskoi Povstanskoj Armii*). Similar approaches were adopted by many historians of the OUN and the UPA in post-Soviet Ukraine. They often uncritically relied on documents or memoirs produced by OUN and UPA leaders and members, who had vested interest in presenting positive histories of their organizations. In contrast, Ukrainian, Polish, Jewish, and Russian archival documents and eyewitness accounts that offered a different perspective on the OUN and the UPA were often marginalized or used selectively. (See, for example, *Litopys UPA*, Serhiichuk; *Ukrainska*). For instance, the website of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute contains almost exclusively documents, publications, and links concerning the activities the OUN and the UPA that were primarily produced by these organizations or their contemporary supporters.⁷

After the “Orange Revolution” in 2004, President Viktor Yushchenko and many other nationalist politicians at the national, regional and local levels employed and promoted such uncritical historical approaches in their policy of the political rehabilitation and heroization of the OUN and the UPA. For example, Ihor Yukhnovsky, the acting Director of the Ukrainian National Memory Institute, which was created by Yushchenko’s order with a status of a central government agency, stated that “a return Stepan Bandera’s good name on the whole territory of Ukraine” was the main task of this government institute (See *Stepan Bandera* 10). The Security Service of Ukraine publicized such approaches concerning the OUN and the UPA. For instance, during Yushchenko’s presidency, Volodymyr Viatrovych, the head of the Center for the Studies of the Liberation Movement in Lviv in Western Ukraine, became the director of the State Archive of the Security Service of Ukraine.

The nationalist politicians and historians in Ukraine presented the OUN and the UPA as a Ukrainian national liberation movement, which started in Western Ukraine with a broad popular support and extended to many other regions of Ukraine. They argued that the OUN-B was forced to collaborate with Nazi Germany not for ideological reasons, but because it was in interest of the pro-independence struggle and that this collaboration effectively ended after the Nazi leadership refused to accept a declaration of the Ukrainian independence by OUN-B leaders in Lviv on June 30, 1941. These politicians and historians emphasized that many OUN-B leaders and ordinary members, including Stepan Bandera, were arrested, imprisoned in concentration camps, or executed by the Nazis. They presented the Ukrainian Insurgent Army as a guerrilla force which included not only ethnic Ukrainians, but also a significant number of minorities, such as Jews, Georgians, and Tatars. The UPA was depicted as a guerrilla army which fought primarily against Soviet and German police and military forces and Soviet and Polish partisans. Mass killings of Polish civilians were either ignored, or justified as retaliatory actions of UPA for the pacification policy of the Polish government before World War II and murders of Ukrainian nationalists in the Chelm region. Similarly, killings of Ukrainian civilians were either dismissed as Soviet propaganda or attributed to “false flag” operations by the Soviet security forces that

misrepresented themselves as UPA units. (See *Ukrainska*; Marples, *Heroes and Villains*, “Anti-Soviet Partisans.”)

For instance, President Yushchenko claimed that a half million of Ukrainians fought in the UPA in 1943.⁸ However, OUN and UPA sources put membership of the UPA at about 25-30 thousand in 1944 when it reached the greatest numerical strength (Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk* 47). Its membership was much smaller before and after that time. The OUN was most active in Galicia in the 1930s and 1940s. The majority of leaders and members of two factions of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists were from this region of Western Ukraine. Although the UPA was initially established by the OUN-B in Volhynia, most of UPA leaders and members were from Galicia. For example, analysis of 118 biographies of leaders of the UPA and the OUN-B in Ukraine published in Sodol (*Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk*) shows that 71% of them were from Galicia, 20% from Volhynia, 1% from Bukovyna, 6% from historically Eastern Ukraine, and 2% from other countries or their place of birth was unknown. The data exclude non-OUN and non-UPA members of the Supreme Ukrainian Liberation Council, which was created in the middle of 1944 and played a ceremonial role.⁹

The analysis of ideology and policy of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, which split into the Bandera faction (OUN-B) and the Melnyk faction (OUN-M) in 1940, primarily because of tactical and leadership differences, shows that it was a semi-totalitarian organization which combined elements of extreme nationalism and fascism (See Motyl). The OUN envisioned a creation of an independent Ukrainian state that was allied with Nazi Germany and run as a dictatorship by OUN leaders. This monoethnic state, similar in many ways to *Ustashi* Croatia, was supposed to include parts of modern day Russia, Poland, and Byelorussia. The OUN regarded such minorities in Ukraine as Jews, Poles, and Russians, as hostile (See Berkhoff and Carynnyk; Motyka; Rudling, “Theory and Practice”). Although its official ideology abandoned many of the extreme elements since 1943, actual policies of the OUN-B did not change to the same extent. For example, the UPA in 1943 and 1944 undertook an ethnic cleansing campaign against Poles in Volhynia.

The UPA included some units comprised from non-Ukrainians, such as Georgians, Azeries, and Uzbeks. However, these units consisted mainly from former Soviet POWs, who were recruited by Germans and then joined the UPA mostly for instrumental reasons. A very small number of Jews served in the UPA, primarily in such secondary capacities as doctors. Their presence was also motivated primarily by instrumental reasons, since they tried to escape the Nazi genocide while the UPA used them because it needed medical and other such services that could not be provided by Ukrainians. It appears that most of these minorities in the UPA deserted to the Soviet side or were killed by the UPA. (See Diukov; Himka; Motyka; Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk*).

Both the OUN and the UPA were terrorist organizations because their actions correspond to academic definitions of terrorism as use or a threat of use of violence against civilians by organizations and other non-state actors in order to intimidate and to achieve political goals (See Hoffman, 2006). The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists relied on a campaign of assassinations of Polish and Soviet officials and pro-Polish Ukrainians in the 1930s in order to advance its political goals. For example, Stepan Bandera, and other leading members of the OUN, such as Mykola Lebed Roman Shukhevych, organized in 1934 an assassination of Bronislaw Pieracki, the Polish Minister of Internal Affairs.

There is also evidence of the involvement of the OUN in international terrorism, but this aspect of the OUN activity still remains largely unresearched. For example, archival documents

at the Roosevelt Presidential Library show that the U.S. Secret Service, the FBI, and Henry Field, a special intelligence aide to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, investigated an involvement of OUN members, leaders, and sympathizers in a possible Nazi-led plot to assassinate U.S. President Roosevelt. These documents indicate that Christian Zinsser, an agent of German security services who worked under cover of a German press attaché in Buenos Aires, recruited in the beginning of 1941 Hryhorii Matseiko with a mission to kill President Roosevelt.¹⁰ (See Henry Field Papers.) Matseiko was an OUN terrorist who assassinated Pieracki on the order of Stepan Bandera. The same archival documents and Pavel Sudoplatov, a Soviet intelligence agent who infiltrated the OUN leadership in the middle of the 1930s, both independently refer to assistance provided by the OUN to Croatian *Ustashi* in the assassination of the King of Yugoslavia and the French Foreign Minister in France in 1934 (See Henry Field Papers; Sudoplatov 26).

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army also fits a definition of a terrorist organization because it relied on violence against civilians to induce terror and achieve its political goals. The UPA, immediately after its creation in spring 1943, conducted a campaign of mass terror against the Polish minority in Volhynia with an aim of ethnic cleansing. Polish and some Western historians estimate Polish civilian casualties of the UPA in Volhynia at 35-60 thousand. (See Hrytsiuk; Snyder). However, the lower bound of these estimates is more reliable than higher estimates which are based on an assumption that the Polish population in the region was several times less likely to perish as a result of Nazi genocidal policies compared to other regions of Poland and compared to the Ukrainian population of Volhynia. The mass murder of Poles in Volhynia by the UPA cannot be classified as a genocide because there is no evidence of an intent to eliminate entire or a significant part of the Polish nation, and the anti-Polish action was mostly limited to a relatively small region. Although a significant proportion (at least 10%) of ethnic Poles in Volhynia was killed by the UPA, the Polish casualties comprised about 1% of the prewar population of Poles on territories where the UPA was active and 0.2% of the entire ethnically Polish population in Ukraine and Poland.

The UPA mounted an anti-Soviet terror campaign in Western Ukraine. KGB data put Soviet casualties of the OUN-UPA in 1944-1953 at 22 thousand civilians, compared to about 8 thousand members of military, security, police, and paramilitary forces. Most of the civilian casualties were pro-Soviet local Ukrainians, Soviet and Communist Party officials, and intelligentsia, many of whom came from historically Eastern Ukraine. (See *Politychnyi* 771).

Historical studies show that many representatives of the OUN and a significant proportion of the UPA members were involved in the Nazi genocide. The Nazi genocidal policy was responsible for deaths of most of about 7 million people, including 1.5 million Jews, who perished in Ukraine during World War II (Brandon and Lower; Katchanovski, "Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides;" Vallin, Mesle, Adamets, and Pyrozshkov). In Volhynia, Jews accounted for more than 200,000 out of the estimated 400-500 thousands victims among the local population and Soviet POWs. (See Hrytsiuk). The OUN-B and the OUN-M established local police and administration in many regions of Ukraine, particularly in the West, following the German occupation of Ukraine in 1941. Although the police was reorganized by the German authorities into auxiliary police in the fall of 1941 and a significant number of OUN commanders and members were removed from the police and even arrested, the OUN continued to maintain substantial presence and informal control over many units of the auxiliary police, especially, in Volhynia and Galicia. The local police helped to implement the Nazi genocides of Jews, Ukrainians, Russians, Byelorussians, and Poles by assisting in mass executions and other

policies aimed at the physical elimination of the entire Jewish population and significant parts of the Ukrainian, Russian, Byelorussian, and Polish population. (See Berkhoff; Brandon and Lower; Diukov; Katchanovski, "Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides;" *Politychnyi*).

A large part of the auxiliary police in Volhynia abandoned their positions on the orders of the OUN-B and helped to create the UPA in the spring of 1943. The former policemen, who joined the UPA on OUN-B orders, along with former members of auxiliary police units controlled by the OUN-M and by Taras Borovets and incorporated into the UPA, constituted about half of all UPA members in the fall of 1943 (Estimated from Vovk). Many top commanders of the UPA were former police commanders in Nazi occupied Ukraine. For example, Mykola Kovtoniuk (Yakymchuk), the commandant of the Lutsk city police in 1941, an OUN-B leader in the Volyn Region, became the first commander of the "Turiv" Military District of the UPA. (See Sprava 1, Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armii, 1943-49. Dovidnyk druhyi* 117). Stepan Yanishevsky, a deputy commander of the police in Vinnytsia in 1941-1943, was the acting head of the "Zahrava" Military District in 1944. These two districts, which covered most of Volhynia, were the most important formations in the UPA-North. Omelian Hrabets, the head of the regional police in Rivne in 1941 and the leader of the OUN-B in the Rivne Region in 1941-1942, was the commander of the UPA-South in 1943-1944. (See Kentii, *Zbroinyi chyn* 237; Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armii, 1943-49. Dovidnyk* 74, 136).

Local Ukrainian police commanders and members assisted Nazi executioners in implementing the Nazi genocidal policy by rounding Jews and guarding them during mass executions, catching escapees, and guarding Jewish ghettos. For example, senior police commanders and police members, a large proportion of whom later joined the UPA on the order of the OUN-B, served in these capacities in the biggest cities and many small towns of the Volyn Region when mass executions of Jews took place (See Antoniuk 19, 25-26, 34). Estimated numbers of Jews who were executed or killed by other means in these locations from the end of June 1941 to spring 1943 are as follows: 20 thousand in Volodymyr Volynsk, 15 thousand in Lutsk, 15 thousand in Kovel, 3 thousands in Matsiiv, 3 thousands in Torchyn, and 800 in Kolky (Spector 362-364). For instance, Soviet postwar trials of Ukrainian policemen from Schutzmannschaft Battalion 103, which was based in Matsiiv (now Lukiv), and which joined the UPA in spring 1943, reveal that this police unit participated in mass executions of Jews in Matsiiv, Volodymyr Volynsk, and several other towns in the Volyn Region (See Antoniuk 25; Nakonechnyi 13).

The police from these Volhynian towns before defecting to the UPA participated in mass executions in other locations although its specific units are not yet identified in many cases. For example, the police from Lutsk assisted in the Nazi executions of some 4 thousands Jews in Sofiivka in summer and fall of 1942 (Cybulski 67, Nakonechnyi 2003). A significant part of the regional and district police based in Lutsk joined the UPA in spring 1943 (Antoniuk 25-26). In addition, the UPA killed on its own at least a thousand of Jews, who survived the Nazi genocide¹¹ (Himka).

Similarly, the local police was used in guarding and catching Soviet POWs, most of whom were Russians and Ukrainians. For example, the archival police records show that the police in Lutsk under command of Mykola Kovtoniuk (Yakymchuk) and other local OUN-B leaders during summer 1941 handed over Soviet POWs, including Ukrainians, to the German police (Sprava 1). Soviet estimates of the number of Soviet POWs, who perished as a result of the Nazi genocidal policy in POW camps located in these towns in the Volyn Region, are as

follows: 25 thousand in Volodymyr Volynsk, 12 thousand in Kovel, and 11 thousand in Lutsk (*Dovidnyk* 209).

Police from Ratno assisted in mass murder of close to 3000 Ukrainians in the village of Kortelisy and several neighboring villages in the Volyn Region in September 1942 (Olkhovsky). In April 1943, the Ratno police joined the UPA (Antoniuk 25). Similarly, the auxiliary police from Tsuman, most of which later joined the UPA, helped to carry out mass executions of more than 130 residents of the Ukrainian village of Klubochyn and about 50 people in the Polish settlement of Oborky in November 1942 (*Sprava* 4).

Even though this question has not yet been addressed by specific studies, there is a strong likelihood that the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 was involved in implementation of the Nazi genocides of the Jews and the Byelorussians during the war (See Rudling, “The Shukhevych Cult”). Such police units participated in mass executions of Jews and Byelorussians (See Dean; Nakonechnyi; Rudling, “The Shukhevych Cult,” “The Khatyn’ Massacre”). Many top commanders of the UPA came from this police battalion. For example, the former officers of the Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201 included: Roman Shukhevych, the Supreme commander of the UPA from 1943 to 1950; Oleksander Lutsky, the organizer and the first Commander of the UPA-West, which was based mainly in Galicia, and Vasyl Sydor, the Commander of UPA-West in 1944-1949 (Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armii, 1943-49. Dovidnyk*).

Many nationalist politicians and historians in Ukraine cite anecdotal accounts of arrests and killings of OUN and UPA leaders by Germans, October 1942 as the date of creation of the UPA, and individual clashes between UPA and German forces as evidence of anti-Nazi activities. However, the analysis of 118 biographies of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine during World War II shows that at least 46% of them served in top positions in the regional and local police and administration, the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, the SS Galicia Division, or studied in German-sponsored military and intelligence schools, primarily, in the beginning of World War II. At least 23% of the OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine were in the auxiliary police, Schutzmannschaft Battalion 201, and other police formations, 18% in military and intelligence schools in Germany and Nazi-occupied Poland, 11% in the Nachtigall and Roland Battalions, 8% in the regional and local administration in Ukraine during the Nazi occupation, and 1% in the SS Galicia Division. (Calculated from Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armii, 1943-49. Dovidnyk*, with use of other biographical sources). The percentage of Nazi collaborators among the OUN-B and UPA leadership is likely to be higher than this estimate since in many cases information concerning their activities in occupied Ukraine and Poland in the beginning of the war is not available.

At the same time, at least 27% of the wartime OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine were arrested or interned at various times by the German security forces, police and other occupational authorities. However, it is striking that all of them, with the exception of Ivan Klymiv, were either released relatively soon or were able to escape, some more than once. (Calculated from Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armii, 1943-49. Dovidnyk*, with use of other biographical sources). Similarly, Stepan Bandera and the absolute majority of other top leaders of the OUN who were arrested or detained by the Nazis, were not murdered, but were released by the Nazi authorities by the end of the war, in contrast to the majority of Jewish prisoners and Soviet POWs.

President Yushchenko officially commemorated October 1942 as the date of creation of the UPA in order to emphasize its anti-Nazi activity. For example, he personally visited in October 2009 the town of Kolky in the Volyn Region to commemorate the said UPA anniversary

and proclaim UPA members, who created the “Kolky Republic,” as national heroes because, according to him and nationalist historians, they liberated a significant part of the Volyn Region from the Nazis in Spring 1943.¹² However, historical studies and archival documents show that the Ukrainian Insurgent Army was created by the OUN-B in Volhynia not in October 1942, but in Spring 1943 after the turn of the war, which was brought about by a defeat of the German Army and its allies in the battle of Stalingrad, and after Soviet partisan units moved to Volhynia from Eastern Ukraine (*Orhanizatsia*). Even though Galicia was the main stronghold of the OUN-B, the formation of the UPA in Galicia begun only in the end of 1943, and it was fully organized only by spring and summer of 1944 shortly before this region came under Soviet control.

Although two small armed units existed in Volhynia since the end of 1942, they were organized by OUN commanders who served in the local police, and their first attack against German forces dates to February of 1943 (Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk druhyi* 38-39, 76-76). Many of the anti-German attacks attributed to the UPA coincided with the defection of the Ukrainian auxiliary police in Volhynia in March-April 1943. Many locations in Volhynia, in particular, an area around a town of Kolky, came under control of the UPA as a result of the defection of 4-5 thousand out of about 12 thousand Ukrainian policemen in the region. German police forces in Volhynia numbered at that time only about 1.5 thousand (See Motyka 193, 197). Kolky was seized by UPA units without any fight after most of the Kolky police, which participated in mass killings of the local Jewish population, deserted to the UPA, and a small contingent of German gendarmes abandoned the town (Sprava 12). These UPA units were led by Mykola Kovtoniuk and Stepan Koval, who were the former police commanders in Lutsk and became organizers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the Volyn Region after most of Lutsk policemen on their orders deserted to the UPA in March of 1943 (Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk druhyi* 42-43). Archival police records implicate police units under their command in participation in the Nazi genocidal policy of annihilation of Jews and Slavs among the local population and POWs. (Sprava 1, Sprava 7).

The UPA carried a certain number of military actions against German police and military forces, their allies, and Polish and other collaborators. However, reliable estimates of German casualties as a result of UPA activity are lacking. Many sources imply that thousands of Germans were killed by the UPA (See, for example, Kentii, *Ukrainska povstanska armiiia* 133). Nevertheless, casualty numbers cited for individual battles and skirmishes against German forces are often significantly inflated because the corresponding casualties of the UPA are given as being several dozen times lower. Similarly, reports concerning a killing of General Viktor Lutze by an UPA unit in Volhynia in 1943 are likely to be falsified since German sources list a car accident in Germany as a cause of his death (See Motyka 202-203).

The size of anti-German activity of the UPA and the Bandera faction of the OUN was relatively minor compared to their anti-Soviet activity. For example, at most, 6% of OUN-B and UPA leaders in Ukraine during World War II died as result of German actions. In comparison, 53% of the OUN and UPA leaders in Ukraine perished as result of actions of Soviet security and military forces and their Polish, Czechoslovak, and East German allies. In addition, 19% were arrested by the Soviet and allied governments, and they were executed, died in detention, or received long sentences. Some 12% of the OUN and UPA leaders escaped to the West, where none of them was prosecuted and some of them, such as Mykola Lebed, were used by Western intelligence services, in particular, the CIA, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union (See Breitman, Goda, Naftali, and Wolfe). (Calculated from Sodol, *Ukrainska povstancha armiiia, 1943-49. Dovidnyk*, with use of other biographical sources). The leaders of the OUN-B and the

UPA in Ukraine had several times smaller chances to perish due to German actions and policies than adult Ukrainians. (See Katchanovski, “Politics of Soviet and Nazi Genocides;” Vallin, Mesle, Adamets, and Pyrozhkov).

An analysis of 348 biographies of leaders and members of the Security Service (SB) of the OUN-B in the Volyn Region produces similar results. The SB OUN-B also served as the security service of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Only 0.3% of the SB leaders and members in the Volyn Region were killed by German forces, while 0.3% were killed by Polish forces. In comparison, 44% died or were arrested fighting with the Soviet forces, and 2% were executed by the Security Service of the OUN-B. (Calculated from Antoniuk).

Many previous studies explicitly or implicitly attribute mass murder of Poles, Jewish pogroms, and involvement in the Nazi genocide of Jews to Ukrainians or the local Ukrainian population. Ukrainians are regarded as perpetrators of the mass murder or supporters of the OUN, the UPA, and the Ukrainian auxiliary police. (See, for example, Siemaszko and Siemaszko; Spector; Piotrowski). For instance, the Public Opinion Research Center poll found in 2008 that just 5% of Poles attribute “crimes” committed in Volhynia in 1943 to the UPA and Ukrainian nationalists, while 14% blame Ukrainians, and 19% erroneously single out Russians, the Soviet Union, Stalin, and NKVD as the perpetrators.¹³

Public Attitudes towards the OUN and the UPA

Academic studies of public attitudes towards the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army are lacking. Most previous surveys that included questions concerning the OUN and the UPA were conducted by polling companies in Ukraine, and only selected results were published. Previous surveys often dealt with specific aspects, such as recognition of UPA veterans as war veterans or attitudes towards Stepan Bandera.

The 2002 Institute of Politics Survey showed that a minority, 13% of the respondents in Ukraine had very positive and 20% mostly positive view of the UPA. Conversely, 27% had very negative and 16% mostly negative attitude. A quarter (25%) did not give a definite answer. Similarly, 29% of the respondents in the 2002 Institute of Politics Survey, 20% in the 2004 Razumkov Center Poll, and 24% in the 2006 Institute of Politics Survey expressed positive attitude towards Stepan Bandera, while, respectively, 48, 35, and 44% had negative view of the OUN leader.¹⁴

Results of a 2008 audience voting for a popular TV show, entitled “Greatest Ukrainians” were cited by Viktor Yushchenko and other nationalist politicians as evidence of rapidly growing popularity of the OUN-B and its leader after “the Orange Revolution.”¹⁵ The TV voting put Stepan Bandera in the first place a few days before the end of the show, and he was finally voted into third place as the “greatest Ukrainian” of all time, with 16% of the votes. However, these results are non-scientific and non-representative of the adult population of Ukraine because the voters were self-selected and they had the ability to vote an unlimited number of times for the same candidate. In contrast, a KIIS national poll in December 2007 showed that only 1% of the respondents regarded Stepan Bandera as the “greatest Ukrainian.”¹⁶

The 2009 KIIS Survey, commissioned by the author for this study, shows that just 5% percent of the respondents expressed very positive and 8% expressed mostly positive attitudes towards the UPA. Conversely, 29% of Ukrainians had very negative and 16% mostly negative views of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that was organized by the OUN-B. Quarter of the respondents (24%) held a neutral opinion of the UPA. Attitudes towards the Bandera faction of the OUN are similar. (Table 1).

The 2009 KIIS Survey indicates that attitudes towards the UPA and the OUN did not become more positive after the “Orange Revolution” in spite of Yushchenko’s policy of the political rehabilitation and heroization of these organizations and their leaders. This conclusion is derived from estimates based on distribution of “neutral” responses towards the UPA in the 2009 poll and various polls concerning attitudes towards Stepan Bandera. The direct comparison with the 2002 Institute of Politics Survey is not possible because the 2009 KIIS Survey included a “neutral” response category, while respondents of the 2002 survey had only a choice between positive and negative attitudes towards the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

The 2009 KIIS Survey shows that 35% of the residents of Ukraine believed that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the mass murder of Ukrainians, Poles, or Jews in the 1940s, 3% only Ukrainians, 2% only Jews, and 1% of only Poles. Fourteen percent denied any involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA in the mass murder. Close to half (45%) said that they did not know or were not sure.

[Table 1 about here]

Previous poll data indicate that the UPA, the OUN-B and its leaders are much more popular in historically Western Ukraine than in the other regions of Ukraine. For example, Western Ukrainian regions expressed much more positive views, compared to other regions, towards Stepan Bandera and granting former UPA members the status of war veteran (See Katchanovski, “Regional Political Cleavages,” Peisakhin). In the 2010 Research & Branding Group Survey, 48% percent of the respondents in the West, compared to 20% in the Center, and 8% in the South and the East, agreed that Stepan Bandera deserved the “Hero of Ukraine” title. Conversely, 27% in the West, 59% in the Center, and 82% in the South and the East believed that he did not deserve this title. The question of whether Viktor Yanukovich should annul the award produced similar regional differences.¹⁷ Similarly, the 2007 KIIS poll showed that Stepan Bandera was named as the “greatest Ukrainian” by 3% of Western Ukrainians and by 0% of the respondents in the Center, South, and the East.¹⁸

Many previous studies imply that Western Ukrainians are pro-OUN and UPA because these organizations in the 1940s were mainly based in Western Ukrainian regions and because these regions became strongholds of nationalist parties and politicians in post-Soviet Ukraine, in particular, after the “Orange Revolution.” Viktor Yushchenko, his bloc “Our Ukraine,” and other nationalist parties, such as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which considers itself a successor of the OUN-B, have much higher popular support in Western Ukraine than in other regions. For example, *Svoboda*, a radical nationalist party, whose leader publicly endorsed all activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, won the snap elections to the provincial parliament in 2009 and formed a ruling coalition with pro-presidential parties in the Ternopil Region in Galicia. Regional councils in Western Ukraine demanded a withdrawal of the European Union resolution section which condemned the award of the “Hero of Ukraine” title to Bandera.

Conversely, Viktor Yanukovich, his Party of Regions, the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, and many other pro-Russian and pro-Communist parties, which opposed the OUN and UPA policies of President Yushchenko, enjoy much greater support in the geographic East and the South of Ukraine. Many regional councils in these regions demanded an annulment of the “Hero of Ukraine” awards to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych. The Donetsk Administrative Court, which is located in the East, ruled in April 2010 that the posthumous awards to Bandera and Shukhevych were illegal because they were not, as required in the law, citizens of Ukraine. However, while President Yanukovich and other top officials of his

coalition government promised to end the national policy of heroization of the OUN and the UPA, they also indicated that they would give autonomy to regions to pursue their own policies concerning these historical organizations.

The 2009 KIIS Survey shows a majority of the respondents in Galicia have positive perceptions of the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (63 and 60%, respectively). A minority of Ukrainians not only in the East, the South, and the Center, but also in historic Western Ukrainian regions of Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia have positive attitudes, towards the OUN-B and the UPA. One third (36%) of the respondents in Transcarpathia, 25% in Volhynia, 16% in Bukovyna, 13% in the Center, and 2% both in the East and the South express favorable opinion of the OUN-B. Similarly, 36% of the respondents in Transcarpathia 16% in Volhynia, 15% in Bukovyna, 11% in the Center, 4% in the South, and 2% in the East have positive view of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.¹⁹ (Table 2 and 3).

[Table 2, 3, and 4 about here]

However, the percentages of the respondents with negative attitudes towards the OUN-B in all Western Ukrainian historic regions are similar, and they are much lower than in regions of historic Eastern Ukraine. The minority of the respondents in Galicia and Volhynia (both 12%) Bukovyna (10%), and Transcarpathia (7%), compared to much higher proportion in the Center (39%), the East (59%) and the South (79%), express negative attitude towards the OUN-B. A similar regional pattern characterizes attitudes towards UPA. (See Table 2 and 3).

The question concerning involvement of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in mass murder also produces significant regional differences. Much smaller proportions of the respondents in the regions of Western Ukraine (11-19%) than in the regions of historically Eastern Ukraine (32-57%) say that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the mass murder of Ukrainians, Poles, or Jews in the 1940s. The percentages of the respondents, who regard these organizations as linked to the mass murder of all three groups, is much larger in all regions than the percentages of respondents, who believe that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the murder of one of these groups. Half (51%) of the respondents in Galicia, compared to 31% in Transcarpathia, 27% in Volhynia, 5% in Bukovyna, 12% in the Center, and 6% in both the East and the South, deny that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in mass murder in the 1940s. Very large proportions of people in both Western and Eastern Ukraine did not give a definite answer. The percentages of such responses range from 30% in Galicia and 37% in the South to 55% in Volhynia, Transcarpathia, and the Center, and 84% in Bukovyna (Table 4).

There are significant differences in attitudes towards the OUN and the UPA by ethnicity and language. For example, 20% of ethnic Ukrainians and 4% of ethnic Russians express very positive or mostly positive views of the UPA. Conversely, half (48%) of ethnic Ukrainians and 81% of ethnic Russians have very negative or mostly negative attitudes towards the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. Similarly, 21% of ethnic Ukrainians, compared to 2% of ethnic Russians hold favorable opinions of the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, while, respectively, 48% and 84% express negative attitudes.

The differences by age and education level are much less significant than the regional differences. For instance, the younger generation (18-29 years old) in Ukraine does not display radically different attitudes concerning the OUN and the UPA compared to older generations. The proportions of the positive responses towards the UPA and the OUN-B among the youngest generation do not differ significantly compared to the older respondents. Much higher

proportions of the 18-29 years old hold negative views of the OUN-B and the UPA (33 and 31%, respectively) than embrace positive opinions concerning these nationalist organizations (17 and 16%, respectively). However, the youngest group of the respondents is significantly more likely than many of the older age groups to express neutral attitudes or say that they don't know or are not sure about their views of the OUN-B and the UPA.

Multiple regression analysis shows that the residents of not only the East, the South, and the Center, but also Western Ukrainian regions of Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia hold much more negative opinions of both the OUN-B and the UPA than the residents of Galicia when other factors, such as ethnicity, language, age, gender, education level, place of residence, the size of settlement, and the perception of the involvement in mass murder, are held constant. The probability that these effects of the regional variables are due to a chance is less or equal to 1 in 1000 for all regions in the regression model of attitudes towards the OUN-B. Similarly, the probability that the regional factors effects can be attributed to a chance is less or equal to 1 in 1000 for Volhynia, Transcarpathia, the Center, the South, and the East and to 1 in 100 for Bukovyna in the regression model of attitudes towards the UPA. However, the size of the unstandardized regression coefficients shows that the differences between Galicia and other Western Ukrainian regions are much smaller compared to differences between Galicia and the Center, the South, and the East. Galicia is the omitted variable in the regressions, because it serves a yardstick for a comparison with other regions. (See Table 5).

[Table 5 about here]

The regression analysis shows that the regional factors and perceptions of the involvement of the Bandera wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in mass murder are strongest predictors of views concerning these nationalist organizations when all other factors are held constant. The residences in the East, the Center, and the South and the perception of the OUN and UPA involvement in mass murder have the strongest effects on the public attitudes towards the OUN-B and the UPA. These variables have biggest standardized regression coefficients (Betas). The mass murder perception variable is statistically significant at the .001 level. (Table 5).

The multivariate analysis also demonstrates that ethnicity, language, age, and rural residence are statistically significant determinants of attitudes towards both the OUN-B and the UPA when the effect of other factors is held constant. Ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainian-speakers, younger respondents, and rural residents hold relatively more favorable views of these nationalist organizations compared, respectively, to ethnic minorities, Russian-speakers, older respondents, and urban residents. However, the magnitudes of the effects of these variables are much smaller compared to the effects of the regional variables and the perception of the mass murder variable. For example, the unstandardized regression coefficient shows that the average residents of Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia score about .7-.8 units lower, on the OUN and UPA attitudes scales, which range from 1 (very negative) to 5 (very positive), than the average resident of Galicia. The average respondents in the Center, the South, and the East, score, respectively, between 1.1 and 1.4 and 1.0-1.2 units lower, on the OUN-B and UPA attitudes scales than the average respondent in Galicia. In comparison, the favorable opinion of the average ethnic Ukrainian towards the OUN-B and the UPA is, respectively, .3 and .2 units higher compared to the opinion of ethnic minorities. Similarly, the 20-year increase in age of the respondent decreases the favorable view of the OUN-B and the UPA only by about .1 on the 5 unit scale. The level of education and the size of settlement do not have statistically significant effects on the OUN and UPA attitudes. (See Table 5).

Conclusion

The issue of political rehabilitation and heroization of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army became one of the central political issues in Ukraine after the “Orange Revolution.” It provoked major political controversies and debates among historians in Ukraine and other countries. President Yushchenko, nationalist parties, and many Ukrainian historians attempted to recast the OUN and the UPA as a popular national liberation movement, which fought both against Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and to present OUN and UPA leaders as national heroes. They either denied or justified by its pro-independence struggle, the involvement of the OUN and the UPA in terrorism, the Nazi genocide, and the ethnic cleansing.

However, historical studies and archival documents show that the OUN relied on terrorism and collaborated with Nazi Germany in the beginning of World War II. The OUN-B (Stepan Bandera faction) by means of its control over the UPA masterminded a campaign of ethnic cleansing of Poles in Volhynia during the war and mounted an anti-Soviet terror campaign in Western Ukraine after the war. These nationalist organizations, based mostly in Western Ukraine, primarily, in Galicia, were also involved in mass murder of Jews during World War II.

The 2009 Kyiv International Institute of Sociology survey shows that only minorities of the residents of Ukraine have favorable views of the OUN-B and the UPA and deny involvement of these organizations in mass murders of Ukrainians, Poles, and Jews in the 1940s. The negative attitude towards the OUN and the UPA cannot be explained by the effects of Soviet propaganda since the youngest generation of the respondents who were socialized in independent Ukraine does not express radically different views compared to the older generations who were socialized in the Soviet Union. Similarly, while the Soviet propaganda emphasized mass killings of Ukrainians by the UPA and downplayed the mass murder of Poles in Volhynia and Jews during World War II, the 2009 KIIS Survey demonstrates that most respondents, excluding those who did not have definite opinions, believe that the OUN-B and the UPA were involved in the mass murders of not only Ukrainians but also Poles and Jews.

The 2009 KIIS Survey and several other surveys show existence of significant regional differences concerning public attitudes towards the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in contemporary Ukraine. The comparative and statistical analysis of the 2009 KIIS Survey demonstrates that regional factors are one of the strongest determinants of attitudes towards the OUN-B and the UPA. Galicia is the only region in which majorities of the respondents have positive perceptions of the OUN-B and the UPA. Respondents in the Center, the South, and the East, and such Western regions as Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia, have much less positive attitudes, compared to the respondents in Galicia, towards both these organizations. However, residents of Volhynia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia are also significantly less negative in their views of the OUN-B and the UPA compared to residents of historically Eastern Ukraine.

Ethnicity, language, and age also affect the popular views of the OUN-B and the UPA. However, the effect of these factors are weaker compared to the effect of the regional factors. This study implies that the regional differences concerning the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army are not likely to disappear during the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich, even if he would reverse the national policy concerning these nationalist and terrorist organizations.

Table 1. Attitudes towards the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in Ukraine, the 2009 KIIS Survey, %

	OUN-B	UPA
Very positive	6	5
Mostly positive	8	8
Neutral	23	24
Mostly negative	15	16
Very negative	30	29
Don't Know/Not Sure	18	18
Total, %	100	100
N	1023	1024

Table 2. Attitudes towards the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Stepan Bandera faction) in regions of Ukraine, the 2009 KIIS Survey, %

	Western Ukraine				Eastern Ukraine		
	Galicia ¹	Volhynia ²	Bukovyna ³	Transcarpathia ⁴	Center ⁵	South ⁶	East ⁷
Very positive	37	5	5	4	3	1	1
Mostly positive	26	20	11	32	10	1	1
Neutral	20	57	21	50	24	13	19
Mostly negative	6	7	5	0	17	31	13
Very negative	6	5	5	7	21	48	46
Don't Know/Not Sure	6	7	53	7	25	7	20
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	109	44	19	28	330	151	341

Notes: ¹ Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Ternopil Regions. ² Chernivtsi Region. ³ Transcarpathia Region. ⁴ Rivne and Volyn Regions. ⁵ Cherkassy, Chernihiv, Khmelnytsky, Kyiv City, Kyiv Region, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy, Vinnytsia, and Zhytomyr Regions. ⁶ Crimea, Kherson, Mykolaiv, and Odesa Regions. ⁷ Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia Regions.

Table 3. Attitudes towards the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in regions of Ukraine, the 2009 KIIS Survey, %

	Western Ukraine				Eastern Ukraine		
	Galicia	Volhynia	Bukovyna	Transcarpathia	Center	South	East
Very positive	35	5	5	0	2	1	1
Mostly positive	25	11	10	36	9	3	1
Neutral	24	68	19	50	25	13	21
Mostly negative	5	5	5	0	17	30	15
Very negative	5	5	5	7	20	48	44
Don't Know/Not Sure	8	7	57	7	26	5	18
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	110	44	21	28	334	150	340

Table 4. Perceptions of the involvement of the OUN-B and the UPA in mass murder in regions of Ukraine, the 2009 KIIS Survey, %

	Western Ukraine				Eastern Ukraine		
	Galicia	Volhynia	Bukovyna	Transcarpathia	Center	South	East
Ukrainians, Poles and Jews	15	14	11	10	27	53	46
Only Ukrainians	2	0	0	0	3	2	4
Only Poles	2	2	0	0	1	0	1
Only Jews	0	2	0	3	1	2	4
Not involved at all	51	27	5	31	12	6	6
Don't Know/Not Sure	30	55	84	55	55	37	40
Total, %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	105	44	19	29	324	145	334

Table 5. Determinants of attitudes towards the OUN-B and the UPA, OLS regressions

	OUN-B			UPA		
	B	Standard Error	Beta	B	Standard Error	Beta
Volhynia	-.684***	.175	-.109	-.653***	.171	-.106
Bukovyna	-.836***	.240	-.091	-.672**	.234	-.075
Transcarpathia	-.671***	.206	-.087	-.653***	.201	-.087
Center	-1.129***	.114	-.420	-1.033***	.111	-.392
South	-1.383***	.162	-.390	-1.156***	.158	-.333
East	-1.264***	.149	-.472	-1.033***	.146	-.394
Perception of mass murder involvement	-.733***	.048	-.404	-.749***	.047	-.421
Ethnic Ukrainian	.313***	.082	.099	.203*	.081	.066
Ukrainian-speaker	.329***	.103	.129	.489***	.100	.196
Age	-.005**	.002	-.075	-.006***	.002	-.086
Education	.025	.017	.037	.021	.017	.033
Rural	.249*	.120	.093	.276*	.117	.105
Male	-.035	.062	-.014	-.034	.060	-.014
Size of settlement	.025	.028	.039	.036	.028	.059
Constant	3.882***	.273		3.786***	.266	
R squared	.537			.539		
N	813			817		

*** Statistically significant at the .001 level, ** statistically significant at .01 level, statistically significant at the .05 level.

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Notes

¹ In addition, many regional and local governments in Western Ukraine sponsored monuments to OUN and UPA leaders and renamed streets after them. Newspapers, such as *Den*, *Dzerkalo Tyzhnia*, *Ukrainska Pravda*, *Ukraina Moloda*, TV channels, such as the First National Channel and the 5th Channel, and many regional mass media in Western Ukraine actively promoted historical revisionism and the political rehabilitation and heroization of the OUN and the UPA.

² See “Yanukovich obeshchal razreshit do Dnia Pobedy situatsiyu s geroizatsiei Bandery.” RIA Novosti. Web. Apr. 12 2010. <<http://www.rian.ru/politics/20100305/212378540.html>>.

³ “Obrashenie k Presidentu Ukrainy Viktoru Yushchenko.” President of Russia. Web. Sep. 20 2009. <<http://archive.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2009/08/220743.shtml>>.

⁴ “Uchwala Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 15 lipca 2009 r. w sprawie tragicznego losu Polakow na Kresach Wschodnich.” Biuro Prasowe Kancelarii Sejmu. Web. Mar. 1 2010. <<http://orka.sejm.gov.pl>>.

⁵ See “European Parliament resolution of 25 February 2010 on the situation in Ukraine,” Feb. 25 2010. European Parliament. Web. March 4 2010. <<http://www.europarl.europa.eu>>.

⁶ “Wiesenthal Center Blasts Ukrainian Honor for Nazi Collaborator.” Wiesenthal Center. Web. Feb. 27, 2010. <<http://www.wiesenthal.com>>.

⁷ See Ukrainian National Memory Institute. Web. Apr. 7 2010. <<http://www.memory.gov.ua>>.

⁸ See Yushchenko’s interview in Tatiana Serwetnyk. “UPA walczyła o naszą niepodległość,” *Rzeczpospolita*. Web. Mar. 6 2010. <<http://www.rp.pl/artykul/402762.html>>. The original text of the interview referred to 1.5 million of UPA members.

⁹ The inclusion of 12 non-OUN and non-UPA members does change the overall results.

¹⁰ Higham (126) and Newton (420) based on other archival documents offer very brief and differing discussions of the veracity of the plot.

¹¹ The OUN-B also helped to organize anti-Jewish pogroms in a number of Western Ukrainian towns and cities in summer of 1941.

¹² See “Viktor Yuschchenko vidbuv z robochoiu poizdkoui na Volyn.” President of Ukraine. Web. Oct. 14, 2009. <<http://president.gov.ua>>.

¹³ “Wolyn 1943. Komunikat z badan.” Public Opinion Research Center. Web. Apr. 18, 2009. <<http://www.cbos.pl>>.

¹⁴ “Heroi, tsinnosti ta mify suchasnoi Ukrainy: ohliad sotsiologichnykh doslidzhen.” Institute of Politics. Web. 16 Feb. 2009. <<http://www.polityka.in.ua>>; “Symvoly ta tsinnosti suchasnoi Ukrainy.” Institute of Politics, Web. 16 Feb. 2009. <<http://www.polityka.in.ua>>.

¹⁵ See “Rishennia sudu shchodo Bandery zasvidchylo kurs vlady na posylennia protustoiannia v suspilstvi- Yuschchenko.” Our Ukraine. Web. Apr. 11 2010. <<http://razom.org.ua/news/5735>>.

¹⁶ “Do proektu “Velyki ukraintsi.”” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Web. May 11, 2008. <<http://www.kiis.com.ua>>.

¹⁷ “Ukraina. Vostok-Zapad: Edinstvo v Mnogoobrazii.” Research & Branding Group. Web. Apr. 8 2010. <<http://www.rb.com.ua>>.

¹⁸ “Do proektu “Velyki ukraintsi.”” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. Web. May 11, 2008. <<http://www.kiis.com.ua>>.

¹⁹ The data concerning Transcarpathia and Bukovyna have much larger margin of error because of the small number of the respondents in each of these regions.